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Changing Marriage Patterns in Asia
Gavin W. Jones
(Revised 29/5/2014)
INTRODUCTION
There have been major changes in aspects of marriage in Asian countries over recent decades.
In one short chapter, it is not possible to cover effectively a continent as large and diverse as
Asia, but in this paper I will concentrate on three of the major regions of Asia – East and
Southeast Asia, on the one hand, and South Asia, on the other. Together they contain over 90
per cent of Asia’s population.1 The key issues differ between South Asia and the more
easterly parts of Asia, largely because their traditional marriage and kinship systems differed,
but also because the forces acting to modify these systems have had different intensity in
different places. Half a century ago, universal and early marriage were characteristic of
almost all of Asia,2 but child marriage (a high proportion of girls marrying before their
sixteenth 16th birthday), while very common in South Asia, was not common in Southeast or
East Asia, with the exception of some of the Malay populations of Malaysia and Indonesia.
The system that produced child marriage was a strongly patriarchal one in which parent-
arranged marriage was the unquestioned mechanism for finding a marriage partner.
In East and Southeast Asia, traditional arranged marriage systems have almost disappeared,
though on the whole, young people still attach great importance to parental approval of their
chosen partner. Delayed and non-marriage have contributed to very low fertility in the region.
In South Asia, the key issues relate to whether there are any fractures in the arranged
marriage system, issues related to continued patterns of early marriage, and the role of
consanguineous marriage. The geographic division of issues, of course, is not completely
neat. For example, early marriage remains fairly common in some parts of Southeast Asia,
and consanguineous marriage is prevalent in parts of Southeast Asia. Also, in just one South
Asian country - Sri Lanka –- delayed marriage is as prominent as it is in countries further
eastwards.
KINSHIP SYSTEMS AND MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENT
Before discussing changes in marriage ages, the differences in kinship systems and their
effects on both arrangement of marriage and age at marriage need to be considered. Both the
Confucianist systems of East Asia and the Hindu system in India emphasized the absorption
of the bride into the husband’s family, whereas the bilateral kinship systems of most of
Southeast Asia allow much closer association of the bride with her affines cognates?, and a
pattern whereby the newly married couple more commonly lived first with the bride’s parents
rather than the husband’s parents, before establishing an independent household.3
1 1 Central Asia and West Asia are omitted from the analysis for reasons both of space and the author’s lack of
regional knowledge. The rising trend of international marriage is also omitted for lack of space.
2 Universal marriage is sometimes defined as fewer than 5 per cent of women remaining single at age 45-49.
According to this definition, only the Philippines and Myanmar (just) failed to qualify as universal marriage
societies. By early marriage, we mean the vast majority of women marrying before their 25th birthday.
1
The system that is heavily dependant on arranged marriage is strongest in North India. North
Indian kinship involves three key principles: marriage is exogamous with only non-relatives
marrying; males generally cooperate with agnates, particularly brothers; and females do not
inherit. The sexuality of women needs to be carefully controlled to uphold the honour of the
family. Husbands and wives should not be too emotionally attached, as this could threaten the
unity of the patriarchal family. Girls are married off very young, and are thenceforth cut off
from their natal families. There is a saying that “a woman is concerned not with who her
husband will be but with who her mother in law will be” (Caldwell, 1992: 44). Early
marriage (with a considerably older man) helps protect young women’s chastity, marks a
clear break from their natal families, makes them more likely to accept the structure of
authority in their new family, and weakens the husband-wife bond. Writing of fieldwork in
rural Karnataka, in South India, Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1982: 706) noted that
although great changes had been transforming marriage over the past third of a century, there
was no claim of any decline in the significance of arranged marriage, which remained
universal.
Many of these principles also operated in Malay-Muslim societies of Southeast Asia,4 in
particular the desire to protect family honour by marrying off girls at a young age. However,
women could inherit, albeit following the Islamic allocation of half shares. And while
patriarchy as a principle was supported by their Muslim religion, in practice spousal relations
were much more egalitarian. As a result of the bilateral kinship system, the North Indian
pattern of cutting off young wives from their natal family was absent. In the non-Muslim
Southeast Asian societies - Buddhist Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, and Catholic
Philippines, - choice of spouse was more relaxed than in Islamic societies of Southeast Asia.
In East and Southeast Asia, a broad generalization is that at mid-20th century, arranged
marriage with varying degrees of consultation with the individuals marrying remained the
norm, but by the end of the century, it had largely disappeared.5 The sharp decline in arranged
marriage has been clearly documented for Japan, Taiwan, China, Korea and Malaysia
(Retherford and Ogawa, 2006:, Figure 1.9; Thornton and Lin, 1994; Martin, 1990: 108-9;
Tsuya and Choe, 1991; Jones, 1994: 131-144), and observed elsewhere.
The history of arranged marriage reflects trends in gender and inter-generational relations.
Traditional arranged marriage placed considerable power in the hands of parents, and in
particular the father. The weakening of the system of arranged marriage throughout East and
Southeast Asia reflects at a deep level the abdication of this power by the older generation
and in particular by males of the older generation. It can be seen as a largely voluntary
abdication, clearly related to the remarkable developments in education, increasing
urbanization and involvement of women in economic activities outside the household, among
other things – which in the public perception are often referred to in the vernacular as
“changing times” (e.g. in Indonesian, perobahan zaman), a term which some social scientists
3 For Thai patterns, see Podhisita (, 1994) and Limanonda (, 1994). In Thailand, matrilocal residence after
marriage is most common in the northeast and the north, whereas in the central region and the urban south,
where there are larger proportions of people with Chinese ancestry, neolocal residence or virilocal residence
is preferred (Limanonda, 1994: 390).
4 In Indonesia, and the Malay populations of Malaysia, Singapore, southern Thailand and southern Philippines.
5 This generalization of course needs to be more nuanced. For example, in Thailand, arranged marriage was
not the norm in the mid-20th century, whereas in Cambodia, also a Buddhist country, arranged marriage
remains very common, even today. In Indonesia, though arranged marriage is now fairly rare, it probably
remains common in some rural areas.
2
may consider excessively vague, but which on the contrary captures the breadth and
pervasiveness of the changes referred to.
The weakening of the arranged marriage system in Southeast Asian countries is not hard to
explain. As these are characterized by bilateral kinship systems and not (except for northern
Vietnam)6 subject to Confucianist influences, there was little underlying structural need for an
arranged marriage system. The system therefore crumbled when faced by changing reality, in
the form of extended education for girls, the effect of this on raising ages at marriage, and the
lack of a compelling reason why parents should continue to be the ones choosing the spouse
for later-marrying daughters. But this does not explain why the same crumbling took place in
East Asian Confucianist-influenced societies, but not in South Asia, where the arranged
marriage system proved to be much more resilient. Part of the explanation may be simply a
“developmental” one: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were the East Asian “tiger
economies” which experienced rapid and sustained economic growth, underpinned by
remarkable educational advances, over the four decades from the 1960s onwards. In South
Asia, development - whether measured by economic or human development criteria - was
much slower, at least until India’s recent upsurge in growth. Female education has lagged
male, though before concluding from this that lack of female autonomy is a key factor in
persistence of arranged marriage, it needs to be noted that arranged marriage is nearly
universal in Kerala, where female autonomy is acknowledged to be particularly high. This
serves to underline the strong cultural underpinnings of arranged marriage in South Asia.
