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On the Structure of Legal Principles

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Abstract

The author offers a sketch of his thesis that legal principles are optimization commands. He presents this thesis as an effort to capture the structure of weighing or balancing and to provide a basis for the principle of proportionality as it is applied in constitutional law. With this much in place, he then takes up some of the problems that have come to be associated with the optimization thesis. First, he examines the objection that there are no such things as principles, but only different modes of the application of norms. Second, he discusses problems concerning the concept of an optimization command and the character of the 'ought' contained in principles. He concludes that the distinction between commands to optimize and commands to be optimized is the best method for capturing the nature of principles.

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... In Alexy´s (2000, p. 295) words: "principles are norms commanding that something be realized to the highest degree that is actually and legally possible." A so-called optimisation command is used (Alexy, 2000(Alexy, , 2004, which means that for every case, the adjudicating body strives to find an optimum state where each principle is fulfilled as much as possible and, in case of a conflict, weighted according to its importance. As an example, suppose there is a conflict between the freedom of speech and the protection of privacy. ...
... The rare human rights that are legal rules are thus definitive commands (Alexy, 2017). If there is a conflict between them, it has to be specified which takes precedence (Alexy, 2000). Usually, the more specific or the later adopted rule is applied. ...
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If future AI systems are to be reliably safe in novel situations, they will need to incorporate general principles guiding them to robustly recognize which outcomes and behaviours would be harmful. Such principles may need to be supported by a binding system of regulation, which would need the underlying principles to be widely accepted. They should also be specific enough for technical implementation. Drawing inspiration from law, this article explains how negative human rights could fulfil the role of such principles and serve as a foundation both for an international regulatory system and for building technical safety constraints for future AI systems.
... 3). It includes four detailed kinds of reasoning: (1) identification of the elements of the name of the criterion, (2) indication of the moral, political and economic content of the value, (3) confrontation of that content with the legal axiology, and (4) concretization of the extra-legal axiology through its imposition on the established facts of the case. All these components appear in various ways in judicial practice, which is shown, as mentioned above, on the examples of jurisdiction of the two types of courts-international and national (Sect. ...
... Indication of the name, however, does not determine the specific content of the value. The latter happens in the process of applying the law and depends on, among others, the subject of the 1 Cf. for example criteria of "equity" ("l'equite" in Article 1135 of Code Napoleon, "Billigkeit" in § 315 or § 660 of German BGB or in Article 4 of Swiss ZGB), of "good faith" ("bonne foi" in Article 550 of CN, "Treu und Glauben" in § 157 and § 242 of BGB or Article 2 an 3 of ZGB), or of "good manners" ("les bonnes moeurs" in Article 6 of CN, "gute Sitten" in § 26 of Austrian ABGB or § 138 of BGB. 2 24.11.1917, referring to the revolutionary conscience (riewoljucionnoj sowiesti) and revolutionary legal consciousness (riewoljucionnomu prawosoznaniju). ...
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The aim of the paper is to analyze the types of interpretative reasoning determining the content of extra-legal criteria contained in general reference clauses. This construction, despite its normative foundation, detaches itself from the intention of the legislator much more than e.g. the principles of law, at the same time extending deliberately judicial discretion. Extra-legal values, identified by courts as to their type and their content, then confronted with internal legal axiology and concretized with respect to the facts of the case, are the most crucial part of reasoning that affects the process, results and roles of particular rules of judicial interpretation. It reduces the role of language and systemic rules, connecting the effect of determining the content of extra-legal values primarily with the type of political system and the related scope of judicial autonomy. The different impact between democratic and authoritarian regimes on judicial reasoning is confirmed by the analyzed examples of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Polish courts deciding in the period before and after 1989.
... We can, however, try to reformulate the content of the principle of substantive truth by referring to Alexy's proposal. According to Robert Alexy, the principles are orders to realize a certain state of affairs as much as possible -to the highest possible extent [1]. Therefore, the said obligation can be reformulated by indicating that it is essentially a duty to "pursue the truth". ...
