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Sri Lanka: Putting Entrepreneurship at the Heart of Economic Revival in the North, East, and Beyond

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  • Point Pedro Institute of Development

Abstract

Economic growth at the national level in Sri Lanka in the past few years has been largely state-led. Similarly, economic growth in the formerly civil war-affected Northern Province has also been largely state-led (including mushrooming military enterprises) during the past two years after the end of the civil war. This author is of the view that individual and corporate entrepreneurs-led growth strategy is the appropriate strategy to revive the national economy and the formerly war-torn regional economies. Moreover, military peace should be transformed into civil peace in the former war-torn areas.
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Sri Lanka: putting entrepreneurship at
the heart of economic revival in the
north, east, and beyond
Muttukrishna Sarvananthan a
a Point Pedro Institute of Development, ‘Maanicca Vasa',
Thambasetty, Point Pedro, Northern Province, Sri Lanka
Available online: 30 Jun 2011
To cite this article: Muttukrishna Sarvananthan (2011): Sri Lanka: putting entrepreneurship at the
heart of economic revival in the north, east, and beyond, Contemporary South Asia, 19:2, 205-213
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2011.565313
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VIEWPOINT
Sri Lanka: putting entrepreneurship at the heart of economic revival in
the north, east, and beyond
Muttukrishna Sarvananthan*
Point Pedro Institute of Development, ‘Maanicca Vasa’, Thambasetty, Point Pedro, Northern
Province, Sri Lanka
Economic growth at the national level in Sri Lanka in the past few years has been
largely state-led. Similarly, economic growth in the formerly civil war-affected
northern province has also been largely state-led (including mushrooming
military enterprises) during the past two years after the end of the civil war.
This author is of the view that individual and corporate entrepreneur-led growth
strategy is the appropriate strategy to revive the national economy and the
formerly war-torn regional economies. Moreover, current military peace should
be transformed into civil peace in the former war-torn areas.
Keywords: entrepreneurship; military enterprises; military peace; post-war
economy; Sri Lanka
Introduction
Entrepreneurship is about putting ideas into action. It is the function of scientists to
invent and entrepreneurs to innovate. Whereas scientists invent (or dream of) ideas, it
is the entrepreneurs who materialise those ideas into consumable products
(innovation), i.e., tangible goods and intangible services. In this opinion piece I am
going to spur your minds with the power of ideas as opposed to the power of numbers.
In the first four months of 2010 Sri Lanka went through the ritual of Presidential
and Parliamentary elections. As usual, Sri Lankan politicians have outperformed
each other with facts and figures about what a marvellous country we live in (or lack
thereof) and how they are going to make Sri Lanka an even better place to live in.
For both the governing party as well as the main opposition party economic
development would be the heart of government. I have no disagreement with putting
development at the heart of government. My disagreement is with the ways and
means of spurring economic development that were propounded by both the main
political parties in the country in the aftermath of the civil war.
It is not only the government (politicians as well as bureaucrats) that lacks
innovative ideas to unleash the full potential of the Sri Lankan people; our
development partners (bilateral and multilateral donors) and non-governmental
organisations as well lack innovative ideas to rebuild a war-torn economy by
learning from the experiences of other countries that have undergone such a phase.
*Email: sarvi@pointpedro.org
Contemporary South Asia
Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2011, 205–213
ISSN 0958-4935 print/ISSN 1469-364X online
Ó2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09584935.2011.565313
http://www.informaworld.com
Downloaded by [Muttukrishna Sarvananthan] at 06:53 01 July 2011
In spite of recording the second lowest growth rate (3.5%) in the past decade
(2000–9) (the lowest being in 2001: –1.5%) and third lowest growth rate in South
Asia (after the Maldives 73% and Pakistan 2%) in 2009 and other macroeconomic
vulnerabilities, the prospects for the Sri Lankan economy are good (Sarvananthan
2010). The end of the protracted civil war and a stable government with an invincible
majority in parliament has removed two structural impediments (i.e., political and
security) to economic take-off in Sri Lanka. However, what are lacking are a robust
growth strategy and an optimal policy framework to implement the envisioned
growth strategy (Sarvananthan 2009).
1
Despite a high intensity civil war, Sri Lanka’s growth in quantitative terms is
remarkable in comparison to countries under similar circumstances. However, the
quality (or the source) of such growth is the cause for concern. In 2009,
Afghanistan’s growth rate of 15.1% was the highest in South Asia and one of the
highest in the world (in fact, in the past several years Afghanistan has recorded
double-digit growth rate annually). However, foreign aid accounted for 40% and
poppy plants and opium trade accounted for another 40% of the Afghan economy
(Schramm 2010: 96). Is this the kind of economy that would secure Afghanistan
from war and poverty? It is imperative, especially in war times and post-war times, to
look beyond the numerical rate of economic growth and identify the source/s (or
quality) of growth to determine the success or otherwise of the economic model/
strategy pursued.
Sri Lanka’s growth during times of war has been largely fuelled by the growth of
the public sector; both the civilian public administration and the security forces.
That is, the increase in the number of personnel in public services and frequent pay
rises to public sector employees were the main sources of economic growth between
2005 and 2009 (for statistical evidence, see Sarvananthan 2008). Productivity in the
public sector is too low and the cost of the public sector is too expensive. The total
public debt has almost doubled between the end of 2004 (LKR 2140 billion) and end
of 2009 (LKR 4161 billion or 86% of the GDP) and the budget deficit was almost
10% of the GDP in the fiscal year 2009. Politicians and bureaucrats who brag about
doubling of per capita income between 2004 ($1100 per year) and 2009 ($2100 per
year) never point out the doubling of public debt during the same time period.
2
Thus,
the doubling of the per capita income is borrowed growth and not earned growth.
Moreover, the bulk of the rise in public expenditure was for public consumption
rather than public investment. Public expenditure-fuelled growth is wealth diversion
as opposed to wealth creation.
In the same way as the economic growth strategy at the national level, the
government’s post-war economic revival strategy both in the east and north has been
overwhelmingly based on government-funded projects with majority financial
contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors. For the four-year period
2007–10, the budget provision for the Eastern Reawakening Programme (Nagen-
ahira Navodaya) was a total of LKR 197 billion ($1.75 billion); 52% of this amount
was to be financed by foreign aid, nearly 30% by the Government of Sri Lanka
(GoSL), and the remaining 18% by the private sector. Similarly, the development
programme for the north (Uthuru Vasanthaya and other projects) has been
earmarked a total sum of LKR 7 billion ($64 million) thus far (foreign funding
accounting for 40.5% and the rest by the GoSL) (see Kelegama 2010, 24 and 28).
