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The 'Century of Humiliation,' Then and Now: Changing Chinese Perceptions Of the International Order
Abstract
Chinese elites today draw on the “Century of Humiliation” (1839–1949) as a starting point for their views on how China should interact with other nations. Arguments about the nature of international competition, about the reasons that nations succeed or fail in the international arena, and about the prospects for long-term global peace and cooperation draw not just on China's experiences during that period, but on the vocabulary and debates that Qing- and republican-era intellectuals developed to understand the modern international system.
Today there are at least three views among Chinese elites of the international system and China's role in it. All three start from the implicit premise that today's international system has not changed in its essence from the 19th century: the world is composed of strong and weak nation-states that vie for dominance on the global stage. They differ, however, on whether this state of affairs is permanent and on what global role China should seek. Some assert that the international system still revolves around Western interests that aim to subjugate and humiliate weaker nations, and that China's bitter experiences during the Century of Humiliation should provide a cautionary tale about the dangers of this system. A second viewpoint suggests that the current system is acceptable now that China can play a prominent role in it. They assert that China's period of humiliation has ended, and that China should now seek to ensure the stability of the system and to assure other nations of its commitment to doing so. This view suggests that the potential dangers of a competitive international system can be mitigated by adapting existing institutions and practices. A third line of reasoning suggests that China is in a unique position to fundamentally remake the international system because its experiences of shame and subjugation have given the Chinese people an alternative vision of how international relations can and should be conducted.
... wiki.pl?if=gb&res=900281& searchu=%E4%BB%96%E7%A8%AE%E4%BA%BA (accessed 16 September 2017). 21 See Kaufman (2010), who claims that 'most of these writers did not address whether equality among nations could truly coexist with international competition; nor did they say whether China sought to prevail over other nations or simply be "equal" with them' (10). 22 Available at www.marxists.org/ ...
... On Maoist ideology in China's foreign policy, see Harris and Worden (1986, 2), GT Yu (1988, 850), and Li (2007, 70). 32 Quoted in Kaufman (2010 Lu (2010, 19). Qing Liu (2014, 133) in this respect states that 'he er bu tong' 'bespeaks a "dialogical universalism" of "harmony without homogeneity" '. 34 The creation of an 'Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank' was first proposed in 2009 at the Bo'ao Forum; 'One Belt One Road' was inspired by the global financial crisis. ...
... 49 For the notions of 'chosen trauma' and 'chosen glory', see Volkan (1997, 4-10). 50 Kaufman (2010) 3 Author's personal communications and interviews in Jakarta, Singapore, and Tokyo in 2015. 4 In 2012, the Japanese government nationalised three of the disputed islands, which led to a major diplomatic crisis with, and economic retaliation by, China. ...
... Various cultural, historical, religious, and philosophical factors affected China's strategic culture during the course of its evolution. As termed by China, the 'century of humiliation ' (1839-1949) was marked by external interventions and subjugation of the Chinese Empire by the West, Russia and Japan (Kaufman, 2010). China faced fragmentation in its domestic policies, lost several wars, including the First and Second Opium Wars, and was forced to offer a major concession to the western powers after the treaties such as those of Nanking, Peaking, Aigun, Shimonoseki (Kaufman, 2010). ...
... As termed by China, the 'century of humiliation ' (1839-1949) was marked by external interventions and subjugation of the Chinese Empire by the West, Russia and Japan (Kaufman, 2010). China faced fragmentation in its domestic policies, lost several wars, including the First and Second Opium Wars, and was forced to offer a major concession to the western powers after the treaties such as those of Nanking, Peaking, Aigun, Shimonoseki (Kaufman, 2010). Western interference during the 19 th century had a considerable impact on China's foreign policy initiatives, which are visible even in the present times (Farwa, 2018). ...
China’s strategic involvement in the African region is multi-faceted as it seeks to bolster economic, political, and security ties. Chinese security and political engagement with African countries are driven by its interest in stimulating its economic rise. This research is qualitative and exploratory in nature and utilizes the concept of strategic culture to analyze the motivations behind Beijing’s interests and behavior in the African continent. Confucian-Mencian and Parabellum form two major strands of Chinese Strategic Culture, making it a unique Cult of Defense. Three important case studies have been analyzed through the prism of the country’s strategic culture, i.e. Chinese economic engagement with one of its largest trading partners― South Africa―, Chinese political engagement in the conflicts of Sudan and South Sudan, and lastly, its security engagement in Djibouti where it established its first foreign military base. Chinese three-dimensional engagements in Africa have had both positive and negative implications for the region. This research concludes that Chinese strategic culture is not static and likely to adapt itself in accordance with the opportunities available for Beijing and its goals in Africa.
... KEY WORDS: Chinese Political Economy; Technological Warfare; Rise of China; New World Order INTRODUCCIÓN El crecimiento económico de China desde 1980 hasta la actualidad es el mayor y más prolongado de la historia moderna, llegando a multiplicar su PIB por 75 y siendo actualmente la primera economía del mundo en paridad de poder adquisitivo (Li, 2020). Este hito le ha permitido regresar a un lugar que ha ocupado la mayor parte de la historia, esto es, el de las potencias económicas más importantes del mundo, que solo ha abandonado durante un periodo concreto de la historia: el del siglo de humillación (1839( -1949( ) (Kaufman, 2010. ...
... China ha sido la economía más grande del mundo hasta el siglo XIX, suponiendo entre 1500 y 1820 un cuarto de la producción mundial (Li, 2020). Sin embargo, después de una larga decadencia interna y de quedar al margen de la Revolución Industrial, el país asiático entraría en el "siglo de humillación" (1839-1949) (Kaufman, 2010), perdiendo todas las guerras y cayendo bajo el control de potencias extranjeras (Li, 2020;Vázquez y Orellana, 2021;Vázquez, 2021b). Durante esta etapa, la decadencia del país es abrumadora, perdiendo su estatus internacional y llegando a alcanzar uno de los niveles de pobreza más grandes del mundo (Vázquez y Orellana, 2021;Vázquez, 2021b). ...
Con el nacimiento de la República Popular de China y la progresiva inserción en la globalización comercial y financiera desde la década de los ochenta, el país asiático ha llegado a convertirse en la potencia económica más importante del mundo junto a Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, los límites del modelo de crecimiento de China y la estrategia de contención de Estados Unidos, provocan que Pekín se vea ante la necesidad de transformar la economía del país. Los objetivos del Gobierno pasan por impulsar un crecimiento que dependa más del consumo interno, situar al país en las primeras posiciones en las cadenas globales de valor y aumentar la autonomía tecnológica y, a su vez, adquirir un rol más proactivo en la economía mundial. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los límites y posibilidades del país asiático para cumplir dichos objetivos. Para ello, se realizará un análisis de la evolución de la economía china en las últimas décadas, mediante la interpretación de los principales indicadores macroeconómicos, evaluando su impacto en la política económica interna y externa.
