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Infrastructure resources are the subject of many contentious public policy debates, including what to do about crumbling roads and bridges, whether and how to protect our natural environment, energy policy, even patent law reform, universal health care, network neutrality regulation, and the future of the Internet. Each of these involves a battle to control infrastructure resources, to establish the terms and conditions under which the public receives access, and to determine how the infrastructure and various dependent systems evolve over time. This book pays much needed attention to understanding how society benefits from infrastructure resources and how management decisions affect a wide variety of interests. The book links infrastructure, a particular set of resources defined in terms of the manner in which they create value, with commons, a resource management principle by which a resource is shared within a community. The infrastructure commons ideas have broad implications for scholarship and public policy across many fields ranging from traditional infrastructure like roads to environmental economics to intellectual property to Internet policy. Economics has become the methodology of choice for many scholars and policymakers in these areas. The book offers a rigorous economic challenge to the prevailing wisdom, which focuses primarily on problems associated with ensuring adequate supply. The book explores a set of questions: what drives the demand side of the equation, and how should demand-side drivers affect public policy? Demand for infrastructure resources involves a range of important considerations that bear on the optimal design of a regime for infrastructure management. The book identifies resource valuation and attendant management problems that recur across many different fields and many different resource types, and it develops a functional economic approach to understanding and analyzing these problems and potential solutions.
Electronic copy available at:
Brett M. Frischmann
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Electronic copy available at:
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Frischmann, Brett M.
Infrastructure : the social value of shared resources / Brett M. Frischmann.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN ---- (hbk. : alk. paper)
. Infrastructure (Economics)—Social aspects. I. Title.
HC.CF 
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To my wife, Kelly, and my three boys, Matthew, Jake, and Ben
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Introduction ix
  | 
. De ning In astructure and Commons Management
. Overview of In astructure Economics 
. Microeconomic Building Blocks
  |  -   
  
. I n astructural Resources 
. Managing In astructure as Commons
  | 
. Commons Management and In astructure Pricing 
. Managing Congestion 
. Supply-Side Incentives 
  |  
. Transportation In astructure: Roads 
. Communications In astructure: Telecommunications 
  |  
. Enironmental In astructure 
. Intellectual In astructure 
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viii Contents
  |  
. e Internet and the Network Neutrality Debate 
. Application to Other Modern Debates 
 
 
 
  
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is book devotes much-needed attention to understanding how society bene ts from
infrastructure resources and how management decisions a ect a wide variety of interests.
is book links in astructure , a particular set of resources de ned in terms of the manner
in which they create value, with commons , a resource management principle by which a
resource is shared within a community.
Too o en, we take for granted the shared infrastructures that shape our lives, our rela-
tionships with each other, the opportunities we enjoy, and the environment we share.
ink for a moment about the basic supporting infrastructures that you rely on daily.
Some obvious examples are roads, the Internet, water systems, and the electric power
grid, to name just a few. In fact, there are many less obvious examples, such as our shared
language, legal institutions, ideas, and even the atmosphere. We depend heavily on shared
infrastructures, yet it is di cult to appreciate just how much. It is di cult to fully appre-
ciate how these resources contribute to our lives, because infrastructures are complex
and the bene ts provided are typically indirect. We dont pay much attention to infra-
structure resources, because they are conveniently obscure, part of the background. We
assume their continuous availability and pay attention to them only when catastrophe
strikes, for example when a bridge fails or rolling blackouts deprive us of the electricity we
need. And even then, the public attention given is reactive, isolated, and short-lived.
When a bridge collapses, for example, the immediate public outcry may be su cient
to support e orts to rebuild the particular bridge, but that is about as far as it goes. As the
headline value of the disaster fades, the world moves on. According to the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), “more than , or one in four, of the nations bridges
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x Introduction
are either structurally de cient or functionally obsolete.
In , over , bridges in
the United States were categorized as structurally de cient, and in addition, over ,
bridges were categorized as functionally obsolete.
And the problem is by no means
limited to bridges. To take a rather simple illustration, the ASCE Report Card for
Americas Infrastructure (see table I. ) is abysmal, concluding with a “grade point aver-
age” of D and an estimated  ve-year investment need of . trillion.
While there are reasons one might quibble with the ASCE grading system or even
particular grades, the basic point is that we have a major infrastructure problem in the
United States. Our complacent, reactive, piecemeal approach to infrastructure is incred-
ibly shortsighted and must change. A more proactive, systematic, long-term approach
to infrastructure is desperately needed, as experts have long recognized.
For such change
ASCE ().