Most young people in South Asia continue to accept that their parents are the best ones to
choose their marriage partners, and have shown little inclination to challenge the arranged
marriage system, though there is some movement towards greater consulatation with children
in the choice of spouse (Jeejebhoy et al., 2013; Desai and Andrist, 2010; World Bank, 2008:
114-115)). By contrast, it is argued that in East Asia, the collapse of the arranged marriage
system has not been matched by the emergence of an alternative system, and the dearth of
social contacts with the opposite sex is partly responsible for the sharp rise in singlehood
(Retherford and Ogawa, 2006: 17-18). Reports in the popular press suggest that parents in
China and Japan may be getting more involved again in finding partners for their children.
There is certainly evidence that in East and Southeast Asia, many young people are finding it
hard to deal with the lack of an arranged marriage system, though adaptations of various
kinds are developing – for example, the involvement of Islamic marriage bureaus serving as
matchmaking agencies in Malaysia (Jones, 1994: 153) and more broadly, the growth of
internet dating and matchmaking, ranging from many hundreds of small agencies to very
large ones such as Sunoo and Duo in Korea and zhenai.com in China. In Singapore, such
matchmaking is sponsored by the government (Jones and Gubhaju, 2009: 259-60).
The one exception to the persistence of arranged marriage systems in South Asia is Sri Lanka,
which in relation to marriage should perhaps be considered to lie in Southeast Asia, as it is
culturally closer to the Theravada Buddhist countries such as Thailand and Burma than it is to
the countries of the Indian subcontinent. Here, arranged marriage dropped sharply over the 20
years from the early 1960s to the early 1980s (from 70 per cent to 32 per cent), according to
the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project (Caldwell, 1992,: Table 5.1).
TRENDS TOWARD LATER AND LESS MARRIAGE
6 See Guilmoto, (2012:, pp. 37-44).
3
In 1960, Asia was characterized by universal marriage (a crude definition of which is fewer
than 5 %per cent of women remaining single in their late 40s), with the Philippines and
Myanmar the only exceptions, both by a small margin. The contrast with the present time is
dramatic. Asia is now home to some of the latest-marrying populations in the world; in four
countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Myanmar), the proportion of women reaching
their late 40s never-married is around 12 per cent, and is only slightly below 10 per cent in
Thailand.
The trend toward later marriage has been universal throughout Asia over the past half
century; in East and Southeast Asia it has been accompanied by a trend toward less marriage
(Jones, 2005; Jones and Gubhaju, 2009). A summary of trends in the singulate mean age at
marriage (SMAM)7 is given in Table 1. This measure is subject to biases when age at
marriage is rising, but it does have the advantage of summarizing marriage trends into just
one number and it can be readily calculated using census data. Over the 40 years from 1970
to 2010, SMAM for women has increased by 5 years in Japan, 6.8 years in Korea, 7.8 years
in Taiwan and 6.5 years in Hong Kong. In these countries, SMAM was already relatively
high in 1970, and by 2010 was amongst the highest anywhere in the world, particularly if
cohabiting couples in Western countries are included in the married population for purposes
of comparison. In Southeast Asian countries the rise has not been as spectacular, though the
SMAMs for women in Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand - already around 22 in 1970 - have
now reached levels of 24 or 25, and Myanmar has seen a rise of almost 5 years.
Average age at marriage has been rising in South Asian countries as well, though from lower
starting points than in East and Southeast Asia. For women, the SMAM has risen by over four
years between 1970 and 2010 in India, by two and a half years in Bangladesh, by three years
in Pakistan and by five years in Iran. In Iran, the rise was particularly striking, given the
strong promotion of early marriage in the early post-revolutionary years. It is noteworthy that
in Iran’s pro-natalist phase (1979-86), during which early marriage was encouraged, the
SMAM barely changed. There was then a three and a half year rise in SMAM in the 20-year
period between 1990 and 2010, in which pro-natalist policies had been abandoned.
In India, there are large regional differences in age at marriage. Women marry relatively late
in the South, particularly in Kerala, and relatively early in the North, particularly in Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (Visaria, 2004: 62; Bhagat 2002). These
differences have been discussed as part of a broader difference in female autonomy and
demographic behaviour between North and South India (or more strictly northwest and
southeast India) by Dyson and Moore, (1983).
Another measure of singlehood –- the proportion still single at age 30-34 –- is given in Table
2. In East Asia, the revolution in singlehood since 1970 is indicated by rates of singlehood for
women in Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong climbing from low single digit figures to
around 30-35 per cent in 2010. For men, rates have climbed even more - to around 50 per
cent. China is a striking exception, with only the beginnings of an upturn apparent. In
Southeast Asia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand are only slightly below the East Asian
frontrunners in levels of female singlehood, but Vietnam and Indonesia are far lower. For
males in their early 30s in Southeast Asia, levels of singlehood are increasing everywhere.
7 The singulate mean age at marriage is a measure which takes the proportions single in five5- year age groups
from age 15 to 54 to calculate the average age at which a synthetic cohort of people cease being single, or in
other words the mean age at which they cross into a state of marriage.
4
Very few women in South Asia remain unmarried at ages 30-34, with the important exception
of Iran, where the proportion remaining single more than doubled in the 15 years to 2010.
Singlehood is particularly high in the cities, and for well educated women. In Thailand,
among women aged over 30 in 2010, the propoprtion of never-married was twice as high in
urban areas as in rural areas (for example, 20 per cent compared with 10 per cent at ages 35-
39). As for education, figures for Thailand in 2000 show that the proportion of women still
single at ages 35-39 was 7 per cent for those with primary education or less, 14 per cent for
those with lower secondary education, 17 per cent for those with upper secondary education,
and 23 per cent for those with tertiary education. Similar data for three countries in 2010 isare
shown in Table 3. In Singapore and Korea, in the younger adult ages there are few women
with primary school education or less, so the key comparison is between the high school and
tertiary educated; in both countries, delayed and non-marriage is considerably higher for the
tertiary educated women. In China, the tertiary educated are the only group of women
delaying their marriage beyond age 30 in considerable numbers.
For men, the relationship between educational level and marriage is different. In the countries
included in Table 3, and also in Japan and for Chinese Malaysians, it is the less educated who
are less likely to marry, seemingly because of the difficulties they face in the marriage
market. Partly as a result of this, there have been rapid increases in the proportion of men
from wealthier Asian countries (e,g., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) marrying
women from poorer Asian countries (e.g. China, Vietnam) through marriage brokers (Jones
and Shen, 2008; Jones 2012; Kim (ed), 2008).