At both the national and regional levels there is a heavy emphasis on
government/donor-funded and government-driven development strategy, which is
206 M. Sarvananthan
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a cause for concern because of the limited fiscal space available to the government,
low (or less than optimal) productivity of the public sector, and the perpetuation of
dependency on foreign donors and the non-governmental sector for delivery of
goods and services to the people. Now let us look at some of the economic activities
undertaken by the government in the north, which could be more productively and
profitably done by individual and/or corporate entrepreneurs in those regions.
Businesses of the government
Passenger transport
The end of the war in May 2009 and the subsequent opening-up of the A9 highway
have created opportunities for individual entrepreneurs and private transport
companies to operate passenger and cargo transport services to and from Jaffna and
other towns in the north. In the earlier stages, the government monopolised the
passenger transport services through the use of Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB),
which is a perpetually loss-making state-owned enterprise. Since the beginning of
2010, private bus operators have been allowed to operate bus services to and from
Jaffna, alongside the government bus service.
The inter-city bus services operated by the SLTB have curtailed the local services
within the Jaffna peninsula and other major towns in the north, because hardly any
new buses were made available for the new routes. Curtailment of local bus services
has restricted the mobility of people and goods to the local markets, thereby stifling
economic growth.
Leaving the passenger transport sector entirely in the hands of the private sector
could have created new entrepreneurs in the formerly war-torn areas and provided
new employment opportunities to local youth, the most vulnerable group in the
population. Furthermore, it would have reduced the losses made by the SLTB and
thereby contributed to reduction in public expenditure and public debt.
Hospitality trade
The proposed three-star hotel construction in Nallur (a suburb of Jaffna town) by a
state-owned financial institution (Mercantile Bank of Sri Lanka, a subsidiary of
state-owned Bank of Ceylon) is another blow to aspiring private enterprises in the
formerly war-torn areas. It is doubtful whether MBSL is competent enough to
manage a commercial venture in the hospitality market.
Instead of undertaking to build the hotel itself, MBSL should have called for
expressions of interest from private entrepreneurs in the country and the diaspora to
build and operate the hotel. State-owned enterprises are not only a burden to the
economy and the tax-payers, but stifle private entrepreneurship by diverting public
financial resources.
Military enterprises
Food and beverages
Another folly of the government is to let the army establish and operate tea
boutiques, snack bars, food stalls, barber saloons and other such businesses, along
the A9 highway (from Omanthai to Mirusuvil) to cater to the passenger traffic in
addition to the armed forces personnel stationed in these areas.
3
These military
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enterprises are copycat versions of restaurants and lodges run by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which controlled these areas during the period of
ceasefire (April 2002–August 2006). Thousands of passengers travel daily along the
A9 highway in both directions. It would provide a good business opportunity for
people living along or near the A9 highway to set up food and refreshment boutiques
to serve the passing traffic.
Instead, the bulk of those refreshment boutiques are run by the Sri Lanka Army
(SLA) and a few, in places like the Murukandy temple area, are run by local multi-
purpose cooperative societies (MPCS), which are perpetually loss-making local
government welfare shops (the exception being a private entrepreneur from the
Southern Province, who built a hotel and restaurant in the vicinity of the
Murukandy temple). The income earned by these army and cooperative society
boutiques hardly contributes to economic growth or generates new employment in
those remote areas. In addition, it unnecessarily diverts the valuable time of the
armed forces personnel and cooperative society personnel to this mundane
occupation. Public service personnel are not paid by the government to prepare
and serve tea, coffee, snacks, or meals to passing travellers. Their salary is much
higher than that which would be required for such a job. Therefore, it is an economic
loss to the government and the country.
Alternatively, if the local people who have returned from welfare camps and
resettled in their place of origin (or nearby) were allowed and were provided with the
appropriate loan facility to undertake these businesses, more jobs would have been
created. This would have boosted the incomes of their households, and increased the
money circulation within the local impoverished communities. Individual entrepre-
neurs from outside those areas could also be encouraged to set up roadside boutiques
to serve the passing traffic, which would have boosted the local economies. Of course, a
few returnees have put up makeshift boutiques to sell soft drinks, biscuits, chocolates,
and other refreshments along the A9 highway. However, they should be encouraged
and provided with the facilities to put up bigger and better shops.
As an aside, the mushrooming military enterprises have also become a nuisance.
For example, there is unlawful tapping of electricity to power the aforementioned
military enterprises in the north; narcotic drugs and prostitution are said to be
‘unsavoury entertainments’ in these establishments; and the army stationed in the
north (particularly in Jaffna) is facilitating informal pavement hawkers from other
parts of the country to trade in the urban areas of the north, flouting local
government regulations and bypassing local authorities. In other words, security
forces are directly and indirectly involved in breaking the law, abusing public
property and undermining democratic governance at the local level.
Domestic air transport
Since the 24-hour opening of the A9 highway in the first week of January 2010, the
market for air travel to and from Jaffna has dropped dramatically. This has paved
the way for the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) to monopolise domestic air services
through its commercial wing, Helitours, thereby driving the private sector out of the
domestic air travel and freight markets. These developments are not conducive to
curtailing public expenditure or promoting private enterprises.
I doubt that domestic air transport to and from north and east is commercially
viable given the current policy framework and cost structure. If this is so, why should
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the SLAF be made to incur losses? Instead, I would suggest that larger private
budget airlines should be encouraged and facilitated to operate the domestic air
passenger market. With the upgrading of the Pallaly airport in Jaffna, not only
domestic air travel, but air passenger services to India, could be resumed (services
that were in operation until the late-1970s and were provided by the erstwhile Air
Ceylon).
Military peace
The oversized military has become a burden to the Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lanka
has one of the largest armed forces per capita and defence expenditures per capita in
the world, and certainly the largest in South Asia. According to the Secretary to the
Defence Ministry, there are about 450,000 persons in uniform (including air force,
army, navy, and police – including civil defence force and special task force –
personnel)
4
for a population of 20.653 million, which works out to be one armed
person for every 50 people in the country. Further, the earmarked Defence Ministry
budget for 2011 is $1957 million (LKR 215.2 billion), which works out to be $94.7
(LKR 10,417) of defence expenditure per person per year. Moreover, every member
of the armed forces (including the police) on average costs the exchequer $4,348
(LKR 478,266) per year, which is significantly higher than the average cost of any
other public sector personnel. Furthermore, 94% of the earmarked defence budget
for 2011 is for recurrent expenditures and only 6% is for capital expenditures; which
means that defence expenditures cannot be curtailed without cuts in the armed forces
personnel (see also Sarvananthan 2004).
