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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
THE OBLIGATION OF LAWYERS TO HEAL CIVIC CULTURE:
CONFRONTING THE ORDEAL OF INCIVILITY
1
IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW
Russell G. Pearce
*
and Eli Wald
**
After the January 2011 shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords
and eighteen bystanders,
2
Pima County Sherriff Clarence Dupnik provoked
a national debate on civility in public discourse with his comments that
―[w]hen you look at unbalanced people, how they respond to the vitriol that
comes out of certain mouths about tearing down the government. The anger,
the hatred, the bigotry that goes on in this country is getting to be outra-
geous.‖
3
While a consensus soon emerged that the deranged shooter was proba-
bly not responding to harsh political rhetoric,
4
Sherriff Dupnik‘s words
struck a chord. His comments reflected a sense that contemporary Ameri-
can public discourse is uncivil, angry, and counterproductive, and that it
may affect how all of us act and engage with each other both in the public
domain and in the private sphere. The Sherriff‘s comments led to calls for
greater civility in public discourse
5
as well as debates regarding who was
more at fault for the lack of civility
6
and whether uncivil language was a
problem at all.
7
The context for this debate is the broader question of the importance of
civility to public culture in a liberal democracy. Civility extends beyond
individualized politeness and courtesy to encompass a norm of mutual re-
spect that makes possible the long-term health of civil society.
8
Understand-
ing civility in these terms, many commentators have described a rise in inci-
vility in the past few decades—a rise that is worrisome even in the historical
context of cycles of increasing and decreasing civility.
9
The commentators
describe a rise in harsh rhetoric and polarization, and a decrease in civic
participation.
10
In this article, we argue that the current rise in incivility draws its
strength from the increasing influence of perspectives grounded in an auto-
nomous, as opposed to relational, view of personal and political self-interest.
Where relational perspectives lead civic actors to understand their own well-
being as connected to those of neighbors, communities, and government,
autonomous perspectives focus on maximizing the ambitions of individuals
and groups even at the expense of civility. Autonomous perspectives only
find obligations to community and government compelling when they fur-
ther political self-interest.
11
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Following the 1960s, autonomous self-interest became dominant
among the liberal and libertarian elite.
12
It then began to shape the habits of
mind and conduct of ordinary Americans and to extend its influence even to
social conservatives, and some political liberals, who embrace a relational
perspective with regard to their own communities of interest, but adopt au-
tonomous self-interest as their approach to political debate and civic cul-
ture.
13
Accordingly, adherents of the increasingly polar perspectives today
do not seek to employ relational self-interest to heal our civic malaise.
Not surprisingly, the legal profession has faced a similar conundrum.
Since the 1980s, the legal profession has faced a ―crisis of professionalism‖
that includes reports of decreased civility and commitment to the public
good.
14
As is the case with incivility in American society, some commenta-
tors argue that lawyers‘ increased incivility is a recent phenomenon,
15
while
others argue that the legal profession seems to be in a state of perpetual cri-
sis,
16
and that the current level of incivility is nothing more than one manife-
station of this particular cycle of crisis.
17
We argue that the current incivility
crisis—whether unique or cyclical—tracks the shift in the legal profession
from a ―professional‖ conception of the lawyer‘s role grounded in relational
self-interest, which recognizes an obligation to the public good, to a neutral
partisan—or hired gun—conception grounded in autonomous self-interest
and rejecting a particular obligation to the public good. Given lawyers‘
commitment to autonomous self-interest, the effort of bar leaders to restore
civility and commitment to the public good has been largely unsuccessful.
18
Our main contention is that as neutral partisans, lawyers have contri-
buted to the civic malaise, in and outside of the legal profession. No matter
how lawyers view their role, they do serve as civics teachers who explain
the appropriate responsibilities of citizenship both in their everyday practice
and in their civic leadership.
19
Available evidence suggests that many, if not
most, lawyers today practice and teach the autonomous self-interest ap-
proach of the Holmesian bad man—the individual‘s obligations to the spirit
of the law and the community are only what they can get away with within
the bounds of the law. In this way, lawyers as civics teachers have pro-
moted the commitment to autonomous self-interest not only in the private
dealings of clients but in culturally manufacturing autonomous self-interest
as the dominant paradigm of public discourse and in the resulting erosion of
relational self-interest as a countervailing influence. We assert that lawyers
should instead draw upon the relational tradition found in professionalism
and the lawyer‘s historic role to encourage public dialogue, help repair our
civic culture, and suggest to clients relational means of pursuing their inter-
ests.
Our proposal for lawyers as civics teachers seeks to change the cultural
norms of lawyers and of civil society. It is not about mandatory professio-
nalism rules,
20
increased enforcement of existing ethics rules, or hate speech
codes.
21
Neither is it about stifling dissent, in and outside of the legal pro-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
fession.
22
Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr. is our prime example of a public
actor who challenged the powerful while treating with respect those whose
racism he found hateful.
23
Following his example, relational self-interest
demands an ethic of mutual benefit and mutual respect, concepts that require
respect for the human dignity of the powerless as well as the powerful.
Last, relational self-interest rejects the extremes of either communitarianism
or individualism. Grounded in human dignity and relationships, it values
both the individual and the community.
Why would our appeal to relational self-interest work where the Bar‘s
efforts to foster greater civility have failed? Relational self-interest employs
language that is familiar to and accepted by modern lawyers, making it more
likely that practicing attorneys would find it relevant to their work and per-
suasive. Yet the case for relational self-interest is far from being merely
instrumental. Many lawyers view themselves relationally. They would
appreciate a vocabulary of role that permits them to explain to themselves
and others why they should value relational self-interest—and civility—in
their everyday practice and in their civil leadership. Other lawyers, who
understand their role and view themselves and their clients autonomously,
report relatively high instances of substance abuse, professional unhappi-
ness, and dissatisfaction.
24
We argue that the dominance of autonomous
self-interest helps explain professional discontent and that a move toward a
more relational self-interest perspective would be desirable for both lawyers
and their clients. Finally, if lawyers accept the invitation to practice and
pursue relational self-interest as a counterforce to autonomous self-interest,
they would be able to help heal our civic malaise and thus ―do great work
for this country.‖
25
I. THE ORDEAL OF INCIVILITY
A. Civility Defined
As Anthony Kronman has explained, the root meaning of civility is not
etiquette, but rather ―the art of civil government.‖
26
Justice Warren Burger
has added that civility is ―‗the very glue that keeps an organized society
from flying into pieces.‘‖
27
In this part, we develop the connection between
the inability to conduct civil dialogue regarding cultural and political differ-
ences with harms to civil society and the inability to repair it. As Justice
Burger explained:
Without civility no private discussion, no public debate, no legislative
process, no political campaign, no trial of any case, can serve its purpose or
achieve its objective. When men shout and shriek or call names, we witness
the end of rational thought process if not the beginning of blows and com-
bat. I hardly dare take the risk of adding that this may also be relevant to the
news media.
28
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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
We suggest that the conception of civility as the foundation of civil so-
ciety relies on a relational conception of the self and self-interest. In civil
society, each person and organization exists within a web of relation-
ships. As we have written elsewhere, ―‗relational self-interest‘ [represents]
the view that all actors are inter-connected, whether individuals or [groups] .
. . [and] cannot maximize [their] own good in isolation. Rather, maximizing
the good of the individual or [group] requires consideration of the good of
the neighbor, the [constituent, the community] and of the public.‖
29
While
relational self-interest is consistent with diverse philosophical perspec-
tives,
30
relational self-interest is inconsistent with extreme commitments to
either individualism or communitarianism. As a matter of human dignity,
relational self-interest requires not only basic courtesy but also a commit-
ment to foster conditions and protect arenas of discourse that allow for mea-
ningful substantive discussions. Relational self-interest requires respect for
each person and an obligation to allow all to participate in the public dis-
course especially to voice disagreement, discontent, and dissent. At the
same time, it recognizes that each person has the duties to respect, coope-
rate, trust, and tolerate their neighbors and community. These duties main-
tain the public sphere as a place of meaningful engagement, even when one
wholeheartedly disagrees with the merits and content of particular state-
ments and actions.
Civility in word and deed is a basic component of relational self-
interest for individuals and organizations. In the context of civility, rela-
tional self-interest prescribes the norms of mutual benefit and mutual respect
and avoids the dangers of civility serving only as etiquette
31
or, even more
worrying, as a way to enforce deference to the powerful.
32
Mutual benefit
describes how people and organizations should pursue their relational self-
interest. All actors participate in civil society with the understanding that
―fulfilling‖ their own interests requires consideration of ―participating in a
combination of actions directed at the benefit‖ of all those whom the actions
will impact.
33
Mutual benefit rejects the notion that politics is a zero-sum
game.
34
It encourages individuals and groups to select strategies and goals
that seek to maximize dialogue, cooperation, trust, and reconciliation in or-
der to at best strengthen and at worst minimize harm to neighbors and com-
munities. But even where the potential for dialogue and cooperation ap-
pears low, especially in instances where substantive agreement and coopera-
tion appear unlikely, civility demands mutual respect for the human dignity
of those whose opinions or actions we find deplorable. Martin Luther King,
Jr. expressed this best. He counseled his followers to hate racism, not rac-
ists, and to indicate that they were always open to reconciliation.
35
Mutual benefit and mutual respect move far beyond etiquette and defe-
rence. Respectful language is a component of both mutual benefit and mu-
tual respect, but it is only the beginning of dialogue, cooperation, trust, and
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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
reconciliation. As former Republican Congressman Jim Leach recently
observed, ―Civility is not simply or principally about manners. . . . What
civility requires is a willingness to consider respectfully the views of others,
with an understanding that we are all connected and rely on one another.‖
36
Jim Taylor takes a similar approach regarding the politicosphere and blo-
gosphere:
I draw the line between civil and uncivil political discourse when
someone moves from a focus on substance to a focus on the per-
son. I also draw the line when passion for an issue turns into anger
and insult directed at the person (think of all the name calling that
goes on in the politicosphere). The current politicosphere has lost
respect, reason, and tolerance.
37
Similarly, mutual benefit and mutual respect reject the standard of ci-
vility as deference to the powerful and suppression of the weak. Indeed,
they require that those with more power consider the benefit to and respect
those with less power.
38
Human dignity places powerful and powerless on
the same level with regard to benefit and respect. As an exemplar of civility
grounded in relational self-interest, Martin Luther King, Jr. demonstrates
how civility encompasses strong challenges to the status quo.
The understanding of civility as relational and as requiring mutual ben-
efit and mutual respect accords with the views of numerous commentators
who approach the topic from a variety of philosophical perspectives. They
are found in the procedural perspectives of Jurgen Habermas
39
and John
Rawls,
40
which implore citizens to abide by and promote certain ethics of
deliberation that aim at making the political realm a place of mutual defe-
rence to competing moral outlooks. They are found in the natural law ap-
proaches of John Finnis
41
and Alasdair MacIntyre,
42
who approach the topic
from the perspective of virtue ethics. Robert Pippin, from a Kantian pers-
pective,
43
explains civility as having distinct ethical status with the practice
of ―being civil‖ consisting of more than merely being polite and different
than moral righteousness in general.
44
Rather, Pippin contends that ―civility
in general involves a kind of enactment of mutuality … [or] a way of ac-
knowledging through social forms an open recognition that we are not whol-
ly independent, a way of avoiding the a dishonest pretense of solitary inde-
pendence.‖
45
In this sense, civility can be understood as a sort of habit of
outwardly acknowledging that the self is not an isolated entity, but an inter-
dependent member of a community. In law, Robert Araujo argues from a
relational perspective that ―[c]ivility revolves around the acceptance and
display of mutual respect.‖
46
Even Amy Mashburn, who worries about the
abuse of civility norms and their use to foster deference to the powerful and
stifle dissent, acknowledges that ―[c]ultural and political theorists have put
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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
forward a variety of definitions of civility, but most echo these notions of
reciprocity and mutual respect.‖
47
Last, our analysis of civility in this article is cultural and aspirational.
We do not suggest that legislation enforces civility on lawyers and their
clients, and we do not reach the question of whether and the extent to which
hate speech legislation would be appropriate to mitigate incivility by law-
yers.
48
Indeed, our analysis of the connection between the conception of the
self and the level of civility in civic society underscores the importance of
culture to the construction of law and legal norms. We argue that the do-
minance of autonomous self-interest helps explain increased polarization
and incivility among lawyers and clients. By accepting and incorporating
relational perspectives into their practice and in that sense modeling and
teaching civility to their clients, lawyers can help build a robust and vibrant
civic society that adheres to norms of mutual respect, cooperation, trust, and
tolerance with a commitment to meaningful substantive discourse in the
public sphere, especially when we find ourselves agreeing to disagree.
B. Incivility in Civic Culture
Uncivil conduct often occurs in two related, and sometimes, overlap-
ping arenas—―culture wars‖ and ―political wars.‖ James Davison Hunter
popularized the term ―culture wars‖ and described the opposing perspectives
in the culture wars as orthodox and progressive.
49
These camps were di-
vided into polar perspectives on social issues, such as abortion and gay
rights.
50
The perceived ―incompatible nature of the polarizing cultural im-
pulses‖ led to negative strategies of ―public ridicule, derision, and insult.‖
51
As Hunter explained, ―in public discourse, ‗dialogue‘ has largely been re-
placed by name calling, denunciation, and even outright intolerance.‖
52
This
negative strategy is ―systematic‖
53
with each side describing the other as
evil, un-American, totalitarian, intolerant, and bigoted.
54
Among the many examples Hunter provides is Pat Robertson‘s asser-
tion ―that ‗the minute you turn the [Constitution of the United States] into
the hands of non-Christian people and atheistic people, they can use it to
destroy the very foundation of our society and that‘s what‘s been happen-
ing.‘‖
55
People for the American Way‘s Anthony Podesta said of Robert-
son, ―Beneath the superficial impression of a friendly television personality
who loves America, lurks the reality of a fanatic who hates our nation‘s
courts, its public schools, its system of social insurance and even much of its
Constitution.‖
56
In political discourse as well, ―incivility reigns‖
57
with adversaries rely-
ing on dehumanization, allegations of lack of patriotism, attacks on legiti-
macy, and description of opponents serving ―special‖ as opposed to the pub-
lic interest. Opponents of President Obama call him un-American, ―a so-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
cialist who wants to impose tyranny,‖ a Nazi, an ―impostor,‖ a ―traitor,‖
58
challenge his American citizenship, and mistakenly argue that he is a Mus-
lim; or assert that he grew up in Kenya and therefore does not appreciate
American values.
59
Similarly, foes of President Bush described him as stu-
pid, a Nazi, and usurper of the Presidency.
60
Adversaries of Bill Clinton
used similarly harsh rhetoric, such as Newt Gingrich‘s characterization of
the Clinton ―administration [as] the ‗enemy of normal Americans.‘‖
61
The
discourse with regard to the Presidency is emblematic of the public dis-
course generally,
62
with members of Congress and local and state candidates
employing similar rhetoric.
63
As Judith Rodin and Stephen Steinberg have
observed, ―[o]ur political leaders have certainly become trapped in a see-
mingly endless cycle of polarized and unproductive behavior, ever more
constrained in their ability and willingness to affect the caliber of public
discourse.‖
64
This uncivil political discourse has resulted in deep suspicions of polit-
ical figures. Rodin and Steinberg quote Bill Bradley‘s observation that,
[c]itizens at a very gut level believe that politicians are controlled by
special interests who give them money, by parties which crush their in-
dependence, by ambition for higher office that makes them hedge their
positions rather than call it like they really see it, and by pollsters who
convince them that only the focus group phrase can guarantee them vic-
tory.
65
Uncivil speech pervades rhetoric of ordinary Americans as well.
66
Campus radio shows pose questions to listeners asking, ―How will you
crush the Republicans in every way this semester?‖
67
Tea Party members
have declared, ―I'm cleaning my guns and getting ready for the big show.
