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Abstract

Four overlapping research agendas form the bulk of current academic legal scholarship in Britain. First, the understanding and internal coherence of legal concepts and legal reasoning, how legal concepts fit together, the consistency of the use of concepts in different areas of law, the extent to which general principles can be extracted from legal reasoning that can be used to predict or guide future legal decision-making. Second, the meaning and validity of law, the examination of what makes law different from, or similar to, other normative systems. Typically, this has involved questions such as: "What is law?" "How far are issues of ethics or morality part of legal reasoning?" "How does a set of normative principles come to be thought of as 'legal'"? "How does law differ from other social institutions and practices?" Third, the ethical and political acceptability of public policy delivered though legal instruments, the consideration of issues such as whether specific legal interventions are acceptable when assessed against external moral, ethical or political principles, or what should be the appropriate legal response where none exists at the moment. Policy prescription is thus often encountered in legal scholarship, sometimes addressed to the courts, sometimes to policy makers in government. Fourth, the effect of law. What effect, if any, does law have on human behaviour, attitudes, and actions? How does it have these effects? Are some institutional mechanisms for delivering legal outcomes more appropriate or effective than others? Each of these four sets of issues can be studied in a purely domestic legal context, such as England and Wales, or at the European level, internationally or comparatively, as a contemporary issue, or historically. Which, if any, of these questions engage a legal academic in "social scientific" research?
LEGAL RESEARCH AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
FOUR overlapping research agendas form the bulk of current academic
legal scholarship in Britain. First,the understanding and internal coherence
of legal concepts and legal reasoning: how legal concepts fit together, the
consistency of the use of concepts in different areas of law, the extent to
which general principles can be extracted fro m legal reasoning that can
be used to predict or guide future legal decision-making. Secondly, the
meaning and validity of law : the examination of what makes law different
from, or similar to, other normative systems. Typically, this has involved
questions such as:
“What is law?”
“How far are issues of ethics or morality part of legal reason-
ing?”
“How does a set of normative principles come to be thought of
as ‘legal’?”
“How does law differ from other social institutions and prac-
tices?”
Thirdly,the ethical and political acceptability of public policy delivered
though legal instruments: the consideration of issues such as whether
specific legal interventions are acceptable when assessed against external
moral, ethical or political principles, or what should be the appropriate
legal response where none exists at the moment. Policy prescription is
thus often encountered in legal scholarship, sometimes addressed to the
courts, sometimes to policy makers in government. Fourthly, the effect of
law. What effect, if any, does law have on human behaviour, attitudes,
and actions? How does it have these effects? Are some institutional
mechanisms for delivering legal outcomes more appropriate or effective
than others? Each of these four sets of issues can be studied i n a
purely domestic legal context, such as England and Wales, or at the
European level, internationally or comparatively, as a contemporary issue,
or historically.
Which, if any, of these questions engage a legal academic in “social
scientific” research?
L
EGAL RESEARCH AND THE “SCIENTIFIC METHOD
We can distinguish two broadly contrasting a pproaches to science that are
frequently on display in discussions of social science methodology.
1
The
1
See further, H.J. Berman, “The Origins of Western Legal Science” (1977) 90 Harvard Law Review
894 at 931.
632
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 633
first, older, model of science, perhaps best exemplified in some areas of
mathematics, acquires knowledge on the basis of constructing logically
coherent conclusions from elementary principles. The techniques used are
argument, conceptual clarification, logic, and discussion. The second uses
the term “science” to mean the generation of knowledge by empiri ca l
investigation of natural phenomena, often using laboratory investigation.
The distinction, then, between the older and newer forms of scientific
enquiry is that the former is based largely on logical argumentation, the
latter on empirical examination of the phenomenon, and the testing of
theoretical hypotheses.
D
OCTRINAL AN ALYSIS
Over the past few centuries, Western legal aca de mi cs often thought they
were being scientific in the first sense.
2
They considered, in other w or ds ,
that they were studying law using reason, logic and argument. They
adopted methods that date back at least to the scholastic philosophers. The
methodology adopted is one that concentrates on the primacy of critical
reasoning based around authoritative texts. But this is not simply textual
analysis, at least in common law systems, for the idea of law as a practice
is deeply embedded. The core of this type of legal research concentrates
on i ss ue s of legal coher en c e, what is sometimes called “black letter law”,
or “doctrinal legal analysis”, adopting an internal viewpoint, the meaning
of which will be considered subsequently.
Although sometimes much disparaged by non-lawyers (and by some
legal academics) as narrow, the ability to engage in this type of research
is what most often marks out what are perceived by one’s colleagues
as “goo d lawyers” from “bad lawyers”.
3
This type of work concentrates
substantially on the first set of research questions that I mentioned above.
Crucially, traditional legal analysis adopts an “internal” approach. The
internal approach is the analysis of legal rules and principles taking the
perspective of an insider in the system. As David Ibbetson has written:
“Its sources are predominantly those that are thrown up by the
legal process: principally statutes and decided cases, supplemen t ed
where possible with lawyers’ literature expounding the rules and
occasionally reflecting on them.”
4
An external approach, in contrast, is the study
2
For a discussion in the U.S. context, see H. Schweber, “The ‘Science’ of Legal Science: The Model
of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth Century American Legal Education” (1999) 17(3) Law and History
Review 421.
3
For a robust defence of such work, see A. Burrows, Understanding of the Law of Obligations: Essays
on Contract, Tort and Restitution (1998), pp.112–114.
4
D. Ibbetson, “Historical Resea rch in Law”, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook
of Legal Studies (2003), 863 at p.864.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
634 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
“of the law in practice, of legal institutions at work in society
rather than legal rules existing in a social, economic, and political
vacuum.”
5
I want to use this distinction to draw out different strands of legal
scholarship, although, ultimately, I shall argue that the distinction is useful
mainly for heuristic purposes, and that much recent legal scholarship
adopts both approaches.
An internal approach, then, dominates traditional doctrinal scholarship.
