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757
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 757–795, June 2006, doi: 10.1785/0120050191
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake
by Kelin Wang, Qi-Fu Chen, Shihong Sun, and Andong Wang
Abstract The publicized four-stage (long-term, middle-term, short-term, and im-
minent) prediction of the M7.3 1975 Haicheng, China, earthquake once generated
worldwide fascination. Yet the prediction process has remained mysterious because
of lack of reports on real-time documentation and details of how warnings were
issued. In the present work, study of declassified Chinese documents and interviews
of key witnesses have allowed us to reconstruct this important history. Our findings
indicate that there were two official middle-term predictions but no official short-
term prediction. On the day of the earthquake, a county government issued a specific
evacuation order, and actual actions taken by provincial scientists and government
officials also effectively constituted an imminent prediction. These efforts saved
thousands of lives, but the local construction style and time of the earthquake also
contributed to minimizing fatalities. Evacuation was extremely uneven across the
disaster region, and critical decisions were often made at very local levels. The most
important precursor was a foreshock sequence, but other anomalies such as geodetic
deformation, changes in groundwater level, color, and chemistry, and peculiar animal
behavior also played a role.
Introduction
The magnitude (M
S
) 7.3 1975 Haicheng, China, earth-
quake is considered the only major earthquake ever to have
been predicted. The earthquake occurred at 19:36 local time
on 4 February 1975, with the epicenter located near the
boundary between the counties of Yingkou and Haicheng,
southern Liaoning Province (Figs. 1, 2). The earthquake was
caused by the left-lateral slip of a northwest-trending blind
fault, unknown prior to the event (Gu et al., 1976), and the
seismic moment was reported to be 3 ⳯10
19
N m (Cipar,
1979). The earthquake caused extensive ground failure and
liquefaction (e.g., Adams, 1976).
The most comprehensive description in English of the
prediction of this earthquake was provided in a report by the
Haicheng Earthquake Study Delegation sent to China from
the United States a year after the earthquake (Raleigh et al.,
1977). Earlier foreign visitors to China provided simpler de-
scriptions (Adams, 1976; Whitham et al., 1976). There are
also many accounts published in Chinese (e.g., Zhu and Wu,
1982; Quan, 1988). Despite decades of disappointment in
the pursuit of earthquake prediction, Haicheng continues to
provide hope.
All publicized stories about the Haicheng earthquake
have the following elements. The prediction consisted of
four stages: long-term (a few years), middle-term (one to
two years), short-term (a few months), and imminent (hours
to a couple of days). Professional and massive amateur pre-
cursor monitoring helped refine the spatial and temporal pre-
dictions gradually. A foreshock sequence triggered the final
imminent prediction. Some evacuation orders were given
just before the earthquake occurred.
To commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Hai-
cheng earthquake, Liaoning Province Earthquake Adminis-
tration (2005) published a photo collection and showed pic-
tures of some historical documents. Until then, no reports
had ever provided documents published prior to the earth-
quake that predicted that it would happen. Until now, few
details of pre-earthquake evacuation have been given. This
lack of written records and details has led to suspicion about
the reported success (Geller, 1997; Jackson, 2004). Suspi-
cion is deepened by the fact that the earthquake occurred
during the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976), when obtaining accurate information from
China was particularly difficult.
Based on what is presently known, it is justifiable to
relate the lack of written records and details to the political
situation in China for two reasons. First, under pressure to
project the notion of success and to emphasize the leadership
of the then provincial committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, the prediction process as it was described to foreign
visitors shortly after the earthquake was dramatized. Stories
told to later visitors, such as the U.S. delegation in 1976
(Raleigh et al., 1977), were less dramatized than those told
to earlier visitors such as R. D. Adams from New Zealand
(Adams, 1976) and the Canadian Seismology Delegation
(Whitham et al., 1976) in 1975. This may have been brought
about as a result of questioning by visitors. These foreign
758 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Figure 1. Map of northeast China showing
the location and focal mechanisms of large
earthquakes in the period 1966–1976. The fo-
cal mechanisms are shown as lower hemi-
sphere projections and are labeled with mag-
nitude and year. The names of the earthquakes
are Xingtai (1966), Hejian (1967), Bohai
(1969), Haicheng (1975), and Tangshan
(1976). Over the past 300 years, M⬎7 earth-
quakes occurred in the land area within this
map only during this 10-year period.
Figure 2. Map of Liaoning Province in 1975 and active faults according to Deng
et al. (2003). Thick lines show boundaries of the province. A northwestern part of the
province shown in this map, including the town of Aohanqi, now belongs to the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region. Open circles are locations of cities or towns. The gov-
ernment of Haicheng County was located in the town of Haicheng, and thegovernment
of Yingkou County was in the town of Dashiqiao. The epicenter of the 1975 Haicheng
earthquake is shown with a star.
visitors found it difficult to get their hosts to talk about any
lack of success (F. Wu and R. D. Adams, personal commu-
nication, 2004, 2005). Second, to demonstrate the correctness
of Chairman Mao’s ideology, the role of amateurs in moni-
toring precursory anomalies was exaggerated. At the time, the
amateur contribution as described in various reports im-
pressed many people, but the exaggeration has also prompted
doubts on the truthfulness and seriousness of these reports.
One practical reason for the former unavailability of
real-time documentation is that all critical information was
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 759
in restricted or classified documents, including meeting min-
utes and telephone notes, and so forth. Timely scientific pub-
lication was discouraged during the Cultural Revolution, and
release of prediction information to foreigners was a crimi-
nal offense (“leaking secrets”). However, in accordancewith
China’s secrecy laws and regulations, all these documents
have now been declassified. The current political environ-
ment is also quite different from that of the time of the Cul-
tural Revolution and its aftermath. Therefore, it is time to
take a fresh look into the prediction of the Haicheng earth-
quake.
To determine what can be learned from the prediction
process, the history must be properly documented. In order
to do this, we have conducted a document search and inter-
viewed many witnesses including those who created many
of the key documents in 1974–1975. Some of the more rele-
vant documents are listed in Appendix A and will be ex-
plained in the next section. Most of the documents are stored
in the Archives of Liaoning Province Earthquake Adminis-
tration in Shenyang, but some are in the Archives of China
Earthquake Administration (CEA) or its Institute of Earth-
quake Sciences in Beijing. The official English translation
for CEA in 1975 was the State Seismological Bureau (SSB)
and during 1998–2003 was China Seismological Bureau.
We focus on documenting the sequence of significant
events, and we are particularly interested in how scientists
and government officials made critical decisions and rec-
ommendations without understanding much about earth-
quake processes. Important events of the prediction process
are summarized in chronological order in Appendix B. We
pay attention to what influenced people’s thinking in the
specific scientific, political, and cultural environments of the
time, as well as whether what they thought was correct.
Monitoring work and precursory anomalies have been de-
scribed in great detail in Zhu and Wu (1982). Some details
about the techniques used for the monitoring were given in
Raleigh et al. (1977).
Like most others dealing with earthquake “prediction,”
we find a need to discuss the meaning of the word first.
Chinese use the same word yubao for both “forecast” and
“prediction,” while in English the latter, when used for earth-
quakes, is meant to be a more precise account of a future
event. How to translate the two words into Chinese without
losing the distinction is still unresolved. Weather forecast
and earthquake prediction are both referred to as yubao.In
Chinese documents, there is sometimes a distinction be-
tween yubao (predictive statement) and yuce (predictive
analysis), but this distinction relates more to government
functionality than with preciseness. Indiscriminately trans-
lating yubao as “prediction” has caused misunderstanding in
the past. In this article, we follow this unfortunate tradition
and continue to translate yubao as “prediction,” but we em-
phasize that on most occasions the word is better understood
to be forecast.
We provide three tables for the convenience of the read-
ers. Table 1 lists English transliterations of place names used
in Raleigh et al. (1977) (and in most other English publi-
cations shortly after the Haicheng earthquake) and the offi-
cial transliterations used in this article. Table 2 lists govern-
ment levels in China in 1975. Table 3 lists acronyms and
names of people used in this article. To help readers under-
stand the peculiar political environment and government
structure in China at the time of the Haicheng earthquake,
we give a bare-minimum introduction to the Cultural Rev-
olution of 1966–1976 in Appendix C.
Documents
We group the documents listed in Appendix A into
seven categories: (1) summary materials of national or in-
terprovincial conferences and related government docu-
ments that authorized their restricted circulation, (2) various
reports from earthquake workers to the Liaoning provincial
government, (3) announcements from the provincial govern-
ment, (4) local government documents, (5) speeches or oral
directives given by upper echelon government officials,
Table 1
Official (Pin-yin) and Previous (Wade-Giles, Used in Raleigh
et al., 1977) Transliteration of Place Names
Official* Previous
Beijing Peking
Bohai Sea Pohai Sea
Dalian Dairen
Dandong Tantung
Hebei Province Hopeh Province
Hejian Hochien
Jilin Province Kirin Province
Liaodong Bay Liaotung Bay
Liaodong Peninsula Liaotung Peninsula
Shandong Province Shantung Province
Shipengyu Observatory Shihpengyu Observatory
Tianjin Tientsin
Xingtai Hsingtai
Yingkou Yingkow
*Transliterations that have not changed since 1977 (such as Haicheng
and Tangshan) are not listed.
Table 2
Government Levels in China in 1975
Government Level Notes
State council Also supervises various ministries
Province or
autonomous region
There are a few province-level cities
(e.g., Beijing)
City or prefecture* Directly administers municipalities,
enterprises, etc.
County Directly administers small urban centers
People’s commune From this level down: rural areas only
Production brigade Usually all families of a village
Production team
*City as an administrative unit includes an urban district and several
surrounding counties. City as a geographic unit usually concerns the urban
district only.
760 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
(6) log books or notebooks of earthquake offices or obser-
vatories, and (7) miscellaneous documents. Documentsfrom
bodies of the central government such as the State Council
and SSB were properly printed in publication quality. Doc-
uments at the provincial level were typically mimeographed,
but occasionally handwritten, presumably when a typist was
unavailable. Most of the documents that we saw from lower-
level governments were handwritten. In Appendix A (first
column), the documents are indexed with two numbers, the
category number followed by a sequence number. For ex-
ample, “3 – 2” means the second document in the third cate-
gory. In subsequent reference to these documents, we will
only quote these index numbers.
Documents of National or Interprovincial Conferences
National and interprovincial earthquake-prediction con-
ferences were organized by the SSB, typically once or twice
a year, to provide forecasts for earthquake potential within
the following one to two years for the whole or a large part
of China. At these conferences, participants would present
their scientific arguments for earthquake potential in various
regions and debate them. By contrast with academic gath-
erings, these conferences are required to form consensus and
produce specific opinions as to the likelihood of earthquakes
occurring. The acclaimed “middle-term” prediction for the
Haicheng earthquake was made at such a conference (1 – 1,
1 – 2).
Reports from Liaoning Earthquake Workers
Earthquake research was one of the few fields in which
some scientists could work in a more or less orderly fashion
during the Cultural Revolution. Prediction of the Haicheng
earthquake was coordinated mainly by a team of scientists
in Liaoning Province. From 1971 until the establishment of
the Liaoning Seismological Bureau in May 1975, this team
functioned under two names: the SSB Shenyang Brigade and
the Earthquake Office of the Revolutionary Committee of
Liaoning (RCL) (see Appendix C about “revolutionary com-
mittees”). In practice, the team reported mostly to the RCL
but kept the SSB headquarters informed.
The scientific leader of this team was Mr. Zhu Feng-
ming (Zhu, but Chu in some translations, is the family name;
the family name goes first for all Chinese names in this ar-
ticle except for the authors’ list and reference list). Zhu
graduated from the Department of Geophysical Exploration,
Northeast College of Geology, in 1955. He was an expert in
petroleum exploration until he began working on earthquake
prediction in 1968. His official title in the Earthquake Office
was “Technically Responsible Person.” During the Cultural
Revolution, it was important to distinguish technically re-
sponsible persons from the higher-ranking politically re-
sponsible persons.
The provincial Earthquake Office had frequent “group
discussion” sessions to synthesize information collected by
themselves or reported to them by earthquake observatories
Table 3
Acronyms and Names of People (Family Name Is First)
Acronym or Name Explanation
Page Number of
First Appearance
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences p. 762
Cao Xianqing Head of Yingkou County’s Earthquake Office p. 772
Cha Zhiyuan Leader of the Earthquake Leadership Group of CAS p. 762
CEA China Earthquake Administration (the name was SSB until 1998 and China Seismological Bureau
1998–2003)
p. 757
Gang of Four Chairman Mao’s wife and three allies; a powerful political faction during the Cultural Revolution p. 780
Gu Haoding Seismologist of Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office p. 768
Hua Guofeng Vice Premier of China; successor of Chairman Mao p. 774
Hua Wen High-rank official of RCL; PLA officer p. 762
Li Boqiu High-rank official of RCL; one of the Secretaries of the Liaoning provincial Party Committee;
PLA General
p. 762
Li Fuxiang Clerical officer of Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office p. 769
Li Zhiyong SSB Scientist p. 770
Liu Yimin Junior RCL official directly responsible for Earth Office; civilian “revolutionary cadre”
(Appendix C)
p. 766
Ma Binggui Survey engineer; leader of Jianxian leveling group p. 764
Mao Yuanxin High-rank RCL official; one of the Secretaries of the Liaoning provincial Party Committee;
PLA officer; Chairman Mao’s nephew
p. 766
PLA People’s Liberation Army p. 762
Qiao Changman Worker at amateur Haicheng Earthquake Observatory p. 774
RCL Revolutionary Committee of Liaoning Province p. 760
SSB State Seismological Bureau (Name of CEA until 1998) p. 757
Wu Ge Scientist of Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office p. 778
Yin Canzhen High-rank official of RCL; PLA officer p. 762
Zhou Rongxin Leading cadre of CAS p. 780
Zhu Fengming Scientific leader of Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office p. 760
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 761
and city- or county-level earthquake offices. Piles of notes
from these discussions remain on file (e.g., 6 – 2). For mat-
ters deemed important, they presented written reports with
opinions or discussion conclusions to the RCL officials who
were directly responsible for earthquake work. We are told
by several regular participants of these discussions that these
reports were usually a compromise of different opinions.
Only occasionally did the same report contain conflicting
opinions. Liaoning’s provincial Earthquake Office also had
a more formal reporting series of documents called Earth-
quake Information, to be circulated in a wider government
circle, usually the SSB,RCL, and the Standing Committee
of the provincial Party Committee. The proclaimed “immi-
nent prediction” was given in the fourteenth issue of this
series (2 – 15), composed by Zhu Fengming.
Provincial Government Documents
After receiving information from the provincial Earth-
quake Office, the RCL might disseminate the earthquake in-
formation and give related directives to cities, prefectures,
and a few important industrial and military units in the prov-
ince. The RCL usually paraphrased Earthquake Office re-
ports but sometimes made critical wording changes that re-
flected its own political judgment. The RCL had two ways
of doing the formal dissemination: sending a mimeographed
circular and, in exceptionally urgent cases, organizing a
“telephone distribution.”
Intercity telephone calls in China in the 1970s were
made via switchboards. The “telephone distribution” made
a clever use of the switchboard. The RCL caller in Shenyang
would speak to a number of phone lines simultaneously con-
nected to receivers in different cities. The receivers were able
to listen and talk (mostly listen) to the caller but not to one
another. There were usually two people on each receiving
end, a listener and a recorder. The listener would verbally
repeat the caller’s sentences to allow the recorder to write
them down by hand. The general warning from the RCL on
4 February that an earthquake was about to happen was is-
sued via such a telephone distribution (3 – 14).
The city and prefecture revolutionary committeeswould
then relay the message down to the next government level—
counties (Table 2)—and to various city organizations such
as industrial and street units. The county committees relayed
the message down to communes in the rural area and to
various urban organizations within their administration. The
communes further relayed the message to production bri-
gades (during 1958–1978, Chinese peasants were organized
into the People’s Communes, each having a number of pro-
duction brigades; see Table 2). These communications were
made via telephone calls or meetings and therefore took
time. Party branches of production brigades or various city
units would finally convey the message to individuals, either
directly using loud speakers or through junior cadres. In the
1970s, except for an elite class, no individuals in the Chinese
mainland had home telephones.
Each level of government might add its own additional,
more specific directives when relaying the message to lower
levels. From the county level down, the original message
from the province would be increasingly simplified and
might be distorted. Depending on their own sense of ur-
gency, some local committees might delay relaying the mes-
sage or even never pass it on. It appeared that organizations
in larger cities could be much less zealous in relaying these
messages than those in rural areas. For example, during our
2004 interview of a former junior government worker in the
city of Dalian (see Fig. 2 for location), he did not recall
hearing much about earthquakes during the months before
the Haicheng earthquake, despite the fact that Dalian is the
nearest large city to the center of attention in the so-called
middle-term and short-term predictions.
Some of the restricted documents prepared by various
branches of the Liaoning provincial government after the
earthquake contain statistics of casualties, house and infra-
structure damage, and other economic losses, which were
regarded as national secrets at the time.
Local Government Documents
We have included only a small number of documents
from city and county governments. These documents re-
flected how local governments responded to directives from
the province and made their own, in some cases extraordi-
nary, decisions (e.g., 4 – 9). Most of these documents are
from what were then Yingkou City and Yingkou County,
and we have selected a few from a volume of restricted doc-
uments concerning the 1975 Haicheng earthquake that was
complied in 1986 by the Earthquake Office of Yingkou
County (Cao et al., 1986). Only a very small number of
copies of this valuable collection were printed and circu-
lated. Among many other documents, it includes records of
several provincial “telephone distributions” that were tele-
phone-relayed to the county by the Yingkou City committee,
an illustration of the top-down flow of information described
in the previous section.
Some geographical clarification is needed. In China, a
county is at a lower administrative level than a city (see
Table 2). Haicheng, although called a “county-level city”
today, was in 1975 a county under the administration of
Anshan City (Fig. 2). Most of the population was in the rural
area, and only a small fraction was in the town of Haicheng.
Before 1992 when Yingkou County was renamed Dashiqiao
City (a “county-level city”), Yingkou County was one of the
several counties under the administration of Yingkou City,
with its county government located in the town of Dashiqiao
(Fig. 2). It was common practice that one of the counties
administered by a city had the same name as the city. Even
in China, people tended to confuse Yingkou County with
Yingkou City; for eample, some relief materials for Yingkou
County were shipped to Yingkou City by mistake after the
earthquake. When Yingkou is mentioned in official docu-
ments and research articles, it is seldom specified whether it
762 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
is the city or the county. As a rule of thumb, when Yingkou
is mentioned independently of Haicheng, such as in many
documents prior to February 1975, it usually means Yingkou
City, but when Yingkou and Haicheng are both mentioned,
such as in many documents and articles since February 1975,
it usually means Yingkou County.
Speeches and Oral Directives of Upper-Echelon
Government Officials
During the Cultural Revolution, as throughout most of
the Chinese history, words of important individuals were
better respected than laws. Notes of speeches and oral di-
rectives by provincial and state officials were carefully taken
and mimeographed and regarded as official documents.
These restricted documents often became study materials for
Party members and the masses. They now have become an
important source of historical information.
For example, although we are not able to verify the
presence of a summary report for the national conference of
13–21 January 1975, which was said to contain a “short-
term prediction,” the concluding speech by the then leader
of the Earthquake Leadership Group of the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences (CAS) (5 – 5) had the same authority as a
summary report. Some of these documents also exemplify
the attitude of the ruling group in Liaoning. Some important
officials in the provincial government, such as Li Boqiu, Hua
Wen, and Yin Canzhen, were high-rank officers of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) concurrently holding RCL civil
positions, typical arrangement during the Cultural Revolu-
tion (Appendix C).
Log Books or Notebooks of Earthquake Offices
or Observatories
An earthquake office was the predecessor of a “seis-
mological bureau” (the translation became “earthquake ad-
ministration” in 2003). It was a government office dealing
with all matters of earthquakes such as monitoring, research,
education, and emergency response. An earthquake obser-
vatory was a center making specific geophysical and geo-
chemical observations pertaining to earthquakes. The RCL
earthquake office was in charge of a number of professional
earthquake observatories in the province, but county-level
earthquake offices only administered amateur observatories
within their own counties. The log books or notebooks of
various earthquake offices and observatories are valuable
documents. In them, the former earthquake workers scrib-
bled down many worthwhile events, such as earthquakes,
anomaly reports from the public, and telephone communi-
cations with other Earthquake Offices and various govern-
ment officials. The log books and notebooks recorded what
the front-line earthquake workers saw and knew at a specific
time.