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The concept of truth is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy, but also of, for example, semiotics and law. The article analyses the concept (predicate) of truth in judicial fact-finding and the concept (predicate) of truth in legal interpretation from the perspective of the pluralist theory of truth. The concept of an unordered concept of truth is introduced in the paper, which is formed by pairs of opposing meaning postulates concerning a specific aspect of truth, such as “correspondency” vs. “correspondency-independence” or “transcendence” vs. “immanence”. Individual concepts of truth are ordered sets of congruent meaning postulates. The analysis aims to reconstruct the meaning of the truth predicate in judicial fact-finding and legal interpretation from the point of view of meaning postulates. The conducted analysis shows that the predicate of substantive truth, the predicate of formal truth and the truth predicate in interpretation of law can be characterized by means of the same meaning postulates. In this light one may say that despite crucial differences between the indicated predicates, they belong to the same family of predicates of truth and represent the same way of “being true”. As a result, one may say the pluralist perspective reveals (in a certain sense - quite surprisingly) the essential unity of truth in judicial application of the law.
... El modelo de administración del conocimiento jurídico para involucrarse con precedentes y líneas jurisprudenciales cuenta, entre otras bases, con los conceptos de la teoría de la argumentación práctica y moral de Alexy (2008), dada su aproximación analítica y descriptiva del enunciado normativo, en la cual revela que éste es correcto "si, y sólo si puede ser el resultado de un procedimiento P", entonces el análisis como un ejercicio de elaboración de razones, fundamentos y criterios debidamente estructurados desde su elaboración, aplicación e interpretación (Alexy, 2000) pueden vincularse con una representación semántica, y que mediante unidades de conocimiento y reglas de operación sean factibles de proponer elementos a ser considerados en este proceso. ...
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Partiendo de los conceptos y evidencias positivas de la adopción de la administración del conocimiento en la labor jurídica, se presenta cómo esta se vincula con la labor de creación y detección de precedentes y en la integración de líneas jurisprudenciales, cómo puede ser considerada para coadyuvar y acelerar las funciones que pueden ser sistematizadas mediante el análisis del conocimiento explícito. ISSN: 2448-6965
... In view of this primary goal, the interventions must be effective from an empirical perspective, which obviously can only be examined ex post. The aim of the second condition is to protect the citizen from state expansion, in accordance with the principle of proportionality (e.g., Alexy 2000), which applies in constitutional law. But not only in comparison to earlier bastions of freedom, the measures within the COVID-19 crisis seem to be surprisingly. ...
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As Boettke et al. (2007, p. 363) emphasize “Disasters, whether man-made or natural, represent a ‘natural experiment’ for social scientists”. They refer to a very famous quote from John Stuart Mill (1849, pp. 74–75) concerning the value of free economics for the recovery after crises: “This perpetual consumption and reproduction of capital affords the explanation of what has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or carries away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it; all the inhabitants are ruined, and yet, in a few years after, everything is much as it was before.”
... Indeed, when applying legal principles and the so-called proportionality test, legislators and courts often need to carry out experiments, which almost always are imaginary, since real experiments are generally too expensive. As Alexy (1994Alexy ( , 2000Alexy ( , 2017 has shown, legal principles might be conceptualized as optimization requirements, which demand that something valuable be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. The proportionality test is a logical consequence of legal principles being such optimization requirements. ...
... É preciso, ainda, fazer menção à lição de Robert Alexy no sentido de que "toda norma é ou uma regra ou um princípio" 15 . O que diferencia regras de princípios, para Alexy, é a noção de "ser cumprido", ou seja, enquanto regras são normas que ou estão ou não estão em conformidade com o caso, e, por isso mesmo, são sempre ou satisfeitas ou não satisfeitas, princípios são normas que podem ser cumpridas em diferentes graus 16 . ...
... In my light, conditions 1, 2 and 3 should better be typified as principles (Alexy, 2000) or as optimality rules (Sbisà, 2018). According to a distinction drawn by Alexy within the framework of his discourse theory of norms, principles must be distinguished from rules in that the former are commands of optimalization, whereas the latter are definite mandates. ...
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The aim of this paper is to study the role that dissent may have in public political deliberation in democratic societies. Out of argumentative settings, dissent would seem to have a disruptive effect. In my view, dissension effectively puts into question the political authority's hypothetical legitimacy. To the extent that this is so, acts of dissent have illocutionary force and give rise to certain changes in the dialectical duties and rights of the participants.
