Article

Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict: An Evolutionary Narrative

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

Conflicts over the delimitation of territorial waters are abundant around the globe. Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, are no exceptions. The delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf, the status of islands, islets, and flight control zones and corridors in the Aegean Sea constitute constant sources of friction between them. We offer an evolutionary game model to explore for directions their relations can take including chances of new crises and the revision of the status quo. We find that crises constitute a norm in bilateral relations of the two littoral states. The crisis equilibrium indicates routinized practices involving first displaying then falling back. Hence aggressive behavior can be periodically observed but the current status quo will persist. A revised status quo becomes a likely prospect only if both countries were posited as single unitary actors maximizing their expected utilities.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
Realism has been the dominant paradigm in the study of international conflict. Within this paradigm, two leading alternative approaches have been deterrence theory and structural realism. We test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984. We derive a set of hypotheses from each model, operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis, and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great-power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis. The results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support, whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported.
Article
Full-text available
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Article
Full-text available
Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.
Article
Full-text available
Evolutionary games are introduced as models for repeated anonymous strategic interaction: actions (or behaviors) which are more "fit," given the current distribution of behaviors, tend over time to displace less fit behaviors. Cone fields characterize the continuous-time processes compatible with a given fitness (or payoff) function. For large classes of dynamics, it is shown that all stable steady states are Nash equilibria and that all Nash equilibria are steady states. The biologists' evolutionarily stable strategy condition is shown to be less closely related to the dynamic equilibria. Economic examples and a literature survey are also provided. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
Article
Full-text available
Last year the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly approved the expansion of the Atlantic alliance. Whereas some advocates of enlarging NATO, particularly Eastern European leaders for whom the Soviets' iron grip is an all too recent memory, stress the extension of the alliance's traditional deterrent function, others acknowledge that Russia is in no position to reconquer its former empire. Rather, they argue that membership in NATO would stabilize the region by filling the power vacuum and eliminating the need for security competition. Traditionally a volatile area, East-Central Europe is rife with potential irredentist and ethnic conflicts, and NATO can help arbitrate and limit these disputes. Critics have denounced the move as unnecessarily provocative to Russia, and they have also decried its hefty cost. But they have not challenged the claim that alliances create zones of peace.
Book
An analysis of the issues and events related to the conflict between Greece and Turkey, with emphasis on the period after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The text attempts to trace the future evolution of Greek-Turkish relations, paying equal attention to domestic and international factors.
Article
The just war tradition stands as the moral and prudential alternative to both pacifism and realism. It forms the only reasonable ethical basis for the understanding of state initiated force. As applied to questions of nuclear deterrence, just war theory is incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction and with the threat of MAD. Just war theory entails a move toward counterforce with discriminate targeting of military capabilities and away from city targeting . This is now becoming possible technically and is morally indicated. The counterforce option is realistic in that nuclear disarmament is an extremely remote possibility and alternate strategies such as bluff ore not workable. A counterforce strategy would be both discriminate and proportional as well as being in accord with political realism.
Article
This paper focuses on the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty over the Aegean Sea. In 1995-96 the two protagonists again battled over a group of strategic islands at the heart of disputed claims over access to the Aegean and resource rights. Most of the article is devoted to a historical review of Turkish-Greek tensions in the region and considers how their relationship to western security organisations such as NATO created problems for outside powers such as the United States. One enduring irony is that old NATO weapons and equipment from the UK and the USA were given to those parties in an attempt to modernize their forces during the late Cold war. In conclusion, the paper argues that the recent dispute over Imia is an impoprtant escalation of tension between the two nations and urges both parties to seek international conflict resolution rather than waging war.
Article
Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.
Article
Scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by referring to counterfactual cases where a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent. The methodological status and the viability of this very common procedure are unclear and are worth examining. How does the strategy of counterfactual argument relate, if at all, to methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of actual cases, such as regression analysis or Mill's Method of Difference? Are counterfactual thought experiments a viable means of assessing hypotheses about national and international outcomes, or are they methodologically invalid in principle? The paper addresses the first question in some detail and begins discussion of the second. Examples from work on the causes of World War I, the nonoccurrence of World War III, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America, and the origins of fascism and corporatism in Europe illustrate the use, problems and potential of counterfactual argument in small-N-oriented political science research.
Article
Conventional wisdom holds that in international disputes, a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or the balance of interests. Analysis of a game-theoretic model of crisis signaling substantially refines and revises this claim. Due to selection effects arising from strategic behavior, measures of the relative strength of a defender's interests that are available before a crisis begins (ex ante) should be related to the failure of the defender's threats during the crisis. Ex ante measures of the defender's relative military strength should correlate with the success of the defender's crisis threats, but due to strategic dynamics that are not grasped by the standard arguments. A reanalysis of Huth and Russett's data on immediate deterrent threats lends support for these and other hypotheses drawn from the game-theoretic treatment.