Given that singlehood is much more prevalent for well educated women, an important
question is whether the recent rise in singlehood is purely a “compositional” effect of
increasing proportions of women in these educational categories, or whether the increase in
singlehood is something sweeping through the whole society. It has been shown that, up to
2005 at least, the dramatic trend away from marriage in Japan, Korea and Taiwan has been
pervasive across all educational groups, whereas in Thailand, for the Chinese in Peninsular
Malaysia, in Singapore and in China, compositional changes played the dominant role (Jones
and Gubhaju, 2009).
A decade ago, the rise in singlehood throughout Asia seemed to be inexorable, and indeed it
continues to appear this way through most of Asia. However, over the past decade, some
important exceptions have emerged. In Indonesia, the earlier steady rise in age at marriage
was reversed after 2005, though in 2010 the SMAM was still 3 years higher than it had been
in 1970. Singlehood has also declined somewhat in Vietnam and Sri Lanka (see De Silva,
2014forthcoming). Reasons differ. In Indonesia, there appears to be increasing religiosity, and
support for early family formation by popular religious figures, including those hosting
popular TV programs (Fealy and White (eds), 2008; Weintraub (ed), 2011). In Sri Lanka, De
Silva (2014forthcoming) gives a number of reasons: the ending of the marriage squeeze,
restriction on abortion services for unmarried females, clearing of education backlogs
resulting in earlier completion of education and entry into the labour market, and lower
unemployment rates.
5
Turning to age differences between husbands and wives, these are much wider in South Asia
than in East and Southeast Asia; in East Asian countries in recent decades, the SMAM for
males typically exceeds that for females by between 2 to 3.5 years, and for Southeast Asian
countries by 1.8 to 3.6 years, whereas in South Asian countries, the differences tend to be
more like five or six years. (For earlier evidence from World Fertility Survey data, see
Casterline et al., 1986). Bangladesh is probably the most extreme case; men marry on average
more than nine years later than women, indicating large age differences between husbands
and wives (National Institute of Population Research and Training et al., 2009: 77). The
wider age gap in South Asian countries reflects parent-arranged marriage and patriarchal
family structures, which typically lead to young ages at marriage for females, whereas males
are expected to be in a position both to support a family economically, and to show maturity
in taking on the responsibilities of a new family, before entering into marriage, which usually
means some delay in marriage.
Over time, the age differences have contracted somewhat in most Asian countries for which
there is evidence. For example, in Pakistan, the difference between SMAM for males and
females was around 6 years in the 1950-1970 period, but has been around 5 years since the
1980s (1991 DHS:, Table 7.2); census data show the difference contracting to 3.9 years in
1998 (Nayab, 2009). In Iran, the difference in mean age at first marriage in rural areas fell
from 5.3 years in 1980 to 4.3 years in 2000, and in urban areas from 5.4 years to 5.0 years.
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2009,: Table 5.2). However, in Peninsular Malaysia, there has been
little change. What is clear in Malaysia is that tertiary-educated women tend to have a smaller
age gap with their husband, and are more likely than other women to be the same age as, or
older than, their husband (Tey, 2007,: Tables 1 and 8).
ISSUES ARISING FROM RISING SINGLEHOOD
In the traditional, universal marriage systems of Asia, only women with serious physical or
mental disabilities were likely to remain single. The situation has now drastically changed in
many East and Southeast Asian countries. In Japan, around 40 per cent of women are entering
their 30s still single, and around 15 per cent of that cohort is likely to remain single when
they reach 49.8 In Indonesia, around 10 per cent of women are entering their 30s still single,
though the proportion reaching their 40s still single remains very low. Most East and
Southeast Asian countries fall between these two extremes. What is the role of singles in
these societies? In Japan, many adjustments have been made, but the use of terms such as
“parasite singles” to describe those who remain living at home, and enjoy their good salaries
to buy designer clothes and take vacations with friends, shows a degree of tension about the
role of singles. In Indonesia, the situation of singles may be more difficult, because a place
has not been provided for single adults in community and family activities and ceremonies
(Situmorang, 2005). Similarly, in Vietnam, while non-marriage has become more acceptable,
“single women are far from being fully accepted by, and integrated in, their families and
communities” (Belanger and Hong, 2002: 90). It is perhaps easier for single women in
Buddhist countries such as Thailand and Burma, where remaining single to look after aged
parents is an accepted role for women.
Given the increasing numbers of singles in their 20s and 30s in many Asian countries, are
many of them becoming involved in cohabiting relationships? Data on this is scarce, but in
Japan and the Philippines, cohabitation is increasing (Raymo, Iwasawa and Bumpass, 2009;
8 An even higher proportion of Japanese men are likely to remain single on reaching 49 – perhaps 20 per cent.
6
Abalos, 2014forthcoming). In Thailand, where both registered and unregistered marriages are
recognized in the community, cohabitation is a separate category. Its incidence is low (2.4 per
cent among those aged 18-59 in 2006), but higher in Bangkok (10 per cent) (Jampaklay and
Haseen, 2011,: Table 1). A survey in Shanghai found that 30 per cent of couples had
cohabited (Fudan University – check). Cohabitation may well be increasing in other East and
Southeast Asian countries, but it remains very uncommon in South Asia.
In many countries of Asia, it is very difficult for singles to access contraceptive advice and
services. In many countries of the region, access to contraception by unmarried teenagers is
made very difficult. For example, in Mataram, Lombok, women are denied access to family
planning in government clinics if they are unable to confirm that they are married; the
alternative for single women is to access contraception privately, but “this requires the
cooperation and discretion of a willing doctor, midwife, or chemist and the financial
resources to pay the inflated cost of contraception sold in the private sector” (Bennett, 2005:
35). In Malaysia, even the private Federation of Family Planning Associations of Malaysia
“has limited its services for young, adolescent and unmarried women to counseling,
information, and education, and not any direct services that are not endorsed by government
policy” (Chee, 2006: 5). There is a clear need to re-think these policies in view of the much
longer period young people are exposed to the possibility of premarital sexual relations.
Delayed marriage of the magnitude being experienced in many East and Southeast Asian
countries is sufficient to make a considerable difference in lowering fertility rates, from an
accounting point of view, but perhaps more emphasis needs to be placed on the motivation
for delaying marriage. Given the stress on quickly having a child after marriage in these
societies, delay in marriage could in many cases be motivated by reluctance to start family
formation by those who are worried about the many problems they face in bearing and raising
children. These problems include the increasing costs of childrearing, both the direct financial
costs and the opportunity costs of women’s interrupted career development; societal
expectations about intensive parenting and driving children to succeed in a highly
competitive world, and the pressures this places on women in particular; and the difficulty for
women in finding a partners who shares their values and expectations, particularly regarding
sharing about partnership in housework and childrearing in a two-income household.
