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History and Theory of Cooperatives

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Abstract

Cooperatives have evolved significantly over the last 200 years and are of increasing importance to economies throughout the world. Yet, cooperatives are marginalised and treated as inefficient and ineffective organisational types. This paper discusses the significance of cooperatives over historical time and the extent to which they are both efficient and effective economically and socially. Alternative theory is used to provide insight into the cooperative advantage in different economic sectors, and shows that cooperative solutions can produce higher socioeconomic welfare levels to members whilst also overcoming significant market failures. Also, competitive market places and cooperatives are not incompatible as market forces cannot force non-cooperative solutions to socioeconomic problems. Cooperatives show that democratic governance within the firm can contribute significantly to socioeconomic well-being.
International Encyclopedia of Civil Society
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4_102
Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler
Cooperatives, History and Theories of
Morris Altman1
(1) School of Economics and Finance, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New!Zealand
Morris Altman
Email: morris.altman@usask.ca
Without Abstract
Introduction
Cooperatives have evolved significantly over the last 200 years and are of increasing importance to
economies and societies throughout the world irrespective of their level of socioeconomic
development. Yet, cooperatives, generally speaking, are peripheral to contemporary scholarly
analyses. Moreover, they are treated as inefficient and relatively ineffective organizational types
whose presence is typically transient and of some importance in times of crises and to marginal
socioeconomic participants. Even those with a sympathetic eye consider cooperatives to be of
marginal importance. It is therefore of some consequence to discuss the significance of cooperatives
over historical time and the extent to which they are actually both efficient and effective
economically and socially.
Contemporary economic theory has played an effective role in the cooperative (Hill, 2000; Kalmi,
2007). Nevertheless, alternative theoretical lenses provide insight into the cooperative advantage in
different economic sectors and why this advantage is not always realized or exploited. In fact, the
evidence is overwhelming that cooperatives can be potentially much more economically efficient
than their noncooperative counterparts and canrepresent important dynamic components of
contemporary competitive market economies (Altman, 2006; Bonin etal., 1993; Dow, 2003;
Doucouliagos, 1995).
Definition
In general, a cooperative comprises a voluntary network of individuals who own or control a
business that distributes benefits on the basis of use or ownership where ownership is largely
weighted equally across individual members. Benefits are generated by, for example, a share of
surplus or profits, improved working conditions and benefits, lower prices, higher quality of product,
product type and variety that better serve members’ preferences, and better access to credit. Members
control the cooperative on the basis of one member, one vote, with a guaranteed platform to exercise
voice. Members invest in the cooperative and thus have a financial stake in the organization. Unlike
the typical private business, in the cooperative financial risk is more narrowly distributed amongst
users or workers, whereas in the private business, ownership and financial risk need not fall on the
shoulders of users or workers. In some jurisdictions, the risks to cooperative owners are restricted by
limited liability protection afforded by the law.
There are various types of cooperatives which dominate, least important of which, quantitatively at
least, is the workers’ cooperative (see Cropp, 2005; Emelianoff, 1948). It is only in the workers’
cooperative, however, that the overall position of the worker is definitively different from what exists
in the traditional private sector firm. However, in the emerging multi-stakeholder cooperative it is
possible for the nonworkers’ cooperative to incorporate significant components of the substance of
the workers’ cooperatives into their corpus (see below).
Workers’ cooperative
Such a cooperative is owned and controlled by the workers through the standard one member, one
vote platform. Many such cooperatives are run, on a day-to-day basis, by managers and a board of
directors. But worker-owners have the ultimate say as to how the firm is managed over the long term
and are characterized by a much less hierarchical system of management than the standard narrowly
owned firm. Workers’ cooperatives are configured to meet the interest of workers first, as opposed to
maximizing profits or share values in the short run. Maintaining and growing employment is often a
binding constraint of a workers’ cooperative. Profits or surplus can be disbursed across members,
based on memberships or hours worked, or invested in to grow the firm or tomake it more
competitive. Like traditional firms, workers’ cooperatives must be concerned with their production
costs if they are to survive and flourish in the marketplace. Workers’ cooperatives are found largely
in the processing and service sectors, albeit manufacturing isnot unimportant.
Consumer cooperative
This is the most important type of cooperative in terms of membership. Consumer cooperatives are
sometimes referred to as retail cooperatives. Such cooperatives are quite important in the retailing of
food and clothing. Members own the cooperatives and control them through the one member, one
vote platform. However, day–day management can and often does take place as it would in
traditional firms, and management can be quite hierarchical in structure, especially when the
cooperative is large. In addition, management–labor relations are often similar to those in the
traditional firm. In theory, a key distinguishing feature of consumer cooperatives is that they should
be configured to best meet the preferences of their member-owners in terms of product type, quality,
and price. Moreover, the objective of the cooperative is not to maximize the difference between unit
cost and price, but rather to charge the lowest price possible, given quality and the investment
requirements of the cooperative. But consumer cooperatives typically charge the market price for
their product. However, any surplus accrued is supposed to be directed toward investment purposes,
disbursed amongst members, or invested in socially beneficial projects as decided upon by members
(typically by management). It is important to reiterate that a key difference between a traditional
retailer and the cooperative is the overriding importance of the member-owner and thefactthat in a
cooperative ownership is weighted on thebasis of the individual. Thus, no one individual can have a
greater ownership or membership share than another. Additionally, consumer cooperatives,
especially the smaller ones, have been established in localities andproduct lines where private
retailers have deemed it too risky and unprofitable. When consumer cooperatives have better
information on preferences and markets, given asymmetric information, they can survive and even
prosper in domains where the traditional retailer cannot.
