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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964010
Journal of Law and Religion
2010-2011
Review Essay
*595 CHALLENGES PRESENTED TO LAW AND PUBLIC NORMS BY CLAIMS OF
FREEDOM OF RELIGION ARISING IN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES
Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity. Edited by Ralph Grillo, Roger Ballard, Alessandro Fer-
rari, André J. Hoekema, Marcel Mausen and Prakash Shah. Ashgate Publishing Company
2009. Pp. 360. $124.95. ISBN: 0-754-67547-5.
Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context. Edited by Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans
and Zoe Robinson. Cambridge University Press 2008. Pp. 336. $100.00. ISBN:
0-521-42590-5.
Permutations of Order: Religion and Law as Contested Sovereignties. Edited by Thomas G.
Kirsch and Betram Turner. Ashgate Publishing Company 2008. Pp. 283. $99.95. ISBN:
0-754-68938-7.
Steven D. Jamar [FNa1]
Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Hamline University; Steven D. Jamar
Because religion is a potent force for many people, it affects the content, structure, and
function of law and the law's relationship to ordering society. The complexity and variability
from state to state of the relationships of religion to social, governmental, and legal systems is
remarkable. This variability and complexity stems from several major influences including in
particular: (1) the diversity of religions and of people's understanding of and use of those reli-
gions; and (2) the mix of religions within a particular state. As predominantly secular coun-
tries become more ethnically and religiously diverse, particularly through immigration from
regions religiously different from the host country (e.g., the Muslim emigration into Christian
Europe), more free exercise and accommodationist demands are being made by those whose
religions are not merely a variant of the dominant religion. These demands bring new chal-
lenges and require sensitive balancing of *596 conflicting fundamental rights and liberties.
Demands for religious accommodation can conflict with other aspects of individual and
group liberty and can conflict with important secular social and legal norms aimed at knitting
society together. In secular countries, religious adherents may request or demand that their re-
ligious traditions in areas of life controlled by secular law, such as marriage, divorce, and in-
heritance, be recognized as lawful and efficacious. Such accommodations can take the form
of merely allowing the religious activity to continue as an exception to a general secular rule
or it can take the form of delegation of power to religion (e.g., permitting the decedent's reli-
gion to govern inheritance). Other countries which are theocratic or which have an estab-
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964010
lished religion face problems of free exercise where the government has implemented reli-
gious strictures as general law regulating society as a whole, and not just regulating conduct
of adherents of the established religion.
Not only will individual rights sometimes conflict, but the assertion of religious power can
create additional conflicts with the state itself. Creating a legal and governing system that
maximizes religious freedom while creating a national esprit de corp is difficult with reli-
giously based cultural differences of such a fundamental nature informing the beliefs, actions,
and demands of diverse elements of the population.
Given the increasing volume of such conflicts both in number and decibels, it is not sur-
prising that more scholars have turned their attention to aspects of the interactions of the state,
religion, and the individual. The three recent scholarly anthologies reviewed in this essay ad-
dress a variety of aspects of law and religion worldwide from legal, historical, anthropologic-
al, and sociological perspectives. They provide interesting tales of the interrelationships of
law and religion in a variety of contexts. Some of the topics explored in various ways with
mixed success in the articles include: the optimal relationship between political government
and religion; the criteria for making a judgment about the quality or even propriety of one
type of relationship over another; and the ways that established religions can adversely affect
individual liberties such as equality and free speech.
One hoping for deep insights or answers in these texts will be disappointed. And one ex-
pecting quality writing will find some, but not much. Nonetheless, the three books are rich in
providing a variety of perspectives on the larger problem both in terms of what the authors
bring (legal, sociological, and religious perspectives, and perspectives from various nationalit-
ies) and what they have studied.
*597 As would be expected, the books are of uneven quality and the articles within them
even more so. The articles written from a sociological or anthropological perspective may
help broaden lawyers' understanding of the issues. However, one is sometimes troubled by the
shallowness of the analysis of or even the recognition of the legal dimensions of the concerns.