D  T  () (Table -- contains the relevant statistics on bridges).
is need has long been recognized among expert communities.  at is, engineers, economists, and other
experts who focus on infrastructure have long argued for a proactive, systematic, long-term approach to infra-
structure. What has not been recognized or at least explored methodically are the demand-side issues examined
in this book.
 . ASCE Report Card for Americas Infrastructure ()
Infrastructure Type  Grade
Aviation D
Bridges C
Dams D
Drinking Water D
Energy D +
Hazardous Waste D
Inland Waterways D–
Levees D–
Public Parks and Recreation C–
Rail C
Roads D–
Schools D
Solid Waste C +
Transit D
Wa s te wat e r D
Americas Infrastructure GPA D
Estimated Five-Year Investment Need $2.2 trillion
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Introduction xi
to even begin to occur, however, citizens must learn to appreciate the social value of
shared infrastructure.
We simply cannot assume continuous availability. As the ASCE
Report Card indicates, both governments and markets struggle to adequately supply
the public with the infrastructures that it needs.  e reasons are many, and this book will
not discuss them all. Infrastructure resources o en require substantial investment to
supply, maintain, and manage.  e investment must come from somewhere, and the
public must pay one way or another (taxes, user fees, etc.). As economists like to put it,
there is no such thing as a free lunch. Raising su cient capital to invest can be di cult.
ere are a host of “supply-side” obstacles to e cient infrastructure provisioning.
Economic analysis of infrastructure tends to focus on these issues. But one critical reason,
which is generally overlooked and which this book will confront at length, is that infra-
structure users, as voters and consumers, may not adequately signal social demand for
infrastructures.  ere are a host of “demand-side” issues to confront. At bottom, demand-
side problems arise because we do not fully appreciate the social value that infrastructures
Infrastructure resources entail long-term commitments with deep consequences for
the public. Infrastructures are a prerequisite for economic and social development.
Infrastructures shape complex systems of human activity, including economic, cultural,
and political systems.  at is, infrastructures a ect the behavior of individuals,  rms,
households, and other organizations by providing and shaping the available opportuni-
ties of these actors to participate in these systems and to interact with each other.
Transportation and communications infrastructures, for example, enable economic and
cultural engagement between communities, expanding the scope of markets and com-
munities by enabling people, goods, and ideas to travel more easily. Legal infrastructure,
including laws and court systems, for example, enable an incredible variety of economic
and social interactions within and across communities. Property and contract laws are a
basic foundation for markets of all sorts.  e First Amendment shapes the speech envi-
ronment the political, economic, cultural, and other conversations people have.
Infrastructure resources are at the center of many contentious public policy debates,
ranging from what to do about our crumbling roads and bridges, to whether and how
to protect our natural environment, to patent law reform, to electromagnetic spectrum
allocation, to providing universal health care, to energy policy, to network neutrality
regulation and the future of the Internet.  e list could go on and on. Although the
policy arenas may seem unrelated, all of them are, to some extent, the same. Each of these
policy debates (and many others) involves a battle to control infrastructure resources, set
Just as environmental movement helped society to see what it took for granted, this book aims to bring
infrastructure to the foreground, so we can better see infrastructure where it exists and to sense its potential
where it could come to exist.
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xii Introduction
the terms and conditions under which the public gets access, and determine how the
infrastructure and various infrastructure-dependent systems will evolve over time.
e battle is joined in each of these areas, with some groups arguing strongly for
recourse to private property solutions
and other groups arguing strongly that such an
approach would be fatal.
ese groups draw on a broader intellectual debate about the
merits of private control over (or, conversely, open access to) various types of resources.
e intellectual debate takes place in a number of  elds, including law, economics, and
political science. On the private control side, there is robust economic theory in support
of private ordering via markets with minimal government involvement. By contrast, on
the open-access side, there is a frequent call for protecting the “commons,” but the theo-
retical support for this prescriptive call is underdeveloped from an economics perspec-
tive. In fact, many who oppose privatization, deregulation, and commercialization view
the entire discipline of economics with sincere suspicion and doubt.
is book advances strong economic arguments for managing and sustaining infra-
structure resources as commons. For better or worse, economics has become the method-
ology of choice for many scholars and policy makers in these areas.  e book o ers a
rigorous economic challenge to the prevailing wisdom about managing infrastructure.
Within economics, infrastructure resources typically have been evaluated using public
goods and club goods frameworks; under either framework the analysis typically has
focused on the problem of ensuring adequate supply.  is book explores a set of ques-
tions that, once asked, seem obvious: What drives the demand side of the equation, and
how should demand-side drivers a ect public policy? Demand for infrastructure
resources involves a range of important considerations that bear on the optimal design of
a regime for infrastructure management.