It often involves the close analysis of decisions by the higher judiciary,
often at the appellate level, and legislation of various kinds. The task
for doctrinal analysis is often to attempt to understand how these various
elements fit together, to attempt to draw out the patterns of normative
understanding that enable us to see the wood and the trees together as
constituting a working whole.
6
Frequently, however, doctrinal analysis
often takes another form, in which the writer attempts to argue that this or
that is the “best” solution to a particular problem, “best” meaning having
the best fit with what already exists. Often, the analysis concentrates
on questions of law in hard cases,” and how in practice these sho ul d
be addressed. In this hermeneutic approach, the language used by legal
academics is heavily dominated by terms such as coherence, fit and
analogy.
What marks out this type of analysis is the attempt to render the law
intelligible, but sometimes also to show the multiple possible readings and
contradictions of existing “law”. The combination of norms, concepts and
institutions, and their interplay, is mother’s milk to academic lawyers.
7
Looked at from the social science perspective, and using social science
terminology, legal academics are constantly constructing explanatory
“models” from the legal material at their disposal, models that they then
test against that legal material. There are more or less agreed criteria of
what are reasonable or unreasonable readings, although it is sometimes
difficult to articulate these with any precision and they are subject to
change.
I do not want to mislead, however. It is clear that though there are
similarities with model building in the social sciences, there are also
considerable differences: doctrinal legal models are causal models, and
they are empirically tested, but in only a very limited sense; in addition,
legal model-building takes place within a normative context, and is likely
to include normative elements.
5
ibid.
6
A.W.B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature” (1981) 48 University of Chicago Law Review 632.
7
John Bell book review (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1049.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 635
Another crucial point is that the approach to legal research that I have
identified frequently proceeds from a view of the legal system as either
completely autonomous or, more usually, relatively autonomous. This
means that behind such analysis, as Ibbetson says:
“lurks the assumption that law constitutes a sufficiently autonomous
field of experience or discourse that it can legitimately be described
by reference to its own sources.”
8
But, the question of what constitutes the appropriate sources of legal
analysis is often profoundly contested. So too is the issue of their relative
weight or cogency.
9
In particular, the extent to which its sources include
materials other than cases and statute s varies over time, and between
countries. To what extent can accepted sources include considerations of
justice, morality or utility? Or policy analysis? Or social science evidence
on the effects of regulations? When they do, then the “internal” approach
to legal analysis will, perforce, include these considerations within their
domain. The notion of internal legal analysis is therefore potentially highly
flexible. How far any jurisdiction considers particular sources as relevant
is one that is likely to be s ubstantially determined by the (changing)
consensus of academic and practising lawyers and judges.
10
Doctrinal work of this sort is not necessarily antagonistic to engagement
with other disciplines. Indeed, several law faculties in the United Kingdom
have long had relationships with the other disciplines that we would
now consider at the core of the humanities, such as classics, history,
philosophy, and political theory. These disciplines are being seen as
contributing to the scientific study of law in the first sense, in contributing
to the endeavour of applying logic, reason and argument to a body of
material considered legal. Much of this involvement with other disciplines
is perceived as useful because it contributes to better “internal” legal
analysis.
L
AW AND PHILOSOPHY
Undoubtedly, however, the flowering of the most recent phase of close
working relationship between law and the humanities in Britain began
in Oxford after the Second World War. By the 1950s, Oxford law was
significantly influenced by developments in philosophy, and has remained
so since then. The work of H.L.A. Hart revolutionised the study of
the philosophy of law. This was true in at least two respects. First, it
introduced a degree of philosophical sophistication, hitherto unknown
8
Ibbetson, cited above fn.4, p.863.
9
W.L. Twining, “Legal Reasoning and Argumentation” (2004) International Encyclopedia of the Social
and Behavioral Sciences 8670 at 8671.
10
Stephen Sedley book review (1999) Cambridge Law Journal 627 at 628.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
636 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
in England, into consideration of doctrinal legal analysis, such as the
work of Hart and Honor
´
e on causation.
11
Secondly, it revolutionised
consideration of the second set of research issues: the quest i on of what
the relationship is between the normative system that is law and other
normative systems, such as morality. Hart adopted the view that there is
no necessary connection between law and morality, and that law consists
of a series of rules that are regarded as law by virtue only of being
recognised as such by social and political elites, what he calls “officials
of the system”.
12
For Hart, the range of legal materials available to judges
meant that legal rules sometimes ran out. When they did run out, judges
then resorted to other arguments in order to decide cases, including policy
arguments.
A third major s trand in Hart’s work, and those of his successors, is
the critique of what we might call legal policy from a philosophical
perspective, and using philosophical tools, the third set of research
questions. So, for example, Hart’s work on the acceptable reach of the
criminal law in areas such as abortion, and homosexuality, and in the
proper purposes and scope of punishment, left an indelible mark on
the legal research agenda in the United Kingdom,
13
where lawyers and
philosophers have worked happily together on a wide range of legally-
informed philosophical critiques of legal concepts and policy, ranging
from minority rights, to euthanasia. Debates over these issues continue
to flourish, providing an area of primary research as well as influencing
more indirectly the approach to doctrinal legal analysis.
S
OCIAL SCIENCES AND LEGAL RESEARCH
But what is the role of the social sciences (excluding philosophy)
in legal research? What, first, do we mean by the social sciences?
At one level, the answer is clear. We mean to include, at least, the
disciplines of sociology, political science (including normative political
theory), economics, anthropology, statistics and psychology. For the
purposes of this paper, however, it may be more useful to distinguish,
following Murphy,
14
between, first, the more empirical branches of each of
these disciplines; secondly, the more interpretative and phenomenological
branches of the social sciences; and thirdly, more social theory-based
approaches. Each of these three developments within the social sciences
has impacted on legal research. Each is sceptical that either an analytical
11
H.L.A. Hart and A .M. Honor
´
e, Causation in the Law (1959).