... The 'century of humiliation' -the period of colonialist and imperialist intervention between 1839 and 1949 (Kaufman, 2010), has been a recurring topic in the patriotic education. The discourse of 'century of humiliation' retells and reproduces stories of China's victimisation since the Opium War on the one hand, and CPC's heroic achievements for ending China's past humiliation and safeguarding the nation on the other. ...
... The dynamic would tilt completely towards Britain after the Anglo-Chinese War (1839-1842) and the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. The treaty, formally ending the First Opium War, abolished various monopolies, opened ports to foreign trade, demanded Chinese reparations, ceded tariff control to London and helped usher the 'century of humiliation' (Kaufman 2010). It formed the intellectual basis for future unequal treaties, especially the 1855 Bowring Treaty between London and Bangkok, which was more intrusive than its 1826 predecessor (Bowring 2014). ...
A longstanding view in realist studies of international relations has been that within the context of great power competition, lesser states must choose between balancing or bandwagoning. However, a third option is also available: strategic hedging, which provides a means of explaining foreign policy strategies that do not traditionally fit within this standard binary. This article seeks to explain the Kingdom of Siam’s (modern-day Thailand) foreign policy during the nineteenth century when growing competition between European powers, namely France and Britain, manifested itself in aggressive and competitive intervention into South East Asia. Siam presents a unique case study, as it is one of only two states in Asia to resist direct colonization during that period. This article explores how, through a flexible foreign policy of strategic hedging in which complementary and mutually counteracting actions were undertaken within a wider context of great power competition, Siam maintained independence as a sovereign state.
... Rancière's generic term for such fi gures of division, and the third element of politics, is 'wrong' or 'an injustice that needs to be addressed' (Rancière 1995: 97). From BRICS' perspective, 'wrong' could be signifi ed by a largely Western narrative of world history (Zakaria 2009: 34-5), colonial and postcolonial grievances, China's 'century of humiliation' (Kaufman 2010), Russia's post-Cold War humiliation, or (legacies of) apartheid in South Africa. As previously mentioned, a more immediate wrong of concern to BRICS as a group is the inadequate representativeness of international fi nancial institutions. ...
Our age is celebrated as the triumph of liberal democracy. Old ideological battles have been decisively resolved in favour of freedom and the market. We are told that we have moved ‘beyond left and right’; that we are ‘all in this together’. Any remaining differences are to be addressed through expert knowledge, consensual deliberation and participatory governance. Yet the ‘end of history’ has also been marked by widespread disillusion with mainstream politics and a rise in nationalist and religious fundamentalisms. And now an explosion of popular protests is challenging technocratic regulation and the power of markets in the name of democracy itself. This collection seeks to make sense of this complex and paradoxical situation by critically engaging with the influential theory of ‘the post-political’ developed by Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek and others. Through a multi-dimensional and fiercely contested assessment of contemporary depoliticisation, The Post-Political and Its Discontents urges us to confront the closure of our political horizons and re-imagine the possibility of emancipatory change.
... China considers cyberspace as important in the twenty-first century as maritime in the nineteenth and aerospace in the twentieth century. Nineteenth century predominance of Great Britain in the maritime space led to other states exploiting it for carving out China into spheres of influencewhat is known as century of humiliation in China (Kaufman, 2010;Mirza & Khan, 2020). Similarly, twentieth century predominance of the United States in the aerospace arena led to encirclement of China in the South China Sea and East China Sea. ...
... By 2008, the policies of Deng Xiaoping meant that China emerged as the eco nomie centre of East and Southeast Asia. Against the background of the effects of the financial and economie crises that hit the Western world, a transition to a new stage of China's national policies became apparent (Kaufman, 2010). In political rhetoric it was stressed that China had become an 'equal' partner with • all other nations and that the Chinese nation could thus engage in a dialogue with ■ equals. ...
... We begin by noting the overwhelming post-war imperative for China's new communist leaders of consolidating control over a war-torn and divided country. Once achieved, their new reference point was a China relatively invulnerable to the predations and humiliations it had suffered for more than 100 years at the hands of European and Japanese imperialism (Blanchard and Lin, 2013;Buckley, 2014;Callahan, 2006;Kaufman, 2010;Wirth, 2020). Under Deng Xiaoping in particular, this resulted in a foreign policy focused on cultivating a congenial international environment for China's economic development. ...
Most analysts and commentators portray China's conduct in the South China Sea as a series of aggressive norm violations by an emerging peer competitor to the United States. We argue that this narrative misreads both the substance and dynamics of recent Chinese policy. Since 2016, China has strenuously sought – and largely managed – not to be in technical violation of the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal ruling despite having publicly disavowed it and has attempted to position itself as a champion of win–win co-operation. This stands in stark contrast to the previous four years in which China rather shockingly began asserting itself with little regard for either legality or diplomatic nicety – the period in which the “aggressive China” narrative gelled. What explains China's whiplash behaviour? Why has the international community largely failed to notice recent changes and adjust the narrative accordingly? We argue that the answers to these questions lie in an eclectic appeal to bureaucratic struggles, the regime's two-level game balancing domestic and international pressures, and psychological considerations. These do not, however, provide satisfactory accounts either of China's behaviour or of the international response in the absence of recognising the crucial importance of second-order rules for making, interpreting, and applying first-order rules in the international system. Social practices of rule-making, in short, provide vital context. Our analysis suggests a series of takeaways both for International Relations theory and for managing relations with China.
... China considers cyberspace as important in the twenty-first century as maritime in the nineteenth and aerospace in the twentieth century. Nineteenth century predominance of Great Britain in the maritime space led to other states exploiting it for carving out China into spheres of influencewhat is known as century of humiliation in China (Kaufman, 2010;Mirza & Khan, 2020). Similarly, twentieth century predominance of the United States in the aerospace arena led to encirclement of China in the South China Sea and East China Sea. ...
Cyber sovereignty means that states have authority within a fixed boundary to devise rules, laws, and norms about behaviour of individuals, institutions, applications, and other actors and factors in the cyberspace. This idea is intrinsically associated with information security propagated by China, which is a broader concept and is not only limited to defending networks, computers, and confidentiality-dealt by the Western idea of cyber security-but also includes controlling and filtering content in the cyberspace and the communication tools, especially the ones that may damage the government and create schisms in the society. China's ultimate objective remains to try to establish a multilateral global cyber order-within the ambit of rule of law-based upon nationalised cyberspace, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, cyber sovereignty, and mutual honour. An order based upon the principles of equality and justice where every state, small or big, will be having fair share in the management of the cyberspace. This is an exploratory and explanatory study conducted using content analysis in which data is drawn from primary and secondary sources. It tries to conceptualise the idea of China's cyber sovereignty and notes that how is China utilising it to make the cyberspace in its image and develop a global cyber order-in stark contrast to the Western and US image of the cyber order.