In this scenario, it is pertinent to ask whether the security forces provide value for
money. Is the large army necessary in the post-war context? Is there any reduction in
crimes due to the large presence of armed forces personnel? in fact, Sri Lanka
recorded much lower volume and intensity of crimes in the pre-civil war times (pre-
1983), than at present, when the total number of personnel in the police and armed
forces corresponding to the total population at that time was a minuscule compared
to the current number.
There seems to be an acute underemployment of armed forces personnel (except
police) in the current post-war time, which is reflected in deployment of armed forces
personnel to bizarre activities throughout the country. Army personnel are deployed
to cultivate agricultural crops in state lands (and sometimes abandoned private
lands) adjoining several army camps throughout the country.
5
In January 2011 army
personnel were deployed to sell vegetables in Colombo city and the suburbs at cost
price in order to placate the urban population, which is burdened by rising essential
food prices. Army personnel are also constructing a Buddhist temple in Mankulam
by the A9 highway in the north (they have also reconstructed a couple of damaged
churches in war-affected areas), and are supervising road works done by the
Colombo Municipal Council workers in the city of Colombo.
6
The Army has started a travel agency in Colombo to sell air tickets to its own
personnel (and their families) as well as ordinary people in March 2011. The Navy is
hiring its luxury troops’ carrier for corporate entertainments, private wedding
functions, etc. The Air Force is involved in domestic air transport and has built a
small tourist resort in Trincomalee to cater to the rapidly growing tourist traffic in
the area. The list of retail businesses and commercial activities of the three armed
forces (Air Force, Army, and Navy) is continuously expanding reminiscent of the
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mushrooming proxy LTTE enterprises in their areas of control and outside
(including in Colombo) during the ceasefire time.
Furthermore, the Governors of the eastern and northern provinces and the
District Secretary of the Trincomalee district (in the east) are retired senior army
personnel. Besides, several retired senior army personnel are deployed as
Ambassadors and High Commissioners of Sri Lanka in many countries. Re-
employing retired army personnel in public administration and the Foreign Service is
a longstanding practice, dating back to the late 1980s (whereas even the military
regimes of Pakistan have never deployed army personnel as Ambassadors or High
Commissioners). Some retired army and police personnel function as advisors to the
President of Sri Lanka.
The foregoing examples of military personnel in public administration, the
diplomatic service, and commercial activities are indications of an oversized and
underemployed army, particularly in post-war times. Moreover, this is a reflection of
the military peace in Sri Lanka (as opposed to civil peace). The government should
consider downsizing/rightsizing the armed forces in Sri Lanka for economic
sustainability, which is more important than economic stability advocated by
international financial institutions. Military hardware that has little use in this post-
war time should be disposed of.
There are many more examples of unwarranted government and military
involvement in commercial and economic activities and civilian life, within and
outside the formerly war-torn areas and elsewhere, which could be profitably
avoided. Incursion of the army into the civilian economy is a cause for concern and a
potential threat to democracy. Over-developed military in Bangladesh, Myanmar,
Pakistan, and Thailand (for example) are involved in big businesses such as five-star
hotels, factories, golf-courses, etc, which is an outcome of frequent military coups.
Although the Sri Lanka Army is involved only in retail businesses right now, it could
overtime get its hands on big businesses as well. The economic interests and political
role of the Pakistan army should be a warning to Sri Lanka (Siddiqa 2007).
Governmental impediments
Not only is the government forestalling private entrepreneurship in the north, east,
and elsewhere by monopolising certain commercial activities (cooking gas being the
latest public monopoly, the reincarnation of the erstwhile state-owned Colombo Gas
Company), it is also impeding economic revival in the formerly war-torn areas by the
continuation of the following restrictions in spite of the lifting of many other
restrictions in the past couple of years.
Firstly, vehicles carrying commercial cargo to and from Jaffna and the Vanni
(beyond Omanthai) need to obtain a pass from the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Although officially there is no payment required for this pass, there is a ‘compulsory’
informal payment. This increases producers’ costs and consequently reduces market
access.
Of course, the present situation is much better than during the ceasefire time
(March 2002–August 2006) when all commercial and personal cargo passing through
the A9 was subjected to illegal taxation (extortion) by the LTTE, thereby increasing
the prices of all goods in Vanni and Jaffna. In the past couple of years, the prices of
goods in Vanni and Jaffna have been more or less the same as in Colombo or
elsewhere.
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Secondly, foreign nationals need MoD permission to travel by air or road to
Jaffna even two years after the end of the civil war. For instance, Indian nationals
travelling to participate in the Jaffna International Trade Fair in April 2010 and
January 2011 had to obtain prior permission from the MoD. This puts off foreign
tourists visiting, let alone investing in, those areas.
Thirdly, maintenance of the High Security Zone (HSZ) in the commercial hub of
Jaffna city continues to hamper business development due to the dearth of
commercial property and office space. I do not think there is any security imperative
to hold on to this HSZ in the commercial hub of the city. In January 2011 the army
in Jaffna announced that it was planning to move out of the city centre, and
eventually did so in March 2011.
The foregoing restrictions and impediments are hardly conducive to promoting
foreign investment and private entrepreneurship, both of which would spur growth
in the formerly war-torn areas. Not only are the government and the military getting
involved in commercial activities and thereby forestalling individual and corporate
entrepreneurship, they continue to stifle growth incubation by unnecessary and
irrational impediments. The government should restrict its activities to those for
which there is absolutely no other viable alternative (like restoring economic and
social infrastructure) and leave the rest to individual and corporate entrepreneurs.
Negative effects of dependence
Like other war-torn and post-war countries, Sri Lanka has been substantially
dependent on foreign aid, non-governmental assistance and private foreign
remittances for the livelihood of its people, especially in the north and east.
However, there is a threshold beyond which these concessionary and philanthropic
benefits could be counterproductive and even disruptive for economic revival.
