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UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East

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January 2009
76
UNIFIL II:
Emerging and Evolving European
Engagement in Lebanon
and the Middle East
Karim Makdisi &
Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth
This report was produced with the nancial assistance of the European Commission, under contract M ED-2005/109-063. The text is the sole responsibility
of the authors and in no way reects the ofcial opinion of the European Commission.
This report was submitted by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, and the Lebanese Centre for Policy
Studies (LCPS), Beirut, in collaboration with the Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax), Madrid, and the Issam
Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut (AUB). Karim Makdisi is Assistant
Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American Uni-
versity of Beirut; Timur Göksel served as spokesperson and senior advisor to UNIFIL I until 2003, and now also teaches
at the AUB; Hans Bastian Hauck is Head of Program of DGAP’s International Forum on Strategic Thinking; and Stuart
Reigeluth is Projects Manager for the Africa and Middle East Program at CITpax, Madrid.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements 4
1. Executive Summary 5
2. Introduction & Overview 7
2.1. Overview of Peace Operations 7
2.2. Overview of Peace Operations in the Middle East 11
2.3. Overview of EU Policy towards the Middle East 12
3. UNIFIL I (1978-2006): Political Context & Lessons Learned 13
3.1. The Arab-Israeli Wars and Lebanon: Palestinian Refugees and the PLO 13
3.2. Israel’s 1978 Invasion of Lebanon and the Creation of UNIFIL I 13
3.3. Israel’s 1982 Invasion and the Birth of the Lebanese Resistance 15
3.4. The 1990s: Israeli Incursions and the Development
of “Rules of the Game” 16
3.5. Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000: Liberation and the Dispute
over Resolution 425 17
3.6. Crisis in Lebanon and UN Involvement in Lebanon’s Internal
Affairs (2004-2007) 17
3.7. Lessons Learned: Positive Points & Challenges 18
4. UNIFIL II (2007 present): Precedent or Predicament? 21
4.1. Political Context: The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War 21
4.2. The Draft of UNSC Resolution 1701 and the Creation of UNIFIL II 22
Box 1: UNSC Resolution 1701: Excerpts 24
4.3. Deployment and Effectiveness of UNIFIL II 25
Map 1: UNIFIL II Deployment (March 2008) 27
4.4. The Maritime Task Force (MTF) 28
Box 2: German Support for Lebanese Border Management 30
5. Conclusion & Policy Recommendations 31
6. Annexes 34
6.1. UNSC Resolutions 425-426 34
6.2. August 5 UNSC Draft Resolution + UNSC Resolution 1701 34
7. Author Contact Information 39
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
4
76 January 2009
Acknowledgements A number of institutions and individuals contributed to the outcome of this report. The
authors are grateful to the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the Lebanese
Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) for their institutional support. In Berlin, ofcial meetings
were arranged with ofcials of the German Federal Foreign Ofce, the Ministry of Defense
and the Ministry of the Interior, all of whom kindly disposed of their time to discuss the
evolving European role in UNIFIL II. The ofcial visit and the Maritime Task Force presenta-
tion delivered on board the German frigate Bayern, off the Lebanese coast, as well as meet-
ings with ofcials from the German Federal Embassy and the German Border Pilot Project in
Beirut, were also made possible by DGAP. In addition, the authors are grateful to the Toledo
International Centre for Peace (CITpax) in Madrid for arranging meetings with the Spanish
Foreign and Defense Ministries, the Spanish Embassies in Beirut and in Damascus, and
with the Italian Embassy and ofcials in Lebanon. The authors would like to acknowledge
the senior political advisor to the Prime Minister of Lebanon, as well as various Lebanese
ofcials in the Foreign Ministry, for their invaluable assistance during this project. Various
UN ofcials in Lebanon, such as UNIFIL’s head of Political and Civilian Affairs, also kindly
agreed to candidly discuss UNIFIL’s role, achievements and challenges with the authors.
For reasons of condentiality, the names of interviewees are not here disclosed. Finally, the
authors would like to thank the anonymous readers for their useful comments during the
revision process. As usual, the authors take full responsibility for any errors or omissions
in this report. This report reects their opinions, and not those of their respective institu-
tions.
Authors’ Note:
This EuroMeSCo report was completed in mid-spring 2008 and therefore does not include
analysis of the Doha Agreement between Lebanese sides in May 2008, nor of the imminent
Israeli return of the Lebanese side of the border village of Ghajar. This report recognizes
that the lead-nation status of the Maritime Task Force off the coast of Lebanon has changed
from Germany to Italy, and then to France in September 2008. It also realizes that Spain
expects to assume lead-nation status of UNIFIL in early 2009, yet does not provide any fur-
ther details on these recent developments considering that the same mandate and current
obstacles continue to present challenges to peace-keeping in Lebanon.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
5
76 January 2009
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an international peacekeeping
force that results from recurrent attempts at intervention on the part of the international
community through the monitoring of cease-res and the peaceful resolution of conicts
around the world. Although also heavily involved in Africa and Asia, peacekeeping opera-
tions in the Middle East exemplify the repeated international efforts to provide a buffer
force between Arab states and Israel. Indeed, originating in the United Nations Truce Su-
pervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948, successive multinational forces have been de-
ployed in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon to assist in resolving the Arab-Israeli conict. However,
by its very own self-denition as an “interim” force, UNIFIL illustrates the predicament of
prolonged peacekeeping missions, revealing aspects that could nonetheless serve as a
precedent for other scenarios in the region, such as in Palestine.
After the March 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, UNIFIL was deployed following the ap-
proval of the US-drafted UN Security Council Resolution 425, which mandated UNIFIL to
guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international
peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its
effective authority in the area. However, it became clear only a few months later that the
Security Council would not provide UNIFIL the backing required to implement its mandate,
so the peacekeepers thus concentrated their efforts on assisting the delivery of humani-
tarian aid to the local population and recording violations of the cease-re. By 1982, the
US-Soviet détente that had enabled Resolution 425 had come to an end, the rise to power
of Ronald Reagan in the US and of Ariel Sharon in Israel had increased the threat of military
confrontation in the region, the continuing civil war in Lebanon had resulted in the total
collapse of state authority, and the consolidation of power of both the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and of Israeli-armed militias in southern Lebanon had led to an incon-
clusive war of attrition on the ground. UNIFIL was thus neither mandated, nor did it have
the capacity, to stop the large-scale 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent
siege of Beirut that was to shape the reality on the ground for the next two decades. While
PLO ghters had indeed been expelled from Lebanon, Israel continued to occupy a large
area of Lebanese territory, leading to the birth of an increasingly effective and organized
native Lebanese resistance force that at rst included an array of leftist, nationalist, and
Islamist groups. By the 1990s, this resistance to Israeli occupation came to be dominated
by Hizbullah, which gained broad national support that peaked when it was widely credited
for forcing Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000.
The period between May 2000 and July 2006 was relatively quiet on the Lebanon-Israel
border, but many of the root causes of the conict remained. Israel still held Lebanese pris-
oners and refused to relinquish territory claimed by Lebanon, such as the Sheba’a Farms,
while security concerns in both southern Lebanon and northern Israel remained precarious
due to the absence of a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conict. These factors helped main-
tain Hizbullah’s raison d’être for armed resistance and provided an excuse for its cross-
border raid on 12 July 2006 with the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers in order to engage
in a prisoner swap with Israel. Israel’s reaction to this raid led to 33 days of war between
Israel and Hizbullah – the longest war in Israel’s modern history which resulted in the
deaths of 1,200 Lebanese and 43 Israeli civilians, as well as the internal displacement of a
million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Henceforth called the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, the
massive Israeli response and destruction reaped on Lebanon was unparalleled to previous
reprisals for cross-border operations, as was the extent of Hizbullah’s rocket attacks on
northern Israel. After a US-written draft resolution was rejected by Lebanon on 6 August,
and with the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN at a low within Lebanon
because of its failure to halt the war, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1701 on 11
August, which came into effect on 14 August. Resolution 1701 authorized the creation of a
more “robust” UNIFIL in order to allow it to implement its new mandate of supervising the
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, while also ensur-
ing the deployment of the Lebanese army and return of effective state authority in southern
Lebanon at the expense of non-state militias.
EU Member States played a leading role in contributing to this more “robust” peacekeep-
ing force – which, for the sake of clarity, will be called “UNIFIL II” in this paper. Yet while
such an increase in troop levels has contributed to some measure of stability in southern
Lebanon, it has so far proved largely irrelevant in addressing the structural issues that
remain unresolved: different conceptions of security in Lebanon and Israel, territorial and
water claims, weak state authority in Lebanon, repeated Israeli violations of Lebanon’s sov-
ereignty, political stagnancy in the region, and the failure to establish a full cease-re in
southern Lebanon, let alone prevent an arms build-up by both sides along the border. As
such, “UNIFIL II” should be viewed as comprising part of a larger regional solution, rather
than as a partisan force with the impossible task of disarming Hizbullah, which some ac-
1.
Executive
Summary
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
6
76 January 2009
tors were hoping it would be. By early 2007, UNIFIL II had returned to the important role of
keeping the peace, engaging in social and humanitarian work, recording violations to Reso-
lution 1701, and supporting the Lebanese Army to assert its authority on the ground and
protect the residents of southern Lebanon from Israeli threats. Still, the tension surround-
ing UNIFIL’s exact terms of reference and rules of engagement, prompted by the changing
political situation, means that the peacekeepers are sometimes subject to the pressure
of being used as pawns in a partisan conict, rather than acting as neutral peacekeepers
– which could be dangerous for UNIFIL’s own security. Until the matter of its role is clari-
ed, UNIFIL II may prove to be a persistent predicament rather than a positive precedent
for peacekeeping in the Middle East.
To avoid such a possibility, this report offers concrete recommendations directed mainly at
the EU Member States most heavily involved in UNIFIL II, with the hope of rendering their
contribution more effective, avoiding the recurrent pitfalls, and nally reaching the objec-
tive of not only a down-sized participation, but also of monitoring the implementation of a
viable and just peace that ensures shared human security and mutual economic prosperity
for Israel and Lebanon alike.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
7
76 January 2009
There has been a long-standing debate on the merits and drawbacks of UNIFIL, the UN “in-
terim” peacekeeping operation established by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 425
and 426 in the aftermath of Israel’s 1978 invasion of Lebanon. Following the 2006 Israel-Leb-
anon War, this debate intensied as UNIFIL’s original mandate was made more “robust” by
UNSC Resolution 1701, which marked a new phase of UN peacekeeping in Lebanon — hence
the use of the term “UNIFIL-II” in this paper to distinguish it from the original UNIFIL.1 While
the extent to which this new “robustness” has succeeded in transforming UNIFIL II into a
more effective peacekeeping unit is controversial, there is no doubt that it has become a
European-led UN operation. Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has increas-
ingly intervened in conict and post-conict situations throughout Europe, Africa and the
Middle East. It has also maintained a strong interest in supporting the various strands of
the Middle East peace process and pushing for a just and lasting solution to the question of
Palestine. Pursuing a ‘soft power’ approach to conict resolution and peace-building, the EU
has however generally been frustrated in this role due to overpowering US inuence in the
region. UNIFIL II was thus seen by many in the EU as both an opportunity to demonstrate
its increased commitment to the region and as a potential test case for intervention in other
parts of the Middle East, including Palestine. This report suggests lessons that can be drawn
from UNIFIL’s three decade-old “interim” experience that should be considered by the EU as
it continues to clarify its emerging role in the Middle East amidst the realities on the ground
and the natural constraints of any peace operation.
The rst section of this report briey outlines the evolving concept of peacekeeping/peace
operations, particularly in the Middle East, as well as the EU policy towards, and interven-
tion in, the region, as envisioned in EU Pillars I and II and reected in its ESDP military and
civilian missions. The second section considers the case of UNIFIL I and its ambiguous
mandate, detailing the political context within which UNSC Resolution 425 was created
and the huge challenges it faced from 1978 to 2006. Key problems and positive contri-
butions are then drawn from this experience. The third section examines how and why
UNIFIL II was created in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, and shows how one
ambiguous mandate was substituted for another amidst talk of enforcement procedures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for increased “robustness”. This section ends with an
analysis of the current situation, and exposes how the status quo today is not very different
from what it was during the days of UNIFIL I, namely because the political will to resolve
the broader Arab-Israeli conict remains lacking, and because the structural problems and
challenges faced by any UN peace operation in southern Lebanon have not improved, and
indeed may have worsened. The report concludes with a series of policy recommendations
to be considered by the EU as it steps up its engagement efforts, via civilian and military
peace operations, in the Middle East.
Peace operations today represent an important component of the international security
system, both as major tools for crisis management and as one of the “main activities of
the operational dimension of institutions such as the UN, NATO, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to a lesser extent the European Union
(EU).”2 Indeed, such operations have grown signicantly worldwide over the past decade
and have become increasingly complex. According to the Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations, “There are currently a greater number of larger, more robust peace opera-
tions underway around the world than ever before. Simultaneously, these operations are
typically armed with more ambitious military, policing and political goals than pre-1999
missions.”3 The scope of such peace operations has changed considerably since their
inception in 1948, when the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) – a group of
unarmed military observers was sent by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
to supervise a truce between Israel and its neighbors. Since there was no mention of
peacekeeping of any sort in the UN Charter, former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
famously referred to it as a “Chapter Six-and-a-Half” operation. Peacekeeping has since
developed within this “grey zone” between pacic settlement of disputes and military
enforcement, as conceived in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter respectively, growing
alongside preventative diplomacy – the “technique used to forestall the competition of
the rival power blocs into conict situations that were either a result or potential cause
of a power vacuum in the Cold War.”4
Until the early 1990s, peace operations generally comprised of traditional UN peacekeeping
missions deployed after the end of an armed conict and whose main task was to prevent
the ghting from recurring. Such traditional missions operated with the consent of those
states involved in the conict, remained impartial, and lacked the authority to use force
except in narrowly-dened cases of self-defense. With the end of the Cold War – which had
2.
Introduction
& Overview
2.1.
Overview of Peace
Operations
1 It should be made clear here that the UN itself does
not use the term “UNIFI L II” in part because it wanted
to maintain an image of continuity to the peacekeep-
ing mission in Lebanon. However, the mandate, scope
and resources of the mission – not to mention its po-
litical context – have in fact changed sufciently that
the authors feel justied to use the term “UNIFIL II’
to signify the post-Resolution 1701 mission, for the
sake of clarity.
2 Thierry Tardy, “Introduction”, in Thierry Tardy (ed.),
Peace Operations After 11 September 2001 (London &
New York: Frank Cass, 2004), p.1.
3 Center on International Cooperation (CIC), Annual
Review of Global Peace Operations 2006: Brieng
Paper, p.1.