Article
Christopher Layne of Los Angeles is an unaffiliated scholar. He is presently a consultant to the government contracts practice group of the law firm of Hill, Wynne, Troop and Meisinger, which represents major firms in the defense industry. I am extremely grateful to the following colleagues who reviewed various drafts of this paper and offered helpful criticisms: John Arquilla, Ted Galen Carpenter, Kerry Andrew Chase, Jeffry Frieden, John Mearsheimer, Benjamin C. Schwarz, Jack Snyder, Stephen Walt, and Kenneth Waltz. I also thank Stephen Van Evera and David Spiro for providing me copies of, and permission to quote from, their unpublished works. 1. I use the term "democratic peace theory" because it is a convenient shorthand term. However, strictly speaking, the claim that democracies do not fight democracies is a proposition, or hypothesis, rather than a theory. Democratic peace "theory" proposes a causal relationship between an independent variable (democratic political structures at the unit level) and the dependent variable (the asserted absence of war between democratic states). However, it is not a true theory because the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables is neither proven nor, as I demonstrate in this article, adequately explained. See Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses, Laws and Theories: A User's Guide," unpub. memo, Department of Political Science, MIT. 2. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 7; and Russett, "Can A Democratic Peace Be Built?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 277-282. 3. In this article, I build upon and expand the criticisms of democratic peace theory found in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," PS (December 1991), pp. 667-670. 4. Other cases of crises between democratic great powers that might be studied include Anglo-French relations during the Liberal entente cordiale of 1832-48, Franco-Italian relations during the late 1880s and early 1890s and, if Wilhelmine Germany is classified as a democracy, the Moroccan crises of 1905-06 and 1911 and the Samoan crises of 1889 and 1899. These cases would support my conclusions. For example, from 1832 to 1848, the Foxite legacy disposed England's Whigs to feel a strong commitment to France based on a shared liberal ideology. Yet Anglo-French relations during this period were marked by intense geopolitical rivalry over Belgium, Spain, and the Near East, and the threat of war was always a factor in the calculations of policymakers in both London and Paris. Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston profoundly distrusted French ambitions and constantly urged that England maintain sufficient naval power to defend its interests against a French challenge. See Kenneth Bourne, Palmerston; The Early Years, 1784-1841 (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 613. Also see Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone Press, 1974); and Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol. I: 1830-1841, Britain, The Liberal Movement and The Eastern Question (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951). Italy challenged France for Mediterranean ascendancy although the two nations were bound by liberalism, democracy, and a common culture. The two states engaged in a trade war and came close to a real war. France apparently was dissuaded from attacking Italy in 1888 when the British Channel Fleet was sent to the Italian naval base of La Spezia. Italy was prevented from attacking France by its military and economic weakness. See C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, chap. 4; C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1879-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), Vol. I, pp. 147-150; John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 183-188. 5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer first observed the pattern of democracies not fighting democracies in a 1976 article: Small and Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865," Jerusalem Journal of...
Article
Van Coufoudakis is Associate Professor of Political Science at Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne. This article is part of a broader project on Greek—Turkish relations. Research has been carried out between 1978 and 1983 and has been made possible by grants from the Office of International Programs, Indiana University; the West European Center, Indiana University; and by a sabbatical from Indiana University—Purdue University. The documentary and other material has been supplemented by extensive original and follow-up interviews of political leaders, diplomats, journalists, military, and others in Greece and Cyprus. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Lehrman Institute in New York. 1. Republic of Greece Directorate of Press and Information, The Government's Programmatic Proposals and the Discussions in Parliament (Athens: Directorate of Press and Information, 1981), pp. 12-13. 2. Harry J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question: The Last Phase—A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), pp. 106-109. 3. As in the case of the massive population exchange and resettlement, the abandonment by Greece of major property compensation claims, etc. 4. Iphigeneia Anastasiadou, Ho Venizelos Kai To Hellino Tourkiko Symphono Philias Tou 1930 [Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930] (Athens: Philippotes, 1982); Psomiades, The Eastern Question. 5. Psomiades, The Eastern Question, p. 109. Greece's position was vital for the defense of the Straits and the Anatolian coast; Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were seeking access to the Aegean; Italy had expansionist aims in the Eastern Mediterranean, Albania, etc. 6. Limited food supplies were shipped from Turkey to Greece during the hunger of 1941-42, and some assistance was extended to those escaping from Greece to join the Greek forces in the Middle East. See Alexis Alexandris, "Turkish Policy towards Greece during the Second World War and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Détente," Balkan Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1982), pp. 157-197. 7. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 291-296; Edward C. Clark, "The Turkish Varlik Vergisi Reconsidered," Middle East Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 1972), pp. 205-216; and for a most objective account of this event from a Turkish author, Faik Okte, Varlik Vergisi Faciasi [The Tragedy of the Capital Levy] (Istanbul, 1951). 