And I'm serious about that, and I bet you are, too,‖
68
or protested ―the raping
of America‖ by the Obama administration.
69
Newscasts, on both the left and
the right,
70
enjoy high (polarized) ratings by abandoning objective reporting
of the news and replacing it with programs fraught with name-calling and
ridicule of the ―other side.‖
71
Rodin and Steinberg have further noted that
―the most significant consequence‖ of this polarization ―is the apparent im-
pact on citizens‘ engagement with, and even interest in, the politics of their
own government.‖
72
This harsh rhetoric creates a jaundiced perception of
politics and government, and may help explain, in turn, declining rates of
civic engagement and participation in active citizenry. For example, in
Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam documented declining participation in civic
institutions, from bowling leagues to parent-teacher associations.
73
Such cultural and political incivility which spills over, shapes and in-
forms our private interactions and sensibilities threatens our civic culture.
Incivility is meant to silence and stifle disagreement, and it attempts to allow
its proponents to triumph in the public sphere not by engaging with oppos-
ing points of view and persuading dissenters of the strength of one‘s subs-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
tantive arguments but rather by delegitimizing dissent and dehumanizing
opponents. Incivility undermines the space for the very pluralism of pers-
pectives and diversity of opinions that has been one of the great strengths of
America.
74
C. Civility and Incivility Clarified
To the examples above, Ken Gallant, in his reply to this article, adds
two others: ―U.S. Supreme Court Justice James C. McReynolds‘s refus[al]
to sit next to Justice Louis D. Brandeis because Brandeis was a Jew,‖
75
and
the Westboro Baptist Church‘s demonstrations at funerals and other sites
with placards stating that ―God Hates Fags.‖
76
These examples help illu-
strate the boundaries of civility as mutual benefit and mutual respect. In
particular, they demonstrate that civility includes both procedural and subs-
tantive elements, does not require agreement, and as an aspiration is very
different than regulation of uncivil speech.
First, mutual benefit and mutual respect have both procedural and subs-
tantive elements. With regard to procedure, these egregious examples do
not seek to promote cooperation, trust, and reconciliation. Robertson, Po-
desta, and the Westboro Baptists employ impolite and intemperate language
that prevents dialogue. McReynolds prevented dialogue by refusing to sit
next to Brandeis. With regard to substance, they dehumanize those with
whom they disagree, failing to meet the floor of respect for human dignity.
Robertson asserts that non-Christians and atheists are destroying the consti-
tution, Podesta describes Robertson as a fanatic, McReynolds refuses to sit
next to a Jew, and the Westboro Baptists declare that ―God Hates Fags.‖
Second, these examples of incivility also raise the question of whether
civility interferes with disagreement and either requires, or exists only with-
in, views held in common. As we noted above, the example of Martin Luth-
er King‘s powerful and zealous challenge to the established order demon-
strates that passionate disagreement is consistent with civility. Indeed, as
commentators note, liberal democracies need civility to promote the peace-
ful resolution of disputes.
77
By definition, disputes and disagreements occur
where perspectives on a particular issue are not in agreement. But, given
that today most of us agree with Martin Luther King‘s perspective on racial
equality, his example may be too easy. Civility would, of course, permit
Robertson to criticize particular constitutional positions and Podesta to chal-
lenge Robertson‘s views, while respecting the human dignity of non-
Christians, atheists, and conservative Christians. The Westboro Baptist
Church‘s placard and McReynolds‘s conduct are more problematic. By
challenging the right of lesbians and gays, or Jews, to participate in our so-
ciety as full, equal citizens, they fail the criteria of respect for basic human
dignity. They could challenge the extension of anti-discrimination laws to
lesbians and gays, or Jews, so long as they treated individuals who were
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
lesbian and gay, or Jewish, with respect. Admittedly, while substantive ci-
vility creates a boundary condition of basic respect for human dignity of
those with whom we disagree, it does not resolve all the potential issues
regarding the rights and responsibilities deriving from human dignity.
Third, the examples help illustrate the bounds between civility and le-
gal regulation. Respect for human dignity allows for robust freedom of ex-
pression,
78
even of ideas that transgress the boundaries of civility. But the
fact that views contravene respect for human dignity does not make them
right or civil. As explained above, the more civility in a civic culture the
better it will be able to manage disagreement and promote the public good.
Moreover, when civility diminishes beyond a certain threshold, a society
loses ―the very glue that keeps an organized society from flying into piec-
es.‖
79
We argue for civility as encompassing commitments to courtesy and
cooperation, maintaining a vibrant public space in which meaningful subs-
tantive disagreements can take place, and respecting human dignity when
such substantive disagreements do take place. These are the aspects of civil-
ity that an unreflective cultural adherence to autonomous self-interest un-
dermines.
II. CIVILITY AND INCIVILITY IN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
American society has previously experienced cycles of civility and in-
civility. We identify the cultural shift from relational to autonomous self-
interest as a key factor in catalyzing contemporary incivility and removing a
tool for reviving civility.
Incivility is not a new phenomenon. While a commentator noted that
―civility appears to have been buried some time ago in the blogosphere,‖
80
and a post on Facebook declared that ―Our Democracy [has] died . . . , fu-
neral today on the White House lawn,‖
81
in previous periods of American
history, there has been highly uncivil public discourse and a great degree of
disenchantment with government and civic culture.
82
American history features ample moments of extreme public incivility
and even outright violence. Although contemporary politicians certainly use
harsh rhetoric, we have experienced much worse. In 1838, Representative
William Graves, a Whig from Kentucky, challenged and killed Representa-
tive Jonathan Cilley, a Maine Democrat, in a duel after Cilley refused to
accept a letter from Graves, not realizing that such a refusal constituted an
offense likely to result in a duel.
83
In 1851, Representative Edward Stanly
challenged Representative Samuel Inge to a duel precipitated by a Congres-
sional debate on the internal improvements bill. Both suffered injuries from
the duel and later recovered.
84
These were by no means unusual antics for
politicians between the Revolution and the Civil War.
85
Cultural incivility was also quite common at times, for example, in dis-
putes over declarations of war. Consider the fate of the Federal Republican,
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
a Baltimore-based Federalist newspaper started by Alexander Hanson in
1808. On June 20, 1812, two days after a Republican-controlled U.S. gov-
ernment declared war on Britain, Hanson called the war ―unnecessary‖ and
warned against attempts to silence its critics by ―terror.‖
86
The very next
day a mob of war supporters demolished the paper‘s headquarters.
87
Hanson
regrouped and on July 27, 1812, the Federal Republican reappeared, blast-
ing local Republicans as ―remorseless rabble.‖
88
The critique caused ―[t]he lid [to] bl[o]w off Baltimore:‖ a mob sur-
rounded the new headquarters and charged the front door. The first Repub-
lican to break in was shot dead. A cavalry troop rescued the besieged Fede-
ralists and marched them to the local jail for their own protection, only to
have the jailhouse overran by an angry mob later that evening. One Federal-
ist died; others were tortured. Hanson escaped to Georgetown and pub-
lished the Federal Republican there on August 3, 1812. When copies ar-
rived in Baltimore, a mob threatened to destroy the post office if the copies
were distributed. President James Madison refused to dispatch federal
troops to Baltimore, and the post office was spared only after Mayor Edward
Johnson called out the militia. The first dead of the War of 1812 were
Americans killed by Americans, victims of incivility and intolerance, and of
the refusal of some to allow public discourse and criticism of governmental
policies.
89
Half a century later, the failure of American civil society to end
the scourge of slavery led to a Civil War that tragically demonstrated the
consequences of the collapse of civility, public discourse, and the political
apparatus.
The complex causes of political and cultural incivility vary in different
eras, and so do remedies and cures for social malaise. For purposes of this
article, we do not offer a full explanation of these causes and cures. Rather,
we wish to acknowledge that incivility has long been with us as we highlight
the shift from a dominant culture of relational self-interest to one of auto-
nomous self-interest as a significant source of contemporary incivility.
Prior to the 1960s, a dominant understanding of the public sphere, in
politics as well as in law and business, relied on a perspective of the self and
self-interest as relational. Relational self-interest recognizes that the public
good sometimes exists independent of and in addition to collective self-
interests and that government institutions as well as private actors have the
capacity to promote the public good in ways other than merely clearing the
way for the unconstrained exercise of naked autonomous self-interest. Rela-
tional self-interest calls upon members of a civic society to seek common
ground when possible, and where people disagree, consideration of their
relationships requires that they treat each other with respect. Cooperation,
reconciliation, and dialogue are valuable objectives within the framework of
relational self-interest.
The contrasting perspective, which has become more dominant in
American culture, politics, law, and business is the perspective of autonom-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
ous self-interest.
90
According to this perspective, people and organizations
are autonomous in civil society—they are ―atomistic actors [that] seek to
maximize their own atomistic good.‖
91
Everyone and every organization is
self-interested, basing their private and public conduct on the perspective of
the Holmesian bad man—do whatever you can get away with to advance
your goals
92
—and believe that their opponents do the same. Mutual benefit
and mutual respect play no role in autonomous self-interest.
Accordingly, those who believe in autonomous self-interest reject the
idea that those with whom they disagree care about the public good.
93
People in the left, right, and center who follow this view describe their op-
ponents as ―special interest‖ groups, defining a ―special interest‖ as a pers-
pective contrary to their own.
94
Not surprisingly, when their group or party
controls the government, they are especially supportive of the government.
95
When their opponents control the government, the government itself
represents special interests and commands less respect, indeed to some be-
coming the enemy.
96
The perspective of autonomous self-interest is consistent with the ―ze-
ro-sum‖ game mentality.
97
As William Galston describes it, ―if they win,
we lose.‖
98
From the perspective of autonomous self-interest, uncivil rhetor-
ic is both descriptively and normatively acceptable.
99
It reflects how people
do behave and how they should behave in the public sphere.
100
Cooperation,
dialogue, and reconciliation only have any value as a means to an end.
Until the 1960s, autonomous self-interest was a minority perspective in
the public sphere. No matter the level of civic discord in America, a rela-
tional perspective and a belief in the potential for a shared public good of-
fered a hope for eventual reconciliation and restoration of civility.
101
Of
course, relational perspectives and attitudes do not guarantee civil and
peaceful outcomes, as evidenced by the collapse of American society into
the Civil War, nor do they provide for a healthy and equal civil society, as
demonstrated by the persistence of slavery in America before the Civil War
and racial inequality and discrimination subsequently. Relational perspec-
tives dominated the American public and private spheres before the 1960s,
but it was relational self-interest grounded in a society where hierarchies
based on race, gender, and religion promoted discrimination and inequality.
The shift away from relational self-interest as the dominant perspective
was gradual. Although the turn toward the dominance of autonomous self-
interest began after the Civil War,
102
it did not become dominant until after
the 1960s.
103
In part, the growing heterogeneity of American society, and
the increasing openness to that heterogeneity, destabilized the old (discrimi-
natory and exclusionary) foundations of the old relational self-interest value
system grounded in homogenous communities, as well as race, gender, and
religious hierarchies. Helping fuel the challenge to these hierarchies was the
construction of the self as autonomous – as independent from groups and
communities.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Indeed, during the 1960s, elite liberals and libertarians challenged the
notion that people had motivations other than autonomous self-interest.
Anthony Kronman‘s analysis of challenges to the distinction between public
good and private interest provides a framework for describing this shift.
104
First, commentators asserted that ―appeals to the public interest are always
and only disguised efforts to advance the private good of the person making
the appeal.‖
105
For example, left intellectuals often argued that conceptions
of the public good only mask the fact that people, particularly those with
privilege, seek to maximize their power while libertarian intellectuals on the
right claimed that people do—and should—maximize their financial self-
interest and not the public good.
106
Second was the view ―that every politi-
cal judgment, like every aesthetic and (in the view of many) every moral
judgment too, is always offered from a specific point of view or, as we are
now accustomed to saying, from a particular perspective.‖
107
Accordingly,
Kronman writes, ―[w]e have grown accustomed to the idea that every judg-
ment about the public good is rendered from a vantage point which the per-
son making the judgment occupies but others—whose social class, tastes,
personal history and form of life are different—do not.‖
108
From this pers-
pective, the conception of a common public good beyond private goals, even
goals that extend beyond private self-interest, is illusory.
These liberal and libertarian perspectives in turn shaped the dominant
elite culture toward the public sphere. If the public interest is nothing more
than an aggregate of private interests, then from the libertarian perspective
one best serves and contributes to society by aggressively pursuing one‘s
autonomous self-interest.
109
From the left perspective as well, the public
good was a sham and therefore the pursuit of power was the only subject
matter of the public sphere.
110
Under these conceptions, private actors owe
nothing to the public good. At most, their duties in the public sphere con-
sist of playing by the legal rules, and paying taxes, both of which, they are
welcome to challenge and manipulate in their favor. People, of course, pur-
sue their private interests and to some their private interest included charity,
but as Kronman notes that private interest is generally not considered to
consist of the public good.
111
This odd marriage of left and right among the elite has led to a gradual
yet systematic decline in relational self-interest and a rise in autonomous
self-interest among the general public, influencing and being affected by the
following factors. First, the decline of institutions preaching and fostering
relational approaches, such as the family, organized religion, and local
communities.
112
Second, as the culture of autonomous self-interest has become more
pervasive, American society has become more open to diversity.
113
In part,
the focus on autonomous self independent of community, race, gender, and
religion helped break down the hierarchies that dominated American culture
prior to the 1960s. Nonetheless, the absence of a relational culture follow-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
ing the 1960s has rendered it more challenging for a diverse society to de-
velop agreement on conceptions of the public good. This failure reinforces
the appeal of autonomous self-interest exactly because it does not require
shared understandings and instead only expects individuals to pursue their
interests aggressively without regard to the public good. It further fails to
provide a framework for understanding and managing societal diversity in a
way that promotes the good of all and that challenges racial and gender bar-
riers that continue to exist.
114
Finally, a third development magnified the influence of autonomous
self-interest. The role of litigation in promoting progress in civil rights and
civil liberties led to a growing legalization of public discourse. As Ameri-
cans began to view the courts as a venue for addressing and resolving policy
differences, they put more trust in judges and lawyers to resolve core disa-
greements.
115
If the legal profession and legal system had retained a culture
of relational self-interest, this development would not have had the same
effect. But given that, as discussed below,
116
the legal profession had em-
braced the culture of autonomous self-interest, the legalization of fundamen-
tal disputes meant placing them in the context of autonomous self-interest.
Both the form and the substance of modern American law promoted
autonomous self-interest. Substantively, especially since the 1960s, Ameri-
ca has rested largely upon the framework of individual rights and autonomy.
In terms of form, after the 1960s, the legal system has embraced an adver-
sarial model of litigation grounded in autonomous self-interest (as opposed
to an earlier relational notion that provided the foundation for that system).
The post-1960s adversarial model shaped and framed our public discourse.
The model legitimized a combative and adversarial approach as a primary
way of resolving public disputes. Accordingly, the legalization of discourse
has resulted from and further reinforced the culture of autonomous self-
interest.
117
In describing the contribution of autonomous self-interest to a culture
of incivility, we conclude this part with a few caveats. First, we do not in-
tend to suggest that pre-1960s America was a golden era of civic dis-
course.
118
America was racially divided, in parts segregated and in others
unequal, featuring overt and systematic discrimination. In addition, main-
stream public and political spheres often dominated by white Protestant
men, generally discriminated against women, as well as religious, ethnic,
and sexual minorities.
119
To the extent relational self-interest was common,
it was in part a function of relationships resting on exclusion and homogene-
ity. The influence of autonomous self-interest deserves credit for its role in
helping transform this system. At the same time, a reconceptualization of
relational self-interest also contributed through the perspective of Martin
Luther King, Jr., even though it did not gain the devotion of the libertarian
and liberal elite. The pervasive and systematic discrimination that existed
before the 1960s was not therefore a failure of relational self-interest. In-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
deed, not only does relational self-interest have no necessary or inherent
connection to discrimination, today it provides a basis for facilitating a more
open and equal society.