Nonetheless, taken together, the articles provide useful data, helpful analysis, and thoughtful
commentary and suggestions, at least for experts. I do not think these books serve well as an
introduction to the complex field, not even for a general, educated, legal readership.
Several general themes, or if you will, meta-themes, stand out across the three antholo-
gies. First, respect for and accommodation of religious beliefs and practices create conflicts
with other individual human rights such as freedom of expression and equality. For example,
demands of one group that its religion not be disparaged or that its prophet not be depicted
conflict with the rights of expression of others. The legal system could accommodate this
special demand by limiting the disparaging speech that affects the freedom of expression
(perhaps appropriately) of others, or it could permit the speech and seek to inculcate a broader
understanding of freedom of speech in the objectors.
Not only expressive rights are affected; equality is affected as well. If allowed to go to
extremes, such disparaging speech could potentially rise to the level of denying equal rights,
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or even genocide, as has happened repeatedly in history, including in Nazi Germany and in
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. [FN1] On the other hand, carving out an exception from general
free speech rules so as to prohibit such ridicule could itself in extreme cases constitute a spe-
cies of special and unequal treatment by muting one group in favor of another.
A second theme in these texts is the rise of parallel legal systems (formal or informal) as a
means by which to accommodate religious demands. Religious rules addressing inheritance,
marriage, divorce, and property ownership, as well as religious rules regulating other aspects
of life can conflict with a state's secular laws. How to handle this problem is vexing and a
variety of solutions have been and are being tried. Some states allow religious judges and
courts to decide some matters, and some recognize religious rites as satisfying secular formal-
ities, such as marriage and divorce. Permitting areas of personal law such as *598 marriage,
divorce, or inheritance (among others) to be governed by a non-secular, parallel system of law
can be problematic; but not making accommodations can create difficulties as well.
A third theme in these books is the extent to which a state can demand allegiance not only
in a military sense, but also culturally. The extent to which states such as Turkey or France
can lawfully promote secularism and national unity by limiting religious conduct, such as the
wearing of certain religious garb in public, is problematic. A state surely can require allegi-
ance, and can encourage acculturation, but as it moves along the spectrum to assimilation,
problems of individual autonomy and dignity as well as problems of individual liberties and
rights arise. The impact on an individual's exercise of religion may be justified by a legitimat-
ing non-pretextual secular purpose for the offending requirement, but the impact can be very
real nonetheless. For example, a state that mandates equality for women can adversely impact
certain traditional expressions of various religions under which women are treated as servants
(or at least as subservient) to men.
A fourth theme is the role of religion in government. The degree of intertwining of state
and religion varies tremendously from nation to nation, and the free exercise concerns vary
both by the type of state and by the nature and tenets of the dominant (and in some instances,
established) religion. Some states are theocracies (the Vatican and Iran) and some, while not
theocracies, have a strongly endorsed, highly influential state religion (e.g., Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Israel). Most states are highly secularized, although some have established an official
state religion (e.g., United Kingdom and Egypt). Religion plays a major role in many states
that are officially and formally and even substantively secular (e.g., the United States of
America, India, Italy). Communalism in India, the role of the Church of England in the UK,
assertions of power by fundamentalist Christians in the United States, control of Israel by
Jews, and theocratic states like Iran and Saudi Arabia all illustrate variations on this important
theme in the interrelationships of religion, law, and society.
The best of the three anthologies discussing these issues is Legal Practice and Cultural Di-
versity, edited by Ralph Grillo and his colleagues. The book consists of sixteen chapters dis-
cussing the challenges faced in legal regimes adapting to changing cultural milieus in which
groups are more diverse than has historically been the case, or has historically been acknow-
ledged. The articles focus primarily on Western Europe and the challenges posed by Islamic
migrants asserting the shari'a as the controlling law for certain actions such as attire (e.g.,
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*599 head scarves), marriage, divorce, and inheritance. (Legal Practice 73, 93) [FN2] Other
articles draw upon non-European examples, but do so in the service of what they might teach
Europe. Three articles address South Asian and Canadian responses to religious diversity.