8. An extremely valuable work based on German and British archives is that of Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1979); also V.D. Papadakis, Diplomatiki Historia tou Hellinikou Polemou 1940-1945 [Diplomatic History of the Greek War 1940-1945] (Athens, 1956). 9. Among the many accounts of the period see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); John O. Iatrides, Balkan Triangle—Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); and K.G. Andreadis, The Moslem Minority of Western Thrace (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1956). 10. Typical of the American Cold War appeals is the work by C. McKinnon, Turkey and Greece: Closer Unity Now! (New York: Vantage Press, 1968). A more significant indicator of how little U.S. officials understood the serious nature of the emerging Greek-Turkish dispute is the identical note sent to Greece and Turkey by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in the aftermath of the Turkish pogrom against the Greek minority of Istanbul and Izmir on the evening of September 6, 1955. In his note of September 20, 1955, the Secretary of State appealed to the parties to "mend their fences" in view of the need for allied solidarity and expressed his disbelief that such an event could undermine the détente established by Venizelos and Ataturk. Dulles's views were unanimously rejected by all segments of Greek public opinion. 11. The leading recent advocate of this idea is Professor Dimitri Kitsikis. See: Syngritiki Historia Hellados Kai Tourkias Ston 20° Aiona [Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th Century] (Athens: Estia-Kollaros, 1978), and Historia tou Hellino Tourkikou Chorou, 1928-1973 [History of the Greek-Turkish Region, 1928-1973] (Athens: Estia-Kollaros, 1981). 12...
Article
The largely unanticipated end of the cold war and the consequent difficulties in explaining its demise underline the need to understand better the phenomenon of rivalries in world politics. There is, however, much more at stake than the history of the Soviet-American relationship because a respectable proportion of international conflict is embedded within the contexts of specific dyadic feuds with specific pasts and futures. To ignore these contexts may seriously distort the entire analytic undertaking of international relations. This article makes a case for identifying rivalries in terms of decision maker perceptions as opposed to the number of disputes over some period of time in which states engage. A second argument is that predominately positional and predominately spatial rivalries should be differentiated as two basic types. Finally, a third argument is advanced for categorizing positional rivalries with respect to their geopolitical milieu: dyadic, regional, global, and global-regional.
Article
A set of hypotheses derived from experiential learning and a realpolitik orientation to crisis bargaining are employed to investigate the bargaining behavior of pairs of states embroiled in recurring crises. It is proposed that in crisis bargaining, experiential learning focuses on the outcome of the preceding crisis, and the lessons drawn from that experience are interpreted in accordance with a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of a credible demonstration of power and resolve. The hypotheses predict that in crises between states of relatively equal military capabilities, successful outcomes encourage policymakers to repeat the bargaining strategy employed in the previous crisis, while failures lead to more coercive bargaining in the next crisis. Employing events data from a sample of 18 disputes among 6 pairs of states, each pair having been engaged in three successive crises, a significant pattern of shifts to more coercive bargaining following crises with unsuccessful outcomes was found.
Article
Breaking the stability of interstate conflictual relationships requires a dramatic change in the environment of those relationships. The beginning and end of enduring rivalries are closely related to the timing of large political shocks in the form of world wars, territorial changes, alterations in the international power distribution, civil wars, and national independences. Descriptive statistics on timing of enduring rivalry-initiation and termination vis-a-vis political shocks, supplemented by event history analysis. Political shocks were found to be a modest necessary condition for the initiation and termination of enduring rivalries with the strongest impact from world wars, civil wars, and national independences.
Article
General deterrence, unlike immediate deterrence, has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner. We outline a research design for doing so, by studying the circumstances under which, in a set of enduring rivalries, challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes. We indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often-competing theoretical frameworks: rational deterrence, a general model of rational conflict initiation, and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception. The results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models.
Article
Most systematic research on interstate conflict has overlooked the effects of one confrontation on subsequent conflict between the same adversaries. This article explores three aspects of recurrent militarized interstate disputes: the likelihood of a subsequent dispute between the same states, the interval between disputes involving the same adversaries, and characteristics of the initiators of recurrent disputes. These three queries are addressed through empirical examination of recurrent militarized conflict in Latin America from 1816-1986. Subsequent conflict between the same two adversaries is found to be more likely when territorial issues are under contention, and less likely when the first confrontation ends in a negotiated compromise outcome. The next confrontation tends to occur sooner after disputes that ended in stalemate, rather than in compromise or in a decisive outcome, and when territorial issues are at stake. The level of escalation reached in the dispute had little effect by itself on the timing of later conflict, but stronger results were produced in interaction with the type of issue at stake. Similar results were obtained both for recurrent conflict overall, and for recurrent conflict over the same contentious issues as before, but the combination of dispute outcomes, contentious issues, and escalation produced much stronger results with respect to the likelihood and timing of future conflict over the same issue(s). Additionally, the results did not provide overwhelming support for any single ideal type of characteristics of recurrent dispute initiators, with different initiation patterns following different types of dispute outcomes.