Second, as illustrated by the history described at the beginning of this
part,
120
relational self-interest is by no means a full cure to incivility. It
plays an important, but not outcome determining, role in fostering civility.
Autonomous self-interest, on the other hand, necessarily undermines civility
although additional causes may contribute as well.
In sum, incivility is certainly not a new phenomenon; autonomous self-
interest is not an all-consuming evil solely responsible for fueling incivility;
and relational self-interest is not a magical solution to civic tension and un-
rest. Nonetheless, relational self-interest has the potential to play a signifi-
cant and positive role in fostering civility while autonomous self-interest
generally breeds incivility. Thus, the decline of the former and rise of the
latter helps explain the current state and manifestations of incivility.
These conceptions—and the full embrace of autonomous self-
interest—are so powerful that even people who embrace relational self-
interest to some degree adopt autonomous self-interest as the standard for
conduct in the public sphere. For example, social conservatives have a rela-
tional understanding of their own religious and political institutions as well
as a belief in the public good and a consequent relational duty of govern-
ment with regard to social issues.
121
Some political centrists advocate mod-
erate perspectives from a relational view of a balanced society
122
and politi-
cal liberals often embrace a relational duty of government to its citizens with
regard to economic regulation, social welfare, and civil rights.
123
Despite
understanding their own causes and communities at least in part from a rela-
tional perspective, these political actors tend to adopt the perspective of au-
tonomous self-interest in the public sphere. They dehumanize their adversa-
ries through public ridicule, derision, and insult and describe them as cap-
tives of special interests, while treating disagreement as a zero-sum game.
124
At the same time, many leaders and commentators have sought to re-
store civility to the public sphere. Presidential candidates campaign as ―un-
iters, not dividers,‖
125
but when elected, they fail to make progress in repair-
ing our civic culture. Other political commentators and leaders have sought
to restore civil rhetoric as well as to counter political polarization.
126
They
too have not had great success.
127
To the extent that autonomous self-interest dominates American culture
and informs the conduct of actors in both the public and private spheres
(politicians, lawyers, and clients included), the failure of measures meant to
restore civility is not surprising. As we have seen, autonomous self-interest
is antagonistic to civility, and today, autonomous self-interest that promotes
incivility is viewed as legitimate. Restoring civility must entail, therefore, a
retreat from our cultural commitment to autonomous self-interest. We next
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
turn to the role lawyers and the legal profession have played in elevating
autonomous self-interest to its current position of dominance.
III. LAWYERS AND INCIVILITY
Not surprisingly, lawyers have themselves confronted a crisis of civili-
ty that tracks the crisis facing society generally. The legal profession has
experienced a decline of civility in terms of commitment to the public good,
as well as in the treatment of colleagues and adversaries with respect.
128
The perspective of autonomous self-interest has come to dominate the un-
derstanding of the lawyer‘s role just as it has come to dominate civil society.
A. The Rise of Autonomous Self-Interest and Decline of Relational Self-
Interest in the Practice of Law
The dominant conception of the lawyer‘s role has shifted from a rela-
tional approach to an autonomous one.
129
Prior to the 1960s, the relational
approach was dominant although not the exclusive professional account.
130
Both the republican conception of the early twentieth century
131
and the pro-
fessionalism ideal that originated in the late nineteenth century
132
described
the lawyer as simultaneously a zealous representative of clients and a guar-
dian of the public good.
133
Justice Louis Brandeis, Jr., one famous exemplar
of this approach, explained that lawyers ―hold[] a position of independence,
between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of ei-
ther‖
134
both in their legal work and their public leadership. Brandeis de-
scribed representation of corporate clients as equivalent to ―statesmanship‖
and ―diplomacy‖
135
and sought solutions to client problems that benefited all
parties to the ―situation.‖
136
With regard to legislation, he urged lawyers to
serve as the ―people‘s lawyer,‖
137
to ―fairly represent[]‖ the ―public inter-
est[,]‖
138
and ―to do a great work for this country.‖
139
While some bar lead-
ers criticized Brandeis for his political views and for his conception of
―counsel for the situation,‖
140
his relational understanding of the lawyer‘s
role was squarely in the mainstream of elite legal culture.
Relational approaches remained dominant until the 1960s. Sociologist
Erwin Smigel‘s famous study of Wall Street lawyers found that they consi-
dered themselves ―guardians of the law‖ who advised their clients on the
importance of respecting the spirit of the law and the public good.
141
By the
1980s, surveys found that elite large law firm lawyers had abandoned this
approach for the ―neutral partisan[]‖ – or ―hired gun‖ – perspective.
142
For
elite, large law firm lawyers practicing before the 1960s, a commitment to
relational approaches and to the public good implicated two reinforcing
conceptions. At the same time that these lawyers served the interests of
corporate entities and of their powerful leaders, they understood those inter-
ests to be consistent with those of America and Americans. They conceived
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
of their jobs as trusted advisors to corporate entities as entailing, in Elihu
Root‘s famous words, telling the clients that ―they were damn fools and
should stop,‖
143
when they acted contrary to those interests. In other words,
elite lawyers rejected autonomous self-interest and advised their clients in
the spirit of relational self-interest.
At the same time, commitment to the public also meant actual public
service. It was not uncommon for elite lawyers in the first half of the twen-
tieth century to shuttle between high-level government positions in Wash-
ington, D.C. and private law practice in Wall Street‘s large firms.
144
Being a
lawyer thus meant believing in and working toward the public interest,
which meant more than simply pursuing the interests of one‘s clients.
Commitment to the public good informed by a relational approach was
not limited to elite lawyers in large law firms. Many lawyers practicing
both in large metropolitans and in rural areas thought of themselves as gene-
ralists and trusted advisors. Clients came to them not merely to solve legal
problems, narrowly and technically defined. Rather, clients came to seek
advice and to solve problems. In this sense, lawyers were not merely advo-
cates of clients‘ interests, they were trusted advisors, public citizens, and
civic leaders. Clients sought holistic solutions from their lawyers-statesmen
and expected their attorneys to exercise prudent practical wisdom. Lawyers
in turn would offer advice that was more relational in nature.
145
In contrast, grounded in autonomous self-interest, the neutral partisan
discarded relational self-interest and the public good. The lawyer‘s job was
to maximize the client‘s autonomous self-interest subject only to the law,
146
and in so doing the lawyer faced no restraints on the client‘s or the lawyer‘s
autonomous self-interest. According to commentators, the neutral partisan‘s
role was to serve as an extreme partisan on behalf of the client and to have
no moral accountability for the actions of the client, or of the lawyer, for
pursuing the client‘s objectives within the bounds of the law.
147
Moreover,
maximizing autonomous self-interest often discouraged lawyers from coun-
seling clients on morality, the public good, and the spirit of the law.
148
For
example, the Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibili-
ty advised a lawyer who believed abortion to be murder that it would be
unprofessional to advise a teenage girl seeking court approval for an abor-
tion without her parent‘s consent on either alternatives to abortion or the
possibility of consulting her parents.
149
Similarly, for the neutral partisan, autonomous self-interest tended to
discourage consideration of relational concerns, such as the impact on civil
society, in the lawyer‘s conduct. Illustrating this function is Lord Henry
Brougham‘s famous credo, a significant but minority view of the lawyer‘s
role prior to the 1960s.
150
Described by commentators as the ―famous state-
ment‖ of zealous representation,
151
Brougham‘s credo straightforwardly
rejected any responsibility for the public good. He expressly asserted that
lawyers had a duty to promote the client‘s autonomous self-interest even
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
though it would bring ―destruction . . . upon others[,]‖ and ―[s]eparating the
duty of a patriot from that of an advocate,‖ the lawyer would have to ―in-
volve his country in confusion.‖
152
Although some commentators have argued that Lord Brougham‘s
comments were limited to the context of defending criminals,
153
others have
built on the insights of autonomous self-interest to provide a more general
theory of law practice. In his famous ―amoral‖ account of a lawyer‘s role,
Stephen Pepper, for example, has argued that lawyers ought to serve the
autonomous self-interest of their clients in order to allow clients to act as
autonomous first-class-citizens in a highly regulated society.
154
To be fair,
Pepper has also argued that lawyers ought to engage in a moral dialogue
with their clients and attempt to dissuade clients from conduct that is harm-
ful to others,
155
but has concluded that ultimately the preferable framework
for client representation is that of the client autonomously pursuing auto-
nomous self-interest as a Holmesian bad person. Given the dominance of
autonomous self-interest, a perspective that permits autonomous self-interest
only serves to foster it; producing lawyers (and clients) who are autono-
mously self-interested.
156
To be sure, old professional ideologies were not merely relational or
solely about the public interest. First, under the guise of relational self-
interest some lawyers adopted a paternalistic approach: their advice often
reflected not their understanding and appreciation of their clients‘ relational
interests, but rather their own commitments, values and judgments as to
what the client ought to be doing.
157
Notably, while sometimes this may
have been done to promote the lawyer‘s self-interest, it may also have
served the lawyer‘s good faith understanding of the public good. Solo prac-
titioners, for example, were often among the most educated people in their
communities and their advice may have reflected paternalistic visions of
what was good for their community.
158
Even elite lawyers, who often
shared elevated ethnoreligious background, socioeconomic and cultural sta-
tus with the elite corporate decision-makers they served, may have joined in
exhibiting paternalism toward shareholders. These lawyers may have given
advice that appeared relational but was actually paternalistic.
159
Second, lawyers‘ relational approach was arguably self-serving. It
helped lawyers as an exclusive professional community to build and secure
their role as the governing class of American society.
160
Generalist lawyers,
by giving relational advice to clients, helped build their own status as civic
leaders within their communities. Elite lawyers, by promoting client con-
duct which was relational and in the interest of both clients and society,
earned the respect and cemented the standing that in turn would help them
obtain appointment to public office. At the same time, for the many attor-
neys who truly believed that having members of the bar at the helm was
good not only for lawyers but also for American society, their pursuit of
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
relational self-interest appropriately served the goal of mutual benefit. It
served the interests both of lawyers and of the community.
161
Our point, therefore, is not to suggest that lawyers of the past were dri-
ven by relational self-interest alone or that they served their clients and
communities selflessly. Indeed, the ethic of relational self-interest is not
selflessness but rather mutual benefit. We argue instead that the neutral
partisan ideology has made it less likely that lawyers would think that they
should tell clients that they are ―damn fools and should stop‖
162
when clients
purport to act in a legal manner that disregards cooperation, trust, or causes
harm to others. Conceiving of their clients as autonomously self-interested
individuals and entities, lawyers are more likely to assume and facilitate
their clients‘ autonomous self-interest, or accept without comment and chal-
lenge client objectives that are decidedly non-relational.
Moreover, the advent of autonomous self-interest makes it more likely
that lawyers would think of themselves as autonomously self-interested in-
dividuals and will be less likely to shuttle between the public and private
spheres. As lawyers increasingly bought into the vision of autonomous self-
interest and of the public interest as consisting as nothing more of the aggre-
gate of clients‘ private interests, they were less likely to be willing to serve
in public office. When they did, they were less inclined to consider it an
obligation to the public good and more inclined to view it as part of a ―re-
volving door‖ strategy to increase their marketability in the private sector.
163
They also became less civil to each other and to nonlawyers, because civility
was no longer a constitutive element of what it meant to be a lawyer. To the
contrary, being an effective neutral advocate often called for being aggres-
sive, even uncivil.
B. Lawyers‘ Embrace of Autonomous Self-Interest
As we have seen, the rise of autonomous self-interest and decline of re-
lational self-interest has afflicted American culture at large, including mem-
bers of the legal profession. Over time, autonomous self-interest has come
to shape clients‘ expectations of their lawyers and lawyers‘ understanding of
their professional roles. Several unique factors, however, help explain the
particular hold autonomous self-interest has had on American lawyers.
164
First, the exponential growth in the size of the legal profession since
the 1960s has fostered conditions hospitable to autonomously self-interested
approaches.
.165
The growing heterogeneity of the profession destabilized the
shared vision and cultural understandings that formed the basis for the for-
mation of relational approaches among a culturally homogenous elite, and
the sheer size of the bar made it increasingly less likely that lawyers, even in
specific locales and practice areas would get to know each other well
enough to form relationships conducive to the development of relational
perspectives. No doubt, the growing diversity of the bar is vital to the reali-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
zation of a just legal system, but absent a relational approach embracing
diversity, the growth of the profession in overall size, in the identity and
background of its members and their plurality of values, visions, and under-
standings of their role had the unintended and undesirable consequence of
weakening relational perspectives grounded in homogeneity and enhancing
autonomous self-interest.
166
Second, increased competition in the market for legal services has
weakened long-lasting relationships between clients and law firms, both
diminishing lawyers‘ opportunities to provide relational advice to clients
and making attorneys less inclined to practice relationally when such oppor-
tunities do present themselves. Consider, for example, the case of elite large
law firm lawyers. Large law firms once had stable, long-term relationships
with their large institutional clients. Lawyers and clients both viewed these
representations as relational, and lawyers were able to serve as trusted advi-
sors who could, when appropriate, preach and teach relational self-interest.
During the last quarter century, as autonomous self-interest became more
important to clients and to lawyers, competition changed the nature of these
attorney-client relationships. Large law firms no longer have exclusive
longstanding relationships with large entity clients.
167
Clients typically em-
ploy a large number of law firms and require law firms to compete for their
business. As a result, lawyers often represent their clients in a short-term
engagement and in only a part of the entire deal or transaction.
168
In such a
competitive environment, absent a countervailing culture of mutual benefit,
lawyers are likely to feel less secure in offering relational advice and more
inclined to offer aggressive advice in pursuit of the client‘s autonomous self-
interest. To borrow again from Elihu Root, a lawyer who is competing for
business in a culture of autonomous self-interest is less likely to tell the
client that he is a damn fool and more likely to do the client‘s bidding for
fear of losing the client‘s business.
169
Similarly, competitive pressures, both the desire the please and retain
existing clients and the need to expand one‘s client base by seeing more
clients and billing more effectively, have resulted in incentives for solo
practitioners to spend less time with clients, making them less likely to be
able and willing to practice relationally.
170
This result was not inevitable.
An ethic of mutual benefit is entirely consistent with competition. Yet, in-
creasingly competitive practice realities have changed the lawyer-client rela-
tionship from a location that naturally encouraged mutual benefit and rela-
tional self-interest to one where autonomous self-interest appeared the easier
strategy, diminishing the ability and willingness of lawyers to practice rela-
tionally and act as civics teachers.
171
Of course, maintaining strong relation-
ships with clients continues to be of great importance to lawyers. Indeed,
the partners who succeed in bringing in business in today‘s competitive
marketplace for legal services are the lawyers who understand the impor-
tance of behaving relationally toward clients.
172
At the same time, the ex-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
pectations of many clients regarding the meaning of their relationships with
their lawyers have changed in a way that makes sustaining these relation-
ships more challenging.
Third, the increased specialization of legal services has similarly com-
plicated and constrained the ability of lawyers to act as trusted advisors. In
historical context, the lawyer acting as a trusted advisor was a generalist.
Lawyers‘ broad expertise often offered them the opportunity to develop an
informed perspective and counsel their clients strategically on a wide range
of issues. This tradition, however, did not prepare lawyers for finding a
relational perspective in a legal world characterized by increased specializa-
tion. Specialization made the task of relational lawyering more challenging.
From their increasingly narrow perspective, lawyers understandably viewed
themselves as lacking the capacity to learn, understand and advise clients
regarding the broad impact of the legal representation.
173
Although speciali-
zation, in and of itself, does not exclude relational lawyering, it does com-
plicate the task, especially in a circumstance where autonomous self-interest
has become the cultural default.
