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December2009 159
Issues&Studies©45,no.4(December2009):159-188.
StatusforSale:
Taiwanand theCompetitionfor
DiplomaticRecognition
TIMOTHYS.RICH
Diplomaticrecognition isgenerallyseen asfundamental tothe
modernstatesystem.Thetraditionalviewsofrecognition howeverfocus
almostexclusivelyon politicalorideologicalrationales,ignoring other
foundationson which othercountriesbase establishing diplomaticrecog-
nition. Focusing on theRepublicofChina (Taiwan)suggestsamore com-
plicatedview where economicself-intereston onesideand nationalpride
on theothermayunderminetraditionalconceptionsofrecognition.
Using theROC-PRCdiplomaticbattleasacasestudy,thispaper
hopestoshedlighton two questions:why, despitethePRC's riseasa
globalpower, a countrywouldcontinuetoformallyrecognizetheROCand
secondlywhatdoestheROCreceive inexchangefor such high-costen-
deavorstomaintainrecognition. Inthiscasemutualideologicalrationales
have greatlydiminishedwhileIcontend thateconomicfactors have pre-
dominantlymaintainedthisdiplomaticbattle.In addition, previous re-
search oftenfocuseson majorworld powers granting orwithholding for-
malrecognition tosmaller states.Inthis situation, poorcountrieswith
typicallylittlepolitical influence arethemajorplayers,suggesting dif-
ferentrationalesbehind recognition. Methodologically,thispaperblends
qualitative and quantitative analysisto uncoverfactors affecting recogni-
TIMOTHYS.RICHisadoctoralstudent inpoliticalscience at theIndianaUniversity.Hispre-
viousresearchanalyzedTaiwan'sdemocratizationand cross-Strait relations.Hisdisserta-
tionanalyzeselectoralreforminEastAsia.In2009,TimothyreceivedaNationalScience
Foundation grant toconductresearchinTaiwanregarding recentelectoralreforms.The
authorcan bereachedat<tsrich@indiana.edu>.
©InstituteofInternationalRelations,NationalChengchiUniversity,Taipei,Taiwan(ROC).
ISSUES&STUDIES
160 December2009
論
tion. The existing literatureisalmostentirelyqualitative,focusing onlyon
relationsbetweentwocountriesorwithin a particular region. Further-
more,moststudiesonly coverashort timespan, usuallyno morethan a
decade.Thispaperintendsto analyzemostof thepost-civil warperiod,
identifying broad trendswhichmaybeoverlookedin previous research.
KEYWORDS:diplomatic recognition,Taiwan,China,dollardiplomacy,
sovereignty.
* * *
Statesovereigntyremainsa core elementofinternationalrela-
tions,withstates seeking reaffirmation ofsuchclaimsthrough
formaldiplomaticrecognition.Traditionalviewsof recognition,
however,presumepoliticalorideologicalfoundations,ignoring other
rationaleswhichmay underpintheserelations.Focusing on theRepublic
ofChina(ROC)on Taiwansuggestsamorenuanced view where economic
self-intereston oneside and nationalprideon theothermay undermine
traditionalconceptionsof recognition.Despite a cross-Strait diplomatic
truce since 2008,the contextofdiplomaticrecognition inthiscasemay
still create conflictbetweenthetwosidesduetotheincentivesofother
countries.
Formostoftheperiod following WorldWar II,theROCon Taiwan
and thePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC)bothclaimedto bethesole
legitimategovernmentofChina.Accordingly,a countrycould notsuccess-
fullymaintain diplomaticrelationswith both governments.1Diplomatic
recognition based on ColdWarideologiesbeganto unravelaftertheSino-
Americanrapprochementand theseating ofthePRC intheUnitedNations.
Having once beenrecognizedbythemajority ofnations,theROCnowhas
formalrelationswith only 23,comparedto 169 thatrecognize thePRC,
leaving theformermorediplomaticallyisolatedthanmany previouspariah
states suchasapartheid-eraSouthAfrica.2Although theROCdroppedits
1France attempted dualrecognition in1964,until thePRC objectedandFrance cut tieswith
theROC.In 2003,thePRC maintaineditsdiplomaticmission inKiribati forthree weeks
aftertheislandnation recognizedtheROC,hoping toentice it toswitch back.
2OnlyBhutanhasno formalrelationswitheitherside.DespiteIndia controlling much ofits
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 161
claim tothemainland and hasbeen opentodualrecognition since 1991,the
PRC'sposition remainsunchangedand thishaspreventedtheisland from
making any significantprogress inincreasing formalrecognition.
Thisarticleproposesthatwhilediplomaticrecognition isnormally
stable,it may break downwheneachsidehasfundamentally different
rationalesforgranting recognition.Using theROC-PRC diplomaticbattle
asa casestudy,thisarticlehighlightsoftenignoredrationalesbehind rec-
ognition.In doing so,it ishopedtoalsoshedlighton two questions:why,
despitethePRC'srise asaglobalpower,athirdcountrywouldcontinue
toformallyrecognize theROC,and secondlywhatdoestheROCreceive
inexchangeforsuch high-costendeavorstomaintainrecognition?Diplo-
maticrecognition israrelycontroversial,butwhencontroversieshave
arisenthey haveusually been based on conflicting ideologiesorthedesire
toshape anotherstate'sbehavior.Inthiscase,however,Icontend that
ideologicalrationaleshavegreatly diminishedthisdiplomaticbattlewhile
economicfactorshavepredominantlymaintainedit.
Inaddition,previousresearch oftenfocuseson majorworld powers
granting orwithholding formalrecognition tosmallerstates.Inthepresent
case,poorcountrieswithtypicallylittlepolitical influence arethemajor
players,suggesting differentrationalesbehind recognition.Looking at the
ramificationsofdiplomaticrecognition inthiscasemayallowsomeinsight
intofuturepointsofconflictbetweentheROCand thePRC whilepotenti-
allysuggesting areconceptualization ofdiplomaticrecognition itself.
Inaddition toaddressing diverging motivesfordiplomaticrecogni-
tion,thisarticle'smajorcontribution istheblending ofqualitative and
quantitative analysisto uncoverpatternsaffecting recognition.Theliter-
atureon thesubject istothebestofmy knowledge entirely qualitative,
oftenfocusing only on relationsbetweentwocountriesoron aparticular
region.3Furthermore,moststudiesonlycoverashort timespan,usually no
externalrelations,Bhutanhasbeenin negotiationswiththePRC since 1984 regardingtheir
shared borderandhasconsistentlysupportedBeijing'sposition onTaiwan.
3Bih-jawLin,"TheRepublicofChina and Africa:ACaseofPositiveAdaptation,"inFor-
eignPolicy oftheRepublicofChinaon Taiwan:AnUnorthodoxApproach,ed.YuSanWang
ISSUES&STUDIES
162 December2009
morethanadecade.Thisarticle analyzesmostofthepost-civil warperiod,
identifying broadtrendswhichmay havebeen overlookedin previous
research.
Thefirstpartofthisarticlewill consistofanexamination oftra-
ditional theoriesand rationalesbehind diplomaticrecognition.Thisis
followed by a casestudy analysisofthehistoricalprogression ofthe
diplomaticrecognition battlesbetweentheROCand PRC.Next isa
quantitative analysisofdiplomaticrecognition,illuminating theunder-
lying motivationsaswell as structuralconditionswhichmay perpetuate
thisbattle.Inconclusion,thisarticlehopestoshowanalternative and
morenuancedconception of recognition whichcontrastswith political
rationales.
