Content uploaded by John James Kennedy
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by John James Kennedy on Dec 22, 2017
Content may be subject to copyright.
The Price of Democracy: Vote Buying
and Village Elections in China_1215 617..632
John James Kennedy
University of Kansas
Local elections have been occurring in most villages for over a decade in rural China, and
competitive elections are one of the key indicators of the democratic process. Indeed,
competition is an important aspect of any democracy, and it increases the value of a
villager’s vote—so much so that in some villages, a farmer’s vote can be worth a small
fortune. As village elections become more competitive, reports of vote buying are on the
rise, and a number of journalists and academic researchers have condemned this growing
practice in rural China. Accordingly, vote buying subverts democratic development and
hinders democratization efforts. However, vote buying has a long history in well-
established democracies, such as the United States and Great Britain. Rather than subvert-
ing democratization, vote buying can be viewed as part of the process or the price of
democracy. While policies and laws are needed to control vote buying in the long run,
initially it is a positive indicator that voting is an important and valuable process in rural
China.
Key words: China, democracy, village elections, vote buying
Introduction
On Election Day, July 24, it is a warm summer morning, and rural voters come
to the polling site ready to vote. Before eligible voters cast their ballots,
however, they are treated to an endless flow of beer and wine compliments of a
wealthy candidate. Indeed, this candidate is a newcomer to the political stage,
and he is spending a large sum of money to challenge the incumbent (i.e., the gift
of beer and wine to influence voters). Of course, the affluent candidate is not
pouring the wine himself. His representative pours the beverages and reminds
voters who is providing the drink. The new candidate beats the incumbent and
receives the most votes in a competitive, “free and fair” election.
The actual date of this election is July 24, 1758, for a seat in the Virginia House
of Burgesses, and the rich candidate is America’s first president, George Wash-
ington (Abbott, 1983). Washington spent £39 on beer, wine, rum, and brandy. This
was quite a large sum of money at the time. According to one historian, £39 was
“several times more than enough to buy the house and land of the voter who
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 2, Number 4—Pages 617–631
barely met the minimum franchise requirements” (Mutch, 2001, p. 3). While
Washington provided the cash, it was his friend and manager Colonel James
Wood who brokered the deal with voters and monitored the polls at the election
site. Yet, spending this kind of money to influence voters was not limited to only
one of America’s Founding Fathers. In fact, Thomas Jefferson was also known to
dispense liquor on Election Day. Jefferson stated that such practices were not
directly associated with “vote buying,” but rather beverages were small rewards
given to constituents for taking the time and expense to exercise their voting
rights (Campbell, 2005). Indeed, one justification—then and now—was that these
rewards helped to bring out the vote and candidate supporters to the polls. Still,
soon after Washington’s election victory, members of the House of Burgesses
discussed the undemocratic nature of vote-buying practices and eventually
passed a law that disqualified members who provided “any money, meat, drink,
entertainment or provisions in order to get elected” (Campbell, 2005, p. 5). This
story demonstrates how vote buying emerged in colonial America after the intro-
duction of local election reforms, but before the establishment of a developed legal
system with the capacity to fully enforce laws down to the village level.
From earlyAmerica in the 1700s to Taiwan in the 1990s, new democracies have
had to deal with vote buying in one form or another. However, the issue is
particularly salient for countries or communities that introduce local elections for
the first time. Do vote-buying practices that develop soon after the introduction
of local elections reflect a breakdown of these new democratic institutions? This
is the question that Chinese officials and scholars are currently confronting with
regard to village elections for local leaders. Over the last decade, reports of vote
buying have steadily increased, especially after the year 2000. This has drawn the
attention of top officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs who are in charge of
establishing and monitoring village elections in rural China. According to Wang
Jinhua, the director of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Department of Basic Gover-
nance and Community, vote buying is a serious and complex problem (Li, Yue, &
Lai, 2008). Indeed, a number of Chinese scholars and local Civil Affairs Bureau
chiefs argue that vote-buying practices undermine local democratic institutions
by providing disproportional influence of wealthy candidates and stripping vil-
lagers of their equal right to participate and choose without interference (Chen
2009; Chen & Zhou, 2007; Ye, 2007). Of course, these scholars also point out that
the voters (i.e., vote sellers) are as much to blame for this type of electoral
manipulation as the vote buyers. The implication is that rural democracy, in some
respects, is still underdeveloped.
While the general consensus is that vote-buying practices have a negative
influence on the democratic process, some scholars and officials in Civil Affairs
Bureaus view vote buying as a positive outcome (Z. Li, 2007; Si, 2007). For
instance, vote buying spreads the wealth from bribing a specific official to
become a village leader (office buying) to paying off a larger number of village
constituents. Another example is that vote buying provides an opportunity for
new candidates with no prior government connections to challenge incumbents.
The way Chinese scholars and officials view vote buying in village
elections—either negative or positive outcomes—may have serious conse-
quences for the future development of election reforms in China. When asked
about the development of elections in China during a 2006 interview with the
618 Asian Politics & Policy
foreign press, Premier Wen Jiabao said, “We are confident that when the people
are capable of running a village through direct election, they will later be able to
run a township, then a county and a province, true to the principle that our
country is run by the people” (“Premier Wen,” 2006). Thus, if vote buying is
perceived as a negative development in the village election process, then it is
possible to adopt the position that villagers are currently incapable of running a
village and by extension running a town or county. Vote buying may be a
legitimate reason to stall political reforms, at least until this form of voter
manipulation can be curbed or controlled. Even in early America, vote buying
was used as an excuse to limit voting rights to white male property owners.