Fourth, the changing organization of law firms also challenged rela-
tional self-interest among and between lawyers. Lawyers had imbued the
traditional law firm partnership with thick fiduciary duties and a relational
aura. As law firms grew larger, increased mobility has become the norm
and an ―eat what you kill‖ culture had gradually replaced old notions of
loyalty to the firm,
174
lawyers viewed changes away from that model as
representing and validating autonomous self-interest. For example, as large
law firms grew, it became impractical for the partners to manage the firms
effectively as a committee of the whole. Large law firms became more bu-
reaucratic as they transferred power and authority from individual lawyers
to managing committees, replacing relational and more democratic mana-
gerial systems with more impersonal centralized procedures.
175
Firms also adopted risk management procedures that for better or
worse also displaced the exercise of discretion by mutually respectful law-
yers in the idealized partnerships of the past.
176
The point, to be clear, is not
to naïvely suggest that the old systems of governance and risk management
worked effectively or reflected relational commitments. To the contrary, as
Nelson compellingly documented, informal collegial partnerships produced
hierarchies in which powerful partners dominated weaker ones.
177
Nor is it
to deny the importance and usefulness of risk management procedures prop-
erly implemented. Nonetheless, the new risk management landscape with
its emphasis on bureaucracy and managed decision-making might be misun-
derstood by lawyers resenting the loss of their autonomy and decision-
making authority vis-à-vis the firm as being less conducive toward relational
approaches.
Finally, where lawyers had traditionally contrasted profit seeking with
relational professionalism,
178
the increased emphasis on the bottom-line of
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
law practice across the legal profession, from large law firms‘ hyper-
competitive ―eat what you kill‖ ideology
179
to solo and small law firms‘
growing emphasis on fee collection,
180
tended to encourage lawyers to view
themselves as autonomously self-interested. Law, of course, has always
been essentially a for-profit endeavor, so we do not mean to evoke a naïve
image of the profession in which money does not or should not play an im-
portant role. Rather, we observe that lawyers often found themselves unable
and less willing to recognize and foster the relational elements that do exist
in market relationships, vis-à-vis clients and colleagues alike.
181
The growth of the profession, increased competition, increased specia-
lization, the gradual shift of power and exercise of authority from individual
lawyers to centralized decision-making processes, and changed professional
ideologies are by no means negative developments. Rather, these profound
changes are complex phenomena with many consequences for both lawyers
and clients; some of which are positive, others negative. Yet two unin-
tended consequences of these changes were the undermining of a traditional,
relational, and professional ideology and the facilitation of autonomous self-
interest. We argue that the rise of the ―standard conception‖ and of a pro-
fessional ideology that is grounded in autonomous self-interest is therefore
not only a reflection of trends in American culture but also a product of spe-
cific changes to the practice realities of American lawyers. In the context of
autonomous self-interest, when faced with increased competition, increased
specialization, diminished ability to exercise professional judgment vis-à-vis
increasingly powerful clients, centralized and institutionalized bureaucracy,
and outside actors such as insurance companies, lawyers were susceptible to
the ideology that dominated the general culture. The neutral partisan ideol-
ogy, grounded in an understanding of both clients and lawyers as autonom-
ous self-interested individuals, provided just that and proved to be popular
with members of the bar.
C. Autonomous Self-Interest and Increased Lawyer Incivility
As the conception of the lawyer‘s role grounded in autonomous self-
interest became dominant, bar leaders declared a ―crisis of professional-
ism,‖
182
bemoaning lawyers‘ declining commitment to the public good.
183
Employing ―apocalyptic‖ rhetoric, bar leaders complained that lawyers had
abandoned professionalism‘s commitment to law ―as a common calling in
pursuit of public service‖
184
and placed their financial interests above the
public good.
185
They ―asserted that lawyers, their ethics, and their profes-
sionalism are ‗lost,‘ ‗betrayed,‘ in ‗decline,‘ in ‗crisis,‘ facing ‗demise,‘ near
‗death,‘ and in need of ‗redemption.‘‖
186
Explaining how lawyers ―pro-
mote[d] private interests at the expense of the public good[,]‖
187
commenta-
tors noted that lawyers advised clients ―how to maximize material self-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
interest and ignore[] the public good because advising clients to avoid ‗anti-
social‘ conduct would undermine ‗the marketing program.‘‖
188
And why would lawyers not place their own self-interest above all? As
autonomously self-interested individuals, many lawyers came to understand
their role as one that requires them to do nothing but aggressively help their
clients pursue their own autonomous self-interest within the bounds of the
law. Promoting private interests at the expense of the public good was not a
problem—it was a job description. It became a way to advance the ―public
good‖ and to liberate lawyers from the duty to think seriously of themselves
as public citizens.
A manifestation of the growing influence of autonomous self-interest
on lawyers was their increasingly uncivil conduct. Lawyers treated practice
as a ―zero-sum game‖
189
and engaged in ―public ridicule, derision, and in-
sult.‖
190
As a judge noted, ―There must be a way to continue the spirit of the
adversarial profession of law without the mentality of warfare and bitter-
ness. We have lost sight of the fact that we are all brothers and sisters of a
truly noble profession.‖
191
A study conducted with lawyers from Illinois,
Indiana, and Wisconsin found that sixty-one percent of lawyers said ―civility
problems exist‖ and sixty-nine ―percent of responding judges and [fifty-five]
percent of lawyers s[aid] that current civility problems represent a
change.‖
192
In a District of Columbia survey more than half of the lawyers
and eighty percent of judges said they had witnessed incivility between law-
yers.
193
Examples of uncivil behavior include discourtesy, use of insults, and
growing intolerance displayed by attorneys toward opposing counsel,
judges, court personnel and third parties.
194
A court described the conduct
of a ―successful trial lawyer‖ as ―‗disrespectful and contumacious‘ and
‗beyond the pale of civilized conduct‘‖ for the frequent use of insults and
profanity.
195
In another litigation between two large corporations, a promi-
nent litigator said to opposing counsel, ―‗Don‘t ‗Joe‘ me asshole. . . . I‘m
tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat wagon.‘‖
196
He added,
―‗You don‘t know what you‘re doing. Obviously someone wrote out a long
outline of stuff for you to ask. You have no concept of what you‘re
doing.‘‖
197
In yet another case, the court described as ―‘demeaning and un-
dignified‘‖ a male attorney‘s ―reference to a younger female attorney as
‗little lady,‘ ‗little mouse,‘ ‗young girl,‘ and ‗little girl[.]‘‖
198
In addition to insults, lawyer incivility meant treating relations with
adversaries as a ―zero-sum game,‖ in which one‘s gain can only come at an
opponent‘s expense. As one judge noted, ―[g]amesmanship is the norm in
discovery‖ and lawyers viewed litigation as ―‗set up to be a fight‘ . . . in
which the norm is, ‗when in doubt be tough.‘‖
199
Many lawyers took this
strategy to its logical extreme and engaged in ―‗Rambo‘-style discovery.‖
200
Bar leaders responded by exhorting lawyers to recommit themselves to
civility and the public good; creating commissions, promulgating professio-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
nalism and civility codes; and instituting mandatory continuing legal educa-
tion requirements to achieve these goals.
201
In times of crisis where the bar
has faced mounting criticisms not only for its displays of incivility but also
for pushing the autonomous self-interested ideology too far representing
clients too aggressively at the expense of the public, the profession has even
experimented with ideas about new professional paradigms and roles for
lawyers, mostly to be abandoned as the storms of criticisms passed.
202
None
of these strategies have succeeded in changing the dominant legal culture, in
part because they did not directly address the dominant culture of autonom-
ous self-interest, instead focusing on some of its symptoms and manifesta-
tions.
203
IV. LAWYERS‘ DUTY TO BECOME MORE RELATIONAL AND HELP RESTORE
CIVILITY
Lawyers play a major role in shaping civic culture both in their every-
day practice and in their civic leadership. In this dual role, they have a re-
sponsibility as public citizens to help restore civility and facilitate a revival
of a civic culture grounded in relational self-interest.
204
In restoring civility,
lawyers‘ emphasis should be on teaching and modeling it: not only in being
civil toward opposing counsel, judges, court personnel and third parties, but
also in at least discussing with clients, if not advising, relational solutions
and avoiding fostering the culture of autonomous self-interest. Given the
dominance of autonomous self-interest and the growing expectations of
clients that lawyers serve their narrow interests aggressively, teaching,
preaching and advising relational self-interest may not be easy and may
come at a cost. Yet if lawyers fulfill this duty, they will assist healing both
the legal profession and our civic culture.
A. Lawyers as Civics Teachers
Building on the work of Lon Fuller and David Luban, Bruce Green and
Russell Pearce have explained that lawyers serve as ―civics teachers.‖
205
They play a disproportionately large role in political leadership and fre-
quently serve as community leaders.
206
In both this leadership role and in
counseling clients in private practice, ―lawyers invariably teach not only
about the law and legal institutions, but also, for better or worse, about
rights and obligations in a civil society that may not be established by enfor-
ceable law—including ideas about fair dealing, respect for others, and, gen-
erally, concern for the public good.‖
207
In everyday practice, lawyers‘
teaching extends beyond client counseling to the model they present and the
influence they have both directly and indirectly on their clients‘ family,
friends, neighbors, and adversaries, as well as members of the general pub-
lic.
208
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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Accordingly, whether lawyers want to or not, they play an important
role in educating their fellow citizens about civic obligations. Lawyers‘ role
as civics teachers stems from the role law plays in American public life,
public discourse, and even private life. Exactly because law is our social
glue, capturing our common ground and our shared commitments,
209
law-
yers, as high priests of this civic religion, play a constitutive role in explain-
ing and demonstrating the meaning of law, including civility, not only in the
terms of being polite and courteous to each other, but more importantly in
terms of creating the space to engage substantively, especially when we
strongly disagree on the merits.
That lawyers serve as civics teachers—whether they like it or not—
imposes on them specific obligations. To be sure, acting as civic teachers
certainly has its perks: it sustains lawyers‘ status as influential actors in our
public and private lives; and elevates attorneys‘ cultural and social standing.
Yet the role also imposes costs on members of the profession. As we have
seen, the decline of civility and rise of incivility are in part driven by prac-
tice conditions and clients‘ expectations of lawyers. Insisting on and per-
sisting with civility might displease certain clients and might burden attor-
ney-client relationships in a competitive era in which these very relation-
ships are unstable and in which lawyers do not wish to further undermine
these relationships. Yet as long as law plays such a constitutive role in our
public and private lives, lawyers as lawyers must accept and act on their
responsibility as civics teachers.
Indeed, lawyers cannot avoid being civics teachers because the task is
inherent to the meaning of law practice and membership in the American
legal profession. The question, therefore, is not whether lawyers model
modes of communication and civic engagement to their clients, rather, it is
what models of discourse attorneys do and should teach.
Moreover, when lawyers serve as civics teachers, they must strive to be
good effective educators. We argue that lawyers have been poor civics
teachers as of late, succumbing to and modeling incivility and unrestrained
autonomous self-interest. Today, many lawyers teach a civic version of
autonomous self-interest—the ethic of the Holmesian bad man who seeks to
get away with what he can within the bounds of the law.
210
In the public
sphere this has contributed to the current civic malaise. Lawyers have the
opportunity instead to take an active role in reintroducing relational self-
interest into our public and private conversations. When lawyers embrace a
relational self-interest approach to their role, they are able to teach that citi-
zens have an obligation to the spirit of the law and the public good.
B. What Lawyers Should Model as Civics Teachers
First and foremost, lawyers must model and teach civility. Lawyers
must demonstrate mutual respect, courtesy, trust, and cooperation. Civility
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
starts in lawyers‘ interactions with their own clients. It calls for effective
communications with clients, for prompt return of client calls and requests
for information, for reasonable updates regarding material developments in
the case, and for respectful emails.
211
Civility continues with polite and
respectful exchanges with lawyers‘ own staff, opposing counsel, opposing
parties, witnesses, court personnel, and other third parties.
212
It necessitates
refraining from the use of abusive language and tactics, such as name-
calling and the imposition of strategic delays and costs in litigation and
business negotiations.
213
Teaching civility also includes demonstrating a commitment to sustain-
ing a space for communications and engagement, even in disagreement. It
includes modeling to clients the ability to ―agree to disagree‖ and the com-
mitment to ―keep talking‖ even when some substantive disagreements re-
main. Lawyers as lawyers can and should teach that public and private ex-
changes do not always have to become personal; rather, we ought to strive
to treat substantive disagreements as such and not vilify the opposition.
Some lawyers in various practice areas have long tried to preach and teach
these very relational insights,
214
but the practice has come less common and
less legitimate. Lawyers ought to demonstrate a commitment to civility in
the sense of dignity and respect for others in all aspects of their practice and
professional lives such as in litigation and business negotiating, especially
when substantive disagreements abound and the parties are adversarial and
bitter, an approach that would benefit clients both in the short run in terms
of a more amicable resolution of particular disputes and in the long run in
terms of adopting a more relational and civil habits of mind and action.
Finally, teaching civility should include a commitment to introducing
and discussing relational self-interest perspectives when representing
clients. To be clear, this does not mean imposing ideas, perspectives, or
solutions on clients. But it does entail a commitment to pointing out, in
context, the impact and dominance of autonomous self-interest and suggest-
ing relational approaches. This is not going to be easy; clients have come to
expect lawyers to champion autonomous self-interest and may reject rela-
tional self-interest. But it is a fight worth fighting. Some clients defer to
their lawyers on some issues and may be willing to listen. And one should
not underestimate the extent to which lawyers shape clients‘ expectations
and conduct: aggressive, uncivil, autonomously self-interested lawyers tend
to form and shape aggressive, uncivil, and autonomously self-interested
clients. Courteous, civil, and relational lawyers may engage in conduct and
dialogue that will encourage clients to be courteous, civil, and relational. Of
course, some clients may insist on autonomously self-interested course of
conduct, and lawyers will then normally abide by the clients‘ wishes, or in
extreme situations may withdraw from such representations.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
C. Lawyers as Civic Healers or Why Lawyers Should Advance Relational
Self-Interest
A growing body of work in various disciplines shows that people tend
to be cooperative and relational, naturally and intuitively understanding their
own self-interest as related to and depending on the self-interest of others.
215
Moreover, relational self-interest is not only descriptively compelling, but
normatively desirable. Mounting evidence, from mathematical and evolutio-
nary biology
216
to cognitive psychology
217
and neuroscience
218
confirms that
individuals tend to want to cooperate and are more successful when doing
so.
219
Law‘s very essence – the peaceful resolution of disputes and the facilitation
of cooperation – fits well within this relational perspective. That is not to
suggest that autonomous self-interest has no plausible role to play in inform-
ing some private and public discourse, rather, we argue that given the do-
minance of autonomous self-interest, lawyers should embrace and help re-
store relational self-interest as a meaningful counterforce. In particular,
lawyers‘ duty to restore relational self-interest and heal our civic culture
stems from the profession‘s past endorsement of autonomous self-interest
and the role law and lawyers played in elevating autonomous self-interest to
its current position of dominance. In sum, in their everyday practice law-
yers should promote relational self-interest because it is good for clients and
good for society (and, as we shall argue below, also good for lawyers).