12
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
13
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays
in the Philosophy of Law (1968).
14
W. T. Murphy, “Law: History of its Relation to the Social Sciences” (2004) International
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 8521 at 8522.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 637
philosophical approach of the type pioneered by Hart, or doctrinal legal
analysis, are up to the task of explaining law in all its richness, and
thus each has contributed to a set of critiques of law. Importantly,
social sc ie nt ifi c approaches to legal research are often dominated by an
external approach.
This “external” turn led to the growth of three approaches to legal
scholarship, widely seen as antagonistic to each other. The first is
generally termed socio-legal studies (within which, for these purposes,
I include criminology). In the British context socio-legal work and
criminology has frequently drawn on the more empirical side of sociology
and psychology, although some of its work has been influenced by
phenomenology and hermeneutics. The s econd was the development of
Critical Legal Studies, drawing on social theory and particularly influenced
by the Frankfurt School. The third, and more recent, development is
the law-and-economics movement, which draws more substantially on
microeconomics, particularly rational choice. Each of these has affected
the methodology of some current legal research.
S
OCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH
Those who developed socio-legal research usually argued that a more
rounded picture will be gained only if we seek to adopt a more scientific
understanding of law, using the term science in the secon d sense to mean
the generation of knowledge by empirical investigation. This approach
often e mphasised the disparity between “law in the books” and “law in
action”, to use the phrase first coined by Roscoe Pound in 1910.
15
It
examines the role of law, attempting to discover whether patterns can
be identified after collecting a nd organising facts based on observation.
Socio-legal studies focuses on the question, as Eekelaar and Maclean have
put it
“of relating how the form and content of the law (as may be
found in statements of law in legal textbooks), which are matters
for intellectual comprehension and interpretation, move beyond such
intellectual existence into social reality.”
16
Legal rules are not self-enforcing, in other words; they must be mobilised.
What socio-legal studies is, exactly, is heavily contested but at its
core, I understand it meant originally the use of empirical social
science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, social psychology
and political science to investigate and understand legal phenomena and
the role of law in society, on the basis of both multi-disciplinary and
15
R. Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 American Law Review 12.
16
J. Eekelaar and M. Maclean, A Reader in Family Law (1994), p.2.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
638 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
inter-disciplinary work. In contrast to the doctrinal scholarship and current
analytical legal philosophy, this socio-legal work often concentrates on the
routine in the legal process, rather than the hard case, and the operation
of law by actors at the lowest levels of the legal hierarchy, rather than at
the appellate level, attempting to come up with “general predictions about
when law affects society, in what ways and under what conditions.”
17
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
The second major external approach in legal scholarship has sometimes
been termed “post empiricist scholarship”,
18
one example of which is
Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”). This was a loose collection of American
legal scholars, originally influenced by the wilder aspects of American
Legal Realism, 1960s Marxism, and the growth in social and literary
theory of what can broadly be called post-modernism. This heady brew,
which spread to Britain in the 1980s, led to scepticism about the
role of internally based legal reason. It emphasised the importance of
understanding the constructed nature of what we think of as objectivity.
It was, essentially, sceptical that the older understanding of science,
namely the role of reason, has any real claim to validity or truth in legal
studies. Such critics argued that traditional legal philosophy conceals “the
fundamental indeterminacy of legal decision-making”
19
and legal doctrine
masks the law’s hegemonic function, ensuring the dominance of social and
economic elites. It was equally critical of empirical socio-legal research.
Whilst great fun for the participants, CLS’s critique of ideology blazed
during the 1980s, but has now generally faded, apart from some few
bastions in the United States. At its best, it brought to light the role of
power relations in the generation of knowledge and, perhaps, in particular,
the importance of understanding the role of gender and race in that process.
It left in its wake the importance of identity issues in legal studies,
heavily influenced by feminist legal scholarship, critical race theory, and
a scepticism about rights-talk. Methodologically, although not politically,
CLS tended to be relatively conservative, usually resorting to doctrinal
analysis in practice, though one leavened with social theory, an e xternal
perspective, and a radical political agenda. Only in the (sometimes rather
irritating) use of personal narrative as a way of “situating” the author can
they be said to have contributed anything methodologically novel to legal
scholarship.
20
17
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, “Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research” (2004), available at:
www.csls.ox.ac.uk
18
A. Sarat, “Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-empiricist
Sociology of Law” (1990) 15 Law and Social Inquiry 155.
19
Twining, cited above fn.9, at 8672.
20
See E. Rubin, “Legal Scholarship” (2004) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral
Sciences 8677 at 8679–8681.
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OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 639
L
AW AND ECONOMICS
The third major external approach in legal scholarship has been law
and economics. It is probably the single most important methodology in
American legal scholarship, other than traditional doctrinal scholarship,
and is a pplied to all areas of legal concern. In Britain, however, neo-
classical economics is almost entirely absent from academic legal study,
except in such s ub-disciplines as competition law, and to a lesser
extent labour law, company law and regulation. What, then, is it about
microeconomics and rational choice models that appear at once so
powerful, and yet so alien to British legal scholarship? Our starting point
must be rational choice theory. At its core, I understand rational choice to
posit the relatively s imple idea that, in general, individual human beings
know what is best for them, in the sense that they are rational utility
maximisers. They “have goals and make choices intended to achieve their
goals.”
21
Human beings calculate the costs and benefits of their actions.
They choose those actions that they expect will best serve their goals,
given the available evidence. The power of the theory is its apparent
universality, its testability and its importance in a wide range of social
situations, if it is correct. When combined with the application of rigorous
mathematical modelling, and the application of computer-assisted analysis
of large quantities of data, the more it looks as if the social sciences can
come closer to the second conception of science. The theories that are
developed are universal theories, not bounded in time or relevant only to
one jurisdiction, as much of legal research is. The emphasis on goals and
choices
“contrasts with sociological and psychological [and therefore socio-
legal] approaches that treat behaviour as a response to organisational
norms, social pressures, or inner drives.”