Credit union
A credit union is a type of consumer cooperative that specializes in the money market and it is, along
with the food and clothing retail cooperative, among the largest in terms of membership. Acredit
union is owned and controlled on the base of one person, one vote, and is typically locally owned.
But the credit union is managed on a day-to-day basisby an elected board and professional
managers. In additional, management–labor relation can and often maps that of the traditional
financial institution. Credit unions initially developed to provide financial resources to individuals
and firms that found it difficult to secure these in the traditional financial sector. Credit unions have
evolved into financial institutions that cater the needs of individuals across all income levels and
firms of different sizes. This allows credit unions to spread the risk of their financial portfolios. In
addition, contemporary local credit unions are often part of regional and national credit unions
networks, allowing them and their members to take advantage of economies of scale and scope as
can traditional financial institutions. A key distinguishing feature of a credit union is the capacity of
members to determine the direction of its localcredit union. Profits or surplus income can be
disbursed to members, invested in the firm, or in social projects. Moreover, the credit union has the
capacity toexploit local knowledge (asymmetric information) so as to serve individuals and firms
and their particular needs which traditional financial institutions find too risky. But just like
traditional financial institutions, creditunions must be carefully managed otherwise a sufficient
number of bad loans can force a credit union into bankruptcy.
Supply and purchasing cooperative
This type of cooperative is quite important in agriculture where farmers establish a cooperative to
obtain goods and services required for their business or for personal use at lower prices than would
be possible if they were to go it alone. Thus farmers can take advantage of economies of scale and
scope that are afforded to larger corporate farms. But the management of such a cooperative can
mimic that of the traditional firm.
Marketing cooperative
This type of cooperative aligns the interests of producers with regard to marketing output to retailers
or wholesalers. A marketing cooperative can also store, process, and package output prior sale. This
allows farmers, for example, to take advantage of economies of scale and scope in storage and
production, increasing their net income over what it might otherwise be. It also serves to increase the
bargaining and marketing power of farmers. In addition, a marketing cooperative can help stabilize
farmers’ income through its inventory capacity, providing farmers with a relatively stable income as
marketing prices fluctuate. As with other cooperatives, a marketing cooperative must pay attention to
efficiency considerations as well as maintaining the flexibility to vary the prices paid and surplus
(and loses) disbursed to member farmers asmarkets restructure over time. Otherwise, it risks
bankruptcy.
New generation cooperative
This type of cooperative is also referred to as a value-added or new wave cooperative, although
cooperatives of old typically added value to their output. The express purpose of this cooperative is
to transform raw material inputs into processed output, such as cranberries into juice or wheat into
flour. Typically found in agriculture, farmers are owner-members who supply the raw material for
processing, hoping to reap additional net income from value-added activities. Like traditional
cooperatives, the new generation cooperative, is owner-member-controlled. But unlike most
traditional cooperatives, the new wave cooperative’s membership is restricted to those with the
means and the willingness to provide substantial equity capital. This provides the cooperative with
the necessary finances tobuild a competitive value-added enterprise and provide those with an equity
stake in the cooperative with shares (typically) in proportion to the equity supplied. The farmer is
obliged and has the right to supply the cooperative on thebasis of share value. And shares can be
sold at market value, which can be greater or less than the purchase or equity price, when the farmer
or other supplier wishes todissociate himself or herself from the cooperative.
Multi-stakeholder cooperative
This cooperative has two or more groups of members that may include workers, consumers,
producers, investors, community, and/or government. Such a cooperative has the potential of
aggregating the interests of different individuals and groups of individuals within one cooperative
thereby making them all stakeholders of a particular cooperative. For example, a consumer
cooperative, by provided a membership and ownership stake to workers, transforms a traditional
consumer cooperative to one whereworkers’ interests gain significant representation. The consumer
cooperative develops characteristics of aworkers’ cooperative. This can have significant efficiency
benefits to the cooperative. Any cooperative that brings in government, community, or private sector
representation strengthens the stakeholder and knowledge base of the cooperative as well as
spreading risks without the core cooperative members losing control.
Social cooperative
This is a particular type of multi-stakeholder cooperative that brings together providers and users of
social services such as day care, health services, housing, and job training. It provides services that
private sector firms willnotorcannot provide. Such cooperatives often survive onthebasis of
subsidies, donations, and voluntary labor. But very often, noncooperative providers ofthese services
survive on the basis of government support as well.
Historical Background
The Rochdale Principles
The cooperative movement is strictly defined and relates very closely to democratic forms of
governance with regard to members. The cooperative is not simply a group of individuals who
cooperate in particular economic activities. For cooperation of this type can take place under
coercive forms of governance, ranging from serfdom to slavery to the state-sponsored collectives of
Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Wage labor in a democratic society also requires
cooperation amongst the economic actors. But a cooperative requires much more than mere
cooperation, even when the latter is relatively freely undertaken.