During the Constitutional Convention (1787), Governor Morris argued, “Give the
votes to people who have no property and they will sell them to the rich, who
will be able to buy them” (Farrand, 1937, p. 206). Of course, as Washington
discovered, even property owners can be bought. Nevertheless, the implication is
that central leaders may perceive vote buying as a democratic setback and fore-
stall further election reforms.
Yet, if vote buying is accepted as part of the village election process that can
lead to both bad and good outcomes, then it may not be a hindrance to further
democratic development, especially at the town and county levels. While vote-
buying practices are perceived as inherently undemocratic, it could not occur
without relatively free and fair elections. Vote buying takes place only when the
election process is truly competitive and candidates can no longer buy the gov-
ernment position from higher authorities (Schaffer, 2008). Once potential candi-
dates as well as local authorities can no longer resort to intimidating voters,
manipulating election registries, or doctoring final tallies, then vote buying is the
only method left to influence the election outcome (Hicken, 2007). Thus, vote
buying may be a desirable outcome that reflects a positive development in
establishing local democratic elections, especially within an authoritarian regime.
Vote buying emerges when the national leadership in a developing country
attempts election and legal reforms at the same time and political gaps or spaces
between these reforms take shape. The first gap arises after the reduction of direct
appointments for local government officials (i.e., local elections) but before the
introduction of popular elections at the national level. The second gap is the
interim after the promotion of direct elections but before an independent judiciary
and legal system is fully functioning. Thus, within an authoritarian regime
without popular elections for the national leadership, vote buying at the subna-
tional level may reflect significant democratic procedural development.
A theory of vote buying as a positive indicator of institutional democratic
progress rests on the distinction between vote-buying outcomes (good and bad)
and vote buying as a desired outcome in and of itself. This article will examine
the vote-buying debates in the Chinese and English literature. Much of these
debates in China reflect similar themes in the English literature about the nega-
tive (and positive) outcomes of vote buying. There are three general issue areas:
(1) the definition of vote buying, (2) the emergence of vote-buying practices, and
(3) the outcome of vote-buying practices. Few articles in English closely examine
vote buying in China. Most of the North American and Western European schol-
ars focus on the persistent problem of vote buying at the national and district
levels in established democracies as well as democratizing countries in Latin
The Price of Democracy 619
America and Asia (Bowie, 2008; Snyder & Samuels, 2001; Stokes, 2005; Wu &
Huang, 2004). However, for Chinese scholars and Civil Affairs officials, vote
buying is a new phenomenon that is associated with recent democratic experi-
ments at the village level. In China, national, provincial, and municipal leaders
are not popularly elected and, as a consequence, vote buying between candidates
and citizens is not an issue.1Despite the difference in political systems under
study, there is a convergence in the English and Chinese literature along the three
general issues areas.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section will address the various types
and definitions of vote buying in village elections. The second section examines
the emergence of vote buying in rural China. The third section focuses on nega-
tive and positive vote-buying outcomes and draws attention to the distinction
between vote-buying practices and the existence of vote buying as an important
outcome. The final section examines how this distinction fits into the larger
democratization theory. I argue that, at least in the beginning of the democrati-
zation process, vote buying is actually an essential indicator of democratic
progress.
Definitions and Types of Vote Buying
The definitions of vote buying vary from broad concepts that encompass a wide
range of activities to a more narrow definition that identifies specific practices.
Language is the first factor that distinguishes broad definitions from the English
and Chinese accounts. In the English literature, Neeman and Orosel (2006),
Stokes (2005), and Schaffer (2008) provide a market interpretation of vote buying.
Thus, “vote buying, in the literal sense, is a simple economic exchange. Candi-
dates can ‘buy’ and citizens ‘sell’ votes, as they buy and sell apples, shoes, or
television sets” (Schaffer & Schedler, 2007, p. 17). Starting from this general
definition, some scholars point out the potential principle-agent problems with
this economic contract, such as the difficulty vote buyers have when monitoring
sellers who use secret ballots. Stokes (2007) finds that the market definition
reflects the inherent inequality in vote buying. Wealthier candidates can afford to
buy more “apples and shoes” than poorer candidates. Moreover, vote sellers do
not articulate their personal interest at the polls, but vote for the highest bidder.
Yet, it is the poor who typically sell their vote, and it is their interests that are lost
in the transaction.
The literal Chinese definition of vote buying is the two characters “bribery”
and “elect” (huixuan), or “using bribery to get elected.” Many Chinese scholars
and the official statements from the Ministry of Civil Affairs refer to vote buying
as a practice whereby the candidate uses money or other benefits as a means to
influence constituent preferences or desires (Wang & Fu, 2007; Xu, 2006). The
broad definition typically includes references on how vote buying allows indi-
vidual candidates to subvert the will of the people for private gains. Thus, in
principle, most Chinese and Western scholars have the same opinion that vote
buying is a criminal action and subverts the development of fair and equal access
to the democratic election process.
For many scholars in China, one of the main problems associated with vote
buying is that the practice is not clearly defined in the village election law known
620 Asian Politics & Policy
as the Organic Law of Villager Committees. The Organic Law allows villagers to
elect three to seven members of the villagers committee as well as the village
head (chair of the village committee). It was first written in 1988 and imple-
mented as “trial law” throughout rural China. The trial law was amended in 1998
and enacted as a full law that allowed for secret ballots, an open (villager)
nomination process, and noninterference from higher authorities, such as the
township or county party governments. However, the Organic Law (1998) does
not explicitly address vote buying. Article 15 of the Organic Law refers to bribery
(huilu) but does not mention vote buying (huixuan). A number of China scholars
suggest that this ambiguity in the law contributes to the rise in vote-buying
practices at the village level (Lin, 2007; Qian, 2005).