... As specified above, principles are understood as the minimum requirement of appropriate conduct that must be complied within all decision-making processes. Robert Alexy refers to principles as "optimization commands" (Alexy, 2000). ...
... norms that require a certain ideal or value to be protected to the greatest degree factually and legally possible. 107 The boundaries of that legal possibility are contingent upon the specificities of each particular legal order. In the EU legal order, the legal possibilities for ensuring the constitutional principle of the rule of law in composite decision-making are inevitably constrained by other constitutional requirements. ...
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Composite administrative procedures – Exclusive jurisdiction of Union courts to review non-binding national preparatory acts – No jurisdiction of Union courts to enforce national law – Autonomy and uniformity of EU law – No judicial control possible of violation of domestic law by national authorities – National rule of law gap – Judicial review, effective judicial protection, and principle of administrative legality
... As seen above, institutions refer to the rules, decision-making procedures, norms (principles), and programmes that describe social practices. Principles are drawn from institutions and are the formal and informal legal norms with general application to all similar situations (Alexy 2000). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) define norm as the ‗standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity'. ...
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The four decades-long ideological-based insurgencies and conflict in the Kabul River Basin (KRB) have seriously hampered the relations and foreign policies of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, it restricts them to solve various bilateral issues including transboundary waters. This lack of cooperation over shared water resources is one of the barriers to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. Additionally, it has contributed to the prevailing anarchic situation where each country does what it wants. The absence of a formal water-sharing mechanism coupled with poor water management practices within both the riparian counties are resulting various flow and administration-related challenges. Moreover, these challenges are further exacerbated by regional changes in social, political, environmental and economic systems. The scholarly literature suggests that an analytical transboundary water governance framework is essential to address the challenges of water politicisation and securitisation, quality degradation and quantity reduction. Additionally, the literature rarely integrates (a) a multi-level approach, (b) an institutional approach (c) an inclusive development approach, or (d) accounts for the uses of different types of water and their varied ecosystem services for improved transboundary water governance. To enhance human wellbeing and achieve inclusive and sustainable development in the KRB this research indicates that it is essential to: (1) defrost frozen collaboration; (2) bypass border dispute; (3) use biodiversity and ecosystem services approach; (4) address existing and potential natural and anthropogenic challenges; (5) remove contradictions in the policy environment; (6) combat resource limits and dependence by promoting collaboration on long-term cost effective solutions; and (7) enhance knowledge and dialogue on inclusive development.
... As seen above, institutions refer to the rules, decision-making procedures, norms (principles), and programmes that describe social practices. Principles are drawn from institutions and are the formal and informal legal norms with general application to all similar situations (Alexy 2000). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) define norm as the ‗standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity'. ...
... No entanto, a caminhada doutrinária rumo à juridicidade dos princípios inicia-se com Jean Boulanger. 9 Muito antes da contribuição dada à dogmática dos princípios por Alexy (2000) e Dworkin (2002), Boulanger realizou um importante estudo, elaborando uma verdadeira teoria geral sobre o tema, classificando-os em tipos e variedades. Para o professor de Direito da Faculdade de Lille, representam "os princípios os materiais mediante os quais pode a doutrina edificar com confiança a construção jurídica". ...
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Este trabalho busca trazer reflexões teóricas sobre a importância dos princípios para a interpretação e aplicação do direito no Brasil. A partir de uma revisão de literatura, apresentam-se os momentos marcantes, do século XVIII aos dias atuais, observados na relação entre o direito civil e o direito constitucional. Ressalta-se que, no século XX, o Estado passou a intervir nas relações entre os indivíduos com o intuito de corrigir distorções criadas ou ampliadas pela postura abstencionista adotada inicialmente. A introdução de normas cogentes em campo onde outrora imperava absoluta a autonomia da vontade, assim como a intervenção estatal no domínio econômico, são indícios que demonstram a aproximação entre o direito constitucional e o direito civil, na medida em que se torna uma meta do Estado Social a realização dos fins e valores veiculados por intermédio de princípios constitucionais. Neste ambiente criado pela dogmática pós-positivista, umbilicalmente associado ao reconhecimento da normatividade dos princípios, assumem estes mandamentos de otimização um encargo de grande relevância na reconstrução dos tradicionais institutos de direito privado. Nota-se que, atualmente, há uma onda de socialização destes institutos, que passam a ser vistos como instrumentos de concretização de princípios insculpidos nos textos constitucionais.