A demand-side approach facilitates a better understanding of how infrastructure
resources generate value for society and how decisions regarding the allocation of access
to such resources a ect social welfare.  e key insights from this analysis are that infra-
structure resources are basic inputs into a wide variety of productive activities and infra-
structure users who choose to engage in such activities o en produce public and social
goods that generate spillovers that bene t society as a whole. Managing such resources as
commons may be socially desirable from an economic perspective because doing so facil-
itates these downstream productive activities. For example, managing the Internet infra-
structure in this manner facilitates active citizen involvement in the production and
e debates involve other issues as well. My point is that infrastructure issues are o en at the core.
E.g., privatize public roads and bridges so that  rms motivated by pro t incentives will reduce costs and
manage the resources e ciently or pay providers of ecosystem services for the bene ts their land conveys to
all of us or let the network owners control what tra c ows across their cables.
E.g., “ privatization bene ts only a few, such as current politicians, the owners, and current users with the means
to pay increased tolls or commodi cation will not solve environmental problems or network neutrality is
essential to the future of the Internet.
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Introduction xiii
sharing of public and social goods. Over the past decade, this has led to increased oppor-
tunities for a wide range of citizens to engage in entrepreneurship, political discourse,
social network formation, and community building, among many other socially valuable
To put the basic lesson more plainly: We should share infrastructure resources in an
open, nondiscriminatory manner when it is feasible to do so.  is is attractive public
policy not only for distributional or fairness reasons, but also for e ciency reasons.
Society is better o sharing infrastructure openly.  is book explains why. And it also
explains that although many people question the feasibility of sharing, worrying that
sharing will destroy incentives to invest or will lead to overuse, such concerns are
greatly overstated and o en can be addressed in a manner that preserves nondiscrimina-
tory sharing.
e infrastructure commons ideas developed in this book have broad implications for
scholarship and public policy across many  elds, ranging from traditional infrastructure
like roads to environmental economics to intellectual property to Internet policy.  e
book identi es resource valuation and attendant management problems that recur across
many di erent elds and many di erent resource types, and it develops a functional
economic approach to understanding and analyzing these problems. Accordingly, the
theory is developed at a higher level of abstraction than would be appropriate if it focused
exclusively on a single  eld or resource.  is means that the theory needs re nement
as it is applied in context.  e book o ers no universal prescriptions, because trade-o s
will be di erent in di erent areas. Still, it is helpful and illuminating to take a step back
and look across traditional disciplinary lines before examining the trade-o s.  e rst
three parts of this book develop a general theoretical framework for examining the social
value of shared infrastructure.  e framework is not tailored to a particular type of infra-
structure. Instead, it is based on a functional economic analysis of the characteristics of
infrastructure resources.  e nal three parts of the book apply the framework to
many di erent types of infrastructure, exploring nuanced trade-o s that arise in particu-
lar contexts as well as common issues that cut across di erent contexts. Despite their
obvious di erences, road systems, telephone networks, ecosystems, and ideas have much
more in common than is conventionally appreciated.
Detailed Summary of Chapters
Part I lays the foundation for the economic arguments developed throughout the rest of
the book. Chapters , , and  are building blocks.  e concepts “infrastructure” and
commons” are used di erently and o en loosely across a wide range of disciplines,
including engineering, economics, political science, and law. Moreover, the two concepts
are rarely used together. Accordingly, chapter  sets forth a general description of the
concepts, drawing on some of the key functional features of in astructure as resources
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xiv Introduction
and commons as a mode of resource management . is discussion highlights some of the
gaps in our understanding of how infrastructure generates social value and the role that
commons management plays in facilitating value generation by infrastructure users.
Chapter  gives an overview of infrastructure economics. Surprisingly, there is no par-
ticular sub eld within economics devoted to infrastructure.  e overview explains the
basic supply-side orientation of public welfare economics and regulatory economics
and highlights this book’s point of departure its focus on the demand side. Chapter 
provides a detailed discussion of microeconomic concepts that serve as building blocks
for the demand-side theory developed in Part II.  e concepts are very important to
understanding the value of infrastructure and evaluating and improving resource
management. (Readers well versed in microeconomics may wish to skip this chapter.
However, the chapter highlights some overlooked demand-side issues that arise in the
analysis of public goods, social goods, and externalities.)
Part II develops a demand-side theory of infrastructure and commons management. It
is the heart of the book. It delineates a set of infrastructure resources based on functional
economic criteria and examines whether managing these resources as commons is an
attractive resource management strategy.