22
Perhaps the most famous article of the genre, certainly among the most
cited articles in American law journals, and in many ways the start of the
modern law and economics movement, provides a useful illustration of
the method. Ronald Coase’s article, “The Problem of Social Cost”, was
published in 1960 and is among the most important theoretical statements
in law and economics.
23
This is what lawyers would probably say it meant:
Coase’s theorem holds that when transaction costs are zero or very low,
bargaining will lead to the efficient use of resources, regardless of the
law. Certain insights flow from this. First, if the desired legal outcome is
efficiency, there may be circumstances in which that goal will be achieved
21
M. P. Fiorina, “Rational Choice in Politics” (2004) International Encyclopedia of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences at 12760.
22
ibid.
23
R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
640 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
without any need for law. Secondly, in certain circumstances, the law may
actually impede or make more costly an efficient outcome. Thirdly, where
transaction costs are high, achieving an efficient outcome may depend
on law. Economists would probably describe the theorem somewhat
differently, substituting the idea of “property rights” for “law” in the
description I have given. Indeed, it is noticeable that in academic writing
on the institutional turn in economics that “property rights institutions”
seem frequently to be used as a substitute for “legal institutions”. My own
view is that a richer idea of the institutional complexities at work would
be captured by more explicit reference to legal institutions, a point I shall
return to subsequently. The Coase theorem has generated a huge literature
and could be the basis for a profitable paper by itself, which I shall not
attempt here.
Instead, I shall concentrate on two common criticisms, from socio-legal
scholars in particular, about rational choice models as applied to legal
phenomena. The first is that such an approach, based on methodological
individualism, is incompatible with research that concentrates more on
systems and institutions. The second common criticism is that law and
economics often seems to have a political agenda that is politically neo-
liberal. Neither of these criticisms is convincing, in my view. The unease
about law and economics lies elsewhere than in methodological concerns
or perceived political bias. My sense is that this unease, apart from s imple
ignorance of economics, often arises from its important role in generating
what Duxbury has called “the counter-intuitive impulse”.
24
By this he
means that law and economics is often most powerful when it c hallenges
legal and political orthodoxy. “Over and again, lawyer-economists”, he
says, “want to warn us that things are not as they might at first appear.”
25
Indeed, sometimes they turn out to be the opposite of what orthodox
thinking supposes. This can often challenge deeply held views. In short,
law and economics is reviled for much the same reason that law and
economics scholars often revel in their reputation: they rather like being
the enfants terribles of the legal academy. And to the extent that the
function of scholarship is to afflict the intellectually comfortable, it seems
to me that they can play an exceptionally important role.
C
HARACTERISTICS OF “EXTERNAL LEGAL RESEARCH
These three “external” approaches—socio-legal studies, critical legal
studies and law and economics—despite their many differences, have
several characteristics in common. The first involves a broadening
24
N. Duxbury, “A Century of Legal Studies”, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, cited above fn.4, 950 at
p.961.
25
ibid., at p.961.
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OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 641
of the disciplinary background of the research community involved.
In considering the research carried out using the older methods of
legal research, it is clear that most of the researchers are lawyers.
26
Research in law, however, is not now any longer the “preserve of
the academic lawyer alone, but has attracted scholars from across the
social sciences, especially sociologists, economists, and psyc h ol o g is t s. ”
27
Secondly, these approaches tend to regard the appropriate research agenda
as encompassing all four of the issues mentioned earlier, thus occupying
some of the territory originally thought to be the preserve of doctrinal
lawyers.
Most importantly for our purposes is their third common characteristic:
the adoption of a much more explicitly “external” perspective when
viewing the operation of legal phenomena. In this sense, they often
proceed from a view of the legal system as either entirely or (more
usually) partly determined by the same type of forces that affects other
non-legal social phenomena. Law, therefore, can and should be examined
using the same tools and methodologies as are used to study any other
political, social or economic practice. They reject the assumption that law
is autonomous, or largely so. At the more extreme e dges of each of these
approaches, law is viewed as simply politics, or as simply economi c s,
or as simply sociology. What we see, in other words, is the growth of
an approach to law that may challenge the idea of legal scholarship as a
separate craft. They tend to set up an apparently irreconcilable tension with
important aspects of traditional legal scholarship, in particular doctrinal
legal analysis.
E
ND OF “INTERNAL LEGAL RESEARCH?
Are we seeing, then, the end of a specifically legal s phere, where
legal research “steadily succumbs to the influence of the social and
behavioural sciences”?
28
Some, like Richard Posner have encouraged such
a development.
29
Others have decried it; in 1990, Ruth Deech objected
to the apparent regard that law reformers were paying to social science.
The influence of social scientists had led, she asserted, to an apparent
reduction in the “intellectual challenge and content of the law.”
30
But I
do not believe that this is occurring. Rather, I agree with Rubin, who
26
J. Baldwin and G. Davis, “Empirical Research in Law”, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, cited above
fn.4, 880 at p.881.
27
ibid., at p.881.
28
Murphy, cited above fn.14, at 8525.
29
R.A. Posner, “The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962–1987” (1987) 100 Harvard
Law Review 761.
30
R. Deech, “Divorce Law and Empirical Studies” (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 229.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
642 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
argues that these apparently irreconcilable approaches in legal research
are now “being significantly eroded” by developments in each.
31
There are several significant developments that contribute to my
sense that legal research now e mb ra ce s a pluralism of methodologi-
cal approaches. These developments have had the effect of moderat-
ing important elements of legal research dominated by both “ internal
approaches” and “external approaches”, creating opportunities for closer
working across these boundaries, and between law and the social s c ie nc es .
What is emerging are approaches that combine both the internal and the
external approaches that I have distinguished up to this point, pinpointing
what is distinctive about law as a social construction, as well as examining
its inter-relationship with other social phenomena.
C
URRENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF METHODOLOGICAL
PLURALISM
Without attempting to be comprehensive, we can mention some develop-
ments as particularly important, beginning with the social science side.
