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Plea Bargaining Before the ICTY
Abstract
Chapter in Essays in ICTY Procedure and Evidence - Essays in Honour of President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. May, Richard et al. Kluwer Law International. 151 - Studies and analyses the beginnings of the plea bargaining practice at the ICTY, juxtaposes the practice with admissions of guilt at the ICC and in civil law domestic systems and critiques the use of the model for the purposes of international criminal justice.
The pronouncements of punishment for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will be among its most important legacies for international law and international relations. The purpose of our research is to examine the judges' opinions on the determinants of punishment and, most especially, the data on sentences handed down by the trial chambers in order to understand which factors are the most powerful in explaining sentences. We nd that there is a fair degree of consistency in the sentences conferred on the guilty. By systematically examining all the sentences both doctrinally and empirically we can see that sentences are premised on those critical factors that the judges are admonished to employ by the ICTY Statute and their own Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
The author traces the evolution of the concept of guilty pleas in international criminal law as developed by the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. These international tribunals, alongside their sister hybrid criminal courts, not only irreversibly changed the landscape of international law but played a pioneering role in establishing a credible international criminal justice system, by producing the main body of jurisprudence on guilty pleas in the context of wide-spread international crimes. As a foundation member of the Office of The Prosecutor, in one of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals established since the end of the Second World War, the author was not only privy to many of the challenges encountered by international prosecutors but was also uniquely placed to discuss the plea-bargaining processes adopted by these international criminal courts. Having led the negotiations in three of nine guilty pleas obtained by prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the author examines the development and practice of guilty plea negotiations in the context of large-scale international crimes. Well apart from the cost, duration, scale and complexity of prosecuting international crimes, the author concludes that the divergence in legal cultures of various actors in the transitional justice system contributed to the complexity of negotiating guilty pleas before international criminal courts. Nevertheless, the surrounding political circumstances made it imperative for various stakeholders operating therein to embrace the concept of guilty plea negotiations to avoid lengthy and expensive international trials.KeywordsGuilty pleasInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)Plea bargain negotiations and agreementsInternational criminal law
Cambridge Core - Human Rights - Model(ing) Justice - by Kerstin Bree Carlson
Happy Birthday, ICTY! I remember the birth of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia quite well because I was in the room for the big event. A guest of the U.S. delegation, I sat behind U.S. Representative Madeleine K. Albright in May, 1993, as she negotiated and voted for the establishment of the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. (That's me behind Secretary Albright in the CNN file footage, rocking from side to side like an expectant father, straining to get a better look at the proceedings.) Like any birth, this one had its share of labor pains, and like any newborn, this one – a piece of paper, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal – was an almost weightless little bundle, lacking definition but full of promise. How the little one has grown! The Tribunal now employs over a thousand people, and its annual budget exceeds 248 million gross, or $223 million net, for 2002-03).
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