Recognition
Regardless ofwhetherdiplomaticrecognition isalegalorpolitical
act,4the actof recognition itselfisareflection ofstatesovereigntyand thus
the"goldenring thatpolitical leadershopeto grasp.5"Internalsovereignty
can bedefinedasagovernmenthaving exclusivedefactocontrolovera
specific area and itscitizensgenerallyaccepting thisrule(Montevideo
Convention).ClearlytheROC,since democratization at least,aswell as
otherdisputedterritories(e.g., Somaliland and Abkhazia),meet these
minimalistrequirements.However,internationalrecognition israrely
basedsolelyoninternalsovereignty,especiallywhen otherstateslay
(New York:Praeger,1990);PhillipLiu,"Cross-Strait ScrambleforAfrica:A Hidden
AgendainChina-Africa Cooperation Forum,"HarvardAsiaQuarterly5,no.2(2001):1-9;
and Richard.J.Payne and Cassandra.R.Veney,"Taiwanand Africa:Taipei'sContinuing
Searchfor InternationalRecognition,"JournalofAsian and African Studies36,no.4
(2001):437-50.
4EdwinBorchard,"Recognition and Non-Recognition,"American JournalofInternational
Law3,no.1(1942):108-11;and HansKelsen,"Recognition inInternationalLaw:Theo-
reticalObservations,"American JournalofInternationalLaw35,no.4(1941):605-17.
5StephenD.Krasner,"Who GetsaState,and Why?"ForeignAffairs 88,no.2(2009):http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64872/stephen-d-krasner/who-gets-a-state-and-why (ac-
cessedMay 1,2009).
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 163
claim totheterritory.6
External legitimacyisconsiderablymore complex.HedleyBull
statesthatapoliticalcommunitythatclaims sovereignty,evenifjudged by
outsidersaslegitimate,cannotbe calledastateifin practice it cannotassert
thisright.7Tostrengthensovereigntyclaims,many entitiesattempt the
perception ofstatehood by mirroring the actionsof recognizedstates.For
example,many disputedstates(including Taiwan)declaretheirconsent to
internationalagreementsofwhichtheywerenotsignatoriesasameansof
propping up claimstostatehood.Although theremay bedegreesofex-
ternalsovereignty,8amore explicit indicatorisdiplomaticrecognition.
Newnhamassertsthatdiplomaticrecognition iscrucial tothevery defini-
tion ofstatesovereignty.9Simply put,sovereigntyispartially determined
by otherstatesand thegreaternumberofstatesextending diplomaticrec-
ognition toa country,agreatersenseofexternal legitimacythatcountry
exhibits.HeretheROCison shaky ground,withless thanaquarterofna-
tionsexplicitlyrecognizing itsclaimstosovereignty.Thislack ofexternal
legitimacyleavestheROCinsecure asfewarewilling to openlychallenge
Beijing'sclaim that theisland isarenegadeprovince.
Thenearuniversalrecognition of foreign governmentscan beviewed
asaninternationalnorm,withsovereign equalityan underlying principle
ofinternationalrelations.10 Inthepastcentury,sovereign equalityasa
normative concept may have"attainedanalmostontologicalstatusinthe
structureoftheinternational legalsystem.11 "Onceastate'sindependent
6PalKolsto,"TheSustainabilityand FutureofUnrecognizedQuasi-States,"Journalof
PeaceResearch43,no.6(2006):725-40.
7HedleyBull,TheAnarchicalSociety:AStudyofOrderinWorldPolitics(New York:
ColumbiaUniversityPress,1977),8.
8ChristopherClapham,"DegreesofSovereignty,"ReviewofInternationalStudies24,no.2
(1998):143-57.
9Randall E.Newnham,"EmbassiesforSale:ThePurchaseofDiplomaticRecognition by
WestGermany,Taiwan,andSouthKorea,"InternationalPolitics37 (2000):260.
10KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics(New York:RandomHouse,1979),88.
11Thompsonargues,however,thatonlywiththeUnitedNationsdidstatesrhetoricallyaccept
thenotionofequalityamong states.See HelenThompson,"TheCaseforExternalSover-
eignty,"European JournalofInternationalRelations12,no.2(2006):256.
ISSUES&STUDIES
164 December2009
statushasbeeninformallyacknowledged,mostgovernmentsquicklyfor-
malize this statusthrough recognition.12 Timor-Leste,forinstance,re-
ceived diplomaticrecognition from theUnitedStates,China,and Portugal
within daysofdeclaring independence and boththeUnitedStatesand the
SovietUnion recognizedthestateof Israelwithin hoursofitsformation.
Somestateshave evenmadethisprocess virtuallyautomatic,suchas
Mexicowithitslong-standing EstradaDoctrinewhichcondemnedthe
notion of recognition tiedtomoral judgmentsasundermining statesover-
eignty.Once granted,recognition traditionally hasbeen verystable,re-
voked onlyrarely,suchaswhenanewgovernment isbelievedto have
gainedcontrolofthestatethrough illegitimatemeans(howeverdefined)
and oftenafteraninitialsuspension of relations.
Although recognition iscommonplace,thereisno obligation toex-
tend recognition toanewgovernmentonce it effectivelyrulesastate,
and after1917 non-recognition lasting morethantwenty years seemed
commonplace.13 Many Westernand non-alignedcountriesevenavoided
recognizing theSovietUnion untilthe1970s,14 whileSpainand Yugoslavia
weresimilarly deniedrecognition until themid-1970s.Whenrecognition
hasbeenwithheld or revoked,thishasusually been based on onlyafew
factors.Since thenineteenthcentury,mostofthese caseshavebeen based
on themethod by whichagovernmentcameto power (suchascoupsand
revolutions,asinCuba and Iran),thelevelof foreign influence on the
newgovernment thatbringsinto question itsdefactoindependence (e.g.,
NorthernCyprus,theBalticstatesduring theColdWar,and theBantustans
inapartheid-eraSouthAfrica),orbeliefsthat theothergovernment is
12Howacountryreachesthislevel iscontentiousand beyond thescopeofthispaper.See
RobertH.Jackson,Quasi-states:Sovereignty,InternationalRelations,and theThirdWorld
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990);and BenedictKingsbury,"Sovereignty
and Inequality,"European JournalofInternationalLaw9,no.4(1998):599-625.
13M.J.Peterson,"PoliticalUseofRecognition:TheInfluence oftheInternationalSystem,"
WorldPolitics34,no.3(1982):325,47.
14M.J.Peterson,"Recognition ofGovernmentsShouldNotBeAbolished,"American Jour-
nalofInternationalLaw77,no.1(1983):32;WilliamG.Gray,Germany'sColdWar:The
GlobalCampaign toIsolateEastGermany,1949-1969 (ChapelHill: University ofNorth
CarolinaPress,2003),3.
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 165
illegitimately occupying partorall oftheland underitscontrol.Forex-
ample,in 1907 fiveCentralAmericancountries(CostaRica,ElSalvador,
Guatemala,Honduras,and Nicaragua) refusedtorecognize governments
thatcameto powerwithoutdemocraticsupport,astipulation theUnited
Stateshasalso occasionallyfollowed.15 MostMiddleEasterncountriesdo
notrecognize Israelbasedonterritoriesoccupiedsince 1967.Eventhe
meansby whichcoloniesbecameindependentcould begroundsforwith-
holding recognition,asinthe caseofRhodesia.16 IntheROC-PRC case,
early non-recognition ofthePRC waslargelytiedto hesitation inacknowl-
edging theNationalists'defactoloss ofcontrol,evenaftertheir retreat to
Taiwan.In virtuallyall cases,diplomaticrecognition wasbased on claims
oflegitimateruleoveraspecificterritoryand revoked orwithheld based
on domestic actionsaltering thisvaguely definedstatusquo.Whatsets
Taiwanapart isnot thelong-termbreaking off and/orwithholding of
recognition fromalargenumberofgeographically diverse countries.