There have, first, been important evolutions in economics and political
science that render it more sympathetic both to traditional legal scholar-
ship, and legal philosophy. Rational choice theory is now more open to
the role that institutions and organisations play in individual decision-
making. Studies in institutional economics of the type carried out by
Douglass North
32
and Oliver Williamson
33
seem close to the organisational
and institutional approach that dominates research on legal phenomena.
A second development has been the incorporation of some findings of
recent behavioural economics into legal research.
34
This has been impor-
tant both in challenging the approach to rationality inherent in previous
law a nd economics, and in leading to attempts to set up experimen-
tal testing. If people are irrationally attracted to current endowments,
or irrationally influenced by the way choices are presented, then this
has important implications for legal decision-making. There is now also
considerably greater recognition that c ognitive science may require deep
revisions to economic models of the human decision-maker. The periodic
recurrence among economists of replacing the more radical assumptions
of economic man with models of bounded rationality and bounded selfish-
ness, and the recognition of the importance of institutional and organisa-
tional context to decision-making, make joint working considerably more
likely.
31
Rubin, cited above fn.20, at 8677.
32
D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990).
33
O.E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (1996).
34
C. Jolls, C. Sunstein and R. Thaler, ”A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics” (1998) 50
Stanford Law Review 1471.
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OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 643
A major development within law and economics scholarship has
reflected this, namely the study of whether internalised norms “exercise
powerful e ffects that conflict with the self-interest, or at least the
immediate self-interest, of the author.”
35
In a famous book testing the
Coase theorem, Robert Ellickson studied the way in which cattle ranchers
and farmers in Shasta County in California, handled disputes about the
harms caused by cattle trespassing on farmland.
36
In general, he found the
Coase theorem to be limited in its ability to predict how disputes would
be handled in practice. The study discovered that the Coase theorem over-
emphasised the importance of law in certain circumstances. Although they
knew there was law that could have governed their relationship, few of
the farmers or the cattle ranchers actually knew what the law was, or had
regard to it in practice. Rather, they ordered their relationships on the basis
of social norms, rather than law. There was bargaining but, contrary to
expectations perhaps, it was not bargaining in the shadow of the law, but
without law. It also demonstrated that the social norms of Shasta County
overcame the immediate self-interest of the farmers and ranchers.
Within socio-legal studies, the turn to supplementing empirical work
with more theoretical approaches, has also meant that socio-legal scholars
have increasingly engaged with other approaches. Themes drawn from
Critical Legal Studies have influenced several British socio-legal scholars.
But Critical Legal Studies has also become more sophisticated. Some
Critical Legal scholars, such as Robert Gordon,
37
are much more likely
to accept claims to law’s partial autonomy, accepting the existence
of some degree at least of insulation in the activities of lawyers and
judges. A separate development within socio-legal studies, drawing on
systems theories, has also resulted in considerable attention being paid
to what might be distinctive about the legal system. First developed
by Luhmann,
38
and refined by Teubner,
39
this approach views law as
a more or less closed normative system in w hich norms are generated
and sustained within the system itself, thus emphasising the autonomous
aspects of legal thought in a way that previously would have seemed
unlikely from a sociological perspective. Ironically, this brings socio-legal
scholarship closer to doctrinal legal scholarship than in the past.
So too, within those approaches to legal scholarship that previously
adopted more of an internal perspective, several developments have
occurred that have opened up the possibility of greater rapprochement
with external approaches. First, legal philosophy has increasingly focussed
35
Rubin.
36
R. Ellickson, Orde r Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
37
R. Gordon, “The Independence of Lawyers” (1988) 68 Boston University Law Review 1; R. Gordon,
“Critical Legal Histories” (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57.
38
N. Luhman, Law as a Social System (2004).
39
G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A N ew Approach to Law and Society (1988).
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
644 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
on the political theory aspects of the third research issue mentioned
above, increasing the opportunity for external perspectives to be engaged
with that are neither legal nor philosophical. Particularly in the critique
of legal policy, Hart and his successors have appeared somewhat more
comfortable in using social science literature derived from economics
or sociology. Hart himself, for example, worked with David Soskice,
the economist, on abortion.
40
Sociology and economic approaches are
now increasingly influencing legal philosophy.
41
The approach to law
in doctrinal legal scholarship is also changing in ways that allow for
increased multi-disciplinary work. In the past, doctrinal legal analysis
has concentrated on “state-centred” law, meaning the law that derives
from, and is accepted by, the institutions of the nation state. Traditional
doctrinal analysis, whether in a particular state’s legal system, or in
comparative law, often emphasised the extent to which law was the
result of a country’s unique history or culture. Even traditional ideas of
international law were essentially state-centred, seeing international law
as developing mostly either from state practice, or from the acceptance of
treaties by states. This was seen as at odds with the desire of increasingly
dominant social science approaches that stress the need for generalisation.
Economists, after all, do not see the utility of economics as limited to
the country in which a theory was developed.
42
Intriguingly, however,
legal academics are increasingly questioning this state-centredness, and
“there are indications . . . that this theoretical preoccupation with state
structures, state institutions, and state laws may now be in decline.”
43
The importance of European legal scholarship, of human rights law, of the
use of such concepts as “soft law”, of the grow in g conversati on between
judges in different jurisdictions, of globalisation, all point to developments
that weaken the state-centred-ness of traditional legal cat eg or ie s. As Bell
writes, “The conventional hierarchies of norms is being challenged by
ideas of ‘networks’ of normative orders.”
44
This development links with
traditional socio-legal work on legal pluralism, which argues that the state
does not have a monopoly on what we mean by law, to create synergies
between internal and e xternal perspectives on law in fields as diverse as
comparative law and criminal law.
45
40
D. Soskice and H.L.A. Hart, “After the Act”: The Guardian, May 3, 1972. See also D. Soskice with
T.J. Trussell, Effects of the Abortion Act, British Journal of Hospital Medicine (1973).