The modern cooperative movement aspires to a set ofprinciples first clearly and coherently
articulated by members of the Rochdale consumer cooperative, founded by 28 weavers in Rochdale,
England, at a time when worker and consumer rights were relatively limited. Consumer cooperatives
received legal sanction in England only in 1852. Theoriginal Rochdale Principles defining
cooperative organizations are (Birchall, 1997; International Co-operative Alliance, 2008;
MacPherson, 1996: Thompson, 1994):
1. Democratic control (one member, one vote)
2. Open membership
3. Limited interest on capital
4. Distribution of surplus in proportion to a member’s contribution to the society
5. Cash trading only (no use of credit)
6. Providing for the education of members in cooperative principles
7. Political and religious neutrality
For the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), the official governing body of cooperatives, the
following four of the Rochdale principles are central to the governance of member organizations:
1. Open membership
2. Democratic control (one member, one vote)
3. Distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their transactions
4. Limited interest on capital
The following three principles are deemed important and necessary to membership in the ICA:
1. Political and religious neutrality
2. Cash trading only
3. Promotion of education
The fact of the matter is that many cooperatives have very clear political and religious agendas. Most
use credit as a means of sale. The latter is critical in contemporary market economies and is often the
preferred means of payment. Also, a plethora of cooperatives invest little in the domain of education.
Kibbutzim and Mondragon Cooperatives
Two important examples of national cooperative movements are the Kibbutzim of Israel (first
established in1910) and the Mondragon Cooperative Association founded in the Basque country of
Spain in the 1950s. The Kibbutz Movement of Israel is the largest cooperative grouping in the world.
By the end of the twentieth century there were 270 of these collective settlements with a population
of 120,000. These settlements are community owned and run and represent a mélange of worker,
consumer, producer, and financial cooperatives.Initially, largely agricultural in orientation,
manufacturing, and tourism now plays a significant role in theKibbutz economy as Kibbutzim adjust
to increasing competitive pressures. Most cooperative settlements are small (they vary from about 50
to over 2,000), but there is significant cooperation amongst these (Communal Studies Association,
2008; Avrahami, 2002).
The Modragon Cooperative Association of Spain is comprised of over 160 companies operating in
manufacturing, distribution, and finance. Member companies employed almost 80,000 people and
the Modragon group of companies was the seventh largest in Spain in 2006. But at least 20% of
Modragon’s employees are nonmembers (Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa, 2006; Whyte,
1991). The Kibbutz movement also now employs a large number of nonmembers. For the
Kibbutzim, thishas been to a large extent fueled by severe labor shortages – the inability to attract an
adequate supply oflabor to meet ongoing demand. Both of these long-standing cooperative
movements thus employ many individuals to whom the principles of the cooperative movement do
not necessarily apply. Both these movements have had to adjust to ever-changing and increasing
market pressure, meeting with much success.
Key Issues
Economics and Cooperatives
Contemporary economic theory pays little heed to the cooperative, especially worker and consumer
cooperatives. Whereas, supply and marketing cooperatives are treated as contributors to
monopolistic pricing, therefore contributing to economic inefficiency (allocative inefficiency) and the
misallocation of resources. At best, cooperatives as an organizational type are looked upon as a
possible solution to economic dilemmas faced by the economically marginalized members of society.
The cooperative is not regarded as a source of economic efficiency and possible contributor to
material welfare (Bonin etal., 1993; Dow, 2003; Hill, 2000; Kalmi, 2007). This is a product of the
behavioral assumptions embedded in the theory.
Although cooperatives are not dominant, their quantitative importance in most countries in both
marginal and mainstream sectors, and their profitability and relatively high levels of productivity
compared to their privately owned counterparts suggest that cooperative economic organizations
must be doing something right to have maintained a significant presence in an increasingly
competitive global economy. On the other hand, it isimportant to understand why cooperatives are
not dominant if they are economically efficient.
Theory and Workers’ Cooperatives
How does one explain the economic success of workers’ cooperatives? Conventional theory assumes
that no such success is possible given that cooperatives are not obliged to invest profits (focusing on
employment and workers’ income) and are too egalitarian to generate economically efficient
incentives and to engage the employment ofsuperior management. But there exists a cooperative
advantage in the workers’ cooperative that lies in its capacity to increase the quantity and quality of
effort inputs into the “production process,” thereby producing higher levels of output and a superior
quality of output (Altman, 2002, 2006; McCain, 2008). This can also bereferred to as the x-
efficiency effect (Altman, 2001; Leibenstein, 1966) of cooperative organization. In the cooperative,
worker-owners and owner managers have the incentive to work harder and smarter – a possibility
assumed in the traditional modeling of the firm. Conventional theory assumes that the manner in
which a firm is organized does not impact the extent of x-efficiency. Moreover, where workers’
cooperatives focus on improving benefits and working conditions whilst maintaining and even
growing employment they are incentivized into adopting and developing technologies that make
them competitive. Workers’ cooperatives can, therefore, be more costly to operate than traditional
firms, especially low-wage traditional firms, but they can also be much more productive, such that
their unit costs and profits can be the same as that of the traditional firm.
The cooperative productivity advantage countervails the increased costs of operating the cooperative.