Ideologicalrationalesforwithholding recognition werebroadly used
afterWorldWar II.17 Ideologicalconflicthasbeenanexcellentpredictor
ofthenumberofexpressionsofopinion on diplomaticrecognition deci-
sions.Throughout theColdWar,opposing sidesroutinelywithheldrecog-
nition,especiallyinthe casesofdivided nationswheretheoption ofdual
recognition wasrejected.Bythe1960srecognition wasviewedasasign
ofapprovalofaregime.Today,withfewexceptions(i.e.,theUnitedStates'
non-recognition ofCuba),purelyideologicalrationaleshavefallen outof
favor.Regardless ofthestatedrationale,theunderlying goalofwithholding
recognitionhasbeentocoerce statestoact inamannerfavorabletoanother
state.Peterson statedthataslong asregimes seekrecognition,othergov-
15Peterson,"Recognition ofGovernments,"38.
16TheEuropeanminorityRhodesianFrontgovernmentdeclaredindependence in1965,ig-
noring GreatBritain'spolicy ofno independence forAfricancolonieswithoutAfrican
majorityrule.Nocountryextendedrecognition tothestate(nowZimbabwe)untilelections
in 1980.
17Peterson,"PoliticalUseofRecognition,"347.
ISSUES&STUDIES
166 December2009
ernmentscanexploit thisneed.18 Since coercion requirespower,with-
holding recognition hasgenerally beenatoolused by powerfulstates
againstweakerstates.Forexample,theUnitedStateswithheldrecognition
fromseveralCaribbeannationsasameanstoextractconcessions,and most
Western powersdidthesame(in ordertomaintainextraterritoriality)be-
forerecognizing theROCin 1911.In dividedstates,theintentwasex-
plicit: tocoerce thenon-recognized partytoconsent to unification underits
counterpart'scontrol.In general,recognition flowedfromstablepowerful
countriestostateswhosestatus,ifnot in dispute,was still comparatively
weak.
Recognition,however,should notbe conflatedwithsubstantivere-
lations.Diplomaticrecognition itselfisalowcostactivity,consisting of
littlemorethan public announcements,whiledeeperconnectionsaremore
costly,requiring at least thestationing ofdiplomats.GreatBritain,for
example,did notfollowdiplomaticrecognition ofAlbaniaorChinawith
exchangesofambassadorsforovertwenty years.19 Asimple concrete
measureofthedepth ofbilateralrelationsisthe establishmentofem-
bassies.Extensiverelationsnecessitatein-countryembassies,whereas
less importantrelationsorlimitedresourcescanmanagewithaccredited
diplomatscovering severalcountriesinaregion.20 Although recognition
implies sovereign equality,thenumberofembassiespercountrybeliesthis.
Outof194 countries,the averagenumberofembassiespercountryisonly
44,with only17countrieshaving 100 ormore embassiesincountryand 33
less than 10.
18M.J.Peterson,Recognition ofGovernments:LegalDoctrineand StatePractice,1815-
1995(New York:St.Martin's,1997),3.
19EberhardSandschneider,"China'sDiplomaticRelationswiththeStatesofEurope,"in
ChinaandEuropesince 1978:AEuropeanPerspective,ed.RichardLouisEdmonds(New
York:CambridgeUniversity,2002),35.
20Forinstance,Andorraoftenhasonediplomaticmission covering multiple countries,such
asitsmission toBrusselsthatcoversBelgium,Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Germany,
and Poland.Othersallowforproxy ambassadors,suchasLiechtensteinwhichallows
Switzerland torepresent itsinterestsincountrieswhereit doesnothaveadiplomaticmis-
sion.LikewisethediplomaticmissionstotheHolySee and Tuvaluall resideinanother
country(Italyand Fiji,respectively).
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 167
TheTwoChinas
Thepresentsituation betweenthePRC and theROCprovidesa
unique casewheretherationaleforgranting recognition hasevolved over
time.Whereonce bothsidesclaimedto bethelegitimategovernmentof
all ofChina and recognition wasoften basedtoalarge extenton ColdWar
ideologicalrationales,thesituation hasevolvedintoa carefullycrafted de-
bateon Taiwan's status(independentstateversusrenegadeprovince),in
whichrecognizing stateshavefewifany ideological imperatives.21 The
battlefor recognition hasnowbeenlimitedtorelatively powerless coun-
tries,someofwhich barely qualifyas sovereign states.22 Many ofthese
statescannotafford orsimplychosenot toestablishconsulatesonce
recognition isgranted.23
Whereasthe averagenumberofembassiespercountryisforty-four,
among theROC-recognizing countries,the averageisonlythirteen.24
WhiletheROChasanembassyineverycountry butTuvalu,Tuvaluand
three othercountrieshaveyet toestablishembassiesinTaiwan(see
table1).
Severalcountrieshadnorelationswitheithersidedirectlyafter1949,
presumablywaiting forafinalsettlement.2 5 Asmany as sixteencountries
21Technically,nocountryrecognizesTaiwanasanindependentnation,butratherrecognizes
theROCasthelegitimategovernmentofChina,evenifdirectreferencestosuchclaims
havelargelyceased.
22TwooftheROC'sdiplomatic allies,theMarshall Islandsand Palau,werebothUN trust
territoriesadministered by theUnitedStatesuntil 1994.UndertheCompactofFree As-
sociation theUnitedStatesremainsincontrolofthesecurityand defenseoftheislands.
Thisdoesnotensurelong-termrecognitionforTaipei,however.TheCookIslands,which
havea similar"freeassociation"relationshipwithNewZealand,chosein 1997 toswitch
recognition tothePRC.
23MostconsulatesinTaipeiarepaidforby theROC.See JieChen,Foreign Policy of the
NewTaiwan:PragmaticDiplomacyin SoutheastAsia(Northampton:EdwardElgar,2002),
29.
24ThisincreasestosixteenifthemissionstotheHolySee basedinRome(seventy-two)are
included.
25JamesC.Hsiung,"China'sRecognition Practice andItsImplicationsinInternationalLaw,"
inChina'sPracticeinInternationalLaw,ed.JeromeAllenCohen(Cambridge,Mass.:Har-
vardUniversityPress,1972),54-55.
ISSUES&STUDIES
168 December2009
immediatelyrecognizedthePRC,including theUnitedKingdom,in part
duetoconcernsoverHong Kong.Meanwhile,onlythirty-sevencountries
formallyrecognizedtheROC,and ofthose,onlyseven had permanent
missionsinTaiwan,whilemany diplomatsremainedinBeijing despite
theircountry notformallyrecognizing thePRC.26 However,withthestart
oftheKoreanWar,anti-communistpoliciesand renewedU.S.supportfor
theROCallowedtheROCtomaintainand even gainsomediplomaticre-
presentation post-1949.Anti-communistsentiment increasedrecognition,
whichinturn helpedtheROCmaintainits seat intheUN.From mid-1950
tomid-1955,thePRC received no additionalrecognitions.Inthe1960s
only oneLatinAmericancountry,Cuba,recognizedthePRC.Similarly,
theROCfaredwell inAfrica,receiving recognition from thirteen outof
twenty-three Africancountriesfrom1960 to 1963,comparedto onlyfive
26DonaldKlein,"Formosa'sDiplomaticWorld,"TheChina Quarterly,no.15(1963):45-50.