41
For example the extensive presence of Weber in the work of John Finnis (J. Finnis, Natural Law
and Natural Rights (1980)).
42
T.S. Ulen, “A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in
the Study of Law” [2002] University of Illinois Law Review 875 at 895.
43
H.P. Glenn, “A Tr ansnational Concept of Law”, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, cited above fn.4, at
p.839.
44
Bell, cited above fn.7, at 1049.
45
See, e.g. N. Lacey and L. Zedner, “Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice” (1995) 22 Journal
of Law and Society 93.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 645
Thirdly, much traditional doctrinal legal analysis now relaxes its view
of the autonomy of law, drawing on economic and socio-legal insights
increasingly easily. Now, the seamless integration of insights from other
disciplines into legal scholarship is sufficiently common for it to be
unremarkable, although it is still more common in some areas than others.
As Collier has recently argued:
. . . there now exists a commonly held view within legal studies
that the majority, if not all, university law schools can usefully be
characterised as embracing a broadly ‘liberal’, pluralistic approach
to legal education and scholarship.”
46
Cownie observes, drawing on her research, “We’re all socio-legal now.”
47
Seen from this perspective, then, the broad insights of the external
approaches are increasingly being incorporated into traditional British
legal scholarship. This is not to say that all legal academics are adopting
an external perspective. Some areas of law, such as public law, family
law and labour law seem more likely to engage with these perspectives
than other areas. Nor am I arguing that all are engaging in empirical
work themselves. Rather, my argument is that those engaging in doctrinal
legal analysis much more frequently than before are ready to support,
and sometimes to test their doctrinal or theoretical models by drawing
on social science influenced information. Should this methodological
pluralism be regarded as a strength or a weakness in current legal
scholarship? Does it show an immature desire to derive comfort by
leavening legal research with undigested parts of other more prestigious
disciplines? My own view is contrary to the thrust of such questions. In
my view it demonstrates, instead, a mature openness to other disciplines
that demonstrates a welcome self-confidence.
But we should not be blind to outside criticism. Our a ssessment of our
research should not be limited to the views of other lawyers. In particular,
it should include the assessments of other social s cientists working on
related topics. If they are not persuaded of the utility of what we are doing,
perhaps particularly of our methodologies, we need at least to know why.
But that assumes that other social scientists actually know of the work
we produce, and have assessed it, and frequently this is not the case. We
need to develop strategies that bring our work much more frequently to
the attention of those in cognate areas, not least in order to ensure that
the approaches we take, and the result s we achieve, make sense.
46
R. Collier, “Research Capacity, C ritical Social Science and the Paradox of Socio-Legal Studies”, 43
Socio-Legal Newsletter (Summer 2004), p.3.
47
F. Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Ide ntities (Hart, Oxford, 2004).
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
646 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
O
NE-WAY TRAFFIC?
Thus far, I have concentrated on what the social sciences can do for
law. What about the flip side of the coin? Wh at can l eg al researc h do
for the social sciences? We know that, in the past, legal studies have
made an important contribution to the development of other social science
disciplines. Now, however, if one views the relationship between law and
other disciplines as akin to that between neighbours, then the relationship
seems one-sided. Law increasingly uses insights from the other social
sciences but, with some limited exceptions, mainstream social scientists
neither perceive themselves as studying legal phenomena nor (apparently)
do they see themselves as able to gain a ny significant insight from legal
scholarship.
There are several problems with convincing social scientists that legal
research has anything to contribute to the social sciences. Institutionally,
academic law sits uncomfortably somewhere between humanities and the
social sciences in universities, although particular legal academics are
more likely to see themselves as closer to one rather than the other.
48
Methodologically, legal academics, in my experience at least, seld om
appear to talk about methodology in the context of their research, whereas
other social scientists often place particular importance on methodological
issues. There is another problematic element: the a pparently almost
complete blindness to the potential relevance of legal issues in much social
science research. The absence of explicit consideration given to law a nd
legal institutions in much mainstream social sciences research is puzzling.
The role of one of the primary methods of organising social life seems to
be left outside consideration. Why is that the case? Several explanations
are possible. The first e xplanation may lie simply in the apparent aridity of
legal research, its apparent absence of interest in theory, and its apparent
closeness to legal practice (all false assumptions as I hope I have shown).
Academic law may seem too intimidating and technical, too specific, too
detailed a nd too parochial to have much to offer to approaches that are
attempting to bring clarity, simplicity, elegance, and generalisation. And
yet, the other social sciences are equally com pl ex . In m uc h social scien ce
research, there appears to be fairly regular reference to the other social
(and often natural) sciences without embarrassment, demonstrating the
extent to which where there is a will, there is a way.
An explanation for law’s virtual exclusion from the modelling of the
other social sciences may be sought at a deeper level. Is it to be found in
the assumption that law is, ultimately, unimportant? Is law simply “super-
structural”, as Marxist historical materialism used to assert, only the
48
Twining et al , “The Role of Academics in the Legal System”, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, cited
above fn.4, p.920.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 647
outward manifestation of much deeper social and behavioural processes
that should attract social science research instead? In this perspective, law
becomes the symptom not the cause. Legal research is impliedly missing
the point, reifying the legal at the expense of the real determinants of the
social. However, in 1997, Professor Goodhart, a professional economist,
argued that although the scale of law on the economy was pervasive, law
was “rarely examined in any depth by economists”. He illustrated his
argument with an analysis of how often there was discussion of the legal
system in mainstream textbooks on economics. In the classic textbook
Samuelson’s Economics (currently 800 pages), one-quarter of one page
addressed the legal framework of the economic system and three-quarters
of a page considered the influence of economics on law.
49
Treating law as epiphenomenal may not be the only problem. Inves-
tigating the legal dimensions of an issue in s o ci al science research may
be seen as requiring a close working relationship with legal academics. Is
this a price too high to pay, perhaps? Fiona Cownie has described how
the “predominant notion of academic lawyers [by those from other disci-
plines] is that they are not really academic.”
