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JUSTICE QUARTERLY VOLUME 23 NUMBER 3 (SEPTEMBER 2006)
ISSN 0741-8825 print/1745-9109 online/06/030336-24
© 2006 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
DOI: 10.1080/07418820600869111
Europol and the Policing of
International Terrorism: Counter-
Terrorism in a Global Perspective
Mathieu Deflem
Taylor and Francis LtdRJQY_A_186839.sgm10.1080/07418820600869111Justice Quarterly0741-8825 (print)/1745-9109 (online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis233
000000September 2006MathieuDeflemdeflem@sc.edu
The European Police Office (Europol) is an international police organization that
was formed to promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the
European Union. Framed within the context of the Treaty of the European
Union, Europol’s mandate includes all serious forms of international crime,
including international terrorism. This paper offers an analysis of the organiza-
tion of Europol’s counter-terrorism operations in the context of the history and
dynamics of international police cooperation. More specifically, on the basis of
the bureaucratization theory of policing, Europol is reviewed to exemplify the
dual forces of political control over the organization via the regulative bodies of
the European Union, on the one hand, and the institutional autonomy and
professional expertise of participating police agencies, on the other. The
outcome of these dual forces can be expected to determine the course and
outcome of counter-terrorist policing in the European Union in years to come.
Keywords counter-terrorism; Europol; globalization; international terrorism;
policing
Introduction
Since September 11, 2001, the world has undeniably changed, at least with
respect to many institutions of societies across the globe as well as the social-
scientific study thereof. Although most work on terrorism and terrorism-related
issues continues to come from political science and legal scholarship (Deflem,
Mathieu Deflem is Associate Professor in the Sociology Department at the University of South Carolina.
His current research interests include the policing of terrorism, international police cooperation,
abortion policy, and sociological theories of law. Deflem is author of Policing World Society: Historical
Foundations of International Police Cooperation (Oxford University Press, 2002), and editor of Terror-
ism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives (Elsevier, 2004), and Habermas, Modernity
and Law (Sage, 1996). Correspondence to: Mathieu Deflem, University of South Carolina, Department
of Sociology, Sloan College 217, Columbia, SC 29208, USA. E-mail: deflem@sc.edu
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 337
2005b), the study of terrorism in sociology, criminology, and criminal justice has
clearly gained ground (Black, 2004; Deflem, 2004a; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero,
2005; Rosenfeld, 2002; Sociological Theory, 2004; Turk, 2004). This renewed
attention also includes contributions on the criminal justice and policing dimen-
sions of counter-terrorism, especially from an international and comparative
viewpoint (Das & Kratcoski 2003; Deflem, 2004b, 2006; McCulloch 2003; Paye
2004; Wallace & Kreisel 2003). Within this scholarship, the present article offers
an analysis of the organization of counter-terrorism by the European Police
Office (Europol), the international police organization that was recently set up
in the European Union (EU). Europol was originally conceived in the Treat of the
European Union in 1992, and limited operations began in 1994 with an emphasis
on drug enforcement that was later extended to cover organized crime. In 1998,
the Council of European Union Ministers formally approved an extension of
Europol’s mandate to include counter-terrorism. Then also agreed upon was the
creation of a special Counter-Terrorism Task Force, which eventually was set up
shortly after 9/11.
The organization of counter-terrorist policing by Europol represents but one
component in a broad and complex global constellation of terrorism-related
activities by a plethora of criminal justice and policy agencies at both the
national and international level. The results of this inquiry into one interna-
tional police organization will therefore be restricted because of its thematic
focus. However, in order to unravel the patterns and dynamics of the global
constellation of counter-terrorism in any meaningful way (Bennett, 2004),
studies of concrete institutional responses are in order, especially those that
are undertaken at an international level. The dynamics of these developments
will have consequences beyond the boundaries of any confined localities.
This paper will unravel the characteristics of Europol’s counter-terrorism
strategies on the basis of the bureaucratization theory of policing (Deflem,
2002). Europol’s mandate is explicitly defined by the European Union, and its
operations are overseen by the regulatory bodies of the EU, whereas other
international police organizations have been formed outside the context of any
(international) political body. The prototypical case is the International Crimi-
nal Police Organization, better known as Interpol, which was formed in 1923 by
police officials to function independently as a nongovernmental international
organization on the basis of an internal set of rules and procedures (Deflem,
2002, pp. 124–152). Yet, despite the fact that Europol has been established
within the political and legal structures of the European Union, I will argue that
the organization nonetheless displays important features of professional exper-
tise similar to those that characterize other international police organizations.
The analyses in this paper rely on archival sources and interviews with
Europol officials (Interviews, Europol headquarters, 2003). The archival sources
include official EU policy documents, reports and press releases made available
by Europol, and international news reports about Europol’s counter-terrorism
activities and related EU policies. Official documents and reports were primarily
retrieved via the official websites of Europol, the Council of the European
338 DEFLEM
Union, and the civil rights organization Statewatch. News reports were mostly
obtained via the online database of LexisNexis. Additional sources were found
via online search engines. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with
personnel at the Europol headquarters in The Hague, The Netherlands, in the
spring of 2003, and at the Europol liaison office in the European Commission in
Washington, DC, in the summer of 2003. Reporting these data, no details of the
specific interviews and respondents will be identified in order to preserve
anonymity. Mention will be made when information was retrieved by interview,
but no direct quotes are included.
Counter-Terrorism and International Policing
This analysis relies on a theoretical model of policing that has been developed
in research on the historical antecedents of international police cooperation
(Deflem, 2002, 2005a) as well as its further development and contemporary
conditions (Deflem, 2004b, 2006). Specifically, following Max Weber’s (1922)
bureaucratization theories, I defend the theoretical viewpoint that the form
and dynamics of international police cooperation are shaped by a historical
process of bureaucratization that has affected police institutions across the
Western industrial world. Three conditions are central to this development: (1)
the structural condition of formal bureaucratic autonomy of police institutions;
(2) the operational motive among police of a shared conception of crime and
crime control; and (3) the collaborative form in which police cooperation takes
place (Deflem, 2002, pp. 12–34).