... The modes through which the west dominated other states during the nineteenth and early twentieth century have ramifications today, shaping the institutions and identities and nationalisms of those that were controlled. For example, there is a plausible case to be made that the humiliations of the nineteenth century shape China's historical and political memory to this day (Kaufman 2010). Alternative forms of hierarchy also have immediate consequences for contemporary foreign policy. ...
Hierarchy in international relations has often been understood as an arrangement with a single dominant state controlling aspects of the subordinate actor's sovereignty. While such arrangements play an important role in structuring international politics, it does not exhaust the forms that hierarchy can take. Very often hierarchies have developed where multiple states jointly claim control of the same sovereign rights of the subordinate state. This paper introduces a new conceptualization of hierarchy where the sovereign rights of the subordinate state are understood as a resource that can be controlled by multiple dominant states. As with other resources, different types of property regimes can be developed to organize access and extraction of sovereignty, such as common property resources regimes. Finally, an explanation of common-pool hierarchy regimes is developed and explored using two case studies: European imperialism in the nineteenth-century China and the scramble for Africa.
... For instance, the "Century of Humiliation" is a major theme in the previously mentioned education campaigns of the 1990s and is still well-known nowadays (Kaufman, 2010). ...
This university paper is about Chinese state-affiliated media on Twitter and their representation of Chinese nationalism.
... Not just the British (Treaty of Nanjing in 1842), but the United States, France (Treaty of Whampoa in 1844), Russia (Treaty of Aigun in 1858) and Japan (Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895) also benefitted from these unequal treaties that were imposed on China. This period is firmly embedded in the psyche of Chinese people as its 'Century of Humiliation' (1839 to 1949) and it is the birth of the CCP which ended this period of misery with the communist revolution (Kaufman 2010). This narrative explains why the Chinese government today prefers that legal development and reform must come from within China. ...
It is no secret that a nation state’s domestic legal system, its functioning and continued reformation is essential to maintain the ‘rule of law’. While the notion of this ‘rule of law’ differs from state to state based on the extent of enshrined constitutional guarantees, independence of the judiciary and various other socio-cultural factors, China and India present two very contrasting examples.
This paper will delve into exploring the origin and nature of the differences that these two states exhibit in their understanding of ‘rule of law’. After delineating these schisms, the authors analyze the myriad forms in which these base differences have manifested themselves in China’s and India’s approach to international legal order governed by public international law.
... While China may have overcome feudal and colonial oppression and emerged from "100 years of humiliation" (Alison, 2010), it has joined the transnational capitalist states in a global market dominated by neoliberalism. Its major industries remain state-owned. ...
Educational drama is a term that has in recent years achieved a pride of place in the field of arts-based research. During previous centuries, however, drama was considered anathema to formal learning and theaters themselves were considered “sinks of uncleanliness” (Coggin, 1956, p. 38). Only in recent history has educational drama been considered a legitimate means of teaching and learning. While Dorothy Heathcote, Gavin Bolton, Richard Courtney and others have helped to legitimize the fecund role that drama plays in learning, there has, to date, been a dearth of studies utilizing interdisciplinary approaches such as playbuilding (a participatory arts-based research methodology) in the context of critical pedagogy and its emphasis on developing critical self-reflexivity and critical praxis among students. Furthermore, little research of this nature has found its way into educational research in international settings. This current research project involves eight Chinese graduate student volunteers from a teacher training university in Northeast China who agreed to pursue the collective project of creating a theatrical production; and performing in front of a select audience of their peers and professors. The main part of the research (the collective creation of a play) took place over 5 weeks, with a total of 8 playbuilding sessions: two sessions each week, consisting of 6 hours per session, followed by a live theatrical performance. The fundamental question framing this research project is posed as follows: How can the process of playbuilding serve as a creative means for students to problem-pose their university experiences through the development of protagonistic agency (i.e., from the role of a spectator to that of an actor)? The researcher served as the lead researcher, facilitated the creation of the play and served as an actor in the theatrical production. Her responsibilities were to introduce the students to improvisational drama, and the playbuilding approach, and to co-create with her participants conditions that would result in what the researcher named “protagonistic agency.” Throughout their collective creation process, the group demonstrated various ways to embody protagonistic agency.
... It is narrated that the harmonious and benign Tianxia order was forcefully replaced with the Hobbesian world in the wake of the Opium War of the mid nineteenth century. This shift was a national trauma that has been deeply entrenched in the Chinese mind through the government's ideological reeducation of the public (Wang 2012;Kaufman 2010). From this problematique, the question 'What is China?' is continuously raised and contested in Chinese national politics of memory. ...
This article analyses competing discourses on a postmodern world order perpetuated by the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which are themselves built on their own pre-modern or early modern (inter)state models. Among several dimensions of the growing struggle between the two superpowers, this article focuses on their contestation of global norms or the standard of civilization regarding the question of world governance. What is unique in the contemporary competition between America and China is the fact that both countries aim to alter the fundamental organizing principle of modern world politics; they are against not only the balance of power system but also the imperial order, both of which originated from the modern European system. Indeed, Washington and Beijing strive to offer a third organizing principle beyond the conventional dyad in the modern discipline of international relations (IR) of anarchy and hierarchy. In terms of an analytic framework, this article explores the constitutive processes of self-identity formation in America and China against the European other (the Westphalian system and imperialism), thereby demonstrating the two states’ exceptionalist doctrines and their alternative visions for a postmodern world order.
... Having accepted the norm of the modern nation-state system, these leaders no longer thought of China as the centre of the world and Chinese culture as a universal set of values. But they have shared a strong sense that China should be restored to its rightful status as a great power as they believed China's 77 Kaufman (2010), no. 1, at 2. 78 Ibid., at 1. 79 Ibid., at 3. Notably, some scholars have strongly criticized the consumption of national humiliation in China, e.g. Wang, Z. (2012). ...
China’s long history has yielded an abundance of cultural relics. Unfortunately, since the mid-nineteenth century, many Chinese cultural relics have been destroyed or removed from China by various means. The term ‘lost cultural relics’ refers to Chinese cultural objects looted, stolen, clandestinely excavated or illegally trafficked between 1840 and 1949. Although there are no definitive totals of the lost Chinese cultural relics, the Chinese Society of Cultural Relics estimates more than ten million pieces of invaluable Chinese cultural objects have ‘sunk into oblivion’ in Europe, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asian nations since the First Opium War.
... Having accepted the norm of the modern nation-state system, these leaders no longer thought of China as the centre of the world and Chinese culture as a universal set of values. But they have shared a strong sense that China should be restored to its rightful status as a great power as they believed China's 77 Kaufman (2010), no. 1, at 2. 78 Ibid., at 1. 79 Ibid., at 3. Notably, some scholars have strongly criticized the consumption of national humiliation in China, e.g. Wang, Z. (2012). ...