Table1
CountriesRecognizingtheROCand Number ofEmbassiesin-Country,2008
Country
Belize
BurkinaFaso
DominicanRepublic
ElSalvador
Gambia
Guatemala
Haiti
HolySee (VaticanCity)
Honduras
Kiribati
Muarshall Islands
Nauru
EmbassiesCountryEmbassies
12
22
32
27
8
35
17
0
24
3
3
1
Nicaragua
Palau
Panama
Paraguay
SaintKittsand Nevis
SaintLucia
SaintVincentand theGrenadines
SaoTome and Principe
SolomonIslands
Swaziland
Tuvalu
32
4
36
23
3
5
3
7
6
4
0
Italicsdenotescountrydoesnothave anembassyinTaiwan
Source:Embassypages.com
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 169
forthePRC and fivewhichrecognized neither.27
Evenasinternationalsupportforseating thePRC intheUN in-
creased,theROCresistedchanging its"oneChina"policy.Between 1971
(theyearthePRC was seatedintheUN SecurityCouncil)and 1979 the
ROCunilaterallycut tieswith44countriesthatrecognizedthePRC—
withoutsignificantpressurefromBeijing.Thisisnotunusual,however,
among dividedstates;WestGermany revokedrecognition ofsevencoun-
triesthat increasedtieswithitscounterpartfollowing theproclamation of
theHallsteinDoctrine.29 AftertheUnitedStatesformallyrecognizedthe
PRC in 1979,mostotherholdoutsfollowedsuit,leaving onlyafewcoun-
triesretaining officialrelationswiththeROC.
IronicallyBeijing'sownTaiwan policyshiftat thetimemay have
indirectly proppeduprecognition oftheROC.WithSino-American
rapprochement,thePRC endedreferencestothe"liberation"ofTaiwan
and thus suggestedthepossibility ofapeacefulresolution ofthedispute.
This subtlepolicyshiftcould beviewedas signaling a continuation of
thestatusquo,thusencouraging theROCtocontinue effortstomaintain
recognition undera"oneChina"framework— whichthePRC grudgingly
accepted— ratherthan pursuerecognition through aformaldeclaration of
independence.
WhileColdWartensions strengthenedmany oftheROC'srelations,
the end oftheColdWar removedmuch oftheideological motivation to
maintainthem.Indonesiareinstituted diplomaticrelationswithBeijing in
1990 afteratwenty-five-yearhiatus.SaudiArabiaswitchedrecognition in
1992.Singapore,traditionally hesitantaboutrecognizing thePRC because
ofitsownlargeChinesepopulation,and SouthKorea,perhapsthemost
27Despitethe competition tencountriesintheUN recognized neithergovernment in 1963:
Austria,CentralAfricanRepublic,Ethiopia,Iceland,Ireland,IvoryCoast,Malaya,Niger,
SierraLeone,and Tunisia.See ibid.,49-50.
28FrancoiseMengin,"TheForeignPolicyoftheROCon Taiwansince1971:AnOverview,"
inTheRepublicofChina onTaiwaninInternationalPolitics,ed.Marie-LouiseNat(Berlin:
PeterLang,1998),21-22.
29Lawrence L.Whetten,GermanyEastand West(New York:New YorkUniversityPress,
1980),43,190.
ISSUES&STUDIES
170 December2009
anti-communiststateinAsia,recognizedthePRC in 1990 and 1992,re-
spectively.Today onlytheHolySee seemsto baseitsrecognition ofthe
ROCon explicit ideologicalgrounds.
Withanti-communistappealsevaporating,theROCshifteditsdiplo-
maticstrategy.One crucialstepwasacknowledging thelegitimacy ofthe
PRC on themainland and thusopening up thepossibility ofdualrecogni-
tion.Although impracticalduetoBeijing'scontinued opposition,this
preventedaself-imposedisolation.Furthermore,with democratization,
Taiwanattemptedto definerecognition intermsofdemocraticprinciples,
adefinition reiterated by some currentdiplomatic allies.Thisachieved
somesuccess asthenumberofdiplomatic alliesincreased underLee Teng-
hui's(李登輝)presidency(1988-2000) from twenty-twototwenty-eight;
however,thenumberofindependentcountriesalsoincreased during the
sametimeframe.Taiwanthusalteredthestatedrationalefor recognition
whileonlyslightlychanging therecognition playing field.
Whereasrecognition usuallyconferslegitimacyand isonlyrevoked
undersevere conditions,recognition oftheROCisoften grantedand with-
drawnwithouta clearpolitical motive.Thisinstabilityisapparentfromthe
numberofcountriesthathaveswitchedrecognition morethan once.The
mostextreme examples,Senegaland theCentralAfricanRepublic,have
switchedfivetimes since both originallyforged diplomatictieswiththe
ROCin 1962.Ten othercountries—Benin,BurkinaFaso,Chad,theGam-
bia,Lesotho,Liberia,Nauru,Nicaragua,Niger,and St.Lucia—switched
diplomaticrecognition morethan once,eightofthemat leastonce inthe
lastfifteen years.Two othersrecognizedtheROCforonly daysbefore
switching back.ROC-Vanuaturelationslastedten daysin 2002 and Papua
New Guinea'srecognition lastedsixteen daysin 1999,culminating ina
scandaloverareportedUS$2.5 billion loanwhich ultimatelyledtothe
resignation ofPapuaNew Guinea'sprimeminister.30 Ideologicalrationales
may havestabilized diplomaticrelationspreviously,butwithoutaCold
War framework,Taiwan'sremaining diplomatictiesappearunstable.
30"ACargo fromTaiwan,"TheEconomist,July 10,1999.
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 171
One alsoseesevidence ofthin diplomaticrelationsintermsofthe es-
tablishmentofembassies.Although currentlytheROChasembassiesin
mostofthe countriesthatrecognize it,thishasnotalwaysbeenthe case.
Nineyearselapsed betweenrecognition and the establishmentofanem-
bassyinHaiti and morethansixelapsedinthe casesofGuatemala,Nicara-
gua,and Uruguay.SimilarlythePRC waitedseven yearsafter recognition
ofVanuatutoestablishanembassytherein 1989.Thiscouldbeawait-and-
see response,hoping toavoidclosing anembassyshortlyafteritsestablish-
mentduetothehostcountryswitching recognition,ashappenedwiththe
ROCinMali (1960)and Laos(1962)withinfourmonthsof recognition.
CheckbookDiplomacy
Economicinterestshavetraditionally playedsomeroleinrecognition
inthatrecognition encouragesinteraction and decreasestheinformational
costsoftrade.The economic costofnon-recognitioncanbehigh asforeign
firmsarewary ofinvestmentwhereinternationalconventionsarenot
binding.Enticing otherstoalsoforego recognition can bejustascostly,
as seeninU.S.subsidiestoJapanin part tocompensatefortheloss ofpo-
tential tradewiththePRC.31 Suchrationalesarenotuniquetocapitalist
countries.Shortlyfollowing theBolshevikRevolution,Lenin desired
diplomaticrecognition from theUnitedStatesforthe economicbenefits
it could bring.32 Inthelate1980s,SouthKorea promisedaid packages
and increasedtradeiftheSovietUnion extendedrecognition,supportedthe
former'sentryintotheUnitedNations,and no longersoldweaponsto
NorthKorea.33 Within oneyearof recognition,tradetripled betweenthe
31EdgarSnowand Shao-Chang Hsu,"Recognition ofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,"An-
nalsof theAmerican AcademyofPoliticaland SocialScience 324 (1959):79.