First, in order to accomplish cooperation across national borders, police
institutions must have gained a position of relative independence from the
dictates of the governments of their respective national states. Such a condi-
tion of institutional independence or formal bureaucratic autonomy allows
public police institutions, though formally sanctioned by states, to autono-
mously plan and execute relevant strategies of crime control and order main-
tenance. Conversely, without a sufficient degree of detachment from the
political centers of states, police institutions will not be in a position to
engage in international cooperation on a broad multilateral scale beyond more
limited cooperation among politically akin states. Early efforts to organize
international police cooperation in Europe in the nineteenth century, for
instance, were limited in scope and operations because they were politically
motivated and planned by autocratic governments (Deflem, 2002, pp. 45–65,
2005a). From these political efforts, however, police gradually developed
more autonomously conceived cooperation efforts on the basis of professional
expertise. Following Weber’s rationalization theory, I maintain that police
institutions gained such a position of relative independence because the
execution of their duties is guided by formal criteria of efficiency and an
impersonal calculation of means, a trend towards instrumental rationalization
which Weber equated with modernity itself. The reliance on technologically
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 339
sophisticated means of criminal investigation is the most concrete expression
of this development among police institutions.
Second, under conditions of formal bureaucratic autonomy, police agencies
develop expert systems of knowledge that can be shared among fellow profes-
sionals across national boundaries. In the case of international cooperation,
such knowledge systems will particularly concern expertise about the course of
international crime, including crimes that in their execution traverse the bound-
aries of national jurisdictions, as well as criminal developments that affect
several countries at once, such as the influence of economic modernization on
criminal conditions across the world. When such systems of knowledge have
developed, police agencies are also bureaucratized in operational respects and
can effectively form international cooperation plans on a broad multilateral
scale. In the context of counter-terrorism, knowledge systems will be shared
across the police of national states when a common understanding has devel-
oped about the nature and occurrence of international terrorism. It will be
particularly important, then, for police to define and respond to terrorism in a
manner that is not limited by the ideologically divisive conceptions of terrorism
that often dominate in the world of international politics.
Third, considering the form in which international cooperation will take
place, it is noteworthy that international police work will primarily remain
oriented at enforcement tasks that have a distinctly local or national signifi-
cance. The national persistence of international police work does not clash
with a police institution’s relative autonomy from governmental control,
because both the governments and the bureaucracies of states are legitimated
in the context of national states. Even despite the proliferation of interna-
tional police operations and the formation of multilateral cooperation initia-
tives, including international organizations such as Interpol, a remarkable
persistence of nationality can be observed in international police work. This
national persistence is manifested in at least three ways (Deflem, 2002,
pp. 215–219, 2004b, pp. 87–89). First, police institutions will prefer to engage
in unilaterally enacted transnational activities, most typically through a system
of international liaisons stationed in foreign countries. Unilaterally planned
international operations are not always possible because police agencies may
lack necessary personnel and means. The police institutions of more powerful
nations are at a considerable advantage in this respect. Second, international
cooperation among police will typically take place in a bilateral form, between
the police of two nations, and will be maintained only on a temporary basis for
a specific inquiry or investigation. Third, and finally, national persistence in
international police work is revealed in the fact that multilateral cooperation
among police is of a collaborative nature that does not involve the formation
of a supranational police force. The idea of a supranational police force
clashes with conceptions of both state sovereignty and police autonomy,
whereas a collaborative network among police of different nations, for
instance such as currently exists among the 184 member agencies of Interpol,
can bring about the advantages of international cooperation. Collaboration
340 DEFLEM
among police of different nations can be formalized by means of regular
meetings, shared communication networks, and other institutions of coopera-
tion, such as a central headquarters through which information can be routed.
The police agencies of national states are thereby affirmed as the partners of
cooperation.
In the light of the history of international police cooperation, Europol is a
remarkable organization, even on formal grounds alone. Unlike other interna-
tional police organizations, Europol was not formed from the bottom-up by
police professionals but was the result of a top-down decision by the political
and legislative bodies of the European Union. The activities of Europol are
therefore more distinctly legally framed and bound to certain well-defined
areas of investigation. Europol’s operations are also supervised by the political
representatives of the EU, but as I will seek to substantiate in this paper,
Europol is nonetheless characterized by a degree of autonomy to determine the
specific means and objectives of its policing and counter-terrorist programs.
Primarily geared at an efficient process of information sharing among police,
Europol conceives of its counter-terrorist mission on the basis of the profes-
sional standards of policing that have developed among the participating
agencies.
Sharing the collaborative structure of other international police organiza-
tions, also, Europol is not a supranational police force but an international
cooperative network that coordinates the activities of national police institu-
tions in the various EU member states via a central headquarters. Conforming to
this collaborative structure, there will be a persistence of national and, more
broadly, regional interests revealed in the organization’s police activities. This
persistence of nationality and regionalism implies that police and counter-
terrorism objectives will harmonize with distinctly European concerns over
terrorism and, furthermore, that there will exist national variations in counter-
terrorism across the police units of the EU nations participating in Europol.
Before I examine these propositions in the context of Europol’s counter-
terrorism activities, it will be useful first to describe briefly the structure and
activities of Europol and the history of counter-terrorism policies in Europe.
Policing Terrorism in Europe: A Brief History
European efforts to control terrorism have a relatively long history (Monaco, 1995;
Peek, 1994; Rauchs & Koenig, 2001; Richardot, 2002). Besides the historical ante-
cedents of political policing from the nineteenth century onwards (Deflem,
2005a), the modern era of European counter-terrorism can be located in the 1970s.
The Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence group, or TREVI
group, was formed in 1975 by European police officials, who initially convened
on the basis of a Dutch initiative that year, to exchange information and provide
mutual assistance on terrorism and related international crimes (Peek, 1994). The
cooperation activities of the TREVI group were subsequently formally approved
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 341
by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of the then European Economic
Community (EEC).
Beyond TREVI, unified Europe created additional cooperative arrangements
to combat terrorism, such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism and the
Counter Terrorist Group. The Police Working Group on Terrorism was first set up
in 1979, when the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium
formed the group following the assassination of the British ambassador to
Ireland in 1976 (Swallow, 2004). Counter-terrorism units of all other EEC states,
the Scandinavian countries, and Finland soon joined the Group, whereupon it
was formally agreed to cooperate to combat international crime, including
terrorism, in the 1986 “Political Declaration by the Governments of the Member
States on the Free Movement of Persons” (Benyon, 1997). The Counter Terrorist
Group (CTG) is an initiative of the so-called “Club of Berne,” an informal
gathering of the heads of the security and intelligence services of various EU
states as well as Norway and Switzerland. Set up shortly after the events of
September 11, the CTG provides for cooperation in terrorism matters on the
basis of an extra-legal memorandum of understanding. Focusing specifically on
Islamic extremist terrorism, the Group meets regularly to facilitate operational
cooperation among the EU’s police and intelligence agencies.