The completeness of these records depends on the con-
scientiousness of the people on duty and how busy they
were. In the log book of the Shipengyu Earthquake Obser-
vatory (to be discussed in detail in the Role of the Shipengyu
Earthquake Observatory section), located near the area
shaken by numerous foreshocks, there is relatively little in-
formation on 4 February 1975, other than the foreshocks.
Obviously, workers were overwhelmed with recording and
reporting foreshocks and dealing with enquiries and had lit-
tle time to take notes of other events. In contrast, the log
book of the Earthquake Office of Anshan City, farther away
from the foreshocks, contains more information for this day.
Miscellaneous Documents
Some documents serve to provide miscellaneous back-
ground information. An example is the SSB report presented
at the National Science and Technology Conference in 1972
(7 – 2). Strangely, this slogan-rich newspaper-ready report,
with no secrets even by Cultural Revolution standards, was
classified at the highest level (top secret). The scanty depic-
tion of some popular beliefs in this report provides clues for
understanding people’s reactions before the 1975 Haicheng
earthquake.
For example, the report quoted a popular saying “small
quakes booming, big quake looming.” The belief that fore-
shocks would precede a large earthquake was widespread
among the Chinese populace, which may explain why vari-
ous communes and brigades of the Haicheng earthquake re-
gion made their own evacuation decisions before the main
shock. The report also said: “Precursors began to appear one
or two years before some of the earthquakes greater than
magnitude 6; various precursory phenomena ensued and de-
veloped, up to the time of the earthquake. . . . For an event
larger than magnitude 5 (which may be damaging), obvious
anomalies often might occur within a range of 200 km.”
Empirical rules like these, some of which may have been
imported from foreign research (see The 13–21 January Na-
tional Conference section), would explain how Chinese sci-
entists came to make, rightly or wrongly, some of their time,
place, and magnitude predictions for the Haicheng earth-
quake.
A few post-Haicheng SSB Headquarters documents are
also included because they recorded how the prediction ef-
forts were recognized and publicized at the state level. In-
formation in these documents may not be accurate. They
oversimplify and prettify prediction efforts. There is no evi-
dence for fabrication of events, but some critical details may
have been altered.
Outlook in June 1974
Background
After three centuries of relative quiescence, north China
was struck by several large earthquakes over a period of
three years: the three earthquakes of M6.8, 6.7, and 7.2 in
the Xingtai area in March 1966, the M6.7 Hejian earthquake
of 1967, and the M7.4 Bohai Sea earthquake of 1969
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 763
(Fig. 1). They all indicated right-lateral motion of north-
northeast-trending strike-slip faults, and they appeared to
have migrated from southwest to northeast.
The interpretation of these earthquakes was strongly in-
fluenced by the then most popular tectonic theory in China,
the “geomechanics theory” of Li Siguang (Zhu and Le
Grand, 1999). The theory maintains that north-northeast
China is part of an integral geological system characterized
by neotectonic right-lateral motion along north-northeast-
trending structures. In modern plate tectonics terms, thiscor-
responds to internal deformation of the Eurasia plate in a
nearly east–west compressive stress regime caused by con-
tinental collision at the Himalaya and plate subduction along
the Japan–Kuril trenches. Chinese scientists believed thatthe
recent earthquakes in north China represented activation of
this large system, which would eventually lead to more
earthquakes. In 1970, the RCL Leadership Group for Earth-
quake Work, the predecessor of the Liaoning provincial
Earthquake Office, said in a secret document (2 – 1): “Epi-
centers of recent strong earthquakes in the Bohai Bay area
show a tendency of northward migration. Jinxian and Ying-
kou that are located on the Bohai Bay may fall into in this
area of strong earthquakes and suffer destruction.”
Given this background, it is by no means a surprise that
in the 1970s the Chinese government greatly strengthened
earthquake and anomaly monitoring. The champion of
China’s earthquake prediction program was the then Premier
Zhou Enlai. In 1970, China held its first national meeting on
earthquake prediction. In 1971, the SSB was created within
the CAS (Allen et al., 1975). In 1972, the SSB began to
organize the regular national earthquake-prediction confer-
ences described in the Documents of National or Inter-
provincial Conferences section. In the meantime, public edu-
cation to spread knowledge of earthquake processes,
preparedness, and prediction was enhanced. For example, a
pictorial brochure published by Tainjin City Earthquake Of-
fice Editorial Group (1973) not only explained in plain lan-
guage concepts such as magnitude, intensity, foreshocks,
and crustal deformation, but also provided recipes for mak-
ing amateur observations of telluric currents, well water, ani-
mal behavior, and so forth for the purpose of earthquake
prediction.
June Conference and State Council
Document 69, 1974
The Conference on Earthquake Situation in North China
and Bohai Sea Regions was held by the SSB 7–9 June 1974
in Beijing, with 53 participants from 20 organizations. Three
attendees including Zhu Fengming were from the SSB Shen-
yang Brigade (i.e., Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office).
The conference was charged with determining earthquake
potential in north-northeast China for the next one to two
years. The participants suggested a few areas that deserved
attention. As mentioned in the Documents of National or
Interprovincial Conferences section, conferences of this type
not only were required to form consensus but also were re-
quired to make statements of likely sites of future earth-
quakes. The CAS received the conference summary contain-
ing such statements (1 – 1) from the SSB and, feeling that
the information was critical, modified the summary into a
report to the State Council on 15 June. On 29 June, the State
Council issued State Council Document 69, 1974, to autho-
rize the distribution of the CAS report to the Revolution
Committees of affected provinces (1 – 2).
The key paragraphs of the CAS report are as follows.
(Words in square brackets are added by us for clarification.)
“Most people [at the conference] think that earthquakes of
magnitude 5–6 may occur in this or next year in Beijing-
Tianjin area, northern Bohai Sea [area], Handan-Anyang
area where Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan Provinces meet, Lin-
fen basin of Shanxi Province, and Linyi area of Shandong
Province and central Yellow Sea, and that a magnitude 5
earthquake may occur in Baotou-Wuyuan area of Inner
Mongolia.”
Six places in north-northeast China were identified as
at risk from possibly significant earthquakes within one and
a half years. The mention of “northern Bohai Sea” consti-
tutes what was later referred to as the “middle-term predic-
tion” of the 1975 Haicheng earthquake. Out of the six places,
the northern Bohai Sea area was the only one struck by a
damaging earthquake in the following two years. The origi-
nal June conference summary had been circulated within the
SSB system before the CAS report was created. In the origi-
nal summary, the above paragraph was followed by another
sentence: “Among these places, the Baodi to Hejian area
between Beijing and Tianjin and the Jinxian-Dalian area of
northern Bohai Sea are exhibiting the most conspicuous pre-
cursory anomalies.” The Jinxian-Dalian area (Fig. 2) is about
200 km south of the epicenter of the Haicheng earthquake.
The following paragraph illustrates the diversity of
opinions at the conference:
Besides, there are two other opinions. One opinion is based on
the characteristics of historical strong earthquakes and a syn-
thesis of broad regional earthquake activity that takes into con-
sideration the influence on north China by the western Pacific
seismicity band [i.e., earthquakes along subduction zones such
as Japan Trench] and its 400- to 500-km-depth deep-source
earthquakes. It suggests that energy for magnitude 7–8 earth-
quakes has been stored in north China. In addition, northern
north China has endured prolonged droughts in recent years and
seen meteorological anomalies that have rarely occurred since
the founding of the country [i.e., 1949], such as warm winter,
cold spring, and humidity imbalance. Many large earthquakes
in history were preceded by a similar situation. Therefore, it is
proposed that the danger of having earthquakes about magni-
tude 7 is present in north China. The other opinion is based
primarily on the fact that Earth’s rotation accelerated since last
year and that there were very few strong earthquakes in north
China under similar conditions in the past. In addition, strong
earthquakes in north China usually have large time separations.
Given that the 1969 Bohai Sea earthquake was only four years
764 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
ago, it is proposed that no earthquakes greater than magnitude
5.5 will occur in the next few years.
Here the reference to Earth rotation is reminiscent of
another aspect of Li Siguang’s “geomechanics theory.” Ac-
cording to this theory, the acceleration of Earth’s rotation
would decrease east–west compressive stress at midlatitude
and hence stabilize those north-northeast-trending dextral
strike-slip faults. Later research has not shown this effect to
be significant as compared to other tectonic forces.
The tone of State Council Document 69 was very cau-
tious:
Because the present level of science and technology of earth-
quake yuce and yubao is not high, the report’s suggestion that
earthquakes may occur in some places in this or next year is
merely an estimate. The earthquakes may or may not occur.
However, we should base our work on the assumption that they
will occur and be fully prepared. In the meantime, we should
also prevent such assumption from causing panic and distur-
bance to the masses, interrupting production and people’s liv-
ing. More importantly, we should be on guard against class
enemies seizing this opportunity to spread rumors to confuse
the public and carry out destructive activity.
It is clear from this document that the Chinese government
had a genuine concern with both the potential earthquakes
and the disorder that a false alarm could create.
As the first central-government document endorsing an
earthquake prediction in China, albeit cautiously, State
Council Document 69 sent out an extremely strong message.
All authors of this article spent their childhood or early youth
in the Cultural Revolution (Appendix C). On the basis of
our own experience, and after talking with numerous people
in China over the past 30 years and especially in 2004, we
believe that the psychological significance of Document 69
is immeasurable. The ultimate principle taught to people
during the Cultural Revolution was to obey Chairman Mao
and the Party, and in the minds of the majority of Chinese
people at that time, the State Council represented both. Most
of them did not know exactly what was said in the document
and depended only on local cadres’ interpretations, but the
very existence of such a document was symbolically impor-
tant. The logic was very simple: if the State Council takes
the prediction seriously, it must be a really serious matter!
Hence this document enhanced earthquake awareness
among the general public in a very special way.
Basis for the Middle-Term Prediction
The paragraph in the CAS report that summarizes what
were considered precursory anomalies in northern Bohai Sea
area is as follows:
There are four relatively significant anomalies in the northern
Bohai Sea area: Leveling measurements at Jinxian [Observa-
tory] had shown very slow changes over the past few years,
with an [average] annual rate of 0.11 mm [over a short distance
of a few hundred meters], but the cumulative change since Sep-
tember 1973 is as high as 2.5 mm; a 22-gamma [vertical com-
ponent] geomagnetic anomaly has occurred [over the past 10
months] in Dalian [relative to Beijing]; six tide gauge stations
in northern Bohai Sea detected a [relative] sea-level riseof over
10 cm in 1973, a phenomenon that has not been seen for more
than a dozen of years; small-earthquake activity also obviously
increased.
The four anomalies are listed in decreasing order of impor-
tance. We discuss them in the reverse order.
The increase in earthquake activity was only casually
mentioned as supporting evidence. According to Zhu and
Wu (1982), Liaoning Province and its immediate neighbor-
ing areas had very low seismicity in 1972 and 1973, aver-
aging 70 detected earthquakes each year. In 1974 before the
June conference, the only “obvious” increase was an earth-
quake swarm in March at Aohanqi, western Liaoning
(Fig. 2), quite far from the future epicenter of the Haicheng
earthquake. This part of Liaoning Province now belongs to
Inner Mogolia Autonomous Region.
The greater than 10-cm sea-level rise since September
1973 is actually absent in the tide gauge records, as Zhu and
Wu (1982) later showed. There must have been an error in
the tide gauge results that was soon recognized. This anom-
aly was seldom mentioned again after the conference.
In the referenced geomagnetic record (Fig. 9 of Raleigh
et al., 1977), a ⬃20-gamma increase from October 1973 to
May 1974 is obvious, but the trend stopped around the time
of the June conference and does not appear to have had much
association with the 1975 earthquake. The use of this tran-
sient anomaly for earthquake prediction seems to be fortui-
tous. Geomagnetic data from other, later-established moni-
toring sites in northern Bohai Sea area (Zhu and Wu, 1982)
did not show any appreciable correlation with the Haicheng
earthquake either.
Jianxian leveling played a vital role in both the middle-
term prediction (Raleigh et al., 1977) and the proclaimed
short-term prediction (The 13–21 January National Confer-
ence section). Two short leveling lines were established in
Jinxian in 1970 to monitor the active Jinzhou fault (Fig. 2).
The nearly east–west line across the fault was 580 m long
with eight benchmarks, and the nearly north–south fault-
parallel line was 360 m long with six benchmarks. From
1970 until today, both lines have been surveyed twice a day
(forward and reverse) without break for 36 years. The Jin-
xian (now Jinzhou) Earthquake Observatory that surveys
these lines has won numerous national awards for its hard
work. Since 1973, the observatory has also been monitoring
a water well for radon.
The surveys reported at the June 1974 conference were
carried out by a four-person team led by Mr. Ma Binggui, a
survey engineer graduated from a military college of survey
engineering in 1954. Ma was one of the three participants
of the June conference representing the SSB Shenyang Bri-
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 765
Figure 3. Monthly-average elevation changes of
the eastern end of the east–west short leveling line at
the Jinxian Observatory relative to its western end.
The line is 580 m long across the Jinzhou fault (Fig. 2)
with eight benchmarks. Basement end-point bench-
marks began to be used from 1980. Old overburden
benchmarks continued to be occupied until 1985 for
calibration purpose. Times of the Haicheng and Tang-
shan earthquakes are also shown in the figure.
gade. The Jinxian team had another engineer trained in car-
tography and two trained-on-the-job full-time junior work-
ers. Measurements were made with an Ni004 spirit level
meter, and data were neatly hand-plotted on graph paper.
The hand-plotting tradition is still being carried on today at
this observatory, although computer records are also main-
tained.
SSB specified quality-control standards for its observa-
tories. Error estimate rfor repeat measurements of height
difference between end points of a fault-crossing short lev-
eling line was based on the following formula (e.g., 1978
“Earthquake Observatory Standards”).
2
D
兺
k
2
r⳱,
4Nn
where D
k
is the difference (mis-closure) between a forward
and a reverse survey, Nis the number of round-trips, and n
is the number of benchmarks on the line. It was reported in
post-Haicheng publications (e.g., SSB Geodetic Survey Bri-
gade for Earthquake Research, 1977), and further empha-
sized by Ma when we interviewed him in 2004, that the
monthly r(i.e., for N⳱28 to 31 round trips) of the Jinxian
surveys was consistently less than 0.1 mm. Acceptable
monthly error defined by SSB standards was 0.11 mm. This
standard requires an average mis-closure of 0.6 mm for in-
dividual round-trip surveys along the east–west line at Jian-
xian (n⳱8). This seems to be a very large mis-closure for
a line of this length (Bomford, 1971), but monthly averages
of daily measurements should cancel out much of the ran-
dom errors. The accuracy of the monthly averages probably
greatly exceeds standards designed for single round-trip
measurements.
Elevation changes of the east end of the east–west line
relative to the west end during 1972–1984 as reported by Lu
et al. (1985) are shown in Figure 3. The 1972–1975 part of
the same data was reproduced and discussed by Deng et al.,
(1977), Raleigh et al. (1977), Zhu and Wu (1982), Cao and
Aki (1983), and Jackson (2004). Prior to 1980, benchmarks
at both ends of the line were 2-m-long concrete posts buried
in a sediment overburden of 30–40 m in thickness. Since
1980, new benchmarks have been used that consist of nearly
40-m-long steel pipes drilled through the overburden and
several meters into the bedrock. During 1980–1984, both old
overburden and new bedrock benchmarks were occupied for
calibration purposes. The overburden benchmarks showed a
gradual westward tilt of the line, but the bedrock benchmarks
showed little tilt (Fig. 3).
This comparison and a study of groundwater level
changes during the same period led Lu et al. (1985) to con-
clude that pumping of groundwater by a textile mill imme-
diately west of the survey line caused a gradual subsidence
of the west-end overburden benchmark. However, Lu et al.
(1985) argued that, if the groundwater effect were assumed
to be linear with time, the elevation changes before and after
the 1975 Haicheng earthquake still looked rather anomalous
and were probably caused by fault motion. The groundwater
effect prior to 1980 is difficult to assess, but it is a potential
source of uncertainties to be kept in mind.
Predictions in December 1974 and Early
January 1975
Kaiyuan Meeting of 25–27 November 1974
In response to State Council Document 69, the RCL or-
ganized its first meeting devoted to earthquake problems on
23 July 1974 to initiate a massive program of earthquake
education and to implement amateur training for anomaly
observation (3 – 1). Measures taken were described in vari-
ous provincial and local documents (2 – 4,2–5,2–6,
3–3,4–1).
During 25–27 November, the SSB organized a meeting
in Kaiyuan County of Liaoning Province, to provide a more
detailed outlook for earthquake potential in northeast China.
A terse concluding statement (1 – 3) listed six places that
had potential to have damaging earthquakes “in the near fu-
ture.” Two of them, Dalian and Yingkou Cities, are in Liaon-
ing Province. Out of the six, the Yingkou area is the only
one that has experienced significant earthquakes since this
meeting. Representatives from the SSB Shenyang Brigade
(i.e., Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office) wrote a more
technical report (2 – 7) detailing the Liaoning cases men-
tioned in the meeting conclusion. This report listed seven
areas within Liaoning that had “relatively large earthquake
danger,” of which the Jinxian and Yingkou-Xiongyue areas
and the offshore area within 200 km southwest of Dalian
were said to have “greater possibility of having damaging
earthquakes in the near future.” Thus the emphasis of the
report was on the north-northeast-trending active fault sys-
tem shown in Figure 4 and its southern, offshore extension.
The main difference from the CAS report on the June
766 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Figure 4. Map of southern Liaoning to show the
locations of the Liaoyang-Benxi earthquake swarm of
22 December 1974, discussed in the M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-
Benxi Earthquake, 22 December 1974 section (north-
ernmost four-pointed star), four anticipated earthquakes
(false alarms) predicted in late December discussed in
the False Alarms section (four-pointed stars), the ap-
proximate triangular area in Gu’s short-term prediction
for the Haicheng earthquake, discussed in The 13–21
January National Conference section (dashed lines).
Solid lines indicate Late Pleistocene or Holocene active
faults, as shown in Figure 2. Spatial distribution of the
intensity of the 1975 M
s
7.3 Haicheng earthquake as
reported in Zhu and Wu (1982) is indicated using gray
curves. The Chinese seismic intensity scale is similar
to the modified Mercalli scale and also has 12 levels
ranging from nearly unfelt to total destruction (Table 1
of Raleigh et al., 1977; Chen et al., 1988, p. 4). The
innermost line around the epicenter (solid star) indi-
cates the area of intensity ⱖIX, and the outermost line
encompasses the areas of intensity ⱖVII. Zhu and Wu
(1982) did not give the exact perimeters of intensity
ⱖVI, but according to their text description, it should
extend roughly about 200 km from the epicenter in all
directions.
conference is an increased focus on the Yingkou area. In
addition to arguments based on the distribution of active
faults, historical earthquakes, recent small-earthquake activ-
ity, and Jinxian leveling, the report referred to various other
leveling observations. Regarding Yingkou City, it said:
“Surrounded by uplift to the east, west and north, Yingkou
is the lowest point of [relative] subsidence and may consti-
tute an area of stress concentration. There is also a recent
trend of increase in small earthquakes. This is a danger zone
deserving attention.” The uplift pattern mentioned in this
paragraph is roughly consistent with the 1970–1973 geodetic
vertical deformation of this area shown by Quan (1988), but
it is quite different from changes during 1958–1970, shown
in Raleigh et al. (1977). The temporal pattern of change may
be related to the incubation of the Haicheng earthquake.
M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-Benxi Earthquake,
22 December 1974
From September to late December, a number of small
earthquakes, including several felt events, occurred in the
northern Bohai Sea region, but clustered activities occurred
only offshore. Well radon anomalies were reported from
several earthquake observatories (2 – 8). On 22 December,
a swarm of earthquakes occurred around the Shenwo res-
ervoir near the cities of Liaoyang and Benxi (Fig. 4), cul-
minating with a M
L
5.2 (M
S
4.8) event. This event attracted
great attention because it was the first significant earthquake
around the northern Bohai Sea area since State Council Doc-
ument 69. Earthquakes of this size are relatively infrequent
in Liaoning Province; up to 1974, there had been only 8
events greater than M
L
4.9 (M
S
4.5) since 1904 when the
first seismic station in China was established in Dalian
(Liaoning Province Local History Compilation Committee,
1996). The SSB headquarters sent some people to Liaoning
to study the earthquake swarm (7 – 3, 7 – 4). They eventually
concluded that the earthquakes were associated with the fill-
ing of the Shenwo reservoir that had started in November
1972. However, their conclusions were not presented to RCL
until early January. Until then, the widely felt M
L
5.2 earth-
quake caused great concern to RCL officials. They began to
request daily reports from the provincial Earthquake Office
and ordered a range of emergency response measures con-
cerning reservoirs, railways, the mining industry, and so on
(5 – 1). Under pressure to provide more specific prediction
information, the Earthquake Office staff accelerated their
work.