4 Ramesh Thankur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Op-
erations”, p.1.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
8
76 January 2009
resulted in a paralysis within the UNSC, as the Soviet Union and the US effectively blocked
the UNSC from intervening in their proxy wars – three major inter-related shifts occurred.
First, the UN explored ways to “enlarge its repertoire of techniques for dealing with con-
ict.”5 Henceforth, according to Marrack Goulding, the former UN Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, UN action in relation to conict evolved
to include the following categories: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building – all
of which require the consent of the hostile parties along with sanctions and peace en-
forcement, which are coercive and thus do not require such consent, as they would be tak-
en under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (see Table 1). Peacekeeping operations underwent
a further split between more traditional types (such as UNIFIL) and the more complicated
and expensive “multifunctional” operations that generally support the implementation of
negotiated settlements and require major civilian components (such as election specialists
and police units). By 2005, for instance, the number of police deployed worldwide in peace
operations had tripled since 1998 to reach 9,500.6
5 Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Mur-
ray, 2002), p.17.
6 CIC, Annual Review 2006, op. cit., p.3.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
9
76 January 2009
Table 1:
Peace Operation Types
CATEGORY CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES
1. Peacekeeping
a) Traditional
Deployed after an armed conict has been temporarily sus-
pended in order to ensure that ghting does not re-start, by
working towards a lasting settlement of the dispute. Actions
include monitoring cease-res, controlling buffer-zones,
and verifying compliance with provisional agreements.
Lebanon (UNIFIL); Afgha-
nistan (UNGOMAP); Iran &
Iraq (UNIKOM)
b) Preventative
Refers to the deployment of peacekeepers at the request
of only one of the parties to a potential conict and only on
that party’s territory. This type has been rare.
Macedonia (UNPROFOR)
c) Multifunctional
Denotes peacekeeping operations established to help the
parties in conict implement a negotiated settlement. This
task requires a larger, more complex and costly operation
than traditional peacekeeping. Rather than simply super-
vise cease-res, such operations may also demobilize com-
batants, supervise local administrations and police forces,
establish truth commissions, conduct elections, de-mine,
and assist in economic reconstruction. These operations
thus require a major civilian component.
Namibia (UNTAG); Angola
(UNAVEM II); El Salvador
(ONUSAL); Western Sahara
(MINURSO); Cambodia
(UNTAC)
d) Complex emergency
Occurs when an operation is deployed during an active
conict where no cease-re agreement exists. A traditional
or multifunctional operation may often become an emer-
gency one when the agreement upon which a settlement
has been reached falls apart. Its functions are generally
humanitarian in nature.
Lebanon (UNIFIL); Bosnia
(UNPROFOR); Angola
(UNAVEM II)
2. Peace-making
Involves the use of diplomacy to persuade hostile parties
to settle a dispute that has led (or could lead) to armed
conict between them. Peacemakers seek to achieve a
cease-re, to then send in peacekeepers, but also push for
a comprehensive agreement to end the conict and to mini-
mize the risk of it breaking out again.
El Salavdor (ONUSAL)
3. Peace-building
Denotes longer-term action to consolidate peace by tack-
ling the root causes of a potential or past conict. Root
causes are often domestic, and include human rights, jus-
tice and law issues, ethnic discrimination, social and eco-
nomic policy.
Iraq (UNAMI)
4. Coercion Usually takes the form of economic and/or arms embar-
goes imposed by the UNSC. South Africa; Iraq
5. Peace-enforcement
Since the UN cannot itself wage war, the UNSC may autho-
rize the intervention of a multinational force to achieve a
stated objective. Such multinational forces must keep the
UNSC informed of their activities and not exceed their man-
date.
Korea; Iraq
Source: Based on Goulding, “Peacemonger”, pp. 12-21.
The second shift that occurred was the revision of the peacekeeping doctrine and rules of
engagement, in line with the realities of conicts taking place within, as opposed to between,
states.7 Goulding explains that “For a long time the United Nations’ peacekeeping doctrine
was that coercion cannot be combined with consent-based peacekeeping; they are alterna-
tives and a choice has to be made between them.” The new doctrine, therefore, had to:
Provide for situations in which a party’s consent has been given in general
terms but the peacekeepers could nevertheless expect to encounter armed
resistance from some of the party’s adherents or, in some states without ef-
fective government, from armed bandits with no political agenda. This made 7 Goulding, Peacemonger, op.cit., p.17.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
10
76 January 2009
it necessary to change the peacekeepers’ rules of engagement and provide
them with sufcient repower to assure military superiority. The essence of
the new doctrine is that force is, if necessary, used against armed persons
because of what they do, not because of the side they belong to.8
In practice, this meant that the UNSC authorized the use of force by multinational forces
when it is needed to protect core humanitarian or peacekeeping functions, in such coun-
tries as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone.
The third major shift that occurred in the 1990s was the huge expansion of global military
deployment that were no longer exclusively under UN authority, particularly following the
deployment of NATO troops during the 1999 Kosovo war. The number of UN peacekeepers
dramatically increased by 477% between 1999 and 2005, so much so that the UN missions
had more active troops deployed globally than those foreign deployments of any other
country except the US.9 Still, obvious political and logistical constraints inherent in UN
missions paved the way for increased intervention by non-UN forces in unstable regions.
By the fall of 2006, there were about 72,000 military personnel deployed in UN operations
– mostly in Africa (75%) – compared to around 74,000 in non-UN operations (for UN peace-
keeping deployment in the Middle East, see Table 2).10 NATO troops comprised by far the
largest contribution of the non-UN personnel (66%), followed by the EU (11%).
Table 2:
Current UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East
UN Mission Strength
(as of 11/07)
Appropriation/Budget
(2007-2008) Fatalities
UNTSO 150 military observers
227 civilians $62,270,500 (gross) 49
UNDOF 1,062 military
143 civilians $41,586,600 (gross) 42
UNIFIL 13,264 military
869 civilian $748,204,600 (gross) 268
Source: UNDPKO, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note, 30
November 2007”
While peace operations are still not strictly speaking dened, they generally refer to civilian
and military activities aimed at dealing with a crisis or with the consequences of a crisis, at
different possible stages (before, during and after). Most peace operations avoid warfare,
the principle of impartiality being theoretically paramount to the success of such operations:
“The central and primary objective of any peace operation is the promotion of peace, not
the defeat of one of the parties involved.”11 However, the shifting nature of warfare since
the end of the Cold War, as well as the increasingly security-related foreign policies of the
US and EU since September 11, 2001, means that the use of force – or the threat of it – to
implement such peace operations has become more common. It is important to note that
there is a “one-way barrier” that separates peacekeeping from peace enforcement: “once
peacekeepers become peace enforcers, they cannot revert to a peacekeeping mandate.”12
UNIFIL II initially trod this ne line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, a policy
that ultimately backred.
In November 2007, there were 17 UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world, de-
ploying 82,500 uniformed personnel (including police) from 119 contributing countries, at
an estimated annual cost of $7 billion for 2007-2008 (of which $5.5 billion had been ap-
proved).13 There are also a further 11 UN political or peace-building missions.14 As one ana-
lyst asserts, this massive increase in the annual budget for UN peacekeeping should not
necessarily be seen as reecting the will of the international community to improve peace
operations in the wake of failures in the 1990s, but rather as resulting from the “post-9/11
belief that failed states are ideal training, staging, and breeding grounds for international
terrorists.”15 While such assumptions are being increasingly challenged, they remain popu-
lar within the security policy circles in NATO countries. In this context, there are complaints
8 Ibid.
9 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006,
op.cit., p. 2. By 2005, the UN missions had deployed
60,200 troops, while the US only 592,000 because of
the on-going occupation of Iraq
10 Note that by December 2006, UN military personnel
had reached around 80,000, given that UNIFI L II had
expanded. See CIC, Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations 2007: A Brieng Paper
11 Tardy, “Introduction”, op.cit., p.2.
12 Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascos of the
1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), p.9.
13 U N, DPKO, “United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions: Background Note, 30 November 2007,” http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf.
14 UN, DPKO, “United Nations Political and Peace-
building Missions: Background Note, 30 November
2007,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.
pdf.13
15 Cedric de Conig, “Peace Operations in Africa: the
Next Decade,” NUPI Working Paper Nº721 (2007), p.1.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
11
76 January 2009
that a kind of “informal peacekeeping apartheid has come about, whereby most European
and American peace operations and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or EU operations
in Europe and the Middle East, whilst most UN peace operations troops are contributed by
the developing world and deployed in Africa.”16
There are currently nine multilateral peace operations in the Middle East, only three of
which are UN missions that report to and are supported by the UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO):
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) in Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria (es-
tablished in June 1948).
UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observation Force) in Syria’s Golan Heights (estab-
lished in June 1974).
UNIFIL in Lebanon (established in March 1978).
EUJUST-LEX (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq) in Iraq (established in July
2005).
EUPOL-COPPS (EU Police Reform Mission for the Palestinian Territories) in Pales-
tine (established in January 2006).
EUBAM-Rafah (EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point) in Pales-
tine (established in November 2005).
NTM-I (NATO Training Mission in Iraq) in Iraq (established in August 2004).
MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) in Egypt’s Sinai (established in April
1982).
MNF-I (Multinational Force in Iraq) in Iraq (established in October 2003).
There are three further UN peace-building missions in the Middle East that report to the UN
Department for Political Affairs (DPA), namely:17
UNSCO (Ofce of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East) in Jerusalem (es-
tablished in October 1999).
UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission in Iraq) in Iraq (established in August 2003).
Ofce of the UN Special Coordinator of the Secretary General for Lebanon (estab-
lished in February 2007).
As a result of the UNIFIL II deployment, nearly 80% of UN military personnel operating in
the Middle East are now European in origin.18 This clearly reects the strategic importance
placed by Europe on stability in this region. Due to geographic proximity and common secu-
rity concerns, the Middle East has become the most important region in EU foreign policy.
European engagement in UNIFIL II, led particularly by France, Italy and Spain, is considered
by some analysts, such as the Lebanese diplomat and political scientist Ghassan Salameh,
as a “European adventure.” Others, such as Joschka Fischer, former German Foreign Minis-
ter, referred to the augmented European presence in the region as “crossing the Rubicon”19
essentially passing a point of no return. In either case, Member State participation is
an irreversible step for the EU in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East, even as
it moves from being a “payer”, through its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the
European Commission, to becoming a “player” on the ground, via the civilian and military
missions of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emanating from the Euro-
pean Council.
2.2.
Overview of Peace
Operations in the Middle
East
16 Ibid., p.2.
17 UN, DPKO, “Political and Peacebuilding Missions.”
18 CIC, Annual Review 2007.
19 See Conference Proceedings of Madrid: Fifteeen
Years Later, Towards Peace in the Middle East, Ad-
dressing Concerns and Expectations, Madrid: CITpax,
January 2007, available at: www.toledopax.org; and
Joschka Fischer, “Europa cruza el Rubicón”, El País, 5
September 2006, p. 13.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
12
76 January 2009
Relying on a rather ambiguous and contradictory agenda of democracy-promotion, the EU
has three main documents that form a strategic umbrella for its emerging strategy in the
Middle East. The “European Security Strategy” (December 2003), “Strengthening the EU’s
Partnership with the Arab World” (December 2003), and the “Interim Report on an EU Stra-
tegic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” (March 2004), the last of
which was an EU response to the US’s “Broader Middle East and North Africa Agenda”
(BMENA).20 Revolving around the Mediterranean, the EU has chosen to augment security
to the demise of democratic apertures. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Palestin-
ian territories, where the EU has followed the US-Israeli-PA Presidency troika to undermine
the election of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), after the EU had monitored and
deemed the elections democratic.
The apparent contradictions, double-standards, and general lack of specicity in EU policy
towards the key players in the Middle East have greatly diminished the capacity of the EU
Member States to act as a coherent and consistent block, and have stunted the develop-
ment of an independent and interest-oriented EU policy that could garner increased inu-
ence in the region. Although the EU is not yet “a mature foreign and security player”, what
is more signicant is that “it is not perceived as such, neither by the Europeans themselves
nor by other countries.”21 Again, this is particularly poignant in Gaza, where the third party
EU monitoring role at the Rafah crossing has been marked by Israeli control and conde-
scension. Indeed, the EU is today largely seen in the Middle East as implementing the
US agenda across the region, and at best playing the occasional ‘good cop’ role vis-à-vis
the US’ ‘bad cop’ stance. This is true for the two ESDP civilian missions in the Palestin-
ian territories: the EU police reform mission for the Palestinian civil police (EUPOL-COPPS)
and the EU border assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point (EUBAM-Rafah), both of
which have been largely suspended since the election of Hamas in January 2006. EUPOL-
COPPS has recently re-engaged in assisting in the training of Palestinian police, whereas
EUBAM-Rafah ofcially suspended all monitoring activity when Hamas took over Gaza in
June 2007. These ESDP missions are exploring other means to engage (EUPOL-COPPS has
expanded to include a new “rule of law” branch mandated to help reform the Palestinian
judiciary), but have largely been reduced to implementing the US/Israeli military agenda in
the West Bank and the Israeli closure policy in the Gaza Strip. A similar trend is perceptible
in Afghanistan, which would fall within the Broader Middle East Initiative, where another
EU police reform mission was sent in June 2007 to develop and buttress the Afghan police
force (EUPOL-Afghanistan). The situation in Iraq is also similar, in that the EU has an active
civilian mission in charge of reforming the Iraqi judicial system (EUJUST-LEX), though train-
ing occurs outside the country. Across the Middle East then, the EU is providing soft power
ESDP support to either the NATO- and/or US-led military hard power.22
UNIFIL II differs from these cases in that it is a UN peacekeeping mission, not a civilian or
military ESDP mission. During the protracted negotiations leading to the adoption of UNSC
Resolution 1701, there was debate in Brussels and in leading European Member States’
capitals about the possibility of deploying an EU mission to Lebanon, but the ESDP appara-
tus was not deemed sufciently developed, and key players, such as Hizbullah and Syria,
would not have consented to such a sensitive operation. The subsequent Spanish sugges-
tion to deploy an EU civilian border management mission along the Lebanese border with
Syria was equally discarded, but within the EU foreign policy framework, France did push
for a military ESDP mission in Chad and the Central African Republic in the fall of 2007,23
both of which occurred after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, but denitely demonstrative of
an emerging and enhanced European role in peacekeeping around the world.