D. Autonomous Self-interest, Relational Self-interest and Legal Ethics
While lawyers‘ professionalism and professional ethics is certainly
consistent with autonomous self-interest, lawyers‘ ethics can also be read to
support relational self-interest, transcend autonomous self-interest and allow
lawyers to play a role in healing civil society. Roscoe Pound famously de-
scribed a profession as ―a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service—no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the
spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.‖
220
This aspiration is at the core of legal ethics codes. The 1908 ABA Ca-
nons of Ethics explained that the ―future of the Republic‖ depended upon
lawyers‘ conduct
221
and the 1964 Model Code of Professional Responsibility
declared that ―lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the pre-
servation of society.‖
222
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which form the basis of the codes that govern almost all jurisdictions today,
similarly states that ―[l]awyers play a vital role in the preservation of socie-
ty.‖
223
The Model Rules further note that ‖[a] lawyer, as a member of the
legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of jus-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
tice.‖
224
Arguably rejecting an exclusive autonomously self-interested ap-
proach, the Rules assert that ―a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience
and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain
the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to
exemplify the legal profession‘s ideals of public service.‖
225
While the dominant legal culture has changed with the decline of rela-
tional self-interest and the rise of autonomous self-interest, the goals and
core commitments reflected in the ABA Canons, Model Code and Model
Rules have remained intact for over a century. Put differently, the Model
Rules are, and have always been, broad enough to encompass relational
perspectives. What has changed is their narrow reading by lawyers, who
celebrate autonomous self-interest by elevating their role as ―representa-
tive[s] of clients,‖ to the exclusion of relational self-interest inherent in their
role as ―officer[s] of the legal system‖ and as ―public citizen[s].‖
226
When lawyers teach relational self-interest in the public and private
spheres, they fulfill these goals and commitments. They counsel clients to
consider their association with a colleague or adversary as a relationship, to
treat all people with respect, and to understand that their own self-interest
ultimately requires obligations to the community and the law. Again, when
lawyers do so, they will undoubtedly confront circumstances where their
views differ from those of their clients. Here, lawyers would both teach and
model respectful dialogue. Similarly, when interacting with colleagues,
adversaries, and courts, as well as in their own civic activities, lawyers
would employ relational self-interest to ground their actions in an ethic of
mutual benefit that would exemplify civility. Relational self-interest does
not discard self-interest or compromise the lawyer‘s obligation to represent
clients zealously. Rather, it grounds self-interest in the knowledge that the
self is relational and that accordingly mutual benefit is both descriptively
and normatively the preferred strategy.
227
E. Are Lawyers Likely to Teach Civility and Promote Relational Self-
Interest?
But why would an appeal to civility grounded in relational self-interest
succeed? As noted above, efforts to promote civility in the public and pri-
vate spheres and among lawyers have met with only very limited success.
The bar‘s reliance on assertions of a tradition of commitment to the public
good are unpersuasive to lawyers who believe in autonomous self-interest
and who reject as unpersuasive appeals that are not grounded in self-
interest.
228
For lawyers who believe in autonomous self-interest, appeals
calling on them to ―do the right thing,‖
229
pursue justice,
230
or show fidelity
to the law,
231
are unpersuasive because they are understood as calling for
giving legal advice that is inconsistent with clients‘ and lawyers‘ legitimate
autonomous self-interests. Worse, they are understood as calling on lawyers
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
to usurp the legitimate interests of their clients (and their own) in advancing
their autonomy, and imply conceiving of lawyers as paternalistic philoso-
pher kings who know better than their clients what is in their own self-
interest. To begin with, because relational approaches take self-interest se-
riously, both in substance and in rhetoric, they are likely to be contemplated,
or at least not quickly dismissed by a profession that has come to openly
embrace aggressive pursuit of clients‘ and lawyers‘ self-interest as legiti-
mate and desirable.
The first step toward becoming effective civics teachers in the spirit of
relational self-interest is to educate lawyers about the value and desirability
of relational self-interest. If lawyers do not embrace relational self-interest,
they will not do a good job of teaching it, and will be more likely to suc-
cumb to pressures to abandon it in favor of autonomous self-interest. Else-
where, we developed the claim that contemporary legal education has
adopted the culture of autonomous self-interest, and we have called for re-
forms in legal education to encourage the formation of lawyers in the spirit
of relational self-interest.
232
Here, suffice it to say that law students—who
enter law schools as the product of American culture with its celebration of
autonomous self-interest, who study law in institutions that explicitly and
implicitly teach autonomous self-interest, and who enter a profession that
has accepted a professional ethos built on the premise of autonomous self-
interest—are more likely than not to end up as autonomously self-interested
lawyers.
233
The education of lawyers and the formation of professional identity are life-
long processes.
234
Law schools have a responsibility to advance relational
self-interest as a meaningful alternative to autonomous self-interest, in part-
nership with bar associations, law firms and in conjunction with revised
rules of professional conduct and regulatory enforcement. Bar associations,
local and national, can foster relational perspectives by providing lawyers
with opportunities to become involved in civic activities, educating the pub-
lic about the law and offering training and mentoring. Law firms can at-
tempt to combat the prevailing culture of autonomous self-interest by incen-
tivizing their lawyers to act more relationally vis-à-vis opponents, clients,
third-parties and the public. The organized bar can promulgate rules and
clarifying comments explaining in greater detail the role of lawyers as ―of-
ficers of the legal system‖ and as ―public citizens,‖ and can encourage rela-
tional conduct by lawyers, for example, the provision of pro bono legal ser-
vices and mentoring.
235
If taught and advanced by all of these constituencies, civility grounded
in relational self-interest has a chance to become once again a meaningful
force in the lives of lawyers because it reflects what is good for clients, for
society, and for lawyers. In the short-run, of course, avoiding dialogue with
clients regarding their assertions of autonomous self-interest seems more
consistent with lawyers‘ own self-interest, especially in highly competitive
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
times. Yet, both in the short and long-run relational self-interest is the better
route. Not only are clients‘ interests better served by advancing civility and
suggesting relational self-interest approaches, but lawyers‘ own careers are
likely to become more meaningful and rewarding if members of the profes-
sion were to pursue relational self-interest.
The vast and complex literature on lawyers‘ happiness and satisfaction
suggests that two causes of dissatisfaction with the practice of law have to
do with its harsh adversarial nature and lack of civility and with its amoral
demands of serving clients who act as Holmesian bad men.
236
A profession
more accepting of and committed to relational self-interest is likely to expe-
rience less combative and abusive practices that its members complain
about. It is also less likely to experience the consequences of practicing law
amorally, aggressively advocating on behalf of clients‘ autonomous self-
interest with little regard to the consequences imposed on third parties and
the public.
F. Are Lawyers Likely to Succeed in a Campaign to Heal Civic
Discourse?
Just as efforts to promote civility among lawyers, clients and the public
have failed to date for having not recognized and challenged the dominance
of autonomous self-interest, so have similar attempts failed outside of the
legal profession. Proponents of civility generally frame their arguments as
if a binary exists between civility and self-interest. They rarely justify ci-
vility in terms of self-interest.
237
In the culture of autonomous self-interest,
a proposal that does not rely on self-interest is a non-starter. It appears
naïve and disconnected from the reality of modern culture. From the pers-
pective of autonomous self-interest, with its understanding of the public
sphere as a zero-sum game, neither civility nor cooperation make sense oth-
er than in the instrumental way that would appeal to the Holmesian bad
man. They would never be ends in themselves. Relational self-interest,
however, which offers a vision of cooperation and respect while advancing
self-interest, can become a meaningful part of how we think about and ulti-
mately act, publically and privately.
To be sure, efforts to promote civility have failed for reasons that have
little to do with autonomous self-interest. Arguments that link incivility
with polarization often fail because of their internal inconsistency. Although
civility and cooperation are relational values, some of their advocates take
an autonomous self-interest approach to those with whom they disagree,
labeling them as heretics.
238
Similarly, in linking cooperation and civility
with absence of polarization, they imply that disagreement itself is the
source of the problem and that civility and cooperation will only emerge
when a centrist position emerges.
239
This approach does not reflect the reali-
ty of our political system where disagreement exists on many issues. In-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
deed, for issues like abortion and gay rights, or health care and collective
bargaining rights, these differences are extremely contentious.
240
More im-
portantly, they simply confuse civility and the space for civic engagement
with substantive agreement. The former simply does not require the latter.
Relational self-interest, in contrast, has a greater chance of succeeding
in challenging the culture of autonomous self-interest and in promoting ci-
vility both because it accepts the reality of disagreement and views civility,
the public good, and self-interest as inextricably connected. Civility and the
public good are necessary to promote self-interest understood in relational
terms. Relational self-interest, therefore, offers a way to begin a conversa-
tion with those who see the world through the lens of self-interest and seeks
to challenge only their particular narrow understanding of self-interest.
Faced with a challenge to their perspective of autonomous self-interest, most
people, including many liberals, libertarians, and conservatives would have
to admit that they live their lives in relational terms to a significant de-
gree.
241
Indeed, successful political and community leaders have strong rela-
tional networks, even if they are limited to their own constituencies.
242
Moreover, many in the public appear open to a relational perspective.
The Presidential candidates that identified themselves as ―uniters, not divid-
ers‖ won in 2000 and 2008, and an increasing number of commentators and
organizations seek to restore civility. Even where the evidence indicated
that uncivil rhetoric did not motivate the shooting of Congresswoman Gif-
fords, many have responded with efforts to heal our civic culture.
243
One objection that may arise to civility arguments grounded in relation
self-interest is a practical one. From the perspective of autonomous self-
interest, the public sphere is a zero-sum game where the most autonomously
successful wins. It is a prisoner‘s dilemma game where the non-
cooperative, autonomous move generally provides the safest chance of win-
ning.
244
This perspective would not only justify the uncivil conduct, but it
would also dictate that the proper response to incivility is further incivility.
A civil response to an uncivil move would both look weak and be weak.
245
Interestingly, even the prisoner‘s dilemma game does not discard coopera-
tion. While it is the riskiest move, it also provides the greatest return if—
and only if—the other player cooperates as well.
The answer to this objection from a relational perspective is that the au-
tonomous perspective does not as a general matter reflect the reality of hu-
man relationships. If people are fundamentally relational, they will respond
to relational appeals. In the prisoner‘s dilemma, the prisoners‘ core problem
is a lack of trust and cooperation, the very conditions brought about by ad-
herence to autonomous self-interest. Relational self-interest, on the other
hand, is the very tool that may end up fostering sufficient trust and coopera-
tion leading to better results for both prisoners. Assume that the prisoners
had lawyers who could serve as teachers of relational approaches. Perhaps
the prisoners would trust each other and avoid harsher penalties.
246
As dis-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
cussed in connection with Martin Luther King, Jr., a relational approach
need neither look weak nor be weak.
247
Another objection to relational approaches is that they are implausi-
ble—in a culture dominated by autonomous self-interest, lawyers and clients
alike are simply going to reject appeals to relational self-interest. For exam-
ple, assume that a lawyer attempts to model civility and also introduce rela-
tional insights in representing a client. The client rejects the teaching, in-
sists that the lawyer adopts an aggressive adversarial posture on her behalf,
and pursues an autonomously self-interested course of conduct. Should not
the lawyer have to yield to the client‘s wishes?
248
And would not the lawyer
have every incentive to yield to the client, for fear of losing the client‘s
business? In other words, the objection questions whether the attorney-
client relationship, with its inherent power dynamics favoring principals-
clients over lawyers-agents, is an arena in which lawyers can meaningfully
and effectively teach and influence clients.
The example, we concede, is partly compelling on its own terms.
While a lawyer should never conduct herself with incivility and clients
should not be able to legitimately demand or insist on incivility, lawyers
should ultimately yield to clients with regard to the objectives and the goals
of the representation. And yet, the example completely misses the point of
our argument. What we seek is a change in lawyers‘ and clients‘ dominant
cultural perspective of autonomous self-interest. We argue for a change in
the terms of and understanding of how people ought to interact with each
other and specifically how lawyers ought to facilitate these exchanges. If
lawyers were to adopt and pursue relational self-interest and were to effec-
tively teach and model it to clients, some clients would follow suit. Impor-
tantly, even a ―failed‖ teaching moment, one in which a client insists on an
autonomously self-interested course of conduct, is not a failure, but rather an
opportunity to create the foundation for further dialogue in the future.
249
Yet another objection is that intractable disagreements cannot be re-
solved relationally, and must be advocated by means of autonomous self-
interest. People with fundamental views that conflict will not be able to
engage in constructive dialogue—will never be able to make a difference in
each other‘s views. Therefore, some argue that these fundamental views
should not properly be part of the public sphere,
250
while others assert that
the voting mechanism alone functions adequately to determine winners and
losers on fundamental issues, regardless of the discord between oppo-
nents.
251
Relational self-interest, in contrast, posits that constructive dialo-
gue and respectful relationships are possible and necessary for a well-
functioning and healthy democracy even among, indeed, especially among,
people with diametrically opposed views. Understood relationally, the ethic
of mutual benefit becomes important to adversaries because it is necessary
to maintain the civil society that permits this very disagreement. On the
personal level, the reality of relationships makes one see an opponent as a
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
human being with whom one is likely to share much in common at the same
time as disagreement remains with regard to difficult issues. This contrasts
with the zero-sum perspective of autonomous self-interest that collapses the
political into the personal and seeks to erase all aspects of human interaction
other than the focus of disagreement. The person who holds reprehensible
views becomes a reprehensible person, rather than a human being deserving
of respect, as the relational perspective requires.
Accordingly, the relational approach provides a framework for a civil
approach to the most intractable and contentious conflicts, such as those
involving abortion and gay rights. An illustration of how this would work is
the model of Martin Luther King, Jr. In pursuit of equal rights for Black
Americans, Martin Luther King, Jr. faced mobs of angry, hate-filled, and
sometimes violent White people committed to denying Black people their
fundamental human rights. Nonetheless, he sought ―to attack the evil sys-
tem rather than individuals who happen to be caught up in the system.‖
252
King explained that ―our aim is not to defeat the white community, not to
humiliate the white community, but to win the friendship of all of the per-
sons who had perpetrated this system in the past.‖
253
He rejected the auto-
nomous approach of a ―zero sum game.‖
254
Seeing all people as connected
relationally, King sought ―reconciliation and the creation of a beloved com-
munity.‖
255
V. CONCLUSION
While it may be unrealistic to expect lawyers to accept relational self-
interest, teach it to clients and the public and help heal civic culture in the
near future, lawyers can indeed make a difference in helping to restore civil-
ity to our political culture. Rather than maintaining the current culture of
incivility by acting as neutral partisans, a role grounded in an understanding
of themselves, both as lawyers and as human beings, and of their clients as
autonomously self-interested, lawyers have the opportunity and obligation to
adopt a relational perspective in their work and in their civic leadership. By
counseling and modeling relational self-interest, lawyers can play a power-
ful leadership role challenging the dominance of autonomous self-interest
and, over time, help heal our civil society. If they do so, then the words of
Louis Brandeis would appropriately describe the legal profession as having
done ―a great work for this country.‖
256
1. The phrase ―Ordeal of Incivility‖ is a modification of John Murray Cuddihy‘s
phrase, the ―Ordeal of Civility,‖ although Cuddihy uses it in a different context than we do.
JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY: FREUD, MARX, LEVI-STRAUSS, AND THE
JEWISH STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY 13 14 (1974).
* Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion, Fordham
University School of Law. Our deepest appreciation to the participants at the University of
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Arkansas at Little Rock symposium on the Transformation of Public Interest Law for their
helpful comments and especially to Ken Gallant, whose response both at the conference and
in writing has helped us refine and clarify our work. Thanks as well to Anthony Kronman,
Amy Mashburn, David Thomson and Amy Uelmen for their comments. We are also very
grateful to Reference Librarian Lawrence Abraham for his extraordinary assistance, and to
Jerry Dickinson, who coordinated our team of student research assistants. Thanks to Jennifer
Chiang, Adam Elewa, Meagan Keenan, and Christina Lee for their excellent work.
** Charles W. Delaney, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law.
2. Andrew Martin, Tucson Shootings Add to Glock's Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2011, at B1.
3. Andrew Malcolm, Have Gun, Will Talk: Arizona Sheriff Clarence Dupnik Not
Speechless over Tucson Shootings or Much Else, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011, 2:34 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/01/clarence-dupnik-tucson-shootings-
gabrielle-giffords.html.
4. See, e.g., Dan Nowicki, Why Gabrielle Giffords Shooting Struck Heart of Nation,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 25, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles
/2011/01/25/20110125gabrielle-giffords-shooting-grips-the-nation.html (describing ―gun-
man‖ as ―twisted‖).
5. For example, at a Tucson memorial, President Obama stated:
But what we cannot do is use this tragedy as one more occasion to turn on each
other. . . . As we discuss these issues, let each of us do so with a good dose of
humility. Rather than pointing fingers or assigning blame, let‘s use this occasion
to expand our moral imaginations, to listen to each other more carefully, to shar-
pen our instincts for empathy and remind ourselves of all the ways that our hopes
and dreams are bound together.