CONSANGUINEOUS MARRIAGE
Consanguineous marriage tends to be prevalent in societies where the interaction between
young women and men from outside close kin is highly restricted. It is therefore prevalent in
many Islamic societies, as well as non-Islamic communities in South Asia, especially in
South India. The most common form of consanguineous unions is between first cousins
(Bittles, 1994: 562). As noted by Korson (1979: 196), writing of Pakistan, “with the
limitation of sexual segregation among adolescents and adults enforced by the practice of
purdah, it is only natural that the young men and women are likely to develop close
attachments to those relatives they are permitted to see over a period of time, namely,
cousins”.
Pakistan does, indeed, have one of the highest rates of consanguineous marriage in the world.
Among currently married women aged 15-49 surveyed in the 2006-7 Pakistan Demographic
and Health Survey, only one third were married to non-relatives, and the proportion was even
lower among those aged below 30, suggesting, if anything, a tendency for the practice to
7
increase over time. This increase over time is confirmed by comparing the 2006-7 Pakistan
Demographic and Health Survey with the DHS of 1990-91 (Nayab, 2009). More than half of
women in 2008 were married to first cousins. Consanguineous marriage was more common
among the rural and less educated population, but even among those with secondary
education, 44 per cent were married to first cousins, and among the tertiary educated, 37 per
cent (National Institute of Population Studies et al., 2008,: Table 6.3).
In India, consanguineous marriage has long been more prevalent in the south, especially in
Tamil Nadu. The favoured version is matrilineal cross-cousin (with mother’s brother’s
daughter), or uncle-niece marriage, that is, with sister’s daughter (Caldwell, 1992: 49; Dyson
and Moore, 1983). Tamil populations abroad (e.g. in Malaysia) have carried on this tradition;
in a survey of Indian (mainly Tamil) women in Malaysian estates in the 1980s, close to 30 per
cent had been offered to their maternal uncle, where one was available (though only half of
them actually proceeded to the marriage), while one third were offered in marriage to a
cousin, of whom two thirds married the cousin. In all, some 40 per cent were offered in
marriage to a cousin, an uncle, or both (Tan et al., 1988: 44-48).
In Malaysia, not only the Tamils but also the Malays have traditions of marrying close
relatives. Malaysia’s long-serving Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad famously argued in his
book The Malay Dilemma (banned until he became Prime Minister) that the genetic
weaknesses resulting from the practice of cross-cousin marriage were part of the reason why
Malays were unable to compete successfully with the Chinese in Malaysia. 9 Interestingly, the
evidence from the Malay world shows that among Malays in Malaysia, marriage to relatives
is not particularly common, and certainly less than in parts of Indonesia, where in places it
reaches levels of 30-50 per cent, (though the Javanese seem to have lower rates of
consanguineous marriage than elsewhere in Indonesia - (Jones, 1994: 11-13).
It has been frequently argued (e.g. by Goode, 1963) that consanguineous marriage will
decline with development, urbanization and the decline of arranged marriage. And there is
indeed evidence of decline in many parts of the developing world (Tfaily, 2005). However,
the decline has tended to be slow, and not universal. As noted above, there is no sign of a
decline in consanguinity in Pakistan. A recent study for Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008)
shows very considerable regional variation in levels of consanguinity, and greater incidence
in rural areas and among the lesser-educated, lending some support to the argument that it
may soon decline, particularly bearing in mind the decline in arranged marriages in Iran.
Nevertheless, consanguineous marriage has strong cultural support in Iran, and there is no
evidence of a lowered incidence so far.
Many observers stress the undesirable clinical outcomes of close kin marriages, though these
adversely affect only a small minority of the families and individuals concerned, and need to
be balanced by an understanding of the social and economic benefits of a consanguineous
union in the cultural settings of the countries in which they are prevalent. Such benefits
include maintenance of family structure and property, financial advantages of keeping dowry
or bridewealth payments within the family, a closer relationship between the wife and her in-
laws, and greater marital stability.
9 Because the highest rates of consanguineous marriage tend to be associated with low socioeconomic status,
interactions between consanguinity and social variables can complicate assessment of the genetic effects of
human inbreeding. In a survey of the available studies, Bittles (2001) summarizes that the greater likelihood
of rare recessive genes inherited from a common ancestor results in morbidity levels some 1% to 4% per cent
higher in the progeny of first cousins than in the offspring of unrelated couples, and mean excess mortality 4
per cent% higher.
8
PROBLEMS OF CONTINUED EARLY MARRIAGE
In South Asia, universal marriage remains the norm, and although there has been a decline
over time in the proportion of females in the 15-19 age group who are married, the proportion
still marrying as teenagers remains very high in Bangladesh, parts of India, Afghanistan and
Nepal (Bhagat, 1993, 2002). Marriage, though, tends to be at a later age in Pakistan, and at a
much later age in Sri Lanka, which in this respect does not fit the South Asian pattern at all.
Before World War II, teenage marriage was the norm throughout Southeast and East Asia.10
The postwar years saw major changes, but in the early 1960s, teenage marriage remained the
norm in Islamic Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malays in Malaysia, Singapore and Southern
Thailand), as well as among the Indian populations of Malaysia and Singapore and, to a
lesser extent, in rural Thailand and Myanmar. The median age at marriage for females in the
late 1950s was around 17 in Indonesia, for Malays in Malaysia and Singapore, and for
Southern Thai Muslims (Jones, 1994,: Table 3.1). Then it rose dramatically and by 1990 had
reached 21 in Indonesia and 24 for Malays in both Malaysia and Singapore.
Table 4 shows the percentages of females ever-married in the 15-19 age group in various
countries and populations. This statistic needs to be interpreted carefully. It is a cross-
sectional figure, showing the current marital status of those in the age range 15-19 at the time
of the census. If 50 per cent of this age group are ever-married, it does not mean that half of
women marry only at ages 20 and above. Many women aged 15-19 at any particular time are
aged 15, 16 or 17, and the fact that they are not yet married does not necessarily mean that
they will not marry before reaching age 20. Thus, if 50 per cent of women aged 15-19 are
ever-married, this implies that a large majority of the women in this cohort marry in their
teens.
In South Asia, although proportions ever married at ages 15-19 have fallen very substantially,
they remain much higher than in most countries of Southeast Asia; in East Asia, teenage
marriage has virtually disappeared. However, it is noteworthy that in the first decade of the
21st century, sharp declines in percentage of teenagers who are married in India and Pakistan,
and slight increases in Indonesia and Thailand, have resulted in a convergence in the
incidence of teenage marriage in these four countries.
In India, the proportion of females aged 10-14 who were currently married declined from 6.5
per cent in 1981 to 2.4 per cent in 2001 (Office of the Registrar General and Census
Commissioner, India, no date: 18). The legal age at marriage for women in India is 18. In
2001, one state –- Rajasthan –- had by far the highest proportion of women who were married
before reaching age 18 – 5.4 per cent. It was followed by Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, each
3.2 per cent, Andhra Pradesh, 2.9 per cent, and Uttar Pradesh, 2.8 per cent. The Census report
commented that these are the known demographically backward states with high birth rates,
high infant and maternal mortality rates and low literacy rates (Office of the Registrar
General and Census Commissioner, India, no date: 19). While 18 has been set as the
10 The youngest marriages in East Asia appears to have been in Korea, where in 1935, 63 per cent of females
aged 15-19 were ever married (Kwon, 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan, 2005, Fig. 8) ;. and i In China, where a
study carried out in eleven provinces between 1929 and 1931 found that 72 per cent of women had married
before reaching the age of 20 (Croll, 1981: 66-67).
