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A call for evidence-based security tools

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Ewout H Meijer at Maastricht University
Ewout H Meijer
Bruno Verschuere at University of Amsterdam
Bruno Verschuere
Aldert Vrij at University of Portsmouth
Aldert Vrij
Harald Merckelbach at Maastricht University
Harald Merckelbach
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Abstract

Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of deception. Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scientific underpinning. We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of security policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from technological to behavioural sciences. Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security tools. Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those methods that have been proven effective. After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth.
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Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology
http://www.forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/ – 2009. 1: 1-4
A Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools
Ewout H. Meijer, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, The Netherlands. Email: eh.meijer@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Bruno
Verschuere, Department of Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium. Aldert
Vrij, Psychology Department, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK. Harald
Merckelbach, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, The Netherlands. Fren Smulders, Faculty of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands. Sharon Leal,
Psychology Department, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK. Gershon Ben-
Shakhar, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
Pär Anders Granhag, Department of Psychology, Göteborg University, Göteborg,
Sweden. Matthias Gamer, Department of Systems Neuroscience, University
Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany. Nurit Gronau,
Department of Education and Psychology, The Open University of Israel, Israel.
Gerhard Vossel, Department of Psychology, Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz, Mainz, Germany. Geert Crombez, Department of Psychology, Ghent
University, Ghent, Belgium. Sean Spence, School of Medicine and Biomedical
Sciences, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.
Abstract: Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have
changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the
detection of deception. Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scien-
tific underpinning.
We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of secu-
rity policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from
technological to behavioural sciences. Secondly, the burden of proof should lie
with the manufacturers of the security tools. Governments should not rely on secu-
rity tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those
methods that have been proven effective. After all, the use of tools that do not
work will only get us further from the truth.
Keywords: security policy, lie detection, deception detection, behavioral science,
terrorism
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
A Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools
2
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 1. 2009.
Recently, the peer-reviewed journal The International Journal of Speech, Lan-
guage and the Law yanked an article that unfavourably reviewed voice-stress-
analysis software. This software analyzes a speaker’s voice, and its manufacturer
claims that it can be used for truth verification (See the Nemesysco website at
www.lva650.com and http://security.nemesysco.com/gk1.html). Examples of its
use entail airport screening (Moscow Domodedovo Airport, 2006) and the
evaluation of benefits claims by social services (“Lie detector to target claimants,”
2007). The decision by the editorial board was prompted after the company
manufacturing the software threatened to sue for defamation (Cho, 2009). Such
intimidation and censoring of academic discussion is alarming. The real problem,
however, lies in governments actually using these technologies.
Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed
drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of
deception. Potential solutions are primarily sought in new methods and
technologies. The US Department of Homeland Security funded the development
of the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST; Barrie, A., 2008), a set of
sensors that can remotely measure multiple physiological signals. The US
Transport and Security Administration introduced The Cogito, another device
measuring physiological signals, as well as the Screening Passengers by
Observation Technique (SPOT), where specially trained teams watch travellers for
behavioural signs thought to be indicative of deception (Karp & Meckler, 2006).
Meanwhile, the US Defence Academy for Credibility Assessment issued the
Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), yet another
device measuring physiological signals, to its soldiers in Afghanistan (Dedman,
2008). Non-US examples of widely used deception detection techniques include
the use of the voice stress analysis software by British authorities (Cho, 2009), and
Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) as one of the worlds most widely used
methods to detect deception from written statements (Vrij, 2008). Besides well-
chosen acronyms, these methods have one thing in common: They all lack
scientific underpinning. None of them is supported by research published in peer-
reviewed journals.
In absence of systematic research, users will base their evaluation on data
generated by field use. Because people tend to follow heuristics rather than the
rules of probability theory, perceived effectiveness can substantially differ from true
effectiveness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For example, one well-known prob-
lem associated with field studies is that of selective feedback. Investigative author-
ities are unlikely to receive feedback from liars who are erroneously considered
truthful. They will occasionally receive feedback when correctly detecting
deception, for example through confessions (Patrick & Iacono, 1991; Vrij, 2008).
The perceived effectiveness that follows from this can be further reinforced through
confirmation bias: Evidence confirming one’s preconception is weighted more
heavily than evidence contradicting it (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). As a result,
even techniques that perform at chance level may be perceived as highly effective
(Iacono, 1991). This unwarranted confidence can have profound effects on
A Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools
3
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 1. 2009.
citizens’ safety and civil liberty: Criminals may escape detection while innocents
may be falsely accused. The Innocence Project (Unvalidated or improper science,
no date) demonstrates that unvalidated or improper forensic science can indeed
lead to wrongful convictions (see also Saks & Koehler, 2005).
We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of secu-
rity policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from
technological to behavioural sciences. It is the behavioural sciences that can pro-
vide insight into the psychological factors underlying deception. For example,
many of the methods described above rely on the assumption that deception is
accompanied by some kind of heightened emotional arousal. The robustness of
this link between deception and emotional arousal, however, has been criticized in
the scientific literature for decades. Consequently, it is not the reliable registration
of stress that is cumbersome; it is the relationship between stress and deception
that is a problematic starting point (Lykken, 1998; National Research Council,
2003; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). This key problem is addressed by the
behavioural sciences, and not by technology.
Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security
tools. Currently, the evidence for many of these tools relies almost exclusively
upon testimonials or non-disclosed research performed by the manufacturers
themselves. This stands in sharp contrast to scientific practice and the recom-
mendation of the US National Research Council. This council— distinguished
scholars—concluded that research directed at methods for detection and deterring
major security threats should be “conducted and reviewed openly in the manner of
other scientific research. Classified and restricted research should be limited only
to matters of identifiable national security” (National Research Council, 2003, p.
230; see also Bhattacharjee, 2006).
The government’s task of protecting her citizens comes with responsibilities. One
of these responsibilities entails that decisions about matters with significant poten-
tial social or personal implications are based on informed quantitative reasoning
(Smith, 1996). Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed
scientific scrutiny, and only employ those methods that have been proven effective.
After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth.
Acknowledgements: The authors form The European Consortium of
Psychological Research On Deception Detection (EPRODD; www.eprodd.net).
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A Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools
4
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 1. 2009.
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... However, in the last decades, this assumption has been challenged due to its lack of scientific basis (Meijer et al. 2009; Nortje and Tredoux 2019). Arousal, a key element in the theory, can be triggered by various factors beyond deception, including surprise, cognitive load, and the fear of being perceived as deceptive (Ben-Shakhar 2008). ...
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Scientific openness: Should academics self-censor their rA Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools 4 OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 1
  • 993-994
  • Y Bhattacharjee
Bhattacharjee, Y. (2006). Scientific openness: Should academics self-censor their rA Call for Evidence-Based Security Tools 4 OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 1. 2009. findings on terrorism? Science, 312, 993-994
Can we determine the accuracy of polygraph tests?
  • Jan 1991
  • 201-207
  • W G Iacono
Iacono, W. G. (1991). Can we determine the accuracy of polygraph tests? In J. R. Jennings, P. K. Ackles & M. G. H. Coles (Eds.), Advances in Psychophysiology (Vol. 4, pp. 201-207). London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
A tremor in the blood The polygraph and lie detection. Committee to review the scientific evidence on the polygraph. Division of behavioral and social sciences and education
  • Jan 1998
  • D T Lykken
Lykken, D. T. (1998). A tremor in the blood. New York: Plenum Press. National Research Council. (2003). The polygraph and lie detection. Committee to review the scientific evidence on the polygraph. Division of behavioral and social sciences and education. Washington, DC: The National Academic Press. Retrieved 7/7/09 from http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=212.