International experiences reveal that foreign aid may not necessarily buy quality
economic development or promote enduring economic growth during the time of
war or in the aftermath of war. War-time experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and
post-war experiences in the Balkans provide ample evidence for this. In Bosnia, for
example, in spite of nearly $10 billion of foreign aid disbursed since the end of the
war in the mid-1990s and the current per capita income of circa $3500 per year, both
the rate of unemployment and poverty is about 25% today. Similarly, the current
unemployment rate among the age group of 15–29 years in Iraq is about 28%, in
spite of a higher per capita income than that of Sri Lanka (Schramm 2010, 90–1).
Hence, real economic development should be measured in terms of rate of net
increase in new private businesses, real increase in the disposable income of the
population, and creation of new employment, in lieu of economic growth, per capita
income and so on.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ‘food-for-work’ and ‘cash-for-work’ pro-
grammes of the foreign multilateral donors, various relief and welfare programmes of
the non-governmental organisations, and private remittances from abroad in the
north are perpetuating the culture of dependence and stifling the culture of entre-
preneurship, in spite of the noble intentions of such welfare programmes. Yet, there is
a call for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the north and east by one expert (Kelegama 2010, 31).
Similarly, the Improving the Relevance and Quality of Undergraduate Education
(IRQUE) project funded by the World Bank and the Secondary School Education
Modernisation Project (SSEMP) funded by the Asian Development Bank at the
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national level appear to be hitting the wrong targets. On and off I read newspaper
advertisements by these projects calling for tenders for the supply of furniture and
equipments (computers etc.) to the universities and schools, and construction of new
buildings. Although the objective of these projects is to improve the ‘quality’ of
secondary and tertiary education in the country, a significant proportion of the funds
is expended on buildings, furniture and electronic equipment. How could these
material goods and physical infrastructure improve the quality of education?
Besides, I am personally aware that a few buildings constructed under the foregoing
projects lie idle. Moreover, two flagship projects of the World Bank in the formerly
war-torn areas are headed by former government officials who were subjected to
disciplinary inquiries while in public service.
Although private foreign remittance is the single largest foreign exchange
earner and thereby indispensable to the balance-of-payments of the country, it has
negative consequences for economic revival in the formerly war-torn areas. Free
flow of foreign remittances has dis-incentivised productive work and had made
many youths laid-back. Ironically, amidst complaints from many in the north and
east about the high unemployment and underemployment rates, there are labour
shortages during agricultural harvest season. Thus, the threshold for incentive to
work is high.
Conclusion
Money or wealth cannot buy quality economic development or economic dynamism;
oil-rich Arab countries are prime examples of this fact. What Sri Lanka requires is
not a ‘Marshall Plan’ of any sort; instead, what it requires is entrepreneurial
capitalism. Modest scale enterprises, as opposed to donor and/or government-
funded grandiose projects, could contribute to substantive and enduring growth.
Wipro (a vegetable oil trading turned technology company), Infosys (one of the
largest IT companies) and the like are the ones spearheading and transforming the
Indian economy, and the role models for budding young entrepreneurs (see Naude
2010 for the nexus between entrepreneurship and economic development).
Suppose the government had given one million rupees per household ($9000) to
about 50,000 households in the north and east, based on their innovative ideas and
viable business plans (total cost of LKR 50 billion or less than $450 million; just 25%
of what the government would have spent in those areas in the four-year period
2007–10). If only 5000 or 10% of them succeeded in establishing growth invigorating
dynamic enterprises, the economic and social landscape of the former war-torn areas
could have been vastly different.
The past two years have been watersheds in the political history of Sri Lanka
because of the end of the civil war (2009) and the re-election of the President and the
government (2010), respectively. I hope and wish for this year to become a watershed
in economic history by way of overhauling the traditional economic thinking or
paradigm, and embracing transformative entrepreneurial capitalism.
Acknowledgements
This opinion piece was first written in April 2010 and updated in March 2011. I am
indebted to Carl Schramm, whose article in the Foreign Affairs magazine inspired me
to write this one.
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Notes
1. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, Envisioning a robust post-war economy, The Sunday
Leader, 31st January 2001: 14. http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/01/31/envisioning-a-
robust-post-war-economy/.
2. See Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual report 2009, special statistical appendix Tables 2, 5
and 6.
3. See also Mel Gunasekera, Sri Lanka soldiers adapt to post-war pastimes, AFP, 24th June
2010. http://www.mysinchew.com/node/40828?tid¼14.
4. Indian Defence Review interview with the Defence Secretary of Sri Lanka, 25, no. 4,
October–December 2010. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/04/interview-with-
gotabaya-rajapaksa-defence-secretary-sri-lanka.html. However, according to this author’s
estimations, the total number of armed forces personnel (including the police) may not
exceed 375,000: Army 200,000 þAir Force 25,000 þNavy 25,000 þPolice 125,000
(including Special Task Force and Civil Defence Force).
5. In fact, the Army Commander boasted in January 2011 that the army is cultivating the
farms formerly cultivated by the LTTE in the north and has saved about $27 million
(LKR 3 billion) to the exchequer by building bridges, pre-fabricated cantonments,
renovation of houses and de-mining. (Sunday Observer, 30th January 2011: 1). What the
Army Commander fails to recognise is that the long-term cost of maintaining an oversized
army will far outweigh the occasional savings to the exchequer. It is important to note that
Sri Lanka’s annual defence budget does not include disability benefits and pensions to the
armed forces personnel.
6. The elected Colombo Municipal Council was dismissed in 2010 on corruption charges and
is now run by the Urban Development Authority, which was brought under the Ministry
of Defence by Executive fiat in 2010.
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Contemporary South Asia 213
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... A prolonged civil war was waged in this province for 30 years, which concluded in mid-2009. Although peace prevails in these areas currently, the majority of youth remain unemployed (Sarvananthan, 2011;Somasundaram and Sivayokan, 2013) and are in dire need of access to capital to commence entrepreneurial activities. Also, infrastructure facilities, such as road networks, electricity, communication and water are yet to be fully restored in many areas of this province (Somasundaram and Sivayokan, 2013). ...
... During the post-war period, microcredit activities have been initiated by rural banks, nongovernmental organizations, government institutions and international benefactors to facilitate entrepreneurial activities (Yogendrarajah and Semasinghe, 2013). Also, during this period, several initiatives have been taken to rehabilitate youths: for example, affected schools were rebuilt, and vocational, agricultural, farming and entrepreneurial training and advice were given to rehabilitate these youth (Hettige and Salih, 2010;Sarvananthan, 2011). A survey was used to collect data from the youth in the sample. ...