This book investigates China’s demands for the repatriation of Chinese cultural relics ‘lost’ during the country’s modern history. It addresses two main research questions: Can the original owners, or their rightful successors, of cultural objects looted, stolen, or illicitly exported before the adoption of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention reclaim their cultural objects pursuant to remedies provided by international or national law? And what are the philosphical, ethical, and cultural considerations of identity underlying the international conventions protecting cultural objects and claims made for repatriating them? The first part of the book explores current positive legal regimes, while the second part focuses on the philosphical, ethical, and cultural considerations regarding repatriation of cultural objects. Consisting of seven chapters and an introduction, it outlines the loss of Chinese cultural relics in modern history and the normative framework for the protection of cultural heritage. It presents case studies designed to assess the possibility of seeking legal remedies for restitution under contemporary legal regimes and examines the cultural and ethical issues underpinning the international conventions protecting cultural heritage and claims for the repatriation of cultural heritage. It also discusses issues of cultural identity, the right to cultural identity and heritage, multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, cosmopolitanism, the right to cultural heritage, and other related issues. The concluding chapter answers the two research questions and offers suggestions for future research.
... Having accepted the norm of the modern nation-state system, these leaders no longer thought of China as the centre of the world and Chinese culture as a universal set of values. But they have shared a strong sense that China should be restored to its rightful status as a great power as they believed China's 77 Kaufman (2010), no. 1, at 2. 78 Ibid., at 1. 79 Ibid., at 3. Notably, some scholars have strongly criticized the consumption of national humiliation in China, e.g. Wang, Z. (2012). ...
Today it is universally accepted that looted/stolen cultural objects should be restituted to their rightful owners. However, the rules protecting cultural are regulated in detail only since the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention have been adopted, but these conventions are of no retroactive effect to cultural objects that were looted or stolen before the entry into force of these conventions.
In this chapter we look at Liang Shuming as a philosopher of culture. Liang is the first Chinese thinker who through a comparison of Chinese culture with Western and Indian cultures attempted to find for Chinese culture its place and meaning in the system of world cultures. Liang’s cultural thought, which will be explored by means of four of his works, i.e., Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (Dong-Xi wenhua ji qi zhexue 東西文化及其哲學; 1921), “The Final Awakening of the Self-Saving Movement of Chinese Nation” (Zhongguo minzu zijiu yundong zhi zuihou juewu 中國民族自救運動之最後覺; 1930), A General Idea of Rural Reconstruction (Xiangcun jianshe dayi 鄉村建設大意; 1936) and The Essential Meaning of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中國文化要義; 1949), echoes the tremendous predicament of Chinese culture which started its new unprecedented phase with the foreign intrusion in China after the unequal treaty in Nanjing of 1842 in the wake of the First Opium War (1839–1842). All in all, Liang’s cultural thought turns out to be—as understood here—a manifestation of “Sinodicy”, i.e., a philosophical theory of the justification of Chinese culture. This cultural theory is a kind of apology and argumentation for the greatness of Chinese culture in the face of its many shortcomings which are actually part of each human culture. Liang’s key theorem describing Chinese culture was its premature character, which was eventually concretized in his understanding of it as the early manifestation of human reason. According to him, reason displayed within Chinese culture a function of substitution, i.e., (1) morality substituted for religion, (2) familial-ethical human relations substituted for feudalism, (3) ceremonies (customs) substituted for law, (4) feelings substituted for force, (5) diversity in occupations substituted for social classes, etc.
New faces bring new policy. In the 21st century, when the "hard power" loses its positions in international relations, the utilization of "soft power" is only due to increase. Political speeches, talk shows, calls and tele-radio broadcasting became the cornerstone of a new type of policy. The US President Donald Trump's Twitter campaign is sufficient example of that. More importantly, the analysis of political messages and slogans and their narrative analysis gained quite a popularity. The special interest towards the “Chinese dream” from the international relations theory and political science standpoint only grew after China initiated “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) strategy.
I begin, haltingly, and the individual begins, for John Stuart Mill, with an impulse. My impulse, in terms of Mill, is to ask after power and energy in his On Liberty. There, impulses are desires and those of the “Strong” variety are synonymous with energy (Mill 2002, p. 62). An individual with their own impulses has character and one with strong impulses governed by a strong will has energetic character. One without them has no character. I begin haltingly, in part, because, insofar as my impulse is directed toward power and energy, I am unsure as to the will that may or may not govern it, whether this question reveals or begins to reveal something of my character, its degree of energy, or the lack thereof. What does it mean, in other words, to ask about power and energy in this book? Call this question the opening of an experiment in thinking.
This article focuses on the colonial context of China, which led to a monumental loss of Chinese cultural objects by three means: looting and plundering; cultural expeditions; and illicit trafficking. The loss of cultural objects caused severe deprivation to the country of origin (i.e. China) from the perspective of culture, and active decolonization could helpheal the wounds and rebuild the cultural independency of China.In order to recover cultural objects removed during the colonial era, at the present time countries of origin are faced with difficulties at two levels. In terms of provenance research, the history and ownership trajectory of the cultural objects is difficult to establish in light of the fact that significant time has elapsed. In terms of legal claims, evidence needs to be collected in order to prove the original ownership, while at the same time issues of private law create obstacles to claims. Moreover, current international conventions fail to provide a legally-binding obligation on the part of current possessors to return objects lost due to colonialism. This article proposes mutual respect for cultural sovereignty as a way to make up for the absence of cultural sovereignty during past colonizations.
China's mistreatment of its Uyghur minority has drawn international condemnation and sanctions. The repression gripping Xinjiang is also hugely costly to China in Renminbi, personnel, and stifled economic productivity. Despite this, the Chinese Communist Party persists in its policies. Why? Drawing on extensive original data, Potter and Wang demonstrate insecurities about the stability of the regime and its claim to legitimacy motivate Chinese policies. These perceived threats to core interests drive the ferocity of the official response to Uyghur nationalism. The result is harsh repression, sophisticated media control, and selective international military cooperation. China's growing economic and military power means that the country's policies in Xinjiang and Central Asia have global implications. Zero Tolerance sheds light on this problem, informing policymakers, scholars, and students about an emerging global hotspot destined to play a central role in international politics in years to come.
Relying on prior work in the incorporation of sociolinguistic concepts of 'impoliteness' into studies of international relations and diplomacy, this thesis utilises mixed qualitative and quantitative methods to comprehensively analyse speeches delivered by representatives of the People's Republic of China at plenary sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. In adjudging between plausible explanations contained in the literature for the actions at multilateral international institutions, this thesis finds a complex relationship between deployment of undiplomatic language at multilateral fora and a state's relationship with a putative international order. Findings strongly supported include rising power trends, core interests defence, and naming-and-shaming socialisation.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the nature of Sino-Russian relations by applying a multi-vector framework to examine the tenability of the so-called strategic partnership between Russia and China in the Russian Far East (RFE). Addressing a growing body of literature that seeks to move beyond single-factor evaluations of the dyadic relationship, I embrace the principles of analytic eclecticism, borrowing from Voskressenki's (Alexei D. Voskressenski, Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations [London, 2003]) multifactor framework to advance an argument for intertwining the three dominant international relations research traditions—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of the current equilibrium in the RFE, rather than assuming in advance the most pertinent lens. This in turn allows for more effective application of international relations theory to Sino-Russian studies. To accomplish my aim, I incorporate data pertaining to economic, geopolitical, and ideational factors. From these data, I find that the relationship in the RFE is in a state of stable equilibrium, with the most important vectors contributing to the balance for each side at present, geopolitical considerations for Moscow and ideational concerns for Beijing, being conducive to cooperation. The short-term potential for conflict is thus minimal, but a shock in the form of increasing Chinese nationalist hostility toward Russia or continued territorial belligerence by Russia internationally would severely endanger the status quo. By applying a similar approach to other dimensions of the Sino-Russian relationship, scholars can gain greater traction in assessing the robustness of the continually evolving bilateral partnership between these two large and important neighbors.