False Alarms
The day after the M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-Benxi earthquake,
the RCL distributed a circular (3 – 4), apparently drafted by
the Earthquake Office. In addition to asking the Liaoyang-
Benxi area to maintain a state of high alert, this circular made
the following three short-term predictions: (1) An earth-
quake of around M5 might occur in the Dandong area, al-
though “its time of occurrence is difficult to predict.” The
basis for this tentative prediction was that beginning in mid-
December, water in some two dozens wells in that area had
changed color and taste and had become enriched in Ca
2Ⳮ
and Mg
2Ⳮ
, and water levels had began to fluctuate. (2) An
M4–5 earthquake might occur 25 December to 10 January
in the Panjin-Yingkou-Xiongyue area. Evidence included
sighting of snakes coming out of hibernation dens, a radon
anomaly at the Panjin Earthquake Observatory, and in-
creased earthquake activity around Yingkou City. (3) An M
⬎5 earthquake might occur in the Dalian area, but “its time
of occurrence is difficult to predict.” The evidence included
the Jinxian leveling anomaly and increased earthquake ac-
tivity. Approximate locations of these predicted earthquakes
are shown in Figure 4. The city of Dandong is about 180 km
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 767
southeast of, and the city of Dalian is about 200 km south-
west of, Haicheng. These three predictions later proved to
be false alarms.
The evening of 28 December, the provincial Earthquake
Office held an overnight emergency meeting of all earth-
quake observatories of the province to evaluate the current
earthquake risk (2 – 9). The meeting continued to recom-
mend high alert in the Liaoyang-Benxi and Yingkou areas
and continuation of anomaly monitoring in anticipation of
large earthquakes in the Dalian area. The Dandong area (the
first prediction just described) was no longer considered a
danger zone because well water anomalies had disappeared.
On 29 December, the RCL made an announcement
(3 – 6) that paraphrased the conclusions of the overnight
meeting and made more specific predictions. It said that the
Liaoyang-Benxi area (Fig. 4) might still expect an earth-
quake around M5, based on radon anomalies in the Panjin
Observatory, tilt anomalies in the Fushun and Shenyang Ob-
servatories, and continuing earthquake activity. The an-
nouncement also reiterated the predictions for the Panjin-
Yingkou and Dalian-Jinxian areas made on 23 December
(the second and third predictions). However, it did not men-
tion the 25 December to 10 January time window for Panjin-
Yingkou.
On 31 December, the Earthquake Office presented a
group-discussion conclusion to the RCL (2 – 11) that pre-
dicted a possible earthquake of about M5 in the Liaoyang-
Benxi area (Fig. 4) by 5 January 1975, based on continuing
earthquake activity in that area, radon and tilt anomalies in
the Panjin Observatory, and telluric current observations at
the amateur Haicheng Earthquake Observatory. The RCL
immediately announced the prediction (3 – 8). This predic-
tion, a more specific version of the first prediction announced
on 29 December, also turned out to be a false alarm. Among
all official documents of the provincial Earthquake Office
listed in Appendix A, this is the only one that made a formal
reference to amateur telluric observations.
Probably because the predicted epicenter was in the area
of the 22 December earthquake swarm and therefore the pre-
diction appeared more credible, the provincial government
took this prediction much more seriously than other predic-
tions made in the previous week. Mao Yuanxin (one of the
Secretaries of the provincial Party Committee; Chairman
Mao’s nephew) showed a strong interest by ordering an
earthquake drill to be organized in preparation for this event
(5 – 2). Mao Yuanxin’s relation with Chairman Mao re-
inforced the weight of his words. Other RCL officials quickly
followed suit and gave other specific instructions to the
Earthquake Office, such as drafting an emergency response
plan assuming an M⬎6 earthquake (2 – 12).
On 4 and 5 January 1975, the provincial Party Com-
mittee organized a two-day earthquake preparation meeting
involving relevant people from cities, prefectures, industry,
and so on. The meeting focused on the M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-
Benxi earthquake of 22 December. Apparently, at least at
the beginning of the meeting, the RCL officials did not know
about the presumed association of that earthquake with fill-
ing of the Shenwo reservoir, and they continued to accept
the 31 December prediction and made arrangements for re-
sponse and relief work. General Li Boqui stated in the open-
ing speech (5–3): “It is now clear that the epicenter will be
in this area [i.e., Liaoyang-Benxi].”
Speeches made by RCL officials vividly reflected the
mentality of the governing group and portrayed the political
environment that the provincial Earthquake Office was
working in. General Li Boqiu said (5 – 3): “This time, we
will demonstrate ‘preparedness averts peril.’ It’s like fight-
ing a war. Be prepared for a big war, early war, nuclear war,
and sudden attack. . . . Defeating natural hazards and de-
feating class enemies are both struggles. They require mak-
ing the best use of the situation to achieve victory.” Yin
Canzhen put it more bluntly (5 – 4): “In my view [of earth-
quake prediction], a false alarm is better than a miss.” All
former workers of the Liaoning provincial Earthquake Of-
fice whom we interviewed in 2004 were more than im-
pressed with the “courage and resoluteness of those military
guys.”
Several days later, on 10 January, based on the winding
down of earthquake activity and other anomalies, the pro-
vincial Earthquake Office’s group discussion (2 – 13) drew
the following conclusion about the Liaoyang-Benxi area:
“Although swarms of small earthquakes may still occur in
that area in the near future, the possibility of having M⬎4
events is small.” The chaos generated by the 22 December
earthquake swarm thus came to an end. Attention then re-
turned to the Liaodong Peninsula and the Jinxian leveling
anomaly. The Earthquake Office’s report went on to predict
that an M⬎5 earthquake might occur in Liaodong Penin-
sula, but “the specific time is difficult to predict.” It also
noted that some members of the Earthquake Office “think
that the M⬎5 damaging earthquake will occur very soon.”
The RCL circular on 12 January sent a similar message but
withheld the statement that “the possibility of having M⬎
4 events is small” for the Liaoyang-Benxi area and did not
mention the minority view of the M⬎5 earthquake being
“very soon.”
Time predictions for the false alarms issued in late De-
cember appear to have been made up rather randomly. Our
only explanation is that they were the result of the pressure
from the RCL to provide specific time predictions. We have
heard about several accounts of senior RCL officials scolding
Liu Yimin, an RCL official directly responsible for the Earth-
quake Office.
These false alarms were not without scientific merit.
Their spatial pattern (Fig. 4) is a representation of the dis-
tribution of various anomalies known to the earthquake
workers. The pattern was not affected by the locations of
earthquake offices and observatories, which were rather uni-
formly distributed across the province. All counties had
earthquake offices, and there were professional observatories
in other parts of the province such as Kaiyuan, Shenyang,
and Chaoyang (see Fig. 2 for locations). There is an obvious
768 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
spatial correlation of the anomalies with the epicenter, and
to some degree even with the intensity distribution pattern,
of the future Haicheng earthquake (Fig. 4). Earthquake
workers in Liaoning did not, and we still do not, know how
to interpret these anomalies more quantitatively, but their
occurrence in such a broad region distributed asymmetrically
around the future epicenter may contain information about
the active fault system and earthquake processes in that re-
gion that requires study.
Some false alarms did have negative consequences. On
one occasion, Yin Canzhen mentioned that 600 people left
a petroleum production field in Panjin for fear of earthquakes
(and went home for an extended New Year vacation); he
blamed the Earthquake Office for not timely reporting the
incident to RCL (5 – 2).
The 13–21 January National Conference
Mr. Gu Haoding, a seismologist of Liaoning’s provin-
cial Earthquake Office, did not attend the group discussion
of 10 January, because he had been asked by Zhu Fengming
to prepare a presentation on behalf of the SSB Shenyang
Brigade for the upcoming National Conference on Whole-
China Earthquake Outlook scheduled to be held in Beijing
on 13–21 January. Gu graduated from the Department of
Geophysics at Peking (Beijing) University in 1966. As a
student, he had participated in a field investigation following
the M7.2 1966 Xingtai earthquake (Fig. 1). Gu had already
presented the “middle-term” prediction on behalf of SSB
Shenyang Brigade at the June 1974 conference. The follow-
ing is a translation of the essential part of what Gu wrote
and presented at the January 1975 conference (2 – 14).
1. Based on Jinxian short-line leveling, at least at the Jinzhou
fault, the [rock] material is presently at the post-strain-
hardening unstable stage of plastic deformation, on the verge
of rupture. Increase in precursory anomalies also points to
this situation. Therefore, a relatively large earthquake will
not be very far and should be in the first half of this year or
even January and February.
2. Based on Jinxian’s leveling and radon anomalies, Dalian’s
magnetic anomaly, and the pattern of earthquake activity,
there is a greater possibility that the [large] earthquake will
occur at the southern tip of Liaodong Peninsula. However,
considering current radon anomaly in Panjin and other
anomalies in Dandong and Gaixian, the earthquake may oc-
cur within a larger region that includes entire Liaodong Pen-
insula and its offshore areas.
3. Based on the duration of the Jinxian leveling anomaly, the
magnitude of the anticipated earthquake is around 6.
These statements are the later proclaimed “short-term” pre-
diction for the Haicheng earthquake, which covered the tri-
angular region shown in Figure 4. It became part of the four-
stage prediction in all official stories of the Haicheng
prediction.
However, the national conference did not fully endorse
this prediction. In his concluding speech at the conference,
Cha Zhiyuan, who headed the Earthquake Leadership Group
of the CAS, summarized the conference conclusions as fol-
lows (5 – 5). “An earthquake of about M7 may occur in
Jianchuan, Xiaguan, Lijiang, and Yongsheng of the North-
South Seismic Zone in this or next year; for North China,
M5–6 earthquakes may occur in the area between Beijing-
Tianjian and Tangshan, and in Jinxian-Yingkou area and
Dandong in this year; an M6.0–6.5 earthquake may occur
in Songpan of Sichuan Province to Wudu of Gansu Prov-
ince.”
This conclusion changed Gu’s estimate of M6 within
six or even two months to M5–6 within one year. According
to Chinese definitions, this is just another middle-term pre-
diction, similar to that made in June 1974 (see the June Con-
ference and State Council Document 69, 1974 section). The
conference-accepted term is not as short as Gu’s, perhaps
because the conference was charged to provide one- to two-
year predictions only. However, it is remarkable that, within
20 months after the conference, an M⬎7 earthquake oc-
curred in every one of the four regions mentioned in this
conference conclusion, including the 1975 Haicheng earth-
quake. The other three all occurred in 1976: the M7.4 Long-
ling earthquake (200 km southwest of Xiaguan) on 29 May,
the M7.8 Tangshan earthquake on 28 July, and the M7.2
Songpan earthquake on 16 August.
The basis for Gu’s “short-term” prediction is similar to
that for the June 1974 middle-term prediction, but his de-
scription of the anomalies is more detailed. Other parts of
Gu’s opinions (1 – 4) that are not translated here summarized
leveling surveys after the June meeting, groundwater radon
anomalies in several observatories, and a tilt anomaly in the
Shenyang Observatory. All these observations were later
discussed in some detail by Raleigh et al. (1977). There is
also brief mentioning of groundwater fluctuations and sight-
ing of snakes and frogs coming out of hibernation dens. As
in the June prediction, the focus of attention was the Jinzhou
fault (Fig. 2; see the June Conference and State Council
Document 69, 1974 section), although a larger region in-
cluding Haicheng-Yingkou was also identified because of
the spatial distribution of various reported anomalies.
In his summary of leveling results, Gu mentioned “two
interesting incidents.” On one occasion, results of repeat lev-
eling of a 10-km line crossing the Jinzhou fault showed an
elevation change of 2.7 mm within 10 days. On the other
occasion, the surveyors of the Jinxian short-leveling lines
had difficulty leveling their spirit level because the air bub-
ble kept drifting in one direction, suggesting rapid ground
tilt over minutes to hours. These signals were much too large
to be counted as noise, but the surveyors had no means to
further explore them. Similar aseismic deformation tran-
sients are presently under intense scientific investigation us-
ing modern techniques such as GPS (e.g., Dragert et al.,
2001).
Gu’s time estimate for his impending earthquake is a
slightly more specific, and hence more in line with the con-
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 769
Figure 5. (a) Daily numbers of macroscopic
anomaly reports from 1 December 1974 through 4
February 1975, reported in Deng et al. (1981) based
on interviews of eyewitnesses right after the Haicheng
earthquake. Numbers for the last four days of the plot-
ted period are in the hundreds and greatly off the
scale. (b) Macroscopic anomaly reports recorded in
Shipengyu Earthquake Observatory’s log book (not
used in Deng et al. 1981).
ference, expression of “anytime soon.” He applied the lab-
oratory-observed rock failure process, which is highly non-
linear and cannot be used to predict the exact time of failure.
When he was challenged for his seemingly very short time
estimate during the conference, he emphasized the urgency
of the situation by replying that the earthquake could occur
“even before the end of this conference.”
When we asked him about his magnitude estimate dur-
ing an interview in 2004, he said that it had been based on
an empirical relation between the duration of preseismic de-
formation anomaly and earthquake magnitude reported by
Japanese scientists. According to Ishibashi (1982), two for-
mulae of this type were proposed by Japanese scientists prior
to 1975. Gu probably used the formula by Tsubokawa
(1969): log
10
T⳱0.79Mⳮ1.88, where Tis the duration
of the deformation anomaly in days, and Mis the magnitude.
Given that the Jinxian leveling anomaly had lasted for about
500 days by January 1975, this formula would predict a mag-
nitude 5.8. The other Japanese formula, log
10
T⳱0.52M
ⳮ0.24, by Fujii (1974), would predict a magnitude 5.7.
Given a few more months, both formulae would predict a
magnitude approaching 6.
Just before the Earthquake
Provincial Prediction and Warning
After the December earthquake swarm in the Liaoyang-
Benxi area, earthquake activity in and around Liaoning
Province nearly came to a hiatus (Zhu and Wu, 1982). In
January, the RCL officials’ sense of urgency subsided, as
reflected by the paucity of official earthquake documents in
that period. This might have to do with the recognition that
the December Liaoyang-Benxi earthquakes had been trig-
gered by reservoir filling. However, in interesting contrast,
reports of groundwater and animal behavior anomalies in-
creased after the end of December. Daily numbers of the
reported “macroscopic anomalies” stayed high throughout
January and peaked around 23 January, 1975, as shown in
Figure 5. These anomalies will be further discussed in the
Relation of the Anomalies with the Earthquake section.
The best illustration of what provincial government of-
ficials and earthquake workers in Shenyang knew in the last
few days before the Haicheng earthquake is in the log book
of the provincial Earthquake Office (6 – 4). We have trans-
lated the notes in this book from 31 January through 3 Feb-
ruary, the day before the earthquake (Appendix D).
A report on 31 January by Zhu Fengming gave a three-
point summary, upon request from a junior RCL officer (Ap-
pendix D). The first point reiterates the Earthquake Office’s
conclusion of January 10 that no significant earthquakes
were expected in the area of the 22 December 22 earthquake
swarm (the False Alarms section). The second point men-
tions reoccurrence of anomalies in the Dandong area without
claiming them to be earthquake precursors. The third point
shows that the Earthquake Office (1) fully accepted the con-
clusion of the January national conference and did not insist
on Gu’s short-term prediction (see the 13–21 January Na-
tional Conference section) and (2) took the conference pre-
diction very seriously. At the end, Zhu requested that a time
be scheduled for him to report to RCL about the recent na-
tional conference (the 13–21 January National Conference
section). Zhu explained to us in 2005 that he had verbally
informed some of the RCL officials about the national con-
ference upon his return from Beijing, but the RCL officials
never found the time to listen to a systematic report before
the 4 February Haicheng earthquake. This probably also re-
flects RCL’s decreased sense of urgency with regard to earth-
quakes.
Several very small earthquakes in the normally quiet
Yingkou-Haicheng area were detected on 1 and 2 February
by the Shipengyu Earthquake Observatory, located about
20 km southwest of the future epicenter (Fig. 6). As shown
in the provincial Earthquake Office’s log book (Appendix
D), these events did not cause any concern. Beginning from
the evening of 3 February, there was a surge of earthquake
activity in the same area. This burst of seismicity truly
alarmed the provincial Earthquake Office. They correctly
predicted (Appendix D): “If a large earthquake is to occur,
the magnitude of these small events may increase and their
occurrence may become more frequent.” By midnight, the
770 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Shipengyu observatory had recorded 33 small earthquakes
in its log book (6 – 1). All events were estimated to be 20
to 21 km southeast of the observatory (based on V
s
–V
p
ar-
rival-time difference and the direction of first motion re-
corded on their short-period three-component seismograph).
The magnitude (M
L
)–time sequence of the more than 500
events, which are now confidently recognized as foreshocks,
is shown in Figure 7. There are about 20 more events in
Figure 7 than are actually recorded in Shipengyu Observa-
tory’s log book, because later analyses helped identify some
additional small events. A similar data set was shown in M
S
by Wu et al. (1978). Some of these events were later used
by Jones et al. (1982) in a relocation study.
At 0:30, 4 February, after group discussions, Zhu com-
posed the fourteenth issue of Earthquake Information (2 –
15; Appendix E) to explain the situation to the provincial
government. Two more issues of Earthquake Information
were written and mimeographed at 5:00 and 8:00 a.m., re-
porting the continuing upward trend of earthquake magni-
tude. By 8:00 a.m., over 200 events had been recorded, cul-
minating in the largest foreshock of M
L
5.1 (M
S
4.7) at
7:51 a.m.
The brief fourteenth issue of Earthquake Information
was later officially proclaimed as the imminent prediction of
the Haicheng earthquake. Although it was not written in a
definitive style, by stating that “the magnitudes are still in-
creasing” and “a relatively large earthquake is very likely to
follow,” it sent a warning of unprecedented urgency. Similar
wording had never been used in previous reports from the
provincial Earthquake Office. Zhu brought the brief report
to Liu Yimin, the junior RCL official directly responsible for
the Earthquake Office. Liu then took Zhu to see Mr. Hua
Wen, a Vice Chairman of RCL, at 8:00 a.m.
The former workers of the Liaoning provincial Earth-
quake Office whom we interviewed in 2004 are unanimous
on one point: none of them ever attempted to, or felt they
were able to, predict an earthquake to a day. Mr. Zhu Feng-
ming told us that when he wrote “a relatively large earth-
quake is very likely to follow,” he was “thinking of a time
frame of one to two weeks.” However, when they reported
the earthquake situation to Mr. Hua Wen in the early morn-
ing of 4 February 1974, Hua Wen felt a much heightened
sense of urgency. To our surprise, it was Hua’s 8:00 a.m.
administrative decision that effectively helped to bring about
the provincial prediction of the Haicheng earthquake.
According to an account from the Lianing provincial
Earthquake Office (2 – 21) written after the earthquake,
when the office staff proposed to dispatch earthquake work-
ers to examine the Yingkou-Haicheng area before arranging
emergency response, Hua Wen said: “There may not be
enough time for that. You’d better fix a meeting place, and
we [RCL] will notify relevant cities and counties to muster
there to discuss response measures immediately.”
Following this order, Liu drove to the town of Haicheng
with Gu Haoding and a clerical officer of the Earthquake
Office Li Fuxiang. They organized an emergency meeting
in the Haicheng guesthouse during 14:00–15:30. The meet-
ing was attended by a total of 12 people, including govern-
ment officials of Haicheng and Yingkou Counties and an
officer of a PLA troop that was staying in that area. At the
meeting, Li Fuxiang from the provincial Earthquake Office
estimated a magnitude of greater than 6 and said “the large
earthquake may occur within the next few days” (2 – 21).
At 10:30 a.m., while Liu’s trio was driving from Shen-
yang toward Haicheng, the RCL organized a telephone dis-
tribution (see the Provincial Government Documents section
for how a telephone distribution worked). The formal RCL
announcement (3 – 14) broadcasted in this distribution was
brief. It reported the large number of earthquakes, with “the
largest being M4.7,” and slight damage in what was to be-
come the epicentral area. Apparently, by this time, reports
of damage caused by the foreshocks had begun to trickle in.
The RCL announcement said that “the magnitude is contin-
uing to climb, and the earthquakes are abnormally frequent”
and asked all relevant regions to be on high alert. The for-
mal announcement was accompanied by characteristically
military-style personal directives from General Li Boqiu.
The Yingkou City committee relayed the provincial distri-
bution to the Yingkou County at 11:30 a.m. According to
Yingkou County’s telephone records (4 – 10), General Li’s
directives contained four points:
1. Determine the scope of the [impending] earthquake. How
large will the epicentral area be?