European caution to act in Lebanon was compounded by the inherent political implications
and the severe sensitivities of the setting. Germany, for instance, was skeptical about mak-
ing its rst return to the Middle East since World War II, and was not perceived as an im-
partial actor due to controversial comments made by Chancellor Angela Merkel stating that
any force deployed was there to protect Israel. Spain and Italy, along with a more hesitant
France, openly mooted to replicate the European reinforcements sent to buttress UNIFIL
II in the Gaza Strip. The EU potential to deploy a Battle Group of 1,500-2,000 troops was
explored, as was the possibility of deploying EU Member State contingents under the UN
ag. This replication of a parallel peacekeeping mission along the eastern Mediterranean
coast was part of a ve-point Middle East peace plan proposed by the European trio, but
the option was not pursued further due to the Israeli monopoly of security in the Palestin-
ian territories. The possibility does however exist (if not by land, then by sea) to replicate
– under an overall political framework accepted by the Palestinians and Israelis – the pres-
ence of a European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) along the Gaza Strip coast, such as the
one included in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) supporting and training the Lebanese Navy
for UNIFIL II (see Part 3).
2.3.
Overview of EU Policy
towards the Middle East
20 Yezid Sayigh, Security Sector Reform in the Arab
Region, Challenges to Developing an Indigenous
Agenda, Arab Reform Initiative, Thematic Papers, Nº 2,
December 2007, p. 7-9.
21 “Securing the Future: Europe’s Agenda for a More
Peaceful Neighbourhood”, Discussion Paper for the
XIth Kronberg Talks “Europe and the Middle East”,
Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 17-19, 2008, p. 11.
22 For more on the tensions and cohesions between
NATO and ESDP, see Volker Heisse, The ESDP and the
Transatlantic Relationship, SWP Research Paper 11,
Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), No-
vember 2007.
23 Council of the European Union, Portuguese Presi-
dency Report on ESDP, Brussels, 11 December 2007,
pp. 2-3.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
13
76 January 2009
In order to understand the challenges facing UNIFIL II, it is important to clarify the political
and security context within which UNIFIL I was operating for three decades in southern
Lebanon. The pattern of conict and reprisal between Israel and the resistance forces in
Lebanon – rst the PLO, and later the Lebanese Resistance, which came to be dominated
by Hizbullah – and the role of the Lebanese State and Armed Forces are remarkably similar,
as are the logistical and operational challenges faced by UNIFIL. A central argument in
this report is that any peace operation in Lebanon must be accompanied by a solution to
the underlying problems that initially caused the conict; otherwise it will be doomed to
remain “interim”. This section briey highlights key events and phases that have shaped
this evolving context.
Unlike large portions of its population, ofcial Lebanon has long tried to remain out of the
Arab-Israeli conict. It participated only symbolically in the war of 1948, while during the
Arab defeat of 1967 the Lebanese army “contented itself with defending the foreign embas-
sies and the headquarters of British and American oil companies in Beirut from an angry
population.”24 Still, the creation of Israel and the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars inexorably
drew Lebanon into the conict, with two major problems ultimately having direct implica-
tions for UNIFIL’s deployment in southern Lebanon. First, the forced expulsion of Palestin-
ians from their land, beginning in 1948, created a massive refugee crisis that came to organi-
cally link Lebanon’s stability with the fate of Palestinian self-determination. Both Lebanon
and the Palestinians have long maintained the right of return for all refugees to their home-
land, as per international law and UN resolutions. In 2005, there were 4.4 million registered
Palestinian refugees, the majority of whom remain distributed among the 58 recognized UN
camps – as well as the surrounding cities, towns and villages – in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the
West Bank and Gaza.25 Most of the refugees that reached Lebanon (now ofcially number-
ing over 400,000) were placed in 16 UN camps (now reduced to 12, with four having been
destroyed over the years) under dire conditions and devoid of any civil and social rights.26
The second major repercussion that is relevant to this paper is the creation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) stronghold in southern Lebanon during the 1970s. The PLO,
which served as an umbrella organization consisting of eight guerrilla groups led by Yassir
Arafat’s Fatah, was created in 1964 with the objective of liberating Palestine and achieving
self-determination for the Palestinians. But since the PLO had no native territory on which to
operate, it was in reality a “liberation movement of exiles”27 that depended on the patron-
age of its hosts to gain some measure of self-rule, even in the refugee camps. Following
the PLO’s violent eviction from Jordan in 1970 – and the severe curtailment of its activities
in Syria, with the rise of President Haz al-Assad that same year – the PLO moved towards
a consolidation of its military and political presence in southern Lebanon, under the terms
of the 1969 Arab League- sponsored ‘Cairo Agreement.’ Under this deal, the PLO recognized
Lebanon’s “sovereignty and security” and pledged to coordinate its activities with the Leba-
nese Army. In return, the PLO gained “ofcial recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian
armed presence, freedom of movement in the Arqub district in the south, and the establish-
ment of autonomous institutions in the refugee camps.”28 Southern Lebanon would thereaf-
ter become the main stage of war between the PLO and Israel for over a decade.
The Lebanese civil war and breakdown of the state after 1975 led to a political vacuum
in southern Lebanon, in which a direct confrontation emerged between Israel and its
Lebanese proxies on one side, and the “Joint Forces” of the PLO and progressive Leba-
nese National Movement on the other. By 1977, right-wing militias supported by Israel
had launched a series of offensives with the goal of forming a contiguous zone along the
Lebanon-Israel border, but this was rebuffed by the Joint Forces. The “two-year” war (as
the rst phase of the Lebanese civil war is called) had ended with the US-backed (and
Israeli approved) deployment of the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), a peacekeeping force
comprising, for the most part, Syrian soldiers. The ADF, however, was not authorized
to cross several Israeli-imposed ‘red lines’, such as deploying south of Sidon or use of
its air force.29 With the rise to power of the Likud party, Israel continued to harden its
position towards the PLO, even after having secured a major political victory by get-
ting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to visit Jerusalem in May 1977. Indeed, Sadat’s
policy of breaking away from the Arab fold and making a separate peace with Israel was
interpreted by Palestinian leaders as a direct attack on the centrality of the PLO in the
Arab-Israeli conict. Israel also stepped up its cross-border raids on Lebanon, which
culminated in the shelling of the Lebanese village of Azziyeh, during which over 200
civilians were killed.30
3.
UNIFIL I
(1978-2006):
Political Context
& Lessons Learned
3.1.
The Arab-Israeli Wars
and Lebanon: Palestinian
Refugees and the PLO
3.2.
Israel’s 1978 Invasion
of Lebanon and the
Creation of UNIFIL I
24 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon
(London: Pluto Press, 2007), p.152.
25 According to the UN, refugees are “persons whose
normal place of residence was Palestine between June
1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and
means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli
conict.” This denition also covers descendents of
persons who became refugees in 1948. See UNRWA,
“Who is a Palestine Refugee?”, http://www.un.org/
unrwa/refugees/whois.html.
26 UNRWA, “Lebanon Refugee Camp Proles”, http://
www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html.
27 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York:
Vintage Books, 1991), p.134.
28 Rex Brynen, “PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and
Lessons” in Journal of Palestine Studies (Winter 1989),
pp. 50-1. See also text of Cairo Agreement, available
at: http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/histor-
ic_documents/1969_cairo_agreement.asp.
29 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2000), p344.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
14
76 January 2009
30 Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in
Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).31 Robert
Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1990), p.124; and Noam Chomsky,
Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the
Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: Southend Press, 1999),
p.192.
32 Ghasan Tueni, Peacekeeping in Lebanon: the Facts,
the Documents (New York: William Belcher Group,
1979), pp.4-5.
33 Ibid.
34 UN Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425 (19
March 1978), in Tueni, Peacekeeping in Lebanon, p.19.
For online access to full text of Resolutions 425 and
426, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unres.htm.
35 See, for instance, Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Sur-
vival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990).
36 UNSC, “Provisional verbatim record of the two
thousand and seventy-fourth meeting”, S/PV.2074 (19
March 1978) in Tueni, Peacekeeping in Lebanon.
37 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 425
(1978)”, S/12611 (19 March 1978) in Tueni, Peacekeep-
ing in Lebanon, pp. 127-129.
38 UN SC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon”,
S/12620/Add.3 (17 April 1978); and UNSC, “Progress
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Interim Force in Lebanon”, S/12620/Add.4 (5
May 1978).
39 UNSC, S/12611, op.cit.
40 Ibid.
41 Brynen, op. cit.
On 11 March 1978, Palestinian gunmen carried out an operation that originated in Leba-
nese territory inside Israel, leaving over 30 civilians killed. Israel’s response came on 14-15
March, when it launched its rst major invasion of Lebanon, occupying an area that reached
as far as the Qasmiyeh bridge on the outskirts of Tyre and that resulted in the deaths of
as many as 2,000 people, mostly civilians.31 Lebanon strongly protested to the UNSC that
such an attack was a “naked aggression against the Lebanese territory,” stating that “Leba-
non is not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon.”32 The
Lebanese government was convinced that Israel was using this invasion as a pretext to (a)
satisfy its long-standing desire to occupy the water-rich areas of southern Lebanon (the
fact that it dubbed this “Operation Litani” may thus not seem a coincidence); and (b) to
impose a permanent ‘buffer zone’ patrolled by its main Lebanese proxy militia, the South
Lebanon Army (SLA).33
The UNSC convened on 17 March to deliberate on a US recommendation to end the war
and establish a peacekeeping mission. Two days later, UNSC Resolution 425 and 426 were
adopted by a vote of 12 to 2 (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained), with China
not participating. Resolution 425 “called upon Israel to immediately cease its military ac-
tion against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Leba-
nese territory.”34 It also decided to “immediately establish under its authority a United
Nations interim force for southern Lebanon” with the purpose of:
Conrming the withdrawal of Israeli forces;
Restoring international peace and security; and
Assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective author-
ity in the area.
Israel ofcially accepted the ceasere on 21 March, after its forces had completed their
march towards the Litani River in a bid to get the proposed peacekeeping force deployed as
far north as possible.35 However, Israel criticized Resolution 425 as “inadequate and sorely
lacking” because it did not explicitly ban “terrorists” from returning to southern Lebanon.
The PLO too had major reservations about the resolution, mainly because it did not con-
demn Israeli aggression and “terrorism” strongly enough, and because the resolution only
addressed a “derivative” issue, rather than deal with the core problem: the question of
Palestine and the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their homes.36
Resolution 426 approved the UN Secretary General’s report on the implementation of UNSC
resolution 425 and authorized the deployment of a 4,000-strong UNIFIL force – command-
ed by the UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.A. Erksine and with troops largely borrowed
from UNTSO and UNEF operations – for an initial period of six months, at a cost of about
$68 million.37 By mid-April 1978, UNIFIL numbered around 2,500 troops from France, Nepal,
Norway, Sweden, Iran and Canada; and by early May, there were already over 3,100 ground
troops (Senegalese and Nigerian units had joined the others) and a further 836 interna-
tional personnel dealing with logistics.38 After Resolution 427 of May 3 had authorized an
increase in this number to 6,000 troops, further Iranian, Irish, Fijian and Nigerian battalions
arrived in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL’s terms of reference included stipulations to “use its
best efforts to prevent the recurrence of ghting and to ensure that its area of operation
is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.”39 Moreover, the peacekeeping units could
“not use force except in self-defense” and were required to maintain “complete impartial-
ity.” The SG report also made it clear that there were three pre-conditions for UNIFIL to be
effective: “Firstly, it must have at all times the full condence and backing of the Security
Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned.
Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efcient military unit.”40
While Lebanon welcomed the UN peacekeepers, the more radical factions within the PLO
urged Yassir Arafat to reject any ceasere. However, Arafat’s pragmatism prevailed (as did
Syrian pressure) and the PLO ofcially accepted both the ceasere and the UNIFIL pres-
ence on 28 March, and soon pledged to facilitate UNIFIL’s task by not attacking Israel from
southern Lebanon. Israel eventually did withdraw its troops from Lebanon on 13 June, but
rather than handing over key positions near the border to UNIFIL as was required, it author-
ized the South Lebanon Army (SLA), under Sa’ad Haddad, to take control of a 10km “Free
Lebanon” zone within which the SLA were the “de facto” force (DFF). While the relationship
between UNIFIL and the PLO remained tense over the ensuing years, it is the DFF that ac-
counted for the bulk of attacks against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.41
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
15
76 January 2009
UNIFIL established its force headquarters in the southern Lebanese town of Naqoura, near
the border with Israel. However, its civilian employees and a few of its ofcers lived in Is-
rael, which meant that each morning for many years they had to seek permission from the
Israeli army and SLA to make their way to Naqoura. UNIFIL troops and ofcers, on the other
hand, resided in southern Lebanese villages south of the Litani River. By the fall of 1978,
the UNIFIL battalions were distributed along three sectors (western, central, and eastern)
as follows42:
Table 3:
UNIFIL Deployment (September 1978)
Battalion Coun-
try of Origin Sector Location in South Lebanon Headquarters Troop
Numbers
Senegal Northern part of western sector Marakah 634
Fiji Southern part of western sector Qana 500
Nigeria Northern part of central/western
sector Tayr Zibna 673
France Southern part of the central/western
sector Haris 644
Iran Northern part of central/western
sector Qallawiyah 599
Ireland Southern part of central/eastern
sector Tibnin 661
Nepal Western part of the eastern sector Blate 642
Norway Eastern part of eastern sector Ebel Es-Saqi 706
Source: based on UNSC, S/12845 (13 September 1978).
Tensions across the Lebanese-Israel border continued despite UNIFIL’s presence, leading
to UN Resolution 501 that authorized a further increase of UNIFIL to 7,000 troops. Even
though the PLO had succeeded in curbing cross-border operations, in line with a 1981
cease-re with Israel, Israel considered that the threat remained given that the PLO had
consolidated its grip on inuence in southern Lebanon. With the Likud party’s restoration to
power following Israel’s 1981 elections, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon moved to implement
his “Grand Design” for the Middle East. This plan included the annexation of Golan Heights,
ofcially annexed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on December 14, 1981, the
removal of the Palestinian threat from southern Lebanon, as well as the elimination of the
PLO as a signicant military and diplomatic player.43
On 6 June 1982 – in response to an assassination attempt on its Ambassador in London by a
small terrorist group led by Abu Nidal, who had been condemned to death by the PLO itself
Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon, destroying Palestinian refugee camps
along the way and reaching Beirut within days. The long siege on Beirut, where the remain-
ing PLO ghters and its allies pitched their last line of defense, lasted until mid-August,
when the PLO nally agreed to a US-mediated plan to evacuate its forces from Lebanon.