Article
Purpose – The leading multinational companies tend to expand their marketing activities to bottom of pyramid (BOP) market. The BOP market comprises many segments, however, little is known about the purchase behaviour of BOP market or segments therein. Microcredit provides credit access to customers in BOP market. The purpose of this paper is to investigate youth’s intentions of obtaining microcredit in the post-war era, which could be a segment of BOP market. Design/methodology/approach – The sample comprised 1,250 youth aged 18-27 selected from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Surveys were administered for data collection. After testing measurement model, two structural models – full model and non-mediated model (direct effects model) were run to test hypotheses. Findings – Positive affect, subjective norms, entrepreneurial desire and self-identity enhanced intentions of obtaining microcredit, whereas perceived deterrents reduced those intentions. Additionally, self-identity mediated the association between positive affect, entrepreneurial desire, perceived behavioural control and knowledge of microcredit, and intentions of obtaining microcredit. Research limitations/implications – This study was conducted amongst youth in one country. Also, the data were cross-sectional. Hence, the model needs testing with youth and adults in other post-war contexts and with longitudinal data. Practical implications – The findings of this study inform how effectively microcredit can be marketed to youth in post-war contexts and to the other segments of BOP market. Originality/value – A unique purchase behavioural model is suggested with the mediating role of self-identity, to enhance intentions of obtaining microcredit in BOP markets, such as youth in post-war contexts. This study contributes to literature relating to purchase behaviour and self-identity, with particular reference to BOP market.
... But most of the organizations in Sri Lanka are risk averse and more likely to maintain the status quo (Lawless, 2018). Though, management support has been identified as a major contributor to foster intrpreneurship (Schachtebeck and Nieuwenhuizen, 2015) within Sri Lankan context, intrapreneurs are destroyed much more often than it gets supported from the management (Sarvananthan, 2011). For instance, "we didn't recruit you to fix our company" and "we didn't ask you for your ideas and it is not your job to think about that" (Hurt and Dye, 2020) such kind of feedback can be expected from the management. ...
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In the contemporary business world, innovation is more critical than ever. Unlike before, every organization is aware of the significance of innovation in gaining and sustaining competitive advantage over rivals. However, organizations can be more innovative just by triggering and uplifting the intrapreneurial spirit of the employees with the management support. But currently the policies, structures and systems which are developed by the management of the organization tend to isolate innovative and creative employees by demoralizing them from sharing valuable novel insights. There are certain instances where the management agrees with the new idea but later on they encourage employees to continue their work in the traditional way as they are reluctant to move away from their comfort zones. However, there is scant number of evidences from Sri Lankan context. Therefore, the objective of the study is to assess the impact of management support on intrapreneurship with special reference to apparel industry in Sri Lanka. With a standard questionnaire, responses were obtained from 240 non-executive employees from three leading apparel sector organizations in Sri Lanka. Results of regression analysis proved that managerial support significantly impacts on intrapreneurship and as a percentage it is 53.2%. Even in reality, intrapreneurs cannot recognize, nurture or inspire without the support of the management. Hence, management of the organization needs to create a better atmosphere not just to create intrapreneurs but also to recognize and encourage such intrapreneurial employees at workplace.
... But most of the organizations in Sri Lanka are risk averse and more likely to maintain the status quo (Lawless, 2018). Though, management support has been identified as a major contributor to foster intrpreneurship (Schachtebeck and Nieuwenhuizen, 2015) within Sri Lankan context, intrapreneurs are destroyed much more often than it gets supported from the management (Sarvananthan, 2011). For instance, "we didn't recruit you to fix our company" and "we didn't ask you for your ideas and it is not your job to think about that" (Hurt and Dye, 2020) such kind of feedback can be expected from the management. ...
... Nationally, postwar infrastructure priorities have shifted from roads to ports; new infrastructure and real estate projects and ports, including the controversial Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City, have dominated public debate. In the ambition to become a globally connected trading nation, the construction of Port City is viewed as an economic imperative. 1 The theme of connectivity has been a refrain increasingly mobilized in political discourse; former president Mahinda Rajapaksa made it a key theme of his flagship Mahinda Chinthana policy vision,a frame since invigorated by the present government's recommitment to the "business for peace" agenda (Brown, Chan, and Ruwanpura 2018;Venugopal2018).Since the defeat of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam militants in 2009,successive governments have sought to consolidate popular support and territorial control through road building and infrastructure programs, incorporating the former war zones of the north and east back into national life (Sarvananthan 2011). Although the stated focus of infrastructure was initially to integrate the nation and mend a fractured ethnic polity, over time there has been marked shift in emphasis, in keeping with efforts to strengthen regional economic and political ties across Asia in alignment with China's One Belt,One Road (OBOR) initiative (de Alwis 2010; Duara 2010Duara , 2011Mawdsley 2012;Sidaway and Woon 2017). ...
Article
Sri Lanka is in the midst of a postwar infrastructure boom, with new investment directed into roads, ports, and airports as part of an uneven and contested development process. Taking the transformations unfolding in Colombo as our point of departure, we examine how the vision of megapolis has animated debates on the geographies of connectivity. The postwar Sri Lankan political landscape initially envisioned political integration, which was to be delivered through the expansion of national road networks. The political priorities in the past decade reoriented away from integrating the nation to the strategic positioning of Colombo as a financial trading hub for South Asia. Focusing on Colombo’s flagship Port City project, we problematize these models of development by foregrounding counternarratives that speak to concerns around debt, enclosure, persistent ethnic tensions, and the degradation of coastal ecosystems. Key Words: connectivity, ecological stress, infrastructure, Sri Lanka, uneven development.
... Though developing country like Sri Lanka, the role of entrepreneurship development is more important than the developed countries, hence there is an essential to create the self-employment opportunities to reduce the unemployment situations (Nishantha, 2009). Despite the fact providing employment opportunities for all youths is a crucial issue for the government of Sri Lanka (Sarvananthan, 2011). Thus there is a need to create self-employment opportunity is the one of best career options for youths and graduates (Beeka & Rimmington, 2011;Buang, 2011; O. O. Fatoki, 2010; Jebarajakirthy, C. Lobo, & Hewege, 2014). ...