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President at a Memorial Service for the
Victims of the Shooting in Tucson, Arizona (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-memorial-service-victims-
shooting-tucson. The University of Arizona has created a National Institute for Civil Dis-
course with former Presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush as honorary co-chairs. M.
Amedeo Tumolillo, University of Arizona Sets Up Civility Institute, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/us/politics/21civility
.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
6. See, e.g., Carrie Budoff Brown & Meredith Shiner, Liberals Blame Sarah Palin in
Wake of Tucson Shooting, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2011, 4:23 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47252.html. Sarah Palin, in turn, rejected ―the
irresponsible statements from people attempting to apportion blame for this terrible event. . . .
[E]specially within hours of a tragedy unfolding, journalists and pundits should not manufac-
ture a blood libel that serves only to incite the very hatred and violence they purport to con-
demn. That is reprehensible.‖ NRO Staff, Sarah Palin on „America‟s Enduring Strength,‟
THE CORNER (Jan. 12, 2011, 7:07 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/256942/sarah-
palin-americas-enduring-strength-nro-staff.
7. For example, in response to concern with harsh rhetoric, Sarah Palin asserted:
Vigorous and spirited public debates during elections are among our most che-
rished traditions. And after the election, we shake hands and get back to work,
and often both sides find common ground back in D.C. and elsewhere. If you
don‘t like a person‘s vision for the country, you‘re free to debate that vision. If
you don‘t like their ideas, you‘re free to propose better ideas.
NRO Staff, supra note 6. See generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1983).
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
8. Stephen Carter, for example, describes civility as ―the sum of the many sacrifices we
are called to make for the sake of living together.‖ STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY:
MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY 11 (1998). While other commenta-
tors would emphasize the rewards, as well as the sacrifices, associated with civility, they
share an understanding of the connection between civility and a flourishing community.
9. See infra pp. 10-13.
10. See, e.g., JUDITH RODIN & STEPHEN P. STEINBERG, Introduction: Incivility and Public
Discourse, in PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN AMERICA: CONVERSATION AND COMMUNITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 5 (Judith Rodin & Stephen P. Steinberg eds., 2003); see also
ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
55 57, 111 112 (2000).
11. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 81 (1979); MAURIZIO PUGNO,
CAPABILITIES, THE SELF, AND WELL-BEING, in CAPABILITIES AND HAPPINESS 231 33 (Luigino
Bruni, Flavio Comim, & Maurizio Pugno eds., 2008) (citing Amartya Sen).
12. See Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public
Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1351 53 (2006)
[hereinafter The Legal Profession as a Blue State].
13. Id.
14. Warren E. Burger, Remarks, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
949, 949, 954 (1995); see also Report of the Professionalism Committee: Teaching and
Learning Professionalism, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR §
1(B) (1996) (discussing the decline in professionalism and increased incivility); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Professionalism, WYO. LAW., Apr. 27, 2004, at 12, 13 (noting the ―growing inci-
vility‖ among lawyers). See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm
Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1253 57 (1995) [hereinafter The Professionalism Paradigm
Shift].
15. Some commentators have argued, for example, that the adoption of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 authorizing sanctions against lawyers who file meritless claims has led to
increased combativeness and incivility among lawyers. See, e.g., Alex Elson & Edwin A.
Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 365 66 (1988); Glen N.
Lenhoff, Some Negative Aspects of Rule 11, 67 MICH. B.J. 522, 523 (1988); Mark S. Stein,
Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the Purpose of Imposing
Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309,
309–10 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 482 (1991). Others have blamed the contentious nature of corporate
law and the use of aggressive litigation for the increase in lawyers‘ incivility. See, e.g., Ro-
nald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 536 37 (1994). And yet others have
identified the exponential growth of the profession and the resulting competition as a cause of
increased incivility. See, e.g., Thomas Gibbs Gee & Bryan A. Garner, The Uncivil Lawyer: A
Scourge at the Bar, 15 REV. LITIG. 177, 181–88 (1996); Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological
Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 979, 980 (2002).
16. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 283
(1998) (―Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears from the
chronic laments by critics within and outside the Bar.‖).
17. See, e.g., William J. Wernz, Does Professionalism Literature Idealize the Past and
Over-Rate Civility? Is Zeal a Vice or a Cardinal Virtue? 13 NO. 1 PROF. LAW. 1, 3 (2001).
Some have argued, for example, that the Socratic Method has been contributing to lawyer
incivility since its widespread adoption by American law schools in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. See Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 992–95 (2005) (exploring whether the Socratic Method
leads to incivility between attorneys); Paul T. Hayden, Applying Client-Lawyer Models in
Legal Education, 21 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 301, 303 (1997) (arguing that law students learn
from a Socratic teacher that a ―super-competent lawyer is brusque, dominating, and often
condescending to those less competent (a category that certainly includes clients)‖); Roger E.
Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
367, 381 (1997) (asserting that a Socratic law professor ―communicates an unspoken but
nonetheless powerful message that rude or mean-spirited wise cracks, and even temper tan-
trums, are entirely appropriate behavior‖).
18. Russell G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn
From Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, 913 15 (2005) [hereinafter Revitalizing the Law-
yer-Poet].
19. Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The
Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2009);
Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1364–65.
20. Compare Christopher J. Piazzola, Comment, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches
to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1197,
1200–02 (2003) (promoting civility codes), with Amy Mashburn, Making Civility Democrat-
ic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1219 26 (2011) (opposing civility codes).
21. Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo
Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762–79 (1994) (surveying and criticizing the pro-
fession‘s typical responses to increased incivility).
22. Amy Mashburn has recently documented that the profession‘s preoccupation with
incivility and enforcement of civility rules tends to spare powerful elite lawyers and focus on
solo practitioners typically occupying the lower ranks of the profession, thus reflecting as
much concern with sustaining the hierarchal status quo and stifling the dissent among the so-
called lower strata of the Bar; than it is with genuinely dealing with instances of overly ag-
gressive, rude and intolerant lawyering. See Mashburn, supra note 20, at 1220; see also,
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 144 45 (1989) (finding that the profession tends to
disproportionately regulate and discipline solo practitioners and small firm lawyers and
avoids and evades regulation of elite lawyers).
23. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 12 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
In this speech, King advocated for the strategy of non-violence. Id.
24. Pearce, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 18, at 914 (collecting sources on
lawyer unhappiness and dissatisfaction and discussing interpretations of this data).
25. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 343 (1933).
26. Anthony T. Kronman, Civility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 727, 729 (1995 1996).
27. Piazzola, supra note 20 at 1199 (quoting WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE:
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 172, 175 (1990)).
28. Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Necessity of Civility,
Remarks at the Opening Session of the American Law Institute (May 18, 1971), in 52 F.R.D.
211, 212 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
29. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Law Practice as a Morally Responsible Business:
Reintegrating Values into Economics and Law 5 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author), available at http://law2.fordham.edu/calfiles/flscal24523.doc.
30. See, e.g., discussion infra at notes 39–47 (describing how commentators from a
variety of philosophical perspectives support all or part of a conception of civility grounded
in relational self-interest).
31. Kronman, supra note 26, at 727–28.
32. Mashburn, supra note 20, at 1209 16.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
33. Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden, Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally
Free Zone, 24 ECON. & PHIL. 35, 51 (2008). Bruni and Sugden define mutual benefit in terms
of economic exchanges while arguing that it provides the basis of all relationships. Id. at 63.
34. See A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 23, at 18 (implying that autonomous self-
interest promotes an understanding of civil society as a zero-sum game). Martin Luther King
rejected the zero-sum game imagery of public discourse. Id. at 17 18.
35. Id. at 17 19.
36. Jim Leach, Can We Restore Compromise and Civility to Politics?, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2010/1215/Can-we-restore-compromise-and-civility-to-politics.
37. Jim Taylor, Is the Anger in American Political Discourse Good or Bad?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-jim-taylor/is-
the-anger-in-american_b_592844.html.
38. This is not to deny, of course, that norms of civility are often invoked by the power-
ful elites for the very purpose of protecting their status and maintaining the disenfranchised in
their ―proper‖ place. ABEL, supra note 22; Mashburn, supra note 20.
39. See William Rehg, Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the
Legal Theory of J. Degreesurgen Habermas, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1996).
40. See Mashburn, supra note 20, at 1202.
41. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3 (1980).
42. ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 248 (2nd ed.
1984).
43. ROBERT B. PIPPIN, THE PERSISTENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY: ON THE KANTIAN AFTERMATH
232 36 (2005).
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id. at 230.
46. Robert Araujo, Humanitarian Justice: The Quest for Civility, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
715, 718 (1996).
47. Mashburn, supra note 20, at 1217.
48. See Kenneth S. Gallant, No Paradise to Regain: Comments on Russell G. Pearce
and Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of
Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 113, 118 (2011).
49. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA 42 48 (1991) [hereinafter CULTURE WARS]. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER
& ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE WAR? A DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIFE (2006) (discussing the debate regarding the existence of the culture wars and ways to
describe the opposing perspectives).
50. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, supra note 49, at 42–48.
51. Id. at 136.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 156.
55. Id. at 147.
56. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, supra note 49, at 147 48.
57. Will Bunch, Hearing voices: Is political talk producing acts of hate?, PHILLY.COM
(Jan. 10, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-01-10/news/27020193_1_political-theater-
giffords-political-rhetoric/3 (quoting Michael Smerconish).
58. George Packer, It Doesn‟t Matter Why He Did It, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2011/01/judging-from-his-internet-
postings.html; Jake Tapper, Obama Derangement Syndrome, POLITICAL PUNCH (Nov. 10,
2008, 3:42 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2008/11/obama-derangeme.html;
Jeffrey Weiss, Make Our Ugly Discourse Better: Join the Civilogue, POLITICS DAILY (MAR.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
28, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/28/you-can-make-our-disagreeable-
discourse-better-join-the-civilog.
59. David Horowitz, Get over Obama derangement syndrome, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2008,
2:37 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1208/16306.html; Citizen of Chicago,
Comment to Obama Derangement Syndrome, supra note 58; Weiss, supra note 58.
60. John Leo, Nancy‟s Nazi Shock: Did She Forget the Bush Years?, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Aug. 8, 2009), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/08/
08/nancys_nazi_shock_did_she_forget_the_bush_years_97812.html; Jacob Weisberg, The
Misunderestimated Man: How Bush chose stupidity, SLATE (May 7, 2004, 9:54 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2100064/.
61. RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: HOW EXTREME PARTISANSHIP HAS
PARALYZED WASHINGTON AND POLARIZED AMERICA 152 (2007).
62. See Jennifer Rubin, The uncivil left, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2011, 10:15
AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-turn/2011/01/the_uncivil_left.html.
63. See Anthony Shoemaker, Sen. Brown compares anti-union governors to Hitler,
Stalin, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/
blogs/content/sharedgen/blogs/dayton/ohiopolitics/entries/2011/03/03/sen_brown_compares_
antiunion_g.html (Comparing anti-union believers to Hitler and Stalin.); Adam Smith, Marco
Rubio and the world „socialist‟, THE BUZZ, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011, 10:37
AM), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/marco-rubio-plays-
socialist-card (Describing Democrats as ―socialists‖); Daniel Tencer, Grayson ad compares
Florida religious fundamentalists to Taliban, THE RAW STORY (Sept. 25, 2010, 9:06 PM),
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/09/25/grayson-ad-taliban-dan/ (Describing opponent as
American Taliban).
64. RODIN & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 5.
65. Id. at 5 6 (quoting Bill Bradley, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BEHAVIOR, Plenary
Presentation to the Penn National Commission on Society, Culture and Community (Dec. 8,
1997), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/trans.html).
66. See Ian Bauder, Political discourse turns uncivil on campus, THE WASHINGTON
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2008, 4:45 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/16/ politi-
cal-discourse-turns-uncivil-on-campuses/.
67. Id.
68. Eric Kleefeld, Tea Party Activist And Senate Candidate: 'If We Don't See New Fac-
es, I'm Cleaning My Guns And Getting Ready For The Big Show' (VIDEO), TPM (Jan. 26,
2010, 7:00 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/01/tea-party-activist-and-senate-
candidate-if-we-dont-see-new-faces-im-cleaning-my-guns-and-getting-rea.php.
69. Tea Party rally calls for limited government, MID-HUDSON NEWS (July 12, 2010),
http://www.midhudsonnews.com/News/2010/July/12/TeaParty-12Jul10.html.
70. Ken Tucker, Jon Stewart to Chris Wallace on 'Fox News Sunday': 'You're insane',
EW.COM (June 19, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://watching-tv.ew.com/2011/06/19/jon-stewart-chris-
wallace-fox-news-sunday/; see also Joe Gandelman, CNN Ratings Are Up But Big Cable
Winner Remains Fox, THE MODERATE VOICE (June 29,
2011),
http://themoderatevoice.com/115014/cnn-ratings-are-up-but-big-cable-winner-remains-fox/.
71. See James Fallows, Is There Anything to Do About „Civility?‘ THE ATLANTIC (June
13, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/01/is-there-anything-
to-do-about-civility/69457/.
72. RODIN & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 5.
73. PUTNAM, supra note 10, at 55 57, 111 12 (2000). Not surprisingly, Putnam ob-
serves that the previous low point of civic engagement was the Great Depression, the pre-
vious high point for polarized political culture. Id. at 54, 63; see also BROWNSTEIN, supra
note 61, at 17 (describing the era between 1896-1938 as a ―period of sharp party conflict‖).
Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Together: The United State of America, 3 THE AMERICAN
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
PROSPECT 20 (2002) (―The closing decades of the twentieth century found Americans grow-
ing ever less connected with one another and with collective life. We voted less, joined less,
gave less, trusted less, invested less time in public affairs, and engaged less with our friends,
our neighbors, and even our families. Our ‗we‗ steadily shriveled.‖).
74. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 12 (2003).
75. Gallant, supra note 48; see MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 479
(2009) (citing many examples of McReynolds‘s discourtesy).
76. Gallant, supra note 48; see Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Protestors at Military
Funerals, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/
us/03scotus.html.
77. See supra note 26 38 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
80. Jim Taylor, The Blogosphere Jungle, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2009, 11:22 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-jim-taylor/the-blogosphere-jungle_b_404529.html; see
Weiss, supra note 58.
81. Weiss, supra note 58.
82. See, e.g., MARCUS DANIEL, SCANDAL & CIVILITY: JOURNALISM AND THE BIRTH OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 17 (2009); RODIN & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 1–3.
83. Peter Carlson, Pistols at Dawn, AM. HISTORY, Feb. 2011, at 38–39.
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 34. President Andrew Jackson, to name but one leading American politician,
has the distinction of being the only American President to have killed a man in a duel. Id.
86. Richard Brookhiser, Fighting Words Flew When the Nation Was New, AM. HISTORY,
June 2011, at 15, 15.
87. Id. at 15–16.
88. Id. at 15.
89. See id. at 15–16.
90. Pearce & Wald, supra note 29, at 5. The comparison of autonomous and relational
concepts of the self is not original to us. As explained in greater detail in Pearce & Wald,
supra, a wide range of commentators have employed similar frameworks, including philoso-
pher Charles Taylor, who wrote in his lecture on ―The Malaise of Modernity‖ that theorists
such as Locke and Hobbes, as well as modern political theorists such as Ronald Dworkin
have neglected the social context in which individuals arise. See generally CHARLES
TAYLOR, THE MALAISE OF MODERNITY (2003). Relational feminists such as Carol Gilligan,
Nel Noddings, Eva Feder Kittay and Virginia Held have advanced a notion of the ―ethics of
care‖ which recognizes caring as ethically relevant to both the public and private spheres.