Israel’s plan seemed to have worked: a multinational force (MNF), composed of US, French,
British and Italian troops, arrived on 12 August to oversee the agreement; the pro-Israeli
candidate Bashir Gemayal was elected president of Lebanon eleven days later; and Arafat
left Lebanon at the end of August. All in all, Lebanese authorities reported that an esti-
mated 19,000 people had been killed and 30,000 wounded during the invasion, while the
Israeli military reported 368 deaths and over 2,000 wounded.44
The UN responded to the invasion by issuing a series of UNSC Resolutions. On 5 June,
Resolution 508 called for an end to all military activities, and the following day, Resolution
509 demanded “that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally”
to the Lebanese border. However, on 8 June, the US vetoed a Spanish-drafted resolution
condemning Israel’s non-compliance with resolutions 508 and 509.
3.3.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion
and the Birth of the
Lebanese Resistance
42 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary General of the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the pe-
riod 19 March to 13 September 1978),” S/12845 (13
September, 1978).
43 See Don Peretz, “Israel’s Historical Foreign Policy in
Lebanon” in Deirdre Collings (ed.), Peace for Lebanon?
From War to Reconstruction (Boulder & London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 116; and Itamar Rabinov-
ich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca & London:
Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 132-3.
44 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Eqbal Ahmad, “The 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon: the causalities” in The In-
vasion of Lebanon, Race & Class (Volume XXIV, Spring
1983, Nº 4), pp. 340-2.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
16
76 January 2009
3.4.
The 1990s:
Israeli Incursions and the
Development of “Rules
of the Game”
On 18 June 1982, UNSC Resolution 511 authorized an extension of UNIFIL’s mandate for a
further two months pending further review. According to their rules of engagement, UNIFIL
troops were authorized to halt the Israeli army’s advances. The reality, of course, was that
UNIFIL was not sufciently equipped or politically supported by the Security Council to do
much more than observe and record Israel’s activities. Some units did summon the courage
to try and stop the Israeli advance, but soon gave up as it became clear that this was not a
limited operation.
For three years, UNIFIL remained behind Israeli occupation lines, with its role “limited to
providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent
possible”.45 Israel’s invasion and its reluctance to depart from Lebanon after the PLO had
evacuated, led to growing resentment among the Lebanese and the unraveling of Shar-
on’s “Grand Design.” Bashir Gemayal was assassinated before taking ofce, a 1983 ‘peace’
treaty perceived by most Lebanese as a capitulation agreement – was ofcially aban-
doned, and a national resistance movement composed of secular, nationalist and Islamic
groups was becoming increasingly effective against Israeli forces in Lebanon. In February
1985, Hizbullah published its “Open Letter” proclaiming the emergence and objectives of
its military wing, the Islamic Resistance.46 This letter essentially asserted that resistance
was a “main and fundamental priority” for Hizbullah, but equally that “no jihad movement
could separate itself from complementary political work that builds on the fruits of resist-
ance.”47 By then, and under sustained pressure, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were carry-
ing out a partial withdrawal to what was termed the “security zone,” which extended from
the Blue Line to the Litani River and was manned by both the IDF and the SLA militia. Israel
had abandoned large urban cities such as Sidon, Tyre, and Nabatieh, but still occupied
around 1,100 square kilometers of land, representing 55% of South Lebanon and 11% of
Lebanon’s total area.48
By 1991, the civil war in Lebanon had ended with the implementation of the Saudi and Arab
League-mediated Ta’if Accords, negotiated on 22 October 1989. These Accords called for
the dissolution of militias and the collection of their arms in such a way as to incorporate
many of the former militia members into the Lebanese Army (which had split during the
war). The security plan’s ultimate aim under Ta’if was thus to allow the state to “extend its
authority over all the territory of Lebanon by means of its own forces,” with a caveat that
allowed Syrian forces to “assist the legitimate Lebanese forces” in this task.49 The role of
the Lebanese Army was also made explicit: “the fundamental task of the armed forces is
to defend the homeland,” and, as such, it must be “unied, prepared and trained in order
that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli ag-
gression.” The Accord called for “privileged relations” with Syria, and close cooperation
between Lebanon and Syria “in all areas,” particularly in security matters. With regard to
UNSC Resolution 425, Ta’if called for its immediate implementation and the withdrawal
of Israeli occupation troops, as well as the adherence to the armistice line of 1949. In the
meantime:
All necessary steps will be taken to liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli
occupation, spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and deploy the
Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to
reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to ensure the Is-
raeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security
and stability to the border area.50
Israel, however, prolonged its occupation throughout the 1990s, despite its clearly de-
creasing value, as it assumed that unilateral withdrawal would simply encourage armed
resistance in both Lebanon and Palestine. It launched major incursions into Lebanon dur-
ing 1993 (“Operation Accountability”) and 1996 (“Operation Grapes of Wrath”), aiming to
drive Hizbullah out of southern Lebanon and create inter-sectarian tension within Lebanon
as hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands of mostly Shia’a residents were forced
to nd shelter in Beirut and surrounding towns. UNIFIL had now been reduced to 4,500
troops and could only watch and record such events, including the attack on the Fijian Bat-
talion Headquarters of UNIFIL in the village of Qana during “Operation Grapes of Wrath”, in
which 107 civilians who had taken refuge there were killed.
Rather than deterring Hizbullah’s capacity to strike against Israel, the 1993 and 1996 in-
cursions actually strengthened inter-sectarian solidarity against Israel and compelled the
international community to react once again by helping to negotiate a “Document of Un-
derstanding” between Israel and Hizbullah on 27 April 1996.51 The Israel-Lebanon Monitor-
45 UNIFI L, “Background”, http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/unil/background.html.
46 The text of the “Open Letter” is available in Augus-
tus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia’a: Struggle for
the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1987), pp. 167-187.
47 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within
(London: Saqi, 2005), p. 98. Sheikh Naim Qassem was
a founding member of Hizbullah and currently has
served as its Deputy Secretary General since 1991.
48 Ibid., p. 95.
49 Ta’if text is available online at http://www.al-bab.
com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm. See also Joseph
Maila, “The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation” in Deirdre
Collings (ed.), Peace for Lebanon? From War to Recon-
struction (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publish-
ers, 1994), p. 36.
50 Ta’if Accord, Part III.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
17
76 January 2009
ing Group (ILMG) – including the participation of the US, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria
– emerged as a mechanism to issue restraint declarations for violations of the “April Under-
standing”.52 This important document established what were to become the “rules of the
game” between Israel and the Lebanese resistance groups. These rules primarily included
prohibiting the belligerent parties from targeting civilians and ring from civilian areas. In
acknowledgement of the drastic decrease in civilian casualties between 1996 and 2000,
the ILMG was seen as “a relative success” when it was dissolved with Israel’s unilateral
withdrawal from South Lebanon.53
In late May 2000, the IDF completed their withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon be-
cause the cost of occupation had simply become too high. What had begun as a unilateral
decision to withdraw, with the intention of retaining the SLA’s hegemony in the area, turned
into a Hizbullah rout as the SLA quickly disintegrated. Israel had not coordinated its inten-
tions with UNIFIL, which as a result could not effectively act as a buffer between the re-
treating Israeli forces and the Lebanese returning to their villages. The Lebanese State was
totally unprepared for the Israeli withdrawal and had no plans formulated to secure its au-
thority in the region. Moreover, lacking any adequate security coordination measures with
UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army, the IDF left a vacuum that was rapidly lled by Hizbullah, as
later occurred with the void left following Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in Au-
gust/September 2005, which was lled by Hamas. The lack of security coordination, as well
as the unwillingness to relinquish all occupied Lebanese and Palestinian territory, proved a
persistent source of frustration for both the Lebanese and Palestinians, and was fundamen-
tally counterproductive for Israel and its purported peace efforts with its neighbors.54
On the Lebanese-Israeli track, the UN ofcially certied that Israel had nally complied
with the terms of Resolution 425, but Lebanon promptly rejected this, pointing to Israel’s
continued occupation of the Sheba’a Farms area, as well as a number of villages near
the border. This dispute over the continuing validity of Resolution 425 meant that UNIFIL
would remain on the ground in southern Lebanon until the issue was resolved. It also
gave Hizbullah a continued raison d’être to maintain its arms active. After proclaiming
victory from the southern town of Bint Jbeil on 26 May 2000, Hizbullah leader Sayyed Has-
san Nassrallah insisted that the armed resistance against Israel would continue until all
Lebanese territory – including Sheba’a farms – was liberated and all Lebanese prisoners
returned to their homes.55 While Nassrallah made it clear that Hizbullah had no intention
of replacing the Lebanese State, he would later add a third condition for giving up Hizbul-
lah’s arms: the development of a viable national security strategy that would effectively
protect southern Lebanon from Israeli incursions and reprisals. This move has broad pop-
ular support among the population of southern Lebanon who prefer to rely on Hizbullah
for their security, rather than on the respected but ineffective army, or the international
community with its unfullled commitments.
By 2004, the regional situation had shifted signicantly as a result of the US invasion of Iraq
in 2003 and its bellicose attitude towards Iran and Syria (as well as Hizbullah and Hamas).
France and the US sponsored the short but divisive UNSC Resolution 1559, which contained
two paragraphs: one calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and the other for the dis-
banding of all remaining “militias”. The latter was of course challenging both Hizbullah’s
armed presence, as well as its status as the prime national resistance movement. On 14
February 2005, former Prime Minister Raq Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb in down-
town Beirut. This prompted mass demonstrations against Syria which had been widely
implicated in the bombing despite a lack of evidence – forcing it to postpone its own plans
for departure because of unprecedented international pressure, especially UNSC Resolution
1559. Syria subsequently withdrew all its military personnel and equipment from Lebanon
in April 2005. Since Hariri’s assassination, there have been 14 other assassinations (up to
January 2008), and the country has been paralyzed by a split between two camps: the ruling
“March 14” coalition that is backed by the West and includes Prime Minister Fouad Siniora;
and the opposition “March 8” grouping that includes Hizbullah and General Michel Aoun’s
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as its most prominent representatives.56
The internal split, coupled with the partisan role played by the US and other Western back-
ers of March 14, has had a profound impact on the perception of the UN itself. The July
2006 war has exasperated this tension. The rising role of Sunni extremist groups in Leba-
non, including Al-Qaeda afliated ones, amidst the internal turmoil has been an important
development. The battle between the Lebanese Army and Fath El Islam militants in Nahr
3.5.
Israeli Withdrawal
from Lebanon in 2000:
Liberation
and the Dispute over
Resolution 425
3.6.
Crisis in Lebanon and UN
Involvement in Lebanons
Internal Affairs (2004-
2007)
51 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), p.183.
52 The “April Understanding” emerged as a gentle-
man’s agreement, but remained unsigned, perhaps
due in large part to the possible backlash an ofcial
imprimatur could accrue, such as occurred with the
discredited and inconclusive peace treaty signed by
Amine Gemayel with Israel on 17 May 1983.
53 “Old Games, New Rules: Conict on the Israel-
Lebanon Border”, ICG Middle East Report Nº 7, 18 No-
vember 2002, pp. 5-6; for a brief description of ILMG
during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, see Adir Gurion
Waldman, “Lebanon’s force for good”, International
Herald Tribune, 2 August 2006; for a more detailed
Israeli perspective of the ILMG, see Adir Gurion Wald-
man, Arbitrating Armed Conict: Decisions of the
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (JurisNet, 2003);
and for a US assessment, see Adam Frey, “The Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group: An Operational Review”,
(Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 1997).
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
18
76 January 2009
El Bared was erce, and led to a re-appraisal of the strength of such groups. One of their
proclaimed objectives was to attack UNIFIL forces and challenge Hizbullah’s monopoly on
confrontation with Israel.
UNIFIL I arrived in southern Lebanon as an “interim” force, and yet it has remained
deployed for nearly three decades. It was handed three tasks under UNSC resolution
425: namely, to conrm the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon; to restore
international peace and security; and to assist the Lebanese government in extending
its effective authority in southern Lebanon. By these criteria, its success was limited.
Yet it was established under conditions where the key parties to the conict were at
war, an overall political framework was absent, and precious little meaningful support
was provided from the SC itself. Essentially, there was no ‘peace’ to keep, and instead
it was about managing a low-level conict that occasionally exploded. This left UNIFIL
with the challenge of guring out, on the ground, its own way to diffuse tension, provide
impartial information, as well as support, and to gain the trust of the local population
amongst whom they operated. It was in this latter area that they found their greatest
success, which remains to this day unheralded amidst occasional dismissive references
that UNIFIL I somehow “failed” or was not sufciently “robust”. In short, UNIFIL I did
not fail, but rather it was let down by the UNSC, on the one hand, and the major parties
to the conict, on the other. As Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary General of the
UN, explains:
[UNIFIL’s] mandate looked all right on paper, but it had little to do with the
grim realities of the situation. The government of Lebanon was powerless in
the area; the government of Israel was resentful of the new peacekeeping
force and not really disposed to cooperate with it, while other armed groups
in the area, including the PLO, had their own agendas and ideas. Having
launched UNIFIL, the members of the Security Council, both individually
and collectively, were extraordinarily restrained about providing strong and
outspoken support for their new offspring. The crushing burden of perform-
ing an extraordinarily difcult and hazardous task therefore fell mainly on
the commander and the ofcers and men of UNIFIL.57
This section summarizes a number of UNIFIL’s positive contributions, as well as key chal-
lenges faced by the force.
UNIFIL I: Positive Points
In the early years of its intervention, many civilians who had opted to remain in
their village in the South needed UNIFIL to survive. Although UNIFIL had no budget
for humanitarian efforts, it managed to offer an incredible array of services. With
its own resources, it repaired schools and cleared mines and cluster bomblets, all
using its own troops and without any external assistance. It provided outstanding
medical services, to the extent of sending helicopters to evacuate civilian patients
and having them treated in Israeli hospitals when security concerns made it impos-
sible to transport patients to Beirut. Some of UNIFIL’s contingents – the Norwe-
gians and Finns – even mobilized their own national resources to assist in South
Lebanon.
UNIFIL became one with the land: it provided compassion and assistance to people
who had long been ignored by the Lebanese State and the international community,
helping them rebuild their lives, and aided South Lebanon to become a relatively
secure region, and most signicantly, without conict amongst the local populace.
The locals reciprocated in kind. For instance, the people not only welcomed UNIFIL
personnel to their homes and workplaces, but they also provided UNIFIL with in-
formation on potential threats against the force and at times even intervened with
hostile elements to thwart any potential attacks against the UN troops. Further-
more, UNIFIL I quickly learned that the only reliable intelligence on irregular forces
roaming the South could be obtained from local villagers. The major problem faced
was the location of the headquarters in the occupied village of Naqoura. Nobody
from outside the zone could access it. But this was eventually solved by establish-
ing a logistics base in Tyre, with a press ofce to service the local media. This ofce
became the hub of information pouring in from the villagers, merchants and, most
usefully, from taxi and service drivers plying the roads of South Lebanon.