Still, there is disagreement among China scholars over which forms of vote
buying constitute “bribing elections.” The types of vote buying range from small
gifts and banquets to cash. Moreover, vote buying varies by degree as well as
kind. In the Chinese literature, the three general and most common forms of
bribery for votes are (1) promises of future state benefits, (2) immediate material
rewards, and (3) cash. Vote-buying promises are different from general campaign
rhetoric because these rewards are focused more on individuals than the com-
munity. The individual promises are associated with postelection favors, such as
a job in the collective enterprise or providing a construction permit. They can
even include getting around the family-planning policy and obtaining “legal”
household registration certificates. This type of reward to influence voters is not
unlike methods used by urban political machines in America around the late
1800s. Political bosses used the promise of city jobs in exchange for electoral
support, especially from new immigrant communities (Riordon, 1963). Most
Chinese scholars (and turn-of-the-century American reforms) view this type of
vote buying as undue influence on the voters’ choice as well as misuse of public
works and funds (Lin, 2007; Wang & Fu, 2007; Xu, 2006).
The second type of vote buying is in the form of gifts and banquets. The small
gifts range from a pack of cigarettes and a few bottles of liquor to large banquets
and cases of beer and wine. This form of vote bribery is the most ambiguous.
While some scholars include gifts in the broader definition of vote buying, others
see this practice as less threatening. For example, in a Carter Center Report on
village elections in 2000, the head of the Department of Basic Governance and
Community in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Zhan Chengfu, was asked about vote
buying and gift giving during an election visit. He replied, “Can we categorize
offering cigarettes or a simple meal as vote buying?” He answered his own
question with “probably not” (Carter Center, 2000). One of America’s founding
fathers, Thomas Jefferson, held the same impression that small gifts of food and
drink did not constitute vote buying.
The third and most explicit form of vote buying is handing out cash for votes.
Both Western and most Chinese scholars view this form as a corrupt practice. The
amount can vary from 5 yuan ($0.75) to 1,500 yuan ($220) for a single ballot. Local
and national newspapers tend to report the most excessive cases. For example,
during a spring 2006 village election, one village candidate in Huhehaota munici-
pality, Inner Mongolia, paid 662 villagers 1,000 yuan apiece (Liu, 2006). A 2008
press report details how one village candidate in Guangdong province spent a
total of 1.6 million yuan ($235,000) for a single election (“Guangdong Dongyuan
The Price of Democracy 621
Villager,” 2008). Of course, the extreme examples receive the most attention from
the Chinese and English press, and this paints a bleak picture of the election
process. However, most cases of vote buying or bribery to influence elections are
much less sensational and never make the headlines. For instance, most rural
candidates do not have over 100,000 yuan readily available to spend on an
election.
All three types of vote-buying outcomes present a challenge for the local and
national leadership. Yet, some higher officials recognize that vote buying exists
within the political spaces that open up after the introduction of direct elections
for village leaders, but before legal reforms are enacted and fully implemented.
For example, in a 2008 report, a leading official from the Ministry of CivilAffairs,
Wang Jinhua, the deputy director of the Department of Basic Governance and
Community, points out three difficulties in dealing with election bribery at the
village level (Li et al., 2008). First, the current laws (up to 2008) do not clearly
identify specific election bribery practices. Second, vote sellers are reluctant to
testify against vote buyers. Third, there are no specific sanctions against election
bribery. Therefore, the worst punishment for the offending candidate is disquali-
fication from the election. Wang acknowledged that over the last few years,
vote-buying practices have become more prevalent in village elections (Li et al.,
2008).
Emergence of Vote-Buying Practices
Much of the research on vote buying suggests that the practice emerges due to
a number of social, political, economic, and institutional factors (Hicken, 2007).
The Chinese and Western literature on vote buying overlap and vary among these
four factors.
Social and political factors involve the use of material gifts and cash to increase
turnout. Rather than using cash and material incentives to change the minds of
voters, candidates use these incentives to get their supporters to the polls
(Nichter, 2008; Schedler, 2002). This suggests that the emergence of vote buying
is a party (or individual candidate) strategy to target strong support. Nichter
(2008) examines elections in Argentina and suggests that the candidate (party)
use of material incentives to influence votes reflects turnout buying rather than
vote buying. Several Chinese scholars have made a similar argument regarding
village elections (Lin, 2007; Wang & Fu, 2007). For example, candidates who are
from a specific family clan will use an election banquet or even cash gifts in little
red envelopes (hongbao) to get extended family members to the polls on Election
Day (Lin, 2007). There are also natural groupings within the village, such as small
groups (xiaozu), where villagers have common interests and tend to back a
specific candidate. These represent small voting blocs within the village commit-
tee elections, and vote buying is used to solidify these internal groups.
However, since the mid- to late-1990s, local leaders in some townships and
villages have had to use material incentives just to get any villagers to attend mass
assemblies, including elections. This is an interesting twist to the vote- and
turnout-buying argument. In many villages, especially in the poorer, more
remote mountainous regions, attendance in village assemblies has been dramati-
cally decreasing due to temporary labor migration to local cities and reduced
622 Asian Politics & Policy
authority of village leadership over the local economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
village (brigade) leadership had wide authority over land use, agricultural
inputs, crop choice, grain rations, and jobs in rural factories. During this period,
when village leaders called a mass assembly all villagers attended without delay.