... Alexy distinguishes two different types of norms: principles and rules[1]. In his approach, they differ in structure. ...
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Certainly principles of criminal liability may be understood as rules or norms outlining orders or prohibitions and standing out among other norms with their weight, for legal culture, legal doctrine, etc. In such a classic approach they are norms defining basic rights and obligations in the applicable criminal law (legalata level). However, is it the only possible and cognitively interesting meaning of the word “principle” in jurisprudence? From the semiotic point of view, they can occur in three forms: special-kind norms, teleological directives, rules which constitute valid performance of conventional activities (making criminal law). In an extra-directival sense these principles may be understood as models-descriptions of shaping the system of criminal law (or criminal liability as the core of criminal law). From a theoretical and practical point of view principles addressed to the legislator are extremely weighty—they can be called rules constructing the system of criminal liability. These all problems are discussed in the article.
... 9), pp. 47-8 y 67-69;ALEXY, Robert (2000), "On the Structure of Legal Principles", Ratio Juris 13, p. 300. 32 DWORKIN, Ronald (n. 16), p. 25; ALEXY, Robert (n. 9), p. 50. ...
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En este ensayo presento ideas acerca de cómo la dimensión autoritativa del derechopuede conciliarse con la corrección sustantiva en el control de constitucionalidad en el campo del principio de proporcionalidad. Para ello reconstruiré el principio de proporcionalidad por medio de la teoría principialista y sus elementos y rasgos distintivos para después enfocarme en explicar cómo los principios formales y sustanciales operan de acuerdo con la misma lógica, para así sostener que la ponderación conecta o reconcilia la dimensión formal con la sustantiva. Esto me permite concluir que por medio de los principios formales puede refutarse la objeción democrática al principio de proporcionalidad en el control de constitucionalidad.
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Nowadays, we are witnessing rise of general principle of administrative law discourses in all legal systems to empower good administration values in administrative legal orders. In numerous administrative litigations, judges have invoked some instances of legal principles which are imposed to the context of government’s actions as modern criterions and legal requirements; but, despite of deterministic normative role of general principle of administrative law, its concept is not yet precisely defined. There are multiple meticulous works that identify concept of legal principle and its known examples in legal systems; nevertheless, this essentially remains unclear that if we existentially have general principles of administrative law in our administrative legal systems. Hence, this paper strives to provide a convincible answer to the question by presenting a stringent discourse about definition of general principle of administrative law and its probable instances in administrative legal systems, mostly, among European Union and United Kingdom (UK) judges’ decisions; whereof general principles of administrative law represent fundamental administrative norms, by finding out an accurate general concept of each of them in legal systems, a generic portrait of global administrative law face can be drawn.
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The chapter continues the discussion on the technological approaches to detecting disinformation and manipulation, but from a legal perspective. It deals with the legal aspects of detecting online disinformation and propaganda using autonomous algorithmic tools, the requirements for the forensic analysis of digital evidence, and a relevant legal framework for collecting and evaluating evidence available in order to tackle these issues. The determination of the propagandistic or disinformation quality of content constitutes information needed in threat evaluation. For a proper understanding of the possibilities and limits of proving such a quality in content, the first part of the chapter provides theoretical insight into the definition of information and evidence according to law. The second part of the chapter then elaborates on the requirements and rules of evidence in criminal law, with a particular focus on digital evidence and its specifics.
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The purpose of this article is to explore the normative nature of the Ecosystem Approach in international environmental law. To do so, the article examines the implementation of this approach in two Mediterranean regimes: the Barcelona Convention and the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean. As these two regimes have implemented the Ecosystem Approach by taking into account the experiences of other international regimes, they are representative of broader trends in relation to this concept. The examination reveals that the Ecosystem Approach operates as an interstitial principle: a norm that fulfils the functions of a principle with regard to other rules, but is devoid of normative autonomy. This understanding of the Ecosystem Approach brings clarity to a concept that is ambiguous yet is widely disseminated in environmental governance. It may also further the progressive emergence of the Ecosystem Approach as a general principle of international environmental law.
