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Real Exchange Rate Volatility in the Presence of Financial Fragility and Central Bank Intervention in Turkey
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the balance sheet of the private sector has played a role in the volatility of the real exchange rate in Turkey after the capital account liberalization in 1989. The results of this paper indicate that the rise in the short-term and non-financial sector debt as a ratio to GDP has significantly increased real exchange rate volatility in the post-crisis period. Another result is that the Turkish central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange markets to lower real exchange rate volatility by mitigating the adverse impact of financial fragility indicators.
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Many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises. One view blames soft pegs for these crises. Adherents of this
view suggest that countries move to corner solutions—hard pegs or floating exchange rates. We analyze the behavior of exchange
rates, reserves, and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner solutions.
We focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so. We find that countries that say they allow
their exchange rate to float mostly do not—there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.”
The literature on the benefits and costs of financial globalization for developing countries has exploded in recent years, but along many disparate channels with a variety of apparently conflicting results. There is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of broad capital account liberalization, but a number of recent papers in the finance literature report that equity market liberalizations do significantly boost growth. Similarly, evidence based on microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data shows some benefits of financial integration and the distortionary effects of capital controls, but the macroeconomic evidence remains inconclusive. At the same time, some studies argue that financial globalization enhances macroeconomic stability in developing countries, but others argue the opposite. This paper attempts to provide a unified conceptual framework for organizing this vast and growing literature, particularly emphasizing recent approaches to measuring the catalytic and indirect benefits to financial globalization. Indeed, it argues that the indirect effects of financial globalization on financial sector development, institutions, governance, and macroeconomic stability are likely to be far more important than any direct impact via capital accumulation or portfolio diversification. This perspective explains the failure of research based on cross-country growth regressions to find the expected positive effects of financial globalization and points to newer approaches that are potentially more useful and convincing.
This paper investigates the role of external balance sheet variables as determinants of currency crises in emerging market (EME) and advanced economies. A random effect probit model is used in a panel of 40 countries with monthly data over the January 1980-December 2004 period. The main results of the paper are as follows. First, size and, particularly, the composition of a country's external balance sheet are found to play an important role in the onset of crises. Second, EMEs seem to be more sensitive to external balance sheet variables than developed countries, and so too do economies with fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes. Third, further support is provided to standard theoretical explanations of currency crises. The likelihood of a crisis is found to increase with: the extent to which the real exchange rate rises above its trend; faster growth in broad money (relative to the level of international reserves); larger current account and budget balance deficits; lower GDP growth; and, if a neighbouring country already has a crisis. Economic fundamentals are also found to be a more important explanation of the onset of currency crises during the 1980s than during the 1990s, suggesting that more recent crises are less 'fundamentally' driven.
Inflation targeting (IT) has recently become the dominant monetary policy prescription for both developing and industrialized countries alike. Emerging market governments, in particular, are increasingly pressured to follow IT as part of their International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led stabilization packages and the routine rating procedures of the international finance institutions. However, the common expectation of IT promoters that price stability would ultimately lead to higher employment and sustained growth has failed to materialize. Generally, the current growth patterns of the world economy are too concentrated and uneven to generate sufficient capital investment and reduce unemployment. To contribute to the task of designing a more socially desirable macroeconomic policy environment, we offer concrete country case studies that devise viable alternatives to inflation targeting central bank policies in order to promote employment, sustained growth and improved income distribution.
This paper examines the role of structural factors - governance and rule of law, corporate sector governance (creditor rights and shareholder rights), corporate financing structure - as well as macroeconomic variables in currency crises. Using a technique known as a binary recursive tree allows for interactions between the various explanatory variables. It is found that structural vulnerabilities play an important role in the occurrence of "deep" currency crises (those with a real GDP growth decline of at least 3 percentage points) and that there are complex interactions between these structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances. Copyright 2003, International Monetary Fund
According to the development approach to exchange rates, competitive currencies have been a key factor in most East and Southeast Asian successful growth strategies. There is also today an important empirical literature that relates overvaluations to low per capita growth rates. While the econometric literature on this issue is relatively rich, theoretical analysis of channels through which real exchange rate levels could affect economic development are very scarce. This paper intends to contribute to the debate by bringing more theoretical elements and providing new econometric evidence to the connections between real exchange rate levels and development.