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMINIST
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); VIRGINIA HELD, ETHICS OF CARE:
PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL 63 64 (2006); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE‘S LABOR:
ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY AND DEPENDENCY 20 (1998). Economists such as Amartya
Sen, Luigino Bruni, and Robert Sugden have also cited various problems with a philosophy
centered on the individual and self. See Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public
Goods Through Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772, 774 (1984) (discussing Margolis‘
theory of ―group interest‖ in relation to economic understandings of the self); Bruni & Sug-
den, supra note 33, at 35 (grounding economic theory in mutual benefit and not in material
self-interest); see generally AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(1970) (arguing for the utility of social welfare in society).
91. Pearce & Wald, supra note 29, at 5.
92. Id. at 15 16.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
93. See generally GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST
POLITICS (2001) (arguing that individuals and groups are predominantly self-interested, and
approach politics with a ―game theory‖ attitude towards achieving equilibrium).
94. See, e.g., Meet the Republican Congress: New Chairs Put Corporate Special Interests
Before Middle Class Jobs, available at
http://dccc.org/blog/entry/meet_the_republican_congress_new_chairs_put_corporate_special
_interests_bef/ (asserting that Congressional Republicans are pursuing the ―agenda of Corpo-
rate special interests‖); http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/special-reports/2011/01/
special-report-democrats-must-break-free-their-special-interest-stra#ixzz1YmfMDmMk
(asserting that ―power within the Democratic Party lies with . . . with the special interests on
the left, including public employee unions, environmentalist groups and trial lawyers‖). See
generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
95. Olson states that ―political parties usually seek collective benefits: they strive for
governmental policies which, as they say, will help all of the people (or at least a large num-
ber of them).‖ Id. at 163. As such, ―most people feel they would be better off if their party
were in power.‖ Id.
96. Olson describes the phenomenon of discomfort with the government in a ―pressure
group system‖ as such: ―Even if such a pressure group system worked with perfect fairness to
every group, it would still tend to work inefficiently . . . . Coherent, rational policies cannot
be expected from a series of ad hoc concessions to diverse interest groups.‖ Id. at 124, n.52.
He goes on to explain that in such a system, ―there may be a sense in which the narrow ‗spe-
cial interests‘ of the small group tend to triumph over the [. . .] interests of ‗the people‘ . . . .
Often a relatively small group or industry will win a tariff, or a tax loophole, at the expense
of millions of consumers or taxpayers in spite of the ostensible rule of the majority.‖ Id. at
144.
97. William A. Galston, Can a Polarized American Party System Be “Healthy”?, ISSUES
IN GOVERNANCE STUDIES Apr. 2010, at 1, 17.
98. Id.
99. Patrick J. Deenan notes that ―[i]n the wake of the tragic shooting in Tucson, Arizona
. . . a chorus of voices . . . arose in denunciation of the decline of ‗civility‘ in contemporary
political life. Somewhat incredibly, some of the more prominent voices on the political
Right—such as Rush Limbaugh and Mark Levin—denounced these calls for civility.‖ Patrick
J. Deenan, Who Owns Civility?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2011, 9:44 AM),
http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/georgetown/2011/03/civility_and_democracy.htm.
Sarah Palin condemned such calls for more civil discourse in politics as an infringement on
free speech. See Lance Bennett, What‟s Wrong with Incivility?: Civility as the New Censor-
ship in American Politics 3 (Ctr. for Comm‘n and Civic Engagement, Working Paper No.
2011-1, 2011), available at http://ccce.com.washington.edu/projects/assets/working_papers/
Bennett-What's-Wrong-with-Incivility-CCCE-WP-2011-1.pdf. Rush Limbaugh echoed her
sentiment to defend incivility when he argued that civility was the ―new censorship.‖ RUSH
LIMBAUGH, Civility is the New Censorship, on THE RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_011311/content/01125108.guest.html.
While such analogies between civility and censorship are arguably less visible on the
left, remarks from liberal politicians and pundits are just as rife with examples of uncivil
discourse, suggesting that they too view incivility as an acceptable form of debating oppo-
nents. Barney Frank, a House Democrat from Massachusetts, responded to a Tea Partier in
an August 2010 town hall meeting equating Obama‘s healthcare plan to Nazism by saying
―On what planet do you spend most of your time? . . . Ma‘am, trying to have a conversation
with you would be like trying to argue with a dining room table, I have no interest in doing
it.‖ Kasie Hunt, Frank Debates Dining Room Table, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:30 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/41861.html. President Obama also sparked con-
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
troversy when he referred to members of the Tea Party as ―teabaggers,‖ a term with sexual
connotations that the Americans for Tax Reform President Grover Norquist says is ―indefens-
ible‖ and ―the equivalent of using the ‗n‘ word.‖ Jennifer Harper, Strong Brew, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 5, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/may/5/strong-brew/. The term is widely used on the Left, by commentators such as Bill
Maher, Keith Olberman, Rachel Maddow, and even NPR. See Joe Sudbay, Top Teabagger is
mad: Don‟t call us „an offensive sexual slur,‟ AMERICA BLOG (Jan. 17, 2010, 10:30 AM),
http://www.americablog.com/2010/01/top-teabagger-is-mad-dont-call-us.html; NPR Apolo-
gizes, Denies Knowing „Teabagger‟ Was Offensive, THE FOX NATION (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://nation.foxnews.com/culture/2010/01/08/npr-apologizes-denies-knowing-teabagger-
was-offensive.
100. See Galston, supra note 97.
101. Pearce & Wald, supra note 29, at 5–6.
102. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1351–53. Norman
Spaulding describes, for example, how the Civil War destroyed the American elite‘s faith that
a shared conception of civic culture and the public good would maintain civil society. Nor-
man Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2015 (2005).
103. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1351 53.
104. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 85, 109 (1993) [hereinafter LOST LAWYER]. According to Plato and Aristotle,
there are different concerns to which a person may reasonably devote himself. These con-
cerns are rank-ordered in a hierarchy of objective worth. The lawyer-statesman stands for the
value of public interest and the virtue of civic-mindedness associated with it. Id.
105. Kronman, supra note 26, at 731; Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra
note 12, at 1362.
106. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1359.
107. Kronman, supra note 26, at 731.
108. Id.
109. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1358 64.
110. Id.
111. Id.; Kronman, supra note 26, at 730 2.
112. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 10, at 65 79 (2000) (discussing the effects of
declining participation in organized religion in the U.S. as one of the factors contributing to
broad distrust in governing institutions); BARRY KOSMIN, et al., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 12–13 (2001), available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY-
Graduate-Center/PDF/ARIS/ARIS-PDF-version.pdf (finding that those without any religious
identification grew from 8% of the population in 1990 to over 14% in 2001.) Some have
argued that lawyers and the legal profession have played a role in the decline of organized
religion, by advocating an aggressive and expansive separation of church and state, thus
limiting public interest in, and the space for organized religion in our society. See, e.g.,
BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE END OF
SECULAR POLITICS 16–18 (2007). While we believe that lawyers have played a role in cultu-
rally manufacturing and elevating autonomous self-interest to its dominant position and are
thus partly responsible for the incivility fostered by autonomous self-interest, see infra Part
III, we take no position on the question of whether the legal profession contributed to the
decline of organized religion in the United States.
113. See SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 74. Or, if American society has
not become more open to diversity, it has at least become inundated with ―diversity talk‖.
Ironically, ―diversity fatigue,‖ a backlash against diversity may be taking place while the
underlying challenges of diversity have not been yet addressed. See Eli Wald, A Primer on
Diversity, Discrimination and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1110 1 (2011) [hereinafter A
Primer on Diversity].
114. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity,
and Rule of Law. 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2005); Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas. Team
Learning and the Radical Diversity-Performance. (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 05-
026, 2004); Wald, A Primer on Diversity, supra note 113, at 1093 119.
115. The literature on law and lawyers as social engineers is vast. For an instructive
review, see Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996).
On the legalization of social movements and the American tendency to seek social reform by
means of legal reform, see Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477,
480 (2004); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 941 (2011); see
generally Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions, and
Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (2010); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (University of Chicago Press, 2
nd
ed. 2008).
116. See infra Part III.
117. The turn to the courts has often placed public disputes into the box of ―public inter-
est law,‖ dominated by the liberal left between the 1960s and 1980s, and since then featuring
both liberal and conservative voices with conservatives playing a more influential role in
Supreme Court litigation. KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER, supra note 104, at 161. On the rise of
conservative cause lawyering, see ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT –
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF
THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
118. Indeed, we share Marc Galanter‘s general distrust of nostalgic pleas to so-called
golden eras. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia,
100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996).
119. See, e.g., E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT, ARISTOCRACY &
CASTE IN AMERICA (Yale University Press ed., 1987). See generally MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Routledge Classics ed., 2001).
120. See supra notes 83 89 and accompanying text.
121. See generally GINA WELCH, IN THE LAND OF BELIEVERS: AN OUTSIDER‘S
EXTRAORDINARY JOURNEY INTO THE HEART OF THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH (2010) (covering
the author‘s two year undercover journey into Jerry Falwell‘s mega-church where she came
to understand the empathy of Evangelicalism).
122. See, for example, the No Labels group, a bipartisan lobby whose slogan is ―Not Left.
Not Right. Forward.‖, which advocates for people who ―want a less partisan, less ideological,
more common sense approach to the nation‘s problems and crises.‖ NO LABELS,
http://nolabels.org (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). Also, consider John Stewart‘s ―Rally to Re-
store Sanity‖ held in Washington, DC on October 30, 2010 in response to Glen Beck and the
Tea Party‘s ―Restoring Honor‖ rally in August. Stewart‘s event was billed as ―not so much
for the Silent Majority as the Busy Majority‖. Stewart‘s website called for people ―who think
shouting is annoying, counterproductive, and terrible for your throat; who feel that the loud-
est voices shouldn‘t be the only ones that get heard; and who believe that the only time it‘s
appropriate to draw a Hitler mustache on someone is when that person is actually Hitler‖ to
join him. RALLY TO RESTORE SANITY, http://www.rallytorestoresanity.com (last visited Aug.
8, 2011).
123. See, for example, the Daily Kos, an online community of liberal writers and com-
mentators that ―recognizes that Democrats run from left to right on the ideological spectrum,
and yet we're all still in this fight together.‖ Memo to the World, DAILY KOS (Nov. 15, 2004,
6:24 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/15/73807/-Memo-to-the-world.
124. At a Philadelphia fundraiser in June 2008, Barack Obama stated in regards to Re-
publican attacks that ―If they bring a knife to the fight, we bring a gun.‖ In reporting on the
story, the Washington Post later added an editor‘s note in the wake of the Tucson shooting
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
about civility. See WSJ Staff, Obama: „If They Bring a Knife to the Fight, We Bring a Gun,‘
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 14, 2008, 1:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2008/06/14/obama-if-they-bring-a-knife-to-the-fight-we-bring-a-gun/. A 2008 Republican
candidate for the Senate, Richard Behney, told supporters in December 2008 that if midterms
didn‘t go well for him, he was going to be ―cleaning my guns and getting ready for the big
show‖. John Prince, The Party Isn‟t Over Yet, HARV. POL. REV. (FEB. 18, 2010),
http://hpronline.org/uncategorized/the-party-isnt-over-yet/.
125. A commercial spot for George W. Bush‘s 2000 presidential election aired just before
the Republican National Convention described him as ―a man of integrity who will ‗unite, not
divide and let every American look at the White House and be proud.‘‖ Hotline, ADWEEK
(July 31, 2000), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/hotline-50728. In the 2004 presi-
dential election, John Kerry chose John Edwards as his running mate and embraced his mes-
sage of unity as well, pledging to bridge ―the great divide‖ between ―two Americas‖. Kerry
Taps Fellow Senator Edwards as Running Mate, THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (July 6,
2004), http://www.democraticwhip.gov/content/kerry-taps-fellow-senator-edwards-running-
mate. Unity was also frequent theme in Obama‘s 2008 campaign, especially with regards to
religion, as he remarked in June 2007 that faith should unite, not divide us in response to
growing criticism from the Christian Coalition. Scott A. Giordano, Obama: Faith should
unite, not divide us (June 24, 2007 10:31 AM), http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/
post/scottgiordano/CXVW.
126. See Galston, supra note 97, at 14.
127. Id. at 2.
128. See supra notes 14 17 and accompanying text.
129. See Pearce & Wald, supra note 29.
130. See Galston, supra note 97, at 2.
131. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992). See generally GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993).
132. See Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1342; Russell G.
Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Origi-
nal Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 403
(2001) [hereinafter Lawyers as America‟s Governing Class]; see also Pearce, The Professio-
nalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 14, at 1238; Eli Wald, Loyalty In Limbo: The Peculiar
Case of Attorneys‟ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L. J. 909, 928-36 (2009) [hereinafter
Loyalty in Limbo].
133. See Pearce, Lawyers as America‟s Governing Class, supra note 132, at 391; Pearce,
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 14, at 1241; Wald, Loyalty in Limbo, supra
note 132 at 928 36.
134. BRANDEIS, supra note 25, at 337.
135. Id. at 335. In court, the lawyer‘s duty was to pursue the client‘s case ―fairly and
well,‖ not to destroy the other side. In ―the greater part of‖ lawyer‘s work, ―advising men on
important matters, and mainly in business affairs,‖ lawyers deal with ―questions of states-
manship‖ and ―exercise . . . the highest diplomacy. The magnitude, difficulty and importance
of the problems involved are often as great as in . . . matters of state.‖ Indeed, noted Bran-
deis, ―[t]he relations between rival railroad systems are like the relations between neighbor-
ing kingdoms. The relations of the great trusts to the consumers or to their employees is like
that of feudal lords to commoners or dependents.‖ Id.
136. Pearce, Lawyers as America‟s Governing Class, supra note 132, at 402 n.194.
Commentators identify the concept of ―counsel for the situation" with Louis Brandeis. Id. In
one famous instance, ―Brandeis represented United Shoe in a dispute with its employees.‖
Id. at 402. While ―investigat[ing] the employees‘ complaints that they needed annual, rather
than seasonal, employment[,]‖ Brandeis ―determined that these claims were legitimate and
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
worked with his client to revamp the plants‘ manufacturing schedule in a manner Brandeis
believed to be in the best interest of both his client and the employees.‖ Id. at 402.
137. BRANDEIS, supra note 25, at 337.
138. Id. at 341.
139. Id. at 343.
140. Id. at 402.
141. See generally ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964).
142. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007).
143. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938).
144. See Smigel, supra note 141.
145. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A
MIDDLE-SIZED CITY 13 34 (1967); DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF
CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 19 33 (1990).
146. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 115 16 (1978).
147. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669, 672 75 (1978); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617. See gen-
erally Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS‘
ROLES AND LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 150 71 (David Luban ed., 1984); Russell G. Pearce, Profes-
sional Responsibility for the Age of Obama: Reviewing David Luban, Legal Ethics and Hu-
man Dignity, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1594, 1600 (2009) [hereinafter Age of Obama]; Wald,
Loyalty in Limbo, supra note 132 at 928 36.
148. Pearce, Age of Obama, supra note 147, at 1600. See generally LUBAN, supra note
142, at 9 11.
149. See Bd. of Prof‘l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-
140 (1996); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-10-303(b) (Supp. 1997). Under § 37-10-303(b),
―[i]f . . . the minor elects not to seek consent of the parent or legal guardian whose consent is
required, then the minor may petition, on the minor's own behalf, or by next friend, the juve-
nile court of any county of this state for a waiver of the consent requirement . . . .‖
150. See Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1350.
151. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 71 73 (1990). See also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991) (de-
scribing it as ―the legal profession‘s basic narrative‖).
152. SHARSWOOD, supra note 131, at 87. Brougham‘s entire statement strongly endorsed
autonomous self-interest as the lawyer‘s goal:
An advocate . . . in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expe-
dients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them to himself,
is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the
alarm, the torments, the destruction he may bring upon others. Separating the
duty of a patriot from that of advocate, he must go on, reckless of consequences:
though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion.