3.7.
Lessons Learned: Positive
Points & Challenges
54 See CITpax, Third Party Intervention in the Arab-Is-
raeli Conict, From Mediator to Monitor, Middle East
Special Report Nº 2, Madrid: CITpax, Winter 2008.
55 Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah, “Victory” in Nicho-
las Noe (ed.), Voice of Hizbullah: the Statements of
Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah, pp. 232-243.
56 It should be noted that this paper was drafted be-
fore the seminal events in Lebanon during May 2008,
when the Hizbullah-led opposition militias overran
the March 14 militias in Beirut, and a national unity
government was nally formed after the main national
and regional players met in Doha to reach a national
accord to end the conict. Despite these agreements,
however, tension remains.
57 Brian Urquhar t, “Foreword” in Bjorn Skogmo,
UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-
1988 (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1989), p. viii.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
19
76 January 2009
UNIFIL was sensitive to local sentiments. Local leaders and notables were always
invited to parades and other ceremonies. Visiting dignitaries from troop-contribut-
ing countries were encouraged to visit local notables. During Ramadan, UNIFIL even
banned its troops from eating and smoking in public. Troops were only allowed to
sunbathe in designated locations, not visible to the public. When it snowed in Ark-
oub, it was the Norwegians who opened the roads. UNIFIL was the only re brigade
in the region, always fully responsive. When the South did not receive fuel supplies,
UNIFIL quietly replenished gasoline in the pumps providing villages with water. One
village in the occupied zone borrowed a UNIFIL generator every oil harvest time in
order to press the olives. The front-line between the occupied area and the rest of
the country boasted the most productive agricultural lands, yet these could not be
cultivated because the SLA militiamen had a nasty habit of ring on farmers. All
UNIFIL battalions thus began to send out patrols, which became known as Harvest
Patrols, to protect the farmers.
UNIFIL was set up at a time when there was no state authority in the South. To
survive and continue with its mission without becoming drawn into the conict,
UNIFIL had to set up channels of communication with irregular groups. Although
the headquarters did not want UNIFIL to deal with any group except the PLO on the
one side, and Israel on the other, it quickly became clear that marginalizing and
ignoring the other relevant groups with heavy arms and rather ill-disciplined cadres
was dangerously misguided. UNIFIL made excellent use of well-trained, sometimes
linguist, professional ofcers provided by UNTSO as military observers under the
operational control of UNIFIL. These ofcers, especially those from the US, France,
Australia and New Zealand, were able to establish and maintain correct and work-
able relations with all the groups in the South, even with Major Haddad’s noto-
riously ill-disciplined militiamen. No doubt it was this excellent liaison work that
transformed the massive Shiite grassroots movement Amal into a fully dedicated
UNIFIL supporter and ally.
When Hizbullah rst appeared in the South in 1983, it was virulently anti-West, anti-
foreigner and anti-UNIFIL. This soon blossomed into armed clashes, especially with
the French, who left Lebanon post haste. Never mind the lack of support from UN
headquarters, even in Beirut there was no one to guide and assist UNIFIL in its con-
tacts with these highly emotional, heavily armed and non-talkative new faces in the
South. Despite initial opposition from New York and Israel, after long and tedious
work, UNIFIL was able to establish some contact with Hizbullah leaders in South
Lebanon and eventually bring the conict under some degree of control.
UNIFIL I: Challenges
There were also numerous problems that UNIFIL had to face from the outset, on the level of
the UNSC and the UN Secretariat, and also as regards organization within UNIFIL itself:
The UNSC created an ambiguous mandate that could not realistically be achieved
given (a) that little political pressure was exerted on Israel, over two decades of
occupation, in a bid to compel its withdrawal from Lebanese territory; and (b) the
absence of any breakthroughs in the overall political settlement that would have
allowed, and empowered, the Lebanese State to effectively extend its authority into
southern Lebanon.
The UN Secretariat, which had originally opposed the creation of UNIFIL due to
the ongoing civil war and total absence of state authority in the area where the
peacekeepers were to be deployed, provided limited guidance to its peacekeepers
on the ground. Similarly to the UNSC, there was little to no debate on how UNIFIL
was to be supported, nor was sufcient consideration given to what conditions the
peacekeeping force might face on the ground.
At the UNIFIL level, because the troop-contributing countries were not adequately
warned of the dangers involved when operating in southern Lebanon and were thus
unprepared for the inevitable challenges posed by abundant irregular forces, UNI-
FIL was not in a position to attempt any moves that might lead to confrontation. The
location of the headquarters and of several symbolic outposts in the occupied zone,
coupled with UNIFIL’s inability to control supply routes to some of these isolated
units, made it a hostage. As occurs within most multinational commands, UNIFIL
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
20
76 January 2009
suffered from wide divergences of opinion between its contingents. There was no
unity of purpose or of approach to problems, as a result of differences in national
interests, political outlooks, military doctrines, linguistic ability and equipment.
UNIFIL’s military and political staff constantly sought to wean the force away from
the Israeli suppliers of its logistical needs. But in this respect, UNIFIL’s civilian
administrative staff proved to be an almost insurmountable barrier. These people
lived in Israel, where doing business was safe and easy. By strictly conforming to
the letter of UN rules and regulations, they caused a permanent embarrassment to
the force when asked by the Lebanese why it was buying its supplies from Israel.
Even the support of key political ofcials in New York was unable to change the
situation. This was, however, true; UNIFIL did not have unfettered, safe access at
its disposal, even to Beirut, given that the roads were under the control of irregular
forces up until the Ta’if Accord.
Since UNIFIL is by its own mandate an “interim” peacekeeping mission, the ques-
tion of temporality is unavoidable. For three decades, UNIFIL was present in south-
ern Lebanon, providing assistance to the Lebanese, coordinating with the Israeli
Defense Forces, and monitoring the cease-re. During this time, UNIFIL was unable
to impede successive Israeli invasions, nor was it mandated to do so; but more
importantly, due to a lack of mechanisms to denounce and reprimand mutual vio-
lations, UNIFIL lost a large degree of its legitimacy. Moreover, the longer the time
without political movement – towards internal Lebanese conict resolution, as well
as external Israeli military occupation and Syrian interference – UNIFIL will continue
being prone to the whims of the parties in conict, as happened once again when
UNIFIL became ‘caught in middle’, acting as a rather bland buffer, during the 2006
Israel-Lebanon War.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
21
76 January 2009
4.
UNIFIL II
(2007 present):
Precedent or
Predicament?
4.1.
Political Context:
The 2006
Israel-Lebanon War
The period between May 2000 and July 2006 was, generally speaking, deceptively calm
along the Blue Line. Effectively, although the ILMG had disbanded, the general terms ne-
gotiated between Israel and Hizbullah under the April 1996 Agreement, continued to apply.
During this period, the border was “quieter than it had been for the past thirty years”, with
only one Israeli civilian killed – victim of falling anti-aircraft rounds that had been red at
Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace – and about a dozen Katyusha rockets red across
the border into Israel, though none having been attributed to Hizbullah.58 By the time of
the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL troops had been reduced to their lowest number since
1978, down to a skeleton force of only around 2,000, amidst talk of the force being alto-
gether disbanded. Behind the scenes, however, no further progress as regards the larger
political dispute meant that Hizbullah continued to stockpile weapons and reinforce its po-
sitions in southern Lebanon, amidst fears that Israel would launch further incursions. Hiz-
bullah’s main demands encompassed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the remaining
occupied Lebanese lands, including Sheba’a farms, and the release of Lebanese prisoners
long-held in Israeli jails. For its part, the IDF was “chomping at the bit for a chance to settle
scores with Hizbullah”, after its withdrawal from Lebanon under “unrelenting pressure”
from a very effective resistance movement.59 Israel wanted to reassert its military suprem-
acy in the area, lest Hizbullah’s model of resistance be replicated in other Arab lands under
Israeli occupation, especially in Palestine, and in the process also prevent the possibility of
rocket re into northern Israel.60
On the morning of 12 July 2006, a Hizbullah unit crossed the Blue Line and attacked an
Israeli army patrol near the border, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing three others.61
The captured soldiers were brought into Lebanon, and a heavy exchange of re ensued
between Hizbullah and Israel across the entire length of the Blue Line.62 Israel’s armed
forces targeted, in these initial exchanges, not just Hizbullah positions, but also a number
of roads and bridges in southern Lebanon, and at least one Israeli tank and platoon crossed
into Lebanon in an attempt to rescue the captured soldiers, but resulting instead in the
deaths of a further ve Israeli soldiers.63 Israel’s army chief of staff, Dan Halutz, warned that
Israel would “turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years” if its soldiers were not released,
but Hizbullah clearly stated that it would only return the Israeli prisoners through “indirect
negotiations”, which led to the “trade” of Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel during
its two decade occupation of southern Lebanon.64 Hizbullah had, in fact, succeeded in a
similar endeavor in early 2004, when Germany brokered a “historic prisoner swap” involv-
ing two dozen Lebanese and Arabs held in Israeli prisons, in return for one captured Israeli
army reserve ofcer and the dead bodies of three other soldiers.65
By the afternoon of 12 July, the Lebanese government had ofcially requested that UNI-
FIL broker a ceasere.66 Israel, however, rejected this and declared that Hizbullah’s ac-
tions constituted an “act of war” by the government of Lebanon and, as such, “Lebanon
is responsible and Lebanon will bear the consequences of its actions”.67 On 13 July, Israel
bombed Beirut’s International Airport and imposed a total land, sea and air blockade on
Lebanon. It had by then also greatly expanded its scope of attack to include civilian areas
and infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including Beirut, while Hizbullah was ring rockets
into civilian areas in northern Israel. By 14 July, Israel’s declared aims had gone beyond
the mere return of its captured soldiers and now sought the total elimination of Hizbullah
and implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559. IDF Brigadier General Ido Nehustan echoed
Prime Minister Olmert’s stance in stating: “We know that it’s going to be a long and con-
tinuous operation, but it’s very clear: we need to put Hizbullah out of business. Our aim is
to change the situation in which a terrorist organization operates from within a sovereign
territory”.68 The tone had now been set: Israel pounded Lebanon, especially the South of
the country and southern suburbs of Beirut, while Hizbullah absorbed these aerial attacks,
fought to repulse Israeli land advances, and launched missile strikes on northern Israel.
This war (or to be more precise, this phase of the war) ended 34 days later, on 14 August,
with the entering into effect of UNSC Resolution 1701, which aimed at the “cessation of
hostilities” in anticipation of a permanent cease-re between Hizbullah and Israel. By then,
nearly 1,200 Lebanese had been killed and over 4,000 wounded – the vast majority civil-
ians, and about a third of these children. Moreover, around one million people in Leba-
non had been displaced by the war, 15,000 homes were destroyed, and the infrastructure
throughout the country was severely damaged.69 43 Israeli civilians and 117 Israeli soldiers
had been killed, around 300,000 Israeli civilians were displaced, and thousands of homes
were damaged in northern Israel.70
58 Augustus Richard Norton, “The Peacekeeping Chal-
lenge in Lebanon,” The MIT Electronic Journal of Mid-
dle East Studies (Vol. 6, September 2006), p. 77.
59 Ibid.
60 See Stuart Reigeluth, “Hezbolá: un modelo de re-
sistencia para Hamás”, Foreign Policy Spanish edition,
6 August 2006: http://www.fp-es.org
61 U N Security Council, “Report of the Secretary
General on the United Nations Interim Force in Leba-
non,” S/2006/560 (21 July 2006), p.1: http://dac-
cessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/437/22/IMG/
N0643722.pdf?OpenElement.
62 See Karim Makdisi, “Israel’s War on Lebanon: Re-
ections on the International Law of Force,” The MIT
Electronic Journal of the Middle East Studies (Vol. 6,
Summer 2006), pp. 9-26. http://web.mit.edu/cis/
www/mitejmes/issues/200610/MITEJMES_Vol_6_
Summer.pdf.
63 UNSC, S/2006/560, op.cit.
64 Chris McGreal, “Capture of soldiers was ‘act of war’
says Israel,” The Guardian, 13 July 2006.
65 CNN, “Israel, Hizbullah swap prisoners,” 29
January 2004: http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/
meast/01/29/prisoner.exchange/index.html.
66 UN SC Report (21 July).
67 Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Olmert: Leb-
anon is responsible and will bear the consequences,”
12 July: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Communiques/2006/PM+Olmert+-+Lebanon+is+res
ponsible+and+will+bear+the+consequences+12-Jul-
2006.htm.
68 McCarthy, op. cit.
69 Republic of Lebanon, Presidency of the Council of
Ministers, Higher Relief Council, http://www.lebano-
nundersiege.gov.lb. This information was retrieved on
30 August 2006.
70 Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Hizbullah at-
tacks northern Israel and Israel’s response,” 12
July 2006: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hiz-
bullah/Hizbullah+attack+in+northern+Israel+and+Isr
aels+response+12-Jul-2006.htm#background.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
22
76 January 2009
4.2.
The Draft of UNSC
Resolution 1701
and the Creation
of UNIFIL II
UNSC Resolution 1701 established a new mandate for UNIFIL, but its protracted negotia-
tion explains why it took several months to reach an acceptable status quo on the ground.
In essence, 1701 still contained remnants of the controversial US-drafted text that had cir-
culated a week before, and which had threatened to turn UNIFIL II into a peace enforcement
operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a mandate, if passed, would surely
have led to disaster for UNIFIL troops, who could hardly be expected to accomplish what
the Israeli armed forces had failed to do during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War: disarm Hiz-
bullah and provide security for Israel.
Draft Resolution of 5 August 2006
On 5 August 2006, the US and France tabled a UNSC draft resolution that was strangely out
of line with the reality on the ground. Israel’s aerial blitzing of southern Lebanon – explicitly
modeled on the tactics used by NATO during the 1999 Kosovo War – created a humanitarian
disaster among the civilian population and also an environmental disaster,71 yet had failed
to stop Hizbullah from launching strikes into northern Israel. Indeed, Israel’s ground force
assault was met with erce resistance, even in the border towns, and as such, Hizbullah
was gaining the upper hand. Lebanon quickly rejected this draft resolution, yet it is impor-
tant to briey consider it, as this draft reected the intentions of both Israel and the US at
the time, and left many residents of southern Lebanon deeply suspicious and resentful of
all UN activities henceforth. The draft resolution proposed the following:72
Full “cessation of hostilities, based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation
by Hizbullah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive
military operations”;
Extension of the “control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese terri-
tory”;
Full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559, including the disarming of all armed
groups in Lebanon;
Unconditional release of Israeli prisoners, while “encouraging the efforts aimed at
resolving the issue of Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel”;
Re-opening of Lebanon’s airport and ports only for “veriably and purely civilian
purposes,” as opposed to an immediate lifting of the blockade;
Deployment of an “international force” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to help
implement a “long term solution”;
UNIFIL is to monitor the implementation of this resolution and to extend its as-
sistance “to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe
return of displaced persons”.