Chapter  focuses on infrastructure resources. It aims to identify and evaluate infra-
structure resources functionally from a systems perspective. First, it identi es and exam-
ines three economic criteria common to traditional infrastructure, such as transportation
systems and telecommunications networks, and nontraditional infrastructure, such as
the atmosphere and basic research. Speci cally, infrastructural resources satisfy the
following criteria:
() e resource may be consumed nonrivalrously for some appreciable range of
() Social demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive
activity that requires the resource as an input.
() e resource may be used as an input into a wide range of goods and services,
which may include private goods, public goods, and social goods.
ese criteria delineate a set of resources that are functionally in astructural . Bear in
mind that the economic concepts woven together in these criteria are carefully explained
in chapter . Second, chapter  develops a typology of di erent infrastructure (commer-
cial, public, social, and mixed infrastructure) based on the distribution of productive
activities the infrastructure facilitates.  ird, it discusses how both the resource set
delineated by the three criteria and the subsets delineated by the typology are dependent
on demand, and how resources may evolve into or out of the set or subsets.  e chapter
explains how di erent types of demand-side market failures arise when spillovers from
public or social goods are prevalent.
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Introduction xv
Chapter  connects the demand-side analysis of how infrastructure resources generate
value for society with the management of such resources as commons.  e case for
commons management must be evaluated carefully and contextually. Chapter   rst
considers commons management as a private strategy.  ere are a variety of reasons why
private  rms choose to manage their infrastructure as commons. I discuss  ve primary
reasons: (a) consumers generally dislike and react negatively to discrimination; (b) com-
mons management may economize on information and transaction costs and avoid
unnecessary complexity; (c) commons management may facilitate joint production or
cooperation with competitors; (d) commons management may support and encourage
value-creating activities by users; and (e) commons management may maximize the
option value of infrastructure when there is high uncertainty regarding sources of future
market value.
Chapter  next considers commons management as a public strategy.  ere are a
variety of situations in which commons management is not an attractive private strategy
but nonetheless is an attractive public strategy; markets sometimes fail to adopt com-
mons management even when doing so would improve social welfare.  e chapter
explains the conventional forms of and justi cations for such regulation. Next, it utilizes
the typology developed in chapter  and articulates additional, powerful reasons
to manage public, social, and mixed infrastructure in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Speci cally, commons management can be an e cient means of indirectly supporting
public participation in a variety of socially valuable activities, namely activities that
involve the production, use, and distribution of public and social goods. As such, com-
mons management can be understood as serving two public functions: First, it di uses
pressure within both market and political systems to “pick winners and losers” and leaves
it to users to decide what to do with the opportunities (capabilities) provided by infra-
structure. Second, it functions like an option a social option. When there is high uncer-
tainty about which users or uses will generate social value in the future, as is typically the
case for public, social, or mixed infrastructure, managing the infrastructure as a commons
sustains the generic nature of the infrastructure, precludes optimization for a narrower
range of activities, and avoids social opportunity costs associated with path dependency.
Together, these public functions suggest a third public function: Commons management
structures the relationships between infrastructure and infrastructure-dependent systems
in a manner that creates a spillover-rich environment, where spillovers  ow from the
many productive activities of users.  ese activities yield new and unanticipated innova-
tions, knowledge, social capital, and other public and social goods that lead to economic
growth and development as well as social welfare improvements not fully re ected in
traditional economic measures.
ough theory reveals a weight on the scale in favor of commons management that
seems to be ignored in most contexts, the theory does not necessarily tip the balance;
there are other relevant considerations, some more important than others, depending on
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xvi Introduction
the context. Part III focuses on three sets of complications that must be considered when
evaluating the case for managing infrastructure as commons.  e rst set involve the
impacts that commons management might have on pricing practices, and concerns
that nondiscrimination rules must be accompanied by price regulation or government
subsidies.  e second set concerns congestion management and complications that arise
when infrastructure is partially (non)rival and thus congestible, and the relationships
between commons management and congestion management. Finally, the third set
concerns the impact of nondiscrimination rules on supply-side incentives. As the chap-
ters reveal, arguments based on these complications should be evaluated carefully. In
many cases, the complications are manageable and do not undermine the case for com-
mons management.
Part IV discusses examples of traditional infrastructure speci cally, transportation
infrastructure (roads) in chapter  and telecommunications infrastructure (telephone
networks) in chapter .  ese chapters illustrate how the demand-side theory applies to
these traditional infrastructure resources and how commons management has been
implemented. Both road and telecommunications infrastructures provide generic public
capabilities, mobility and communication, that allow users to engage in an incredibly
wide variety of productive activities.  ese activities generate private, public, and social
goods and consequently substantial spillovers to the bene t of society. In the United
States, the vast majority of road infrastructure is publicly owned, and the vast majority
of telephone infrastructure is privately owned.  e supply-side stories for these infra-
structures are thus quite di erent. Yet both are sustained as commons, accessible to the
public on nondiscriminatory terms.  ese chapters discuss a range of complications.