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The main purpose of the present study is to investigate the youth intention in seeking microcredit in Sri Lankan context. Subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, knowledge of microcredit, perceived government support, tolerance for risk and entrepreneurial desire have been considered as the antecedents that affect the youth intention in seeking microcredit, whilst respondents' demographical factors acts as a control variable to measure the intentions of seeking microcredit also. The sample comprised 350 youth, aged 18 to 25 selected from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Surveys were conducted to facilitate data collection. The findings suggest that Subjective norms, knowledge of microcredit, perceived government support, tolerance for risk and entrepreneurial desire are statistically enhanced by the youth intentions in seeking microcredit. Whereas number of family members in the demographical profile also influenced this intention. From these findings, implications for theory and practice have been discussed. This will help to various stakeholders, like youth in Jaffna region, the Government and Non-Governmental institutions, policy makers and other commercial &micro financial institutions for their decision making and strategy development in the field of microfinance. Additionally, this research adds a new body of knowledge of existing literature in the field of microfinance and entrepreneurship. JEL classification numbers: D91
... A civil war prolonged in this province for a period of 30 years which concluded in mid-2009. Although peace prevails in these areas today, majority of youth still remain unemployed (Sarvananthan, 2011;Somasundaram and Sivayokan, 2013), who are in dire need of access to capital in commencing entrepreneurial activities. Also, infrastructure facilities like road network, electricity, communication and water are yet to be fully restored in many areas of the Northern province of Sri Lanka (Somasundaram and Sivayokan, 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
Purpose – Bottom of pyramid market (BOP) has gained attention of researchers and marketers in recent years. The BOP market comprises many segments, however, little is known about purchase behaviour in BOP market or segments therein. The purpose of this paper is to investigate youth's intentions of seeking microcredit in the post-war era that are an integral part of BOP market. Design/methodology/approach – The sample comprised 1,250 youth aged 18 and above from Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Surveys were administered for data collection. After testing measurement model, a structural model was run to test hypotheses. Findings – Positive affect, subjective norms and entrepreneurial desire enhanced intentions of seeking microcredit, whereas perceived deterrents negatively influenced those intentions. Perceived benefits, perceived behavioural control and knowledge of microcredit did not have significant effects on these intentions. Research limitations/implications – This study was conducted in one war-affected country, Sri Lanka. Also, data were cross-sectional. Hence the model needs replication amongst youth in other post-conflict contexts and with longitudinal data. Practical implications – Findings of this study would be of use to market microcredit to youth in post-conflict era and other segments of BOP. Originality/value – A unique purchase behavioural model is suggested to enhance youths’ intentions of seeking microcredit in the post-war era, a segment within the BOP market. This study can contribute to purchase behaviour literature in identified contexts.
Article
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Entrepreneurship is the dominant form of enterprise in conflict-affected settings, yet little is known about the role of entrepreneurship in peacebuilding. In response, the article undertakes a review of entrepreneurship in conflict-affected regions to integrate research from business and management with research from political science, international relations, and parallel domains. Three views of entrepreneurship emerge – the destructive view, economic view, and social cohesion view – showing how entrepreneurship can concurrently create conflict but also potentially generate peace. The article identifies new avenues for pro-peace entrepreneurship: namely, through personal transformation, social contributions, inclusive interactions, conflict trigger removal, intergroup policy persuasion, and acting as legal champions. The article also discusses several pathways forward for business-for-peace research alongside additional implications for the deployment of business-based support programs in conflict settings.
Article
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The objective of the provincial Vocational Education and Training Plans (VET Plans) has been to bridge the gap between the demand for and supply of skilled personnel in different sectors in different provinces of the country. This is the first-time provincial VET Plans have been prepared by the TVEC and the Northern Provincial VET Plan (2014) is the fifth in the series after Sabaragamuwa (2012), Eastern (2012), Southern (2012), and North Western (2013)Provincial VET Plans. The Northern VET Plan is long overdue due to severe depletion of human capital in the province due to the devastating civil war for twenty-six long years (1983-2009). The cardinal principle on which this Northern VET Plan and Strategy has been prepared is to foster QUALITY skills trainings and education. This quality is envisaged in terms of international benchmarks so that an internationally competitive labour force is created over time. The quality enhancement should take place both among the teachers as well as the students. Of course, quality improvements entail additional cost (and so does quantity increase). It would be ideal if the quality could be improved at the same time as the quantity is increased. If a critical choice has to be made between the two (for example, due to public resource constraints) then this author would choose quality improvement over quantity increase.
Technical Report
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The ordering of the chapters in this report is according to the request of the Tertiary and Vocational Education Commission (TVEC); whereby the chapter on the Vocational Education and Training Plan and Strategy is placed upfront as the first chapter, followed by introduction (Chapter 2), macroeconomic overview (Chapter 3), demand for skilled personnel (Chapter 4), and supply of vocational education and training (Chapter 5). The objective of the provincial Vocational Education and Training Plans (VET Plans) has been to bridge the gap between the demand for and supply of skilled personnel in different sectors in different provinces of the country. This is the first-time provincial VET Plans have been prepared by the TVEC and the Northern Provincial VET Plan (2014) is the fifth in the series after Sabaragamuwa (2012), Eastern (2012), Southern (2012), and North Western (2013) Provincial VET Plans. The Northern VET Plan is long overdue due to severe depletion of human capital in the province due to the devastating civil war for twenty-six long years (1983-2009). There are numerous private, public, and non-governmental service providers of vocational education and training, both formal and informal, spread throughout the country that need to be optimised and rationalised. The Provincial VET Plan is a mechanism through which the optimisation and rationalisation of the delivery of skills training at provincial and district levels is envisaged. It facilitates demand-driven training programmes through the optimal and rational use of human, material, and technological resources. The Northern Province has undergone enormous economic, environmental, human, legal, physical, political, social, and technological destruction and displacement as a result of the protracted armed conflict over a period of quarter century. Whilst nationally the unemployment rate (e.g. 4.4% in 2013) and the headcount poverty ratio (e.g. 6.7% in 2012-13) have been at single digit levels in the post civil war period, the unemployment (e.g. unemployment rate among women in Kilinochchi district was 29% in 2012) and poverty ratios (e.g. the headcount poverty ratio in Mullaithivu district was 29% in 2012) have been at significantly higher double-digit levels, especially among women, in many of the conflict-affected districts in the country. The fastest growing economic sub-sectors those made considerable contribution (over five percent) to the Provincial Gross Domestic Product (PGDP) in the Northern Province in the first two years after the civil war were the fisheries and ‘other food crops’ (green chilies and red onions) in the agriculture sector, construction in the industrial sector, and wholesale and retail trade, transport, and banking, insurance, and real estate in the services sector. The foregoing sub-sectors grew at high two-digit (over 50%) or three-digit rate (over 100%). Although the government services (that incorporates public administration, defence, and other government services) continued to make the single largest contribution to the Northern PGDP in 2011 (25%), this sub-sector has had negative growth in 2011. In a nutshell, the services sector is the economic driver of the provincial economy and will continue to be so in the future as well. Therefore, the