(Legal Practice 31, 49, 151) [FN3] One article addresses the desires of sub-Saharan Africans
to apply their customary law to aspects of their lives controlled by the legacy of the colonial
English legal system still largely in place. (Legal Practice 135) [FN4]
In the main the articles are descriptive and analytic rather than normative; thus they
provide useful information about the challenges to law being presented in Europe and about
the range of responses to those challenges. For example, one article addresses the problem of
free exercise of religion extending to wearing badges of religion in public, such as Muslim
women wearing headscarves, or the chador. (Legal Practice 135) [FN5] It poses the question
as to what extent the French commitment to an officially secular society emphasizing equality
can justify limitations on where the scarf or veil can be worn. (Legal Practice 135) [FN6]
Not all of the articles are as concrete. For example, one of the more abstract articles ad-
dresses the effect of a change from common law-based negative rights to positive law-based
human rights treaties and legislation on religious freedom and countervailing state interests.
(Legal Practice 267) [FN7] Sandberg concludes that the move to positive law serves the cause
of religious liberty in some instances, but in others works to reduce the extent to which di-
versity is accommodated. To Sandberg, these latter cases raise serious concerns. (Legal Prac-
tice 297) [FN8] Respecting not only diverse ideas but also diverse practices is a very signific-
ant value in free exercise of religion.
*600 The book concludes with a discussion of the problem of conflicting positive human
rights laws which support both the individual assertion of free exercise and at the same time
support a concept of equality that is often at odds with traditional religious interpretations.
(Legal Practice 299) [FN9] Freedom of expression, including speech derogatory of religion or
religious figures, can conflict with ideas of inclusion and freedom from being subject to hate
speech and opprobrium. (Legal Practice 299) [FN10]
This book provides few answers, or even few suggested directions. But it provides a
wealth of provocative data, analysis, and commentary.
The second book, Cane, Evans and Robinson's Law and Religion in Theoretical and His-
torical Context (Theoretical) takes a different approach and is somewhat less rich and satisfy-
ing than the first. It is less multi-disciplinary than Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (not
necessarily a weakness) with less use of narrative and examples (though they certainly are
present). It focuses almost entirely on the issues clustered around legal norms, especially con-
stitutional norms, and claims for religious exceptionalism. This focus is a strength to some
extent, but it exposes the broad range of quality of the articles more harshly. Some articles
are relatively tied to particular constitutions (Theoretical 100), [FN11] while others are more
abstract and explore issues of law, religion, and society, “seeking to develop a principled ap-
proach to the relations between state and religion regardless of the particular constitutional ar-
rangements” in place. [FN12]
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The book is divided into three sections. The first four chapters articulate the interaction of
religion with liberal, democratic governments and society, primarily using theoretical per-
spectives. The first two chapters explore the problem of treating religion specially at all.
(Theoretical 16, 26) [FN13] Should religion be irrelevant in the face of equality norms? Or
should the state privilege religion in a special way, accommodating its demands for exceptions
to the law? Sager seeks to rescue religion from the self-contradictory problem of special priv-
ilege for religion which, to Sager, violates the equality principle underlying most human rights
in the liberal democracy setting. He proposes combining an equality principle with a liberty
principle into “a view of *601 religious liberty that we can call Equal Liberty.” (Theoretical
17) [FN14] Essentially, Sager calls for equality to trump any claim for special privilege for re-
ligion as the appropriate standard for religious liberty, but finds in the equality principle
(recast as “Equal Liberty”) sufficient support to allow for full religious freedom.