Liang Shuming’s understanding of Chinese culture, which he conceived of as Sino-Confucian culture, and his understanding of Confucianism differ from the common and familiar understandings in the sinological academic world. It seems that the best way to understand Liang Shuming and his thoughts is in terms of his search for an authentic existence. In his scheme of three modes of world cultures (Western-pragmatic culture, Sino-(Taizhou 泰州-)Confucian culture, and Indo-(weishi-)Buddhist culture) and their historical succession (as given above), the conviction of Liang Shuming was that the imminent future mode of world culture would be that of the Sino-Confucian cultural attitude. He even prophesied that in the nearest future the emotion of love in its particular form as love between a man and a woman would be the greatest and the most formidable problem of this period, i.e. the period of the second domain of a conditional availability or non-availability of the object of desire, that is, of another mind or the will of another person. This domain is called by Liang Shuming the realm of human relationships, or a social problem for the solution of which Sino-(Taizhou-)Confucian culture is responsible. The author concentrates on the place and role of Liang Shuming’s understanding of Confucianism in his scheme of world history.
China’s defeat against British military forces in the Opium War (1839–1842) heralded a quest for a Chinese modernity of its own. That China’s modernity is, in the contemporary period, conspicuously formulated in terms that refer to the country’s imperial past, shows how China’s national consciousness is permeated with the mission to rectify the trauma of the 19th century. The present contribution describes the impact of this historical trauma on how China positions itself in the world.
Language is a vital part of an individual’s cultural identity. Language education policy is also an important part of a country’s national identity construction. This qualitative historical study situates the discussion of China’s foreign language education in the broader socio-historical context of national identity negotiation. The Chinese history of English education over a span of two centuries is critically reviewed as a case study to show the dynamic relationship between national identity and foreign language policy. Foreign language policy has been used as a tool in China to construct a desired national identity in different historical and geopolitical contexts of nation development and international relations. The Chinese case also serves to show the correlation between an open liberal foreign language policy and the achievement of national prosperity.
Restitution of cultural property by the People’s Republic of China on the example of the recovery of the brown heads of animals from Yuanming Yuan Restitution of cultural goods is a very complicated issue in practice, encountering many problems on its way. Most international conventions, including the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, provide for non-retroactivity of their provisions and a limited time to bring claims for reimbursement. Another problem is the still low number of ratifications of both conventions, especially the one from 1995. Also, the national legislation of many countries still does not contain regulations in this area and appropriate restitution instruments. Once the Chinese government realized the value of its cultural heritage treasures as a source of national and political identity, it began the process of restoring looted cultural assets. This is not an easy task, because a large part of the objects was stolen a long time ago, which directly prevents the application of international legal regimes resulting from conventions on the return of stolen or illegally exported goods. The case of bronze statues from the Yuanming Yuan shows another way to recover looted cultural goods. It is based primarily on the national identity of Chinese society, which treats looted artifacts as an important element of their history and culture. Thanks to private collectors and entrepreneurs who had bought such objects and then donated them to Chinese museums and institutions, it was possible to regain many of the lost cultural goods. The aim of article is to provide a general overview of the People’s Republic of China’s restitution policy, its methods and effects, using the example of the recovery of Chinese bronze heads stolen from Yuanming Yuan.
Due to a rapid economic growth over the past several decades China has significantly strengthened its international positions. This growth in its own turn was to a large extent due to a pragmatic and sound foreign strategy that the country has been pursuing since mid-1970s. However, in recent years both within and outside China there has been an on-going debate on the alleged radical transformation of the PRC’s perceptions of its national interests, its place in world politics, and its foreign policy. The variety of opinions becomes increasingly complicated as the number of discussants grows and new arguments are adduced in support of different positions. Whereas outside China this debate structures around the narrative of the Chinese assertiveness, within the country the main dispute is between the advocates of a traditional policy of ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguang yanghui) and proponents of a new ‘striving for achievements’ (fenfa youwei) strategy. The present paper aims to provide a framework for a systematization of debates on the contemporary foreign policy of China in the English language academic literature based on two criteria: whether a researcher admits that the Chinese foreign policy is changing and how he assesses implications of these changes. Such an approach undoubtedly entails certain schematization of the presented views and arguments. However, it differs favorably from traditional, more narrative approaches to conceptualization of the debate since it establishes a clear, transparent theoretical framework aimed to identify the substantive core of the presented views. This, in turn, can bring about a better understanding of the current state and possible evolution of Chinese foreign policy in general. The author concludes that although these debates are far from being over, most researchers admit the PRC’s foreign policy strategy is undergoing a radical transformation. Since the latter half of 2000s there has been a steady trend in the foreign policy of China towards greater assertiveness. At the same time this transformation ensures continuity of the basic principles of Chinese diplomacy. All this means that further debates on the Chinese foreign policy should focus primarily on potential implications of this transformation for the PRC, the regional dynamics and international relations system as a whole.
When Matthew Perry opened Japan to foreign trade in 1854 after more than two centuries of official isolation, Japan became an immediate locus of extraordinary curiosity and fascination for the West. How Japan would thereafter be understood, negotiated, and imagined became an important part of mid-to-late Victorian consciousness. While Japanese influence has been examined piecemeal in disparate disciplines, the unification of this topic as a larger, interdisciplinary, multimodal discourse is still a necessary step for a better understanding. This study of Japonisme as a discourse brings into sharp relief how transnational encounters produce a moment of paradox in which the other nation must be unlearned and simultaneously imaginatively peopled. This process is alluded to in Oscar Wilde’s declaration that, “The whole of Japan is pure invention. There is no such place, no such people.” I differ with Wilde: I say that both the pure invention and the tangible reality are important parts of the transnational encounter. Japan’s relations with Western nations are always in part dictated by commodity exchanges. Japonisme merchandise was far from a simple ambassador of Japanese culture. The proliferation of Japonisme merchandise created a cultural disparity between male professionals of taste and female consumers of the products. In literary incarnations of Japonisme, Japanese merchandise is often placed between public and domestic spheres, caught between masculine and feminine influences, as I demonstrate in my first chapter. Once Japan had been “opened,” however, travel narratives began to trickle back to England. Japan had unusual popularity with female travel writers producing bestsellers and male scholars who inveighed against the quantity of competitor texts; again re-enacting the Japonisme’s position as the fulcrum between public and private, male and female. These informative texts, the focus of the second chapter, eventually were out-sold and out-numbered by the popular Japonisme novels that I examine in my third chapter. These novels bring the interlocking issues of masculinity and femininity back to a Japan of “pure invention.” The generic norms of the Japonisme novels, delineated in my final chapter, create a literary space in which to debate Wilde’s hypothesis, that Japonisme erases Japan’s reality.