The 1994–95 ‘peso’ crisis did not display characteristics which allow it to be easily captured by traditional crisis models.
Models based on Minsky's financial fragility hypothesis offer more persuasive accounts but have been supported by relatively
little direct empirical evidence. This paper provides such evidence, with particular attention being paid to the role of domestic
financial liberalisation in the process. Minsky's hypotheses about the evolution of expectations over the business cycle are
tracked using business survey data. In addition, crisis indicators are constructed, reflecting the changing vulnerability
of the economy to shocks. The findings support a Minskyian interpretation of the crisis.
The Asian crisis provides heterodox economists with the opportunity to investigate counterfactually whether the financial policies they have proposed would have averted the crisis. The paper argues that neo-liberal financial integration introduces distinct risks to emerging economies--currency, flight, fragility, contagion and sovereignty risks. The paper presents the financial policies endorsed by the heterodoxy--transactions taxes, trip wires and-or speed bumps, convertibility restrictions, the Chilean model and a publicly managed mutual fund. The paper considers whether these policies mitigate risks, and whether they could have prevented the Asian crisis (and the transmission thereof). The paper concludes with policies to avert future crises. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Recent years have seen the development of a large literature on balance sheet factors in emerging-market financial crises. In this paper we discuss three concepts widely used in this literature. Two of them original sin' and debt intolerance' seek to explain the same phenomenon, namely, the volatility of emerging-market economies and the difficulty these countries have in servicing and repaying their debts. The debt-intolerance school traces the problem to institutional weaknesses of emerging-market economies that lead to weak and unreliable policies, while the original-sin school traces the problem instead to the structure of global portfolios and international financial markets. The literature on currency mismatches, in contrast, is concerned with the consequences of these problems and with how they are managed by the macroeconomic and financial authorities. Thus, the hypotheses and problems to which these three terms refer are analytically distinct. The tendency to use them synonymously has been an unnecessary source of confusion.
In this paper we examine the impact of membership in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) on trade between PTA members. Rather than considering the impact of PTA membership on the volume of trade we consider the impact of membership on the structure of trade. For a large sample of countries over the period 1962-2000 we find that membership in a PTA is associated with an increase in the extent of intra-industry trade. In addition, we find that the effect of PTA membership on IIT is larger when a PTA is formed between two developed countries.
The paper lays out an analytical framework for understanding crises in emerging markets based on examination of stock variables in the aggregate balance sheet of a country and the balance sheets of its main sectors (assets and liabilities). It focuses on the risks created by maturity, currency, and capital structure mismatches. This framework draws attention to the vulnerabilities created by debts among residents, particularly those denominated in foreign currency, and it helps to explain how problems in one sector can spill over into other sectors, eventually triggering an external balance of payments crisis. The paper also discusses the potential of macroeconomic policies and official intervention to mitigate the cost of such a crisis.
In recent years, the term “fear of floating” has been used to describe exchange rate regimes that, while officially flexible, in practice intervene heavily to avoid sudden or large depreciations. However, the data reveals that in most cases (and increasingly so in the 2000s) intervention has been aimed at limiting appreciations rather than depreciations, often motivated by the neo-mercantilist view of a depreciated real exchange rate as protection for domestic industries. As a first step to address the broader question of whether this view delivers on its promise, we examine whether this “fear of appreciation” has a positive impact on growth performance in developing economies. We show that depreciated exchange rates indeed lead to higher growth, but that the effect, rather than through import substitution or export booms as argued by the mercantilist view, works largely through the deepening of domestic savings and capital accumulation.
The stylized fact that there is no correlation between long-run economic growth and financial globalization has spawned a recent literature that purports to provide newer evidence and arguments in favor of financial globalization. We review this literature and find it unconvincing. The underlying assumptions in this literature are that developing countries are savings-constrained; that access to foreign finance alleviates this to boost investment and long-run growth; and that insofar as there are problems with financial globalization, these can be remedied through deep institutional reforms. In contrast, we argue that developing economies are as or more likely to be investment- than savings-constrained and that the effect of foreign finance is often to aggravate this investment constraint by appreciating the real exchange rate and reducing profitability and investment opportunities in the traded goods sector, which have adverse long-run growth consequences. It is time for a new paradigm on financial globalization, and one that recognizes that more is not necessarily better. Depending on context and country, the appropriate role of policy will be as often to stem the tide of capital inflows as to encourage them. Policymakers who view their challenges exclusively from the latter perspective risk getting it badly wrong.IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 112–138. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.29; published online 6 January 2009
The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange-rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms.