2. Define an alert zone and take emergency measures. Maintain
duty and patrol day and night. Those who have unsafe houses
should sleep elsewhere.
3. [Committees of] cities, counties, and communes should be
on duty. Stand fast at your posts. Report and take actions
quickly if there is urgent situation.
4. Strengthen guarding of factories, mining structures, reser-
voirs, bridges, mining tunnel entrances, and high-voltage
power lines. Stand fast at your posts. Designate persons for
individual posts. Report urgent situation.
It is apparent that in General Li’s mind that (1) the large
earthquake would surely occur (“How large will the epicen-
tral area be?”), and (2) it could occur as soon as in the same
day (“Those who have unsafe houses should sleep else-
where.”).
By the afternoon, it became very clear that the fore-
shocks had caused substantial damage. The provincialEarth-
quake Office submitted the 17th issue of Earthquake Infor-
mation to the provincial government at 2:00 p.m. (2 – 18,
Appendix E). This is an important document, because the
serious damages reported in it, such as collapse of gables
and chimneys, may in part explain why some communes,
brigades, and individuals in the epicentral area made their
own evacuation decisions without explicit instructions from
higher levels. However, from 1:00 p.m. onward, the fore-
shock activity dramatically decreased (Fig. 7). This decrease
and the cold weather complicated evacuation work.
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 771
Figure 6. Map of the epicentral area of the 1975 Haicheng earthquake (epicenter
shown as a star) showing locations of some of the towns, communes, and other types
of population centers mentioned in the text. Thick gray curves show spatial distribution
of the intensity of the earthquake (same as in Fig. 4). Thin gray curves indicate county
boundaries. Urban areas of Yingkou City and towns of Dashiqiao (in Yingkou County)
and Haicheng (in Haicheng County) are outlined with thick solid lines.
Figure 7. Foreshock sequence of the Haicheng
earthquake. Data are from SSB Analysis and Predic-
tion Center (1980).
Role of the Shipengyu Earthquake Observatory
The Shipengyu Earthquake Observatory was estab-
lished in 1970 near the village of Shipengyu in Yingkou
County. It was one of the observatories of the SSB Shenyang
Brigade (i.e., Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office) but
was administered by the Yingkou City government. In 1975,
it had 13 workers, operating a short-period, three-compo-
nent, smoke-recorder type 64 seismograph made in China.
They also had a tilt meter, although their tilt data (shown by
Raleigh et al. 1977) were never mentioned in any precursor
discussions prior to the Haicheng earthquake. It is said that,
in the few years before the Haicheng earthquake, the obser-
vatory made and distributed over 100,000 copies of bro-
chures and organized over 100 film or slide shows to spread
earthquake knowledge (7 – 10). After the earthquake, the
observatory was the first one of the six organizations to be
mentioned by the SSB for rendering “meritorious services in
the analysis-prediction of southern Liaoning earthquake”
(7 – 10).
In early February 1975, because the future epicenter was
only 20 km away (Fig. 6), the observatory became the most
important source of foreshock information not only for the
provincial Earthquake Office but also for all other local gov-
ernments and other earthquake offices of southern Liaoning.
The foreshocks were hand recorded in the observatory’s log
book (6 – 1), which also contains accounts of various anom-
alies and felt and damage reports for the foreshocks that were
772 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
reported to them by amateur observers and by other earth-
quake offices.
The Shipenyu Observatory had many communications
directly with local communities and various organizations,
and apparently these had a strong influence on their deci-
sions regarding evacuation. Note that the word “evacuation”
in this article and all previous stories about Haicheng means
moving people out of their houses and does not mean trans-
porting them to a different area. To illustrate the wide range
of communication, we list here some of the 28 telephone
records in the log book the day before the Haicheng earth-
quake, mostly in the evening. Population centers mentioned
in this list can be found in Figure 6.
1. Zhu Fengming of the provincial Earthquake Office calledand
inquired about earthquake situation . . .
2. Since the beginning of the earthquakes [i.e., foreshocks],pho-
ned city’s Party Committee three times . . .
3. Told Yingkou and Gaixian Counties to inform relevant com-
munes to enhance preparation [for a large earthquake] . . .
4. Xinsheng Farm Earthquake Office: felt [an earthquake] at
4:30; a table moved before the earthquake occurred.
9. Mr. Ma of Tangchi Commune: felt three times at 18:30,
18:40, and near 21:25 . . .
11. Mr. Cao of Yingkou County: His county’s Party’s Standing
Committee asks if the city’s Party Committee has any opin-
ions; all communes in the county felt; . . . at 22:45; shaking
broke glass . . .
12. Anshan City Earthquake Office: felt at 21:23 . . .
13. The PLA Subarea Headquaters . . . phoned . . .
17. Mr. Cao of Yingkou County: (1) Water in twelve wells in
Zhangguan Brigade of Baizhai Commune dropped 30–50
cm tonight; (2) several wells had water during the day but
are dry now (11 p.m.?); (3) horses are neighing; (4) In
Qiaozhen [i.e., Jinqiao in Fig. 6], there are chickens making
large noise and trying to escape.
20. Police at the East Train Station enquired about earthquakes.
25. Liushu Commune in the city suburb reports: many cows in
city’s milk farm moo.
26. Comrade Fan from the suburb phoned: Already told comrade
Xu to carry out preparation and relief work.
If many of these communications seem outside the re-
sponsibilities of an earthquake observatory, the following
log book entry on the day of the earthquake is even more
astonishing: “Informed Tianzhuangtai and Dawa Nanqu by
telephone, be prepared for a possible large earthquake to-
night.” Here the observatory, over the phone, issued an un-
official imminent earthquake prediction directly to a local
community. This entry is between two notes on the same
page of the log book about foreshocks. The earlier note says:
“Total of 315 [foreshocks] from 16:00, 3 February, to 10:00,
4 February, 16 were felt and with M⬎3.” The later one
says: “501 from 12:38, 3 February, to 18:30, 4 February.”
Hence the time of the prediction phone call is probably be-
tween 10:00 and 18:30 on 4 February.
Tianzhuangtai and Dawa Nanqu (northwest corner of
Fig. 6) are relatively far from the area of intense foreshocks.
It is logical to infer that the observatory must have issued
similar messages also to communities in and near the fore-
shock area but had no time to record them in the log book.
These messages must have spread quickly and convinced
some communities to evacuate.
Our interviews of witnesses have verified the following
widely publicized story: The movie operator of the Shipen-
gyu Production Brigade was convinced by workers of the
Shipengyu Observatory of an impending earthquake that
night and decided to show movies outdoors overnight to
attract people away from their houses. The earthquake oc-
curred during the movie show. Another person (Mr. Jia) in-
volved in this story also became well known. He disbelieved
the prediction, refused to see the movies, and kept his 4- or
5-year-old child in the house with him. The child was killed
by house collapse when the earthquake came, although Mr.
Jia himself survived.
We do not understand why observatory workers be-
lieved a large earthquake was very possible for that night.
Perhaps they were alarmed by the increasing trend of fore-
shock magnitudes and intuitively anticipated an even larger
event to follow. Anticipation for a large earthquake had been
re-enforced repeatedly since the distribution of State Council
Document 69 (see the June Conference and State Council
Document 69, 1974 section). It is also possible that they
followed an empirical three-stage formula of “many fore-
shocks, short hiatus, large earthquake” and based their pre-
diction on a temporary quiescence of foreshock activity in
the afternoon (Fig. 7). This formula was created in China on
the basis of a foreshock sequence of the 1966 Xingtai earth-
quake and widely quoted in earthquake education materials
(e.g., Tianjin City Earthquake Office Editorial Group,1973).
Another possibility is that they were influenced by other
people. Li Zhiyong, one of the scientists sent to Liaoning
from Beijing by the SSB Headquarters to investigate the
22 December 1974 earthquake (see the M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-
Benxi Earthquake, 22 December 1974 section), wrote in a
recent article (Li, 2005) that he happened to be in the City
of Yingkou on 4 February and told the city government that
an M⬎6.8 earthquake might occur “before midnight, prob-
ably around dinner time.” He said he based his reasoning on
the above three-stage formula and a comparison with the
foreshock sequences of the 1966 Xingtai earthquake and the
recent 22 December Liaoyang-Benxi earthquake. Since the
Shipengyu Observatory was administered by the City of
Yingkou, someone in the city government might have con-
sulted with the observatory about Li’s prediction. Li was
reportedly awarded by various organizations afterward for
his prediction efforts. We have not searched for documents
that would corroborate Li’s story.
Evacuation in Yingkou County
What happened in Yingkou County on 4 February 1975
must be the most remarkable story ever involving the “strug-
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 773
gle” with earthquakes. The Head of the Earthquake Office
of Yingkou County, located in the town of Dashiqiao with
the county government (Fig. 6), was Mr. Cao Xianqing
(known as Cao Diban, i.e., Mr. Earthquake office), a leg-
endary name known to everyone involved in Haicheng
earthquake prediction but never mentioned in state- and
provincial-level official documents. Cao, born in Yingkou,
was a young carpenter when he joined the PLA in 1947. He
learned to read and write in the army. Mr. Cao told us during
an interview in 2004 that he had “fought with the Fourth
Army of the PLA from northeast China to Guangdong Prov-
ince” during the civil war in late 1940s and that he had done
“supply work” during the Korea war. He said that, after re-
tiring from the army in 1954, he had been doing “party
work” before being instructed to establish Yingkou County’s
Earthquake Office in September 1974, just a few months
before the Haichang earthquake.
Cao joined a delegation, organized by the Yingkou City
government, to Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces to learn
about earthquakes and amateur earthquake prediction. There
had been reports of successful earthquake prediction in those
areas. The trip started on 15 November 1974 and lasted for
“more than forty days” (Cao et al., 1986). He was passionate
about his Earthquake Office duties and enthusiastically su-
pervised a network of amateur observatories in the county.
His efforts apparently gained him the trust of the county’s
Party Committee. However, at least on one occasion in early
December, his work was criticized for inflaming earthquake
education and panicking the public (4 – 2).
From 27 December 1974 (just after his trip) until 3 Feb-
ruary 1975, he presented 16 issues of “Briefing Notes” (all
included in Cao et al., 1986) to the county government. A
few issues were simple copies of provincial circulars. Some
issues contained earthquake activity information that he ob-
tained directly from seismologists of the nearby Shipengyu
Observatory. In several issues, there were numerous ac-
counts of peculiar groundwater/surface water fluctuation and
animal behavior and amateur telluric current observations.
For example, in the third issue of 31 December, he
wrote the following about amateur telluric current observa-
tions at Huzhuang Commune’s (Fig. 6) post office: The read-
ing was “normally 60 lA, but dropped by 17 lAon30
December, by 26 lA at 6:26 a.m. and 58 lA at 9:00 on 31
December.” Mr. Cao also regularly reported readings from
Huzhuang and four other amateur groups under his super-
vision to the Shipengyu Observatory, sometime a few times
a day. The Huzhuang amateur group that collected these data
was later recognized by the SSB for having “rendered mer-
itorious services in the analysis-prediction of southern
Liaoning earthquake” (7 – 10), not only for making these
observations but also for their performance when the earth-
quake occurred. Their data, reproduced in Figure 21 of Ra-
leigh et al. (1977), were never formally used by profession-
als of the Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office before the
Haicheng earthquake.
The fifth issue of Cao’s Briefing Notes, dated 4 January,
reported the following: “According to reports on 4 January
from a number of units of our county, water level of wells
in Jianyi Commune generally dropped (one well that origi-
nally had a water level of 1 m below ground is now dry),
water level of the Xiangfang reservoir dropped by 0.5 m,
one well in Sanjiazi Brigade of Weiziyu Commune dropped
by 70 cm (today) and its water has turned muddy and bitter,
and two snakes were found (still kept) in Laodong Brigade
of Boluopu Commune during 28 December to 3 January.”
These were valuable observations. The communes and the
reservoir mentioned here are all in the southernmost part of
the map area of Figure 6.
Cao believed that the above phenomena were precursors
of earthquakes. In January, while the earthquake activity in
the province had become relatively quiet, he was so sure
about the imminence of a large earthquake that he made
some precautionary arrangements. In a notebook from his
Earthquake Office (6 – 3), a record entered on January 28
indicates that by this time the county already organized a 7-
person communication group, a 21-person rescue team, and
a 16-person transportation team, and prepared 25,000 kg of
baked foods, 1000 winter jackets, 10,000 pairs of winter
shoes, 1000 winter hats, 1000 cotton quilts, and so forth in
preparation for a large wintertime earthquake. An entry
made on 22 January in the log book of Shipengyu Obser-
vatory recorded that “all communes in Yingkou County have
formed Earthquake Offices,” apparently to Cao’s credit.
Cao maintained frequent telephone communication with
the Shipengyu Observatory and was fully aware of the de-
velopment of foreshock activity. On 3 February, Cao pre-
sented the last issue of his Briefing Notes to the county gov-
ernment to report the few small earthquakes recorded at the
observatory since 1 February, warning that “the situation is
still developing.” During the same day, most likely in the
evening, he received telephone notification from the Shi-
pengyu Observatory to prepare for a possible large earth-
quake (see item 3 of telephone records of the Shipengyu
Observatory on 3 February shown in the Role of the Shi-
pengyu Earthquake Observatory section). On 4 February at
7:51 a.m., the largest foreshock (M
L
5.1) occurred, and his
Earthquake Office’s notebook recorded collapse of chim-
neys and gables.
At 8:15 a.m., 4 February, the Standing Committee of
the Party Committee of Yingkou County held an extended
emergency meeting upon Cao’s recommendation. The meet-
ing was attended by eight people including Cao, plus a min-
ute-taker. In his oral report at the meeting, Cao said: “A large
earthquake may occur today during the day or in the evening.
County Party Committee please take measures.” The meet-
ing concluded with the following sternly worded morato-
rium (4 – 9).
1. From this moment, all meetings in all urban and rural areas
are cancelled.
2. From this moment, all public entertainment and sport activ-
ities in all urban and rural areas are suspended.
774 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
3. From this moment, all business activities are suspended.
4. From this moment, all production work is suspended.
The minutes of the meeting also recorded the following
specific directives. “Immediately inform all communes.
Each party member is responsible for a specific set of fam-
ilies [to make sure they leave their houses], and each mili-
tiaman is responsible for a specific set of individuals. Mili-
tiamen must be on duty for all urban and rural areas and
persuade the masses to move to safe areas. Party’s leadership
must be strengthened. If the earthquake comes too quickly
to allow warning, each commune or brigade should take its
own actions. Ensure that people are out of their houses and
cattle are out of their sheds.” By designating specific families
and individuals to be the responsibility of a specific party
member or militiaman, the county government wanted to
make sure that not a single person in the county was left
unattended. In 1975, especially in rural areas, many party
members and militiamen had unquestionable loyalty to the
party and would carry out these orders to the letter.
The meeting adjourned at 9:00 a.m. When the 10:30
provincial warning was relayed to the county at 11:30 and
when Cao represented his county at the provincial emer-
gency meeting in Haicheng guesthouse in the afternoon,
evacuation in Yingkou County was already well underway.
Undoubtedly, the provincial warning served to re-enforce
the sense of urgency and further helped evacuation work in
the county.
Throughout 4 February, Cao continued to announce that
a large earthquake would occur on that day, urging imme-
diate evacuation across the county. Several professional seis-
mologists we interviewed in 2004 have various humorous
but friendly recounts of what Cao said on that day. He in-
tuitively interpreted the afternoon decrease in earthquake ac-
tivity (Fig. 7) as the final energy buildup before rupture. He
reportedly said that the later the earthquake struck, the larger
would it be, and the magnitude would be “7 at seven o’clock
(p.m.), and 8 at eight o’clock, . . .” (Qian, 1986). Some think
that he extrapolated the increasing trend of the foreshocks
(Fig. 7) to come up with this magnitude-time estimate. Dur-
ing our interview with him in 2004, he confirmed that he did
say that the earthquake would occur before 8 p.m. When
asked why this time was so important, he offered the follow-
ing explanation.
He knew of a statement in a book called Yinchuan Xiao-
zhi (Serendipitous Historical Records of Yinchuan) that “ex-
cessive autumn rain will surely be followed by a winter
earthquake.” He said that it had rained excessively in the
autumn of 1974, and the winter would have ended at 8 p.m.
on 4 February, 1975, and therefore the earthquake had to
happen before 8 p.m. on that day.
We later located the book he referred to. It is a compi-
lation of notes made between 1754 and 1755 by a private
teacher named Wang Yichen, shortly after a large earthquake
had occurred on 3 January 1739 in what is today’s Ningxia
Autonomous Region (Wang, 1755). In this book, Wang
wrote the following passage: “Ningxia is prone to earth-
quakes. People are used to tremors every year. Earthquakes
occur mostly in winter or spring. If well water suddenly turns
muddy, there is lasting cannon-like sound from the ground,
gangs of dogs bark furiously, one should be mindful of earth-
quakes. Excessive autumn rain will surely be followed by a
winter earthquake.” The passage was widely quoted in pub-
lic earthquake education materials in Liaoning Province in
the forms of wall posters or brochures. Mr. Cao probably
read some of those posters or brochures.
In China, a year is divided into 24 solar terms. In 1975,
4 February was indeed the last day of the last solar term,
that is, the end of winter in this system. However, the precise
winter–spring transition was at 6:59 p.m., an hour earlier
then Cao thought. The Haicheng earthquake did not occur
in the winter after all. It occurred at 7:36 p.m., 37 minutes
into the spring.
The spectacular evacuation work in Yingkou County
attracted the immediate attention of political leaders (5 – 7;
5 – 8). But it would later become a matter of disappointment
that Mr. Cao could not satisfactorily explain his predictions
in the final weeks and especially the final day. More impor-
tantly, in post-Haicheng propaganda campaigns, the central
government of China would like to see the prediction as a
success achieved by the masses over a much larger region
under the leadership of the provincial Party Committee. The
issue of the provincial Party Committee’s leadership will be
revisited in the Recognition of the Prediction Efforts section.
The efforts of Yingkou County, in many ways ahead of the
provincial efforts, were not publicized or told to foreign vis-
itors. In the first foreign scientific report of the prediction of
the Haicheng earthquake (Adams, 1976), Yingkou County
was not even shown on the map.
Zhu and Wu (1982) described the evacuation of the
town of Dashiqiao as follows. “The town of Dashiqiao, in
the region of intensity IX, took measures such as stopping
shopping and public entertaining activities, relocating guest-
house guests and hospital patients, and dispersing the masses
before the earthquake. Although 66% of the buildings in the
town collapsed, only 21 people died, out of a population of
72,000.” What they neglected to mention is that the town of
Dashiqiao was the location of the Yingkou County govern-
ment and its Earthquake Office.
The Yingkou County government and Mr. Cao never
won national and provincial awards for rendering “merito-
rious services in the analysis-prediction of the southern
Liaoning earthquake.” The explanation was that the awards
were given only to professional and amateur earthquake
workers, not to government officials. Those who worked in
the Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office and various ob-
servatories were considered professional and amateur work-
ers. Those who worked in county-level earthquake offices,
like Mr. Cao, were somehow regarded as government offi-
cials.
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 775
Action and Inaction in Haicheng County
Contrary to the popular belief in the west that the “Chi-
nese government announced in 1975 that the city of Hai-
cheng had been evacuated in advance” (Scholz, 1997), Hai-
cheng County was scolded after the earthquake for not
having done as a good job as Yingkou County. When vis-
iting the disaster relief command post in Haicheng a week
after the earthquake, Mao Yuanxin (Chairman Mao’s
nephew) remarked: “Yingkou did a better job than Hai-
cheng” (5 – 7). On 9 May 1975, Vice Premier Hua Guofeng
intimated the following comments to delegates of the Third
National Earthquake Work Conference (5 – 8).
Among the areas that we have had some direct contact, it was
in the countryside of Yingkou County that the education [about
the impending earthquake] was relatively in-depth and popular.
[People in] some of these places slept outside on both the 3rd
and 4th [of February]. Yingkou [county government] issued
warning beforehand and announced it with loudspeakers. [Peo-
ple in] some communes of Haicheng overheard the announce-
ment from Yingkou, but Haicheng’s own warning was issued
late and did not reach all the people. Therefore, Haicheng’slife
losses were heavier in comparison. . . . The greatest casualty
was in the Haicheng guesthouse. The guesthouse attendants
knew there would be an earthquake, so they only arranged
guests to stay on the first and second floors, not the third floor.
They did some propaganda . . . and asked the guests to sleep
with their winter clothes on. That evening [of the earthquake]
they only gave this kind of general notice, unlike Yingkou’s
specific imminent warning. . . . Anshan’s masses and cadres
have complaints, because the leading cadres did not disseminate
any imminent earthquake warning.