However, the introduction of market reforms in the 1980s changed village
dynamics and ended village cadre control over agricultural inputs and local
factory jobs. This also eliminated the incentive for villagers to attend village
assemblies, as villagers’ livelihood became more detached from the village lead-
er’s decisions (except for land that is still collectively owned and managed by the
villager leadership). As a result of lower turnout, local cadres have resorted to
offering small gifts, such as shirts, pens, or food and drink, to increase attendance
in village assemblies (Oi & Rozelle. 2000). In a rural Shaanxi village, during a
2004 interview with the village leader and party secretary, cadres admitted that
they announce a village-wide assembly only once every three years for elections,
and even then they need to provide small material incentives just to get villagers
to attend the election.2
The appearance of vote brokers is also related to turnout buying and reflects a
more sophisticated and localized vote-buying practice. For example, in Taiwan,
political parties and candidates use vote brokers to approach individual voters.
Taiwan has a long history of vote buying, from the introduction of local elections
in the 1950s and 1960s when opposition parties were illegal to post-1987 when
multiparty national elections were first allowed (Rigger, 1999). Vote buying
became a more pervasive practice after the 1987 political reforms and the end of
martial law on the island. A 1992 survey of Kaohsiung City, the second largest city
in Taiwan, revealed that 45% of respondents admitted to selling their votes to vote
brokers in the last election (Wang & Kurzman, 2007a). In order to increase turnout
and influence voters, vote brokers have to be more than candidate or party
representatives dispensing cash and gifts. They need to understand the local
district and be close to the constituency. According to Wang and Kurzman (2007b),
vote brokers in Taiwan need to be “walking encyclopedias of local knowledge” (p.
64). Vote brokers are friends and neighbors, and they are an important component
of the vote-buying process and reaffirm voter commitment to the party or candi-
dates through words (local relations) and actions (gifts). Thus, vote buying, even
for national parties and candidates, is very localized and personal.
In recent years, vote brokers have also appeared in mainland China village
elections. The terms used are agents (dailiren)ormiddle people (zhongjianren) who
personally dispense the gifts or cash to voters (Lin, 2007). These rural vote
brokers are villagers. They can also be friends, family members, and neighbors
who know their fellow villagers very well. The vote brokers as well as the
candidates they represent attend the election, and they are able to closely monitor
who shows up to the election. In some villages, the vote brokers make sure vote
sellers have a stake in the election outcome by withholding partial or full
payment until after the election and the “right” candidate wins (Lin, 2007). This
is a way to create a situation whereby villagers have a monetary stake in the
election outcome. The use of vote brokers in village elections reflects the growing
sophistication of vote buyers.
Another political factor is the relaxed judicial system and local police who allow
vote-buying practices to develop. In Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines, vote
The Price of Democracy 623
buyers relied on the willingness of local judges and police to look the other way
(Wang & Kurzman, 2007b). In Taiwan, weak judicial oversight was a contributing
factor in the emergence of vote buying (Rigger, 1999; Wu & Huang, 2004). In China,
vote buying in village elections also occurs under the supervision of the local party
branch and the township Public Security Bureau (PSB). The township government
is in charge of setting up but not interfering with village elections. According to
Article 4 of the Organic Law (1998), the township government provides “guidance,
support and assistance” to the village committee and election process. Township
election duties include candidate and voter registration, scheduling the election,
and overseeing final vote count to ensure a competitive nomination and election
process. In addition, the nonpopularly elected village party branch and the party
secretary are key political figures in the village. According to Article 3 of the
Organic Law (1998), the local party branch “play[s] the role of leadership core” in
the village and provides guidance and support to ensure villagers practice their
“democratic rights.” Thus, how do the local party cadres and township officials
view the new vote-buying activities? How can extreme incidents of vote buying
where the candidates spend over 100,000 yuan in a single village go unnoticed by
the township government or village party branch? Township officials are close to
villager activities and the village party secretaries are rural residents. During an
interview in 2007, a town official admitted that he knew of the vote-buying
activities, but he considered it a village matter and it did not require the attention
of the township government or PSB.3There is no indication that local authorities
attempt to protect vote-buying activities, nor are they paid off by wealthy candi-
dates; rather, it seems there is general acquiescence among local officials due to
vague laws and unclear sanctions for vote buying.
Economic factors that make office holding attractive, such as management of
a profitable collective industry or high land values, are powerful incentives for
some candidates who resort to vote buying as a means to gain office. This
explanation dominates much of the Chinese literature on vote buying. The most
common theme is land. No one owns land in China, and the village land is
collectively owned and managed by the village committee. As a result, elected
village leaders have control over village land-use contracts. In villages near urban
areas, the land values (i.e., value of the land-use contracts) over the last 10 years
have rapidly increased. Urbanization and the creation of new suburban industrial
parks provide unique opportunities for some village cadres. For instance, if an
urban developer approaches a village leader for a portion of land, then the
elected leader must first renegotiate villager land-use contracts and pay compen-
sation to villager households. Once villager compensation is agreed upon, the
village leader can negotiate a price for the developer’s land-use contact. The
leader may then be inclined to keep the cash difference between village compen-
sation and the new contract price. This is how a village party secretary in Shaanxi
province explained the process in a 2007 interview. He complained that in the
neighboring village, the current village leader spent over 20,000 yuan to buy
votes in the last election. When asked how the elected leader could ever make
back that kind of money on a village leader salary, the party secretary replied, “It
is easy. He will get the 20,000 yuan back and then some within six months after
he completes a land deal with the local developers.”4In this case, vote buying is
associated with land values.