Thus in the worker’s cooperatives workers would be much better of without their benefits causing
their firm to become uncompetitive. Workers’ cooperatives can yield competitive outcomes without
driving out of the market noncooperative traditional firms. Such workers’ cooperative canfunction
and prosper in mainstream economic sectors, even in highly competitive environments. Moreover,
when workers are also owners, there is much less incentive for workers to quit. Reducing quit rates
and thus turnover rates increases labor productivity and reduces production costs by maintaining the
most productive workers and reducing average training costs. Overall, workers’ cooperatives can
generate higher levels of material welfare than the traditional firm.
This argument is illustrated in Fig. 1 (based on Altman, 2001, 2002, 2006). As traditional analysis
would have it, workers’ cooperatives incur higher costs (such as higher levels of labor benefits) and
this yields higher unit or average production costs. This is given by line segment am which relates
increasing cooperative-related costs to average production costs. In the traditional model, increasing
labor benefits, for example, has no impact on labor productivity. More realistically, in a more
democratic firm wherein labor benefits also increase, labor productivity increases, illustrated by ahi.
Therefore, in the cooperative firm, the level of x-efficiency increases as incentives improve. The
cooperative firm induces firm members into becoming more productive. To the extent that such
productivity increases offsets the increased cooperative-associated costs, average or unit production
costs need not change as labor costs increase, illustrated by line segment ag. Eventually, the level of
x-efficiency cannot be sufficiently increased to offset increasing labor costs, at points b and h,
yielding increased average costs. This induces technological change, illustrated by a shift in the cost
curve from agc to agd, which serves to furtheroffset cooperative-related costs when x-efficiency is at
a maximum. Lower wage and higher turnover traditional firms need not be more competitive than
cooperative firms and the more productive cooperative firms need not have the capacity to drive out
the less productive traditional firms. Given the superior incentive system of the workers’ cooperative
there is no good theoretical reason to presume that workers’ cooperatives cannot beboth competitive
on the margin and prosperous. On theother hand, this does not imply that workers’ cooperatives can
be expected to dominate the economy.
Cooperatives, History and Theories of. Fig. 1 Unit production costs and x-efficiency.
The workers’ cooperative represents only one “extreme” alternative to hierarchical organizational
types. Privately owned participatory firms (which allows for some workers’ ownership of firm assets
and effective voice) represent another alternative; one where workers need not risk their capital nor
bear the risks entailed in ownership (Altman, 2002; Gordon, 1998). Also, they need not invest the
time and effort that might be required at the management and corporate decision-making levels in a
workers’ cooperative. This firm type overlaps with the multi-stakeholder cooperative. Given the
possibility and option of a privately owned participatory firm, many workers might choose the latter.
Moreover, workers might choose traditional hierarchical firms given the risks and effort required to
establish and maintain a workers’ cooperative. Also, establishing workers’ cooperatives can be
problematic if financing is difficult to come by given that financiers have limited say on corporate
governance in traditional cooperatives. This constraint can be obviated in multi-stakeholder
cooperatives. In addition, establishing workers’ cooperatives suffers from coordination problems – it
is difficult and costly to coordinate the efforts of individuals to establish a cooperative. This issue is
somewhat mitigated by regional and national cooperative federations. Finally, misinformation about
the design and operation of workers’ cooperatives can negatively affect preferences for cooperatives.
For these reasons, workers’ cooperatives are often established in the wake of crises wherein the
traditional firm is on the verge of closure. In the absence of a workers’ cooperative unemployment,
the breakdown of social networks and less preferred jobs becomes the default. Such cooperatives can
succeed if the new incentive environment increases productivity and encourages technological
change wherein the traditional firm was economically inefficient and resistant to improved
technology. Cooperatives can also survive on the basis of low wages, where worker-owners willingly
sacrifice material benefits so as to remain competitive and thereby secure their employment.
Competing on this basis in the short run provides such a cooperative with the capacity to search for
efficiencies in production that will allow it to compete on the basis of higher wages and improved
working conditions in the longer term. Such a capacity does not typically exist in the traditional
hierarchical firm given mistrust, asymmetric information, and different preferences between workers,
owners, and managers.
Consumer Cooperatives
Establishing consumer cooperatives and other types of nonworkers’ cooperatives face some of the
same constraints as do workers’ cooperatives, but not those related to the risks and time that workers
must absorb to establish and operate a workers’ cooperative. However, consumer cooperatives have
met with considerable success. But they need not be organized in terms of nonhierarchical forms of
management and can remain competitive on the basis of low wages and poor working conditions,
matching the immediate labor costs of their noncooperative counterparts. In this case consumer
cooperatives need not generate superior material welfare outcomes for its workforce, although they
should generate material welfare gains to coop members in terms of price and quality and product
type. However, through multi-stakeholder organizational setups, consumer cooperatives can overlap
with more democratic and less hierarchical working environments, yielding both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary benefits to their workforce.
The cooperative advantage of consumer cooperatives lies in its capacity to better meet the
preferences of their members than privately owned concerns, thus enhancing members’ welfare. For
example, the cooperative might be better able to supply member consumers with the right product
mix and quality and, in relatively noncompetitive markets where consumers have little bargaining
power; provide preferred bundles of goods and services at lower prices; it might be able to overcome
information asymmetries in the credit market providing loans to individuals unable secure such loans
from private banks; and it might be able to secure higher prices for members of marketing
cooperatives by improving their bargaining power relative to purchasing conglomerates with well-
established bargaining power.