In 1993, the TREVI Group and other European institutions dealing with
judicial, customs, and immigration issues were brought together in one new
structure under Title VI of the Treaty of European Union. Title VI concerned all
the compensatory measures that would have to be taken once the removal of
border controls between the member states of the EU had been accomplished
(Benyon, 1997). In 1997, a counter-terrorism preparatory group was created to
formulate Europol’s role in matters of counter-terrorism (Rauchs & Koenig,
2001). Subsequently, the EU Council of Ministers signed the Amsterdam Treaty
that approved an extension of Europol’s mandate to specifically include
counter-terrorism.
The European Police Office: An Overview
The establishment of Europol was first agreed upon on February 7, 1992 in the
Treaty on European Union, also called the Maastricht Treaty, named after the
town in The Netherlands where the treaty was signed (Europol website; Lavra-
nos, 2003; Marotta, 1999; Occhipinti, 2003; Winer, 2004). Article K.3 of the
Treaty concerned the “Establishment of a European Police Office,” specifying
the new body’s governance structure and its function to facilitate cooperation
among the police of the EU member states. On January 3, 1994, Europol started
limited operations in The Hague, The Netherlands, in the form of the Europol
Drugs Unit that was specifically centered on the policing of international drugs
crimes. Progressively, other areas of international criminality were added. On
July 18, 1995, a Europol Convention was formally drawn up in Brussels, and on
October 1, 1998, the Convention came into force when it had been ratified by
342 DEFLEM
all member states (Europol Convention, 1995). Europol thereupon commenced
its full range of activities on July 1, 1999.
Europol’s Mandate
Based on the provisions of the Europol Convention, the objectives of Europol are
to improve the effectiveness of and cooperation among the police authorities of
the EU member states in order to prevent and combat serious international
organized crime. Europol’s specific areas of criminal investigation include the
illicit trafficking in drugs, vehicles, and human beings, including child pornogra-
phy; forgery of money; money-laundering; and terrorism. Priority is given to
crimes against persons, financial crimes, and cyber crimes, when an organized
criminal structure is involved and when the criminal activity involves two or
more member states of the EU. As of January 1, 2002, the mandate of Europol
has been expanded to deal with “all serious forms of international crime,” such
as organized robbery, swindling and fraud, computer crime, corruption, envi-
ronmental crime, and other crimes specified in the Europol Convention’s Annex
(Europol Convention, 1995).
Similar to the structure of other international police organizations, Europol is
not an executive police force with autonomous investigative powers. Instead,
Europol’s activities are oriented at facilitating communications among and
supporting selected activities of the police organizations in the participating
states. Formally, Europol’s functions include: (a) the facilitation of information
exchange among the so-called Europol Liaison Officers, who are seconded to the
Europol headquarters in The Hague by the member states to act as representa-
tives of their national police; (b) the supply of operational analysis in support of
relevant police operations conducted by the member states; (c) the drawing up
of strategic reports, such as threat assessments, and crime analyses on the basis
of information supplied by police of the member states or generated at Europol
headquarters; and (d) the offering of technical support for police investigations
conducted in the EU member states. Each member state of the EU must desig-
nate a particular agency to act as the Europol National Unit or contact point for
Europol communications, but the specific organization of the National Units is
determined by each member state.
Among its most important instruments, Europol manages the Europol Computer
System. This system was set up in accordance with the Europol Convention’s spec-
ification that Europol would maintain a computerized system for the analysis of
data within a framework that also included protections in terms of human rights
and a proper supervision of those data. The collection and distribution of data on
people’s behavior and movements has been a long-standing concern in Europe
ever since the development of the so-called Schengen Information System, which
had been in operation since 1995 and was later brought under control of the EU
(Winer, 2004). Though still treated with suspicion among privacy advocates, the
Europol Computer System is presently supplemented by two additional databases:
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 343
the EU Customs Information System which provides customs agencies the ability
to exchange information on smuggling, and the FIDE (an acronym for “Fichier
d’identification des dossiers d’enquêtes douanières,” Identification File of
Customs Investigations) which provides information on subjects involved in a
criminal investigation.
Organization and Control
Currently, Europol ensures cooperation among police of all 25 EU member
states. Since Estonia joined Europol on July 1, 2005, all 10 states that had
joined the EU in May 2004 also formally participated in Europol. The slight delay
in the newest EU member states receiving Europol membership was due to the
fact that a new member state must first adopt the Europol Convention and
subsequently send notification to the EU of its intention to join Europol, 3
months after which membership is granted. Each member state sets up a
Europol National Unit and seconds officers to the Europol headquarters in The
Hague. Presently, Europol’s headquarters are staffed by 494 personnel from the
various member states. Of these, 82 are Europol Liaison Officers from a variety
of member states’ police and security agencies, including national police,
customs, and immigration services.
Europol is governed by a Directorate, consisting of a Director and three
Deputy Directors. The EU Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs
appoints the Director for a 5-year period, renewable once for 4 years, and the
Deputy Directors for a once renewable 4-year period. The Council also adopts
the Europol budget and acts as a control and regulatory body over Europol by
each year forwarding a report to the European Parliament to document on the
work of Europol. The European Parliament must also be consulted if provisions
of the Europol Convention or any other Europol regulations are to be amended.
Supervision of Europol’s day-to-day operations is undertaken by an internal
Europol Management Board, consisting of one representative of each member
state, which meets at least twice a year to discuss a range of issues pertaining
to Europol’s activities and adopt reports on Europol’s activities and future
direction. These reports are submitted to the Council of Ministers of Justice and
Home Affairs for final approval. Finally, Europol is also guided by a Joint Super-
visory Body that is composed of appointed representatives of the national super-
visory bodies in the member states. The task of the Joint Supervisory Board is to
ensure that the rights of the individual are not violated by the handling of data
that are managed through the Europol channels.