Under the terms of this draft resolution, UNIFIL was thus to be conned to solely a monitor-
ing and humanitarian role, while a NATO-supported “international force” would deal with
the task of disarming Hizbullah, implementing UNSC Resolution 1559, and guaranteeing
security for Israel along the Blue Line.
Resolution 1701 and the creation of UNIFIL II
UNSC Resolution 1701 was unanimously passed on 12 August 2006, 32 days after the war
had begun. The fact that the UNSC had waited so long before securing a resolution – in or-
der to satisfy the geopolitical demands of the US, which had publicly backed Israel to nish
the job at hand of defeating Hizbullah – greatly affected the UN’s credibility and claim of
impartiality in Lebanon and the Arab region. UN Secretary General Ko Annan recognized
this when describing how “profoundly disappointed” he was that a ceasere resolution
had been delayed for so long, while civilians “suffered such terrible, unnecessary pain and
loss”.73 The consequences, Annan recognized, were that “this inability to act sooner has
badly shaken the world’s faith in its [the UN’s] authority and integrity”.74
71 See Lebanon, Post-Conict Environmental Assess-
ment, United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP), January 2007: http://postconict.unep.ch/
publications/UNEP_Lebanon.pdf
72 See the full text of this draft resolution, “Text: Draft
UN Lebanon resolution” (5 August 2006): http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5249488.stm.
73 UN Security Council, SC/8808, 5511th Meeting,
“Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities Between
Hizbullah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolu-
tion 1701 (2006)” http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2006/sc888808.doc.htm.
74 UN Security Council, 5511th Meeting, “Security
Council Calls for End to Hostilities between Hizbul-
lah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701
(2006),” SC/8808 (11 August 2006).
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
23
76 January 2009
While Resolution 1701 was still seen by many analysts as favoring Israel, it was ultimately
accepted by all parties to the conict as a compromise deal that was urgently needed in
light of the humanitarian disaster and Israel’s military failure on the battleeld.75 The res-
olution had removed the most controversial references to peace enforcement measures
under Chapter VII and retreated from the idea of an “international force” that was distinct
from UNIFIL (see Box 1). However, it remained vague in key passages and left a number
of ‘Trojan horses’ that implied the embedding of Chapter VII intentions into the revised
text – an important factor that contributed to a tense stand-off during the initial post-war
phase.76 For instance, in Resolution 1701’s nal pre-ambular paragraph, the following was
inserted: “determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international
peace and security.” This language is derived directly from Chapter VII logic, and not that of
Chapter VI, which is concerned with the “Pacic settlement of disputes.”
Resolution 1701 clearly envisions that the long-term solution to this conict rests on the
need to disarm “all armed groups”, in keeping with Resolution 1559 (previously rejected
by Hizbullah), to establish a buffer zone free of any “armed personnel, assets and weapons
other than those of the government,” and also a de facto arms embargo on Lebanon, except
for those authorized by the government itself. In other words, Israel and the US are openly
interpreting this resolution as a de facto enforcement mechanism for 1559. Moreover, Reso-
lution 1701 requires that all states agree to an arms embargo, as well as to the prohibition
of any ‘technical training or assistance’ save that authorized by the Lebanese government.
This is clearly intended to attempt at severing links between Hizbullah and Iran and Syria.
Interestingly, there is no mention of any arms restrictions on Israel.
With regard to UNIFIL, Resolution 1701 set the terms of reference for an expanded UNI-
FIL force, which was authorized to monitor the cease re, accompany the Lebanese Army
in its deployment in the South, and to assist in humanitarian issues and in the return of
displaced people – all this in addition to its original terms under 425 and 426. UNIFIL is
present to support the Lebanese government “in securing borders and other entry points to
prevent arms or related material from entering Lebanon.” More cryptically, the resolution
authorizes UNIFIL to take “all necessary action” to ensure that the areas under its mandate
are not used for “hostile activities.” This may result in UNIFIL being urged to confront Hiz-
bullah or other armed groups in southern Lebanon. It is a potentially dangerous indication,
and will place UNIFIL staff in danger of being seen as the enemy.
75 See, for instance, Muriel Asseburg, “UN Resolu-
tion 1701, UNIFI L 2, and the ‘New Greater Middle East
Project’: A German Perspective” in UN Resolution
1701: Horizons and Challenges (Beirut: Cultural Move-
ment-Antelias & Friedrich Eber t Stiftung, February
2007), p.69.
76 Karim Makdisi, “The Flaws in the UN Resolution” in
Counterpunch (14 August, 2006), http://rmf.net/mak-
disi08142006.html.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
24
76 January 2009
Box 1: Excerpts of UNSC Resolution 1701
2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL,
as authorized by paragraph 11, to deploy their forces together throughout the South and
calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its
forces from southern Lebanon in parallel (…);
8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasere and a long-term solu-
tion based on the following principles and elements:
full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the es-
tablishment, between the Blue Line and the Litani river, of an area free of any
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of
Lebanon and of UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolu-
tions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed
groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July
2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the
Lebanese State;
no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon, except as authorized
by its Government;
provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in
Israel’s possession;
11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, man-
date and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL
to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its
mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the
South, including along the Blue Line, and as Israel withdraws its armed forces from
Lebanon, as provided in paragraph 2; (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph
11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; (d) Extend its as-
sistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary
and safe return of displaced persons; (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking
steps towards the establishment of the area, as referred to in paragraph 8; (f) Assist the
Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;
12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an inter-
national force to assist it in exercising its authority throughout the territory, authorizes
UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems
within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharg-
ing its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of
movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice
to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent
threat of physical violence;
14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points,
to prevent the entry into Lebanon, without its consent, of arms or related material, and
requests UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, to assist the Government of Lebanon at
its request;
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
25
76 January 2009
4.3.
Deployment
and Effectiveness
of UNIFIL II
Ground Troops
In the midst of the war, the UNSC passed Resolution 1697 on 31 July 2006 and exceptionally
extended UNIFIL’s mandate, for one month only, pending further negotiations. Resolution
1701 subsequently authorized a further one year extension to the UNIFIL mandate until 31
August 2007. UNIFIL personnel emerged from their shelters immediately after the cessation
of hostilities on the morning of 14 August 2006, and began intensive patrolling throughout
its area of operations and in the “Tyre pocket” up to the Litani River. It also resumed air
patrols along the Blue Line. Signicantly, UNIFIL force commander Major-General Pellegrini
convened a tripartite meeting with his counterparts from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
represented by Major-General Shehaitly, and the Israeli Defense Force, represented by Ma-
jor-General Dekel – the rst such meeting in over a decade – to coordinate deployment
and withdrawal plans. These tripartite meetings have been held several times since, and
are an important forum for communication between the various ofcial parties. A ‘hotline’
was also established between the UNIFIL force commander and the IDF to report Blue Line
violations and any other emergency issues that may arise, while a similar mechanism was
established with the LAF, both in Tyre and in the Defense Ministry headquarters. This tri-
partite dialogue has allowed UNIFIL to diffuse tensions that inevitably arise, to discuss all
violations of Resolution 1701 and to work towards formalizing the Blue Line itself – which
also helps to build trust among the conicting players.77
Meanwhile, plans were underway to increase the number of UNIFIL troops from 2,000
to a maximum of 15,000, as stipulated by Resolution 1701. This deployment was envi-
sioned over three phases. The rst phase – spanning from mid-August to mid-October
2006 – involved a rapid response deployment to stabilize the security situation in south-
ern Lebanon, oversee Israel’s withdrawal and support the LAF’s concomitant deployment.
Battalions from France, Italy, and Spain arrived by 15 September, joining Ghanaian and
Indian contingents already in place to create a 5,000 strong force. Further logistical and
support units were added, including the deployment of a UH1 helicopter. By the end of this
phase, Israel had withdrawn from most of southern Lebanon and had lifted its siege of the
Lebanese coast, following the deployment of an interim Maritime Task Force consisting
mainly of Italian vessels. The second phase of UNIFIL deployment involved the entry of
four mechanized infantry battalions from France, Indonesia, Italy and Nepal, as well as
one infantry unit each from Malaysia and Qatar, and various other support units (including
those specialized in de-mining) from countries as distant as China and the Dominican Re-
public. By the end of November 2006, UNIFIL numbered around 10,500; and by December,
this had risen to 11,500 ground troops, 1,750 naval personnel, and 51 military observers
from UNTSO, which – with the deployment of four LAF brigades in southern Lebanon – was
nally “deemed sufcient to execute the mandate”.78
The third phase of UNIFIL’s deployment concentrated on improving relations with local au-
thorities and the local population.79 The arrival of “robust” UNIFIL II units coincided with
growing suspicions among most southern Lebanese that these troops were merely tools
of a larger US-led initiative to advance Israel’s aims during the war to disarm the Resist-
ance via a peace enforcement operation. Whereas UNIFIL I had, by and large, enjoyed the
trust and respect of the local population, the rst UNIFIL II troops – particularly those from
the Spanish and French contingents – appeared overly militant and disrespectful to the lo-
cals. As such, during January and February 2007, UNIFIL focused on forging better relations
with the local political leadership and municipalities, which of course included Hizbullah
members. The move proved successful, as these initiatives were reciprocated and trust was
slowly gained. This trust, however, was predicated on UNIFIL sticking to the narrow inter-
pretation of Resolution 1701 and not adopting a pro-active stance towards the disarmament
of Hizbullah units. Next, UNIFIL stepped up its civilian operations in order to win the good
will of the local population in whose areas they were serving. These programs proved quite
challenging during the rst few months of 2007 – many residents of Bint Jbeil and other
areas refused to engage with UNIFIL in a meaningful way – largely due to the residual mis-
trust and unwise statements made by Western leaders, such as German Chancellor Mer-
kel’s infamous proclamation that UNIFIL was there to defend Israel. Nonetheless, within a
few months, UNIFIL had established open channels of communication with the local popu-
lation as it enhanced the civilian component of its operations, both for its own public rela-
tions purposes and for strategic reasons rooted in a realization that its security would be
greatly enhanced by such activities. Since May 2007, UNIFIL has attained a modus vivendi
with the locals by moving away from overt peace enforcement type activities towards, ironi-
cally, a more UNIFIL I-style grassroots focus. Whereas stone-throwing at UNIFIL II units by
the local population was a regular, even daily occurrence during the initial period of its de-
ployment, after May 2007, such demonstrations of anger towards UNIFIL had been largely
eradicated, with perhaps only one or two such incidents a month by the end of 2007. The
77 Information based, in part, on an interview with the
Director of Political and Civil Affairs in UNI FIL, held in
Beirut on 20 October 2007.
78 UNSC, “Letter Dated 1 December 2006 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council,” S/2006/933 (1 December 2006).
79 Information on UNIFIL-local population relations
based, in part, on the interview with the Director of Po-
litical and Civil Affairs in UNIF IL, op. cit; and an inter-
view with the Senior Political Affairs Ofcer in UNIFIL,
Beirut, 17 October 2007.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
26
76 January 2009
European contingent of UNIFIL units, initially composed of battle-hardened military troops,
was slowly but surely rotated and replaced by trained peacekeeping units a move that
certainly contributed to better relations.
UNSC Resolution 1773 (24 August 2007) added one more year to UNIFIL’s mandate, which
was extended until the end of August 2008. UNIFIL now maintains over 60 positions, as
well as a series of checkpoints and observation posts, and conducts around 400 vehicle,
foot and air patrols over any 24-hour period (both day and night) throughout its area of op-
erations, in both rural and urban areas. These operate in addition to the LAF’s four brigades
and a separate artillery regiment, which together carry out 60 patrols over a 24-hour period
and maintain more than 100 checkpoints.80 Overall, as of the end of November 2007, UNIFIL
maintained 13,264 military personnel and some 304 international civilian staff drawn from
27 countries, together with 583 local civilian staff. Its approved budget during 1 July 2007
to 30 June 2008 was of $748.20 million.81 In terms of budget dispensed on civilian projects,
UNIFIL itself has set aside $500,000 a year for quick impact projects (generally approved
by the UN in the aftermath of a crisis, such as the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War), which are
projects limited both in scope (must be implemented within three months) and budget
(up to $20,000 per project), and that benet the community as a whole. However, various
lead UNIFIL national contingents (particularly those of the EU Member States) contribute
additional funds (outwith the UNIFIL budget) through civilian-military coordination (CIMIC)
procedures.82 Such budgets have increased in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the
Spanish UNIFIL unit in June 2007, as it was felt that UNIFIL troops needed to establish bet-
ter relations with the local population for security reasons.
80 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701
(2006),” 29 October 2007.
81 UNIFIL, “Facts and Figures,” http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/missions/unil/facts.html.
82 Interviews with the Director of Political and Civil
Affairs in U NIFIL and Senior Political Affairs Ofcer in
UNIFIL, op.cit; for more on Civil-Military Coordination
(CIMIC), see paper presented at the 2008 European
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Ses-
sions of Workshops in Rennes, France, April 2008, and
at the 2008 Conference “The EU in International Af-
fairs”, Brussels, Belgium, 24-26 April 2008, by Chiara
Ruffa, “Imagining War and Keeping Peace? European
Military Cultures in a non-ESDP Peacekeeping Op-
eration: the Case of UNIFIL”, available at: http://www.
ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_VIII_2_
Ruffa.pdf
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
27
76 January 2009
Map 1:
UNIFIL II Deployment (March 2008)
Source: Map No. 4144 Rev. 19, United Nations, March 2008: http://www.un.org/Depts/
Cartographic/map/dpko/unil.pdf
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
28
76 January 2009
For the rst time in UN history, a Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed alongside na-
tional ground troop contingents. Italy commenced the MTF in early fall 2006. Soon there-
after, Germany assumed the lead of the maritime force, with a eet of four large vessels
and an approximate crew of 800 personnel, for over a year, including all of 2007. Italy
resumed lead-nation status in February 2008, introducing and incorporating the European
Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) element, created in 1995 by Spain, Portugal, Italy and
France. The MTF relieved Israel of its proclaimed security responsibility to prevent the
smuggling of arms.83
Operating off the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon, MTF navigates some 5,000 square nau-
tical miles, compared to the 300 square miles monitored by UNIFIL ground troops. Despite
early coordination difculties, and suspicions amongst the local population that its pres-
ence was serving Israeli interests, MTF has ultimately succeeded in gaining Lebanese sup-
port by ending the Israeli sea embargo of Lebanon and projecting a sense of professional-
ism and impartiality. Moreover, MTF training activities for Lebanese Navy personnel and the
procurement of adequate equipment began in December 2006.