Webber critiques that view arguing that as valuable and important as equality is, some ex-
ceptionalism is still required. (Theoretical 27) [FN15] Webber demonstrates that religious
freedom presupposes a specialness for the concept of religion. Webber considers the category
of religion not as closed-ended, but rather as one that requires on the part of society in general
and the law in particular a “willingness to recognise commitments that operate in a compar-
able way whether or not they conform to a preconceived idea of religion.” (Theoretical 43)
[FN16]
One provocative chapter addresses the various rules that govern conduct, highlighting that
people do not live under a single, unified system of positive law, but rather live under com-
plex rules from multiple sources, including morality generally, state-sanctioned law, and reli-
gious constraints. (Theoretical 99) [FN17] This rather obvious truism needs reinforcement
from time to time and Davies's article does a fair job serving that function. Nonetheless, how-
soever interesting the ideas, the article seems instrumentally pointless insofar as the ideas
seem to have no applicability to actual legal conundrums, either directly or even indirectly. In-
deed, the author herself disclaims any direct applicability of the broader perspective she artic-
ulates, opting instead to become even more cryptic and equivocal:
Law can be at once both singular and plural. It has a discursive singularity crystal-
ised into theories, institutions, structures, doctrines, separatism, and so forth. But it also
has a conceptual and social plurality which resists, transgresses, undermines, but also
converses with the singular modality of law. [FN18]
Heady stuff, but one longs for the earth after time spent in such boundless rarified air. In
short, what does a plurality of law-like constraints mean in practical terms? What are the ac-
tual, real implications of it? The author's explicit demurrer on exactly these points is most un-
satisfying. If a person believes that religion requires that he or she must wear blaze orange at
all times, but the court requires *602 that lawyers wear standard, non-flamboyant business at-
tire to practice before it, the state law stands and “wins.” The state could choose to accom-
modate such a request based on religion, and often does, e.g., permitting yarmulkes to be worn
even though they are not part of an official police uniform, but in such instances we see quite
clearly that the positive law of the state “wins” over the other sources of norms.
The insight that we are governed by overlapping, multifarious rules is not much of an in-
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sight, though being reminded of it is itself valuable. Ultimately, the author's failure to devel-
op even a method of applying the core insight of singularity and plurality of law to the real
world of sheer actuality (to use anthropologist Clifford Geertz's felicitous phrase) [FN19]
leaves one wanting.
The next set of articles present the interaction between the state and religion in historical
context. McConnell's article identifies four stages of the U.S. Supreme Court's religion clause
jurisprudence and posits that the shifting sands of interpretations of the religion clauses are
best understood contextually in light of other matters being considered by the court.
(Theoretical 100) [FN20] One period he identifies is “1963-1980: the civil rights era,” [FN21]
in which religious liberty was generally expanded using an individual exceptionalist position.
[FN22] A stricter separationist approach was adopted toward establishment cases as well.
[FN23] This expansion of religious liberty fit within the general trend of the court in that peri-
od in expanding civil liberties in general in the areas of criminal procedure (Miranda) [FN24]
and equality (the Brown legacy cases). [FN25]
The larger point McConnell is making is that understanding Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning the religion clauses is enhanced by placing the decisions in cultural context. If
one tries to reconcile the cases on doctrine or principle alone, one is doomed to fail-
ure. However, showing how the decisions relate to four broad *603 cultural movements
(majoritarianism, individual civil rights/separationism, religious favoritism, and values polar-
ization) helps make sense of this complex, contradictory, and confusing area of law.
McConnell's point is well taken, though perhaps a stretched a bit too thin at times. His
conclusion that in this time of popular polarization, judicial deference to majoritarian, legislat-
ive action is the appropriate solution seems more ideologically driven than based on prin-
ciple. Even more problematically, it seems even less connected to or illustrative of the thesis
developed in the article. That is, values polarization does not lead to any particular sort of jur-
isprudence at all, let alone that of judicial deference on constitutional rights to the legis-
lature. Indeed, what we see in current Supreme Court jurisprudence is in fact a reflection of
that polarization with many five-four decisions with strident positions sometimes intemper-
ately stated. So actual decisions prove McConnell's point that the court's jurisprudence re-
flects dominant cultural or social themes of the times, and right now that theme is strident po-
larization.
The next article uses the Scopes trial [FN26] and the ongoing debate about teaching evolu-
tion to examine the problem of the competency of courts and of legislative bodies to decide
“orthodoxy” for education and criminal laws such as banning evolution from being taught.