Road infrastructure is complicated by congestion, negative externalities associated with
environmental pollution, and public  nancing of maintenance and improvements.
Telephone infrastructure is complicated by regulatory costs and the di culties of transi-
tioning from regulated monopoly to competition. While these chapters do not exhaus-
tively cover these rich and complex  elds, they begin to provide a more nuanced picture
of how these fundamental infrastructure resources generate value for society, the critical
role of commons management, and the various institutional means for sustaining com-
mons when faced with an array of con icting issues.
Part V shi s attention from traditional infrastructure to nontraditional infrastruc-
ture — speci cally, environmental and intellectual infrastructure. It may seem odd to be
grouping roads and telephone networks with lakes and ideas under the infrastructure
umbrella. One reason for doing so is to highlight the demand-side similarities and the
important, if varied, role of commons management. When feasible, society bene ts
tremendously by leveraging nonrivalry to support nondiscriminatory access to such
resources because doing so enables the public to participate productively in a wide range
of socially valuable activities. As with traditional infrastructure, many environmental and
intellectual infrastructure resources are public, social, and mixed infrastructures that
contribute immensely to our economic and social development.  e case for commons
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Introduction xvii
management depends, however, on managing a host of competing considerations.
Intellectual infrastructures face supply-side issues similar to those issues faced by tradi-
tional infrastructure. Attracting private investment can be di cult because of the cost
structure of supply, high costs of exclusion, and misappropriation risks. Environmental
infrastructures do not face the same supply-side issues, but environmental infrastructure
face complex congestion and degradation problems. In short, pure open access to intel-
lectual or environmental infrastructure typically is not feasible absent additional institu-
tional support, whether in the form of public subsidies for basic research or in the form
of command and control regulation of industrial polluters. Viewing foundational
environmental and intellectual resources through the infrastructure lens yields interest-
ing insights regarding commons management institutions. In particular, both environ-
mental and intellectual property legal systems construct semi-commons arrangements
that create and regulate interdependent private rights and public commons. Each does so
in very di erent ways, however.
Part VI applies the infrastructure theory to modern challenges. Chapter  applies
infrastructure theory to the particularly contentious “network neutrality” debate. At the
heart of this debate is whether the Internet infrastructure will continue to be managed
as a commons. Ultimately, the outcome of this debate may very well determine whether
the Internet continues to operate as a mixed infrastructure that supports widespread
user production of commercial, public, and social goods, or whether it evolves into a
commercial infrastructure optimized for the production and delivery of commercial out-
puts.  e chapter criticizes the current framing of the debate as well as the recent rule
enacted by the Federal Communications Commission. It then proposes and defends a
nondiscrimination rule that re ects the core commons management principle discussed
throughout this book. Chapter  brie y discusses some additional modern challenges.
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... The word "resources" itself can be taken intuitively to refer to depletable stuff (water) or rival things (physical objects) rather than to inputs into social systems. To put that point somewhat more technically, a resource is something for which there is social demand (Frischmann, 2012). ...
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The economics of abundance, along with the sociology of abundance, the law of abundance, and so forth, should be re-framed, linked, and situated in a common context for empirical rather than conceptual research. Abundance may seem to be a new, big thing, between anxiety over information overload, Big Data, and related technological disruptions. But scholars know that abundance is an ancient phenomenon, which only seemed to disappear as twentieth century social science focused on scarcity instead. Restoring the study of abundance, and figuring out how to solve the problems that abundance might create, means shedding disciplinary blinders and going back to basics. How does abundance, in various forms, create or alleviate social problems? We explain and illustrate how the Governing Knowledge Commons (GKC) framework provides a useful research tool to generate and test hypotheses about abundance in various economic, social, cultural, and legal settings.
... The GKC approach sees the private property approach as missing important aspects of knowledge commons governance of blockchain. First, knowledge commons perform an important infrastructural function that is often neglected in considering the private aspects of new commons (Frischmann, 2012). Just as market supporting institutions are knowledge commons (Dekker & Kuchar, 2021), blockchain networks support a wide range of market transactions, such as allowing people to purchase and hold tokens, to write smart contracts for their business, and nonprofits to use distributed ledgers to set up crowdfunding. ...