Due to the novelty of a UN naval force, MTF was confronted with a lack of pre-established
UN maritime operation procedures. This meant that such procedures had to be created
in close collaboration with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as well as with the Israeli
and Syrian Navies. Logistically operating out of Limassol, Cyprus, MTF has had no ofcial
contact with the Syrian Navy, which remains highly inactive. Since MTF was launched, the
German contingent has enjoyed open communication channels with the Israeli Navy, but
has been confronted with consistent challenges from the Israeli Air Force (IAF), experienc-
ing recurrent over-ight violations.
Ironically, Israeli violations of UNSC Resolution 1701 helped establish early-warning pro-
cedures. The German contingent demonstrated a high degree of military vigilantism, and
used standard international frequency to issue warning signals to the IAF. After ve pre-
carious incidents, the IAF reduced its over-ights of the MTF area of operations, and now
generally restricts aerial training to the international open air space. Although a ve-mile
code of contact was established with MTF, well beyond the usual testing period for peace-
keeping forces, the IAF still infringes upon Lebanon’s sovereign airspace, often breaking
the sound barrier in low-altitude passes and using drones for collection of intelligence. The
Israeli Navy also maintains ships stationed inside a triangle delineated by buoys and out of
bounds to Lebanese or international vessels, and has in the past opened re on Lebanese
shing boats deemed too close to the maritime border.
Within the MTF Area of Maritime Operations (AMO), primary MTF activities consist of di-
verting and – with the permission of the Lebanese authorities – inspecting suspect ships.
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) also involve hailing and warning measures, which
are carried out in tandem with familiarizing and training the Lebanese Navy ofcers during
operation, in accordance with the motto “train as you operate”. An important facet of these
measures is that of the approximately 10,000 vessels hailed for inspection in 2007 alone,
only around 40 were considered seriously suspect (though none contained weapons), and
MTF personnel did not board a single one. This means that the Lebanese Navy carries out
all inspections, thus permitting the MTF to maintain a high degree of neutrality, and by
extension, a credibility respected by all parties.
Germany also contributed two vessels from the Bremen sea police to strengthen the Leba-
nese naval capacity, namely Bremen 2 and Bremen 9, renamed “AMCHIT” and “NAQOURA”
respectively. Due to their out of date appearance in the Beirut port, it is more likely that
these vessels were tokens of short-term German support, rather than a move to seriously
improve the Lebanese Navy in the long-term. The Bremen boats operate under Lebanese
“ownership” and with German guidance within the inner zone along the coast; the larger
German frigates navigate in the outer zone. Also note-worthy: the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) made a contribution of 10 new rapid patrol boats, more of which will be needed to
consolidate the efcient land-sea coordination envisioned by the coastal radar system.
Given that Germany planned to downsize to only a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to MTF,
other countries, such as Turkey and the Netherlands, were considered to take the lead.84
The Turkish option would have proven problematic due to the historical implications of Ot-
toman occupation, but also logistically: as Limosol (Greek Cyprus) serves as a naval base
for MTF, a Turkish lead would have inevitably caused political complications. Turkey now
contributes one frigate to MTF and uses the Turkish port of Mersin in consideration of these
sensitivities. As Italy reacquired lead-nation status of MTF, the principle of bilateral German
assistance to the Lebanese Coastal Radar Organization has continued. And for purposes of
4.4.
The Maritime
Task Force (MTF)
83 See UNIFIL Press Release, “UNIFIL Maritime Task
Force Changes Command”, 29 February 2008, PIO/
032e, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
missions/unil/pr109e.pdf
84 Germany relinquished its leadership role of MTF
in February 2008, and was replaced by the European
Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), whose main mem-
bers would rotate leadership each six months. Italy
thus assumed command in late February 2008, fol-
lowed by France, which took over in early September
2008, during which time UNIFIL’s MTF comprised
naval units from Belgium (1 ship), France (2 ships),
Germany (3 ships), Greece (2 ships), Italy (1 ship),
Spain (1 ship), and Turkey (1 ship). Such a deployment
of EUROMARFOR forces could be replicated along the
Mediterranean coast of Gaza, i.e. to allow the re-open-
ing of Gaza’s ports.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
29
76 January 2009
continuity, German preparatory training and in situ monitoring should persist until Lebanon
acquires full “ownership” capacity.
A considerable MTF presence should be maintained within the UNIFIL framework to act as
a deterrent or buffer force between the conicting parties. However, MTF needs fewer large
ships, and more small vessels, which would be faster and thus facilitate maritime manoeu-
vres. Ideally and eventually, these rapid patrol boats would and should be operated by the
Lebanese Navy, endowed with the sovereign capacity to stop, inspect and detain suspect
ships. In order to acquire such patrol boats, Lebanon needs serious contributions from the
international community. Particularly after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and the 2007 Nahr
al-Bared hostilities, Lebanon simply cannot fund such an upgrade of its naval forces. Leba-
non does not aspire to have a full-edged navy per say, but does require new patrol ships
if it hopes to carry out rapid relays between coast and sea, in coordination with the coastal
radar system, to secure its sea border and effectively control its territorial waters.85
Bilateral Support
While European support for Lebanon, including its security, is expressed within the frame-
work of UNIFIL, Member State engagement also takes the form of less-heralded, but po-
tentially important, bilateral agreements with the Government of Lebanon. Germany, for
instance, has taken the lead in establishing such bilateral agreements by supporting two
projects: the Coastal Radar Organization (CRO) and a “pilot project” for Lebanese border
management (see Box 2). The CRO is comprised of a chain of seven radar stations along
the coast of Lebanon. Three of these stations are older and are therefore being refurbished
with new equipment and facilities; the four other are new installations. The radar system
was handed over to the Lebanese authorities in February 2008. Due to the bilateral nature
of the CRO, only Germany is training Lebanese ofcers, with training being carried out in
Germany and then implemented in Lebanon. The aim of the CRO is to create and consoli-
date this chain of radar stations to enable coverage of the entire Mediterranean coast of
Lebanon. An advanced and developed radar system will permit Lebanese authorities to
detect vessels in their territorial waters, to coordinate positions, communicate informa-
tion, and issue warning signals. This system of detection and possible inspection was but-
tressed by the UAE contribution of 10 new patrol boats, allowing rapid sorties from coast to
sea for inspections and, if need be, detention. Similar to the low-prole German assistance
to the Lebanese border management, the ultimate goal of German engagement here is
to provide initial training and follow-up exercises, eventually transferring the principle of
“command-and-control” to full Lebanese ownership.
85 This information is based on an ofcial visit aboard
the German Bayern with Admiral Hans Christian
Luther, then Commander of the UNIFI L Maritime Task
Force, off the coast of Lebanon on 12 October 2007;
as well as interviews in Beirut, Lebanon, with the First
Secretary of the German Embassy, on 10 October 2007,
and in Berlin, Germany, with representatives from the
Federal Ministry of Defence, on 14 September 2007.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
30
76 January 2009
Box 2: German Support for Lebanese Border Management
On 25 August 2006, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora requested support to en-
hance Lebanese border management in an ofcial letter to German Chancellor Angela
Merkel. The German Foreign Ministry responded on 7 September 2006 by sending an
initial team of ten federal police (5) and customs ofcers (5) to assess – via a eld study
the seaports, airport and land crossing points. Like UNIFIL II, the resulting German
Border Police Mission in northern Lebanon is based on UNSC Resolution 1701, which
includes clauses for securing borders and interdicting arms smuggling; but this “pilot
project” emanates from a bilateral understanding between Lebanon and Germany. A
subsequent UN eld mission – the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LI-
BAT) – also visited Lebanon from 27 May to 15 June 2007 to assess Lebanon’s borders
and to follow-up on UNSC Resolution 1701.86
The German pilot project activities are restricted to a 24 by 44 km section of Lebanon,
north of Tripoli, and aim to secure Lebanon’s ofcial “green” border with Syria. Along the
100 km northern and north-eastern border with Syria, the pilot project assists in equip-
ping and training around 800 Lebanese border police to operate four border crossings:
namely, from west to east, 1) Ar-Rida, 2) Abu Diyeh, 3) Bukayyah, and 4) Qa’a, as well
as to monitor the border from key observation points. Mobile units, comprising of two
vehicles with four personnel each, will also cover the northern hinterland of Lebanon.
Funded by Great Britain and assisted by a British expert, a Common Operation Centre
has been created to build a common border force, including all four Lebanese security
branches: the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which are to be the civil police and have
received some 30 vehicles from Canada and 20 from Great Britain; the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF), to patrol the “green” border; the General Security Forces, to monitor bor-
der immigration; and Customs, to inspect the entry of goods. Denmark sent two police
experts and pledged 700,000 to refurbish Camp Aramar near Tripoli, where training
of the Lebanese border police began in October 2007. The United States acts as a “si-
lent” partner in assisting with basic communication material, such as radios, as well as
vehicles for the ISF within Beirut proper.
In accordance with the “integrated border management” concept, the pilot project thus
aims to restructure and institutionalize a cohesive Lebanese civil police border force. To
foster better coordination, cooperation and communication, training in IT networks was
delivered, and scanners and visa check devices were introduced at Beirut airport and at
border crossings. Though not part of the northern sector, Germany also provided and
installed, at the main eastern Lebanese border with Syria, known as the Masna’a cross-
ing, a container scanner that is meant to facilitate economic trade.87
In the preparation and implementation phases of procuring equipment and training
personnel, the German pilot project appears to be laying the groundwork for another
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission in the Middle East. This option,
however, is not politically viable in the absence of internal Lebanese consensus and
Syrian consent. As such, it should be reconsidered, particularly in light of the disastrous
precedent set by EUBAM-Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The suspension of the ESDP monitor-
ing mission seriously undermined the EU’s legitimacy to act as a neutral third party:
forbidden by Israel to be operational at the Rafah crossing, the EU monitors are essen-
tially perceived as implementing Israel’s closure policy, which has severely worsened
the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. An ESDP mission along Lebanon’s land border would
irrevocably be perceived as implementing steps to pressurise and isolate Hizbullah and
Syria, with equally negative foreseeable results for EU impartiality.
86 See “Report of the Lebanon Independent
Border Assessment Team” (LIBAT), UN Secu-
rity Council, S/2007/382, 26 June 2007, avail-
able at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2007%20382.pdf
87 This information is largely based on interviews with
German diplomats in Berlin and Beirut, with members
of the German Project Ofce Federal Police / Customs
in Lebanon, and with the German Ministry of the In-
terior, international border police cooperation section,
conducted in September/October 2007. For a more
comprehensive and detailed account of German ef-
forts, bilateral and multilateral, in Lebanon, see Timur
Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Karim Makdisi, and Stu-
art Reigeluth, “Germany’s Contribution to Lebanese
Sovereignty, The Maritime Task Force, Coastal Radar
System and Border Pilot Project”, DGAP Standpunkt,
Berlin, January 2008; translated into Spanish and
republished as “La contribución alemana a la sober-
anía libanesa” with the Centro de Estudios de Oriente
Medio (CEMO) of the Fundación Promoción Social de
la Cultura (FPSC), Madrid, January 2008. And for an
argument against deploying an E SDP mission hastily
along the Lebanese-Syrian border, see Stuart Reige-
luth, “EU monitoring is not the best option”, The Daily
Star, Lebanon, 6 December 2007.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
31
76 January 2009
Following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL II was made more “robust” by UNSC Reso-
lution 1701 in a bid to ensure the “cessation of hostilities” between IDF and Hizbullah. Na-
tional EU Member State contributions increased substantially as a result, but this did not
necessarily improve the efciency of UNIFIL II. The participation of more countries actually
rendered coordination and communication more difcult. The deployment of a Maritime
Task Force (MTF), the rst in UN history, effectively ended the Israeli naval siege of Lebanon
and remains relatively discreet in its operations. Although Israeli violations of the MTF Area
of Operations have decreased, the Israeli Air Force still violates Lebanese sovereignty on
a regular basis, and Israel has abducted Lebanese shepherds from within Lebanon proper
for short interrogations. Meanwhile, Hizbullah has largely rebuilt its military capabilities,
including north of the Litani River (where it expects the next Israeli invasion to come from).
There have also been two isolated Katyusha rocket attacks launched from southern Lebanon
across the border. UNIFIL II has also suffered attacks from al-Qaeda-oriented elements that
are increasingly exploiting Lebanon’s instability and the lack of effective state control, par-
ticularly in northern Lebanon and within some Palestinian refugee camps. Ironically, rather
than ensuring the Lebanese State’s monopoly on arms, as was called for by UNSC Resolu-
tion 1701, UNIFIL II has increasingly come to rely on Hizbullah (and the local population in
southern Lebanon) for its security and intelligence. UNIFIL II’s presence has succeeded in
helping to thwart the resumption of hostilities between conicting parties, yet without suf-
cient political action to resolve the internal or external issues affecting Lebanon, UNIFIL II
may persist as an indenite “interim” mission, especially given that the UNSC, the EU, and
the US continue to neglect the larger political framework needed to resolve the outstand-
ing conict. Leading EU Member States have the potential to provide positive closure to
the conict, particularly in light of the EU’s emerging and evolving role in the Middle East
(although the EU’s policy in Palestine has eroded its standing in the region – an issue that
must be addressed accordingly). This, however, requires greater political will, to both inu-
ence the US agenda in the region and erase the perception of double-standards that most
Lebanese and Arabs feel has become an organic part of EU (and US) policy.
Conclusion 1: UNIFIL is not a solution, but a conict management tool that serves as a
means to an end. This is the greatest lesson learned from UNIFIL I, and the reason this UN
“interim” peacekeeping force is still in operation three decades after its initial deployment.
The remaining outstanding include: Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanese lands, the
violation of Lebanese sovereignty (mostly via regular over-ights) and ongoing security
threat to Lebanon; the permanent demarcation of the Blue Line; the settlement of the Pal-
estinian refugee issue; and the restoration of effective Lebanese State authority through-
out southern Lebanon, ensuring that the LAF has a monopoly over the use of weapons.
While the UN in general, UNIFIL, and various EU Member States are dealing with certain
aspects of this conict (such as mediating the exchange of prisoners, or demarcating the
Blue Line), there remains a generalised lack of political will, particularly to pressurise Israel
towards reaching a nal settlement to the conict.