Europol and Counter-Terrorism
Although terrorism was not formally added to Europol’s mandate until 1998,
terrorism was among the international criminal problems that motivated the
344 DEFLEM
creation of the police organization. The Europol Convention of 1995 already
mentioned “the urgent problems arising from terrorism, unlawful drug traffick-
ing and other serious forms of international crime” as justifying the need for
enhanced police cooperation by means of information exchange between
Europol and the member states (Europol Convention, 1995). Since the formation
of Europol, terrorism has clearly gained in importance as one of the organiza-
tion’s mandates.
The Centrality of 9/11
Although Europe has had considerable experience with terrorism since the 1970s,
the events of 9/11 have served as an important catalyst in the development of
new terrorism legislation in the EU (den Boer, 2003; Peers, 2003; Scheppele,
2004) and a prioritization of counter-terrorism among Europe’s police organiza-
tions, including Europol (Anderson, 2002; den Boer & Monar, 2002; Fijnaut, 2004;
Lavranos, 2003; Monar, 2002; Wouters, 2003). Immediately following the attacks
of 9/11, a Europol Operational Centre was created to provide a 24-hour service
for the exchange of information. On September 20, 2001, the Council of the
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs adopted several measures to combat terror-
ism on the basis of proposals by Europol and the Council General-Secretariat
(Council of the European Union [hereafter: CEU], 2001). A few months later, on
November 15, 2001, a specialized counter-terrorism unit, the Counter-Terrorism
Task Force (at some point called the Task Force Terrorism) became fully opera-
tional at the Europol headquarters. This specialized unit consists of terrorism
experts and liaison officers from police and intelligence services of the EU
member states. The Counter-Terrorism Task Force is assigned to: (a) collect all
relevant information and intelligence concerning the current terrorism threat in
the European Union; (b) analyze the collected information and undertake oper-
ational and strategic analysis; and (c) formulate a threat assessment, including
targets, modus operandi, and security consequences (Europol website). A year
after its creation, the Counter-Terrorism Task Force was incorporated into
Europol’s Serious Crime Department (CEU, 2005b), but after the terrorist bomb-
ings in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the Task Force was re-established as a separate
entity. There are currently 15 Europol staff working permanently on terrorism
matters in addition to 10 experts who are seconded from member states to the
Counter-Terrorism Task Force and 22 analysts from the Serious Crime Depart-
ment who have been assigned to counter-terrorism duties.
Among the most concrete results of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force to date
are the production of several threat assessments concerning the presence of
terrorist groups in Europe and an overview of existing counter-terrorism security
measures in the EU. Assessing the terrorist threat in Europe, Europol maintains
two so-called “analysis work files.” The analysis work file “Islamic Terrorism,”
active since 1999, focuses on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, whereas the
analysis work file “Dolphin” focuses on all other terrorist groups and activities.
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 345
Other Task Force activities include assessments on the financing of terrorism,
various analyses of information concerning terrorist movements in Europe, and
the establishment of an Arabic-to-English translation system for the evaluation
of Arabic intelligence.
The events of 9/11 also influenced the EU’s formal policy decisions against
terrorism. Among the most important of the newly instituted EU policies are the
so-called “framework decisions” on terrorism and related matters, such as joint
investigation teams and mutual legal assistance, that were agreed upon by the
Council of the European Union in June 2002 (Council of the European Union,
2002). The Council framework decisions define terrorist offences as various crim-
inal activities, such as attacks upon a person’s life, kidnappings, the destruction
of public facilities, the seizure of means of public transportation, as well as
threats to commit any of these acts, when they are committed with the aim of
seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or interna-
tional organization from performing or abstaining from any act, and/or seriously
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental structures of a country or of an inter-
national organization. In matters of police cooperation, the framework decisions
call for an improvement of cooperation among the counter-terrorist units of the
EU member states. To this end, joint investigation teams can be set up by the
security forces of two or more EU member states for a specific purpose and for
a limited period. Among the requirements, the leader of the team operating in
any one EU country must be from that country, and the team must always oper-
ate according to the laws of the member state in which it operates. A newly
introduced European Arrest Warrant allows for the handing over of wanted
persons directly from one member states’ judicial authority to that of any other
EU state.
The 2002 framework decisions also suggested an elaboration of Europol’s
counter-terrorism mandate and international cooperation activities. The police
organization is now formally allowed to maintain relations with police and secu-
rity forces outside the EU. Europol entertains cooperative relations with Inter-
pol and with FBI as well as police of other non-EU states, some of which now
have liaison officers at the Europol offices in The Hague (interview). Europol,
conversely, maintains a liaison office in Washington, DC, created as a result of a
cooperation agreement between Europol and the United States that was first
adopted a few weeks after September 11, 2004. The agreement was renewed
after the March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid, Spain, when the EU drafted a
new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” that reaffirmed the 2002 framework
decisions (Council of the European Union, 2004a, 2004b).
Europol’s Counter-Terrorism Programs
Alongside of the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Europol set
up a variety of functionally specialized programs. A “Counter Terrorism
Program” was created to coordinate all Europol activities against terrorism,
346 DEFLEM
including information gathering and threat assessments. Upon request from a
member state, Europol also supports operational investigations by EU police and
joint investigation teams (Schalken & Pronk, 2002). Europol’s “Counter Prolifer-
ation Program” covers all forms of illicit trafficking, including nuclear materi-
als, arms, and explosives. A “Networking Program” aims to establish contacts
and coordination among the experts of the two prior programs and experts of
other international organizations and police of non-EU states. Europol’s
“Preparedness Program” was created to develop multilateral investigative
teams in the case of certain terrorist incidents in the EU. Finally, in support of
the intelligence and investigative programs, a “Training and Education
Program” has been set up to provide training to relevant personnel in the EU
member states.