9
minimum age at marriage for women since 1929 (Haub and Sharma, 2006), most Indian
women married before age 17 until fairly recently.
In Bangladesh, too, the legal age at marriage for women is 18, but a remarkably large
proportion of marriages take place before that age. The 2007 Demographic and Health
Survey found that 66 per cent of women aged 20-24 were married before age 18 (see Table
5). Although there had been a steady decline in the proportion married before age 18, from 90
per cent among women currently aged 45-49, the fact that two thirds of young women are
still married before the legal age suggests that this particular legislation has little or no
meaning. As for the proportion of marriages occurring before age 15, this has fallen rather
more sharply, from 65 per cent among women aged 45-49 to 21 per cent among women ages
15-19.
In 1960, Southeast Asia could not match the South Asian figure of 70 per cent of females ever
married in the 15-19 age group, but among Southeast Asian Muslim populations, figures of
50 per cent and more were common – in Malaysia and Singapore, many provinces of
Indonesia, and in Southern Thailand. Then a decline set in, dramatic in the case of Malaysia
and Singapore, much more gradual in the case of Indonesia, such that the percentage ever
married in this age group is now above 8 per cent only in Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Myanmar – interestingly, three of them countries with only small Muslim
populations.
The trends in early marriage in Indonesia and Bangladesh are compared in Table 5, based on
DHS data collected in 2007. It is possible that in both countries, the extent of teenage
marriage is somewhat overstated, as DHS samples tend to be biased away from single women
or women with few children (Hull and Hartanto, 2009; Avery et al., 2013). In Bangladesh,
there is also evidence of systematic under-reporting of women’s age at marriage (Streatfield
et al., 2015). Keeping this possible bias in mind, the data show that in both countries,
although there has been a gradual decline over time in teenage marriage, it remains quite
prevalent in Indonesia and highly prevalent in Bangladesh. In Indonesia, between the cohort
of women aged 45-49 and those aged 20-24 (i.e. over a 25-year period), the proportion
married before age 15 fell from 17 per cent to 4 per cent; and the proportion married before
age 18 fell from 47 per cent to 22 per cent. More than one third of all women were still
marrying in their teens, and of all women currently in their childbearing ages, approximately
half married as teenagers. In Bangladesh, the proportions marrying as teenagers were much
higher; two thirds of young women aged 20-24 were still marrying before age 18, although
18 is the minimum legal age at marriage.
In both Indonesia and Bangladesh, there are legal issues in early marriage. Although the legal
age at marriage for girls in Indonesia has been 16 since 1974, in the decade after that, more
than 10 per cent% of girls were still being married before reaching that age, a figure which
had fallen to about 3 per cent by the early years of the 21st century. There are a number of
reasons why such marriages are still taking place. One is that in some cases, the girl is
pregnant, and marriage is seen as the only way to preserve family honour. Another is that
some parents, and officials responsible for registering such marriages, do not accept that there
should be any lower age limit on the age at which girls can be married. Another is that
sometimes there is no valid birth certificate for the girl, and therefore no way for the official
to verify her age.
10
There are at least four key problems with early, parent-arranged marriage. First, there is a
human rights dimension. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
“marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses”.
Second, early marriage is likely to result in early age at first childbirth, which can have
adverse health consequences for both mother and child. Third, early marriage is typically a
barrier to education. Fourth, women who marry very young, typically to a much older
husband, “are likely to have less power, status, agency and autonomy within the household.
In fact, men may choose younger brides for this very reason” (Jensen and Thornton, 2003:
10).
DIVORCE TRENDS11
Divorce rates in Western countries rose very substantially –- with more than a doubling of the
general divorce rate –- in the two decades between 1960 and 1980 (Jones, Asari and
Djuartika, 1994:, Table 1). Since then, these rates have shown little change, although with the
rise in cohabitation, divorce trends in these countries are becoming less meaningful as an
indicator of dissolution of long-term relationships. In East Asian countries, though, divorce
rates have been rising steadily since 1980, particularly in the period since 1990 in the case of
Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong (see Table 6). The rise in South Korea was particularly
sharp between 1995 and 2000 – the period in which the Asian financial crisis occurred. The
usual risk factors explain only a small part of the rise in Korean divorce over this period,
implying “transformations in normative regimes regarding divorce, which may have
accelerated after the economic recession in the late 1990s” (Lee, 2006: 127).12 In China,
freeing up of divorce regulations in 2001 and 2003 may have contributed to the sharp rise in
divorce rates (almost a doubling) since 2000.13
Trends in divorce in East Asia appear, then, to be going the way of the West, and partly for
the same reasons. Substantial increases in divorce rates in East Asian countries signify a
significant change in circumstances and attitudes to divorce, because in the past divorce
carried a considerable stigma, and the pressure to remain in a disharmonious marriage for
“the sake of the children” and also for the sake of appearances and family honour, was very
strong. It would appear that factors such as increasing economic independence of women,
and the pressures of the big city environments in which an increasing proportion of East
Asians live, are influencing divorce trends. More controversial is the issue of whether East
Asian societies are becoming more individualistic and less governed by Confucianist norms.
But in the less wealthy countries of Asia, divorce rates have varied tremendously in the past,
from very low rates in South Asian countries to very high rates in the Malay-Muslim
populations of Southeast Asia. One generalization about trends in divorce that has at least
some theoretical basis is that in stable high-divorce systems, “industrialization” can be
expected to lead to declines in divorce rates (Goode, 1963,: Chapter 8). I have argued that,
with regard to the Malay-Muslim populations, it is only when the traditional marriage and
11 For a more detailed discussion of Asian divorce trends, see Dommaraju and Jones, (2011).
12 South Korean divorce rates appear to have leveled off since 2003 and to have fallen since the introduction in
2008 of a mandatory deliberation period before a couple could end their marriage (Junghyan, 2009).
Interestingly, divorce rates in Taiwan also peaked in 2003.
13 Before 2003, in many areas of China, people who wanted to divorce had to obtain a written certificate from
their workplace or neighbourhood committee before the divorce could be finalized. The new Marriage Law in
October 2003 only required the couples to present their own residence booklets, identification cards, marriage
certificates and their written divorce agreements to obtain their divorce certificates on the spot.
11
kinship systems in these countries are understood, along with the pressures under which they
are placed by social and economic developments, that trends in divorce can be understood.
(Jones, 1997; see also Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan, 2003). “Industrialization” led to
massive declines in divorce rates in these populations, because divorce had been an escape
route from unsatisfactory parent-arranged marriages at very young ages, and when this
system of marriage arrangement broke down and love marriages took over, this escape route
was no longer needed.