Recommendations:
The EU should support the evolution from a “cessation of hostilities”, as stated
in Resolution 1701, to a full-scale cease-re. This is particularly true given Israel’s
desire to re-establish the deterrent capabilities it lost during the 2006 Israel-Leba-
non War, which would suggest an incentive for Israel to initiate another invasion of
Lebanon, especially seeing as it continues to perceive Hizbullah by virtue of its
very existence as a resistance force – as a threat to its security.
The EU should support a UN-led over-arching political solution to the conict that
addresses the grievances of all parties (including those of the Palestinian refu-
gees). This means maintaining open communication channels with all parties to
the conict, and pressuring the various parties to make concessions. The absence
of such a general solution will leave UNIFIL troops and staff stranded once again in
no-man’s land amidst a conict that may go on for many years to come.
Conclusion 2: EU Member States, particularly France, Italy, and Spain, play a leading role
in UNIFIL II. The European commitment should not, and indeed cannot, falter now. None-
theless, EU Member States should consider downsizing their national contingents. While
EU troops are essential for deterrence purposes, because of the political clout they en-
joy internationally, such deterrence only works as long as the parties to the conict nd
that the current truce works to their advantage. EU troops have unfortunately also become
high-prole targets for jihadist groups now operating with impunity in Lebanon, as the at-
tack on Spanish and Irish units demonstrated. Moreover, the perception that EU national
authorities have engaged in local politics in a biased fashion over the past two years, has
5.
Conclusion & Policy
Recommendations
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
32
76 January 2009
increased the security risk for UNIFIL contingents through no fault of their own command
or troops. These conditions have prompted EU troops within UNIFIL to over-emphasize the
issue of force protection, to the detriment of the overall mission.
Recommendations:
EU contingents within UNIFIL should be reduced. Downsizing would lower their
prole and make their targeting more difcult, but will not diminish the political
clout of the overall force. However, downsizing should not be mistaken for reduced
political commitment, and support for both the LAF and local civil society institu-
tions should in fact be augmented.
EU national authorities should coordinate more closely with their UNIFIL counter-
parts when intervening in the local politics of Lebanon. This is in order to ensure
that the security of UNIFIL troops is not compromised by foreign policy statements
or blunders (such as Chancellor Merkel’s statement following the initial deploy-
ment of UNIFIL II).
Conclusion 3: The presence of 27 contributing member states to UNIFIL may seem like an
ideal ‘rainbow’ operation, but it seriously hampers practical coordination and communica-
tion. It is wishful thinking on the part of the UN to recruit troops from all over the world
without taking into consideration the differences in quality, equipment, training, and suit-
ability of these troops for a complicated mission such as UNIFIL. Local forces and people
on the ground are aware of such perceptions of this mission and of divergent national in-
terests, and are adept at playing them off against each other. Some contingents are not
seen as anything more than social workers helping out with projects to win the “hearts and
minds” of the people, while the more professional contingents with a NATO background are
perceived as more aggressive and less responsive to the local population because these
troops operate by the book and are not willing to depart from the military standards. UNIFIL
should therefore consider reducing the total number of contributing nations, while continu-
ing to build relations with local authorities and residents of southern Lebanon.
Recommendations:
UNIFIL should reduce the overall number of contingents, which makes the com-
mand, control and mission perception weak. A more compact UNIFIL, with fewer
ags, will be much more respected and efcient.
UNIFIL should operate with the consent of the effective authorities on the ground. It
should thus enhance contacts with the local authorities, including Hizbullah.
The UN should increase UNIFIL’s budget for activities with civilian and humanitar-
ian objectives. There should be efcient coordination under the UNIFIL leadership
for all such civilian operations, including those developed bilaterally by EU Member
States.
Conclusion 4: Germany’s role as lead-nation of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) was positive
overall. Based on the MTF experience, Germany is now in a positive position to inuence
future maritime operations, under the UN banner or any other supra-national organization.
Training of the Lebanese Navy has progressed, while the MTF has set about its mission
without great fanfare or negative publicity (that is, after its initial deployment, when it was
seen in a negative light by locals). Such training and capacity-building must continue until
Lebanon acquires the capacity to control its sovereign territorial waters against all threats.
The Lebanese Navy must be perceived by all Lebanese to be impartial in local disputes. The
end of Germany’s lead-nation role should not affect its bilateral agreements with Lebanon,
namely the consolidation of the coastal radar system and the northern border pilot project.
Recommendations:
The MTF should be maintained, operating on the basis of a rotating EU Member
State leadership. The MTF serves to deter Israeli incursions into Lebanese territorial
seas and hinders potential, if limited, arms smuggling operations into Lebanon.
The UN and EU should provide more material, primarily in the form of high-speed
boats, to the Lebanese Navy in order to effectuate proper land-sea sorties. How-
ever, care should be taken not to appear to politicize the LAF or its Navy, as this
could have severe repercussions.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
33
76 January 2009
An ESDP border management mission should not deploy hastily along the Leba-
nese-Syrian border as this will increase tensions with Syria and lead to more secu-
rity problems for UNIFIL. Precaution is urged, even if consent from all relevant par-
ties, including Syria and Hizbullah, is granted, and the highest level of coordination
and communication must be implemented to ensure cohesiveness between each
side of the border.
Conclusion 5: The lessons learnt from both UNIFIL and UNIFIL II should be processed be-
fore any further large-scale EU intervention into the Middle East, particularly in Palestine,
is considered. Any ESDP mission, or EU-supported UN peace operation, should have re-
alistic objectives that help advance conict management between the conicting sides,
in parallel to general initiatives aimed at solving the underlying political problems. If this
does not occur, then all such operations will either become permanently “interim”, such as
UNIFIL, or face an embarrassed suspension right when they are most needed, as happened
with the EUBAM-Rafah. For instance, based on the MTF experience along the Lebanese
coast, EU Member States may consider replicating the deployment of a European-led naval
force, such as EUROMARFOR, along the 40km coast of the Gaza Strip. However, if such
an operation is deployed out with a political settlement including all the de facto forces,
including Hamas, then it will probably be perceived as a blockade that serves the interests
of the Israeli occupation forces.
Recommendations:
EU troops should not be deployed to Palestine unless this action is reliably per-
ceived as impartial and is implemented in parallel to an effective advancement of
the broad political agenda. Considering the climate of partition that currently per-
vades the Arab region, any such intervention will be perceived as political, rather
than technical in nature.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
34
76 January 2009
UN SC Resolution 425 – 19 March 1978
The Security Council,
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the
Permanent Representative of Israel,
Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its conse-
quences to the maintenance of international peace,
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Mid-
dle East,
1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence
of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial
integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately
under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of
conrming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and
assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the
area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the
implementation of the present resolution.
UNSC RESOLUTION 426 – 19 March 1978
The Security Council,
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council
resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;
2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in
accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that
it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council decides
this.
DRAFT UNSC RESOLUTION – 5 August 2006
The Security Council,
PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978),
426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements
of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/
PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17),
of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3), and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),
PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon
and in Israel since Hizbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused
hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure
and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,
PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the
need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by
the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,
PP4. Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed
at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,
6.
Annexes
6.1.
UNSC Resolutions
425-426
6.2.
August 5 UNSC Draft
Resolution + UNSC
Resolution 1701
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
35
76 January 2009
OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate ces-
sation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive
military operations;
OP2. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;
OP3. Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated
by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;
OP4. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its nancial
and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the
safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon,
reopening airports and harbours for veriably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on
it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and
development of Lebanon;
OP5. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Leba-
non over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004)
and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exer-
cise its full sovereignty and authority;
OP6. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasere and a long-term solu-
tion based on the following principles and elements:
strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and
Lebanon;
full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where
the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;
security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the estab-
lishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed per-
sonnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security
forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;
full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions
1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in
Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there
will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;
deployment of an international force in Lebanon, consistent with paragraph 10 be-
low;
establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and re-
lated material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;
elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;
provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in
Israel's possession;
OP7. Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle
from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and ele-
ments for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;
OP8. Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors
and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Ac-
cords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for
delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the
border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present
those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;
OP9. Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to
refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
36
76 January 2009
for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of
displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this
regard;
OP10. Expresses its intention, upon conrmation to the Security Council that the Govern-
ment of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles
and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to
their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the de-
ployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and
government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a
permanent ceasere and a long-term solution;
OP11. Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to
extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the
safe return of displaced persons;
OP12. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related material are not
imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to
assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;
OP13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the im-
plementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Coun-
cil's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;
OP14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UNSC Resolution 1701 - 11 August 2006
The Security Council,
1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation
by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military
operations;
2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL, as
authorized by paragraph 11, to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls
upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from
southern Lebanon in parallel;
3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon
over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and
resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise
its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government
of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;
4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;
5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its inter-
nationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement of 23 March 1949;
6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its nancial and
humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe
return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reo-
pening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to
consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and develop-
ment of Lebanon;
7. Afrms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to
paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian
access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the
voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this
responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
37
76 January 2009
8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasere and a long term solution
based on the following principles and elements:
full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the es-
tablishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed
personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and
of UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions
1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in
Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there
will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by
its Government;
provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in
Israel’s possession;
9. Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agree-
ments in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the
principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses
its intention to be actively involved;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international ac-
tors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif
Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for
delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the
border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to
present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;
11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, man-
date and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a
maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate
under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):
(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the
South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as
provided in paragraph 2;
(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and
the Government of Israel;
(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the
voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area
as referred to in paragraph 8;
(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;
12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an interna-
tional force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL
to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any
kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under
the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities,
installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Na-
tions personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the
Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
38
76 January 2009
13. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL
is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges Member States to
consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests
for assistance from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have
contributed to UNIFIL in the past;
14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to
prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material and requests
UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;
15. Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their
nationals or from their territories or using their ag vessels or aircraft:
(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of
all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramili-
tary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their
territories; and
(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or as-
sistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in
subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related
material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as
authorized in paragraph 11;
16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and expresses its inten-
tion to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps
to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasere and a long-term solution;
17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the imple-
mentation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;
18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting
peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242
(1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 Novem-
ber 2003;
19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
39
76 January 2009
Karim Makdisi
Department of Political Studies & Public Administration
Jesup Hall
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
karim.makdisi@aub.edu.lb
Timur Göksel
Department of Political Studies & Public Administration
Jesup Hall
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
tgoksel@hotmail.com
Hans Bastian Hauck
Head of Program, International Forum on Strategic Thinking
German Council on Foreign Relations
Rauchstr. 17/18
10787 Berlin, Germany
hbhauck@web.de
Stuart Reigeluth
Projects Coordinator
Middle East and Mediterranean Programme
Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax)
c/ Juan de Mena, 25, 1º derecha
28014 Madrid, Spain
sreigeluth@toledopax.org
7.
Author Contact
Information
UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East
40
76 January 2009
Erzsébet Nagy Rózsa, Abdessamad Belhaj, Ceuta and Melilla: Risks and Risk Management,
EuroMeSCo Paper 75, December 2008.
Mahjoob Zweiri, Ali Tekin, Andrew E. Johnson, Fragile States and the Democratization
Process: A New Approach to Understanding Security in the Middle East, EuroMeSCo Paper
74, November 2008.
Anna Khakee, with Jaber Afoukane, Fouad M. Ammor, Derek Lutterbeck, Pragmatism Rather
than Backlash: Moroccan Perceptions of Western Democracy Promotion, EuroMeSCo Paper
73, November 2008.
Sharon Pardo, Towards an Ever Closer Partnership: A Model for a New Euro-Israeli
Partnership, EuroMeSCo Paper 72, October 2008.
Francesca Galli, The Legal and Political Implications of the Securitisation of Counter-
Terrorism Measures across the Mediterranean, EuroMeSCo Paper 71, September 2008.
Bruno C. Reis, Political Change in the Mediterranean – Impact on Euro-Mediterranean
Relations, EuroMeSCo Paper 70, June 2008.
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Magdalena Mughrabi, New EU Member States’ Policy towards
the Israeli-Palestinian Conict: the Case of Poland, EuroMeSCo Paper 69, June 2008.
Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, Alfred Tovias, Putting the Mediterranean
Union in Perspective, EuroMeSCo Paper 68, June 2008.
Luis Martinez, Fouad Ammor, Morocco, the Arab Maghreb Union and Regional Integration,
EuroMeSCo Paper 67, May 2008.
Gemma Collantes Celador, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Stuart Reigeluth, Volkan Aytar, Mehmet
Arican, Fostering an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform in the Mediterranean: Learning
from Turkish and Palestinian Police Reform Experiences, EuroMeSCo Paper 66, January 2008.
Previous
EuroMeSCo
Publications
... The main factors that resulted in the confrontations between Israel and Lebanon are the Lebanese civil war of 1975 and the Palestinian presence in that country, which included both refugees fleeing from the Israelis first conflict with its Arab neighbors in 1948 as well as the establishing of strongholds of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon in the 1970s (MATTELAER, 2013). In March 1978, PLO armed elements based in Lebanon carried out attacks in Israel, leading to the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupied the entire Southern part of the country (MAKDIS et al., 2009). After protests from the Lebanese government, the UNSC approved resolutions 425 and 426 demanding an immediate cessation of all Israeli military activity and the complete withdrawal of its forces from the Lebanese territory. ...
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... The UNIFIL case is unusual because the mission has been present in the south of Lebanon for 38 years, longer than LAF's presence in that area (Oren, 2009). Not only has this allowed key staff members to gain important local knowledge and contacts, but it has also generated local civilian acceptance of the mission's presence largely because of its lengthy humanitarian work that is unprecedented compared to recent missions that operate within a tighter timeframe (Göksel, 2007;James, 1983;Makdisi, Göksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009;Mudallali, 2013;Sapienza, 2012). 4 Whilst LAF was not present in the south until 2006, its institutional neutrality and hence its popularity has increased since the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 ( de Taisne, 2015;Oren, 2009). ...
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El artículo propone el Índice de Controversia (ico) como una herramienta para medir el desacuerdo en una resolución aprobada por la Asamblea General de la onu, a más de estudiar la votación de México en las resoluciones sobre Oriente Medio y Palestina entre 1994 y 2015. Los autores demuestran que México tiende a abstenerse de votar, cuando las resoluciones son controvertidas, a menos de que haya de por medio un interés determinado.
31 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation p.124; and Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians
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Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).31 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), p.124; and Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: Southend Press, 1999), p.192. 32 Ghasan Tueni, Peacekeeping in Lebanon: the Facts, the Documents (New York: William Belcher Group, 1979), pp.4-5. 33 Ibid. 34 UN Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425 (19
Peacekeeping in Lebanon For online access to full text of Resolutions 425 and 426, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon
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March 1978), in Tueni, Peacekeeping in Lebanon, p.19. For online access to full text of Resolutions 425 and 426, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http:// www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unres.htm. 35 See, for instance, Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).