The impact of Europol’s strategies, including its counter-terrorism opera-
tions, in terms of criminal investigations and arrests is at present difficult to
estimate, not only because of the relatively recent establishment of Europol
and its Counter-Terrorism Task Force, but also because Europol is very protec-
tive of the organization’s assistance in investigative activities. Information on
ongoing criminal investigations (so-called operational data) are typically treated
confidentially by police organizations, but Europol officials are also reluctant to
provide information, even information as general as the number of arrests that
have been made on the basis of Europol support, because the organization seeks
to safeguard the integrity and autonomy of the National Units. Such sensitivity
is considered especially important because of the legal and cultural diversity
that exists across the EU member states (interview). In 2005, an effectiveness
study of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies was published, but most of the
information in the report is not declassified, and no Europol information is
mentioned (CEU, 2005c). Europol officials occasionally confirm that cooperation
is being provided, but will not reveal any specifics of such cooperation. Europol
will sporadically claim to have participated in certain high-profile investiga-
tions, such as when police in 13 European countries in June 2005 raided some
150 homes in a massive Europol-supported operation against child pornography
networks (“As Europe hunts,” 2005). One Europol document mentions that, by
May 2005, 21 investigation in various member states were using the terrorism
analysis services of Europol, but no further information is provided (CEU,
2005b).
The little systematic information that is available about Europol’s activities
in support of investigative matters comes from the organization’s Annual
Reports (available on the Europol website). These numbers reveal that Europol
is increasingly being used by the EU member states’ National Units. While the
number of cases that reached Europol in the year 2000 had dropped slightly to
1,922 from 1,998 the year before, that number rose to 2,429 in 2001. While
there may have been an effect towards greater cooperation following the
events of 9/11 in that year, most cases in 2001 were not terrorism-related but
concerned drugs crimes (51 percent), illegal immigration (17 percent), and
stolen vehicles (8 percent). The Annual Reports for 2002 and 2003 indicate an
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 347
increase in the total number of cases that were initiated: 3,413 in 2002 and
4,700 in 2003. The Annual Report for 2004 does not mention the total number of
cases, but it specifies the total number of operational messages at 154,000, a
considerable increase from the 94,723 messages in 2003. Europol officials
attribute the rise in the use of its services to the growing awareness among
Europe’s police and intelligence agencies of the advantages of Europol, the
enlargement of the EU in 2004, and the more targeted approach of its activities
surrounding matters of organized international crimes, including terrorism,
drugs, illegal immigration, and financial crimes.
Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism
Reviewing the structure and activities of Europol and its counter-terrorism
activities on the basis of the theoretical model of police bureaucratization, I
will argue that a duality and tension can be noted in the manner in which the
police organization relates to the formal political structure of the European
Union, on the one hand, and the organizational and operational components
of the organization, on the other. Europol is an international police organiza-
tion that is formally mandated by the European Union and overseen by the
regulatory bodies of the EU. At the same time, however, Europol coordinates
activities among National Units drawn from existing police and security agen-
cies in the EU member states. These agencies are highly bureaucratized in
respect of the knowledge and know-how of their enforcement duties, which
will also influence the workings of Europol as a collaborative organization. In
terms of its operations and objectives, indeed, Europol’s activities are prima-
rily guided by concerns over efficiency on the basis of a broadly understood
mandate. Europol’s operations, furthermore, are framed within the context of
the interests of the EU and its participating national states, bringing about a
“Europeanization” of counter-terrorism.
Europol in the European Union: Formal Legality and Professional Expertise
The political framework of Europol as a body formally sanctioned within the
structures of the EU creates certain opportunities that other international police
organizations lack. Most distinctly, inasmuch as Europol’s mandate is legally
specified, the organization has a clearly defined and limited field of operations.
Other international police organizations have often experienced problems in
coming to terms among the many participating police agencies about the proper
boundaries of their law enforcement objectives and activities, because the legal
systems and police traditions of countries vary considerably (Deflem, 2006).
Europol is instead guided by a formal set of documents that lays out the organi-
zation’s functions and structure. Relatedly, Europol can also rely on formal
agreements of cooperation with the various participating police institutions and
348 DEFLEM
their respective national governments and likewise formally maintain external
agreements with non-EU states. In the history of international policing, the
formal status of membership in Europol is one of the organization’s most
outstanding characteristics, as other organizations of international policing rely
only on informal resolutions, typically in the form of a memorandum of under-
standing (Deflem, 2002).
The formal legality of Europol can also pose certain restrictions to the organi-
zation’s structure and capabilities. Europol’s Directorate is appointed by the EU
Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. This dependency on the EU
Council in determining the leadership of Europol had a clearly negative effect
when the Council Ministers were recently unable, over a period of more than
half a year, to appoint a new Director after the 5-year term of Europol’s first
Director, Jürgen Storbeck, had expired in July of 2004 (“EU interior,” 2004;
“German report,” 2005). While Mariano Simancas of Spain served as Interim
Director, four countries (Spain, Italy, Germany, and France) each proposed their
own candidate for the vacancy, but a lengthy dispute ensued, and no new
Director could be agreed upon until February 2005, when the German Max-Peter
Ratzel was finally appointed. In the wake of the 2004 terrorist bombings in
Madrid that killed 191 people and wounded more than 1,800, the wrangling over
which national would be allowed take up the Europol post betrays the shortcom-
ings of international cooperation when nationalist sentiments and political
concerns drive the agenda, rather than considerations of expertise in matters of
law enforcement.
The political decision-making process in the EU can also be relatively ineffec-
tive in fostering police cooperation. In the aftermath of the terrorist bombings
that hit Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union swiftly agreed to condemn these attacks, strengthen the European
commitment to fight terrorism, and propose a new series of counter-terrorism
measures (CEU, 2005a; “EU’s anti-terror response,” 2004). However, not all of
those measures have been implemented at the national level of the EU member
states, where political-ideological squabbling often prevents the passing of
appropriate legislation (“EU ministers,” 2005). One of the investigating judges
in the 2004 Madrid terrorist bombings summed up the situation well, when he
argued that the political goodwill to enhance “cooperation and coordination in
the fight against terrorism … generally lasts no longer than the duration of the
symposium” (“EU terror chief,” 2004). Among the few concrete results of the
EU Ministers’ counter-terrorism efforts has been the creation of a new “EU
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,” a position that is currently occupied by the
Dutchman Gijs de Vries, often nicknamed “Mr. Terror” in the European press.