Even when consumer cooperatives can do no better than privately owned concerns in terms of
commodity supply and price, they can enhance members’ welfare ifthe cooperative generates a sense
of belonging or community (social cohesion) amongst members (Fairbairn, 2003). However, such
social cohesion and sense of identity with the coop provides the cooperative with the “protection”
from market forces allowing it to charge higher prices and supply lower quality products. Member-
owners might be willing to pay higher prices, up to a point, simply because a product is sold by their
cooperative. But such behavior would undermine the economic and social viability of the
cooperative. Nevertheless, there is nothing intrinsic in the cooperative organizational type that
implies that this must be the case. Cooperatives can produce and supply quality goods and services at
competitive prices. Also, the extent of social cohesion can diminish when consumer cooperatives
increase in membership. Each member has less power and voice and more difficulty in having an
affect on the decision-making process and outcomes. Less social cohesion and related sense of
belonging can undermine the membership base of the cooperative. And the cooperatives success then
becomes a function of its capacity to compete with traditional producers and suppliers.
International Perspectives
There exist no precise estimates on the importance of cooperatives in the new millennium
(International Co-operative Alliance, 2008; Kalmi, 2007; Global300.coop, 2007; United Nations
2005, 2008a, b). But the United Nations guesstimates that the “cooperative movement” had over 800
million members at the beginning of the new millennium and provided for about 100 million jobs. In
addition, over the last 150 years cooperatives have spread to over 100 countries. Cooperatives are of
importance in both developed and less developed economies. Moreover, cooperatives are of
significance in both the more free market-oriented economies, such as Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, and the more statist market economies of Continental Europe.
About half of the world’s agricultural output is marketed by cooperatives, which speaks to the
significance of marketing cooperatives. Overall, it is in the agricultural sector that cooperatives of
various types remain dominant. In the financial sector, credit unions encompass about 120 million
members in 87 countries. Especially in poor countries, cooperatives provide important micro-credit
services. Consumer cooperatives continue to play an important role worldwide, with its importance
varying across countries. Health care cooperatives service about 100 million people in over 50
countries. Electricity provisioning cooperatives have become important. For example, in the United
States, such cooperatives service over 30 million people. Least important in terms of quantitative
significance are workers’ cooperatives. Only a small percentage of the 100 million individuals
employed by cooperatives are controlled by the workers themselves. Thus, consumer, producer, or
financial cooperatives need not be managed in a manner that benefits employees where the latter’s
(nonmembers’) interest conflicts with that of cooperative member-owners.
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), the formal governing body of cooperatives, referring
to the United Nations, also maintains that cooperatives made secure the livelihood of approximately
three billion people across the globe or about half of the world’s population. But this reference is
quite nebulous in meaning, but suggests indirect economic importance of cooperatives through its
multiple linkages. Survey evidence strongly supports the view that cooperatives serve to reduce
poverty amongst cooperative members as well as amongst nonmembers and the same can be said
with regard to reducing gender inequality. The evidence also suggests that cooperatives can provide a
means of generating income and wealth well above any particular measures of poverty.
Future Directions
Overall, the cooperative solution can produce higher socioeconomic welfare levels to members
whilst also overcoming significant market failures. In other words, cooperatives and cooperative type
organizations can have large positive effects on the economy while at the same time generating
significant improvements to the social and spiritual well-being of members. The nonmaterial and
economic benefits are dialectically and positively related. This reality is marginalized in much of the
conventional literature. To some extent, whether cooperative solutions are adopted depends upon the
preferences of individuals given that cooperatives can be competitive even in extremely competitive
environments. Not all workers prefer pure cooperatives. Not all consumers choose consumer
cooperatives. Nevertheless, preferences for cooperatives need not be met as a consequence of the
dearth of financial resources and organizational capacity. These constraints can be overcome through
cooperative networks, credit unions, multi-stakeholder cooperatives, and facilitating legal
environments. Market forces, no matter how powerful, do not require and cannot force
noncooperative solutions to socioeconomic problems. Competitive markets and cooperative
organizational forms are all quite compatible. Ceteris paribus, the case can be made that a world
without cooperatives is, at a minimum, one that is poorer.
Cooperatives have been forced to engage in dramatic changes in terms of organization, production,
and markets over historical time. Much success has been achieved as is exemplified by the overall
global importance of this democratic organizational type. New forms of cooperatives have been
developed where the core value is democratic governance by member-owners; where ownership still
adheres to the one person, one vote protocol. But cooperative values as articulated in the Rochdale
Principles can become less salient as the cooperative grows andthe voice of each individual member
becomes less effective. Local control becomes critical to maintaining effective voice and social
cohesion within the cooperative. Also, democratic governance excludes employees in most
cooperatives. A significant iteration of the cooperative is the democratic privately owned firm.
Another is the multi-stakeholder cooperative, which strengthens anyparticular type of cooperative by
providing effective voice toindividuals and groups who contribute or who can potentially contribute
substantively to the cooperative viability and prosperity. One vital lesson gleaned from the history of
cooperatives is that democratic governance within the firm can contribute significantly to
socioeconomic well-being.