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In this paper, I engage with J.J. Moreso’s account of legal reasoning. First, I reconstruct Moreso’s conception of legal deliberation, which I regard as taking a distinctive stance within the contemporary debate in jurisprudence, since it innovatively expands on some of the most sophisticated models of practical reasoning and legal reasoning that have been defended in the literature. Building on this interpretation of Moreso’s theory of legal reasoning, I will go on presenting some reflections on the idea of practical rationality that undergirds the practice of reasoning in law, when this practice is conceived in Moreso’s terms. In this context, I account for two central features of the conception of practical rationality that underlines, and best fits with, Moreso’s explanation of legal reasoning. Since Moreso has yet to systematically explore the idea of practical rationality associated with his theory of legal argument, the claims I advance in this part of the paper are merely tentative. Whilst I try to make a rigorous attempt to develop Moreso’s jurisprudence from a theoretical perspective that is sympathetic to his overall project, nothing in the discussion I carry out here should be taken to suggest that Moreso is conceptually committed to the views about practical rationality I associate his theory of legal reasoning with.
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In this paper, I propose a conceptualization of "interlegal balancing" as a distinctively legal-argumentative "interface", or structure for the relation between norms sourced in overlapping and diverse legal orders. My aim is to situate this concept. A concrete or formal structure for its application is left pending. This paper's argument is chiefly "architectonic" or theoretical in a structural and conceptual sense, but it certainly rests on a number of normative considerations. It proceeds in three main sections. The first section (§1) regards my working assumptions regarding the concept of legal order. I gather the continuing relevance of a "necessary and sufficient conditions" type of approach to the concept of a legal order. The next two sections embody my core considerations. They regard, respectively, two different but mutually complementary standpoints. A first standpoint (§2) could be described as a more "deductive" mapping exercise. It is a reconstruction of received views of the distinction between varieties of legal pluralism on the one hand and constitutionalization or constitutionalism beyond the state on the other hand. It aims at structuring a comparison-friendly "scale" upon two crossed variables: the presence/absence of hierarchy and the necessity of either balancing or subsumption. A second standpoint (§3) could be described as a more "inductive" or cumulative effort. Upon the results of the previous standpoint, it becomes necessary to gather more determinate criteria for the identification of legal norms and their preference. In its turn, these criteria are further subdivided into two sorts: classifying criteria of law and qualifying criteria of law. Gathering some foremost contributions in each sense, I announce a further pending research path proposing a taxonomy in relevant guiding criteria for interlegal balancing. I conclude remarking a very brief summary of my argument's open questions (§4).
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Al considerar a la (bio) ética algo más que una reflexión de carácter moral sobre los problemas que suscitan las aplicaciones de las ciencias de la vida y de las nuevas tecnologías, la perspectiva filosófico-jurídica de la Bioética como una disciplina dialógica debe estar respaldada por la ética global y por la interdisciplinariedad. Su aporte a la reflexión del siglo XXI se posiciona como fundamental y en ella participan disciplinas diversas para aportar sus conocimientos, puntos de vista y experiencia, a la elaboración conjunta de pautas que nos permitan tratar los problemas que las ciencias, en la actualidad, nos plantean. Problemas que a todos nos conciernen en tanto seres humanos, individualmente, y en tanto conformamos una sociedad interrelacionada y plural, que comparte un espacio común. La estricta relación entre la ética y la ciencia ha posibilitado que en Latinoamérica, igual que algunos países europeos, y aquí cabe citar el avance español, se profundice los aspectos de fundamentación que guardan entre si, sobre la base de la propuesta dialógica entre la nueva ética de los principios y las corrientes éticas tradicionales. El reto intelectual y práctico de la ética utilitarismo y la ética de consenso neoliberal que claman por imperar en el mundo contemporáneo, están siendo confrontadas por la ética aristotélica, con su desarrollo tomista bajo la perspectiva personalista, por la ética neokantiana y por la ética dialógica, de suerte que los valores culturales se han podido complementar y, con el diálogo, superar posturas diversas. A un nuevo desarrollo técnico, a un nuevo desafío científico y a una nueva disposición legal vienen, históricamente, acompañados de duras confrontaciones por parte de la sociedad cada vez menos homogénea. Pero, en definitiva, ese debate plural permite, con base en la solidaridad y tolerancia, un diálogo posible, necesario y enriquecedor. Un diálogo, una solución. Así se trata de un paso para el inicio de anheladas soluciones para los grandes saltos de la humanidad ante la tecnociencia. Ante la amplitud en relación a la materia de la tecnología y de la innovación, y considerando que hasta aquí sólo se abordan algunos de los principales temas, ya puede dimensionarse el tamaño y la complejidad de los problemas de índole ética asociados al desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías y al avance científico en general. El gran desafío de este siglo ya está lanzado: desarrollar una Bioética y un Bioderecho que prevengan y corrijan los excesos provocados por las investigaciones tecnocientíficas en pos de la vida, con énfasis, de forma inmediata o mediata, en la vida humana, y considerarla como un nuevo paradigma humanista al abrir la posibilidad del diálogo interdisciplinar.