While counter-terrorism cooperation at the political level sometimes remains
an expression of goodwill with few consequences, police and security agencies
do achieve cooperation in practical matters. In part, these accomplishments are
achieved by European counter-terrorism officials gathering at meetings separate
from the EU Ministers. After the Madrid bombings in March 2004, for example,
several meetings of police and intelligence officials were held (“EU Police chiefs
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 349
to discuss Madrid attacks,” 2004). In Dublin, the European Chiefs of Police Task
Force, representing all 25 (then current and future) EU states, held a two-day
conference with representatives of Europol, Interpol, and police officials of
Norway and Iceland. Coinciding with the police meeting was an additional meet-
ing of intelligence chiefs of five European nations (Spain, Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy) in Madrid. Similarly, a few days after the July 7 bombings in
London, a confidential meeting of police, intelligence officials, and forensic
experts was held at Scotland Yard (“Police call,” 2005). Among the attendants
were officials from about 30 countries, including the United States, Israel,
Australia, Japan, and the EU states, as well as representatives from Interpol and
Europol. Additionally revealing the level of effective cooperation at the police
level, investigative support in the inquiries in the London bombings was provided
by Spanish and American forensic teams (“Terror in London,” 2005).
While the formal legal framework set by the European Union’s governing
bodies places limits on the autonomy of Europol, the organization also engages
in cooperation agreements at an institutional and nation-state level. Europol
maintains relations with countries outside the European Union, such as Switzer-
land, Turkey, Colombia, and the United States, and with other international
police organizations (Mitsilegas, 2003; Paye, 2004; Schalken & Pronk, 2002; Seit-
ner, 2003). Although Europol’s cooperation agreements have to be approved by
the EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, it is important to note that they are
initiated at the request of Europol’s Management Board. Europol’s agreements
with other police organizations have distinct implications in terms of the organi-
zation’s autonomy as an international police body. The cooperation between
Europol and Eurojust, the European prosecutorial office, originally located in
Brussels, Belgium, and now moved permanently to The Hague (Eurojust
website), harmonizes with the fact that Europol and Eurojust are both formal
EU-sanctioned organizations. But other cooperation agreements enable Europol
to expand its scope beyond the formally proscribed mandate of the EU. For
example, Europol cooperates with the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) that was
formed after 9/11. Unlike Europol, the CTG was formed at a professional level
by the heads of the police and intelligence services of the EU member states.
Importantly, the CTG does not operate on the basis of a formal mandate by the
European Union, but on the basis of a memorandum of understanding that was
drafted and agreed upon by the participating heads of police. Cooperating with
the Counter Terrorism Group, Europol can therefore route information more
quickly (interview).
Europol entertains agreements similar to the one it has with the Counter
Terrorism Group with other police organizations that are marked by a high
degree of bureaucratic autonomy, such as Interpol and the European Police
Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF). The cooperation between Europol and
the PCOTF concerns several counter-terrorism issues, such as the operational
analysis of “Islamic Extremist Terrorism,” terrorism threat assessments, the
financing of terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Importantly, the
PCOTF is, like the CTG, not regulated on the basis of an explicit EU treaty and
350 DEFLEM
has no formal accountability to the Union, but was instead formed on the basis
of a recommendation from the European Council in October 1999 (Statewatch,
2004).
Thus, Europol’s formal status as an international organization in the EU is
supplemented by an independent structure of international cooperation at the
bureaucratic level of police institutions. Besides cooperation agreements, the
interlinking of multiple international police organizations is also accomplished
by overlapping memberships in their respective leadership structures. For
example, the Assistant Commissioner of the Irish National Police Service also
acts as representative on the Europol Management Board, the Police Chiefs Task
Force, and the Club of Berne (An Garda Síochána, 2004).
Europol as Bureaucracy: Efficiency in Crime Control
Despite Europol’s origins in the context of an international political union, the
organization’s policing and counter-terrorism operations are organized in the
rationalized terms of an efficient control of crime. Europol relies on the partici-
pation of existing police institutions in the EU for the staffing of the headquar-
ters and the Europol National Units in the 25 member states. Personnel at the
headquarters and in the National Units is typically made up of experts in
international policing with prior experience participating in non-governmental
international police organizations. Europol’s recruitment of police professionals
from existing national police and intelligence agencies may seem obvious, but
the implication of this reliance is nonetheless that the international organiza-
tion can operate only within the context of an existing professional culture of
policing.
Besides the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force as a specialized unit
and the development of functional programs to combat terrorism, the relevance
of instrumental rationality in Europol can also be observed in the organization’s
emphasis on efficiency in operations. As is the case in other international police
organizations (Deflem, 2002, 2004b, 2006), an emphasis is placed in Europol’s
crime-fighting activities on establishing swift methods of communication and
information exchange among the participating agencies. Most distinct in this
respect has been the creation of Europol as a cooperative network with a central
headquarters that functions to enable rapid communications among the various
National Units. The practical advantages of such a structure are considerable
from an efficiency-oriented viewpoint as the participating agencies need not
contact one another directly but can route information via The Hague to be
passed on to all other member agencies. Europol communications with the
National Units rely on the latest advances in technology by means of an “Infor-
mation Exchange System” (INFO-EX) that enables encrypted electronic messages.
Europol’s emphasis on efficiency in cooperative matters is also seen in the
various agreements the organization oversees with non-EU states. Europol’s liaison
office in the United States, for instance, functions to ease cooperation with the
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 351
various US law enforcement agencies. It does so directly in police matters that
concern the United States and two or more member states, and it handles requests
to US police from the National Units in the EU member states (interview). Europol
cooperation with local and state police agencies in the United States is accom-
plished via the US National Central Bureau, the US representative of Interpol.
Similarly indicating the concern with efficiency in communications, Europol
officials have expressed concerns that some of the newest member states (the
so-called “accession states,” such as Estonia and Lithuania) do not possess the
necessary infrastructure to effectively participate in international police coop-
eration (Storbeck, 2003).
An emphasis on efficiency does not necessarily imply effectiveness. Among
the obstacles Europol faces with respect to counter-terrorism is the fact that
terrorism is in some EU countries dealt with by police agencies, whereas intelli-
gence agencies are responsible for counter-terrorism in other EU states. Coop-
eration across intelligence and police agencies can be difficult, because police
institutions tend to be interested in specific information about suspects in order
to make an arrest, whereas intelligence agencies are very broadly interested in
general information without prosecutorial purposes (interview).
The technical, rather than political, nature of the difficulties in police coop-
eration is further revealed from the emphasis on linguistic matters of communi-
cation, at the level of police and with respect to the targets of their activities.