Cross-References
Associative Democracy
Civic Agency
Civic Culture
Civic Participation
Civil Society and Democracy
Civil society, Definitions of and Approaches
Community Development
Cooperatives and Employee Ownership
Credit Unions
Freedom of Association
Governance, Organizational
Grameen Bank
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA)
Proudhon, Pierre
Reciprocity
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers
Social Accounting for Social Economy Organizations
Social Cohesion
Social Economy
Social Entrepreneurship
Social Investment
Theories of Nonprofit Organization, Economic
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... We've already discussed the theory and mechanics underlying how good governance in the cooperative can yield higher productivity through a higher quality and quantity of effort inputs, less turnover, smarter management, less freeriding and greater incentives for applied technical change (Altman, 2002;2009a;Ben-Nur and Jones, 1995;Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993;Bowles and Gintis, 2011;Davis, 2004;Doucouliagos, 1995;Gordon, 1998;Lampel, Bhalla, and Jha, 2010;and Sexton and Iskow, 1993). When members are in control of their organisation and have meaningful and effective voice, it creates the incentives to make decisions and behave in a manner that would positively affect productivity and negatively impact on costs. ...
... The traditional investor-owned firm is the preferred organisational form in the traditional economics literature as it is seen to be more efficient and more effective in raising capital for investment purposes. Cooperatives are, therefore, relegated to sometimes useful marginal economic organisations that serve to help the down-and-out, with considerable support from government, if they are actually forced to compete on the market (Altman, 2009a;Ben-Nur and Jones, 1995;Vladislav, 2007). But cooperatives represent a large percentage of the world economy and many of the large international firms are cooperatives or mutuals (a cooperative organisational form) (International Cooperative Alliance, 2019a;1919c;2021). ...
... Traditional theory assumes that members of the firm (for example, coffee growers) work as hard and smart as they can, irrespective of the ownership structure of the firm. But this simplistic assumption has been challenged empirically and theoretically, with the theoretical challenge encapsulated in the theoretical framework referred to as x-efficiency theory (Leibenstein, 1966; see also Akerlof, 1982;Altman, 2001;2005;2009a;2009b;Ben-Nur and Jones, 1995;Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993;Gordon, 1998;Sexton and Iskow, 1993). The main point here is that owners, managers and workers behave differently in different incentive environments, which also encompass the firm's governance structure. ...
Technical Report
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Based on original 2017 survey data from sample coffee cooperatives in the Eastern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, we construct estimates and indicators for cooperative governance and then relate these measures to estimates of cooperatives productivity levels. We address the important issue of weather and the extent which the governance of coffee cooperatives, in particular, aspects of democratic governance, positively affect productivity. Our estimates suggest that cooperative governance is important to co-op productivity. These estimates further suggest that one important means of improving productivity in coffee cooperatives is to strengthen the extent of cooperative governance. This provides coffee cooperatives with a competitive advantage over the more hierarchical investor-owned farmstead. But there are outstanding issues related to technical education, marketing, and vertical integration of producers to processors to marketing that need to be addressed, some of which relates to governance issues. Some of these issues might require government support to resolve.
... The traditional investor-owned firm is the preferred organisational form in the traditional economics literature as it is seen to be more efficient and more effective in raising capital for investment purposes. Cooperatives are, therefore, relegated to sometimes useful marginal economic organisations that serve to help the down-and-out, with considerable support from government, if they are actually forced to compete on the market (Altman 2009;Ben-Nur and Jones 1995;Vladislav 2007). But cooperatives represent a large percentage of the world economy and many of the world's large international firms are cooperatives or mutuals (a cooperative organisational firm) (https://monitor.coop/sites/default/files/publication-files/wcm-intdollars-2017-rankings2015-data-1013346240.pdf ). ...
... Traditional theory assumes that members of the firm (coffee grower, for example) work as hard and smart as they can irrespective of the ownership structure of the firm. But this simplistic assumption has been challenged empirically and theoretically, with the theoretical challenge encapsulated in the theoretical framework referred to as x-efficiency theory (Leibenstein 1966; see also Akerlof 1982;Altman 2002Altman , 2006Altman , 2009Altman , 2014Altman , 2015Ben-Nur and Jones, 1995;Bonin et. al. 1993;Gordon 1998;Sexton and Iskow, 1993). ...
... This section draws heavily fromAltman (2009Altman ( , 2014Altman ( , 2015. ...
... One of such complementary structures is cooperation, because cooperation (both consumer and production) is adapted to the economic relations of modernity. More precisely, both cooperative forms are the product of a market economy and in this regard do not contradict the existing economic system at all [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20]. ...
... Only in cooperation are public and individual interests balanced. The existence of a balance of interests of the individual and the collective is the same systemic imperative as direct democracy [1]. A shift in any of the priorities (individual or collective interests) leads to irreversible mutations of cooperatives. ...
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The article is a review of existing research on the concept of a solidarity economy (SE) and the role of cooperation in this area. The authors analyze various aspects of the SE, such as equity, sustainability, resource allocation, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. The paper emphasizes the relevance of the study of solidarity economy and cooperation in the context of modern challenges. The authors draw attention to the fact that the SE is focused on meeting social needs, unlike the traditional economy, which is focused on profit and cost reduction. The authors point out that the solidarity economy does not require a complete replacement of existing economic forms, but is complementary and compatible with existing market relations. Various methods were used in the research process, including the analysis of scientific literature and international practices, as well as the study of data and statistics. The authors analyze and compare various studies and approaches related to the SE and cooperation. The main conclusions of the article emphasize the importance of a solidarity economy and cooperation in creating a fair, sustainable and socially inclusive society. The authors note that a solidary economy and cooperation can contribute to an equal distribution of resources, promote environmental sustainability and innovative practices. The article provides valuable information for researchers, economists and practitioners interested in solidarity economy and cooperation. The results of the study and the proposed approaches can be used to develop policies and programs aimed at developing a SE and improving socio-economic conditions. The role of energy cooperatives in the sustainable development and decentralization of energy systems is considered.