624 Asian Politics & Policy
While there is currently no comprehensive study on vote buying in rural
China, reports suggest that vote buying is most prevalent in wealthier villages
close to urban centers, such as large metropolitan areas (Beijing, Shanghai, or
Shenzhen), provincial capitals (Chengdu, Xian, or Shenyang), district cities, and
even smaller county seats. This suggests a spatial dimension to vote buying.
However, the distance to urban centers may reflect a variation in the degree and
type of vote buying rather than whether vote buying exists. The Chinese popular
press sensationalizes the extreme cases that are typically in wealthy villages with
high land values near urban centers. Yet, academic and government reports from
the local Civil Affairs Bureaus suggest that vote buying is also prevalent is some
of the more remote villages. The type of vote buying in these villages is less
extravagant, such as candidates dispensing cigarettes, wine, or even a few yuan
for votes. Therefore, although the price of votes varies with the level of village
wealth and geography, the existence of vote-buying practices does not vary by
economic or geographic factors. This suggests intuitional factors may play a
significant role in the emergence of vote buying.
Beyond economic explanations, the two most influential institutional factors in
the literature are party systems and the introduction of political reforms. A
number of Western scholars suggest that candidate-centered politics are more
susceptible to vote buying than party-driven elections (Cary & Shugart, 1995).
One of the key factors is intraparty competition, that is, candidates within the
same party competing in a single election district (Lijphart, 1994). In this
situation, the party platform is no longer an ideological or practical policy tool
candidates can use to distinguish themselves from other candidates. Within a
single-party system where opposition parties are illegal, the key distinction
between candidates in local competitive elections is party vs. nonparty candi-
dates. This occurred in Taiwanese local elections before 1987. In mainland China,
village elections have also generated local competition between Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) candidates and nonparty candidates. Indeed, in a 2000 survey
of 36 villages in Shaanxi province, villagers were more likely to elect nonparty
candidates in competitive elections that had an open nomination process and
were free from township government or local party branch interference
(Kennedy, 2002). While party and nonparty candidates can distinguish them-
selves in a political race, this may become more difficult when all the candidates
are nonparty members. Under this condition, vote buying may be one way to set
the candidates apart. In fact, the rise in nonparty candidates may be a contributing
factor to the increase in vote-buying reports between 1998 and 2008.
In the Chinese press and academic journals, few articles discuss the presence
or absence of CCP candidates in vote-buying scandals. In a number of villages,
the party secretary will also run for village leader (L. Li, 1999). Thus, does the
opposition candidate need to resort to vote buying to compete? Does the local
party secretary also need to resort to vote buying to stay competitive? Indeed,
over the last few years there have been a number of local experiments with
electing village party secretaries. The most common is a competitive election
process among the village party members rather than a village-wide popular
election (L. Li, 1999). Still, studies on village party secretary elections to date have
focused little attention on vote buying in these contests. Although there are no
comprehensive studies on the characteristics of vote buyers, especially CCP
The Price of Democracy 625
affiliation at the village level, future research might examine the role and behav-
ior of the local party branch and party membership in elections that experience
widespread vote buying.
One of the most important institutional factors that influence the emergence
of vote buying is election reform (Schaffer, 2008). When the central and local
governments fully enforce election reforms that protect citizens from voter
intimidation and dramatically reduce the manipulation of the election process,
elections become truly competitive. Vote buying emerges when candidates can
no longer resort to threats and procedural manipulation (Lehoucq, 2007).
Vote buying is a reflection of competitive elections and successful democratic
(procedural) reforms. It is hard to imagine any political system with competitive
elections that has not gone through a period of vote buying. Almost all the
industrialized democracies have a history of vote buying. Vote buying dramati-
cally increased after the 1832 reforms in Great Britain that expanded the electorate
and improved the quality of elections (Lehoucq, 2007). In America, vote buying
was pervasive during the 1800s, especially after the influx of European immi-
grants in the 1880s. New democracies in Eastern Europe and Asia, such as
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, have experienced (and continue to expe-
rience) vote buying (Lehoucq, 2003; Pye, 1997; Schedler, 2002). It is part of the
electoral reform process and reflects a successful implementation of procedural
democracy.
Throughout the 1990s, village election research focused on the competitiveness
of the village elections, township interference in the village election process, and
the dual relationship between the popularly elected village leaders and the non-
popularly elected party secretary.5There were very few reports of vote buying at
the village level. In fact, the flood of vote-buying reports did not occur until after
the 1998 Organic Law that ensured an open nomination process. In addition,
greater top-down pressure to fully implement the 1998 Organic Law from the
national and provincial levels was a key factor in improving the quality of village
elections. Positive reports from the Ministry of Civil Affairs as well as the Carter
Center indicated that village elections were becoming more competitive. Indeed,
several Chinese scholars and key Ministry of Civil Affairs officials made the
connection between election reform and vote buying. In a 2000 Carter Center
report, the head of the Department of Basic Governance and Community in the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Zhan Chengfu, believed that “having a vote buying
problem was a good sign because it meant elections did take place and there was
competition.” Z. Li (2007) finds that vote buying emerges when election reforms
create a shift from office buying to vote buying. This shift is a positive institutional
development and reflects an advance in the village election process. The argu-
ment is similar to that of several American scholars, who suggest that the shift
from office to vote buying means the voter’s choice is important and the candidate
must distribute his or her bid among voters (Neeman & Orosel, 2006).