Soccer is seen as an extended instrument to brand China in the post-Beijing Olympic period. This article explores how the brand of China is expressed and negotiated through the lens of soccer by adopting the content analysis method to deconstruct the media texts specific to sports mega-events. The findings show the creation of a number of media frames accompanied by a new tradition in the representation of Chinese national identity, featuring the rhetoric of a ‘powerful’ nation and social prosperity attributed to the projected common goal of elevating China to be a world soccer superpower by 2050. These media frames provide insights into the underlying personalities of the country’s brand, including humiliation, world hegemony, trust and superiority. We argue that the merit of nation branding in China is more engaged with the inwardly oriented political exercise aiming at restructuring national identity for the purpose of consolidating the state’s legitimacy and social cohesion. The proposed sports nation branding framework expands the scope of critical research on nation branding within the context of identity politics in relation to sports. It underlines the significance of strengthening the personality traits of a nation’s brand through developing a thriving soccer culture. Due to the growing importance of soccer in East Asia, this article has both domestic and regional significance.
Security issues in South Asia could be the key to world peace. Understanding the
particular dynamics of security creation and its provision in the region has therefore
become extremely important. That said, there are major hurdles to a proper comprehension of the underlying complexities. Most of the home-grown security studies and analyses are sponsored or directly provided by the security establishment, focusing mainly on the tactical capacities of the military apparatus. The outside academic community, mainly the Singapore-Australia-USA triangle, tend to concentrate on the global perspectives with predominance given to the India-China aspect of the security configuration. For these reasons, vital and insightful concepts are missing for the proper and realistic understanding of the security policies and configuration of South Asia. The purpose of this essay will be to introduce some of these analytical concepts and give a deeper understanding of the issues at work, in short to provide a historic background to the conflict and security configuration of South Asia.
Autocracies are widely assumed to have a counterterrorism advantage because they can censor media and are insulated from public opinion, thereby depriving terrorists of both their audience and political leverage. However, institutionalized autocracies such as China draw legitimacy from public approval and feature partially free media environments, meaning that their information strategies must be much more sophisticated than simple censorship. To better understand the strategic considerations that govern decisions about transparency in this context, this article explores the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) treatment of domestic terrorist incidents in the official party mouthpiece – the People's Daily. Drawing on original, comprehensive datasets of all known Uyghur terrorist violence in China and the official coverage of that violence, the findings demonstrate that the CCP promptly acknowledges terrorist violence only when both domestic and international conditions are favorable. The authors attribute this pattern to the entrenched prioritization of short-term social stability over longer-term legitimacy.
en Viewed as an economic long march from poverty to middle‐income status, China's four decades of rapid economic growth can seem little short of miraculous. Unsurprisingly, such a record is bound to inspire imitators, and China's political‐economic model of authoritarian capitalism or state‐sponsored neoliberalism has attracted many admirers in Africa. But viewed as a rapid rebound after the removal of catastrophic Maoist economic mismanagement, China's growth spurt has done little more than bring China up to the level of other semiperipheral countries in Asia, the post‐Soviet space, and Latin America. China's economy rapidly grew to a level commensurate with its state capacity, and it is now leveling out at that level. The low levels of state capacity that have historically prevented most African countries from reaching middle‐income levels of GDP per capita still prevail, and until these change, African countries will not be able to follow China into middle‐income status.
Related Articles (in this Special Issue)
Davidsson, Simon. 2020. “Modeling the Impact of a Model: The (Non)Relationship between China's Economic Rise and African Democracy.” Politics & Policy 48 (5).
Hodzi, Obert. 2020. “African Political Elites and the Making(s) of the China Model in Africa.” Politics & Policy 48 (5).
Hodzi, Obert, and John H. S. Åberg. 2020. “Introduction to the Special Issue: Strategic Deployment of the China Model in Africa.” Politics & Policy 48 (5).
Abstract
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El modelo de desarrollo de China: ¿Puede ser replicado en África Subsahariana?
Visto como un largo éxodo económico de la pobreza hacia el estatus de país de renta media las cuatro décadas de rápido crecimiento económico de China pueden parecer poco menos que milagrosas. No debe de sorprendernos que tal logro está destinado a inspirar imitadores, y el modelo político‐económico de capitalismo autoritario o el neoliberalismo patrocinado por China ha despertado la admiración de muchos en África. No obstante, vista como una rápida recuperación después del catastrófico mal manejo económico maoísta, el crecimiento acelerado de China apenas ha logrado elevar a China al nivel de otras naciones semiperiféricas de Asia, del espacio post‐sovietico y de Latinoamérica. La economía de China creció rápidamente a un nivel conmensurable con el de su capacidad de estado (state capacity) y está ahora emparejando tal capacidad al nivel de su crecimiento económico. Siguen prevaleciendo los bajos niveles de capacidad de estado que históricamente han impedido a la mayoría de los países africanos alcanzar niveles del PIB de renta media per cápita. Mientras este continúe siendo el caso las naciones africanas serán incapaces de acompañar a China en su consolidada condición de país de renta media.
Abstract
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中国的发展模式：撒哈拉以南非洲能加以复制吗？
被视为从贫困到中等收入状态的经济长征，中国四十年的快速经济增长可谓是一个奇迹。意料之中的是，这样的记录一定会激励效仿者，并且具有威权资本主义性质或受国家支持的新自由主义性质的中国政治经济模式已吸引了众多非洲崇拜者。然而，被视为在惨烈的毛派经济管理不善结束后产生的快速经济复苏，中国的经济增长冲刺仅将其提升到与其他亚洲、后苏联、拉美的半边缘国家一样的水平。中国经济迅速增长到与其国家能力相当的水平，并且现在增长趋势平稳。历史上阻止大多数非洲国家实现人均GDP达到中等收入的低等国家能力仍然盛行，在这发生变革之前，非洲国家将无法跟随中国达到中等收入状态。
Cambridge Core - International Relations and International Organisations - The World Imagined - by Hendrik Spruyt
In 2016, the Chinese State Council (CSC) published the paper Chinas Africa Policy, as a framework for the strategy of China in Africa. In 2011 the CSC published the whitepaper Chinas Foreign Aid, including specifications on aid modalities, and the definition of sector for future cooperation between China and Africa. With this paper we intend to discuss the recent trends in Chinese foreign policy, the starting point being Chinas Africa policy, and as a case the China-Angola bilateral relations. We start by discussing the strategy of China towards Africa, since 2003, building on the case study of Chinese credit lines provided to the Angolan Government. We proceed with a discussion on guiding principles in Chinese foreign policy, shedding a light on recent debates on Chinas global aspirations.