... Although current estimates are far from precise, the evidence suggests that cooperatives are of importance in both developed and less developed economies, spread across 100 countries. As of the first decade of this century, there were about 800 million members in cooperatives and these cooperatives were responsible for 3 about 100 million jobs (Altman 2009a;International Co-operative Alliance, 2008;Global300.coop, 2007;United Nations 2005, 2008a. ...
... It is important to note that official cooperative organizations are bound by a number principles articulated by the International Cooperative Alliance (Altman 2009a; International Co-operative Alliance 2008).. For example, cooperatives are supposed to be: (i) democratic (one vote per member, typically irrespective of the member's investment in the cooperative, such as deposits in a credit union) and transparent (ii) members are supposed to contribute equitably to the capital of the cooperative and to its democratic governance (iii) there is limited compensation to the coop member, and this would be based on the member's economic (capital) contribution to the cooperative and transactions with the coop; any surpluses are largely used to build up capital reserves, to invest in the cooperative, and to contribute to the larger community (iv) any agreement entered into by the cooperative with external organization, inclusive of those to raise capital externally must be consistent with the democratic control of the coop by its members. ...
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For the past three decades, neoclassical doctrine has dominated economic theory and policy. The balance of power has shifted to protect private interests, resulting in unprecedented damage to the environment and society, with no solution in sight as more austerity and less government continues to be posited as the answer to the oncoming waves of crisis. It doesn't have to be this way. Featuring a remarkable roster of internationally renowned critical thinkers, Co-operatives in a Post-Growth Era presents a feasible alternative for a more environmentally sustainable and equitable economic system - specifically, the co-operative business model. With more than 100 million people working in co-operatives and more than a billion members around the world, the time has never been better for co-operatives everywhere to recognise their potential to change the economic landscape. An essential book for students, policymakers and concerned citizens looking for a practical way to change the current stagnant economic paradigm.
... Many studies suggest that the phenomenon of cooperatives developed during the Industrial Revolution in nineteenth-century Europe, especially in Britain, France, and Spain (Altman, 2009;Gibson et al., 2005). This form of economic organization has spread in Western countries due to tensions arising from industrialization processes (Forno, 2013). ...
... The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, established in 1844 in the North of England, is regarded as the prototype of modern cooperatives (Altman, 2009;Fairbairn, 1994;Mayo, 2017). Its formal principles are known as the Seven Rochdale Principles. ...
Chapter
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Broad acceptance by and support from the society for the sustainable energy transition is indispensable. Public participation and ownership-in particular through collective action initiatives-is seen as a means to foster this support. Starting with the origin of the cooperative model, we present how it has been evolving until today. We then discuss how energy CAIs are classified and discuss the legal underpinnings and how they related to democratic participation of the membership within CAIs. Statistical analysis with data from Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, questions whether they are as inclusive, just, and democratically controlled by their members as often deemed. We find that energy cooperatives are typically initiated by well-off, rural, male sexagenarians. The participation between women and men (including in decision-making) is below parity. Concluding, in practice, the mechanism of recruiting and engaging members falls behind the theoretic ideal of socially sustainable development. Although being a promising tool to curbing sustainability, current practices rather encompass a narrow perspective of sustainable development that is geared towards technological change. We conclude with a perspective of how this may be rectified in the future.
... With the onset of the Industrial Revolution, rights for both workers and consumers were limited to a large degree. Inspired by the ideas of Robert Owen and other social reformers, the Pioneers sought to come together to create a cooperative store and offer that which individually they could not afford (Altman, 2009). The Rochdale Pioneers' success inspired the formation of cooperatives across Europe and beyond. ...
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The role of education is one which transforms. In a capitalist neo-liberal environment, the consuming and competitive individual is cast as the protagonist at the expense of communities that struggle for a common good. Especially in the global north, this is exacerbated by lifestyles and leisure patterns which have been heavily influenced by the onslaught of digital technologies, fragmenting to a considerable degree the physical community and the spaces for social interaction strongly associated with wellbeing. This is evident in a number of trends in society at large, including the organization of labour, which pits workers against each other, eroding solidarity, and dissipating class consciousness. In this context, many educators try their best to provide hope, a sense of belonging, and a struggle for justice. This they do despite being considered pegs to plug holes in a system struggling to cope, and where knowledge is considered technical and practical, rather than emancipatory. A cooperative model which provides a greater sense of belonging, an ethos underpinned by social justice and democratic principles, and ultimately a sense of trust and wellbeing, will be proposed. This model can provide a sound but permeable matrix which empowers educators collectively and provides a better community experience for a diversity of learners.
... The co-operative is rarely discussed in the basic economics literature (Hill, 2000). A key point of this paper is to identify those conditions, if any, wherein an employee-owned or workers' co-operative which is a monopoly, is self-regulating as compared to an investor-owned monopoly which, by assumption, is not self-regulating (for an elaborate discussion of the co-operative organisational form see, for example, Altman, 2009b;Dow, 2003;Fairbairn, 2003;Hansmann, 1966;Rothschild & Allen-Whitt, 1986;Sykuta & Cook, 2001). The same point is addressed with regards to a multi-stakeholder or solidarity co-operative, wherein stakeholders in the production entity include employees, consumers, and possibly representation from local government and community organisations. ...