Id. For a debate on Brougham‘s views, compare Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Re-
conceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (arguing that lawyers'
duties of zealous advocacy to a client are limited by duties implicit in the lawyer's profes-
sional role), with FREEDMAN, supra note 151, at 71 77 (emphasizing lawyers‘ duties to zeal-
ously advocate for clients).
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
153. FREEDMAN, supra note 151, at 72. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1469, 1470 74 (1966).
154. See Pepper, supra note 147, at 615 19.
155. Id.
156. Pepper is by no means alone among legal ethics theorists whose insightful analyses
are influenced by autonomous self-interest. Bradley Wendel‘s powerful recent account of
lawyers‘ fidelity to the law is equally subject to the criticism that the dominance of autonom-
ous self-interest would lead lawyers, in good faith, to understand and interpret the law expan-
sively to allow clients to pursue their narrow self-interest in disregard of the public good. See,
e.g., W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO THE LAW (2011). Even critics of the
hired gun ideology have been influenced by the dominance of autonomous self-interest.
David Luban‘s celebrated rejection of the ―standard conception‖ of lawyers‘ role morality
and his insistence of the relevance of common morality to lawyers‘ practice is somewhat less
compelling if autonomous self-interest forms not only lawyers‘ role morality but also our
common morality. LUBAN, supra note 142, at 9. Similarly, William Simon‘s theory of la-
wyering based on a conception of justice is less compelling if lawyers‘ good faith construc-
tion and understanding of justice is framed by autonomous self-interest. The dominance of
autonomous self-interest either undermines the appeal of these approaches or encourages
lawyers to construe them consistent with autonomous self-interest.
157. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO‘S IN CHARGE? 96 (1974).
158. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 157; Jerome Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A
Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (1962).
159. Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1803, 1822 23 (2008); see also David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case:
Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES, at 68
(1998) (exploring types of attorney-client relationships and situations in which lawyers treat
their clients paternalistically). See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF
DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999) (arguing lawyers‘ exercise of elitist pater-
nalism vis-à-vis a passive citizenry).
160. Robert W. Gordon, ―The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1879–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL
WAR AMERICA 51, 51 74 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (exploring the elevated role and status
of lawyers in American society).
161. Anthony Kronman‘s otherwise powerful account of the decline of the lawyer-
statesman and his ability to exercise practical wisdom on behalf of clients and society has
been compellingly criticized for this very point – its failure to also note that lawyers‘ exercise
of practical wisdom as part of their role as lawyers-statesmen was not only beneficial to so-
ciety but also quite beneficial to lawyers themselves. Compare KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER,
supra note 104, at 161, with Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1179 (1995).
162. See HANDLER, supra note 145.
163. See, e.g., Jeremy Pelofsky, AT&T, T-Mobile hire legal all-stars to save deal,
REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2011) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/us-att-tmobile-lawyers-
idUSTRE78L38Y20110922. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009) (criticizing the under-developed and narrow scope of contem-
porary understanding of lawyers‘ civic role as public citizens).
164. Some commentators have argued that law‘s masculine aggression and incivility are a
reflection of the male identity of generations of lawyers and have speculated that as the num-
ber of women lawyers and their influences in the profession continues to increase, the Bar
will become less combative and more civil. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative
Sociology of Women Lawyers: The “Feminization” of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
HALL L.J. 897, 898 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the
Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 289, 312 19 (1998); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself: An Empirical Investigation
of the Relationship Between the Ethic of Care, the Feeling Decisionmaking Preference, and
Lawyer Wellbeing, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 115 18 (2008); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Review Essay, What's Gender Got to Do With It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of
Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 285 89 (1996).
We leave exploring the relationship between lawyer incivility and a feminine-
inspired and modeled ethic of care to another day. While history teaches us that male law-
yers are clearly capable of practicing pursuant to relational attitudes and that the rise of auto-
nomous self-interest within the profession, at least as of the mid-1980s, took place when
female lawyers constituted a significant and increasing segment of the profession, the ques-
tion remains whether female (and male) attorneys committed to the ethic of care are more
likely to accept and practice relationally. See, e.g., RAND JACK AND DANA CROWLEY JACK,
MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN
LAWYERS (1989).
165. See Gee & Garner, supra note 15, at 181; Richard, supra note 15.
166. As we note above, the rise of autonomous self-interest as a dominant cultural way of
understanding one‘s role and legitimate conduct is not inconsistent with adopting relational
approaches intra-group, while pursuing increasingly aggressive and uncivil approaches vis-à-
vis individuals and groups perceived to be the ―adversary‖ and not fellow human beings. See
Gee & Garner, supra note 15. Similarly, while the growing diversity of the profession has
resulted in the development of some relational approaches practiced by sub-groups within the
Bar, overall the profession features greater stratification and polarization.
167. See KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER, supra note 104, at 282 91; David B. Wilkins, Teams
of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2067, 2080 85 (2010).
168. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Trans-
formation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1878 (2008); Wilkins, supra note
167.
169. See supra note 143; SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (1994).
170. Leslie C. Levin‘s and Rick Abel‘s studies of immigration lawyers offer a vivid and
striking account of the consequences of increased competition on the practice and lives of
solo and small firm attorneys. Richard A. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene‟s
Basement, 84 N. C. L. REV. 1449 (2006); Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: The Back-
grounds, Career Paths, and Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers,
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 399 (2009); see also Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and
Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309 (2004).
171. As is the case with the growth in the size of the profession, we are not making a
normative judgment suggesting that increased competition is undesirable from lawyers‘,
clients‘, and society‘s perspectives, nor do we mean to imply that but for increased competi-
tion relational approaches among lawyers would flourish. Rather, we note that increased
competition in the market for legal services has served to undermine the foundation for rela-
tional perspectives among lawyers and to support the rise of autonomous self-interest.
172. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Trauma Surgeon of Wall Street, N. Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/nyregion/15cohen.html?pagewanted=all; Renee Ciria-
Cruz, Getting Down to Business: Pressure grows to retain clients and find new ones, Cali-
fornia Lawyer, April 2010, http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=908794&evid=1.
173. See KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER, supra note 104, at 288 91.
174. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 168; MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU
KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004).
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
175. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 168.
176. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94
GEO. L.J. 1909, 1910 (2006); Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk Management, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2315, 2324 26 (2010); Wald, A Primer on Diversity, supra note 113, at 1125 29.
177. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM (1988).
178. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 14, at 1251.
179. REGAN, supra note 174, at 59 60. See generally Eli Wald, Glass-ceilings and Dead
Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes and the Future of Women Lawyers at
Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245 (2010) (exploring the rise of hyper-competitive
ideologies at large law firms).
180. American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism, „. . . In the Spirit of
Public Service:‟ A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112
F.R.D. 243, 259 60 (1986) (noting the increased emphasis on fee collection).
181. Bruni & Sugden, supra note 33.
182. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 62; see Pearce,
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 14, at 1256 63 (discussing how the unrave-
ling of the Professionalism Paradigm ―led leaders of an apprehensive legal community [to]
fear[] for the profession‘s future.‖). See generally MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1994); KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER, supra note 104; LINOWITZ & MAYER, supra note 169.
183. See American Bar Association, supra note 180.
184. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
185. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 14, at 1253 (―Instead of
mediating between the interests of business and the public, lawyers promoted the interests of
business . . . .‖).
186. Id. at 1257.
187. Pearce, Lawyers as America‟s Governing Class, supra note 132, at 411.
188. Id. Commentators also note that ―[N]obody ever lost a client by doing exactly what
the fellow wanted, but much lucrative legal work has been sacrificed by lawyers who regret-
fully told prospective clients that this was something they were not willing to do.‖ LINOWITZ
& MAYER, supra note 169, at 18 19. See generally Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professio-
nalism: A Study of Judges‟ and Lawyers‟ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998).
189. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, supra note 49, at 136.
190. Id.
191. Marvin E. Aspen, Doing Something About Civility in Litigation, LITIG., Winter
1992, at 4.
192. Id. at 3 4.
193. Saundra Torry, Disorder in the Court! New Codes Call for Good Behavior, WASH.
POST, June 24, 1996, at F7; see generally Kara Nagorney, A Noble Profession? A Discussion
of Civility Among Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815 (1999).
194. Id.
195. Piazzola, supra note 27, at 1203 (quoting Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d
629, 639 40 (D.V.I. 1999)).
196. Id. at 1206 (quoting Paramount Commc‘ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del.
1994)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1206 n.55 (citing Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (Sup. Ct.
1992)).
199. Sarat, supra note 188, at 819.
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34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
200. Final Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143
F.R.D. 441, 445 (1992).
201. Piazzola, supra note 27, at 1200 n.27 (―Just three years after the Seventh Circuit‘s
adoption of its Final Report, nearly one hundred jurisdictions had adopted civility codes.‖);
see, e.g., ABA TORT TRIAL AND INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION, A LAWYER‘S CREED OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1988); ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, LAWYER‘S PLEDGE OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1988); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA LITIGATION SECTION, MODEL CODE OF
CIVILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM (2006); see also Bruce A. Green, Public Declarations of
Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 30 (2001).
202. Most recently, in the aftermath of corporate scandals and criticisms of large corpo-
rate entities‘ and their managers‘ aggressive pursuit of autonomous self-interest to the great
detriment of their shareholders and society, many have called for a new role for in-house
lawyers and outside counsel as gate-keepers, in which they would be called upon to exhibit a
more responsible—and possibly relational—approach. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 231 32, 348 51 (2006);
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (2003) (exploring the role of lawyers in the corporate meltdown of
the 1990s). See generally William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Law-
yer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2003). Cf. Susan
Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic For Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law,
and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCH., PUB. POL‘Y. & LAW 811 (1999). As external criti-
cisms of the profession declined, so did the profession‘s willingness to seriously entertain
reform. See Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeep-
ing, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 151 52 (2011).
203. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1342; Susan Daicoff,
Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Can Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to
Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
547 (1998).
204. Rhode, supra note 163.
205. Green & Pearce, supra note 19, at 1212.
206. Stephen Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 403, 409 10 (2000).
207. Green & Pearce, supra note 19, at 1212.
208. Id. at 1214.
209. Gordon, supra note 160.
210. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
458 60 (1897) (address at the dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of
Law on January 8, 1897).
211. Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Serious-
ly, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 777 (2008).
212. Several jurisdictions, for example, have explicitly designated discriminatory talk as
professional misconduct. See Wald, A Primer on Diversity, supra note 113 at 1113 15
(summarizing and assessing various states‘ approaches to regulating discriminatory talk and
conduct in the practice of law).
213. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV.
895 (1996). For a recent and growing movement to encourage relational approaches in the
discovery stage led by the Sedona Conference, see http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/tsc_cooperation_proclamation.
214. LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM
IN PRACTICE 10 12 (2001) (examining relational perspectives among family law attorneys);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 56 58 (1963) (studying relational approaches in commercial law).
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
215. Pearce & Wald, supra note 29.
216. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION TRIUMPHS
OVER SELF-INTEREST 2 7 (2011) (asserting that evolution favors those driven to cooperate
with other people).
217. MICHAEL TOMASELLO, WHY WE COOPERATE 4 (2009) (stating that children have a
natural tendency to cooperate with others and that this tendency is something they do not
learn from adults).
218. Daniel Siegel & Debra Pearce McCall, Mindsight at work: an interpersonal neuro-
biology lens on leadership, NEUROLEADERSHIP JOURNAL, 2009, at 1.
219. Legal scholarship lends further support to the desirability of relational perspectives.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
220. POUND, supra note 184.
221. ABA CANONS OF ETHICS PREAMBLE (1908).
222. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY PREAMBLE (1964).
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE, Comment 13 (2010).
224. Id. at Comment 1.
225. Id. at Comment 7.
226. Id. at Comment 1; see Wald, Loyalty in Limbo, supra note 132, at 928 36.
227. Cf. Bruni & Sugden, supra note 33, at 35 64.
228. See Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1356 63; Dai-
coff, supra note 202.
229. David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 969 (1999).
230. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS
54 62 (1998).
231. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1341 (2009). See generally W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos
and the Demands of Legality (Cornell Law School, Research Paper No. 09-019, 2009), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1422603; WENDEL, FIDELITY TO THE LAW, supra note 156.
232. Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate‟s Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report‟s Failure
to Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L. REV. 575, 591 95 (2003); see also WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 28 33
(2007); Roy Stuckey, Transcript, Symposium: The Opportunity for Legal Education, 59
MERCER L. REV. 859 (2007) (Stuckey is the lead author of ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007).). See also Roger C.
Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247
(1978).
233. See Pearce & Wald, supra note 29. We intend to explore these issues in greater
detail in an article we are writing for a St. Thomas School of Law symposium on legal educa-
tion and the formation of professional identity. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Denial and
Accountability in Legal Education: How Law Schools Fail to Meet Their Responsibility for
the Formation of Professional Identity, St. Thomas L. J. (forthcoming 2012).
234. WILLIAM M SULLIVAN ET AL, EDUCATING LAWYERS – PREPARING FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007);
Verna E. Monson & Neil W. Hamilton, Entering Law Students‟ Conceptions of an Ethical
Professional Identity and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 385 (2011);
Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Professionalism to
Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2011). See also, Frank S.
Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321 (1982)
(on the education of adult law students).
235. See Pearce & Wald, supra note 29.
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
236. See, e.g., NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A
GOOD LIFE IN THE LAW (2010); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).
237. Sarat, supra note 188.
238. See JOHN AVLON, WINGNUTS: HOW THE LUNATIC FRINGE IS HIJACKING AMERICA
167 84 (2010).
239. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WARS?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED
AMERICA 57 77 (3d ed. 2010).
240. See id.
241. See, e.g., Sugden, supra note 90.
242. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 251 (2008).
243. See, e.g., the University of Arizona‘s creation of a National Institute for Civil Dis-
course, supra note 5.
244. In game theory lingo, non-cooperation is a dominant strategy for each prisoner. Of
course, the very point of the prisoners‘ dilemma is to demonstrate that dominant strategies
result in non-optimal outcomes for the prisoners and that cooperation would have yielded
better results for both. See, e.g., Robert J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
514 15 (1994).
245. Note that in the prisoner‘s dilemma, both prisoners would be better off if they did
not talk to the police and remained silent. But neither trusts the other, so both speak with the
police and end up worse off. Put differently, in the absence of trust, both prisoners have a
dominant strategy of not cooperating with each other, but the outcome for both is less than
optimal. Id. at 514 n.15. Similarly, autonomous self-interest may be a dominant strategy, but
it leads to sub-optimal outcomes.
246. Assuming, of course, that their lawyers will teach and advise relational conduct and
not push their clients to act as autonomously self-interested actors.
247. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 23.
248. ABA Model Rule 1.2 regarding the allocation of authority between attorney and
client states that the client is ultimately responsible for setting the goals and objectives of the
relationship. MODEL RULES OF PROF‗L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
249. Not to mention that the reality of attorney-client relationships is much more complex
than the one envisioned by Rule 1.2(a). While some clients are quite powerful vis-à-vis their
attorneys, others often defer to their lawyers. See David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the
Troubling Case, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 70 75 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1998) (rejecting simplistic assumptions about the allocation of power and authority within the
attorney-client relationship and exploring various contexts in which clients and lawyers inte-
ract); see also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990)
(same).
250. See supra note 7.
251. See, e.g., Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State, supra note 12, at 1341 43,
1359 60 (referring to public opinion polling data and to the commentary of political philoso-
phers, including Michael Sandel and Ronald Dworkin).
252. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 23. In this speech, King advocated for the strate-
gy of non-violence. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also Deborah J. Cantrell, Lawyers, Loyalty and Social Change, 89 DENV.
U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (draft on file with authors), at 3 4, 24 30 (applying King‘s
analysis to argue that cause lawyers would better serve their clients‘ interests through ―rela-
tional loyalty‖ that views clients, third parties, and adversaries from a relational perspective
*Please refer to original version with footnotes for accurate page numbers
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011).
rather than through ―hyper-loyalty‖ that requires viewing third-parties and adversaries as
necessarily ―friends‖ or ―enemies‖).
255. Id.
256. BRANDEIS, supra note 25.