Drawing on the structural-constructivist framework of journalistic field and habitus, Reporting China on the Rise examines the internal and external dynamics which are shaping the work of foreign correspondents in China during Xi Jinping’s tenure.
This study presents findings from extensive surveys and interviews with current and former correspondents based in China. It aims to explore how they have responded, and continue to respond, to pressures from within the journalistic field (such as a transforming media industry), as well as from constant shifts in global geopolitics, and China’s increasingly restrictive journalistic environment. These factors are shown to work together to relationally define the news production practice of these correspondents and, ultimately, shape the final news product.
Journalism in modern China has become a widely discussed, yet gravely under-researched topic, both for policy-makers and academics. Reporting China on the Rise seeks to open up discussions around the role of the foreign press in generating meaningful media coverage of this growing superpower. It will be an invaluable resource for students and researchers of Journalism and Media Studies.
In exploring the argument that a state’s position in the international system determines its foreign policy and external intervention behaviour, this chapter begins by giving a critical historical analysis of China’s evolving understanding of foreign intervention, its foreign intervention policy and external intervention behaviour from imperial times to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and until 2015. The aim of the historical analysis is to give a concrete background of the evolving nature of China’s foreign policy regarding intervention in other states’ internal affairs vis-à-vis changes in its relative economic power and position in the international system. Appreciating China’s past understandings of intervention is therefore critical to analysing its current intervention policy and behaviour in Africa. Based on that background, the chapter then discusses the implication of China’s increasing economic power and explores whether it has indeed resulted in an increase in its external intervention behaviour.
The First World War (1914-1918) has been widely considered as a European conflict and a struggle for dominance among the European empires. However, it is important to note that non-European communities from various parts of the world such as the Chinese, Indians, Egyptians and Fijians also played significant roles in the war. This paper intends to provide an analysis of the involvement of China in the First World War. During the outbreak of the war in 1914, the newly established Republic of China (1912) encountered numerous problems and uncertainties. However, in 1917 the Republic of China entered the First World War, supporting the Allied Forces, with the aim of elevating its international position. This paper focuses on the treatment that China had received from the international community such as Britain, the United States, France and Japan after the war. Specifically, this paper argues that the betrayal towards China by the Western powers during the Paris Peace Conference and the May Fourth Movement served as an intellectual turning point for China. It had triggered the radicalization of Chinese intellectual thoughts. In addition, China’s socialization during the Paris Peace Conference had been crucial to the conception of the West’s negative identity in the eyes of the Chinese that has remained in
the minds of its future leaders. It has also reinforced China’s uncompromising attitude over territorial disputes till today. This study also highlights the contribution made by the Chinese Labour Corps (CLC). As the involvement of CLC has hardly been recognized after the First World War, this work not only elaborates China’s involvement in the war but equally important, it also focuses on the role of the CLC which has been long forgotten.
This paper approaches symbolic insult in diplomacy as the use of symbolic means by states to oppress the opponent’s sense of Self, to hurt its self-esteem and social status in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives, or as a reaction to a threat from Other. The paper posits that diplomatic actors are extremely sensitive to Self related matters, and may use such sensitivity for influencing each other, bargaining over the issues of importance, and simply defending their sense of Self while they confront the opponent. The enormous importance of collective Self in diplomacy may instigate a variety of social strategic games, including tacit and deceptive ones. The diplomatic actor’s acute sensitivity to recognition, honor and social status sharpens its sense of Self, which makes any humiliation painful. Therefore, protection of self-regard, dignity and public face becomes a critical issue in diplomatic practice. At the same time, that makes the diplomatic actor’s Self vulnerable, and provides the opposing Other opportunities for manipulation and symbolic abuse.
The paper argues that symbolic insult in diplomacy occurs in a highly normative environment, and depends on political objectives, shared knowledge, social perception and practices, and can negatively affect relationships between diplomatic actors, the opponent’s self-perception, self-feeling and security of Self—ontological security. I distinguish three forms of symbolic insult used in diplomacy: by misrecognition (“diplomatic bypassing”), direct confrontation (“diplomatic punch”) and concealed verbal or nonverbal actions (“diplomatic slap”). The paper focuses on the third, indirect form, or “diplomatic slap” which employs obscure symbolic insults as a means of tacit manipulation for influencing the opponent, or as an instrument of restoring social status.
By highlighting interest-based (political), value-based (moral), relationship-based (social) and right-based (legal) imperatives of international diplomacy, this paper shows that diplomatic actors can use symbolically expressed but subtle “slap” for balancing their interests and relationships in dealing with the opponent: Tacit or implicit symbolic insult usually appears ambiguous which may allow the offender to promote its interests but also to stay engaged with the victim.
China is currently considered to be the world's largest purchasing power economy, and is the second after the United States by market value. It is expected to become the largest by the end of the next decade. Previous data have shown that the concept of ‘core interests’ from the Chinese point of view may be included with the development of China's economic and military capabilities. This concept will certainly expand as China grows into a superpower to cover many parts of the world. With China increasingly dependent on energy imports, the Middle East and Africa and the Maritime Silk Road are expected to become a vital priority for the emerging nation in future. In the light of this strategic background, this paper attempts to define the concept of ‘core interests’ from the Chinese point of view and to monitor the most important stages of its application within Beijing's external trends, highlighting the issues of Chinese policy, especially in East Asia. In the context of expanding China's global interests, this paper argues that China's influence in the Middle East will increase, and may be followed by an increased political and military presence, highlighting evidence and a number of trends that support this view.
Examines the key tenets of Confucianism with a summary of Weber’s analysis of Confucianism and why industrial capitalism did not arise in China. There is an overview of China’s economic performance since 1CE. The chapter then turns to the Confucian Culture Area (apart from China, this includes Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam) and summarises its key socio-economic indicators, including corruption and level of religiosity. Examines Confucianism’s attitude towards women and concludes with a discussion of Confucianism, Asian values, and modernity.
People do not typically associate China, Japan, and Korea with multiple ethnic or racial identities, as it seems that all three countries have one predominant group and the identity of being ?Chinese,? ?Japanese,? and ?Korean? is so strong that it trumps all differences that may exist among the populations. However, the idea of homogeneity is only a myth; understanding the position of ethnic minorities and the nature of racial discourses in these countries can reveal the composition of nationhood in East Asia. This entry discusses the social construction of race, ethnicity, and nationalism in the three countries through an analysis of racial and ethnic nationalism, war and nationalism, and economic nationalism in East Asia.