Article
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How to cite this article: Altman, M. (2021). The power of cooperatives: Converting monopolists into self-regulating and efficient organisations. Journal of Cooperative Studies, 54(3), 23-32 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License subject to a six-month embargo after the article is published in the Journal The conditions under which cooperative monopolies can be self-regulating in the sense of behaving similarly (at a minimum) to an efficiently regulated monopoly are modelled in this paper. I argue that an employee-owned or workers' cooperative monopoly can be expected to operate similarly to an investor-owned monopoly generating relative high prices and lower levels of output and producing deadweight losses. But such a cooperative would be relatively more x-efficient because of its incentive environment. I argue, however, that a multi-stakeholder cooperative , incorporating the preferences of consumers and other stakeholders, can be expected to behave similarly (at a minimum) to an efficiently regulated monopoly, whilst generating a higher level of x-efficiency than the investor-owned monopoly and a more equitable distribution of income. Critical to this argument is the quality of governance of the cooperative and the inability of the executive of the cooperative to capture the decision-making goals and objectives from the collective. Such 'co-operative capture' would lead to a failure in cooperative governance resulting in cooperative outcomes converging to those of unregulated investor-owned firms.
... Community-owned social enterprises are not new. Cooperatives have been in existence for over 100 years (Altman, 2009) as social forces that can make a significant impact. Therefore, with the advent of environmental and renewable agenda, communities, especially in Europe, embraced the idea of renewable energy generation either through solar, wind, or other forms of renewables. ...
Chapter
The EJ literature has generally focused on the injustices experienced by different groups based on their racial background, as persons are often marginalized based on their ethnicity, spatial location, and household income (Banzhaf et al., 2019; Bullard et al., 2020). There remains, however, a dearth of research on the environmental injustices experienced by the elderly within the Caribbean region. One of the reasons for this may be because the concept of age is hardly discussed within the EJ literature, as elderly persons are often considered to be a part of the economically vulnerable segment of the population (Day, 2010). The EPA (2014) acknowledges the importance of the elderly in EJ issues, as they are more vulnerable to nvironmental stressors. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021), the social and economic resources needed by the elderly to make healthy choices are indeed limited and must be covered to ensure that they are present in society and communities. Given the importance of this topic to the EJ literature, this chapter made use of a literature review-type methodology to not only examine the social and economic implications of EJ for the elderly but to also design a specific social and economic blueprint for social work interventions to cater for the needs of the Caribbean’s elderly population affected by EJ issues.
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Creating sustainable industrial growth for speedy economic expansion necessitates the diversification of energy potentials to various alternative energy sources such as renewable energy. Consequently, the global call to adopt renewable energy resources such as solar, wind, hydro, or geothermal as alternative energy generation and consumption sources has gained substantial momentum in recent times.
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A new conceptual framework to define and differentiate among diverse forms of employee ownership is developed. Two central rights associated with ownership, return and control rights, are identified. Their impact on individual motivation, individual performance, organizational structural variables and organizational performance is evaluated. We show how, over certain ranges of combinations of control and return rights, the relationship between alternative ownership arrangements and organizational performance may be nonlinear. The implications for the introduction of employee ownership and the evaluation of empirical work are considered.
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The discussion of the feasibility of socialism has long been closed with apparently quite general agreement that an economy will not inevitably collapse as a result of nationalization of the means of production. On the theoretical side the clinching argument was probably made by Barone shortly after the controversy began [2]. Probably the best-known of the arguments on the other side of the question, that of Mises [15], was published twelve years after Barone’s paper and gave rise to a new set of arguments, among them those of Taylor, Lange and Lerner [11] [12]. Lange in fact explicitly (though perhaps with a touch of irony) developed market socialism as a counterexample for Mises’ assertions.
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A fundamental finding of the current empirical industrial relations and human resource management research is that similar types of firms producing similar types of products adopt different sets of work practices or cultures even when working under the same institutional environment. Only a small minority of firms has adopted superior, often more cooperative work cultures. In sharp contrast to neoclassical theory, which predicts the dominance of the more efficient work cultures, a behavioural model of the firm presented here reveals that even under conditions of competitive product markets, firms can produce competitively using either the traditional, less efficient work cultures or the more efficient cooperative work cultures. The superior work cultures need not dominate simply as a consequence of market forces.
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Developing an alternative and more realistic modeling of the firm, the key point of this paper is that workers cooperatives represent a form of corporate governance, which is a subset of the participatory organizational form, that constitutes a competitive alternative to the typical relatively hierarchical and narrowly controlled firms. An important component of the cooperative advantage lies in its capacity to increase the quantity and quality of effort inputs into the ‘production process.’ However, to do so incurs economic costs. Thus, cooperatives can yield competitive outcomes without driving out of the market non-cooperative organizational forms. To some extent, whether cooperative or other participatory solutions are adopted depends upon the preferences of economic agents since cooperatives are shown to be competitive even in an extremely competitive environment. However, dominant or not, the cooperative solution can yield higher social-economic welfare levels to members.