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Time Under Authoritarian Rule and Economic Growth
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between exposure to "authoritarian" or "autocratic" institutions for prolonged periods of time and long-term economic development. Specifically, we examine how the length of time a country's regime was authoritarian between 1920 and 2000 is correlated with economic growth and per capita income. We find a moderate though negative effect, even after controlling for other factors. In contrast, we also find that the length of time a country is not subject to authoritarian regimes is positively related to economic growth and the level of per capital income. We claim this evidence is consistent with the thesis that one of the reasons why countries have had difficulty adjusting to life after autocracy is that the human and social capital necessary to make markets "work" eroded under autocratic regimes and takes time to develop afterward.
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We study the dynamics of economic and political change, theoretically and empirically. Democratic capital measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy, and the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood, appears to reduce exit rates from democracy and raise exit rates from autocracy. Higher democratic capital stimulates growth by increasing the stability of democracies. Heterogeneous effects of democracy induce sorting of countries into political regimes, which helps explain systematic differences between democracies and autocracies. Our results suggest the possibility of a virtuous circle, where accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development and consolidation of democracy.
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics of Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
As the literature on social capital has emerged over the past two decades, both advocates and critics of the concept have grappled with the question 'what is the nature of “social capital?”'. By viewing this question through the lens of Austrian capital theory (particularly under Lachmann's influence) we can understand social capital as being structural in nature, made up of heterogeneous and often complementary elements. This way of thinking about social capital opens the door for understanding the role of the 'social entrepreneur' as discovering new combinations within the social capital structure. By carving out a role for the change agent, we see social capital development as a process of social learning that extends the cognitive reach of individuals beyond what they can know directly. An Austrian approach to social capital advances the theoretical debate by linking the literature on network analysis (in which the focus is on individualistic accumulation of social capital) and broader questions of social capital embedded within community-wide norms. Further, an Austrian understanding of social capital informs policy debates, such as the question of whether social capital development can be, or needs to be, part of a deliberate development strategy.
Hernando de Soto attributes the poor economic performance of developing countries to insecure property rights. When property rights are not well-defined individuals do not have the incentives to invest in capital, and assets cannot be used as collateral, hindering capital formation and economic growth. This paper tests de Soto's hypothesis empirically by examining how the security of property rights impacts wealth, collateral, and capital formation across nations. Using several different measures and model specifications, we find support for de Soto's conjecture. Our results suggest that better defined property rights would result in substantial improvements in capital formation and economic growth in developing countries.
In a series of papers, my colleagues and I have demonstrated that levels of per capita income, economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological variables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from the coast. Three recent papers purport to show that the role of geography in explaining cross-country patterns of income per capita operates predominantly or exclusively through the choice of institutions, with little direct effect of geography on income after controlling for the quality institutions. This note shows that malaria transmission, which is strongly affected by ecological conditions, directly affects the level of per capita income after controlling for the quality of institutions.
Using a new database of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans we examine whether colonial origins affect modern economic outcomes. We argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience. We instrument for length of colonization using wind direction and wind speed. Wind patterns which mattered a great deal during the age of sail do not have a direct effect on GDP today, but do affect GDP via their historical impact on colonization. The number of years spent as a European colony is strongly positively related to the island's GDP per capita and negatively related to infant mortality. This basic relationship is also found to hold for a standard dataset of developing countries. We test whether this link is directly related to democratic institutions, trade, and the identity of the colonizing nation. While there is substantial variation in the history of democratic institutions across the islands, such variation does not predict income. Islands with significant export products during the colonial period are wealthier today, but this does not diminish the importance of colonial tenure. The timing of the colonial experience seems to matter. Time spent as a colony after 1700 is more beneficial to modern income than years before 1700, consistent with a change in the nature of colonial relationships over time.