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Researchers interested in blockchains are increasingly attuned to questions of governance, including how blockchains relate to government, the ways blockchains are governed, and ways blockchains can improve prospects for successful self-governance. Our paper joins this research by exploring the implications of the Governing Knowledge Commons (GKC) framework to analyze governance of blockchains. Our novel contributions are making the case that blockchain networks represent knowledge commons governance, in the sense that they rely on collectively-managed technologies to pool and manage distributed information, illustrating the usefulness and novelty of the GCK methodology with an empirical case study of the evolution of Bitcoin, and laying the foundation for a research program using the GKC approach.
... Thus, commons are not just a 'transitional form' of shared resources. In the state-of-the-art, in particular in relation to natural resources (Ostrom, 1990;Ostrom, 2005), the studied communities did not change the nature of the governing common-pool resources (CPR) organization or the formal status of these goods, yet they were able to remain stable and sustainable over a long period of time (Ostrom, 1990;Carlsson, 2008;Bollier & Helfrich, 2012;Frischmann, 2012). Therefore, Elinor Ostrom, among the '[d]esign principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions', points to '[m]inimal recognition of rights to organize', which she describes as '[t]he rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions [which] are not challenged by external governmental authorities' (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). ...
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An increasing number of communities successfully governing urban commons could be seen as a strong move towards ‘delinking’ from homo economicus myth that still remains at the centre of the capitalist economic assumptions. This paper, theoretical in nature, presents an alternative, a preferred scenario of a future ‘communal system’ as a vision of society built on different values than homo economicus conduct, values that are distinctive for urban commons today, especially in peripheral countries. These are: responsibility, networking, cooperation, caring for others, reciprocity, self-help, continuous learning and sharing. The given three examples of urban commons: Torre David, SE VIOME and Bangkok Noi urban gardens — that illustrate such system in the present — share these values and therefore contribute to social change. Although commons are still at the margins of economic considerations, while corporations through the processes of neo-colonisation dominate the centre, a future ransformation into a ‘communal system’ is possible, as posited by the postcolonial theory and the actor-network-theory (ANT) discussed in this article. Vision of an economic system, based on the new communal myth contributes to the emerging field of postcapitalist, post-growth theories arising in the shadow of a climate catastrophe and other upcoming crises.
... As such, they stay in the focus of urban development planners and environmental activists [31,40]. Careful engineering, planting and maintaining efforts as well as unintended human modification of green spaces in the cities allow researchers to consider them as components of green infrastructure [41]. As any human endeavor, they are the subject of concerns for social inclusivity, accessibility, and justice [42,43]. ...
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Trees in Arctic cities perform not only important provisional and regulating ecosystem services, but also bring predominantly settler population closer to the visual images and household standards of their home southern regions. However, maintenance of green infrastructure in the Arctic has specific difficulties associated with the harsh climatic and environmental conditions. This paper focuses on state and dynamics of vegetation in the city of Nadym, Russia, with a particular focus on native and introduced trees as the main ecosystem service providers and an articulation of local values towards green spaces. The research is based on interdisciplinary approach which includes interviews with local residents, geobotanical survey and analysis of remote sensing data. The results of the study show that maintaining of natural vegetation requires specific measures due to environmental the critical impact of anthropogenic activity. The active introduction of plants from more southern regions is manifested both in the deliberate practice of landscaping the city’s streets and courtyards, and in spontaneous attempts to introduce plants from more southern (not Subarctic) agricultural regions of Russia, which are privately brought by city residents from other regions.
... Private actors, today, rely on trade secrets protection to preserve their commercial interests in specific use-cases of 'inferred data', locking up the base layer of data. Because data is an 'infrastructural good' -a resource whose value proposition stems from its deployment into a wide range of economic activitieshigh exclusion curbs its innovation potential (Frischmann 2012;Benkler 2016). ...
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This draft paper by Anita Gurumurthy and Nandini Chami presents the building blocks of an economic governance regime for data that can contribute to the growth of the digital economy by unlocking the potential of data. The de facto enclosure of data by platform monopolies not only creates a skewed market place with exclusionary effects, it also presents a huge opportunity cost in terms of the unrealized public and social value of data. The paper unpacks the limits of emerging approaches to data governance – both, individualist and collective – arguing why such frameworks do not go far enough. It offers a semi-commons approach to ordering the digital economy as a means to achieve ‘distributive integrity’.
... However, the reflexive and paradigmatic focus on large-scale systems (digital communications networks) and technologically determined innovation evident in the quotation above calls for a reappraisal of the role and value of local-level social infrastructure, particularly in light of new demands made by multiple and intersecting environmental and social crises. This paper argues that policy settings and evaluation schema for facilities such as CHs are largely focussed around service delivery and infrastructural efficiency, and give insufficient recognition to the social value and adaptive capacities of these local-level institutions [14]. The mobilisation of local spatial and social resources during crises exposes the insecurity of governance and funding arrangements for some local facilities, as well as the spatial variability of infrastructure provision. ...