32Todd Pfannestiel,"TheSovietBureau:ABolshevikStrategy toSecureU.S.Diplomatic
Recognition through EconomicTrade,"DiplomaticHistory27,no.2(2003):171-92.
33MilesKahlerand Scott .L.Kastner,"StrategicUsesofEconomicInterdependence:En-
gagementPolicieson theKoreanPeninsula and Across theTaiwanStrait,"Journalof
PeaceResearch43,no.5(2006):523-41.
ISSUES&STUDIES
172 December2009
twocountrieswhilein 1991,SouthKorea providedaUS$3 billion aid
package,thelargest inthe country'shistory.
IntheROC-PRC case,however,theroleofeconomicsappearsmore
explicit.Since 1961,theROChasimplicitly orexplicitlyconnectedaid
packagestorecognition,muchlikeSouthKorea and WestGermany before
dualrecognition.34 According toTaiwan's2009 WhitePaperon Foreign
AidPolicy,officialdevelopmentassistance (ODA)exceededUS$430
million in 2008.Developmentassistance hasbeen particularlyimportant
toisland microstateswhose economicviabilitymay otherwisebein ques-
tion.TaiwanremainsthelargestsingledonortoHaiti,Grenada,St.Kitts
and Nevis,and St.Vincentand theGrenadines,and wasDominica's
greatestbenefactorbeforeit switchedrecognition.35 Withaid packages
equaling afifth oftheHaitian government'sannualbudget,it should have
come asno surprisewhenaHaitiancabinet ministerstatedthatTaiwan
doesnot"giveusany reasontolookaftercontinentalChina."36 Conversely,
oneofficialintheForeign Ministryevensuggestedthat theROCcould pur-
chaserecognition fromaThirdWorldcountryforaboutUS$20 million.37
However,unliketheKoreanand Germancases,boththeROCand PRC are
now willing totielarge assistance packagestorecognition.
Although bothsidesregularlycondemncheckbook diplomacy,their
trackrecordinthepastfifteen yearsbeliesthis.Beijing offeredlargein-
vestmentand aid packagestotheBahamas,St.Lucia,and Dominica short-
lyaftereachswitchedrecognition tothePRC.38 TaipeigrantedNigera
US$50 million loanin 1992 shortly beforerecognition and US$35 million
34RobertA.Madsen,"TheStruggleforSovereigntyBetweenChina and Taiwan,"inProble-
maticSovereignty:ContestedRulesand PoliticalPossibilities,ed.StephenD.Krasner
(New York:ColumbiaUniversity,2001);and Gray,Germany'sColdWar.
35MariaLynch,"TaiwanLavishesAidtoSecureSolidCaribbeanBasinAllies,"Miami
Herald,December7,2003.
36VOA NewsReport,"Haiti and Taiwan"(May 27,2003),http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/library/news/taiwan/2003/taiwan-030527-2ad06368.htm(accessedNovember10,
2008).
37WeiqunGu,ConflictsofDividedNations:TheCasesofChinaandKorea(Westport,Conn.:
Praeger,1995),128.
38See note35 above(Lynch,"TaiwanLavishesAid").
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 173
inassistance toGambiain 1995,morethanall otherdonorstothe country
combinedthatyear.39 TaipeiofferedCostaRica nearlyUS$50 million in
assistance in 2003-2004,onlytosee the countryswitchrecognition in
2007.40 Taipeirespondedwithincreasedassistance toNicaraguato prevent
anotherloss intheregion.41 Beijing accusedTaipeiofoffering SaoTome
and PrincipeUS$30 million inaidinexchangefor recognition in 1997,
withTaipei making similarclaimsaboutBeijing'sUS$100 million as-
sistance packagetoGuinea-Bissauin 1998.42 Taiwan deniedDominica's
requestforUS$65 million in 2004,onlyto havetheCaribbeancountry
switchrecognition fordoublethatamountofaid.ThePRC offeredNauru,
withless thanfourteenthousand citizens,overUS$100 million inaidfor
recognition in 2003,onlyto havetheisland switchagainin 2005.43 The
convergence ofinterests,whichPayne and Veneyargueisbehind many of
Taiwan'sties,breaksdown once thePRC iswilling to offersimilaraid
packages.44
China'sinvestmentstrategy hasalsoevolved,and Beijing hasadopted
amoreregionalapproachtoeconomic enticementsdespitepreferring bilat-
eralagreementsratherthanworking through organizationsliketheAfrican
Union.Crucial toChina'scontinuedeconomicdevelopment isaccess to
energy inputs,especially oil and metals.Access totheseresourceshas
pushedthePRC to develop relationswhich previouslyamountedtolittle
morethansmall developmentprojectsundercheckbook diplomacy.Speci-
ficallyChina appearsto bemirroring Taiwan'sregionalsuccess inmain-
39Nigerswitched backtorecognizing thePRC in1996.
40See note35 above(Lynch,"TaiwanLavishesAid").
41IrisLiu,"TheBigChina and TaiwanTussle:DollarDiplomacyReturnstoLatinAmerica,"
ThePanamaNew14,no.18 (September22,2008).http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/
v_14/issue_18/opinion_10.html(accessedJanuary 20,2010).
42GaryD.Rawnsley,Taiwan'sInformalDiplomacy andPropaganda(NewYork:St.Martin's,
2000),32.
43See ShelleyRigger,"Taiwanin 2002:AnotherYearofPoliticalDroughtsand Typhoons,"
Asian Survey 43,no.1(2003):45;ElizabethFreund Larus,"Taiwan'sQuestfor Interna-
tionalRecognition,"Issues&Studies42,no.2(2006):49.
44Payne and Veney,"Taiwanand Africa,"443.
ISSUES&STUDIES
174 December2009
taining diplomaticrelationsinCentralAmerica by implementing an
integratedregionalpolicyinAfrica.Since the early 1990s,thefirst trip
madeby thePRC'sministerof foreign affairseach yearhasbeentoan
Africancountry,symbolizing theimportance ofChina-Africa relations.
ThiswasfollowedbytheForumon China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
in 2000,China'sfirstattemptata collectiveAfrican dialogue.In 2007
thePRC establishedtheChina-Africa DevelopmentFund (CAD),admin-
isteredthrough theChinaDevelopmentBank and underthedirect jurisdic-
tion oftheStateCouncil.Within oneyear,theCAD granted overUS$90
million to projectsinAfrica and expectedtoinvestanadditionalUS$5
billion intheshort term.45
ThePRC hasalso offered variousassistance packagestoAfrican
countriesinreturnfor recognition,and leadersinBeijing areincreasingly
confident thatAfrican holdoutswill eventuallycometheirway.46 In 2004
ChinaofferedAngola anaid packagenearlymatching anassistance pack-
agefrom theInternationalMonetaryFund (IMF)butwith no constraints
and followedthiswithaUS$9billion loanin 2006.Similarlya2008 agree-
mentprovidedUS$9 billion totheDemocraticRepublicofCongo (DRC)
for far-reaching investment inexchangeformillionsoftonsofcopper
and cobalt.This"ChineseMarshall Plan"ispotentiallyreconfiguring
thediplomaticbattlefront inAfrica by fostering bothlong-term mutually
beneficialprogramsand raising thepotentialcostsofswitching recogni-
tion.47
WhileboththePRC and ROCmaintainideologicalreasonsforex-
tending recognition inwhatHsiehreferstoas"competing nationalisms,"
absentaColdWar frameworkfewothercountries sharethese concerns.48
45ChinaDevelopmentBank.2009.http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp?ColumnId
=176(accessedMarch 3,2009).