A successful post-conflict reconstruction is characterized by a self-sustaining liberal political, economic and social order that does not rely on external support. It is argued that the extent of reconstructed orders is constrained by their institutional prerequisites. These prerequisites—a shared ideology and ethic of individual and private property rights, a commitment to markets and the rule of law—are fundamental. Without these preconditions to serve as a foundation, reconstructed liberal orders will fail to be self-sustaining over time. It is argued that the viability of a shared ideology and ethic, and hence success, is directly dependent on the extent of horizontal ties in the post-conflict country. The main conclusion is that societies lacking adequate horizontal ties will require a high level of continual intervention and reconstruction efforts will have a lower probability of success. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960-90. Based on three tenets of voting theory--that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important--we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracy is correlated with policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.
This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of unenforced property rights hinders our subjects' ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.
Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
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Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively
poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic
prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view that links economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that
the reversal reflects changes in the institutions resulting from European colonialism. The European intervention appears to
have created an “institutional reversal” among these societies, meaning that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions
encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative
incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of the
opportunity to industrialize.
We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes. (JEL O11, P16, P51).
This article investigates the interactions between democracy, political stability and economic growth. Two aspects of the study differentiate it from previous research. First, a simultaneous approach is adopted which combines the study of economic growth and political stability with that of economic growth and democracy. Secondly, a distinction is made between types of political instability, because different kinds of government change have different effects on economic growth and democracy. This analysis employs three-stage least-squares estimation, and utilizes aggregate data covering ninety-six countries from 1960 to 1980. The results indicate that democracy has a positive indirect effect upon growth through its impacts on the probabilities of both regime change and constitutional government change from one ruling party to another. In addition, the evidence indicates that the two kinds of political change mentioned above have significant and opposite effects on growth; that growth has a negative effect on regime change and a positive effect on the probability of the ruling party remaining in power; and that long-run economic growth tends to exert a positive effect upon democracy.
All societies must deal with the possibility of violence, and they do so in different ways. This book integrates the problem of violence into a larger social science and historical framework, showing how economic and political behavior are closely linked. Most societies, which we call natural states, limit violence by political manipulation of the economy to create privileged interests. These privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but doing so hinders both economic and political development. In contrast, modern societies create open access to economic and political organizations, fostering political and economic competition. The book provides a framework for understanding the two types of social orders, why open access societies are both politically and economically more developed, and how some 25 countries have made the transition between the two types.
In The Stages of Economic Growth, for which he is known around the world, W. W. Rostow distinguished five basic stages of growth experienced by societies as they change from a pre-industrial state to full economic maturity. In this book the analysis is continued but the focus is shifted, from economic growth to politics. Professor Rostow see politics as an eternal triangle of competing imperatives - of security, welfare, and constitutional order. Using this concept, he examines the political meaning and content of each of the stages as experienced by eight countries; Great Britain, France, China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Mexico and the United States. He goes on to consider, in the heart of the book, a uniquely political stage: the search for quality which is possible in an age of high mass consumption. Special attention is given the United States. Professor Rostow also examines the character of politics in the developing nations of today, and makes explicit what he sees to be the lessons of history and the contemporary world for these nations. He concludes by using his analysis to speculate on possibilities for peace in the global community.
This article provides a survey of a growing body of empirical evidence that points toward the important long-term effects that historic events can have on economic development. The most recent studies, using microlevel data and more sophisticated identification techniques, have moved beyond testing whether history matters and attempt to identify exactly why history matters. The most commonly examined channels include institutions, culture, knowledge and technology, and movements between multiple equilibria. The article concludes with a discussion of the questions that remain and the direction of current research in the literature.
We examine the effect of political ‘institutions’ on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility.
This paper examines empirically the hypothesis made famous by Nobel Laureates Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman that societies with high levels of political freedom must also have high levels of economic freedom. In our judgment, the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis holds up fairly well to historical scrutiny. Using data on economic and political freedom for a sample of up to 123 nations back as far as 1970, we find relatively few instances of societies combining relatively high political freedom without relatively high levels of economic freedom. In addition, we find that these cases are diminishing over time. Finally, we examine several cases of countries on different economic and political freedom journeys.