(Theoretical 123) [FN27] Radan concludes that the current trend toward a narrower, accom-
modationist reading of the establishment clause will result in what McConnell advocates, le-
gislative primacy in determining whether evolution or creationism is to be taught in school.
(Theoretical 156) [FN28]
The most interesting piece to me (perhaps because it is also the least familiar topic to me)
addresses the history of the Church of England and its various roles with respect to the state
over time in Great Britain. (Theoretical 157) [FN29] The author contends that the challenges
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presented by human rights standards and group demands for exceptional treatment may not be
able to be accommodated by the established church, at least in its traditional role in establish-
ing a moral base for English law and the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution.
*604 The third group of articles examines the problem of religion and the state more from
the bottom up, starting with particular issues or topics and then working through various ap-
proaches to resolving the tensions. The topics include religiously-inspired state-mandated
days of rest (Theoretical 186), [FN30] protection of secret Aboriginal spiritual beliefs and
practices (Theoretical 214), [FN31] religious conscience exemptions (e.g., military duty and
medial procedures) (Theoretical 243), [FN32] and the problem of personhood as applied to
fetuses. (Theoretical 268) [FN33] As in the first book, these articles provide good test cases
for various theories and approaches.
In the final article in the book, Malcolm D. Evans examines the religious freedom juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights and finds that religious claims are losing
out to secular claims. (Theoretical 291) [FN34] Indeed, the ECHR jurisprudence in this area
causes Evans to go so far as to characterize the ECHR as repressive toward religion insofar as
the EHCR does not create adequate space for religious expression in public in the face of
countervailing state interests in secularism. Evans notes that while the court uses the rhetoric
of pluralism, inclusion, and tolerance, its decisions (to Evans) belie that rhetoric. He con-
cludes by questioning the adequacy of the human rights regime paradigm for providing suffi-
cient protection for religion. (Theoretical 315) [FN35]
With respect to the third book, Kirsch and Turner's Permutations of Order: Religion and
Law as Contested Sovereignties (Permutations), don't even try to read the introduction unless
you are well versed in the nearly impenetrable anthropology jargon of the authors (who are
also the editors of the book). The authors should reread Clifford Geertz to learn to write for a
broader audience including political scientists and lawyers. It is not that the introduction can-
not be understood, but rather that it is just too much work to do so. This book is not suitable
for the general academic audience; it is tailored for and should be read by jargon-loving an-
thropologists. The book starts this way:
*605 Whatever historicity we attribute to the particularities of global social realities
at the turn of the twenty-first century--whether they are assumed to be transient episodes
or heralds of a new post-millennial era-- observers have remarked that we are currently
witnessing consequential transfigurations of which two have provided impetus for the
present volume. (Permutations 1) [FN36]
I will spare the reader the authors' description of those two “transfigurations.” Essentially,
the first is an increasing reliance on the use of law instead of social and political means to ad-
dress problems, and the second is the increasing prominence of religion in civic, political, and
legal affairs in many parts of the world.
Fortunately, few of the articles are as badly written as the introduction, though many re-
quire quite a bit of work to slog through, mostly because of the writing style, and less fre-
quently because of the obscurity of the point the author is trying to make. This third book is
broadest in the range of topics covered; so, despite its stylistic weaknesses, it contributes sig-
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nificant value to the field. The articles in this third book are less uniformly rich than in the
other two, but they have a greater range which largely compensates for that failing.
The book proper (after the abysmal introduction) begins with an analysis of religion as a
basis for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention. (Permutations 27) [FN37] The author,
Good, examines the meaning of religion first under the convention, then under U.S. law up
through Yoder, and then under U.K. law. From there, Good examines how religious asylum
cases have actually been treated, noting particularly, and fairly, significant weaknesses in the
U.S. treatment of claims of Muslims or involving Islam.
In the next chapter, the article examines the protection of sacred sites. (Permutations)
[FN38] The author demonstrates the inadequacy of the individual human rights paradigm for
addressing such concerns. Confronted with religions tied to land instead of to ideas, as has
been the norm during the creation of the western religious rights regime, court decisions tend
not to favor sacred-earth religions. [FN39] The traditional rights paradigm simply is ill-
equipped to accommodate claims based on *606 sacred ground.