development of skills in the province also should prioritise the services sector. Severe depletion of the quantity and quality of skilled and quasi-skilled human resources has posed critical challenges to the post civil war recovery. For example, according to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2009/10, only about 7% of the Jaffna district population had passed the General Certificate of Education (G.C.E) Advanced Level (A/L) (Grade 12) whereas nationally 11% had passed the G.C.E. A/L. Similarly, only 10% of the Jaffna district population had passed the G.C.E. Ordinary Level (O/L) (Grade 10) while almost 15% of the national population had passed the G.C.E. O/L. Needless to say even the national level of education is woefully inadequate for a lower middle income country such as Sri Lanka. Moreover, the stock of human capital in the Vanni districts is even worse than that in the Jaffna district. The unprecedented economic, physical, and social reconstruction efforts underway urgently require huge quantity and diverse quality of skilled personnel. The schools, universities, and vocational education and training institutions in the North lack adequately qualified and competent teachers, trainers, and evaluators to produce competitive and quality human capital due to the exodus of human capital to other parts of the country and abroad. Due to the lack of qualified and competent teachers, the schools, universities, and vocational institutions have been hiring under-qualified and incompetent teachers on ad hoc basis to keep these educational institutions running. Over a period of time such ad hoc teachers have been made permanent thereby downgrading the quality and standards of educational institutions permanently. Therefore, critical actions have to be taken to remedy this perpetuation of low quality of education and training in the Northern Province. However, the relatively younger population, especially in the Vanni districts, the untapped reservoir of female labour, and the potential influence of the largest Diaspora population in the country offer windows of opportunities for the Northern Province and the country at large. The four Vanni districts (Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaithivu, and Vavuniya) have relatively younger population than all other provinces, barring the Eastern Province, which provides them a comparative advantage vis-à-vis other provinces in the labour market. The Northern Province has the second lowest, after the Eastern Province, female labour force participation rate in the country, which could be potentially increased in order to stimulate the post-civil war economy. Almost half-a-million first generation Diaspora dispersed in affluent western countries has the potential to effect positive changes in the economy and society of Northern Province through financial investments, transfer of critical skills, and dissemination of up to date knowledge, inter alia. For example, skilled labour in the Sri Lankan Diaspora communities in various countries could be encouraged to transfer skills to the local youths by offering practical trainings in Sri Lanka. Similarly, skills trainees in Sri Lanka could be afforded apprenticeships and internships in the businesses owned by the Sri Lankan Diaspora abroad. The welfare-state fostered by the successive post-independence governments has embedded a dependency culture on the people where goods (e.g. subsidised inputs like fertilizers to producers and subsidised consumption goods like rice and wheat to consumers) and services (e.g. universal free education and free health services) are demanded from the state as a right rather than inculcating a culture of responsibility (promoting a culture of work ethic) to incentivise citizens to earn to purchase consumption goods and services. This welfare-state inspired development model has always promoted quantity over quality. That is, broadening accessibility is prioritised over deepening excellence. Every year the government strives to increase the total number of intake to public universities and professional and technical colleges; once in a way the government strives to increase the number of further or higher education institutions as well in order to facilitate the increase in the total number of intake. The foregoing is necessary but NOT AT ALL sufficient to enhance the competitiveness of the Sri Lankan economy. In spite of the emphasis on increasing the quantity of intake through universal free education from grade one to undergraduate degree, the share of the population in the country with secondary or tertiary qualification is very low as noted above. The cardinal principle on which this Northern VET Plan and Strategy has been prepared is to foster QUALITY skills trainings and education. This quality is envisaged in terms of international benchmarks so that an internationally competitive labour force is created over time. The quality enhancement should take place both among the teachers as well as the students. Of course, quality improvements entail additional cost (and so does quantity increase). It would be ideal if the quality could be improved at the same time as the quantity is increased. If a critical choice has to be made between the two (for example, due to public resource constraints) then this author would choose quality improvement over quantity increase. Since the services sector dominates the national and the Northern Provincial economy it is high time to promote the service culture which entails attitudinal changes among teachers and students alike. One advantage the vocational education sector has is that neither the students nor the teachers are organized or collectivised as in the case of the university education sector and therefore could be relatively better amenable for attitudinal changes. One of the most critical attitudinal changes required is to develop skilled entrepreneurs as opposed to skilled personnel as in the past. Skilled personnel would know only the technical aspects of a particular skill. In contrast, a skilled entrepreneur would not only know the technical aspects of a particular skill but also know financial management, marketing, and continuous up-scaling of that skill in a competitive market place. Hence, an integrated curricula incorporating the technical and entrepreneurial skills need to be developed in each and every skills category in order to inculcate multi-skilling or multi-tasking to nourish skilled entrepreneurs. Another advantage the skills development sector has is that it is by and large practical doing which requires minimal usage of language. Therefore, skills transfer could take place much more rapidly than knowledge transfer across cultures and countries. That is, language is a minimal barrier in the vocational education and training sector. Hence, the dearth of competent trainers of skills in the Northern Province could be offset by trainers from other parts of the country as well as from abroad. Besides, the trainers from outside the province also provide an opportunity for the re-building of the broken inter-communal relationships during the time of the civil war. As noted in chapter one, huge number and variety of skills personnel are in demand in the Northern Province. During the course of this plan (four years duration) it would be near impossible to increase the capacity of existing public vocational education institutions to train the requisite skilled personnel. One way of overcoming the lack of capacity is to outsource the training requirements to the private and non-governmental sector through a competitive, open, and transparent call for international tender. The politico-administrative relationship between the national and the Northern Provincial governments (and by extension with the local governments within the province as well) during the first year of the newly elected Northern Provincial Council (September 2013-September 2014) is not one of constructive engagement. In order to avoid administrative delays in the implementation of the plan and strategy due to politico-administrative tug-of-war we hereby propose that TVEC should set-up a time-bound independent implementation office physically based in the Northern Province to speedily implement at least part of the proposals enunciated herein. This independent implementation unit should be a multi-stakeholder unit incorporating independent vocational education specialists (drawn from the public, private, and non-governmental institutions, and if need be including international consultants as well), private sector employers within the province (micro, small, medium, and large enterprises encompassing the major sub-sectors such as agriculture, banking/finance, construction, education/health, English/ICT/life skills, hospitality, transport, etc), and national/provincial/local government representatives. It is this independent implementation unit that should outsource the training requirements through a call for international tender. This independent implementation unit should be for a fixed time (number of years) beyond which a robust implementation mechanism should be put in place for the medium and long terms. We also understand that the implementation of the VET Plans in the four provinces before this has had very limited progress so far, which provides an additional rationale for the implementation model proposed herein. The proposed implementation model should be a private-public partnership with strong linkages to industries within as well outside the province.
