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The Existential Model of Perfectionism and Depressive Symptoms:
A Short-Term, Four-Wave Longitudinal Study
Aislin R. Graham, Simon B. Sherry,
and Sherry H. Stewart
Dalhousie University
Dayna L. Sherry
Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre
Daniel S. McGrath, Kristin M. Fossum, and Stephanie L. Allen
Dalhousie University
Perfectionistic concerns (i.e., negative reactions to failures, concerns over others’ criticism and expec-
tations, and nagging self-doubts) are a putative risk factor for depressive symptoms. This study proposes
and supports the existential model of perfectionism and depressive symptoms (EMPDS), a conceptual
model aimed at explaining why perfectionistic concerns confer risk for depressive symptoms. According
to the EMPDS, perfectionistic concerns confer risk for depressive symptoms both through catastrophic
interpretations that magnify relatively minor setbacks into seemingly major obstacles and through
negative views of life experiences as unacceptable, dissatisfying, and meaningless. This investigation
tests the EMPDS in a sample of 240 undergraduates studied using a 4-wave, 4-week longitudinal design.
Hypotheses derived from the EMPDS were largely supported, with bootstrap tests of mediation sug-
gesting that the indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns on depressive symptoms through catastrophic
thinking and difficulty accepting the past is significant. Results indicated perfectionistic concerns are
more an antecedent of, rather than a complication of, catastrophic thinking, difficulty accepting the past,
and depressive symptoms. Consistent (but imperfect) support for the incremental validity of the EMPDS
beyond either perfectionistic strivings or neuroticism was also observed. Overall, this investigation
suggests persons high in perfectionistic concerns not only tend to catastrophize their life experiences but
also struggle to accept their life experiences and to negotiate a sense of purpose, direction, and coherence
in their lives. With both a catastrophic view of their present and a dark view of their past, this
investigation also suggests persons high in perfectionistic concerns are at risk for depressive symptoms.
Keywords: perfectionism, cognitive distortions, existentialism, depression, neuroticism
Depression is a prevalent, impairing, and costly mental health
problem involving symptoms such as sadness, anhedonia, guilt,
fatigue, irritability, and sleep disturbance. Among undergraduates,
such symptoms are tied to health-damaging behavior (e.g., smok-
ing), healthcare expenses, suicide risk, lower grades, missing
classes, and relationship problems (Voelker, 2003). There is thus a
clear need to understand why people become depressed. In the
present study, we conceptualize and measure depression using a
dimensional model wherein depressive symptoms are understood
as lying along a continuum of severity. Our use of this model is
congruent with evidence indicating depression is a quantitative,
continuous dimension (Klein, 2008).
Research consistently implicates perfectionism in the onset
and the maintenance of depressive symptoms (Chang, 2000;
Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2003; Hewitt, Flett, & Ediger,
1996; Rice & Lopez, 2004; Sherry & Hall, 2009). Perfectionism
also predicts depressive symptoms above and beyond estab-
lished contributors to depressive symptoms, including attach-
ment dysfunction, low self-esteem, and ineffective coping
(Rice, Ashby, & Slaney, 1998; Wei, Mallinckrodt, Russell, &
Abraham, 2004). Though evidence suggests perfectionism and
depressive symptoms are robustly linked, there is still much to
learn about their interrelation.
Areas for Improvement in Research on Perfectionism
and Depressive Symptoms
Despite advances in the perfectionism-depressive symptoms
literature (e.g., Dunkley et al., 2003; Rice & Aldea, 2006), areas
This article was published Online First September 20, 2010.
Aislin R. Graham, Daniel S. McGrath, Kristin M. Fossum, and
Stephanie L. Allen, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada; Simon B. Sherry and Sherry H. Stewart,
Department of Psychology and Department of Psychiatry, Dalhousie Uni-
versity; Dayna L. Sherry, Department of Psychology, Queen Elizabeth II
Health Sciences Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
This manuscript was based on a research project conducted by Aislin R.
Graham as part of her comprehensive examinations. Aislin R. Graham was
supervised by Simon B. Sherry. This manuscript was supported by a grant
from the Dalhousie University Department of Psychiatry Research Fund
awarded to Simon B. Sherry, Sherry H. Stewart, and Dayna L. Sherry.
Sherry H. Stewart is supported by a Killam Research Professorship from
the Faculty of Science at Dalhousie University. We thank Ellen K. Breen
and Jillian Tonet for their research assistance.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Simon B.
Sherry, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Life Sciences
Centre, 1355 Oxford Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, B3H 4J1.
E-mail: simon.sherry@dal.ca
Journal of Counseling Psychology © 2010 American Psychological Association
2010, Vol. 57, No. 4, 423–438 0022-0167/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0020667
423
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