This paper develops an empirical model of bilateral exchange rate volatility. We conjecture that for developing economies, external financial liabilities have an important effect on desired bilateral exchange rate volatility, above and beyond the standard optimal currency area (OCA) factors. By contrast, industrial countries do not face the same set of constraints in international financial markets. In our theoretical model, external debt tightens financial constraints and reduces the efficiency of the exchange rate in responding to external shocks. We go on to explore the determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility in a broad cross section of countries. For developing economies, bilateral exchange rate volatility (relative to creditor countries) is strongly negatively affected by the stock of external debt. For industrial countries however, OCA variables appear more important and external debt is generally not significant in explaining bilateral exchange rate volatility.
This article analyses the effects of the real value of the dollar on investment in US domestic manufacturing using aggregate data for 1973-2004. Econometric estimation shows a negative effect that is much larger than has been found in any previous study. The exchange rate affects investment mainly, although not exclusively, through the channel of financial or liquidity constraints, rather than by affecting the desired stock of capital. Counterfactual simulations show that US manufacturing investment would have been 61% higher and the capital stock would have been 17% higher in 2004 if the dollar had not appreciated after 1995.
In this paper we focus on cycles and trends of some macroeconomic and housing market variables representative of the French economy. In a first part, we empirically show that cycles in the housing sector, measured by housing prices, housing starts, building permits, sales or residential investment, are strongly correlated to GDP cycles with a lead lying between of one and four quarters, suggesting thus that a monitoring of housing fluctuations could bring useful information for macroeconomic forecasting. Interestingly, this result is robust to the various considered approaches. Moreover, it seems that the housing sector long-term trend possesses its own dynamics, quite different from the global French economic activity. Thus, in a second part, we review various structural factors that could drive housing market developments in France in the future.
The author defines a financial crisis as a disruption in financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As financial markets become unable to function efficiently, economic activity sharply contracts. Factors that promote financial crises include, mainly, a deterioration in financial sector balance sheets, increases in interest rates and in uncertainty, and deterioration in nonfinancial balance sheets because of changes in asset prices. Financial policies in 12 areas could help make financial crises less likely in emerging market economies, says the author. He discusses: Prudential supervision. Accounting and disclosure requirements. Legal and judicial systems. Market-based discipline. Entry of foreign banks. Capital controls. Reduction of the role of state-owned financial institutions. Restrictions on foreign-dominated debt. The elimination of too-big-to-fail practices in the corporate sector. The proper sequencing of financial liberalization. Monetary policy and price stability. Exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange reserves. If the political will to adopt sound policies in these areas grows in emerging market economies, their financial systems should become healthier, with substantial gains both from greater economic growth and smaller economic fluctuations.
The impact of uncertainty on investment has attracted considerable attention in the analytical and empirical macroeconomic literature. In theory, however, uncertainty can affect investment through different channels, some of which operate in mutually opposing direction. So, the sigh of its overall effect is ambiguous and can be assessed only empirically. To thoroughly assess the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on private investment, the author uses a large panel data set on developing countries. He draws a distinction between sample variability and uncertainty, constructs alternative measure of the volatility of innovations to five key macroeconomic variables (inflation, growth, the terms of trade, the real exchange rate, and the price of capital goods), and examines their association with aggregate private investment. He then adds these constructed measures to an empirical investment equation that is estimated using alternative panel data econometric methods, allowing for simultaneity, country-specific effects, and parameter heterogeneity across countries. The results underscore the robustness of the link between investment and uncertainty. Virtually all of the volatility measures in the paper show a strong negative association with investment ratios. In addition, the regression estimates indicate that uncertainty has an adverse direct impact on investment, over and above any indirect effect that might also be at work. This finding is particularly robust in the case of real exchange rate volatility, which invariably has a robust negative effect on investment, regardless of econometric specification.