46T.Y.Wang,"Cross-Strait RelationsAfterthe2000 Election inTaiwan:Changing Tactics
inaNewReality,"Asian Survey 41,no.5(2001):732.
47WenranJiang,"AChinese'Marshall Plan'orBusiness?"Asiatimes.com(accessedMarch
10,2009).
48John Hsieh,"TheProspectofCross-Relations:A Game-TheoreticAnalysis,"EAIWorking
Paper,no.94 (2002):4.
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 175
IfColdWarideologicalframeworkshavelost theirsaliency,economic con-
ditionsmay providegreaterinsight.Countrieswithcomparativelyweak
economiesarguablywould bemorewilling torecognize theROCinex-
changeforaid packages.Microstatesin particularconstantlystruggleto
remain viableinaglobaleconomyand havelittleto bargainforinterna-
tionalassistance,savetheirUN vote and abilitytoconferdiplomatic
recognition.Thosestateswithfewexportslogicallyshould bethemost
willing torecognize theROCasthe appealofaccess toChina'smarket
should beweaker.AcursoryreviewoftheROC'sdiplomatic allies sup-
portsthis.According tothe2005 CIAFactbook,theChinesemarket is
onlyasignificantfactortotwo oftheROC'scurrentdiplomatic allies,
BurkinaFasoand theSolomon Islands,with 39.8 percentand 41.6 percent
oftheir respective exportsgoing tothemainland,whileChinaisthedesti-
nation ofonlyalittleover4percentofthe exportsofbothParaguayand the
Marshall Islands.49 Conversely,Taiwan'sexportstoand importsfrom its
diplomatic alliesareminimal.Currentalliesonlyaccountedforapproxi-
mately.004 percentofbothexportsand importsfrom1989 tomid-2009
and less than.003 percentofexportsin 2008.50
Non-economicfactorshave also beensuggested.Asenseofdemo-
craticsolidaritycouldleadto higherlevelsof recognition.Taiwanmay be
viewedasapolitical model tofollow,cultivating animage asan"exporter
ofdemocracy."51 Accordingly,among Taiwan'salliesatany giventime,
democraciesmay bemorelikelytoremainwithTaiwan.52 However,cor-
ruptauthoritarian governmentsalsomay viewrecognition asaneffective
meanstostrengthentheirposition,especiallyif recognition iscombined
49Thisdoesnot include exportstoHong Kong.CIAFactbook,2005.
50Bureau ofForeign Trade,RepublicofChina,http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/bftweb/english/
FSCE(accessedSeptember7,2009).
51Forexample,in2005TaiwanfoundedtheDemocraticPacificUnion(DPU)tofosterdemo-
craticvaluesaswell aseconomicinteractions.See AnnetteHsiu-lienLu(呂秀蓮),"Ad-
dress totheOpeningCeremony oftheDemocraticPacificAssemblyPreparatoryMeeting
(Taipei),"December14,2002.http://www.president.gov.tw.
52ElizabethFreund Larus,"SoftPowerversusHardCash:Retaining DemocraticAllies,"in
Taiwan and theInternationalCommunity,ed.SteveTsang (Oxford:PeterLang,2008),
153-88.
ISSUES&STUDIES
176 December2009
witheconomic assistance.Abrief reviewof recognizing countries sug-
geststhatsize may be a factorasmany areisland microstates.Incor-
respondence withthe author,diplomaticmissionstoTaiwanalsoreferto
theircountries'commonalitiesas small nations.53 Onewouldalsoassume
thatstatescomparatively distantgeographicallyfrom thePRC would be
moreinsulatedfromBeijing'spushfor recognition.
Toanalyze thefactorspotentiallyinfluencing diplomaticrecognition
oftheROC,Iemploy aProbit model54 withadichotomousdependentvari-
able(1=recognition oftheROC)using datafrom1960-2007.55 Tocapture
levelofdemocracy,IusePolityScores.56 UnfortunatelyPolity doesnot in-
clude any countrywithapopulation ofless thanfivehundredthousand,
which,ifsmallercountriesaremorelikelytorecogniz e theROC,may bias
thestatisticalresults.5 7 Asecond measureisalsotestedtocapturethepo-
tentialdyadic effectsassociatedwith democracy,ascountrieswithsimilar
levelsofdemocracytoTaiwanmay bemorelikelytoextend recognition.
Thisismeasuredasthe absolutedifference betweenthePolityscoresof
Taiwanand theothercountry.Inaddition Iincludeone economicvariable,
exportsasapercentageofGDP,availablefrom the WorldBank.58 Further-
more,Iincludethree controlvariables: thesize ofcountryinsquarekilo-
53Inpersonalcorrespondence withdiplomaticrepresentativesfromseveralofTaiwan'sisland
allies,geographicalsimilaritieswere consistentlyreferenced.
54Aprobit model isanonlinearmaximumlikelihoodestimation regression modelapplicable
whentheoutcomeofinterest isnota continuousvariable.Whilegraphingpredictedpro-
babilitiesmay provide additional insightbeyond theregression outputalone,forthesake
ofbrevitythesehavebeenexcluded.
55Datesofrecognition weresupplied by theROC'sMinistryofForeignAffairsandchecked
againstsecondarysources.Because economicdataisonlyavailableformostcountries
from1960tothepresent,Iamunabletomodel the entireperiod ofinterest.Thedataset
includesall countriesexcept theHolySee (VaticanCity).
56ThePolityIVProjectproducesanauthoritarian-democracyscorewhichrangesfrom-10
(mostauthoritarian)to10(mostdemocratic).Scoresare availablefrom1800 tothepre-
sent.
57Using FreedomHousescoreswouldrelievethisproblem,but theyareonlyavailablefor
thepast thirty yearsand onlyconsistentlymeasuredinthesamemannersince 1984.
58WorldBank website,"WDI,GDF&ADIOnlineDatabases,"http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~menuPK:
64133163~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html(Date access-
ed:March 5,2009).
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 177
meters(inthousands,availablefrom theCIAFactbook59)and thedistance
betweena country'scapitaland Beijing (in kilometersavailable atKristian
Gleditsch'sdataseton distance fromcapitalcities60),along withadummy
variableforwhethertheyearwasduring theColdWar (-1991).
Since Polity doesnotassign valuestocountrieswith populations
under fivehundredthousand,Model1 onlyincludesexportsand the con-
trolvariables.Whilesize ofthe countrywasnotstatisticallysignificant,
exportsweresignificantat the.01 leveland inthe expected direction as
weretheothercontrolvariables.Little changeswhenPolityscoresarein-
cluded(Model2):exports,distance fromBeijing,and ColdWaryears
remainstatisticallysignificantat the.01 level,whileneitherarea norlevel
ofdemocracyreaches significance.
59"CIA-TheWorldFactbook,"https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
(Date accessed:March3,2009).
60"Distance BetweenCapitalCities,"http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data-5.html(Date
accessed:March 1,2009).