Douglass C. North, premio Nóbel de Economía en 1993. En esta obra analiza las estructuras y transformaciones económicas más significativas dentro de la historia económica occidental, con el auxilio de la teoría económica. Dicho análisis abarca desde las primitivas organizaciones agrícolas, hasta los albores del siglo XX, pasando por la Revolución Industrial.
Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view that links economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that the reversal reflects changes in the institutions resulting from European colonialism. The European intervention appears to have created an "institutional reversal" among these societies, meaning that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of the opportunity to industrialize. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The impact of institutions on economic performance is currently the subject of much research. In this study we use panel data to estimate a stochastic production frontier and the sources of inefficiency for a broad set of countries. A maximum-likelihood procedure is used to estimate the parameters for the stochastic production frontier and the determinants of inefficiency simultaneously. Our results show that institutions that promote greater economic freedom in turn promote efficiency.
We use a stochastic frontier approach to study the effects of political and regulatory institutions on aggregate productivity in 39 countries from 1975 to 1990. We show that technical efficiency is positively related to policies supporting laissez-faire and political structures that promote policy stability. Moreover, models of technical efficiency incorporating both measures perform better than models including only one or the other. This suggests that economic performance depends not only on current policies but also on the confidence of market participants and outside investors that these policies will remain in place. (JEL O40, O30, H10, N40, D23) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
This paper takes up the phenomenon of corruption and its relationship to growth explicitly in conjunction with overall institutional environment in which it occurs. The literature has pointed out that some forms of corruption are more detrimental to growth, while others can be considered even beneficial, given the underlying regulation. These notions are made more precise in a framework of Schumpeterian growth in “capitalist” and “totalitarian” environments. The analysis shows that corruption in an overall competitive capitalist environment ordinarily is of a transitive nature and is likely to be conducive to economic growth rather than otherwise. On the other hand, in totalitarian environment, corruption, though also possibly conducive to static welfare, becomes deeply entrenched in the socio-economic system and inevitably leads to a breakdown of the system. That breakdown, in turn, greatly enhances the possibilities for corruption and makes it especially detrimental to the prospects for resumed economic growth.
This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth. Coauthors are Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
The authors examine the relative importance of the growth of physical and human capital and the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) using newly organized data on 145 countries that span more than one hundred years for twenty-four of these countries. For all countries, only 3 percent of average output growth per worker is associated with TFP growth. This world average masks interesting variations across countries and regions. Of the nine regions, TFP growth accounts for about twenty percent of average output growth in three regions and between ten and zero percent in the other three regions. In three regions, TFP growth is negative on average. The authors use priors from theories to construct estimates of the relative importance of the variances of aggregate input growth and TFP growth for the variance of output growth across countries. Across all countries, variation in aggregate input growth per worker could account for as much as 35 percent of the variance of the growth of output per worker across countries, and variation in TFP growth could account for as much as 87 percent of that variance. Much of the importance of the variance of TFP growth appears to be associated with negative TFP growth.
We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes.
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For some countries, 1990 GDP was missing. In these cases the earliest available real GDP per capita was used as a proxy for 1990 GDP, as follows: 1991 GDP for Bulgaria, Lebanon; 1992 GDP for Eritrea
Real GDP per capita, constant prices, chain series,
in 1990 and 2000. For some countries, 1990
GDP was missing. In these cases the earliest
available real GDP per capita was used as a
proxy for 1990 GDP, as follows: 1991 GDP for
Bulgaria, Lebanon; 1992 GDP for Eritrea,
Georgia, Moldova; 1993 GDP for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine; 1994 GDP for
Azerbaijan; and 1995 GDP for Armenia.
Exceptions are Angola, Guyana and Libya, in
which only 2000 GDP is available; these three
countries were dropped from models in which
1990 GDP is used as a control variable
Penn World Tables, mark 6.2,
variable name rgdpch
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