This paper extends Minsky's financial instability hypothesis to the case of the open, 'liberalised', economy, making it possible to put forward a specifically Minskyan account of the road to the financial crisis in Southeast Asia (1997-1998). The analysis suggests that the threats to growth and employment emanating from the financial sector which Minsky identified in the closed economy setting are much intensified in open, liberalised, developing economies. Financial liberalisation is an important key factor in this process. Rival explanations of the crisis are examined and rejected in favour of the extended Minskyan explanation. The policy implications are derived and discussed. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
In a world of high capital mobility, the threat of speculative attack becomes a central issue of macroeconomicpolicy. While “first-generation” and “second-generation” models of speculative attacks both have considerablerelevance to particular financial crises of the 1990s, a “third-generation” model is needed to make sense of thenumber and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. Most of the recent attempts to produce such amodel have argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. This paper sketches another candidatefor third-generation crisis modeling—one that emphasizes two facts that have been omitted from formal modelsto date: the role of companies' balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows inaffecting the real exchange rate. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999
This paper studies the role of an increase in foreign exchange reserves in reducing currency volatility for emerging market countries. The study employs a panel of 28 countries over the period 1986-2002. Several control variables are introduced in the regressions to account for other factors affecting exchange rate volatility (monetary and external indicators as well as conventional macroeconomic fundamentals). The paper controls for the endogeneity induced by the role of the exchange rate regime, since the regime can affect both the level of reserves and exchange rate volatility. The results provide ample support for the proposition that holding adequate reserves reduces exchange rate volatility. The effect is strong and robust; moreover, it is nonlinear and appears to operate through a signaling effect.
The paper examines factors affecting exchange rate volatility, with an emphasis on structural features of the foreign exchange regime. It draws for the first time on detailed survey data collected by the IMF on foreign exchange market organization and regulations. Key findings are that decentralized dealer markets, regulations on the use of domestic currency by nonresidents, acceptance of Article VIII obligations, and limits on banks' foreign exchange positions are associated with lower exchange rate volatility. The paper also provides support for earlier results on the influence of macroeconomic conditions and the choice of exchange rate regime on volatility.
This paper investigates the effects of time varying uncertainty on aggregate private fixed investment in South Africa. The GARCH generated measures of volatility of selected macroeconomic variables indicating five measures of uncertainty are used in the analysis. These are output growth uncertainty, uncertainty about changes in the real effective exchange rate, uncertainty about changes in the real interest rate, producer inflation uncertainty, and terms of trade uncertainty. The results of the estimation by an empirical ECM model of conventional investment determinants controlling for the effects of uncertainty indicated that, over all, time varying macroeconomic uncertainty significantly reduces private fixed investment. Copyright (c) 2006 The Author. Journal compilation (c) 2006 Economic Society of South Africa.
We examine the relationship between aggregate investment and exchange rate uncertainty in the G7, using panel estimation and decomposition of volatility derived from the components generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (GARCH) model. Our dynamic panel approach takes account of potential cross-sectional heterogeneity, which can lead to bias in estimation. We find that for a poolable subsample of European countries, it is the transitory and not the permanent component of volatility which adversely affects investment. To the extent that short-run uncertainty in the CGARCH model characterizes higher frequency shocks generated by volatile short-term capital flows, these are most deleterious for investment. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Yes, ‘it’ did happen again – A Minsky crisis happened in Asia Levy Institute Working paper 234. D Eryar Real Exchange Rate Volatility in the Financial Fragility 555 Comparative Economic Studies rKrugman, P. 1979: A model of balance-of-payments crises
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Policy factors and exchange rate volatility
- Benita
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Benita, G and Lauterbach, B. 2007: Policy factors and exchange rate volatility. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 7: 7–23
(log of real exchange rate volatility is the dependent variable) Total private Maturity Short term Financial Non-financial Total private/GDP 3
Comparative Economic Studies
Table 4: Regressions for the period 2002:1–2007:9 (log of real exchange rate volatility is the dependent variable)
Total private
Maturity
Short term
Financial
Non-financial
Total private/GDP
3.26** (1.35)
Structural vulnerabilities and currency crises
- S Ghosh
- A Gosh
Understanding bilateral exchange rate volatility
- Deveruex
- P Lane
- M Deveruex