Here Hua Guofeng mildly criticized the government of
Anshan City because the City was administratively respon-
sible for Haicheng County. Haicheng’s Earthquake Office
was not directly supervised by the County’s Revolutionary
Committee, an arrangement commonly viewed as an indi-
cation that earthquake work was not given a high priority.
The county government did hold a meeting on 4 February
to prepare for a large earthquake, but it was not until 6 p.m.,
rather late in the day. The earthquake occurred right after
the meeting was adjourned.
According to witnesses we interviewed in 2004, people
in the town of Haicheng were aware of the possibility of a
large earthquake, but they chose to stay inside their rooms
in the evening of 4 February. Most of them survived the
earthquake, but casualties were indeed greater than in the
town of Dashiqiao, with 153 deaths (based on 4 – 11), de-
spite the fact that the town of Haicheng suffered less building
damage (intensity XIII) than Dashiqiao (intensity IX)
(Fig. 6). Forty-four people died due to the collapse of parts
of the three-storey guesthouse (Fig. 8) (based on 4 – 11),
where the provincial Earthquake Office had organized its
emergency meeting in the afternoon. Most of the victims
had just checked in for an agriculture conference.
However, although not across the whole county, evac-
uation indeed took place sporadically in parts of Haicheng.
We were told the following story by Mr. Qiao Changman,
a former worker of the amateur Haicheng Earthquake Ob-
servatory. Workers of the observatory had been making am-
ateur telluric current observations. Their readings showed a
large jump a couple of hours before the M
S
4.7 event (largest
foreshock) in the morning. Just before 2 p.m. the readings
showed a similar but larger jump. They then predicted that
an earthquake “greater than M4–5” might occur “within
three hours.” Mr. Qiao produced a written version (as evi-
dence) of the prediction and asked a fellow worker to hand-
deliver it to Haicheng County’s Earthquake Office. During
his bicycle trip to the Earthquake Office, the messenger told
some friends about this prediction. The news then quickly
spread and triggered evacuation in that neighborhood, in the
northeastern suburb of the Haicheng County.
Mr. Qiao and coworkers must have also immediately
reported their prediction by telephone to the Earthquake Of-
fice of Anshan City, 40 km away, because we later found a
record of their prediction at 2 p.m., 4 February, in the log
book of Anshan’s Earthquake Office (6 – 5). We did not
check whether the Haicheng Observatory had made other
(false) predictions previously.
Publicized and Unpublicized Evacuation Examples
A few glorious evacuation examples were publicized in
Chinese soon after the earthquake. We quote some of these
examples in this section. The examples have been used for
propaganda purposes, and some of the details may not be
accurate. We have not scrutinized the details but believe the
reported deaths (or lack of) in them are not grossly wrong.
These examples either do not mention how the decision for
evacuation was made or indicate that the decision was made
at a very local level. The fact that only selected examples
were publicized indicates that the warning and evacuation
process was very uneven throughout the disaster region. Lo-
cations of communes mentioned in these examples can be
found in Figure 6.
The Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office wrote a re-
port in March 1975 (7 – 11). It is obvious from its style and
wording that the report was written for the masses, not for
government officials. As suggested by the title of the report,
credits were given to the leadership of Chairman Mao. The
success was said to be the “fruit of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution and of the Campaign of Criticizing Lin
Biao and Confucius” (Appendix C). During the Cultural
Revolution, failing to use lavishly these standard expressions
would bring trouble to the writer/speaker. The report con-
tains a few evacuation cases.
“The [amateur] analysis-prediction center at Huzhaung
Commune post office, Yingkou County, consists of three
female switchboard/telegraph operators.” After describing
how the amateur group made their telluric current and other
anomaly observations (also see the Evacuation in Yingkou
County section), the report went on to say: “On 4 February
776 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Figure 8. Damaged building of the Haicheng guesthouse (built with bricks and
concrete). The building had an E shape in plan view, with the three back wings oriented
perpendicular to the front wing. Left: Front view. Right: Back view, two side wings at
the back collapsed. The center back wing did not collapse (shown in the background
on the left-hand side).
at 6 p.m., they obtained information that a large earthquake
might occur that evening and reported it to the commune.
The commune’s Party Committee immediately decided to
disseminate the information. Within half an hour, the girls
made over 70 switchboard connections and made 78 phone
calls to notify all production brigades rapidly. As a result,
more than 30,000 people of the whole commune left their
houses in time, and casualty was minimized.” The time
(6 p.m.) when they obtained the information is obviously
incorrect. Yingkou County’s moratorium was issued in the
morning, and this Huzhuang Commune group, one of Mr.
Cao’s favorite amateur monitoring teams, would have been
among the first to receive a notice from Mr. Cao. The time
appears to have been altered to be only 1.5 hours before the
earthquake to dramatize the girls’ heroic deeds to save lives.
The report praised Team 102 of the Metallurgical and
Geological Exploration Company (Fig. 6) for their precur-
sory anomaly monitoring. The self-potential data from this
amateur group was later reproduced in Figure 13 of Raleigh
et al. (1977). After describing how the group made their
observations and reported their findings to the Yingkou
County’s Earthquake Office and Shipengyu Observatory, the
report said: “According to information provided by them,
the Party Committee of the Team and some neighboring
units timely directed employees and their families to safe
areas. Although the earthquake caused extensive house col-
lapse, none of the more than 1200 people of these units was
killed.” Here the Party Committee of Team 102 and “some
neighboring units” are said to have made their own evacu-
ation decisions. Warnings from Mr. Cao, the Shipengyu Ob-
servatory, and the province might also have contributed to
some degree.
The report also cited an urban and a rural example not
from Yingkou County:
Three thousand four hundred seventy-one people of 801 fami-
lies live on Yangguang Street, Xishi District of Yingkou City.
. . . When the earthquake was coming, the [street] Party Branch
followed the predesigned response plan to organize masses to
move to safe places. One hundred twenty-two rooms collapsed
on this street, but not a single person was killed or severely
injured. Party Branch of Qianjiao Brigade of Yanjun Commune,
Haicheng County, held an emergency branch meeting before
the earthquake and took effective response measures. They gave
notices personally or through loudspeakers, requiring ‘human
leave houses and cattle leave sheds,’ and organized militiamen
to conduct inspection and persuasion [to leave houses] family
by family. The earthquake caused severe collapse of houses, but
there was not a single casualty among the 780 people and 18
cattle.
Zhu and Wu (1982, p. 184) gave two examples from
Haicheng County:
In Yingluo Commune, Haicheng County, located in the most
severely damaged region, the masses were evacuated outdoor
before the earthquake. Although 95% of the 28,027 rooms in
the commune collapsed, only 44 people out of a population of
35,786 died. . . . In Dingjiagou Production Brigade of Pailou
Commune, Haicheng County, also located in the most severely
damaged region, the masses were mobilized to stay in earth-
quake-resistant shelters 10 m away from houses since Feb. 3.
Although 550 out of 700 rooms collapsed, there was not a single
casualty among the 878 people of the brigade.
Vice Premier Hua Guofeng told the following story in
his May 9, 1975, confidential speech to delegates of the
Third National Earthquake Work Conference (5 – 8):
February 11 would be the Chinese New Year. Anshan City sent
a leading cadre and a greeting delegation to [the town of] Dashi-
qiao on February 4, to express good wishes and give a stage
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 777
performance [to entertain the Headquarters of the 39th Army].
Dashiqiao is the location of Yingkou County [government]. . . .
Because of an earthquake prediction for that day, the Army
Headquarters had to decide whether to have the greeting cere-
mony and watch the performance. Since Anshan’s leadingcadre
was already there, the ceremony had to take place [to show
respect for the leading cadre], but the performance was can-
celed. . . . So they held the ceremony with all the seven doors
of the assembly hall kept open [for easy escape]. The Anshan’s
leading cadre gave a greeting speech, and the army hosts ex-
pressed their gratitude. The ceremony was adjourned right after
the speeches, without having the performance. When people had
just walked out of the assembly hall, the earthquake occurred,
and the hall collapsed. An officer who was directing people to
exit was injured, but the rest of the one thousand people were
all safe.
We learned from several independent sources that the
short ceremony began at 7:00 p.m. and ended around 7:20.
Following standard ritual, high-rank officers and leading
cadres who sat on the stage left the hall first, and others
followed in an orderly fashion, just in time for the 7:36 p.m.
earthquake. It is said that the Army Commander was initially
furious over the idea of letting an earthquake prediction in-
terrupt the greeting ceremony, but he became so grateful
after the earthquake that he personally told the story to the
Vice Premier. This close call is well known among earth-
quake workers who themselves experienced the Haicheng
earthquake, but there is some controversy regarding who
provided the earthquake prediction for the army. Hua Guo-
feng and some others said it was the Shipengyu Observatory,
but Mr. Cao insists that it was his Earthquake Office. We
think the army might have obtained information from a num-
ber of sources, but Mr. Cao’s prediction might have been
the most specific.
Basis for Evacuation Decisions
The Canadian Seismology Delegation to China after the
Haicheng earthquake wrote in their report (Witham et al.,
1976): “Final responsibility for the prediction of a hazardous
situation appears to rest with the provincial seismological
brigade or bureau, or its sub-units closer to the predicted
epicentral region, but the evaluation of this prediction and a
decision to evacuate an area is a political one that appears
to be made at the commune, county or city level not nec-
essarily in a uniform way.” Ralph Turner wrote in the “Mo-
bilizing the Masses” section of the U.S. delegation report
(Raleigh et al., 1977): “In early February it appears that rural
communes, factory committees, and urban street committees
received information and advice from higher levels (county
and city) but made their own decisions. It is even possible
that the decisions were made at the brigade level.”
These two astute early observations were somehow un-
noticed or forgotten by western media and science com-
munity. The story has typically been simplified as “in 1975
Chinese officials ordered the evacuation of Haicheng, a city
with one million people, just days before a 7.3-magnitude
earthquake” (National Geographic News, 11 November
2003). As shown above, a characteristic of the evacuation
before the Haicheng earthquake is its nonuniformness. Con-
sequently, it is both interesting and important to ask on what
basis some of the local committees decided to evacuate.
On 4 February 1975, the commune or brigade leading
cadres would have obtained information directly or indi-
rectly from six different sources: (1) the general provincial
warning relayed to them through city and county commit-
tees, (2) in the case of Yingkou County, an evacuation order
from the county committee, (3) nearby earthquake obser-
vatories, particularly the Shipengyu Observatory, (4) local
amateur precursory monitoring groups such as the team of
the Haicheng Observatory, (5) neighboring villages and in-
dustrial units, and (6) the foreshocks and the damage they
were already causing.
In Yingkou County and some neighboring Haicheng
villages that overheard Yingkou’s loudspeaker broadcast,
the decision was easier to make. In the neighborhood of the
Shipengyu Observatory, the villagers relied on their trust in
the observatory workers. Those who heard about the amateur
prediction by the Haicheng Observatory also had a good
reason to evacuate.
It was a difficult problem in most other areas, because
there was no warning evidence to indicate that the earth-
quake would occur as soon as the same evening. Li Fuxiang
of the provincial Earthquake Office merely said “within the
next few days” at the emergency meeting held in Haicheng
guesthouse in the afternoon of 4 February (Provincial Pre-
diction and Warning section). Local committees and indi-
viduals had to weigh the uncertain risks of an earthquake for
that night against the certain risks in staying outdoors in the
Liaoning winter for an unspecified number of nights. The
cold weather was not a trivial factor, as reflected in the num-
ber of deaths due to hypothermia after the earthquake,which
will be discussed in the Deaths and Injuries section.
The situation in the two days before the earthquake must
have been very confusing. A rather peculiar example is re-
corded in the notebook of Yingkou County’s Earthquake
Office (in the town of Dashiqiao) on 3 February 1975 (6 –
3). One director asked the office to tell two local committees
to pay close attention to a reservoir near them but not to
inform the masses about the worsening earthquake situation.
Because the Shipengyu Observatory could detect numerous
unfelt small earthquakes, government officials and earth-
quake workers knew the real situation better than did the
public. Concealing earthquake information from the public,
perhaps to prevent panic or just out of bureaucratic habit,
seems to be completely contrary to what the earthquake
workers were trying to do. To this director, the situation was
certainly not serious.
Undoubtedly, the foreshocks were powerful messages
from nature, making it easier to persuade people to leave
778 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
their houses. Because of the frequent foreshocks, warnings
from the province, local governments, and nearby observa-
tories were taken much more seriously than earlier false
alarms. Some individuals, especially those who had their
houses damaged, may have voluntarily decided to stay out-
doors until receiving clear assurance that it was safe to return
inside. In Hua Guofeng’s 9 May 1975 speech (5 – 8), he
mentioned that some peasants in the Yingkou County told
him that they had stayed outdoors during the night before
the main shock. An evacuation example from Haicheng
County (Dingjiagou Brigade) cited in the preceding section
also mentioned that people had stayed in shelters during that
night. There was no official provincial or county warning on
3 February. It cannot be ruled out that these peasants may
have had some unofficial warning from the county’s Earth-
quake Office, but their direct apprehension of foreshocks
was probably the primary reason.
How the afternoon decrease of foreshock activity was
interpreted seems to have made a vital difference. By the
evening when the outdoor temperature was becoming less
and less comfortable, it must have been quite a temptation
to assume that the earthquake risk had diminished. People
killed in the Haicheng guesthouse may have made this as-
sumption. Most workers of the provincial Earthquake Office,
however, believed that the worst was yet to come. In the
2004 interviews, several of them said that they had this “gut
feeling” because of the overwhelming precursory anomalies
they had seen over the past month. There is a record in the
log book of Anshan City’s Earthquake Office (6 – 5): at
2:40 p.m. on 4 February 1975 (during the relative foreshock
quiescence), Zhu [Fengming] of the provincial Earthquake
Office in Shenyang, when answering the phone and listening
to reports, “estimated that a large earthquake might occur.”
Workers of the provincial Earthquake Office and other of-
fices and observatories deserve thanks for their intuitive
judgment that afternoon.
The readiness of the local committees to respond to im-
minent warnings or equivalent messages from higher gov-
ernment levels or other sources, and the readiness of the
masses to comply can be explained by the education efforts
prior to the earthquake, since June 1974. The psychological
effect of State Council Document 69 and the educational
effect of the massive precursory monitoring campaign were
both important factors. Ralph Turner made the following
observations in the “Mobilizing the Masses” section of the
U.S. delegation report (Raleigh et al., 1977).
In this process, at least two things of importance had happened.
Scientifically based medium- and short-term predictions from
the national and regional arenas had been discussed by many
county and local leadership groups, so that they were prepared
to respond to the local signs of earthquake imminence. And
many of the leadership groups had become responsibly involved
in the impending decision process when they joined in estab-
lishing amateur observation groups within their own units and
began to receive reports from them. Presumably, both of these
developments would have contributed toward the readiness of
civil unit leaders to make the difficult decision of February 3
and 4.
Damage and Effects of Prediction Efforts
Damage
The damage caused by the Haicheng earthquake is
summarized by Quan (1988): “The earthquake damaged
5,080,000 m
2
of urban housing, 867,000 rural house rooms,
1,670,000 m of various transport pipelines and lines, over
2000 bridges of different types, and over 700 hydraulic fa-
cilities. Sand fountaining buried more than 180 km
2
of farm-
land. The total economic loss was about 0.8 billion yuan,
with 61% in cities and 39% in the countryside.” Note that it
was customary to measure living space (including schools,
offices, and factories) by area in urban areas but by the num-
ber of rooms in rural areas. The “urban housing area” in-
cludes the construction area of individual floors of multi-
storey buildings.
Damage estimates made by the Liaoning Seismological
Bureau (successor of the provincial Earthquake Office) in a
secret document a year after the earthquake were generally
greater (2 – 22). For example, it said 14,630,000 m
2
of urban
housing and 1,840,000 rural rooms were damaged, and the
total economic loss was estimated to be 1 billion yuan. Later
estimates reported by Quan (1988) are probably more ac-
curate. Early estimates may have been inflated in order to
seek more financial aid from the central government. Be-
cause these damage estimates did not affect the propaganda
value of the prediction, we do not think any conscious effort
was made to alter the facts for political purposes.
Deaths and Injuries
The issue of death toll, like many other issues, became
confusing because it was kept secret during and shortly after
the end of the Cultural Revolution. Geller (1997) contrasted
phrases like “few fatalities” in four references, all published
by foreign writers during 1975–1978, with the death toll of
1328 reported by Quan (1988) and said: “The large disparity
between the reports of 1975 and 1988 casts doubt on claims
for the Haicheng prediction.” There is actually no real dis-
parity, because death toll information was simply not avail-
able to foreign writers in the 1970s.
Discreetly, earthquake workers in Liaoning worked very
hard to obtain accurate casualty estimates, because the State
Council wanted the numbers badly. Survey sheets were dis-
tributed to all communes and city units to obtain casualty
statistics. In our document search, we have seen a number of
versions of those sheets (2 – 20), demonstrating how the num-
bers were collected, checked, and refined. In the archives of
the now Haicheng City, we found a list of names of all people
who died in the county of Haicheng due to the 1975 earth-
quake, with their age, gender, and cause of death clearly in-
dicated (4 – 11). The list was completed in March 1975.
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 779
We found the following numbers from telephone re-
cords of the Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office in Shen-
yang (2 – 20). On 13 February 1975 the numbers reported
to the central government delegation (led by Vice Premier
Hua Guofeng) to the disaster region were 1475 dead (ex-
cluding deaths caused by fire and hypothermia) and 16,618
injured. At 17:15 on 15 February the numbers reported to
the State Council by telephone were 1395 dead and 17,875
injured. At 19:00, 19 February, civilian casualties reported
to the State Council, again by telephone, were 1380 dead
and 17,875 injured, with a breakdown for individual cities,
towns, and communes. The next day, 21 dead and 401 in-
jured in the army were added to the numbers. These numbers
are meant to represent casualties caused by collapsing build-
ings only. It is unclear why the State Council did not require
statistics of casualties due to related causes such as fire. Per-
haps it was a preemptive effort to prevent local governments
from inflating numbers in order to get more aid.
On March 19, 1975, a secret document by the Medical
Group of Liaoning Provincial Earthquake Relief Command
Post (3 – 17) reported that the earthquake (ground shaking)
killed 1475 and injured 16,618, fires after the earthquake
killed 187 and injured 1302, and the freezing temperature
caused “a number of” casualties.
The number 1328, later reported by Zhu and Wu (1982),
is the widely quoted official death toll of the Haicheng earth-
quake. They refer to the number as deaths caused “directly”
by the earthquake (i.e., ground shaking only). In a 2004 in-
terview, one of the authors, Mr. Wu Ge, explained that ear-
lier statistics of direct deaths were higher because somelocal
committees inflated the numbers in order to obtain more
government financial aid.
More complete statistics were given in an article by Li
(1986) a few years later. In addition to the 1328 deaths, he
reported that there were 4292 with severe injuries and 12,688
with minor injuries in the “direct” category. For the first
time, he also clearly explained the meaning of “indirect”
casualties by reporting that 372 people died from freezing,
suffocation, or CO poisoning, 6578 people suffered frostbite,
341 died in fires, and 980 suffered burning injuries. Many
of the temporary shelters were unable to resist the freezing
weather, and some of them caught fire. The same numbers
were later reported in Liaoning Province Local History
Compilation Committee (1996), with breakdowns for each
affected county. According to the March 1975 victim list
from Haicheng (4 – 11), 808 people in this county were
killed due to building collapse, accounting for 61% of the
total number of direct deaths. Also in this county, 109 people
died of hypothermia, including 64 children aged 2 and
younger, 58 people died in fires, and 43 people including 38
children aged 2 and younger died of suffocation because too
much material was used to cover them to keep them warm
in shelters. Combining “direct” and “indirect” causes, the
total death toll of the Haicheng earthquake is 2041, and the
total number of people injured is 24,538.
Reasons for the Low “Direct” Fatality
Zhu and Wu (1982) indicated that the total population
of the disaster region was 8.3 million. The number depends
on how the disaster region is defined. But even if the popu-
lation is assumed to be only 1 million, the number of deaths
is still exceedingly small, given the extensive collapse of
houses. The number of severe injuries is also very small.
After visiting the disaster region, Raleigh et al. (1977) es-
timated that “casualties in excess of 100,000 would have
ordinarily been anticipated.”