Actually, in very recent years, the falling trend in divorce rates in Malay-Muslim populations
of Southeast Asia appears to have been reversed, very likely because the factors just
mentioned have more than played themselves out, and divorce among these populations is
now being driven by similar factors to those operating elsewhere in East Asia, and in the
West, for that matter. The rise came first for the Muslim population of Singapore, followed by
Malaysia, but it is now clearly evident in Indonesia as well (Cammack and Heaton, 2011).
In South Asian societies, too, the underlying marriage system must be understood if lack of
increase in divorce rates with “industrialization” is to be understood. In the marriage systems
of the Indian subcontinent, divorce is not a feasible way out of a disharmonious marriage.
Unless arranged marriage and patrilocal residence cease to be the norms governing marriage,
it seems unrealistic to expect much increase in divorce rates in the region. However, Iran is a
South Asian country with a different system: relatively high divorce rates, which declined
from 1985 to 1995, then rose significantly over the following 15 years.
CONCLUSIONS
Arranged marriage systems in South Asia have proved extremely durable, whereas they have
broken down in East and Southeast Asia. Age at marriage has risen very substantially in the
countries where arranged marriage systems have collapsed, but it has also risen (though to a
lesser extent) in the South Asian countries. What can be expected in future? Competing
theories abound: Goode’s convergence toward the conjugal family form; changes based on
ideological factors (Lesthaeghe’s second demographic transition, or Thornton’s “development
idealism”). Focusing on the two trends that appear to be close to universal in Asian countries
in recent times – later and less marriage, and increasing divorce rates – both can plausibly be
attributed to either socio-economic trends (rising incomes, education and urbanization) or
ideational change (legitimization of individual self-interest) or, more likely, both. Regressing
female education and economic development indicators against indicators of delayed
marriage shows that these are powerful predictors of singlehood in Asia (Jones and Yeung,
2014forthcoming). Yet there is good reason to doubt that there will be convergence to one
universal pattern. Intercountry differences remain enormous, as do differences within
countries, and these differences are by no means fully explained by levels of socio-economic
development, but involve cultural and institutional factors as well.
As argued by Lesthaeghe (2010) there is certainly evidence of individualism and the quest for
self-fulfillment in some East Asian countries. “But to conclude that rising singlehood is being
driven by individualism would be to downplay (among other drivers of rising singlehood) the
many existential dilemmas facing increasingly educated women in East Asia. Changes in
women’s attitude appear to be related more to dissatisfaction with the dilemmas and conflicts
that traditional gender roles pose for educated women in a rapidly changing economy than
with ‘“individualism’” per se” (Jones and Yeung, 2014: 1581forthcoming). The “marriage
package” elaborated by Bumpass et al. (2009) captures this very well. Thornton (1989) has
12
argued in the American context that marriage has become much more discretionary as an
adult role, and this point can equally be made for many of the countries of East and Southeast
Asia. In time, it may become true for countries such as India and Bangladesh as well, but this
is unlikely to be in a linear way determined purely by economic development.
Marriage patterns in Asia raise some important issues for policy, though the issues differ
between the wealthier and poorer countries of Asia. In some of the poorer countries, the
problem of very young marriage is paramount. Legislating minimum ages for marriage
appears to have little impact on marriage ages, as minimum ages are flouted openly in
countries such as Bangladesh and until fairly recently in India, and a little more
circumspectly in countries such as Indonesia. Some form of community consensus about ages
below which marriage should not be allowed needs to be developed rather than relying solely
on regulations imposed from above. Emphasis needs to be placed on the human rights
violations when marriages are arranged at very young ages.
Policymakers and planners also find it hard to come to terms with issues relating to the
sexuality of the unmarried. In traditional systems, this was dealt with by ensuring that young
women did not remain single for long after reaching puberty. But now the interval between
puberty and marriage has lengthened greatly, meaning that the chance of premarital
conceptions is heightened. Family planning programs in the region must face up to the need
to provide contraceptive information and services to the unmarried, to avert unnecessarily
large numbers of induced abortions and of marriages entered into unwisely to preserve family
honour.
In the wealthier countries, the issues are more to do with adaptation of family and social
structures to the fact of extended singlehood in a context where young people typically live
with parents until they marry, and the family is expected to look after its elderly. Before long,
the movement of a generation with high singlehood rates into the older age groups will pose
many challenges to social policy.
13
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Table 1
Trends in Singulate Mean Age at Marriage, Various Asian Countries, 1970-2010
COUNTRY 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
WOMEN
East and SE Asia
Japan 24.7 25.1 26.9 28.6 29.7
Korea 23.3 24.1 25.5 27.1 30.1
Taiwan 22.6 23.9 26.0 27.6 30.4
China 20.6 22.4 22.1 23.3 24.7
Hong Kong 23.8 25.3 28.0 29.6 30.3
Thailand 22.0 22.8 23.5 24.1 24.7
Singapore 24.2 26.2 27.0 26.5 27.9
Malaysia 22.1 23.5 24.6 24.9 25.7
Indonesia 19.3 20.0 21.6 22.7 22.2
Philippines 22.8 22.4 23.8 23.9 24.4
Myanmar 21.3 22.4 24.5 25.8 26.1
South Asia
India 17.7 18.7 19.3 20.2 22.0
Pakistan 19.7 20.2 21.7 22.2 22.7
Bangladesh 16.8 16.9 18.1 18.7 19.4
Sri Lanka 23.5 24.4 25.5 23.7 23.6
Iran 18.5 19.7 19.8 22.4 23.4
MEN
East and SE Asia
Japan 27.5 28.7 30.4 30.8 31.2
Korea 27.2 27.3 28.5 30.3 32.9
Taiwan 24.6 25.3 28.8 30.5 32.7
China n.a 25.1 23.8 25.1 26.5
Hong Kong 30.2 28.7 29.8 31.9 33.1
Thailand 24.7 24.9 26.0 27.4 28.2
Singapore 27.8 28.4 29.9 30.0 30.3
Malaysia 25.6 26.6 27.9 28.5 27.8
Indonesia 23.8 24.1 25.2 25.9 25.6
Philippines 24.4 24.9 26.3 26.3 27.0
Myanmar 23.9 24.6 26.3 27.6 27.6
South Asia
India 22.7 23.4 23.9 24.8 25.9
Pakistan 25.7 25.1 26.5 26.1 26.4
Bangladesh 24.0 23.9 25.0 25.3 25.0
Sri Lanka 28.0 27.9 28.3 27.6 n.a
Iran 25.0 n.a 23.8 25.3 26.8
Notes:
20
China (1970): Banister, 1984: 248; (1980): Data 1982.; Philippines (2010): Data 2007 from UNPD.;
Myanmar (2010): Myanmar 2007 from UNPD.; India (1990): Data 1992-1993 DHS.; Pakistan (1980):
Data Census 1981, (1990 & 2000): DHS 1990/91, DHS 2001 respectively, (2010): Data 2007 UNPD;.