This article discusses community hubs (CH) — multi-purpose institutions that host social, educational and health services, while building social connectedness and community capacity. Major events such as climate change, wildfires and the COVID-19 pandemic are placing new demands on CHs to be emergency refuges, information centres, community kitchens and more. Such events highlight the critical nature of social infrastructure to both disaster responses and long-term community building and resilience. Such events, though, expose new seams of infrastructural and spatial injustice and place strain on insecure institutional arrangements. Infrastructure policy has typically focussed on large-scale systems and networks in defining and resourcing critical infrastructure. We examine some conceptual and policy challenges in rethinking CHs as anchor institutions for addressing vulnerability, building community resilience, and fostering adaptive responses to enable more socially and environmentally just development.
Infrastructure asset are included as a special property when one is conducting a valuation. The uniqueness of an infrastructure asset due to its specific functions and operations that are differ from other infrastructure asset. Thus, the tangible and intangible factors included for valuation are also difference and specialize according to each infrastructure asset. The issues of intangible factors thatenhance in infrastructure asset valuation are arisen since the investor and stakeholders are concern in getting to know how much the asset are generating a profit compare to its expenses in operating the asset especially a public asset. This research aims to evaluate the application of intangible factors in infrastructure asset valuation. As intangible factors are unforeseen factors, thus this researchelaborates on detailed intangible factors and how to identify the factors that influence to the value. The methodology adopted in this research is based on qualitative analysis by in depth interview with the experts that specialized in special property valuation. The research findings are derived from the content analysis. Based on the interview expert’s session, this paper has also benefit inthe form of knowledge and to the practitioner in implementing the intangible factors in infrastructure asset valuation.
Who should decide what content is permissible online? Platforms will always exercise some degree of discretion over content moderation, and ensuring that platforms exercise their discretionary powers responsibly is a large part of making governance legitimate. In this chapter, we argue that improving the self-regulation of internal governance practices of platforms is a critical component of any regulatory project. Our argument is that platforms must always have a role in regulating lawful speech and that regulating ordinary, lawful speech is critical to influencing cultures and addressing harm. We draw on the results of a qualitative study involving a broad group of participants who actively work to influence how platforms govern their users. We offer a simple proof in the moral responsibilities that platforms bear to address the pressing need for cultural change in violence against women—responsibilities that cannot fully be carried out or overseen by states or other external actors.
The capitalist city is a colossal productive force in permanent construction and contention. On the one hand, urban infrastructure must be constantly adapted to support the relentlessly shifting urban-based economic activities. On the other hand, achieving the goals of sustainable urban development will require profound infrastructural transitions. Proponents of infrastructural change in the Global South should bear in mind that, however well-intentioned, infrastructural transitions are inevitably embedded within urban political economy. Infrastructure policies have distributional effects, and the political economy of infrastructural transitions can produce inequitable urban outcomes. Within this context, this chapter argues that overcoming infrastructural deficiencies can sometimes come at the cost of increasing intra-urban inequality. An analytical framework to study mechanisms of infrastructural exclusion comprised of four categories of analysis is put forward: lack of physical access, expenditure relative to income, institutional constraints, and social stratification barriers. By doing so, the chapter seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive body of literature on urban political economy based on the experience from the Global South.
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The purpose of this book is to present a theory of technical systems that can help us better understand the demands technology places on organizations. New technologies in general require new patterns of activity and reward some patterns over others. Quoting Brian Arthur: When a novel technology enters the economy, it calls forth novel arrangements—novel technologies and organizational forms. The new technology or new arrangements in turn may cause new problems … . The whole moves forward in a sequence of problem and solution. My goal in this book is to shed light on the ways new organizations arise to meet the requirements and respond to the rewards implicit in new technologies. In this introductory chapter, I first motivate the investigation by describing three organizational “surprises,” which I believe can be attributed to new technologies. I will argue that the surprises were each organizational adaptations to the possibilities inherent in new computer and communication technologies arising between 1975 and today (2022). This book seeks to build a detailed and general theory that accounts for the surprises. It also seeks to explain how technology shaped organizations before the advent of the digital era.
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This essay explores how my recent work on infrastructure and commons applies to environmental resources. Part I briefly describes the core idea, which is developed extensively elsewhere. Part II suggests how it might apply to the natural environment, touching on a number of interesting implications in need of further exploration. Specifically, Part II (a) frames the difficult environmental valuation and management problems; (b) applies the infrastructure criteria and delineates environmental infrastructure; (c) offers a few insights regarding environmental management and regulation; and (d) considers how infrastructure theory relates to the literatures on ecosystem services and multiple use management.