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A judicialização do direito à saúde é um fenômeno crescente no Brasil. Os casos difíceis versam sobre medicamentos e tratamentos não incluídos nas políticas do sistema único de saúde – SUS, tema que foi enfrentado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no Recurso Extraordinário n. 566.471/RN. A resposta judicial ineludivelmente perpassará por uma ponderação, que deve passar pela estrutura analítica da norma da proporcionalidade e seus testes. Contudo, para uma maior racionalidade jurídica advinda da maior objetivação da ponderação, é importante acrescentar o conteúdo mínimo como padrão que define o grau de deferência e o ônus de argumentação do Estado. Nessa linha de pensamento, com o uso do método técnico-jurídico, o artigo oferece os parâmetros normativos para auxiliar na definição do conteúdo mínimo do direito à saúde no Brasil. Antes, porém, será preciso verificar a compreensão de conteúdo mínimo dada pelo Comitê de Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais da Organização das Nações Unidas.
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The development of transitional justice measures can be fully understood only when one takes into account the values, rationales and justifications that lie at the roots of various ways of dealing with past wrongs. Seeing transitional justice as an ontologically complex structure, the article aims to relate the legal instruments that concentrate on past abusers to the axiological layer of settling accounts with the past. In order to do so, three basic models of transitional justice – a retribution model, a historical clarification model and a thick line model – all based on the measures implemented during democratic change, are presented. Then, with the use of a classic division between consequentialist and deontological argumentation, the article describes transitional justice justifications. Next, the values emblematic for each of the models are identified. Finally, the article proposes a structure of transitional justice moral reasoning that may guide transitional decision-making process on the axiological level. [Oñati Socio-legal Series, 2016, No. 6(3), pp. 584-606]
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Moderní metody zpracování velkých datových souborů umožňují mimo jiné provádět i detailní a sofistikované analýzy judikatury. Vedle základních vzájemných vazeb a odkazů lze analyzovat v prakticky neomezeném rozsahu i nejrůznější formální a obsahové aspekty soudních rozhodnutí v libovolně širokých souvislostech. Tento příspěvek se v kontextu aktuálního vývoje příslušných technologií zabývá informační kvalitou soudního rozhodnutí a jejím vztahem k informačním efektům užití judikatury v kontinentálně evropské právní kultuře. V diskusní části tohoto příspěvku pak je argumentována legitimita restriktivního regulatorního přístupu k analytickým nástrojům, jejichž užití by mohlo vést k omezení nezávislosti soudce.
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It is both fitting and gratifying that Diversity in America has elicited such richly diverse comments from the Symposium participants. Their contributions teach me about some of the implications of my own book. More important, they refine and advance the debates that I had hoped to provoke in writing it. For all this, I am indebted to the participants, and I offer my responses in the same constructive, analytical spirit that their comments so admirably exhibit. I shall try to do so without repeating much of what I wrote in the book. One purpose of this Symposium, after all, is to get non-participants to pick it up and read it.
Taking Rules Seriously. Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
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Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips The Model of Rules
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Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems Zur Abwa È gungsfa È higkeit von Prinzipien Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
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Die Elemente des Schadensrechts Entwicklung eines beweglichen Systems im bu È rgerlichen Recht
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