Table2
ProbitRegressionofDiplomaticRecognition
(Dependentvariable:1=recognition ofTaiwan)
PolityScores
Area(sq.km)
ColdWar
Distance fromBeijing
Exports(GDP)
Constant
/lnsig2u
sigma_u
Rho
N
Model1
Coef.SEModel2
Coef.SE
-0.00014
0.739041
0.310712
-0.01639
***
***
***
0.000141
0.067065
0.055971
0.002932
-0.00144
-0.00012
0.856999
0.315091
-0.0227
***
***
***
0.007774
0.000147
0.081988
0.058201
0.00344
-5.74446 *** 0.516621 -5.88205 *** 0.544004
2.044372
2.779263
0.885378
6201
0.176303
0.244996
0.017892
2.119594
2.885785
0.892793
5570
0.188611
0.272146
0.018053
***p<.01,**p<.05,*p<.10
ISSUES&STUDIES
178 December2009
Replacing thePolityscorevariablewithadyadic absolutevalue
produceslargelysimilar results(see table3,Model3).Thisnewvariable
reaches statisticalsignificance at the.05 level,butcountertothehypothe-
sized direction.That is,asthedifference betweenPolityscoresforTaiwan
and anothercountryincreases,thatcountryismorelikelytorecognize
Taiwan.Exportsaswellasdistance fromBeijing and theColdWardummy
variableremainedstatisticallysignificantat the.01 level.FinallyModel4
includesboththeoriginalPolityscore and thedyadicvariable.Again,the
only variables statisticallysignificantwerethedyadicvariable,exports,
distance fromBeijing,and thedummy variablefortheColdWarperiod.
Although admittedlycrudemodels,thesesuggest thatreferencestorecog-
nition based on democraticideasareunsubstantiatedwhileunderlying vari-
ables suchaseconomicfactorsmay provideabetterexplanation.
The connection betweenaidand recognition intheROC-PRC case
hastwoimportant implications.First,theincreasedcostsofmaintaining
recognition ofafewstateslimitswhere assistance can be employed.While
thePRC only needsto offer financial incentivestoalimited numberof
Table3
ProbitRegressionofDiplomaticRecognition
(Dependentvariable:1=recognitionofTaiwan)
PolityScores
PolityDifference
Area(sq.km)
ColdWar
Distance fromBeijing
Exports(GDP)
Constant
/lnsig2u
sigma_u
Rho
N
Model3
Coef.SEModel4
Coef.SE
0.014169
-0.00013
0.875517
0.316071
-0.02073
**
***
***
***
0.0064
0.0001
0.0756
0.0593
0.0035
-0.00799
0.016243
-0.00012
0.842872
0.316563
-0.02037
**
***
***
***
0.008246
0.006769
0.000147
0.082361
0.059066
0.003538
-6.05174 *** 0.5556 -6.05713 *** 0.552519
2.110975
2.873376
0.891965
5570
0.1887
0.2711
0.0182
2.110514
2.872714
0.891921
5570
0.188627
0.270935
0.018183
***p<.01,**p<.05,*p<.10
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 179
recognizing countries,theROCmustprovideincentivesto nearlyall ofits
allies.CountriesoriginallysympathetictotheROCmay beswayed by the
growing economic and politicalcloutofthePRC.Forexample,the costs
toTaiwan ofmaintaining diplomaticrelationswithitsLatinAmerican
allies simplymeant less moneyavailableforattracting ormaintaining allies
inSoutheastAsia,all which havenowswitchedtothePRC.Attempting to
maintaineveryallyalsoallowstheROCto be essentially blackmailed by
countrieshiking up theirdemandsintheknowledgethat theROCislikely
torespond favorably.6 1
Secondly,the economicrationaleunderpinning recognition also per-
petuatesunstablerecognition.Wheneverarecognized partyisunwilling
to beat theiradversary'sofferand thuslosesrecognition fromonestate,this
simplyfreesup moneyand resourcesto beutilizedinwooing anotherstate
whileraising the costsforthe adversarytomaintaintheir recognition.This
isevident inthepattern of recognition switching whereoneortwolosses
fromoneside arequicklycounteredwithagain.62 Becauseoftheim-
portance bothsideshaveplacedonrecognition,wheneithersidemakes
gains,theother feelscompelledto quicklyrespond with diplomaticsuc-
cessesoftheirown,reinforcing perpetual instability.63 Recognition tied
toeconomic assistance thuscreates structural incentivesperpetuating diplo-
maticbattles.
Thesepathologiespartiallyexplainwhy boththePR C and ROChave
attemptedadiplomatictruce since 2008.UndertheMaYing-jeou (馬英
九)administration,relationsbetweenthetwo governmentshavenoticeably
thawedand no country has switchedrecognition recently,giving some
61Asimilarpatternwas seenwithWestGermany beforeit rescindedtheHallsteinDoctrine,
whereIndonesia and Algeriaboththreatenedtoswitchrecognition iflargeraid packages
werenotgranted.See Newnham,EmbassiesforSale,264.
62Forexample,Lee Teng-hui'sadvancesinAfrica and CentralAmerica were"immediately
metwith vigorouscountermoves"fromthePRC.See Hung-maoTienand Yun-hanChu,
"Building DemocracyinTaiwan,"TheChina Quarterly,no.148 (December1996):1169.
63Thiscycleisnot l imitedtoofficialdiplomaticrelations.MonthsafterDominica switched
tothePRC,theROCenticedthree Caribbean governmentstoannounce theirsupportfor
Taiwan'srecognitionininternationalbodies.See BertWilkinson,"ChinaBuysInfluence
intheCaribbean,"NewYorkAmsterdamNews,August19,2004.
ISSUES&STUDIES
180 December2009
hopethat theviciouscycleofcheckbook diplomacymay bebroken.
WhyTaiwanPlaystheGame
Onemay question why theROCwouldspend suchexorbitant
amountsconsidering howlittleit seemsto get inreturn.Diplomaticrec-
ognition isdomestically popularinTaiwanand thuselectorallyadvantage-
ousforTaiwanesepoliticians,despitethefact that mostTaiwanese are
unlikelyto be ableto nameone countryrecognizing theROC.Equally
significant istheimportance Taipeihasplaced on recognition withinthe
cross-Strait conflict.Recognition iscrucial toTaiwan'snationalsecurity,
notonlyto preventfurtherisolation but to deny thePRC the abilityto
swallowTaiwanwithout internationalobjection,64 whilemaking forced
unification moredifficult.Atbest,Taipei'seffortscan beseenaspre-
venting aneven greatershift towardBeijing.
Furthermore,oneshouldnotoverlook theUN psychewhichpervades
Taiwanesepolitics.MembershipintheUN isa clearmark ofexternal
legitimacy.In 1971 GeneralAssemblyResolution 2758 revokedthe
ROC'scredentialsasthesolerepresentativeofChina,transferring them to
thePRC,thusthreatening Taiwan'sexternalsovereigntybymotivating
otherstoswitch diplomaticrecognition.NorcanTaiwaneasilyreturnto
theUN astheSecurityCouncil mustapprove all accessions.65 Although
somesuggest thatseating boththeROCand PRC wouldstill havebeen
possible after1971,66 theROC'sdecision towalk out instead ofbeing
64Chen,Foreign Policy oftheNewTaiwan,10.
65Technically,since thePRC istheinterestedparty,it should notbe abletouseitsvetointhe
SecurityCouncil to blockTaiwan'sadmission.See MichaelYahuda,"TheInternational
StandingoftheRepublicofChinaon Taiwan,"inContemporaryTaiwan,ed.DavidSham-
baugh(New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),294.
66One couldarguethat theKMT's strictadherence tothe"oneChina"policy preventedthe
possibility ofdualrecognition intheUN.From1971to 1979,theKMT-ledROCsevered
relationswithforty-fourcountriesrecognizing thePRC withoutthePRC forcingtheissue.