Distinction Between Outcomes of Vote-Buying Practices and
Vote Buying as an Outcome
The Chinese and Western literature draw attention to several outcomes of
vote-buying practices that are both negative and positive. The harmful outcomes
626 Asian Politics & Policy
include unequal access to local political offices and misuse of public resources.
Immediate solutions for these negative outcomes require stricter laws and a
stronger legal system. Possible positive outcomes are greater accountability and
representation of underrepresented groups. The third positive outcome is the
actual existence of vote buying. Vote buying is the result of competitive elections
and a desired outcome at the early stages of democratization. In this case, there is
no need for an immediate solution to the vote-buying phenomenon. Instead,
vote-buying practices can eventually be reduced through a more efficient legal
system and a change in voter attitudes toward vote buying (i.e., voter education).
One negative outcome that dominates the Western and Chinese literature is
how vote buying subverts democratic practices and equal access to political
power (Chen & Zhou, 2007; Lehoucq, 2003; Lin, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Only wealthy
individuals and groups can afford to buy enough votes to win office, and voters
are literally selling their interests to the highest bidder. The best way to resolve
this problem is to enact and enforce strict laws against vote buying with penalties
ranging from fines to jail time (Lin, 2007; Schaffer, 2008). Another way to bring
vote buying under control is voter education (Wang & Fu, 2007).
Still, in rural China, full implement of the election law down to the village level
is difficult to achieve. It took over a decade and two national laws (Organic Law
1988 and 1998) before most villages experienced relatively competitive elections.
The key mechanism that brought about the widespread implementation of
village elections was the commitment of local government officials at the town-
ship and county levels to not interfere with the election process. This came about
through a combination of continued pressure from higher authorities on county
and township officials as well as villagers’ demands and push from below that
provided the opportunity to improve the quality of village elections across rural
China. However, it takes a well-developed legal system, such as an independent
judicial authority and local PSB, to successfully stem vote buying. Local judges
and PSB officers have to be willing and able to identify and prosecute offenders
at the village level. This is the exact problem that many Chinese scholars and
Ministry of Civil Affairs officials point out. It may be easier to fully implement
competitive elections than it is to eliminate vote buying. The lingering question
for the national leadership is does vote buying have to be resolved before the
expansion of direct elections for township and county leaders.
Another negative outcome of vote buying that tends to stand out in the
Chinese literature is the elected leader’s misuse of village (public) resources.
Some candidates will spend huge sums of money and extend favors once in office
in an attempt to control village resources, such as land-use contracts and collec-
tive enterprises. The danger for village constituents occurs when this type of
elected leader does not plan to run for reelection. In this case, the elected leader
may use his or her position to loot local resources as much as he or she can before
the next election. This can undermine the function of elections to make elected
leaders more accountable to their constituents through periodic election (or
reelection). Several Chinese scholars suggest that the best way to resolve the
problem of vote buying and misuse of public resources is to eliminate village
committee authority over local resources, such as land and collective enterprises
(Dang, 2008). The logic is that if you abolish the authority over village economic
or profitable resources, then there will be no incentive for unscrupulous candi-
The Price of Democracy 627
dates to buy votes. However, this may also reduce the role of the village leader to
a powerless cadre whose only function is to carry out unpopular policy demands
from the township authorities, such as family planning. This also removes the
incentive for qualified candidates to run for office. While these village elections
may be free from vote buying, the election process may become a meaningless
exercise to elect someone to a politically hollow position. In addition, reducing
the profit incentive of the elected office may not be a viable solution if election
reform is extended to the township and county levels.
Within the literature, there are two narrow positive outcomes from vote-
buying practices and one broad positive institutional development. The first
outcome is associated with the shift from office buying to vote buying. This
reflects the institutional development from appointments to local direct elec-
tions. Several Chinese scholars suggest that this shift spreads the bribe wealth
more evenly among village voters, that is, from single authority figure to the
village constituency (Z. Li, 2007). As opposed to scholars who argue that vote
buying reduces accountability, these scholars contend that vote buying actually
increases accountability of the candidates and elected leaders. Villagers still have
the electoral authority to recall the elected leader or kick him or her out of office
in the following election. In fact, vote buying does not ensure victory. Even
candidates who spend huge sums of money can lose the election. For example, in
2008, one losing candidate in Guangdong providence paid up to 1,500 yuan for
individual ballots and spent over 200,000 yuan by the end of the election (“Indi-
vidual Spends,” 2008). In 2007, a candidate for a village election in a Beijing
district paid 1.5 million yuan for the election and was still defeated (“Candidate
for Village Leader,” 2007). Of course, voters have to be aware of the looting
problem and whether the candidates or elected leaders intend to run for reelec-
tion. Nevertheless, China is still in the early stages of election reform, and the
shift from office to vote buying is a positive outcome.
The second positive outcome is greater representation for underrepresented
groups. One of the ways candidates buy votes is through promises made to
villagers to help with individual or family problems, such as legal permits or
registration problems. Stokes (2007) argues that it is the poor whose interests are
lost after a vote-buying transaction is complete. However, if candidates keep
their campaign promises (promised favors), then this may provide poorer resi-
dents with access to elected leaders that they otherwise could not obtain. Typi-
cally, poorer villagers do not have long-standing relations with village cadres and
the party branch. Thus, one of the few ways these rural residents can get some
social or political benefits from the village committee is through the sale of their
votes. This is similar to the argument that vote buying played a positive role for
immigrant communities in late 1800s America and the political machines.