Bangladesh (1970, 1980, 1990): Data from 1974, 1981, 1991, repectively from Statistical Yearbooks,
(2000): Data 2001 UNPD , (2010): Data 2011.; Sri Lanka (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010): Data 1971
census, 1981 census, 1993 DHS, 2000 DHS and 2006-07 DHS.; Iran (1970, 1990, 2000, 2010): Data
1966, 1986, 1996, 2011 from UNPD.
Sources: Jones and Gubhaju, (2009,: Tables 1 and 2); Jones and Gubhaju, forthcoming;. Dommaraju,
(2008:, Table 3.1); Sathar and Kiani, (1998, Table 1); Japan (2010) figures calculated by author from
Statistical Survey Department, Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications;
South Korea (1980- 2010) figures calculated by author from Korea Statistical Information Service;
Taiwan (2005, 2010) figures calculated by author from Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China;
China (1980, 1990, 2000) figures calculated by author from China Data Online, (2010) National
Bureau of Statistics; Hong Kong SAR (2010) figures calculated by author from Census and Statistic
Department, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; Thailand (2010)
figures calculated by author from NSO Thailand; Singapore Department of Statistics: Census of
Population 2010; Malaysia (2010) figures calculated by author from Population Distribution and
Basic Demographic Characteristics, Populations and Housing Census of Malaysia 2010; Indonesia
(2000, 2010) from Badan Pusat Statistik; India (2010) figures calculated from Sample Registration
System Statistical Report 2010, Office of the Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Governemnt of India, New Delhi; Bangladesh (1970- 2000) figures are from Statistical Yearbooks ,
(2010) from Population and Housing Census 2011; Demographic Health Survey (DHS) of various
countries; United Nations Population Division (UNPD), World Marriage Data.
21
Table 2
Per cent Never Married at Ages 30-34, Various Asian Countries, 1970-2010
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
East Asia
WOMEN
Japan 7.0 9.0 14.0 27.0 32.5
S. Korea 1.0 3.0 5.0 11.0 29.1
China 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 5.4
Taiwan 2.0 6.0 12.3 20.8 37.2
Hong Kong 6.0 11.1 21.0 30.0 35.0
Southeast Asia
Singapore 10.0 17.0 21.0 20.0 25.1
Malaysia 5.7 9.9 12.1 12.1 17.9
Thailand 5.2 7.3 9.6 11.6 14.6
Philippines 8.0 8.0 8.7 9.5 10.3
Indonesia 1.4 1.9 2.7 3.5 3.8
Myanmar 7.0 8.9 13.8 18.6 21.4
Vietnam n.a n.a 10.9 9.8 8.0
South Asia
India 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.5
Bangladesh 0.4 0.4 0.6 2.5 0.8
Pakistan 2.1 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.9
Nepal 1.4 3.1 1.9 2.5 2.0
Iran 1.1 n.a 2.7 3.3 9.1
MEN
East Asia
Japan 11.7 21.5 32.6 42.9 44.5
S. Korea 6.4 7.3 13.9 28.1 50.2
China 9.0 7.0 8.0 10.0 12.6
Taiwan 11.0 12.5 22.7 35.4 54.1
Hong Kong 35.0 27.0 34.0 46.0 55.4
Southeast Asia
Singapore 22.0 22.0 34.0 31.0 37.1
Malaysia 12.2 14.5 20.2 24.4 28.4
Thailand 11.0 12.0 17.0 23.0 36.5
Philippines 13.1 14.4 16.9 20.8 22.4
Indonesia 6.1 6.1 9.4 11.8 12.8
Myanmar 10.3 12.7 19.6 25.4 27.0
Vietnam n.a n.a 6.8 9.8 12.1
South Asia
India 7.3 7.1 8.2 8.7 13.0
Bangladesh 5.7 6.3 7.2 12.0 8.0
Pakistan n.a 13.9 n.a 13.9 13.0
22
Nepal 5.7 12.4 5.2 4.8 6.4
Iran 8.9 n.a n.a n.a 15.9
Notes:
China (1980): Data for 1982.; Philippines (2010): Data for 2007 from UNPD.; Myanmar (2010):
Myanmar 2007 from UNPD.; India (1990): Data 1992-1993 DHS.; Pakistan (1980): Data Census
1981, (1990 & 2000): DHS 1990/91, DHS 2001 respectively, (2010): Data 2007 UNPD.; Bangladesh
(1970, 1980, 1990): Data from 1974, 1981, 1991, respectively from Statistical Yearbooks, (2000):
Data 2001 UNPD, (2010): Data 2011, Data 1980-2000 are inconsistent with the same cohort.; Iran
(1970, 1990, 2000, 2010): Data 1966, 1986, 1996, 2011 from UNPD.; Malaysia (1990): Data 1991;.
Vietnam (1990- 2010): Data 1989, 1999 and 2009, respectively.
Source: Jones and Gubhaju, (2009:, Tables 1 and 2); Dommaraju, (2008:, Table 3.1); Sathar and
Kiani, (1998,: Table 1); National Institute of Population Research and Training et al. , (2009:, Table
6.2); Japan (2010) figures calculated by author from Statistical Survey Department, Statistical Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; South Korea (2010) figures calculated by author
from Korea Statistical Information Service; Taiwan (2010) figures calculated by author from Ministry
of the Interior, Republic of China; China (2010) National Bureau of Statistics; Hong Kong SAR
(2010) figures calculated by author from Census and Statistic Department, the Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; Thailand (2010) figures calculated by author from NSO
Thailand; Singapore Department of Statistics: Census of Population 2010; Indonesia (2010) from
Badan Pusat Statistik; India (2010) figures calculated from Sample Registration System Statistical
Report 2010, Office of the Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
New Delhi; Bangladesh (1970- 2000) figures are from Statistical Yearbooks , (2010) from Population
and Housing Census 2011; Demographic Health Survey (DHS) of various countries; United Nations
Population Division (UNPD), World Marriage Data.
23
Table 3
South Korea, China & Singapore: Per cent still single women and men, by age and
education, 2010
Age Groups
Educational Level 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
SOUTH KOREA
Women
None, Primary or Middle
School* 60.2 49.7 35.5 17.4 6.2 2.4
High School 86.1 53.6 23.7 9.8 4.5 2.5
Tertiary 98.0 73.8 31.4 14.8 8.4 5.7
Men
None, Primary or Middle
School^ 92.6 82.3 70.4 54.9 36.4 18.2
High School 96.5 78.9 52.9 31.8 17.6 8.0
Tertiary 99.3 87.2 48.8 22.3 9.7 4.2
CHINA
Women
None, Primary or Middle
School 40.2 12.2 4.0 1.4 0.6 0.4
High School 60.0 17.5 4.8 1.6 0.7 0.4
Tertiary 93.1 39.6 9.5 3.6 1.8 1.1
Men
None, Primary or Middle
School 72.0 37.6 21.8 14.5 10.3 9.0
High School 77.8 31.1 11.0 5.1 2.7 1.8
Tertiary 96.4 53.4 13.5 4.2 1.8 0.9
SINGAPORE
Women
None, Primary or Middle
School#55.1 23.0 12.7 9.4 9.0 9.1
High School 88.0 48.0 24.0 16.5 13.9 13.6
Tertiary 93.1 61.7 28.0 20.7 19.1 18.3
Men
None, Primary or Middle
School+88.9 63.9 39.4 29.1 22.7 19.1
High School 97.1 72.0 38.6 21.8 15.3 11.6
Tertiary 97.2 75.7 35.0 16.9 10.9 8.1
Source: www. kosis.kr; National Bureau of Statistics, China; Department of Statistics, Singapore.