Organized evacuation, for whatever reason, certainly
saved many lives. For example, had the Headquarters of the
39th Army proceeded with the stage performance, the con-
sequence would have been disastrous (Publicized and Un-
publicized Evacuation Examples section). A reasonably fair
comparison between Haicheng and Yingkou counties can be
made using the number of “direct” casualties (dead and in-
jured) normalized by the number of collapsed rooms within
each county. According to Liaoning Province Local History
Compilation Committee (1996), total direct casualties in
Haicheng and Yingkou Counties were 13,150 and 1567, re-
spectively. Based on a table of statistics (2 – 20) prepared
by the RCL Earthquake Office on 16 February 1974, the
numbers of collapsed rooms in Haicheng and Yingkou in-
cluding both rural and urban areas were 436,703 and
144,844, respectively. We referred only to this table because
in later reports urban house damage was measured in area
instead of number of rooms. The numbers indicate that for
every 1000 collapsed rooms, there were 30 casualties in
Haicheng but only 11 in Yingkou. Uncertainties in counting
collapsed rooms cannot explain the significant difference be-
tween the two counties. What made the difference is prob-
ably the much better evacuation work in Yingkou County
(see the Evacuation in Yingkou County and Action and In-
action in Haicheng County sections).
It is intriguing that fatalities were relatively low even
for areas with no organized evacuation. Based on discus-
sions with a number of witnesses and our own observations,
we think the traditional wood-frame houses of southern
Liaoning and the time of the earthquake played important
roles.
Traditionally, houses in that area are built with a mix-
ture of wood and bricks. A wooden frame is first constructed
and firmly attached to the ground. The frame consists of
several pillars and beams, usually each made out of a single
tree, and a wooden roof truss. Brick walls fill the space be-
tween the pillars, and there are no bearing walls. The first
layer of the roof, directly nailed to the truss, is usually
wooden boards. A very thick layer of thatch straw or brick
tiles is then used to cover the wooden boards to make a
complete roof. The wooden frame was very resistant to
ground shaking. When a house is said to have collapsed
during the Haicheng earthquake, it is usually the brick walls
that collapsed. For those with brick tiles on the roof, the tiles
typically slid down the roof slope onto the ground outside.
780 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Stripped of their walls and roof but still standing, these
wooden house frames became a common sight of the post-
earthquake epicentral area (Fig. 9).
A small number of those who stayed inside were killed
by inwardly collapsing walls. Some were severely injured,
but most were unharmed or suffered only minor injuries. The
majority of the families in both rural and urban areas around
the epicenter lived in similar houses, and most of them sur-
vived house collapse even if they did not stay outdoors.
Some people were killed or injured by brick tiles falling off
the roof when trying to escape, and casualties due to this
cause must be significant. In 2004, when we interviewed a
resident of the town of Haicheng who experienced thisearth-
quake, he really wondered whether it would have been safer
to stay calmly inside or to run out.
The most dangerous buildings were the more modern
ones built only with bricks and concrete (not re-enforced),
especially the relatively few two- or three-storey buildings.
These were office buildings, department stores, movie the-
atres, assembly halls, guesthouses, factories, schools, and so
forth. It was very fortunate that the earthquake occurred after
work, while many of these buildings were vacant. The ci-
vilian Yingkou County moratorium did not prevent the 39th
Army from using the assembly hall in the town of Dashiqiao,
but as we have seen, the hall was fortuitously evacuated just
in time.
The time of the earthquake might be responsible for the
low casualty for another reason. During the Tangshan earth-
quake in 1976, on the top of the list of causes of death was
choking by dust (Chen et al., 1988). The Tangshan earth-
quake occurred at 3:43 a.m., when people were fast asleep.
Suddenly woken up in a terrible scene and unaware of what
was happening, people screamed and inhaled the dust gen-
erated by house collapse. Had the Haicheng earthquake oc-
curred during sleep hours, many people might have died for
this reason.
Although the “indirect” casualties due to fire and hy-
pothermia are unproportionally high by modern standards,
the situation might have been even worse had not been for
the education campaign before the earthquake and various
official and unofficial warnings. In 2004, we interviewed a
survivor in the town of Haicheng who lost his sister in the
earthquake. His story is probably very representative.
On 4 February 1975, the man heard rumors of an earth-
quake for that night from various unofficial sources. By
7:30 p.m., it was bedtime for his two young children. Not
knowing exactly what to do, he decided to put the children
to bed with their winter clothes on so that they could readily
escape and remain warm in case of an earthquake. When the
earthquake occurred at 7:36 p.m., he snatched the children
from bed, holding one under each arm, but he did not have
time to run out. Luckily, the collapsing walls did not harm
them. The decision to let the children sleep with their winter
clothes on proved to be a wise one. The children survived
the cold night after the earthquake had destroyed their house.
Several others we interviewed also mentioned that they were
wearing winter clothes in preparation for an escape.
Recognition of the Prediction Efforts
The earliest accounts of pre-earthquake warning and
evacuation were given the day after the earthquake in the
third special issue of the SSB (restricted) series “Earthquake
Situation” (7 – 7). After reporting the severe damage, it went
on to say:
Small earthquakes increased in the morning of the 4th, and the
provincial Earthquake Office [in Shenyang] reported the situa-
tion to the provincial Party Committee. Following the Com-
mittee’s directives, Earthquake Office workers went to Hai-
cheng and Yingkou to arrange preparation work. Most of the
80 plus families in the Zhuanwanzi Brigade of Bali Commune,
Haicheng County, moved to the outdoor before the earthquake.
Figure 9. Examples of damaged or collapsed houses in Haicheng County to show
the shake-resistant nature of their wooden frames. Left: Chagou Commune. Right:
Ganwang Commune. See Figure 6 for locations of the communes.
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 781
Ninety percent of the houses collapsed, but only two people
were injured. There are more than 110 families in the Laoda
Brigade of Ximu Commune. Seventy percent of their houses
collapsed, but only three people were injured.
See Figure 6 for the locations of the two communes men-
tioned here. Two days later, Zhou Rongxin, leading cadre
of the CAS mentioned at a meeting that he had read about
the prediction work from Confidential Reference Materials
of People’s Daily (an internal publication to be read by very
high-rank Party officials only) (5 – 6).
The process of publicizing the Haicheng prediction ap-
pears to have been influenced by the political situation in
China. With Chairman Mao’s health deteriorating, friction
between the Gang of Four (Appendix C) and other Party
leaders, including Mao’s would-be successor Hua Guofeng,
intensified. Mao Yuanxin and the Liaoning provincial Party
Committee were keen followers of the Gang of Four. On 10
February the eighth special issue of SSB (restricted) series
“Earthquake Situation” reported comments made on 8 Feb-
ruary by then Vice Premier Hua Guofeng who was visiting
the disaster region (7 – 8). He praised Shipengyu Observa-
tory’s prediction work and the evacuation work in various
places, without mentioning the Liaoning provincial Party
Committee. Two hours later, the SSB issued the ninth special
issue and provided an outline of the prediction story (7 – 9).
The outline praised the leadership of the Party Committee
of Liaoning Province, without mentioning the Shipengyu
Observatory and the Yingkou County government, and cast
the prediction work into a four-stage procedure (long-term,
middle-term, short-term, and imminent). All subsequent de-
scriptions of the prediction of the Haicheng earthquake (e.g.,
Yingkou City Editorial Group, 1975; Jiang, 1978), including
stories told to foreign visitors, built upon this officialoutline.
At this time, the Gang of Four was in complete control of
the country’s propaganda machines.
In the months to follow, Hua Guofeng continued to
praise the Shipengyu Observatory and Yingkou County,
while other official reports continued to emphasize the lead-
ership of the provincial Party Committee. In these official
reports, details that did not help accentuate the central theme
of the provincial Party Committee’s leadership, such as
Yingkou County’s emergency meeting and evacuation order
being earlier than the general provincial warning, were ig-
nored or kept vague. This momentum was continued after
the Cultural Revolution and on until today. After Chairman
Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution, most
senior officials in the Party Committee and Revolutionary
Committee of Liaoning Province were ousted because of
their connection with the Gang of Four. Hua Guofeng per-
sonally ordered the arrest of Mao Yuanxin in October
1976.
An official propaganda campaign began on 13 March
1975, when all major Chinese newspapers published a press
release by Xinhua News Agency from the day before. The
opening paragraph of the press release is as follows:
The State Council issued a general notice today, complimenting
units that rendered meritorious services in the analysis-predic-
tion of the southern Liaoning earthquake. The notice said: At
19:36, 4 February 1975, the Haicheng-Yingkou area of southern
Liaoning Province was struck by a magnitude 7.3 strong earth-
quake. The earthquake-work team of our country predicted this
earthquake; under the unified leadership of the Liaoning Pro-
vincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party
[members], government, army, and masses in the epicentral area
took timely and effective preventative measures, so that losses
caused by the earthquake in this densely populated area were
greatly reduced. This is a vivid demonstration of the superiority
of our country’s socialist system. This is a great victory of
Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line!
Here the key phrase is “under the unified leadership of the
Liaoning Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party.” After the Cultural Revolution, this paragraph was
still quoted in publications about the Haicheng earthquake,
but politically astute authors replaced the key phrase with
“under the unified leadership of the Central Party Committee
and Party Committees of all levels” (e.g., Jiang, 1978).
Discussions on Precursory Anomalies
Chinese earthquake workers separate precursory anom-
alies into microscopic and macroscopic (e.g., Zhu and Wu,
1982). The former are those that are detected with modern
instruments, either professionally or by amateur groups,
such as changes in seismicity, geodetic deformation, water
chemistry, geomagnetic field, telluric current, crustal stress,
and so forth. Macroscopic anomalies are those reported by
observers with or without primitive measuring tools, such as
changes in animal behavior, groundwater (level, flow, color,
smell, etc.), unusual light or sound, and so forth. Micro-
scopic anomalies monitored by amateur groups prior to the
Haicheng earthquake were mainly changes in telluric cur-
rent. There were more than 70 such monitoring groups
within 100 km of the future epicenter (Zhu and Wu, 1982).
Truthfulness of Reported Anomalies
Although it is impossible to verify each anomaly report,
there is no evidence that there was systematic fabrication of
anomaly reports after the earthquake. The log books of the
Shipengyu Observatory and the Earthquake Office of An-
shan City and the notebook of Yingkou County’s Earth-
quake Office contain many, albeit incomplete, reports of
macroscopic and microscopic anomalies.
Many of the microscopic anomalies have been scruti-
nized by the U.S. delegation (Raleigh et al., 1977). One ex-
ception is the telluric current readings responsible for the
prediction by the Haicheng amateur observatory (see Action
and Inaction in Haicheng County section). We found that in
the SSB document to promote the observatory as one of the
six units that rendered “meritorious services in the analysis-
prediction of southern Liaoning earthquake” (7 – 10), the
782 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
time of their reading jump was altered from before 2 p.m.
to 3:50 p.m., so that the 7:36 p.m. earthquake was nearly
within the observatory’s predicted 3-hour time window. This
explains why such a celebrated data set was not shown to
the U.S. delegation. However, incidents like this seem to be
rare.
Usefulness of the Anomalies in Predicting the
Haicheng Earthquake
As others have concluded, the foreshock sequence
(Fig. 7) was the most important evidence used in the im-
minent prediction of the Haicheng earthquake. Routine de-
scription of the foreshocks has the sequence beginning with
an M
L
1.4 event recorded by the Shipengyu Earthquake Ob-
servatory on 1 February at 1:35 a.m., followed by seven
similarly small events on 2 February (Wu et al., 1978). In
the log book of the observatory, only four events were re-
corded for 2 February. The additional three events must have
been identified through reanalysis of seismograms after the
earthquake. The five small earthquakes known seismically
on 1 and 2 February were not accompanied by any felt re-
ports and did not attract much attention (Appendix D). Use-
ful information at the time from the entire foreshock se-
quence included the large number of events, their increasing
magnitudes, their consistent direction and distance from the
Shipengyu Observatory, and most directly, the damage they
caused. More quantitative aspects of the foreshocks, such as
the b-value and source location, were not studied until after
the Haicheng earthquake.
To the workers of the Liaoning provincial Earthquake
Office, the Jinxian leveling data and other professionally
made observations, such as the radon and tilt anomalies dis-
cussed by Raleigh et al. (1977), were useful in sending alert-
ing signals months and weeks before the earthquake, al-
though there is no evidence that these data played any role
in the provincial imminent prediction.
The workers did not have time to analyze anomalous
telluric current changes reported by amateur workers, nor
did they seem to be very interested because of observational
noise and artifacts. Some of the amateur telluric observations
shown by Raleigh et al. (1977), such as those obtained by
middle school students, were regularly mentioned during
group discussions of the provincial Earthquake Office (6 –
2) but never quoted in its official reports. These observations
became prominent in propaganda campaigns after the earth-
quake. The merit of the massive amateur involvement in
microscopic precursory monitoring before the Haicheng
earthquake is in its educational effects, as discussed in the
Basis for Evacuation Decisions section, not in its scientific
contribution.
The macroscopic anomalies, on the other hand, were
more useful to the professional workers. For one thing, the
reports were easier to deal with than the amateur microscopic
observations. The workers did not have to worry too much
about observational noise but only needed to assume that
most of the observers were honest and had used their com-
mon sense.
About the macroscopic anomalies and professionally
observed microscopic anomalies, we learned the following
two points from our discussions with former earthquake
workers in Liaoning. First, the workers would not attach
much significance to an isolated report, such as on radon
fluctuation and aberrant animal behavior, but they would pay
some attention to many reports that showed an unusual tem-
poral and spatial pattern. Second, the role of these reports
was to alarm earthquake workers. The workers did not know
how to use these reports directly for prediction, but they
found the pattern of their appearance alarming on the basis
of past experience, such as what was recorded in ancient
Chinese documents, for example “Yinchuan Xiaozhi”
(Wang, 1755) (see the Evacuation in Yingkou County sec-
tion), and occurrence of similar patterns accompanying other
recent earthquakes in China.
Relation of the Anomalies with the Earthquake
For some of the anomalies, their theoretical relation
with earthquakes may require decades or centuries of re-
search. An empirical answer can be based on anything be-
tween the lack of other obvious causes and a significant
correlation established with many earthquakes. For the
Haicheng earthquake, the relationship of most of the re-
ported anomalies to the earthquake is uncertain but cannot
be ruled out.
In addition to the undisputable foreshocks, we find it
difficult to ignore reports of changes in groundwater level
and animal behavior. This is not to say that the other anom-
alies can be easily ignored. The difference is in the spatial
coverage. Tens of reports from different places in the area
are more difficult to ignore than, say, a fluctuation of water
radon in one well.
Reports of such macroscopic anomalies for three
months before the earthquake and for a region extending
over 150 km from the epicenter in all directions were syn-
thesized by Deng et al. (1981). The daily numbers of reports
of groundwater change, snake or frog sighting, and aberrant
behavior of other animals from 1 December 1974 through
4 February 1975, the day of the Haicheng earthquake,shown
in their article are reproduced in Figure 5a. Because their
data were based mainly on interviews of witnesses after the
Haicheng earthquake, we were concerned about psycholog-
ical effects of the earthquake, that is, witnesses might begin
to remember phenomena that they would not have had paid
attention to had there not been the earthquake.
For this reason, we searched for reports that were re-
corded prior to the earthquake. The best collection of such
reports is those recorded in the log book of the Shipenyu
Observatory, shown in Figure 5b. Deng et al. (1981) neither
used nor saw this log book (Deng, personal communication,
2005). Yingkou County’s Earthquake Office’s notebook and
Cao’s Briefing Notes (Evacuation in Yingkou County sec-
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 783
tion) also contain many anomaly reports, but not in a sys-
tematic way. Two pages of the Shipengyu Observatory’s log
book are shown in Figure 10 as an example. What was re-
corded in the log book must be from a much smaller area
than covered by Deng et al. (1981) and must be a small
fraction of the anomaly observations, because not everyone
regularly communicated with this observatory, but we think
it is a representative and objective data set. In both data sets
in Figure 5, there were few or no records of macroscopic
anomalies until late December 1974. The increase in anom-
aly reports was not related to the timing of earthquake edu-
cation campaigns, which took place a few months earlier
(3–1,2–4,2–5,2–6).
The 22 December 1974 Liaoyang-Benxi earthquake
swarm (M
L
5.2 Liaoyang-Benxi Earthquake, 22 December
1974 section) did not immediately trigger a rise in the num-
ber of anomaly reports either around the Shipengyu Obser-
vatory or in the larger area. Nor did the three false alarms
issued by the RCL on 23 December (False Alarms section).
An increase in anomaly reports in late December preceded
the major false alarm issued on 31 December. This pattern
does not suggest a strong influence of the earthquakes and
predictions on people’s attention on anomalous phenomena.
The major increase of anomaly reports in early January, par-
ticularly on 4 January, may be attributed to the influence of
the 31 December false alarm. The log book recorded a small
Figure 10. Two pages of the 1975 log book of the Shipengyu Observatory that
contain anomaly reports. Upper half of left page (18 January): “Cao Xiangqing of
Yingkou County Earthquake Office phoned; amateur telluric current readings: . . . [list
of readings from five amateur groups].” Lower half of the same page: “Mr. Cao phoned
from Yingkou County at 21:30; water suddenly began to ooze from the ground in Mou
Guangjun’s pigpen in Fengjiafu Brigade of Zhoujia Commune. Now (9:30 p.m.) [the
pen is] full of water. His yard is on the slope of a relatively high hill. There is a ditch
in front of his yard lower than the pigpen by 1.5 m. Now water is turning and bubbling.
Now water is flowing to the ditch from the pigpen. [The pigpen] was dry before. It’s
never happened in history.” The sentences in the two pairs of parentheses are: “Whether
to report this to the province needs further discussion” and “Cao called [again] at
11:45 pm”. Lower half of right page (19 January): “Zhang of Xiongyue [County]
Earthquake Office (9:15): three mice were seen unafraid of people in Mr. Chi’s resi-
dence in Wenquan past 6 p.m. No other changes.”
784 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
earthquake in the Xiongyue area with a number of felt re-
ports on 13 January and a felt report on 19 January, but these
events did not prompt an increase in anomaly reports. What
seems to be the most interesting is that the number of reports
sustained through January and sharply rose around 23 Jan-
uary, opposite of the decreasing trend in both seismicity and
attention paid to earthquake prediction during this time (Pro-
vincial Prediction and Warning section).
These anomalies could be interpreted as precursors of
the Haicheng earthquake. The sharp rise in the number of
reports on 1 and 2 February 1975, shown by Deng et al.
(1981), may reflect some psychological effects, since no
such reports were recorded in Shipengyu Observatory’s log
book for these two days. From the evening of 3 February,
when the foreshock activity escalated, the anomaly reports
became even more difficult to evaluate. However, some
anomalies are too large to ignore. For example, the log book
of Anshan City’s Earthquake Office recorded a telephone
message from a hospital at Tanggangzi hot spring (northeast
corner of Fig. 6) on 4 February 1974 at 4:45 a.m., which
reported that the flow rate from the hot spring had suddenly
increased by about one-third.
Among the animals, the most difficult to ignore are the
snakes coming out hibernation dens when the average tem-
perature was much below freezing. There were nearly 100
snake sightings within one month prior to the earthquake
(Zhu and Wu, 1982). Although they must represent a tiny
fraction of the total snake population in southern Liaoning,
such suicidal behavior is extremely difficult to explain. What
the snakes and other animals sensed is not known. It could
be as simple as vibrations caused by earthquake tremors that
were not detected by the then very sparse seismic network.
Although Jinxian leveling data did indeed contribute to
the predictions made in June 1974 and January 1975, their
actual relationship to the Haicheng earthquake is not under-
stood. On the east–west line (Fig. 3), elevation of the eastern
end with respect to the western end continued to increase
after the June 1974 conference until shortly before the
Haicheng earthquake, then decreased rapidly until the 1976
Tangshan earthquake (Fig. 3). The Haicheng earthquake was
not the immediate cause for this abrupt change, because it
occurred later. A few much less frequently surveyed longer
leveling lines closer to the epicenter did not show the same
temporal behavior, although they were consistent with a gen-
eral tilt of the Liaodong Peninsual down to the northwest
(Raleigh, et al. 1977). The 1975 Haicheng earthquake even-
tually occurred some 200 km northeast of the Jinxian lev-
eling site, not on the Jinzhou fault (Fig. 2). The 1976 Tang-
shan earthquake was to the west of the leveling site, also
about 200 km away. However, not being able to model the
relation between the leveling anomaly and these earthquakes
does not rule out the existence of a relationship. While the
physical model is unknown, the temporal pattern of the Jinx-
ian leveling changes shown in Figure 3 suggests a relation-
ship between these changes and the Haicheng and Tangshan
earthquakes. The real challenge is whether the relationship
can be used for prediction purpose.