50
Drawing on interviews with
other British academics by Becher some time ago, she describes how one
interviewee summed up the attitude to legal academics. They are seen as
“arcane, distant and alien—an appendage to the university world.”
51
Their
personal qualities are described by other academics as “ dubious”: “they
are variously represented as vociferous, untrustworthy, immoral, narrow,
arrogant and conservative.”
52
Their scholarly attitudes are described as
“unexciting and uncreative, comprising a s eries of intellectual puzzles
scattered among ‘large areas of description’.”
53
The work Cownie quotes
is a little dated, so one might hope that these views represent past attitudes,
but this cannot be guaranteed.
There is no point in complaining if legal scholarship really has nothing
to contribute to mainstream social scientific work. I will argue, however,
that law has indeed something to offer and that the failure to engage with
legal scholarship leads to a more intellectually impoverished social science
than need be the case. This is not an argument for legal imperialism. Nor
is it my aim to produce s ome artificial synthesis of the various disciplinary
approaches. Rather, it is to argue that engagement with the diversity of
different social sciences approaches, including law, produces a stronger
social science. What, then, can legal scholars bring to the table of social
science resea r ch?
49
C.A.E. Goodhart, “Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?” (1967) 60 Modern Law
Review 1 at 4, 7.
50
F. Cownie, “Researching (Soc i o) Legal Academics”, 42 Socio-Legal Newsletter (Spring, 2004), p.1.
51
ibid.
52
ibid.
53
ibid., quoting T. Becher Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of
disciplines (1989), p.30.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
648 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
I suggest, tentatively, that in at least four respects legal research may
be able to contribute to s ocial science research. First, doctrinal and
philosophical consideration of law can help provide conceptual clarity
and specificity about particular sets of social norms and s ocial concepts
that occur in both the legal and social contexts.
54
Many examples spring to
mind: the concept of “obligation”, the idea of a “promise”, different forms
that “rules” take and how they differ from other cognate concepts, the
concept of a “right”, and the idea of “discrimination”. Legal scholars, in
ways that are of general relevance, have extensively c o ns i de re d all these.
Those whose empirical work is built upon hypotheses that involve such
concepts but do not incorporate legal insights do so at their peril. Legal
work provides a treasure trove of conceptual resources. Without reference
to legal philosophical clarity, hypotheses are likely to be much less clear,
and therefore much less testable in certain areas. Now, s ometimes, the
response to this argument is that social science research needs simple
concepts, because otherwise the methodological tools available cannot
cope. If that is a valid point, then the lack of sophistication of the available
methodological tools needs to be addressed, if they cannot cope with the
complexity of real life.
Secondly, and less obviously, where law or legal concepts or legal
institutions are recognised by the social scientist to play a role in the
theory that is being developed for testing, the tendency within both
economics and sociology is to view law too often as a datum, as fact,
unproblematic, and one-dimensional. Where lawyers are involved in an
empirical project, the tendency, in my experience, is to ask lawyers to
identify “the law,” stripped of complexity, and preferably in the form
of a rule or obligation that is specific to a limited social setting.
55
If
legal academic work shows anything, it shows that an applicable legal
norm on anything but the most banal question is likely to be complex,
nuanced and contested. Law is more often in the process of becoming,
than settled. Law is not a datum; it is in constant evolution, developing
in ways that are sometimes startling and endlessly inventive, as Doreen
McBarnet has demonstrated in her work on “creative compliance”.
56
That is its fascination. Anyone engaged in research that involves the
formulation or testing of propositions incorporating legal issues who does
not understand this will produce results, however satisfying otherwise,
that are fundamentally flawed.
54
W.L. Twining, “Have C o ncepts: Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Perspective”
(2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 5.
55
Edelman and Suchman discuss this in their work on the relationship between “law and society” and
organisational studies: L. B. Edelman and M.C. Suchman, “The legal environments of organizations”
(1997) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 479; L. B. Edelman and M.C. Suchman, “When the haves hold
court: speculations on the organizational internalization of law” (1999) 33 Law and Society Review 941.
I am grateful to Philip Lewis for drawing my attention to this.
56
D. McBarnet, Crime, Compliance and Control (2004).
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
OCTOBER 2006] Legal Research and The Social Sciences 649
Thirdly, and less obvious perhaps, social scientists who are not lawyers
are perhaps less likely to recognise when law is playing an important role
in the social and economic phenomena they are attempting to analyse.
The best example is probably to be found in the context of theories
of regulatory behaviour, where there is an extensive legal literature
demonstrating the inadequacies of public choice theories as explanations
for how regulatory decisions are made. In the main, this literature argues
that the organisational context is usually too often ignored or underplayed
in public choice theories, and of course the organisational context is a
specifically legal one. It is hard to appreciate the organisational constraints
without understanding the extent to which the legal limits within which
organisations operate affect their behaviour. In short, as Mary Dudziak
has argued, law does not simply reflect social context, but also shapes it.
Writing of the litigation against school segregation in the United States,
she observes that “the ‘social context’ to which law . . . was responsive
turns out to be constructed, in part, by the law . . . itself. . .
57
So many
of the ideas and categories through which we understand the world are in
part legally determined: marriage, war, crime, to take but three examples.
There is a sort of paradox here: law is the product of its social context,
yet the social context is itself in part a product of law.
58
Fourthly, and perhaps most controversial, legal researchers often pride
themselves on being able to see the need for a normative dimension in
inter-disciplinary research. Particularly where such research leads to policy
proposals, legal academics view their training in navigating practical
decision-making, normative principles, and institutional considerations as
equipping them to play an important complementary role to other social
science disciplines, perhaps particularly those with a more descriptive,
empirical bent.