However, beyond vote-buying outcomes is the view that vote buying in and of
itself is a positive and desired outcome. If vote buying emerges as a result of
competitive elections with an open nomination process, then vote buying may be
a desired outcome. This is a crucial development in a country that is in the early
stages of election reforms. In China, indirect elections occur at every level of
government, from the National People’s Congress to the municipal leadership.
There are also direct elections for local People’s Congress representatives, but
these elections typically have a closed nomination process. That is, the candidates
628 Asian Politics & Policy
are preselected. There are also party member elections for party officials and local
party secretaries. This is part of the new election reforms that aim to develop
intraparty democracy. However, popular elections with an open nomination
process and noninterference from higher authorities only occur at the village
level. This explains why the largest proportion of vote-buying reports is associ-
ated with village elections.
Indeed, most of the bribery cases above the village level are considered office
buying rather than vote buying. At annual meetings for the National People’s
Congress, there is a flurry of expensive gift giving among top official and del-
egates who wish to be “elected” into higher positions (Barboza, 2009). There are
also numerous cases of party secretaries at the county, municipal, and provincial
levels arrested for accepting bribes for various promotions and favors (“China
Punishes,” 2007). At higher administrative levels, there is a narrow constituency
of a few individuals, and office seekers may attempt to provide gifts to a single
official as opposed to vote buying at the village level, where the individual
candidate provides gifts to a large constituency. Thus, one expected and desired
outcome of election reforms is the shift from office to vote buying.
Concluding Thoughts
China is currently experiencing political growing pains that occur when the
national leadership is attempting election and legal reforms at the same time. This
creates political gaps or spaces between election and legal reforms. First is the
gap that arises after the reduction of direct appointments for leading government
officials but before the introduction of popular elections for most high authorities.
Second is the interim after the promotion of direct elections, but before an inde-
pendent judiciary and legal system is fully functioning.
Vote buying exists in these political spaces. While vote buying may be generally
regarded as a corrupt practice, it also reflects positive procedural democratic
development. In the early stages of democratization it may very well be the price
of democracy. Viewed in this light, vote buying is an important indicator of
democratic progress. Thus, for China, vote buying should not be perceived as a
hindrance to further election reforms. In fact, in the near future, successful
competitive elections for township government heads should exhibit signs of vote
buying.
Notes
1As stated below, it is office buying that is a serious issue at these higher levels of party government.
2Interview, June 11, 2004.
3Interview, January 5, 2007.
4Interview, July 12, 2007.
5For the most comprehensive collection of articles in Chinese and English on village elections in
China, see China Elections and Governance at http://www.chinaelections.org/.
References
Abbott, W. W. (1983). The papers of George Washington. Colonial Series. Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press.
The Price of Democracy 629
Barboza, D. (2009, March 14). For bribing officials, Chinese give the best. New York Times,p.A1.
Bowie, K. A. (2008). Vote buying and village outrage in an election in northern Thailand: Recent legal
reforms in historical context. Journal of Asian Studies,67, 469–511.
Campbell, T. (2005). Deliver the vote: A history of election fraud, an American political tradition: 1742–2004.
New York: Carroll & Graf.
Carter Center. (2000). Fourth observation of Chinese village elections. Carter Center Documents.
Retrieved February 11, 2009, from http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/539.html#12.
Cary, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral
formulas. Electoral Studies,14, 417–439.
Chen, G., & Zhou, J. (2007). Huixuan wenti burong hushi [Do not neglect the vote buying problem].
In Quanguo cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju gongzuo jinzhan baogao 2005–2007 [Report on the progress
of national villager committee election work 2005–2007] (pp. 597–599). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui
Chubanshe [China Social Publishing].
Chen, L. (2009, January). Huixuan ji yuru cunweihui zuzhifa [Vote buying and reading the
Organic Law]. Ministry of Civil Affairs. Retrieved February 18, 2009, from http://
www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=113405.
China punishes 192 officials for electoral fraud. (2007, January 2). China Daily. Retrieved Febuary 11,
2009, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/01/content_798893.htm.
Cunweihui huanjie luoxuan renzibao 20 wan mai xuanpiao [Individual spends 200,000 yuan to buy
votes for village committee and loses the election]. (2008, May 17). Southern Net. Retrieved
November 20, 2008, from http://gd.news.163.com/08/0417/08/49NHO20C003600FQ.html.
Cunzhuren jingxuanren zibaohuafei 150 wan huixuan reng laobai [Candidate for village leader
election spends 1.5 million yuan to buy votes and is still defeated]. (2007, November 26). Jinghua
Shibao. Retrieved December 15, 2008, from http://www.huixian.net/viewnews-16609.html.
Dang, G. (2008, August 6). Zhihuixuang xu jianshao cunguan quanlide hanjinliang [Dealing with vote
buying requires reducing village control over cherished monetary measures]. China Elections
and Governance. Retrieved December 15, 2008, from http://www.chinaelections.org/
NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=132396.
Farrand, M. (1937). Records of the federal convention of 1787 (Vol. 2). New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Guangdong dongyuan cunmin biezhihua 160 wan mai xuanpiao dang cunzhuren [Guangdong
Dongyuan villager spent 1.6 million yuan to buy votes for village leader position]. (2008, May 17).
Nanfang dushibao [Southern Daily]. Retrieved November 20, 2008, from http://news.
sina.com.cn/s/l/2008-04-17/120215375871.shtml.
Hicken, A. D. (2007). How do rules and institutions encourage vote buying. In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.),
Elections for sale: The causes and consequences of vote buying (pp. 47–60). Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner.
Kennedy, J. J. (2002). The face of “grassroots democracy”: The substantive difference between real and
cosmetic elections in rural China. Asian Survey,42, 456–482.
