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Abstract

This article reviews research on electoral fraud—clandestine and illegal efforts to shape election results. Only a handful of works classify reports on electoral fraud to identify its nature, magnitude, and causes. This review therefore looks at the larger number of historical works (as well as some ethnographies and surveys) that discuss ballot rigging. Its conclusions are threefold. First, fraud takes on a panoply of forms; it ranges from procedural violations of electoral law (that may or may not intend to distort results) to the outright use of violence against voters. Second, even when ballot rigging is an integral part of electoral competition, it is infrequently decisive. Fraud, nevertheless, undermines political stability because, in close races, it can be crucial. Third, political competition shapes the rhythm and nature of electoral fraud. Efforts to steal elections increase with inequality, but competitiveness—which institutions help to shape—determines the ballot-rigging strategies parties adopt.
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... Lebih lanjut Lehoucq berpendapat bahwa, kondisi tersebut dapat mengakibatkan menurunnya tingkat partisipasi masyarakat, menguatnya sentimen publik yang pada gilirannya akan mengganggu stabilitas demokrasi dan mendiskreditkan pemilu. Puncaknya adalah akan mengikis dan melemahkan sistem demokrasi secara keseluruhan (Lehoucq, 2003). Beberapa ahli juga menguraikan dampak negatif yang diakibatkan oleh pemilu yang tidak beritegritas. ...
... Fabrice Lehoucq juga menguraikan penyebab terjadinya tindakan pelanggaran dalam pemilu, yakni: (1) berkorelasi dengan upaya melindungi kepentingan ekonomi; (2) tingginya tingkat persaingan politik; (3) lemahnya tradisi warga terlibat dalam aktivitas kolektif, lemahnya civil societyorganizations (social differentiation); (4) angka kemiskinan yang tinggi; (5) rendahnya literacy warga sehingga lemah kapabilitasnya untuk melindungi kebebasan sipil, termasuk sistem pemiluproportional representation yang memberikan peluang partai politik untuk melakukan pelanggaran (Lehoucq, 2003). Masih menurut Lehoucq, argumentasi mendasar dibalik beragam pelanggaran dalam pemilu adalah "…seems to be that incumbents, parties, and machines will try to get away with anything to retain or obtain control of the state." ...
... Masih menurut Lehoucq, argumentasi mendasar dibalik beragam pelanggaran dalam pemilu adalah "…seems to be that incumbents, parties, and machines will try to get away with anything to retain or obtain control of the state." Sebuah perspektif tentang karakter politik dari pemilu yang sesungguhnya (Lehoucq, 2003). ...
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... Electoral violence can eliminate competition, deter opposition turnout, and compel voters to cast their ballots for certain candidates, among other things. Electoral fraud, which has the same goal as this type of electoral violence, includes any illegal action intentionally undertaken to change the outcome of an election, such as ballot stuffing, multi-voting, and vote buying (Lehoucq 2003). Perhaps, not surprisingly, given their common purpose, much research on why this particular type of electoral violence occurs explains violence in terms of the same conditions as fraud (e.g., competitiveness, stakes, and permissiveness). ...
... Existing explanations for this type of electoral violence tend to explain violence in terms of the same factors used to explain fraud -competitiveness, electoral stakes, and permissiveness (Lehoucq 2003). Both competitive elections (Sterck 2020) and elections in which incumbents are weak (Collier and Vicente 2008;Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014) are argued to encourage violence by increasing the need to cheat to win. ...
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Political actors often resort to electoral violence to gain an edge over their competitors even though violence is harder to hide than fraud and more likely to delegitimize elections as a result. Existing explanations tend to analyze violence in terms of the same factors as fraud, or to treat violence as a means of last resorts given its overtness. We introduce a novel explanation that does neither, arguing that political actors often use violence for the very reason that it is hard to hide. Its overtness, we argue, allows political actors to observe whether the agents they enlist to manipulate elections for them do so and reduces these agents' likelihood of shirking in turn. We develop our argument through a formal model showing that electoral monitors, by exacerbating problems of moral hazard (shirking), can induce actors to increasingly turn to violence and use process tracing to examine the implications of this model through the example of Egypt. Word Count: 11000 (estimated) * The authors would like to thank Omar el-Gammal for research assistance; Ossama Kamel, Tamir Moustafa, and Nadine Sika for their academic and/or policy expertise on Egypt;
... All forms of organised acts or threats-physical, psychological and structural, aimed at intimidating, harming and blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying otherwise influencing an electoral process. It is thus conceived as the deadliest form of electoral fraud and defined as 'clandestine efforts to shape election results' (Hoglund, 2009;Lehoucq, 2003, cited in Omotola, 2011. From the array of definitions given by scholars above, one can discern certain salient elements: electoral violence is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted phenomenon, encompassing series of stages, covering pre-election, election day and post-election period (International Peace Institute, 2010;Sisk, 2008); directed towards specific targets (USAID, 2010;Hoglund, 2009); designed to achieve specific goals (Bekoe, 2012;Fischer, 2002); involving different actors (UNDP, 2009;Laakso, 2007); and equally of various forms in nature-physical, psychological and structural (Omotola, 2011;UNDP, 2009). ...
... The 1954 and 1959 elections were conducted by colonial masters while 1979, 1993 and 1999 were conducted by military regimes. The ones organised by civilian governments were the 1964the , 1983the , 2003the (Akinwalere, 2013 as well as that of 2015 and 2019 elections. However, since the inception of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999 to date, six general elections have been held namely 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections. ...