The lack of knowledge of Arabic among Europe’s police forces and resulting
difficulties in penetrating underground groups of non-European origin are
obvious and important concerns (Kupchinsky, 2004). Police cooperation is
further compounded by the linguistic, cultural, legal, and political diversity that
exists across the countries of the European Union (Tak, 2000). All the informa-
tion which Europol receives in the area of terrorism has to be translated in some
11 languages before it can be sent to the National Units in the member states
(interview).
Among the implications of police bureaucratization in terms of efficiency, it
is important to note that not only can police agencies independently determine
the proper means of policing, but also they can specify the objectives of police
work given a broad and generally formulated mandate of crime control (Deflem,
2002, 2004b). In the case of Europol, the relative restrictiveness of the organi-
zation’s formal mandate can be evaded by relying on existing police agencies in
the EU and broadening the organization’s membership by cooperating with
other international police organizations and the agencies of non-EU nations. As
a result, Europol can rely on a well-developed international police culture, in
Europe and across the world, which has for a long time forged international
relations on the basis of a common understanding of the function of police. As
research has shown (Deflem, 2002, 2005a), the development of an international
police culture in the industrialized world can be traced back to at least the late
nineteenth century when police institutions began to develop international
cooperation for the policing of criminal, rather than political, offences.
Therefore, also, Europol’s participating agencies and those with whom Europol
352 DEFLEM
cooperates typically will be able to agree on the scope of terrorism-related
activities, despite the diversity of the legal systems of the EU member states
(den Boer, 2001; Tak, 2000).
What is most remarkable given the range of institutions that cooperate with
Europol is not that problems occasionally ensue, but that there has been a trend
towards the development of a shared understanding of terrorism across the
globe since the events of 9/11. Much like is the case with police organizations in
the United States and other parts of the world (Deflem, 2004b, 2006), Europol’s
counter-terrorism focus has gone most centrally to “Islamic extremist terror-
ism” or “fundamentalist jihadist terrorism” (Europol website). In a Europol
terrorism trends report of December 2004, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are
mentioned as a main security concern against European and Western interests
(Europol, 2004, pp. 23, 41). Other terrorist groups Europol focuses on include
the separatist Basque group ETA, the Real IRA, Bosnian and Chechen nationalist
groups that organize in Austria, and extreme leftists and anarchist groups in
Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. These assorted terrorist groups are similarly
targeted by Europol because of the impact their criminal activities have on
European societies, irrespective of the groups’ political motivations. Harmoniz-
ing with the comprehensive definition of terrorism in the EU framework
decisions (Council of the European Union, 2002), Europol and its participating
agencies thus focus on terrorism very broadly in terms of the commonalities
terrorist activities have as a criminal, rather than a political, offense.
Europol in Europe: The Boundaries of International Cooperation
No single international police organization has ever been formed as a suprana-
tional force, although occasionally calls are made for the creation of such as an
international agency. In the context of Europe’s recent counter-terrorism expe-
rience, for example, the Ministers of some EU member states expressed their
preference to create a “European Intelligence Service.” At the EU Council meet-
ing after the Madrid bombings in 2004, the Belgian and Austrian Ministers
expressed their hope that the agency would be modeled after the CIA or the FBI
in the United States (“One year from Madrid” 2005). Ultimately, the proposed
new body was conceived as a clearing house of information on extremist groups,
but no such new agency was ever set up, indicating that supranationalism in
police and intelligence cooperation could not be achieved. The collaborative
model of international cooperation was affirmed in the continued and expanded
role of Europol. The one limited form of supranationalism that was accomplished
after Madrid is the new position of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. However, the
Coordinator cannot propose legislation and has no real authority over the EU
member states but acts only in the limited capacity of advisor.
The persistence of nationality in international policing also affects Europol’s
cooperation efforts. Although the establishment of a Europol National Unit is
required for all EU member states once they have joined Europol, the organization
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 353
and staffing of the National Unit are entirely up to the member states. Information
exchange with the Europol headquarters, also, is voluntary, and the level of
involvement from the various National Units in Europol varies greatly from one
country to the next (interview). Differences in the level of participation in Europol
are not surprising inasmuch as police can be expected to be involved in interna-
tional activities to a degree that is determined by their experience with relevant
criminal problems. However, indications are that other factors play a role as well
and that even in the case of international terrorism and organized crime—prob-
lems which effectively cross national boundaries—cooperation is not always easily
accomplished. A sense of trust among police and an expectation of positive
outcomes are among the central concerns in international cooperation irrespec-
tive of the availability of technologically advanced communication systems (inter-
view). Absent these prerequisites, police may be reluctant to share information
even when they formally participate in international organizations such as
Europol. Europol officials themselves have conceded that cooperation could be
improved. Following the 2004 bombings in Madrid, then Europol Director Jürgen
Storbeck criticized the EU member states for paying mostly “lip service” to the
international organization (Big Five, 2004).
An indication of a lack of cooperation among Europe’s counter-terrorism
forces was revealed after the Madrid bombings, when French police officials
were outraged over the fact that their Spanish counterparts refused to share
information on the types of explosives that had been used (Kupchinsky, 2004).
Likewise, after a Moroccan citizen, who used to live in Hamburg, Germany, was
arrested by Italian authorities in April 2003 because of his association with a
Milan-based Al-Qaeda cell, it turned out that the man had already been ques-
tioned by German police just a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks. Information
about the suspect, however, had not been shared among Europe’s police (“As
Europe hunts,” 2004). Such findings indicate that police agencies remain
concerned primarily with nationally defined enforcement tasks, even when
these tasks involve criminal problems of an international nature.
In consequence, although the intelligence and analysis capacities at the
Europol headquarters have improved considerably, the volume of data that
reaches Europol is said to remain relatively “sparse” (“German report,” 2005).
While indications are that Europe is facing a growing number of internationally
organized militant organizations, agencies in the EU states are reluctant to
share information on a multilateral scale and instead engage in more limited
bilateral cooperation. The preference of bilateral cooperation is most notice-
ably revealed in the relations between Europol and the FBI. Despite the coop-
eration agreement between Europol and the United States, the FBI prefers to
conduct its international cooperation directly with the police of the EU
member states in a bilateral context. Whenever a EU member states contacts
Europol with a request to the FBI, the message is not passed on via the Europol
Liaison Office in Washington but is routed to the FBI legal attaché in the EU
member state from which the request originates (interview). The police agen-
cies of some member states, furthermore, have their own liaison officers
354 DEFLEM
stationed in Washington, DC, and supplement the Europol system by means of
bilateral cooperation with US agencies.