Other articles chronicle a wide variety of traditional religious settings being confronted
with modernity including witchcraft in Cameroon (Permutations 149), [FN40] traditional
practices of rural Moroccans (Permutations 185), [FN41] and two settings in Indonesia.
(Permutations 207, 227) [FN42] The case-study details of each of these are the richest contri-
butions they make, giving the reader more and broader perspective than would be expected
from a singular, parochial experience.
A number of articles could be considered case studies of religion interacting with or cir-
cumventing the civil legal structures. The articles examine Old Colony Mennonites
(Permutations 107) [FN43] and custody issues under Islamic family law. (Permutations 247)
[FN44] One takes as its geography India, with all of its diversity and complexity, and exam-
ines dispute resolution from various contexts, including, in particular, religious ones.
(Permutations 87) [FN45]
Individuals and groups regularly assert a right to be free from governmental interference
in matters of religious belief and practice both in public and in private. Whether the issue is
wearing religious garb in public or a newly formed coven meeting in a hallowed hollow on
midsummer's eve, people claim the right of free exercise of religion. While in the main such
assertions are not problematic, states and the law are continually being called upon to set and
adjust the scope of free exercise allowed.
Religion is a special category of human conduct. Our traditional, immediately post
WWII-vintage understanding of human rights has served us well and continues to serve us
well, in general, in enhancing liberty and freedom of religious belief and expression. But that
understanding does not seem fully adequate to the task any longer, especially when claims of
religions exceptionalism or accommodation are confronted by other values including secular-
ism, equality, and *607 freedom of expression. These three books provide many data points
for a scatter chart of religious freedom which can be used to try to move us forward appropri-
ately. Indeed, more than as theoretical assessments or academic critiques, these books are use-
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ful for their many narratives--their many examples of religion interacting with the state and
the variety of state responses to the demands of religion for special treatment.
[FNa1]. Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law, and Associate Director, Insti-
tute of Intellectual Property and Social Justice (IIPSJ), Washington, D.C. Special thanks to
Leslie Griffin for her insights, her books on freedom of religion, and her assistance in shaping
this article.
[FN1]. See Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for
Harmful Social Movements (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002); Steven Jamar, Respecting Speech, 46
How. L.J. 499 (2003).
[FN2]. E.g., Prakash Shah, Transforming to Accommodate? Reflections on the Shari'a Debate
in Britain, Legal Practice 73; Mathais Rohe, Shari'a in a European Context, Legal Practice 93.
[FN3]. Werner Menski, Indian Secular Pluralism and its Relevance for Europe, Legal Practice
31; Veit Bader, Legal Pluralism and Differentiated Morality: Shari'a in Ontario?, Legal Prac-
tice 49; Jean-Francois Gaudraeault-DesBiens, Religious Challenges to the Secularized Identity
of an Insecure Polity: A Tentative Sociology of Québec's ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ De-
bate, Legal Practice 151.
[FN4]. Gordon R. Woodman, The Challenge of African Customary Laws to English Legal
Culture, Legal Practice 135.
[FN5]. Claire de Galambert, L'affaire du foulard in the Shadow of the Strasbourg Court: Art-
icle 9 and the Public Career of the Veil in France, Legal Practice 237.
[FN6]. Id.
[FN7]. Russell Sandberg, The Changing Position of Religious Minorities in English Law: The
Legacy of Begum, Legal Practice 267.
[FN8]. Id. at 297.
[FN9]. Roger Ballard, Human Rights in Contexts of Ethnic Plurality: Always a Vehicle for
Liberation?, Legal Practice 299.
[FN10]. Id.
[FN11]. E.g., Michael McConnell, The Influence of Cultural Conflict on the Jurisprudence of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, in Theoretical 100.
[FN12]. Carolyn Evans, Introduction, in Theoretical 3.