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... Electoral violence can eliminate competition, deter opposition turnout, and compel voters to cast their ballots for certain candidates, among other things. Electoral fraud, which has the same goal as this type of electoral violence, includes any illegal action intentionally undertaken to change the outcome of an election, such as ballot stuffing, multi-voting, and vote buying (Lehoucq 2003). Perhaps, not surprisingly, given their common purpose, much research on why this particular type of electoral violence occurs explains violence in terms of the same conditions as fraud (e.g., competitiveness, stakes, and permissiveness). ...
... Existing explanations for this type of electoral violence tend to explain violence in terms of the same factors used to explain fraud -competitiveness, electoral stakes, and permissiveness (Lehoucq 2003). Both competitive elections (Sterck 2020) and elections in which incumbents are weak (Collier and Vicente 2008;Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014) are argued to encourage violence by increasing the need to cheat to win. ...
Article
Full-text available
Political actors often resort to electoral violence to gain an edge over their competitors even though violence is harder to hide than fraud and more likely to delegitimize elections as a result. Existing explanations tend to analyze violence in terms of the same factors as fraud, or to treat violence as a means of last resorts given its overtness. We introduce a novel explanation that does neither, arguing that political actors often use violence for the very reason that it is hard to hide. Its overtness, we argue, allows political actors to observe whether the agents they enlist to manipulate elections for them do so and reduces these agents’ likelihood of shirking in turn. We develop our argument through a formal model showing that electoral monitors, by exacerbating problems of moral hazard (shirking), can induce actors to increasingly turn to violence and use process tracing to examine the implications of this model through the example of Egypt.
... In spite of electoral management bodies being enabled by the internet and digital technologies to engage with citizens through the electoral cycle, absence of transparency of election technology introduced new dimensions of election malpractice posing risks of manipulation of servers to determine the final Presidential tally results; therefore subverting Kenya's democratic elections. Efforts to rig elections increase with inequality between the opposition and the incumbent, the rich and poor; but competitiveness -which institutions help to shape -determines the ballot-rigging strategies parties adopt (Lehoucq 2003 ...
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Digital technologies for elections were introduced in Kenya with a vision that they would bring election reforms through increasing administrative efficiency, reducing long-term costs, and by enhancing transparency in the electoral process would enhance citizenry inclusivity. Despite the voting exercise taking place without a hitch, the 2017 General Election results were dismissed by various stakeholders who called on the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to ‘open the servers’, with witnesses, to use the results inside the servers to verify the ballot papers in the ballot boxes. Promises by IEBC that counting, transmission and verification of results would promote citizens’ rights during the electoral process were not met hence the Swahili phrase, ‘Fungua server’ (Open the servers) was coined. The server became the Holy Grail, the gadget of hope for free and fair elections. Chants of ‘Fungua server’ unveiled the dreaded side of Kenya’s democratisation; of flawed elections and violence that followed. ‘Fungua server’ was a call to free and fair elections. The paradox of technology this article seeks to interrogate was how technology has subverted democratic elections in Kenya; arguing that there is need to demystify the server and focus on electoral transparency as a yardstick of democracy. Joyce Omwoha, PhD, Lecturer, Journalism & Media Studies, Technical University of Kenya. Email: joyceomwoha@gmail.com
... Election fraud -clandestine, and illegal efforts to shape electoral outcomes [1] -distorts representation, undermines public accountability, and erodes government legitimacy [2]. Therefore, determining whether electoral results reflect voters' preferences is pivotal in representative democracies [3]. ...
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Objective This paper studies the integrity of the vote counting system in Brazil. Method We analyze data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for the 2018 Brazilian presidential election to assess suspicious vote count patterns deploying five techniques commonly used to detect fraud: a) the second-digit Benford's law test; b) the last digit mean; c) frequency analysis of last digits 0 and 5; d) correlation between the percentage of votes and the turnout rate; and e) resampled Kernel density of the proportion of votes. Results The results show that the second-digit distributions for the three most voted candidates – Jair Messias Bolsonaro (PSL), Fernando Haddad (PT), and Ciro Gomes (PDT) – conform to Benford's law. We also find that last digit means and last digit frequency are within normal parameters, indicating no irregularities. Similarly, the fingerprint plot indicates a correlation coefficient that is consistent with the theoretical expectation of a fair election. The resampled Kernel density suggests that the vote count was performed without statistically significant distortions. These results are robust at different levels of data aggregation (polling station and municipality). Conclusion The joint application of digit-focused tests, regression-based techniques, and patterns in the distribution of vote-shares provide a more reliable method for detecting anomalous cases. Relying on this unified framework, we find no evidence of electoral fraud in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election. These results advance our current understanding of statistical forensics tools and may be easily replicated to examine electoral integrity in other countries.
... Previous research had been primarily focused on examining the actors who conduct election fraud, the tactics they use, and the policies that can be adopted to prevent election irregularities (Alvarez et al., 2009;Lehoucq, 2003;Levin, 2020). Recent developments, however, have examined perceptions of procedural fairness (Norris, 2013). ...
Conference Paper
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The legitimacy of the electoral process is often put into question by political candidates and elites who seek to account for their loss. As a result, a significant portion of voters are presented with unfounded allegations of widespread election fraud even though such fraud seldom occurs in consolidated democracies. Previous research has determined that misleading claims regarding the integrity of elections carry important implications for citizens' perceptions of electoral fairness. However, the literature has yet to systematically explore the impact of electoral fraud allegations on voter participation. Using original survey data from the United Kingdom, this research measures the impact of unfounded allegations of election fraud on the decision to vote or not. The results of the survey experiment do not support the hypotheses according to which exposure to unfounded allegations of fraud influences confidence in elections and voter participation. However, results from supplementary analyses highlight a significant relationship between perceptions of fraud and subsequent desire to cast a ballot. Explanations for these findings are discussed.
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