Jackson (2004) questioned the relevance of the Jinxian
anomaly because it did not climax with the Haicheng earth-
quake and “measurements much closer to Haicheng did not
show similar tilts.” The expectation that an anomaly should
be strongest at the time of the earthquake and nearer to the
site of the future earthquake is based on a temporally and
spatially smooth mechanical model and is probably too sim-
plistic. Depending on the mechanism (e.g., if viscous defor-
mation in the lower crust or upper mantle is involved), an
anomalous phenomenon can be of a low-frequency nature
and may not show rupturelike coseismic changes, even
though it may be part of the same process that leads to the
earthquake. If the governing process has a large spatial scale,
seismic rupture in one place with slow deformation in an-
other place 200 km away before and/or after the earthquake
is not an unreasonable scenario.
Applicability of the Precursory Anomalies
to Other Earthquakes
Can similar anomalies be used as precursors to other
earthquakes? This question is the most fascinating but is
inducive to misleadingly superficial answers. For any one
type of anomaly, the answer to the question may be “no.”
For example, use of significant foreshocks, the most impor-
tant precursor for Haicheng, was not applicable to the disas-
trous 1976 M7.8 Tangshan earthquake (Fig. 1). Within two
months prior to the Tangshan earthquake, not a single fore-
shock was detected by the regional seismic network that
could detect events of M
L
ⱖ1.7 (Chen et al., 1988) or M
S
ⱖ1(SSB Editorial Group, 1982), although some other types
of anomaly that had preceded the Haicheng earthquake also
to some degree preceded the Tangshan earthquake (SSB Ed-
itorial Group, 1982). What geological structures could ac-
count for the difference in the foreshock patterns between
the two large earthquakes? This is an important question yet
to be addressed. No obvious anomalies were observed prior
to the M6.0 Parkfield, California, earthquake of 2004, de-
spite the massive instrumentation on site in anticipation for
this event (Bakun et al., 2005). Reports of precursory anom-
alies are also absent for many other earthquakes on Earth.
What is responsible for the presence or absence of precur-
sory signals is also an important question to be addressed.
The use of one type of “diagnostic” precursory anomaly
for earthquake prediction is likely unrealistic. Earthquakes
are sufficiently different from one another to cause different
anomalies. Earthquakes also modify geological structure and
affect certain rock properties (such as permeability and po-
rosity), such that the same anomaly may not occur, or occur
differently, for two consecutive earthquakes in the same re-
gion. Besides, there are numerous anomalous phenomena
that are not followed by earthquakes.
However, since earthquake is a failure process that in-
volves rupture initiation, some combination of different
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 785
anomalies may precede some large earthquakes. Before pro-
ceeding with experiments and statistical analysis, some care-
ful studies of the anomalies’ local environments are needed.
It is simplistic to expect, for example, that earthquakes in all
geological conditions should be preceded by similar diag-
nostic electrical signals and that animals in southern Cali-
fornia and most of Japan, which regard earthquakes as a fact
of life, should panic in the same way as animals in the Hai-
cheng-Yingkou area, where seismicity is normally lower.
Here is one example to show the need for site-specific
studies. Before the Haicheng earthquake, there were a few
sightings of groups of disoriented mice unresponsive to peo-
ple and cats around them. They represent a tiny fraction of
the total mouse population in that area, and their behavior
must have some site-specific reason. One possibility is that
their dens were invaded by some toxic gas emitted from the
ground, perhaps due to fracturing before the large earth-
quake. Without knowing what happened to these mice, why
most other mice were not bothered in this way, it will be
unfruitful to try to use mouse behavior as an earthquake
precursor.
Conclusions
Our findings have largely confirmed the sequence of
events before the Haicheng earthquake that the U.S. dele-
gation was told during their visit to China in 1976 (Raleigh
et al., 1977), with the following four significance disparities.
(1) The events do not fit the ideal model of four-stage (long-
term, middle-term, short-term, and imminent) prediction. In
particular, there was no official short-term prediction, al-
though such a prediction was made by individual scientists.
(2) We have noticed some major factual inaccuracies in the
story they learned. For example, the claim that on 4February
1975 the provincial government was “given a prediction of
a strong earthquake near Haicheng for that day” is untrue.
(3) The story publicized and told to foreigners in the 1970s
was biased by a desire to emphasize the leadership of the
Party Committee of Liaoning Province. Details were either
neglected or exaggerated to help emphasize this point. (4)
The importance of amateur microscopic-anomaly, such as
telluric currents, monitoring was exaggerated in the story
told to foreigners and the public.
Our findings show that, within months prior to the
event, there was indeed a general middle-term prediction for
magnitude 5–6 earthquakes to occur within one or two years
in the north Bohai Sea area and five other places in north
China. The focus of attention in Liaoning was around Jinx-
ian, an area some 200 km southwest of the actual epicenter.
There were a number of false alarms within one and half
months prior to the earthquake, in the aftermath of an earth-
quake swarm some 60 km northeast of the future epicenter,
which was later considered to have been caused primarily
by the filling of a reservoir. Less than a month before the
earthquake, there was another official middle-term predic-
tion for a magnitude 5–6 earthquake to occur within a year
in the region of Liaodong Peninsula including Yingkou-
Haicheng, together with similar predictions for three other
places in China.
On the day of the earthquake, Yingkou County was the
first to issue an imminent prediction, and there were unof-
ficial imminent predictions by professional or amateur earth-
quake workers in other places later during the day. None of
these predictions can be scientifically explained. There was
no explicit provincial imminent prediction, but a report from
earthquake workers to the Liaoning provincial government
in the morning of 4 February 1975, and the ensuing govern-
ment announcements effectively constitute an imminent pre-
diction.
Warning issuance and evacuation were very uneven
across the disaster region. In Yingkou County, an explicit
and firm evacuation order was issued before any provincial
warning. In other places, evacuation decisions were made
by local committees or individuals that were influenced by
the general warning from the provincial government. Many
places, such as the town of Haicheng, were not evacuated.
The location of the impending earthquake became ap-
parent because of foreshocks that intensified 24 hours before
the main shock. However, except in some exceptional in-
stances such as in Yingkou County (see the Evacuation in
Yingkou County section), the time of the impending earth-
quake was never specified, and the magnitude was under-
estimated. The general lack of specific time prediction, how-
ever, was to a large extent compensated by the actual actions
taken by earthquake workers and government officials.
Jinxian leveling data were the primary basis for the two
middle-term predictions. Changes in groundwater level,
color, and chemistry, and animal behavior also played a role
in alarming the public. Amateur microscopic-anomaly moni-
toring served to spread earthquake knowledge and enhance
earthquake awareness. Our study has confirmed that it was
the foreshocks alone that triggered the final decisions of
warning and evacuation, as concluded in the U.S. delegation
report and nearly all other studies of this earthquake (Raleigh
et al., 1977; Scholz, 1977; Wu et al., 1978; Jones et al.,
1982; McNally, 1982; Zhu and Wu, 1982). The Haicheng
experience demonstrated that at least some earthquakes do
have precursors that may lead to some prediction.
According to published statistics, 2041 people died dur-
ing the Haicheng earthquake and 24,538 were injured, in-
cluding 4292 severely injured. Measures taken by various
levels of government on 4 February 1975 in the Yingkou-
Haicheng area indeed saved thousands of lives. But we think
the construction style in that region and the time of the earth-
quake also saved lives.
Although the prediction of the Haicheng earthquake was
a blend of confusion, empirical analysis, intuitive judgment,
and good luck, it was an attempt to predict a major earth-
quake that for the first time did not end up with practical
failure. Revisiting this history has raised scientific questions
about earthquake processes and precursors. It also has raised
questions about the role of the government and public in
786 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
earthquake prediction and preparation. May history remem-
ber those who died in the Haicheng earthquake and those
who helped others survive.
Acknowledgments
Interviews with the following Liaoning earthquake workers who par-
ticipated in the prediction of the 1975 Haicheng earthquake made this re-
search possible: Cao Xianqing, Gu Haoding, Ma Binggui, Qiao Changman,
Qiao Wenhai, Wu Ge, Xu Xintong, Yue Mingsheng, Zhang Weidong,
Zhong Yizhang, and Zhu Fengming. Numerous individuals offered their
help during the course of this research, particularly Cao Yang, Deng Qi-
dong, Duan Zhiying, Ge Yanzeng, Jiang Xiuqin, Li Jing, Liu Xudong,
Wang Ling, Wang Manda, Zhao Ming, and Zhu Zhaocai. Inspiring discus-
sions with Robin Adams (first foreigner to visit the Haicheng area after the
earthquake), Francis Wu and Jim Savage (both were members of the 1976
U.S. delegation), Bob Geller, Dave Jackson, Seya Uyeda, Helmut Tri-
butsch, and Chen Yong about the Haicheng earthquake and earthquake
prediction are greatly appreciated. Francis Wu also generously lent us all
the notes he took in 1976 as a member of the U.S. delegation to China,
among other useful materials. Brian Atwater, Ted Irving, Lucile Jones,
Andrew Michael, Francis Wu, and Dapeng Zhao read various English ver-
sions of the manuscript, and Gu Haoding and Wu Ge read the Chinese
translation of a near-final version. They all provided valuable comments.
Jiao Mingruo located the December 1974 portion of the log book of the
Shipengyu Observatory and concluded our six-month search for it. Zhen
Lin helped us study Haicheng County’s victim list and obtain statistics from
it; she and Lynn Wang also helped create some of the figures. Ting Wang
provided editorial assistance in preparing the Chinese translation of this
article. Liaoning Province Earthquake Administration generously supported
us in using their Archives, visiting the Haicheng earthquake area, and in-
terviewing witnesses. This work was conducted as part of a joint project
“Investigation of Earthquake Precursors” under the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the Geological Survey of Canada and China Earth-
quake Administration and was partially supported by China’s Science and
Technology Grant 2005DFA20980. The views presented in this article are
those of the authors and do not represent those of the Chinese and Canadian
governments.
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Appendix A
Table A1 on following pages.
Appendix B
Chronology of Events in the Prediction of the
Haicheng Earthquake
The title of the section detailing the event is given in
parentheses.
1974
7–9 June National conference and the proclaimed middle-
term prediction (June Conference and State
Council Document 69, 1974)
15 June CAS report to State Council on the above confer-
ence (June Conference and State Council Docu-
ment 69, 1974)
29 June State Council Document 69, endorsing the above
report (June Conference and State Council Doc-
ument 69, 1974)
23 July First RCL meeting devoted to earthquake problems
(Kaiyuan Meeting of 25–27 November 1974)
25–27 Nov. SSB interprovincial meeting in Kaiyuan (Kai-
yuan Meeting of 25–27 November 1974)
22 Dec. Earthquake swarm in Liaoyang-Benxi area (M
L
5.2
Liaoyang-Benxi Earthquake, 22 December 1974)
23 Dec. Three false alarms issued by RCL (False Alarms)
31 Dec. RCL false Prediction of M5 event in Liaoyang-
Benxi by 5 Jan. (False Alarms)
1975
4–5 Jan. Provincial meeting reinforcing the 31 Dec. pre-
diction (False Alarms)
10 Jan. End of warning for Liaoyang-Benxi area (False
Alarms)
13–21 Jan. National conference and the second middle-
term prediction (The 13–21 January National
Conference)
Gu Haoding’s short-term prediction (The 13–21
January National Conference)
1 Feb. First foreshock at 1:35 (Provincial Prediction and
Warning)
3 Feb. Foreshocks intensify in the evening with felt events;
provincial Earthquake Office began to pay atten-
tion (Provincial Prediction and Warning)
4 Feb.
0:30 Proclaimed imminent prediction (Earthquake Infor-
mation: Issue 14) written by Zhu Fengming (Pro-
vincial Prediction and Warning)
7:51 Largest foreshock (M
L
5.1) (Provincial Prediction and
Warning)
8:00 Hua Wen ordered RCL Earthquake Office to call emer-
gency meeting (Provincial Prediction and Warn-
ing)
8:15–9:00 Yingkou County’s emergency meeting, Cao
Xianqing’s prediction for a large earthquake “to-
day,” and the county’s evacuation order (Evac-
uation in Yingkou County)
10:30 Provincial general warning through telephone distri-
bution (Provincial Prediction and Warning)
11:30 Provincial warning relayed to Yingkou County
(Evacuation in Yingkou County)
14:00 Earthquake Information: Issue 17; foreshock-caused
damage (Provincial Prediction and Warning)
14:00 Emergency meeting in Haicheng Guesthouse orga-
nized by provincial Earthquake Office (Provin-
cial Prediction and Warning)
14:00 Prediction of M⬎4–5 earthquake within 3 h by
amateur Haicheng Observatory that triggered lo-
cal evacuation (Action and Inaction in Haicheng
County)
Before 18:30 Shipengyu Observatory informed people by
phone to “be prepared for a possible large earth-
quake tonight” (Role of the Shipengyu Earth-
quake Observatory)
18:00–19:00 Haicheng County’s emergency meeting (Ac-
tion and Inaction in Haicheng County)
19:00–19:20 39th Army’s greeting ceremony in Dashi-
qiao’s assembly hall (Publicized and Unpublici-
zed Evacuation Examples)
19:36 M7.3 Haicheng earthquake
Feb. 5 Account of prediction in third special issue of SSB’s
Earthquake Situation (Recognition of the Predic-
tion Efforts)
788 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Table A1
List of Chinese Documents Relevant to the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake in Chronological Order, All Declassified
Index
Date, Time
(dd/mm/yy) Title and/or Type
Issuing/Publishing
Organization/Individual Notes*
2–1 10/10/70 Synopsis of investigation report on
earthquake danger zones in the
Kaiyuan-Dalian region of Liaoning
Province
Earthquake Work Leadership
Group, RCL
Kaiyuan-Shenyang-Yingkou-Dalian
corridor singled out for danger of large
earthquakes in Liaoning Province
7–1 15/05/72 Summary of precise leveling survey at
Jinzhou (i.e., Jinxian) Observatory
(experience exchange material)
Luda (i.e., Lushun and
Dalian) City Earthquake
Observatory
7–2 09/72 Progresses in earthquake prediction
work—report presented at the
National Science and Technology
Conference
SSB
2–2 17/01/74 Opinions on earthquake outlook in
Liaoning Province
SSB Shenyang Brigade Ningcheng-Yixian and Yingkou-Dalian-
Dandong named as two earthquake-
prone areas in Liaoning; magnitude
estimate ⱕ3
1–1 22/06/74 SSB Document 084, 1974: Notice to
distribute Summary of Conference on
Earthquake Situation in North China
and Bohai Sea Regions
SSB The acclaimed “middle-term prediction”;
six places identified for M5–6
earthquake potential within 1–2 yr,
north Bohai being 2nd on the list
(09/06/74) (Attachment: the Summary named
above)
1–2 29/06/74 State Council Document 69, 1974:
Forwarding Report by Chinese
Academy of Sciences on Earthquake
Situation in North China and Bohai
Sea Regions
State Council of the People’s
Republic of China
State Council’s cautious endorsement of
SSB’s 1–2-yr predictions
(15/06/74) (Attachment: the Report named above) (Chinese Academy of
Sciences)
2–3 29/06/74 Report on earthquake situation in
coastal regions of our province and
on strengthening prediction and
preparation work
RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Briefing on 7–9 June conference; written
before receipt of SSB and State
Council documents; suggestions to
enhance earthquake work in the
province
2–4 10/07/74 Earthquake Notes, Issue 12 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Accounts of mass education campaign;
effects of showing earthquake
knowledge films
3–1 23/07/74 Minutes of a meeting of the RCL to
relay State Council Document 69,
1974, and to arrange earthquake work
in the province
First provincial government meeting
dedicated to earthquake work
2–5 09/08/74 Report on follow-through of State
Council Document 69, 1974
RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Administrative adjustment at various
levels of government to enhance
earthquake work
4–1 22/11/74 Notice about several attention-deserving
issues in present earthquake work
Earthquake Work Leadership
Group, Yingkou City
An effort to curtail public panic and
overheat in earthquake education
2–6 25/11/74 Report on follow-through of State
Council Document 69, 1974
RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Report of mass education campaign
concerning earthquakes
1–3 27/11/74 Opinions on earthquake outlook in
Northeast China (Conclusions of
Conference on Earthquake Outlook
in Northeast China)
Conference on Earthquake
Outlook in Northeast
China (held in Kaiyuan)
Listed six places in the three northeastern
provinces for near-future earthquake
potential, including Yingkou and
Dalian of Liaoning Province
2–7 27/11/74 Opinions on earthquake outlook in
Liaoning Province
SSB Shenyang Brigade Listed Jinxian, Yingkou for greater
earthquake danger in near future;
handwritten in Kaiyuan
6–1 01/12/74–
07/02/75
Pages of log book of Shipengyu
Earthquake Observatory
Shipengyu Earthquake
Observatory
Logs of foreshocks and aftershocks;
records of anomaly reports (animal,
water level, etc.) and notes of
telephone communication
(continued)
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 789
Table A1
Continued
Index
Date, Time
(dd/mm/yy) Title and/or Type
Issuing/Publishing
Organization/Individual Notes*
4–2 02/12/74 Comrade Shen Mu’s directives on
earthquake education work and
Zhao’s additional comments
Shen of Yingkou City
government, Zhao of
Yingkou County
government
Criticized overheating in earthquake
education; also in Cao p. 93
3–2 03/12/74 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Reports of felt earthquakes in Benxi;
Cao p. 8
3–3 11/12/74 RCL Planning Committee Document
304, 1974: Notice to forward “Report
on Strengthening Earthquake Work in
our Province” by RCL Earthquake
Office
RCL Planning Committee Encouragement of amateur networks for
anomaly monitoring
(03/12/74) (Attachment: the above named report) (RCL Earthquake Office)
2–8 17/12/74 Earthquake Information, Issue 10 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Provincewide updates on small
earthquakes; general alert; accounts
of leveling, radon, electric inductance
anomalies; also in Cao p. 8
6–2 20/12/74–
07/02/75
RCL Earthquake Office group
discussion notes
RCL Earthquake Office Total 12 sessions: 9 during 20/12/74,
31/01/75; 3 during 05/02/75, 07/02/75
5–1 23/12/74 Typed records of oral instructions on
Liaoning Province’s earthquake
preparation upon listening to reports
on following through Mao Yuanxin’s
earlier instructions
Li Boqiu In response to 22/12/74 M
L
5.2 (M
S
4.8)
Benxi earthquake; demands for rapid
reports and recommendations from
RCL Earthquake Office; arrange-
ments for emergency response
3–4 23/12/74, 19:00 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Reports of earthquakes in Liaoyang-
Benxi area; prediction of M4–5
earthquake in Panjin-Yingkou-
Xiongyue region 25 Dec.–10 Jan.,
M5 in Dandong area, and M⬎5
near Jinxian in near future (all false
alarms); accounts of leveling, water
well, radon anomalies and snake
sightings; also in Cao p. 6
4–3 24/12/74 Telephone distribution in response to
23 Dec. provincial circular on
earthquake situation
Earthquake Office of
Yingkou City
Cao p. 7
3–5 28/12/74 Circular on earthquake situation since
provincial telephone distribution
RCL Reports of felt earthquakes; mention of
snake sightings and water level
changes in wells
2–9 29/12/74 Concluding report of an overnight
conference of all earthquake
observatories of Liaoning Province
(20:00 28/12–6:00 29/12)
RCL Earthquake Office Continuing attention on Liaoyang-
Benxi; continuing attention on
Jianxian; Dandong acquitted
3–6 29/12/74 About group-discussion opinions on
earthquake outlook in our province
General Office of RCL Prediction of M⬃5 in “near future” in
Liaoyang-Benxi-Anshan and M⬎5
in Panjin-Yingkou-Dalian
2–10 30/12/74 Earthquake Information, Issue 13 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Reports of small earthquakes in Benxi
City
3–7 30/12/74 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Identical with Earthquake Information
Issue 13
4–4 30/12/74 Report on earthquake preparation work Earthquake Office of
Yingkou City
Handwritten; for city leadership only,
not to be distributed
2–11 31/12/74 Group discussion conclusions RCL Earthquake Office Prediction of M5 earthquake near
Liaoyang-Benxi by 5 Jan. (false
alarm)
3–8 31/12/74, 19:00 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Official announcement of the above
prediction
(continued)
790 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Table A1
Continued
Index
Date, Time
(dd/mm/yy) Title and/or Type
Issuing/Publishing
Organization/Individual Notes*
5–2 31/12/74–
05/01/75
Typed records of oral instructions by
provincial leaders
Mao Yuanxin, Yin Canzhen,
Hua Wen
In response to the 31 Dec. prediction of
M5 event; account of 600 people
leaving petroleum production field for
fear of impending earthquake
2–12 01/01/75 Emergency response draft plan:
Important issues in earthquake
preparation in Liaoyang-Benxi-
Anshan area
RCL Earthquake Office As follow-up of the 31 Dec. prediction
5–3 04/01/75, evening Opening speech at earthquake work
meeting organized by Party
Committee of Liaoning
Li Boqiu (based on hand-
taken notes)
In response to 22/12/74 M
L
5.2 Benxi
event; one account of earthquake-
shelter fire causing death
5–4 05/01/75, morning Speech at earthquake work meeting
organized by Party Committee of
Liaoning
Yin Canzhen (based on
hand-taken notes)
Promotion of “a false alarm is better
than a miss”
3–9 05/01/75, 20:00 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Reports of small earthquakes in
Liaoyang-Benxi area and one event
near Dandong
3–10 07/01/75, 22:00 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Reports of small earthquakes in
Liaoyang-Benxi area and other areas,
sighting of groups of rats on
highway, well water color change
4–5 08/01/75 Earthquake Information, Issue 2 Earthquake Office of
Yingkou City
One account of earthquake rumor;
handwritten
4–6 08/01/75 Speeches at a city government meeting
on earthquake preparation
Party Secretary of Yingkou
City (based on hand-taken
notes)
Handwritten
4–7 08/01/75 Report on trip to Sichuan and Yunnan
Provinces to study earthquake
situation and suggestions for next-
step earthquake work
Cao Xianqing, Earthquake
Office of Yingkou County
Advocacy of massive amateur precursor
monitoring; Cao p. 24
4–8 01/75 Earthquake preparation and response
plan (draft)
Earthquake Office of
Yingkou County
Handwritten; an earlier (25/12/74)
version is in Cao p. 22
3–11 08/01/75, 22:00 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Reports of small earthquakes near
Liaoyang-Benxi
6–3 10/01/75–
04/02/75
Pages of notebook of Yingkou County’s
Earthquake Office
Preparation of relief materials before the
earthquake; a 3 Feb. instruction not to
reveal earthquake situation to the
public; foreshock-caused damage,
animal behavior, and water level
anomalies
2–13 11/01/75 Conclusions of group discussion of
10/01/75
RCL Earthquake Office Handwritten; Liaoyang-Benxi acquitted;
prediction of M 5 earthquake in
Dandong-Yingkou-Dalian-Panjin but
“difficult to determine time and
location”
3–12 12/01/75 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Paraphrase of 10 Jan. group discussion
conclusions
7–3 13/01/75 Report on a trip to Liaoning Province to
help carry out earthquake work in the
Liaoyang-Benxi area
Seven-people SSB team led
by Xu Zhonghuai
Handwritten; on 22/12/74 Benxi
(Shenwo reservoir) M
L
5.2 (M
S
4.8)
earthquake
2–14 13/01/75 Opinions on large-earthquake outlook in
1975 in Liaoning Province (notes
prepared for a speech at the National
Conference on Whole-China Large-
Earthquake Outlook, 13–21 Jan.