[FN13]. Lawrence G. Sager, The Moral Economy of Religious Freedom, in Theoretical 16;
Jeremy Webber, Understanding the Religion in Freedom of Religion, in Theoretical 26.
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[FN14]. Sager, supra note 13, at 17.
[FN15]. Webber, supra note 13, at 27.
[FN16]. Id. at 43.
[FN17]. Margaret Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in Theoretical 72, 73-74.
[FN18]. Id. at 99.
[FN19]. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 89 (Basic Books, Inc. Publishers
1973).
[FN20]. Michael W. McConnell, The Influence of Cultural Conflict on the Jurisprudence of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, in Theoretical 100.
[FN21]. This curious allocation of time must be understood as a religious-rights driven per-
spective and, as with all such time-splitting, the edges are fuzzier than the dates would imply.
For example, the Civil Rights era is more often thought to begin with the Warren Court in its
1954 decision in Brown v. Bd. Educ. Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
[FN22]. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
[FN23]. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
[FN24]. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[FN25]. E.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) (the time given
by the Supreme Court with its “all deliberate speed” rhetoric in Brown II (the remedial case,
Brown v. Bd. Educ. Topeka Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)) held to have run out).
[FN26]. E.g. Scopes v. State of Tenn., 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927); Steven D. Jamar, Aping
Creation, The Washington Lawyer (Sept./Oct. 1997) (reviewing Edward J. Larson, Summer
for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate over Science and Religion
(Basic Books 1997)).
[FN27]. Peter Radan, From Dayton to Dover: the Legacy of the Scopes Trial, in Theoretical
123.
[FN28]. Id. at 156.
[FN29]. Charlotte Smith, A Very English Affair: Establishment and Human Rights in and Or-
ganic Constitution, in Theoretical 157.
[FN30]. Ruth Gavison & Nahshon Perez, Days of Rest in Multicultural Societies: Private,
Public, Separate?, in Theoretical 186.
[FN31]. Ernst Willheim, Australian Legal Procedures and the Protection of Secret Aboriginal
Spiritual Beliefs: A Fundamental Conflict, in Theoretical 214.
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[FN32]. Yossi Nehushtan, Secular and Religious Conscientious Exemptions: Between Toler-
ance and Equality, in Theoretical 243.
[FN33]. Ngaire Naffine, Law's Sacred and Secular Subjects, in Theoretical 268.
[FN34]. Malcolm D. Evans, Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human
Rights: Approaches, Trends, and Tensions, in Theoretical 291.
[FN35]. Id. at 315.
[FN36]. Introduction, in Permutations 1.
[FN37]. Anthony Good, Persecution for Reasons of Religion under the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, in Permutations 27.
[FN38]. Rene Kuppe, Religious Freedom Law and the Protection of Sacred Sites, in Permuta-
tions 49.
[FN39]. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(permitting desecration of mountains sacred to certain Native Americans by U.S. Forest Ser-
vice building logging roads and allowing logging on the mountain).
[FN40]. Michaela Pelican, Customary, State and Human Rights Approaches to Containing
Witchcraft in Cameroon, in Permutations 149.
[FN41]. Bertram Turner, Religious Message and Transnational Interventionism: Constructing
Legal Practice in the Moroccan Souss, in Permutations 185.
[FN42]. Jacqueline Vel, Playing the Religious Card: Competing for District Leadership in
West Sumba, Indonesia, in Permutations 207; Franze & Keebet von Benda-Beckman, Beyond
the Law-Religion Divide: Law and Religion in West Sumatra, in Permutations 227.
[FN43]. Lorenzo Canas Bottos, Order and Dissent Among Old Colony Mennonites: A Regime
of Embedded Sovereignty, in Permutations 107.
[FN44]. Nahda Shehada, Negotiating Custody Rights in Islamic Family Law, in Permutations
247.
[FN45]. Anindita Chakrabarti, Judicious Succession and Judicial Religion: Internal Conflict
and Legal Dispute in a Religious Reform Movement in India, in Permutations 87.
26 J.L. & Religion 595
END OF DOCUMENT
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26 J.L. & Religion 595
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