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This critique of "Sri Lankan Boat Migration to Australia: Motivations and Dilemmas" (EPW, 31 August 2013) argues that the article was a study based on subjective views expressed by a limited number of interviewees and was partisan in its findings.
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The economic effects of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka are multifarious. A discussion of the economic effects of ethnic conflict could encompass the opportunity cost of the war (i.e., the foregone income due to the war at micro- and macro-levels), the economic impact of the military expenditures (on both sides of the war), financing mechanisms (both national and international) of the rebel movement, and the impact of economic sanctions on rebel territory. It should be noted that the economic effects of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a relatively under-researched area (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2000; Goonetileke, 1998; Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 1993; Gunatilleke et al., 2001; Kelegama, 1999; O’Sullivan, 1994, 1997, 2001; Rankaduwa & Cooray, 1999; Ravano, 2001; Richardson & de Samarasinghe, 1991; Ross & Samaranayake, 1986; Seabright, 1986).
Article
Washington's approach to rebuilding economies devastated by conflicts and natural disasters has serious shortcomings. Rather than continuing to rely on the prevailing doctrine of international development, which holds that strong economies cannot emerge in poor countries, it should allow the U.S. military to help more with economic reconstruction and should encourage U.S.-style entrepreneurialism.
Article
What is the role of entrepreneurship in economic development? At a minimum the answer should be able to explain the role of entrepreneurs in the structural transformation of countries from low income, primary-sector based societies into high-income service and technology based societies. More broadly though, it should also be able to explain the role of entrepreneurs in the opposite pole of stagnating development (including conflict) and in high innovation-driven growth. Although economic development lacks a ?general theory? of entrepreneurship, which could encompass a variety of development experiences, much progress has been made in extending the understanding of entrepreneurship in the process of development. This paper surveys the progress with the purpose of distilling the outlines for a more general theory of entrepreneurship in economic development. Entrepreneurship in developing countries remains a relatively under-researched phenomenon, so by surveying the current state of research, and by discussing the role of entrepreneurship in dual economy models of structural transformation and growth, a secondary objective of this paper is to identify avenues for further research. Finally, the policy implications from the economic literature suggest that a case for government support exists, and that this should focus on the quantity, the quality, and the allocation of entrepreneurial ability. Many routinely adopted policies for entrepreneurship, such as provision of credit and education, are shown to have more subtle effects, not all of which are conducive to growth-enhancing entrepreneurship.
Sri Lanka soldiers adapt to post-war pastimes
  • See Also
  • Mel Gunasekera
See also Mel Gunasekera, Sri Lanka soldiers adapt to post-war pastimes, AFP, 24th June 2010. http://www.mysinchew.com/node/40828?tid¼14.
Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Development The path to economic and political emancipation in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka: economy poised for take-off Expeditionary economics: spurring growth after conflicts and disasters
  • Sarvananthan
  • Muttukrishna
Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2008. Phantom growth of the Sri Lankan economy. PPID Working Paper No. 10. August. Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Development. http://pointpedro.org/images/WorkingPapers/ppid%20working%20paper%2010.pdf Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2009. The path to economic and political emancipation in Sri Lanka. Conflict Trends 4: 13–22. http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2009_4.pdf Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2010. Sri Lanka: economy poised for take-off. Global: The International Briefing 4, September: 70–1. http://www.global-briefing.org/2010/09/economy-poised-for-take-off/ Schramm, Carl J. 2010. Expeditionary economics: spurring growth after conflicts and disasters. Foreign Affairs 3, no. 89 (May–June): 89–99. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/66207/carl-j-schramm/expeditionary-economics Siddiqa, Ayesha. 2007. Military inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy, London: Pluto Press. Contemporary South Asia
Development of north and east of Sri Lanka, Economic Review 35, nos
  • Saman Kelegama
Kelegama, Saman. 2010. Development of north and east of Sri Lanka, Economic Review 35, nos. 11 and 12 (February-March). Colombo: People's Bank.
Expeditionary economics: spurring growth after conflicts and disastersj-schramm/expeditionary-economics Siddiqa, Ayesha Military inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy
  • Carl J Schramm
Schramm, Carl J. 2010. Expeditionary economics: spurring growth after conflicts and disasters. Foreign Affairs 3, no. 89 (May-June): 89-99. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/66207/carl-j-schramm/expeditionary-economics Siddiqa, Ayesha. 2007. Military inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy, London: Pluto Press. Contemporary South Asia
Phantom growth of the Sri Lankan economy. PPID Working Paper No. 10 Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Developmentpdf Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna The path to economic and political emancipation in Sri Lanka Lanka: economy poised for take-off. Global: The International Briefing 4
  • Muttukrishna Sarvananthan
Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2008. Phantom growth of the Sri Lankan economy. PPID Working Paper No. 10. August. Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Development. http://pointpedro.org/images/WorkingPapers/ppid%20working%20paper%2010.pdf Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2009. The path to economic and political emancipation in Sri Lanka. Conflict Trends 4: 13–22. http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2009_4.pdf Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2010. Sri Lanka: economy poised for take-off. Global: The International Briefing 4, September: 70–1. http://www.global-briefing.org/2010/09/economy- poised-for-take-off/
Envisioning a robust post-war economy
  • Muttukrishna Sarvananthan
Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, Envisioning a robust post-war economy, The Sunday Leader, 31st January 2001: 14. http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/01/31/envisioning-arobust-post-war-economy/.
Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Development
  • Muttukrishna Sarvananthan
Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. 2008. Phantom growth of the Sri Lankan economy. PPID Working Paper No. 10. August. Point Pedro: Point Pedro Institute of Development. http://pointpedro.org/images/WorkingPapers/ppid%20working%20paper%2010.pdf