1975)
Gu Haoding on behalf of
SSB Shenyang Brigade
The proclaimed “short-term prediction”;
handwritten by Gu Haoding;
prediction of M6 earthquake in Jan.–
Feb. or within six months in Jinxian-
Dalian area or Liaodong Peninsula
and offshore areas
7–4 16/01/75 Synopsis of report presented to Party
Committee of Liaoning Province
(Attachment: Analysis opinions for
this earthquake)
SSB Investigation Team to
Liaoning (to determine the
nature of the Dec. 22
Liaoyang-Benxi earthquake)
(continued)
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 791
Table A1
Continued
Index
Date, Time
(dd/mm/yy) Title and/or Type
Issuing/Publishing
Organization/Individual Notes*
3–13 18/01/75 Circular on earthquake situation RCL Report of felt earthquakes in Liaoyang-
Benxi area
5–5 21/01/75 Concluding speech at the National
Conference on Whole-China Large-
Earthquake Outlook
Cha Zhiyuan (based on
hand-taken notes)
Changed Gu’s short-term prediction to
one year; prediction for four regions
in the country, including Liaodong
Peninsula
6–4 27/01/75–
04/02/75
Pages of log book of RCL Earthquake
Office (i.e, SSB Shenyang Brigade)
SSB Shenyang Brigade
6–5 01/02/75–
11/02/75
Pages of log book of Anshan City
Earthquake Office
Anshan City Earthquake
Office
Mostly notes of telephone
communication
2–15 04/02/75, 00:30 Earthquake Information, Issue 14 RCL Earthquake Office Surge of small earthquakes in Yingkou-
Haicheng area; the acclaimed
“imminent prediction”
2–16 04/02/75, 05:00 Earthquake Information, Issue 15 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Reports of small and felt earthquakes;
no confirmed damage
2–17 04/02/75, 08:00 Earthquake Information, Issue 16 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Report of increasingly larger, felt
earthquakes; M
L
5.1 event at 07:51
4–9 04/02/75, 08:15 Minutes of (extended) emergency
meeting of Standing Committee of
the Party Committee of Yingkou
County
(Minutes taken by Yang
Ying)
Evacuation order issued by the county
government
3–14 04/02/75, 10:30 Telephone distribution from the
provincial government
RCL (based on telephone
notes)
Provincial warning of “increasing
magnitude” and reports of slight
damage, with Li Boqiu’s oral
directives; also in Cao p. 17
4–10 04/02/75, 11:30 Telephone record: Yingkou City Party
Committee’s relay of provincial
instructions and the city’s own
instructions
(Notes taken by Liu Boyu,
Yao Zhenying, Yingkou
County)
Provincial warning and Li Boqiu’s
directives; additional directives from
city government; Cao p. 17
2–18 04/02/75, 14:00 Earthquake Information, Issue 17 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
Accounts of confirmed damage caused
by foreshocks in Yingkou-Haicheng
area
2–19 04/02/75, 20:00 Earthquake Information, Issue 18 RCL Earthquake Office and
SSB Shenyang Brigade
First report of the Haicheng earthquake
7–5 04/02/75 Earthquake Situation, Issue 9: A strong
earthquake struck Yingkou—
Haicheng area of Liaoning Province
SSB
7–6 05/02/75 Earthquake Situation, Special Issue 2:
Follow-up report on M7.3 earthquake
in Yingkou—Haicheng area of
Liaoning Province (1)
SSB
7–7 05/02/75 Earthquake Situation, Special Issue 3:
Follow-up report on M7.3 earthquake
in Yingkou—Haicheng area of
Liaoning Province (2)
SSB Accounts of warning and evacuation
before the earthquake
5–6 07/02/75, morning Speech at the Emergency Conference on
Earthquake Situation
Zhou Rongxin (notes hand-
taken by Liu Nanren and
Wang Chengmin)
Praise of prediction and preparation
work before the earthquake;
handwritten
3–15 08/02/75 Investigation Report on House Damage
and [Need for] Rebuilding in the
Earthquake Disaster Area
Joint Investigation Group of
Liaoning Provincial
Planning Committee and
Construction Committee
3–16 08/02/75 Recovery of Electricity Network after 4
Feb. Earthquake (Situation of Electric
Power in northeast China, Part 5)
Northeast China Electric
Power Bureau
Summary of power interruption caused
by the earthquake, damage to major
facilities, and repair efforts
7–8 10/02/75, 14:00 Earthquake Situation, Special Issue 8:
Distribute and follow through Vice
Premier Hua Guofeng’s instructions
on earthquake work
SSB First official announcement of
successful prediction, praising
Shipengyu Observatory
(continued)
792 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
Table A1
Continued
Index
Date, Time
(dd/mm/yy) Title and/or Type
Issuing/Publishing
Organization/Individual Notes*
7–9 10/02/75, 16:00 Earthquake Situation, Special Issue 9:
Brief introduction of prediction and
prevention work before the large
Haicheng earthquake
SSB First official outline of the prediction
process, praising the leadership of
Liaoning provincial Party Committee
2–20 10/02/75–
20/02/75
Various statistics forms and telephone
records regarding casualties and
damage
RCL Earthquake Office
5–7 11/02/75 Oral instructions on earthquake work
when visiting Haicheng
Mao Yuanxin (telephone-
relayed by Ding Guoyu,
notes taken by Cui Dehai
and Liu Puxiong)
Stating “Yingkou [County] did a better
job than Haicheng [County]” (in
terms of pre-earthquake warning)
2–21 18/02/75 Recounts of emergency meeting on
earthquake preparation held on 4 Feb.
1975, 2:00–3:30 pm, in the town of
Haicheng
RCL Earthquake Office Hua Wen’s oral instructions to Liu
Yimin et al. at 8:00, 4 Feb. and
details of the Haicheng meeting in the
afternoon
7–10 13/03/75 SSB Document 033, 1975: Notice about
learning from organizations that
rendered meritorious services in the
analysis-prediction of southern
Liaoning earthquake (Attachment:
Deeds materials of six units)
SSB The six units were: Shipengyu
Observatory, Jinxian Observatory,
Panjin Observatory, Haicheng County
Amateur Observatory, Huzhuang
Commune Post Office amateur group,
and Team 102’s amateur group
4–11 15/03/75 List of victims in Haicheng County
killed in the earthquake
Revolutionary Committee of
Haicheng County
With name, gender, age, and cause of
death (building collapse,
hypothermia, fire, and suffocation)
3–17 19/03/75 Summary of Medical Work in
Earthquake Relief Effort
Medical Group of Liaoning
Provincial Earthquake
Relief Command Post
Casualty statistics
5–8 09/05/75,
16:18–17:50
Speech when meeting delegates of the
Third National Earthquake Work
Conference
Hua Guofeng (based on
hand-taken notes)
Accounts of uneven pre-earthquake
warning work in disaster region; story
of 39th Army greeting ceremony
7–11 —/03/75 Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line
guides us to march on to victories:
Report on the prediction and
preparation work for the Haicheng-
Yingkou magnitude 7.3 earthquake
RCL Earthquake Office Accounts of evacuation orders issued by
local leadership of commune, brigade,
etc.
2–22 16/03/76 Brief Report on Haicheng Earthquake
Damage and Relief Materials
Business Department of
Liaoning Seismological
Bureau
Statistics of casualty and damage;
higher numbers than in Quan (1988);
total loss estimated to be 1 billion
yuan
*References to “Cao” are to Collection of Documents Regarding the M 7.3 Earthquake (Restricted Documents), a 99-page informal volume compiled
by Cao Xianqing et al. in 1986 on behalf of the Yingkou County Earthquake Office. Only a very small number of copies were printed.
Feb. 10 Hua Guofeng’s version of the prediction story in
eighth special issue of SSB’s Earthquake Situa-
tion (Recognition of the Prediction Efforts)
Official version of the prediction story in ninth
issue of same series (Recognition of the Predic-
tion Efforts)
March 13 Prediction success announced in all major Chi-
nese newspapers (Recognition of the Prediction
Efforts)
Appendix C
The Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949
after Chairman Mao Zedong led the Chinese Communist
Party and its army (PLA) to win the civil war of 1946–1949.
In order to establish rapidly a Soviet-style economy and so-
cial order, Mao launched a series of political and economic
campaigns over the ensuing decade, including organizing
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 793
peasants into People’s Communes in 1958. The campaigns
brought disastrous consequences to the economy. By 1959
and 1960, Chinese agriculture was ruined, resulting in one
of the worst famines in history.
Stunned by his own inability to run the economy, Mao
allowed other Party leaders to fix the situation in early 1960s.
But a few years later he decided that those other leaders were
guiding China to a capitalist direction, which was against
Marxist principles. He warned people that the 1949 victory
was by no means the end of the “class struggle” and asked
them to “continue the revolution under the proletarian dic-
tatorship.” In 1966, he launched the Cultural Revolution and
mobilized hundreds of millions of masses to fight “class en-
emies,” especially those “within the Party.”
Most veteran Party cadres were purged in 1966–1967.
Many people who had assumed some supervisory roles be-
fore 1966 (ranging from the President of China to school
teachers) were publicly denounced and humiliated by “rev-
olutionary mass organizations” (e.g., the “Red Guards”). But
the PLA was little affected except at the very top level. In
1967–1968, provincial and lower-level governments were
dismantled and replaced with “revolutionary committees.”
However, various mass organizations, who all claimed to be
true followers of Mao, had been denouncing one another and
become increasingly violent. In order to control the situation,
numerous PLA officers were given positions in civilian rev-
olutionary committees.
Revolutionary committees were based on a “three-way
combination” of leaders of revolutionary mass organiza-
tions, PLA officers, and civilian revolutionary cadres. “Rev-
olutionary cadres” were Party veterans considered well be-
haved in the Cultural Revolution. All civilian units
(factories, schools, stores, communes, brigades, etc.) formed
their own revolutionary committees to run day-to-day busi-
ness. Small or rural revolutionary committees might or
might not have PLA representatives. With rare exceptions,
leaders of mass organizations gradually became unimportant
at the provincial level. Members of the Party committee or
branch usually formed the core of a revolutionary committee
and assumed true leadership.
The enormous Cultural Revolution campaign had a
number of subcampaigns. The Haicheng earthquake oc-
curred at the end of the Campaign of Criticizing Lin Biao
and Confucius. Lin Biao, Chairman Mao’s once “hand-
picked” successor, betrayed Mao and died during an attempt
to flee in 1971. It is still not clear why Confucianism was
blamed.
Mao’s wife and her three allies became very powerful
during the Cultural Revolution. But Chairman Mao later was
disgusted by their power-seeking activities and called them
the “Gang of Four.” Mao eventually “handpicked” Hua Guo-
feng as his successor. In October 1976, less than a month
after Mao’s death, Hua Guofeng arrested the Gang of Four
and ended the Cultural Revolution. A few years later, Hua
stepped down as the Party leader, and Deng Xiaoping started
sweeping economic reforms in China.
Appendix D
Notes in the Log Book of RCL Earthquake Office
(SSB Shenyang Brigade) in the Last Few Days
Prior to the Haicheng Earthquake
31 January 1975
(by Wang Guiying)
When Zhu Fengming etc. came to the [office of] Rev-
olutionary Committee to report work, I asked him about the
first item of their group discussion conclusion, i.e., there
might be an earthquake. He said that that opinion was later
withdrawn.
Director Dong [a military officer of RCL responsible
for the Earthquake Office] phoned to enquire about earth-
quake situation of the past few days. . . . Director Dong’s
instruction: Tell Zhu . . . write a report for the leading cadres.
There has been no report [from the Earthquake Office] for
a few days. I promptly phoned Zhu and asked him to write
the report immediately. He promised to bring it here.
(19:10) Earthquake Situation Report
(by Zhu Fengming)
1. In the Gujiazi—Gongchangling earthquake area [i.e.,
the area of the 22 December 1974 earthquake swarm around
the Shenwo reservoir], frequency of earthquake occurrence
has gradually decreased. . . . Because there are still occa-
sional anomaly reports from that area, and considering our
analyses of general behavior of reservoir earthquakes, we
estimate that clusters of small earthquakes may still occur
in early and mid-February, but their magnitude may not
exceed 4.
2. Since January 20, well and animal anomalies ap-
peared in more than 20 places along two bands around Dan-
dong City. . . . This is the third time such anomalies have
occurred in that area since [the beginning of] December. It
is still difficult to say whether these are precursors fora large
earthquake. Assuming worst-case scenario and to be fully
prepared, the city of Dandong has strengthened prediction
work and is closely watching the development of these
anomalies.
3. During the National Conference on Whole-China
Large-Earthquake Outlook held in Beijing during 13–21
January, based on analyses, it was decided that the Jinxian-
Yingkou and Dandong areas of Liaodong Peninsula might
have earthquakes of magnitude 5–6 within this year. There-
fore, we paid great attention to anomalies in this region. For
emergency response, the provincial Earthquake Office al-
ready held a meeting of heads of earthquake offices of
Lushun-Dalian, Yingkou, Dandong, and Panjin [Cities] and
of observatories on 28 January and made initial arrange-
794 K. Wang, Q.-F. Chen, S. Sun, and A. Wang
ments to enhance prediction and preparation. Full arrange-
ments are to be made after reporting to provincial leading
cadres.
There is another matter to seek advice from Director
Dong. We wish to meet Commander Hua [i.e., Hua Wen] to
report on the Beijing Conference and earthquake work.
Some arrangements need to be made. Can this be scheduled
right away?
1 February 1975
(by Quan Yingdao, Li Guimei)
No issue to record today.
(by Zhong Yizhang)
Nothing.
2 February 1975
(by Meng Huilin, Wang Guiying)
Nothing today.
3 February 1975
(by Gu Haoding, Li Guimei)
Tanggangzi spring resumed outflow on January 31, five
o’clock in the evening. No earthquake activity today.
(by Li Xin)
[time and magnitude of nine foreshocks detected at Shi-
pengyu Observatory and some notes]
(by Zhu Fengming, Tian Chuanlu)
Location: about 20 km southeast of Guantun Commune
[i.e., location of Team 102 in Fig. 6] of Yingkou County.
Time: 3 February, from 18:38 until 20:02, a total of nine
small earthquakes occurred, with the largest being magni-
tude 2.5 and locally felt.
Earthquake activity in the Yingkou area has never been
as intense as this.
The [provincial] Earthquake Office cannot yet draw a
conclusion on what will follow and is still closely watching
the situation. If a large earthquake is to occur, we estimate
that the magnitude of these small earthquakes may increase,
and their occurrence may become more frequent. Will timely
report any new situation to the provincial government.
[records of many small earthquakes, felt reports, un-
usual light, animal reaction, etc.]
Appendix E
Translation of Two Earthquake Reports Available
to the Liaoning Provincial Government
on February 4, 1975
Earthquake magnitudes in these documents are M
S
,
which were converted from M
L
using formula M
S
⳱1.13
M
L
ⳮ1.08, as required by SSB in 1975. See Figure 6 for
locations of communes mentioned in these documents.
Earthquake Information, Issue 14, 4 February 1975,
0:30
Prepared by:RCL Earthquake Office
Submitted to: SSB, RCL, Members of Standing Com-
mittee of Provincial Party Committee
According to recordings by the seismic network in our
province, from 18:00 to 24:00 on 3 February, 23 earthquakes
occurred in Zhoujia, Pailou, and Chagou, and so on Com-
munes, the area where our province’s Yingkou and Hai-
cheng Counties meet, of which 15 were greater than mag-
nitude 1, with the largest being an M3.3 event at 21:23. The
earthquakes were felt in [the cities of] Yingkou, Anshan, and
Liaoyang, and Xiuyan [County] of Dandong [City] but
caused no damage.
Judged from the seismicity pattern, the magnitudes are
still increasing. Taking into consideration the anomalies in
our province and the results of recent National Conference
on Whole-China Large-Earthquake Outlook (which con-
firms that M5–6 earthquakes may occur in the Yingkou-
Jinxian and Dandong and so on areas of our province’s Liao-
dong Peninsula), a relatively large earthquake is very likely
to follow, and we must be on guard. At present, relevant
observatories around the earthquake area are carefully moni-
toring the development of the earthquake activity. Earth-
quake Offices of Yingkou and Anshan Cities have notified
relevant communes to strengthen office duty and patrol,
carry out prediction and preparation, and organize militia-
men to inspect reservoirs.
Earthquake Information, Issue 17, 4 February 1975,
14:00
Prepared by:RCL Earthquake Office and SSB Shen-
yang Brigade
Submitted to: SSB, RCL, Members of Standing Com-
mittee of Provincial Party Committee (60 copies printed)
Today, from 07:51 to 14:00, another 212 earthquakes
occurred in the earthquake area between Yingkou and
Haicheng Counties, including two events greater than mag-
nitude 3, namely,
08:57 3.5
10:35 4.2
Based on reports from Earthquake Offices of Anshan
and Yingkou Cities, we are presently aware of the following
situation: In Pailou, Chagou, Yingluo, and Zhoujia and so
on Communes, 27 houses had gable or chimney collapse due
Predicting the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake 795
to shaking, shelves in one store fell due to shaking and dam-
aged goods, and a peasant in Pailou Commune had a head
bruise when a chimney fell.
The provincial Earthquake Office has sent eight people
one after another to the earthquake area to cooperate with
the locals in earthquake preparation and relief.
Geological Survey of Canada
9860 West Saanich Road
Sidney, British Columbia, Canada
kwang@nrcan.gc.ca
(K.W.)
Institute of Earthquake Science
China Earthquake Administration
63 Fuxing Avenue
Beijing 100036, People’s Republic of China
chenqf@seis.ac.cn
(Q.-F.C.)
China Earthquake Networks Center
China Earthquake Administration
Beijing, People’s Republic of China
(S.S.)
Liaoning Province Earthquake Administration
Shenyang, People’s Republic of China
(A.W.)
Manuscript received 9 September 2005.