See Mengin,Foreign Policy of theROC,21-22.
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 181
seatedasaseparate country preventedaccommodation likethat inthe
Germanand Koreancases.67
Diplomaticrecognition alsoassistsTaiwaninmaintaining aninterna-
tionalpresence informal institutions.From1993 to 2008 theROCusedits
fewalliestoannuallysupportre-entryintotheUN,seenasitsonly hope
afterthe1995offerofonebillion dollarstotheUnitedNationsinexchange
formembershipwasrejected.Inaddition toattempting toenterundervari-
ousnames("RepublicofChinaon Taiwan," "RepublicofChina(Taiwan),"
and mostrecentlysimply"Taiwan"),theROChasalsoattemptedentryas
a"non-memberentity"similartoPalestine,all to no avail.Countriesmay
besympathetictoTaiwan;however,nonewithrelationswiththePRC has
supportedthismeasure(see table4).Infact,onlyabouthalfofthe coun-
triesrecognizing theROChavesupportedtheyearly proposal,whilemore
non-recognizing countrieshaveoftenspokenin opposition.68 Taiwanalso
67TheROC-PRC case also differsinthatUN membershipforboth dividedGermany andKo-
reawascontingenton bothsides simultaneouslyentering.
68Admittedly,Taiwan doesnotexpecteveryallyto backtheUN petition,but it doesexpect
otheractivitiesinTaiwan'sinterest.Personal interview withMinistryofForeign Affairsof-
ficial,LillianWu,1997."ROC'sUNBidisLong-TermGoal:ActingForeignMinister,"Cen-
tralNewsAgency,September18,1997;andRawnsley,Taiwan'sInformalDiplomacy,32.
Table4
CountriesThatSupportedtheUN PetitiontoSeat theROC
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
CountriesSupporting
UN Petition ROC'sDiplomaticAllies*
10
12
16
15
11
16
15
29
28
27
27
26
25
24
Source:MinistryofForeign Affairs(ROC)website and UnitedNationswebsite.
*Denotespeak numberofcountriesrecognizingtheROCinthatyear.
ISSUES&STUDIES
182 December2009
useditsalliesto propose a UN working group on Taiwan's statusin 2000
and adebateon Taiwanin 2005,69 signifying that theTaiwanissueisnot
resolved.70 Whileit isnot impossiblethatadeal may bebrokeredtoallow
TaiwanintotheUN,71 these actionsallowTaiwanto preventfurthererosion
ofitsdiplomaticspace.
WhiletheROCmaintainsthe competition overclaimsofsovereignty,
thePRC viewseachmovewithcaution.Thelegitimacy ofthePRC isnot
in question asthevast majority ofcountriesnotonlyrecognize it,but
acknowledgeitsclaimstoTaiwanaswell.72 ThePRC,however,sees
any pushforTaiwan'sexternal legitimacyasanincrementalsteptoward
formal independence.Inthisviewevenlosing a countrylikeKiribati only
strengthensTaiwan'sabilitytoavoid unification.Thisinturnjustifiesthe
PRC adopting amore aggressivestance againstTaiwan outof fearthat
theROCisunilaterally deviating from the"oneChina"policy.
Aformal movetowardindependence,however,may notbenefit Tai-
wan'squestfordiplomaticrecognition.Although some arguethatWestern
democracieswould behard pressedtoignoretheplightofafellowdemoc-
racy,thepotentialbacklashfromChinamightnotonly discouragedejure
recognition ofTaiwan,butalso persuadethelastholdoutstoswitcheither
outof fearofpoliticalretribution (e.g., blocking assistance through the
UN73)or realization thatheightenedcross-Strait tension may hamperTai-
69"MinisterRegretfulasUN BidFails,"Taiwan News,September15,2005.http://www.gov
.tw/TaiwanHeadlines.
70Asonediplomatstated,thedoortotheUN may be"closedbutnot locked."Personal in-
terview.
71"U.S.ExpertSuggestsTaiwan-ChinaJointMembershipinUN,"TheChina Post(Taipei),
July 23,2009.http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2009/07/23/
217382/U.S.-expert.htm.
72CharlesW.Freeman,Jr., "Preventing WarintheTaiwanStrait: RestrainingTaiwan— and
Beijing,"ForeignAffairs 77,no.4(July-August1998):6-11.
73ThePRC hasonlyuseditsSecurityCouncil veto powersixtimes,yetithastwice usedit
to blockthedeploymentofpeacekeepers(toMacedonia and Guatemala),ostensibly be-
causebothofthesecountriesrecognizedtheROC.PRC officialsdidnotexplicitlylinkthe
UNvotetosupportforTaiwan,insteadarguingintheMacedoniancasethatconditionshad
"apparentlystabilizedinthelastfewyears."Suchmovescould beinterpretedasattempts
to detergranderdisplaysofsupportforTaiwan.See PaulLewis."ChinaVotesaU.N.
Force OutofBalkans,"NewYorkTimes,February 16,1999,11.
Taiwan'sStruggleforDiplomaticRecognition
December2009 183
wan'scommitment tocheckbook diplomacy.WhereastheROC'spresent
lack ofuniversaldiplomaticrecognition makesit anon-statusquo power
insomerespects,responding withaformaldeclaration ofindependence
may providelittlediplomaticbenefit.Thepresentdiplomatictruce ap-
pearsto bein both parties'interestsasit underminesbidding warsand en-
couragesassistance targeting theinfrastructureneedsofunderdeveloped
countries.Inthe absence oflargeroffersofassistance,no country has
switchedrecognition.However,ifa countrywereto unilaterally drop
recognition,it isunclearwhethertheotherpartywouldforgo pursuing
relations,amovewhichcouldreignitediplomatic competition.
Conclusion
ThediplomaticbattlebetweentheROCand thePRC highlights
severalaspectsof recognition thathavenotbeenadequatelyaddressedin
theliterature.Asevidentfrom thenumberofcountries switching recogni-
tion,recognition may notalwaysincludeanormative elementoradeeper
commitment.Aid packagesalso havelimited diplomaticvalueinthese
situationswhererecipientcountriescanalwaysmakegreaterdemands
whileoffering thesameincentivetowhoeveriswilling to payfor recogni-
tion.The analysisoftheROC-PRC casereaffirmsthat"in diplomacy,you
can'tbuy friends,you can onlyrent them."74 Theinstability of recognition
fromsmall powersdrawsthesenationsintotheTaiwan debate,a conflict
whichmostofthese countrieshavelittleinterest inseeing resolvedasit
would potentially decreasetheiraccess toaid.Although thediplomatic
truce ispromising,thePRC still mayreturntocheckbook diplomacyin
ordertofurtherdiplomaticallyisolatetheROC.SimilarlytheROCmay
continue assistance packagesoutof fearofChinesediplomatic appeal.
Eveninlate2009,criticspointedto donationsofaircraft toPanama asa
74"RelationsRecast: InDiplomaticCompetition withBeijing,EconomicCloutKeepsTaipei
aStrong Player,"Free China Review,March 1998.
ISSUES&STUDIES
184 December2009
returntocheckbook diplomacyonTaiwan'spart.75 Taipei thusmustfind
creativewaystoexpand itsinternationalposition.WhiletheROChas
madesubstantiveprogress in upgrading unofficialrelations,whichwill be
farmore crucialfortheisland'slong-termsecurity,the continuedfocuson
costlyloweconomicreturn officialrelationsmayinsome casesbe counter-
productive.
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