C
ONCLUSION
I have argued, then, that developments within legal scholarship and
developments within the other social sciences mean that the time has
probably never been better for inter-disciplinary research, and increased
cross-fertilisation. Indeed, a t a time when the social sciences appear to
be fracturing, separating from each other into smaller and smaller sub-
disciplines, and when increasing calls are heard for greater communication
between the s ocial sciences leading to more interdisciplinary and multi-
disciplinary work, developments within the legal academy are of broader
57
M.L. Dudziak, “The Court and Social Context in Civil Rights History, Review Essay: From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality, Michael J. Klarman”
(2005) 72 University of Chicago Law Review 429 at 444.
58
A.W.B. Simpson, “Analysis of Legal Concepts” (1964) 80 Law Quarterly Review 535.
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
650 Law Quarter ly Review [Vol. 122
relevance. Legal research and legal scholarship now provides an inter-
esting model of how interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary work in the
social scien ce s and the humanities can be done. The attempt to reconcile
and join up the different social sciences and the humanities is not just
an aspiration in legal scholarship, it is currently taking place; slowly and
painstakingly, of course, but it is happening. The opportunity is there for
us to make it work better.
Legal research has engaged with the more recen t social sciences in ways
that would have seemed unlikely even 50 years a go. Socio-legal studies,
sociology of law, law and economics must now be seen as integral to legal
research. The social sciences can (and do already), therefore, contribute
significantly to legal research. But, more controversially, legal research
should contribute significantly to the social sciences. The most productive
relationship between law and the s ocial sciences, therefore, is one in which
each contributes to the other, with two-way, rather than one-way, traffic.
C
HRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN
*
* Professor of Human Rights Law, Oxford University; Fellow, Lincoln College, Oxford. I am grateful
to the following for sharing their thoughts with me whilst I was preparing this paper: Andrew Ashworth,
Andrew Burrows, Anne Davies, John Eekelaar, Liz Fisher, Denis Galligan, John Gardner, Simon Gardner,
Joshua Getzler, Anthony Heath, Roger H ood, P hilip Lewis, Mavis Macle an, Bronwen Morgan, Brendan
O’Leary, Michael Rosen, Brian Simpson, Margaret Stevens, William Twining Karen Yeung, Richard
Young, and Lucia Zedner. They bear no responsibility for any views expressed. This paper was first
given as part of a series of public lectures to celebrate the opening of the Oxford Social Sciences’ Centre.
keywords to follow
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER SWEET & MA X WE LL AND CONTRIBUTORS
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Marc Galanter's 1974 essay, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead," portrayed large bureaucratic organizations as the archetypal repeat players in the legal system; Galanter's account, however, devoted relatively little attention to the distinctive legal capacities of organizations as organizations. This article extends Galanter's analysis by considering the ability of large bureaucratic organizations to "internalize" legal rules, structures, personnel, and activities. Specifically, we posit that the relationship between law and organizations has undergone four interrelated shifts in recent years: (1) the legalization of organizational governance, (2) the expansion of private dispute resolution, (3) the rise of in-house counsel, and (4) the reemergence of private policing. These processes interact with one another to transform the large bureaucratic organization from being merely a repeat player in the public legal system to being a full-fledged private legal system in its own right. Although "have not" groups may gain some short-run advantages from the introduction of citizenship norms into the workplace, the organizational annexation of law subtly skews the balance between democratic and bureaucratic tendencies in society as a whole, potentially adding to the power and control of dominant elites.
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"From Jim Crow to Civil Rights" engages a theme that has been at the center of American constitutional theory since at least the 1930s: the role of judicial review in a democracy. Klarman situates himself between the heroic vision of the courts in works like Richard Kluger, "Simple Justice" and a negative view of courts in works like Gerald Rosenberg, "Hollow Hope." For Klarman, the courts are neither the hero of the story, generating needed social change, but neither are they the villain, deflecting the movement's energies from political struggles more likely to be successful. Along the way, Klarman strikes a blow at the countermajoritarian difficulty thesis, for Klarman imagines a Court without significant agency. The Court does not shape American society; instead the Court follows the flow of predominant cultural mores, reflecting changes that have their source elsewhere. This review essay focuses on a central theme in Klarman's book: his view of the relationship between law and social context. The essay examines two features of social context that Klarman sees as important: African American migration out of the South, and the impact of global developments - World War II and the Cold War - on the Court. Many African Americans migrated into segregated and soon-to-be-declining Northern cities. Because urban segregation was facilitated in part by law, the experience of migration helps to illuminate the way that social context is in part constructed by law, helping us to see that law does not simply reflect social context, but also shapes it. Klarman views war-related pressures as an important part of the social context affecting the Court; however, these issues drop out when he examines the impact of Court decisions. Because Brown and other landmark civil rights cases aided U.S. efforts to project a positive image of American democracy around the world during the Cold War, the cases had a broader impact, and arguably were more important in aiding democratization, than a purely domestic analysis of the cases would reveal.
28 Murphy, cited above fn
  • Ibid
ibid., at p.881. 28 Murphy, cited above fn.14, at 8525.
The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline Divorce Law and Empirical Studies
  • A Posner
A. Posner, " The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962–1987 " (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 761. 30 R. Deech, " Divorce Law and Empirical Studies " (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 229. (2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER © SWEET & MAXWELL AND CONTRIBUTORS
Researching (Socio) Legal Academics " , 42 Socio-Legal Newsletter (Spring, 2004), p.1. 51 ibid
  • Cownie
Cownie, " Researching (Socio) Legal Academics ", 42 Socio-Legal Newsletter (Spring, 2004), p.1. 51 ibid. 52 ibid.
Have Concepts: Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Perspective 55 Edelman and Suchman discuss this in their work on the relationship between " law and society " and organisational studies The legal environments of organizations
  • October Sweet
  • Maxwell
  • W L Contributors
  • Twining
(2006) 122 L.Q.R., OCTOBER © SWEET & MAXWELL AND CONTRIBUTORS 54 W.L. Twining, " Have Concepts: Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Perspective " (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 5. 55 Edelman and Suchman discuss this in their work on the relationship between " law and society " and organisational studies: L. B. Edelman and M.C. Suchman, " The legal environments of organizations "