Lehoucq, F. (2003). Electoral fraud: Causes, types, and consequences. Annual Review of Political Science,
6, 233–256.
Lehoucq, F. (2007). When does a market for vote buying emerge? In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.), Elections for
sale: The causes and consequences of vote buying (pp. 33–46). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Li, H., Yue, R., & Lai, Z. (2008, August 8). Minzhengbu guanyuan tan cunweihui he juweihui xuanju
[Ministry of Civil Affairs official discusses village and neighborhood committee elections]. China
Elections and Governance. Retrieved December 5, 2008, from http://www.chinaelections.org/
NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=132260.
Li, L. (1999). The two-ballot system in Shanxi province: Subjecting village party secretaries to a
popular vote. The China Journal,42(July), 103–118.
Li, Z. (2007, August 13). “Huixuan” yeshi jinbu [“Vote buying” is also progress]. China Election and
Governances. Retrieved November 20, 2008, from http://www.chinaelections.org/
NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=114483.
Lijphart, A. (1994). Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945–1990.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lin, R. (2007). Guanyu pojie cunweihui huanjie xuanju zhonghuixuan wentide sikao [Considering
about explaining the vote buying within village committee election]. In Quanguo cunmin weiyuan-
hui xuanju gongzuo jinzhan baogao 2005–2007 [Report on the progress of national villager committee
election work 2005–2007] (pp. 592–596). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe [China Social
Publishing].
Liu, L. (2006, October 4). Huhehaote bufen cunwei houxuanren mai xuanpiao meizhang biaojia 1000
yuan [Village candidates from part of Huhehaote municipality buy votes for 1000 yuan apiece].
Liaowang xinwenzhoukan [Liaowang Newsweek]. Retrieved November 20, 2008, from http://
china.rednet.cn/c/2006/10/04/996296.htm.
630 Asian Politics & Policy
Mutch, R. E. (2001). Three centuries of campaign finance law. In J. Lubenow (Ed.), A user’s guide to
campaign finance reform (pp. 1–24). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Neeman, Z., & Orosel, G. O. (2006). On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common
interests. International Review of Law and Economics,26, 536–556.
Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. American
Political Science Review,102, 19–32.
Oi, J. C., & Rozelle, S. (2000). Elections and power: The locus of decision-making in Chinese villages.
China Quarterly,162, 513–539.
Organic Law. (1998). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunminweiyuanhui zuzhifa [The People’s Republic of
China Organic Law of villager committees]. Beijing: Legal Publishing House.
Premier Wen meets European press ahead of visit. (2006, June 9). Xinhua News Agency. Retrieved
January 24, 2009, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200609/06/content_5064453_2.
htm.
Pye, L. W. (1997). Money politics and transitions to democracy in East Asia. Asian Survey,37, 213–228.
Qian, S. (2005, August 8). Zhizhi huixuan cunguan haixu zhiben zhice [Curbing village level vote
buying requires radical policy measures]. Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily]. Retrieved November 20, 2008,
from http://www1.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/200422394062/200581083241.html.
Rigger, S. (1999). Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy. London: Routledge.
Riordon, W. L. (1963). Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A series of very plain talks on very practical politics.New
York: Dutton.
Schaffer, F. C. (2008). The hidden costs of clean election reform. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schaffer, F. C., & Schedler, A. (2007). What is vote buying? In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.), Elections for sale: The
causes and consequences of vote buying (pp. 17–32). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Schedler, A. (2002). The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy,13(2), 36–50.
Si, T. (2007, November 28). Huixuan weibi buminzhu [Vote buying is not necessarily undemocratic].
China Election and Governance. Retrieved December 15, 2008, from http://www.
chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=119425.
Snyder, R., & Samuels, D. (2001). Devaluing the vote in Latin America. Journal of Democracy,12,
146–159.
Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics and evidence from
Argentina. American Political Science Review,99, 315–325.
Stokes, S. (2007). Is vote buying undemocratic? In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.), Elections for sale: The causes and
consequences of vote buying (pp. 81–100). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Wang, C. S., & Kurzman, C. (2007a). Dilemmas of electoral clientelism: Taiwan, 1993. International
Political Science Review,28, 225–245.
Wang, C. S., & Kurzman, C. (2007b). Logistics: How to buy votes. In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.), Elections for
sale: The causes and consequences of vote buying (pp. 61–79). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Wang, D., & Fu, W. (2007). Qiantan cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju zhong huixuan wentide yufang yu
zhili [Discussion regarding the prevention and management of vote buying problem within
village committee elections]. In Quanguo cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju gongzuo jinzhan baogao 2005–
2007 [Report on the progress of national villager committee election work 2005–2007] (pp. 589–591).
Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe [China Social Publishing].
Wu, C., & Huang, C. (2004). Politics and judiciary verdicts on vote-buying litigation in Taiwan. Asian
Survey,44, 755–770.
Xu, Y. (2006). Cunweihui zhixuan zhongde huixuan xianxiang [Vote buying phenomena among
village committee direct election]. Zhongyang Zhejiangsheng Weidang Xiaoxuebao [Central Zhe-
jiang Province Party School Journal] (Vol. 6). Retrieved November 20, 2008, from http://
www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=112373.
Ye, P. (2007, July 19). Nongcun huixuan: Xuanpiao gupiao chaopiao [Rural vote buying: Ballots as
stock notes]. Lianhe Zaobao [Lianhe Morning Paper]. Retrieved December 15, 2008, from http://
www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=113405.
The Price of Democracy 631