Note:
* Only 0.8% of female aged 20-24, 1.1% of those aged 25-29, 1.2% of those aged 30-34, 2.3% of
those aged 35-39, 6.7% of those aged 40-44 and 20.1% of those aged 45-49.
^ Only 0.7% of male aged 20-24, 1.2% of those aged 25-29, 1.6% of those aged 30-34, 2.6% of those
aged 35-39, 4.8% of those aged 40-44 and 11.8% of those aged 45-49.
24
# Only5.4 % of female aged 20-24, 5.5% of those aged 25-29, 8.3% of those aged 30-34, 14.2% of
those aged 35-39, 22.7% of those aged 40-44 and 33.9% of those aged 45-49.
+ Only 4.2% of male aged 20-24, 4.0% of those aged 25-29, 6.0% of those aged 30-34, 9.8% of those
aged 35-39, 19.2% of those aged 40-44 and 32.1% of those aged 45-49.
25
Table 4
Teenage Marriage: Per cent of Females Ever Married at Ages 15-19, Various Countries,
1960-2010
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
East Asia
South Korea 7.0 2.9 1.8 0.5 0.7 0.4
China n.a n.a 4.4 4.7 1.2 2.1
Taiwan 10.4 7.2 5.3 2.7 1.6 0.4
Hong Kong 7.0 3.3 3.7 1.6 0.7 0.1
Southeast Asia
Philippines 12.7 10.8 14.1 10.5 10.2* 5.3
Indonesia 40.5 37.4 30.0 18.2 13.3 14.4
Thailand 18.5 18.9 16.7 14.9 12.0 13.5
Malaysia Malays 54.2 22.8 10.5 5.1 3.0 4.8
Malaysia Chinese 10.3 6.0 4.6 2.5 1.8 4.8
Malaysia Indians 53.2 17.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 5.0
Myanmar n.a 22.0 16.8 10.7 8.4 7.2
South Asia
India 70.8 57.1 44.2 35.7 24.9 14.4
Bangladesh n.a 70.2 65.8 53.3 48.1 31.5
Nepal 73.9 60.7 50.8 44.0 40.3 28.9
Pakistan 53.4 34.4 29.4 24.9 20.6 10.8
Iran n.a 46.1 34.3 33.5 18.6 21.4
Notes:
*6.8 if "common law/live in" are considered to be never married.
Philippines (2010): Data 2007 from UNPD.; Myanmar (2010): Myanmar 2007 from UNPD.; Pakistan
(2000): Census data 1998.; Bangladesh (2010): Data 2011.; Iran (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010): Data 1976,
1986, 1996, 2011 from UNPD.; Nepal (1960-1980): Data 1961, 1971, 1981, (1990): Data 1996,
(2010): Data 2011 UNPD.; Malaysia (1960): Data 1957 and 1970 are for Peninsular Malaysia
Source: Jones, (1994,: Table 3.1); Population census reports for Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia;
Byun, (2004:, Table 6.3); Xenos and Kabamalan, (1998); Sathar and Kiani, (1998:, Table 1); National
Institute of Population Research and Training et al., (2009:, Table 6.2); Nepal Demographic and
Health Survey (2007:, Table 6.2); South Korea (2010) figures calculated by author from Korea
Statistical Information Service; Taiwan (2010) figures calculated by author from Ministry of the
Interior, Republic of China; China (2010) National Bureau of Statistics; Hong Kong SAR (2010)
figures calculated by author from Census and Statistic Department, the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region; Thailand (2010) figures calculated by author fromNSO
Thailand; Malaysia (2010) Education and Social Characteristics of the Population; Indonesia (2000 &
2010) from Badan Pusat Statistik; India (2010) figures calculated from Sample Registration System
Statistical Report 2010, Office of the Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Governement of India, New Delhi; Bangladesh (2010) from Population and Housing Census 2011;
National Population Census, Government of Nepal; Demographic Health Survey (DHS) of various
countries; United Nations Population Division (UNPD), World Marriage Data.
26
Table 5
Indonesia and Bangladesh: Per cent of Women Married by Exact Ages 15, 18 and 20,
From 2007 Demographic and Health Survey
Current age % before age 15 % before age 18 % before age 20
Indonesia
15-19 1.7 n.a. n.a.
20-24 4.3 22.0 40.7
25-29 5.1 24.0 43.4
30-34 8.6 28.0 46.4
35-39 9.1 31.7 49.6
40-44 15.1 43.4 59.4
45-49 16.8 46.6 65.0
20-49 9.3 31.6 49.8
Bangladesh
15-19 21.1 n.a. n.a.
20-24 32.3 66.2 79.2
25-29 41.3 75.4 86.4
30-34 48.5 81.1 90.2
35-39 47.2 81.8 91.0
40-44 54.4 87.1 94.0
45-49 64.7 90.1 95.3
20-49 45.2 78.0 87.8
Source: 2007 Demographic and Health Survey; National Institute of Population Research and
Training et al, 2009: Table 6.3.
27
Table 6
General Divorce Rates (Number of Divorces per 1,000 Population Aged 15+),
Various Countries and Regions, 1980-2010.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
OECD countries
Australia 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.2 2.7
France 2.0 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.4 3.1 2.5
Germany 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.6
United Kingdom 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.4 2.7
United States 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Russian Federation 4.7 4.5 4.9 5.7 5.2 5.2 5.8
Asian countries
Hong Kong n.a. 1 1.2 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.8
Japan 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.3
South Korea 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 3.2 3.3 3.1
China n.a. n.a. 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.4
Thailand 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Singapore 1.0 1.0 1.6(13) 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4
Iran 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.8
Notes:
Australia (2010): Data 2009; France (1980, 2010): Data 1979 and 2008 respectively; Germany (1990,
2010): Data 1991 and 2009 respectively; United Kigdom (2005, 2010): Data 2003 and 2008
respectively; Russian Federation (2005, 2010): Data 2006 and 2009; Hong Kong (2010): Data 2009;
Japan (2010): Data 2009; South Korea (2010): Data 2009; China (1990, 1995, 2010): Data 1992, 1997
and 2010 respectively; Thailand (1980, 1990): Data 1979 and 1992 respectively; Iran (2010): Data
2006
Source: Calculated from data on numbers of divorces and on age structure from United Nations
Demographic Yearbooks; Singapore: Department of Statistics, Singapore.
28
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