Article
Historians commonly criticize studies in a more behavioral mode as being “ahistorical”; that is, they lump together a disparate group of events without regard for their historical contexts. We propose to focus on what may be the most obvious and serious form of historical continuity: repeated conflict among the same set of states, or what we refer to (in accordance with the small but growing literature) as “enduring rivalries.” Specifically, we (1) explore the theoretical relevance of the concept of enduring rivalries, (2) define the concept of enduring rivalries, (3) evaluate current operational criteria for enduring rivalries, and (4) describe empirically the rivalries generated by those criteria.
Article
The rise of Kostas Simitis and his ‘modernizers’ faction to the leadership of PASOK in January 1996 brought certain changes to Greece's foreign policy. Contrary to the widespread belief that Simitis's impact has steered Greece away from its nationalist foreign policy to a modernist/Europeanist direction, this article argues that such conclusions are premature and simplistic. Instead, it suggests an alternative interpretation whereby Simitis's foreign policy is perceived as predominantly dualistic, combining a westernist with a nationalist orientation with the aim of satisfying the two major competing factions of the social democrats and the populists inside PASOK and among the wider Greek electorate. To the extent that modernization in foreign policy presupposes a commitment to international interdependence as a means of attaining security and domestic socio‐economic development, Simitis's impact has had a modest modernizing effect on Greek foreign policy. Greece still remains largely preoccupied with a dogmatic attachment to the western alliance through which it aspires to fulfil the role of a dominant power in the Balkan region to counter Turkey's expansionism. In this sense, the elements of continuity with Andreas Papandreou's nationalism remain considerable, while most of the change has been invested in reinstating Greece's westernist diplomatic tradition associated with the liberalism of Karamanlis.
Article
This is the entire text of the 1989 Nancy L. Schwartz Lecture delivered by the author at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
Article
Through an examination of 129 territorial disputes between 1950 and 1990, Paul Huth presents a new theoretical approach for analyzing the foreign policy behavior of states, one that integrates insights from traditional realist as well as domestic political approaches to the study of foreign policy. Huth's approach is premised on the belief that powerful explanations of security policy must be built on the recognition that foreign policy leaders are domestic politicians who are very attentive to the domestic implications of foreign policy actions. Hypotheses derived from this new modified realist mode are then empirically tested by a combination of statistical and case study analysis. ". . . a welcome contribution to our understanding of how and why some territorial disputes escalate to war."--American Political Science Review Paul Huth is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Research Scientist, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
Article
I want in this article to trace the history of an idea. It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. The problems are diverse and include not only the behaviour of animals in contest situations but also some problems in the evolution of genetic mechanisms and in the evolution of ecosystems. It is not, however, sufficient to take over the theory as it has been developed in sociology and apply it to evolution. In sociology, and in economics, it is supposed that each contestant works out by reasoning the best strategy to adopt, assuming that his opponents are equally guided by reason. This leads to the concept of a ‘minimax’ strategy, in which a contestant behaves in such a way as to minimise his losses on the assumption that his opponent behaves so as to maximise them. Clearly, this would not be a valid approach to animal conflicts. A new concept has to be introduced, the concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’.
Article
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Article
An evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked to their current relative success, but mutuation, perturbing the system from its deterministic evolution, are present as well. The focus is on the long run implications of ongoing mutations, which drastically reduce the set of equilibria. For 2 by 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean Sea
  • Faraj Ahnish
Ahnish, Faraj, 1993. The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean Sea. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1981-89: The Populist Decade. London: St
  • Greece
Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade. London: St. Martin's Press (167-80).
Turkish Policy Toward Greece
  • Tozun Bahcheli
Bahcheli, Tozun, 2000. 'Turkish Policy Toward Greece', in A. Makowsky and S. Sayari, eds, Turkey's New World. Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near east Policy (131-152).
Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation
  • Eds Moore
Moore, eds., Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation.
PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations
  • Van Coufoudakis
Coufoudakis, Van, 1993. 'PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations', in Robert Clogg, ed.,
The Aegean Dispute', Adelphi Papers no. 195. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies
  • Andrew Wilson
Wilson, Andrew, 1979. 'The Aegean Dispute', Adelphi Papers no. 195. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.