National and regional persistence in international policing, finally, is also
reflected in Europol’s focus on those terrorist and other criminal conditions that
are specific to the European Union. The “Europeanization” of international
counter-terrorism policing is not surprising as the disappearance of Europe’s
internal borders with the European unification was the primary motivating
factor in developing enhanced police cooperation (den Boer, 2003). But cooper-
ative activities with police organizations beyond the European Union will also be
influenced by such European concerns. Thus, Europol concentrates its efforts on
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups inasmuch as they are active in or other-
wise relevant to Europe. In the EU, some countries are targeted because of their
involvement in the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, or because of some specific
regional factor, such as the ban on Islamic veils in French schools (Europol,
2004). Other counter-terrorism matters with which Europol is involved are
distinct to some of the EU’s nation states, such as the various nationalist
terrorist groups that operate in Spain and the United Kingdom.
Conclusion
As in the case of other police and criminal justice agencies in many countries
across the world, counter-terrorism activities by Europol have increased consid-
erably in scope and significance since the events of September 11. With the
focus continuing to be oriented at terrorist activities that are planned by
certain extremist Islamic-affiliated groups, and in view of the persistent
tensions surrounding related political issues such as the war in Iraq, it is clear
that international terrorism will remain a central driving force in forging coop-
eration among police and security agencies in the European Union and else-
where in the world. Terrorism, in general, and Islamic extremist terrorism, in
particular, will surely remain important elements in shaping international
police efforts in Europe, because they are perceived as major threats to Euro-
pean security. Europol’s counter-terrorism programs and instruments can simi-
larly be expected to be elaborated and relied upon by participating police
agencies.
In the broader constellation of international police developments, Europol
takes up a special place. Europol is a unique international police organization in
having been created by the international governing body of the European Union,
whereas other international organizations of policing have been formed from
the bottom up by police professionals. Europol’s dependence on the regulatory
oversight capacities of the European Union creates a legal framework of police
cooperation that can increase the organization’s accountability (den Boer,
2002), but that can also hinder effective cooperation among police, if only
because police officials perceive accountability requirements as intrusions on
their activities (Alain, 2001).
EUROPOL AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 355
Despite being a formally sanctioned institution in the EU, Europol is also
dependent on and a manifestation of a professional police culture that evolved
at the European and broader international level. Broadening its scope beyond the
European Union, Europol relies on cooperative agreements with professional
police agencies inside and outside Europe and with non-governmentally formed
international police organizations, such as the Counter Terrorism Group and the
Police Chiefs Operational Task Force. Maintaining relations with such institu-
tions, Europol can rely on counter-terrorist and other policing practices that have
developed on the basis of professional expertise. The extent to which police work
in Europol is bureaucratized may lead to concerns that the organization’s
activities, especially in the sensitive area of terrorism, emphasize efficiency in
police work without sufficient regard for considerations of legality and justice.
Such concerns are amplified because of Europol’s international computerized
data system and the power of the organization in influencing police work in the
EU member states. Also, Europol is a relatively young organization, so that it may
be expected to continue to evolve into a more fully developed bureaucratic
institution characterized by a high degree of institutional independence.
Europol’s activities against international crime and terrorism focus on
distinctly European problems or the European dimensions of more global
concerns. Islamic extremist terrorism, particularly, is conceived by Europol as a
global criminal concern that also affects security conditions in the European
Union. Because of the involvement of European al-Qaeda cells in the terrorist
attacks of September 11 and in view of the affiliations of the perpetrators of
the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, these justifica-
tions have foundation. Europol and other police organizations had anticipated
some of these developments. In December 2004, for example, Europol had
already singled out the United Kingdom as a special target of al-Qaeda terrorism
and warned that “active extremist cells of European Union citizens of second
generation Pakistani origin” deserved special consideration (Europol, 2004;
“Terrorism,” 2005). At the same time, given the considerable presence in
Europe of people with Middle-Eastern and Muslim origins, the focus in Europol’s
counter-terrorism operations on Islamic extremism can have effects beyond
those explicitly intended, inasmuch as suspicions may arise among the public
that counter-terrorist police operations reveal an anti-Muslim bias. So far,
however, the emphasis on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism has met with little
opposition. Only the Turkish press has occasionally criticized Europol’s
suspected overconcentration on Islamic-linked terrorist organizations (“Shallow
fight,” 2005).
Because of Europol’s focus on the criminal aspects of terrorism, the Europe-
anization of counter-terrorism does not usually clash with the operations against
terrorism that are being waged by many other police organizations across the
world. But this police focus on terrorism as a crime cannot always be harmo-
nized with anti-terrorist activities that conceive of terrorists as enemies or
unlawful combatants. From the United States viewpoint, there are many criti-
cisms on the “war on terror” in terms of its domestic repercussions in terms of
356 DEFLEM
civil rights, but the use of the metaphor as a source of US concerns over
Europe’s supposed lack of cooperation in military matters is less severely criti-
cized. Yet, it is clear that charges that Europe is “soft” on terrorism cannot be
founded. What is the case is that Europe has more experience in approaching
terrorism more exclusively as a police matter and that the European public
tends to be wary of military actions (LaPorte, 2004). It is uncertain if the occa-
sionally strained relations across the Atlantic in political and military respects
will also affect cooperation among relevant police authorities, or if the latter
can maintain a level of independence. Continued research by social scientists
studying the crime and criminal justice dimensions of terrorism and counter-
terrorism can contribute to formulating adequate answers to such central
questions of contemporary public policy, providing their research is framed
within useful contexts and, as always, guided by theoretically meaningful
models of analysis.
Acknowledgments
A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
American Society of Criminology, Denver, November 2003. The Richard L.
Walker Institute of International and Area Studies provided funding for this
project. I thank the Editor, Chester Britt, and the anonymous reviewers at
Justice Quarterly, for their help in finalizing this paper. I am grateful to Brian
Hudak, for his valuable research assistance.
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