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In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, the Supreme Court will decide the future of Betamax - not the technology, which is already dead, but the Betamax decision issued by the Supreme Court in 1984. As frequently occurs in copyright law, it is a new, disruptive technology - this time, peer-to-peer (p2p) technology - that tests the boundaries and soundness of existing copyright doctrine. This essay makes two basic points. First, the Sony rule, which precludes secondary liability in situations where a technology is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, properly limits the scope of copyrights and prevents them from impeding access to and development of infrastructural technologies, such as p2p systems. Second, commercial significance is an inappropriate metric for gauging the substantiality of noninfringing uses; commercially insignificant but socially valuable noninfringing uses should be recognized as substantial. For the most part, the parties and amici have presented the Supreme Court with the arguments it ought to evaluate. I do not aim to recount or rehash those arguments in this essay. Instead, I aim to articulate an economic argument for retaining the Sony rule that has not been made fully.
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What is the best way to manage resources that provide both public and private benefits? For years, academics have debated this question with respect to transportation systems, communication networks, environment resources, scientific research, and a variety of other "infrastructural" resources. Many press for private control of these resources, arguing that the market efficiently distributes the costs and benefits associated with these resources. Others argue that these resources should be managed in an openly accessible manner. This camp maintains that private control often is overly restrictive and unfairly allocates the benefits of these resources to a few private parties. In this ambitious Article, Professor Brett Frischmann identifies the unifying characteristics of these infrastructure resources and, from this analysis, develops a theory of infrastructure that promises to redefine the current open access versus private control debate. Largely basing his theory on demand-side economics, he brings new and important considerations to the current debate. Frischmann's infrastructure theory demonstrates how open access to infrastructure resources generates significant value for consumers and society. His theory suggests that the benefits of open access and the corresponding costs of restricted access are significantly greater than reflected in current debates. Frischmann supports his theory by example, demonstrating how private control of various infrastructure resources-lakes, basic scientific research, and the Internet-may prevent society from realizing the full value of these resources. This exciting new theory has the potential to reframe the debate within intellectual property, cyberlaw, telecommunications regulation, and many other legal areas.
In 1984, by the margin of a single vote, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that the home-taping of a copyrighted television broadcast for purposes of time-shifting constituted a fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976. Since that time, economic and legal commentators have generally justified the decision in terms of market failure. If time-shifting were not a fair use, the reasoning goes, then a license would be legally required; yet, the transaction costs associated with negotiating individual time-shifting licenses would prove prohibitive. As a result, the market for time-shifting licenses would likely fail, justifying the Court's finding of fair use. There is just one problem, however: the majority opinion in Sony neither expressly embraced a market failure rationale, nor referred to the potential for prohibitively high transaction costs as a justification for the Court's fair use outcome. Rather, the Court embraced a balancing approach to fair use issues. Eschewing any undue reliance on the four statutory factors found in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the Court balanced directly what the public had to gain and what it had to lose from allowing unauthorized time-shifting to continue. Concluding on the evidence presented that the public had more to gain than it had to lose, the Court held that unauthorized time-shifting constituted a fair and hence non-infringing use. Unfortunately, the market failure reinterpretation has effectively concealed Sony's true rationale and sharply limited its potential reach. Properly understood as a balancing of the competing public interests at stake, Sony becomes both: (i) more consistent with present economic understanding of the conditions necessary for optimal private market production of a public good; and (ii) generally applicable to a wide range of fair use issues.
Ecosystem management, the new guiding concept for federal land management, requires collaboration and information sharing across ownership boundaries, facilitation of changes in social values, and adaptation to new scientific and social information. Particularly in the western states, the federal land management agencies have been involved to varying degrees in innovative collaborative processes with the goal of implementing ecosystem management. However, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which places numerous procedural requirements on certain federal interactions with non-federal parties, has been cited as an obstacle to federal participation in these efforts. This Comment presents an analytic framework for determining when FACA applies and recommends strategies for overcoming this perceived obstacle to ecosystem management.
Game theory studies encounters (or games) between two or more players in which each has a clearly defined choice of strategies and in which there are well-established payoffs from the potential outcomes. In this Article, Professor Crump examines several different types of games and addresses whether any of them, or game theory in general, has real-world applications in the legislative realm. He concludes that while game theory does not offer many firm answers about legislation, the strategies examined by the discipline help to illuminate many of the problems raised by legislation that affects equality.