Framed as a meeting of two streams of ethnocentrism, this is a study of how Chinese immigration to the United States created a crisis for China and the United States and how it forced intellectuals and officials in both countries to reevaluate their worldviews. Using Chinese and English-language sources, this study uses concepts of the self and Other as an analytical framework with which to compare how Chinese elites viewed the Chinese immigrant community to how Americans reacted to the Chinese presence in America. Chapter One juxtaposes the Sinocentric worldview and official attitudes toward emigrants with the tension in American society between ideals of pluralism and the desire for homogeneity and how Chinese immigrants brought this tension to the surface. Chapter Two examines how these conflicting worldviews were transformed through the immigration experience. The Chinese broke with tradition and established a foreign legation while Americans altered immigration policy by passing a series of bills excluding the Chinese from entering America. This chapter also provides a textual analysis of American anti-Chinese publications and Chinese written responses to the anti-Chinese movement. Chapter three focuses on Yung Wing, a graduate of Yale, the Co-commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission, and the Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister to the United States. His life is presented as the quintessential example of Chinese immigrant assimilation into American life, a process many Americans thought the Chinese incapable of. The final chapter is an analysis of the travel diary of the intellectual-reformer Liang Qichao, written during his 1903 tour of North America. Liang's negative assessment of the Chinese in America as found in this text is examined in light of Liang's use of Chinese immigrants as a third party Other as a vehicle to criticize Chinese culture and comment on American social and political institutions. Similarly, this study views Chinese immigrants and their treatment in America as important factors in shaping China's response to the West and its entrance into the modern family of nations, as well as the fundamental challenge to American constructions of the image of the United States as a nation of nations.
Three American missiles hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and what Americans view as an appalling and tragic mistake, many Chinese see as a "barbaric" and intentional "criminal act," the latest in a long series of Western aggressions against China. In this book, Peter Hays Gries explores the roles of perception and sentiment in the growth of popular nationalism in China. At a time when the direction of China's foreign and domestic policies have profound ramifications worldwide, Gries offers a rare, in-depth look at the nature of China's new nationalism, particularly as it involves Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations-two bilateral relations that carry extraordinary implications for peace and stability in the twenty-first century. Through recent Chinese books and magazines, movies, television shows, posters, and cartoons, Gries traces the emergence of this new nationalism. Anti-Western sentiment, once created and encouraged by China's ruling PRC, has been taken up independently by a new generation of Chinese. Deeply rooted in narratives about past "humiliations" at the hands of the West and impassioned notions of Chinese identity, popular nationalism is now undermining the Communist Party's monopoly on political discourse, threatening the regime's stability. As readable as it is closely researched and reasoned, this timely book analyzes the impact that popular nationalism will have on twenty-first century China and the world. 2004 by The Regents of the University of California.
This volume contains a number of articles on modern Chinese history and historiography written by one of the leading academic experts on the subject. The author provides a critique of older approaches to nineteenth-century history and offers powerful reinterpretations of such key events in the recent history of China as the boxer rebellion, Mao's ascension to power in 1949, and the process of political and economic reform in the post-Mao era. This is a strong collection which will be of enormous interest to scholars of East Asian history.
In the second millennium, "Health for All", started with the World Health Assembly, 1977, aimed to improve the well being of humankind and to attain a future with peace and security. Much has been accomplished since then, but progress towards Health for All has been too slow in many countries. Therefore, to accelerate the work in this area, the Millennium Summit was held in New York in 2000 and eight main goals were defined to eradicate inequalities throughout the world up to 2015 and increase the common health of mankind. Millennium Development Goals can be accepted as an international contract targeting eradication of extreme poverty on earth. The main difference between these goals and the previous targets is that many more countries have accepted them and expended greater effort than before. Three of the eight goals, eight of the 18 targets and 18 of the 48 indicators deal with health. Achieving these targets requires sustainability and money; however, powerful politics, macroeconomic stability and dynamic governments that work against corruption are also needed. Less developed countries cannot overcome these constraints alone. Therefore, for the future of the world, developed countries should continue their support and all nations should work in collaboration to eradicate the inequalities on the world. It is now, for the first time, that different sectors and institutions are working together to carry humankind to a better healthy future. Thus, Millennium Development Goals will take their place in world history as being the most important progress of the third millennium.
This paper examines a symbol, bupingdeng tiaoyue (Unequal Treaties), that has received no attention in the current literature on the role of political ceremonies and symbols in China's national awakening and the formation of Chinese nationalism. This paper aims to repair this omission by tracing how the term acquired a strongly symbolic role and by analyzing the form, content, function and impact of the bupingdeng tiaoyue rhetoric. First, this paper examins Chinese nationalism by looking at the discourse on the Unequal Treaties as employed by various forces in Chinese history. Second, the shared experience of the Guomindang (GMD)-Communists (CCP) with the Unequal Treaties reveals further details about a highly strained and precarious relationship in the United Front from 1924 to 1927. Part of the vocabulary, style, rhetoric and argumentation of the Unequal Treaties discourse became integrated as a perpetual element in the common inheritance of Chinese-ness. Third, the discourse on the Unequal Treaties alerts us to the continuing relevance of the subtle distinction between the political state and national culture, a distinction that both the GMD and the CCP have attempted to obliterate. Fourth, China's experience with the Unequal Treaties suggests that the spread and interpretation of international law can only take place on a particular nation's own terms. Fifth, this paper seeks to focus attention on China's positive role in the development and crystallization of international law against imposed treaties.
This article argues that the conventional wisdom about Chinese intransigence on intervention (and sovereignty) is inaccurate. It does so by illustrating that a subtle yet significant shift in the Chinese stance on both issues took place over the course of the last fifteen years. Indeed, since the early 1990s, the Chinese have committed to a series of multilateral endeavours that gradually modified China's stance on intervention and, by extension, sovereignty's role in international politics. This development was initially the product of a historically framed set of calculations within China concerning the relative costs and benefits involved in allowing for a redefinition of the balance between state sovereignty and intervention in the international arena. However, these considerations were supplemented over the course of the decade by two new forces: (1) repeated Chinese participation in humanitarian operations created a new precedent which affected the way some within the foreign policy community interpret the legitimacy of intervention; and (2) growing interest in Beijing in portraying China as a responsible member of the international community pushed the Chinese to make more compromises on the sovereignty-intervention nexus.
Conventional understandings of Chinese nationalism often portray it as anti-Western, focusing on Chinese nationalists’ obsession with a powerful state and on their ambition to recover the glory of China’s historical empire. Such understandings clearly underlie the fear and hostility toward rising Chinese nationalism today. But this view relies too heavily on China’s conflictive relations with the West and overemphasizes the impact of China’s unique history, culture, and politics, making it hard, if not impossible, to draw on the concept of nationalism in understanding China’s relations with its non-Western neighbors. Such a perspective neglects the importance of ideas and ideals from the international system that animate Chinese nationalism. In this article, the author characterizes Chinese nationalism as fusing realpolitik ideas and ideals and a fervent quest for national identity and power. A realpolitik nationalist, as defined here, is someone who frames an external threat to China in terms not of the country’s unique culture or history but of a breach of the prevailing norms of the nation-state system, whose key dimensions include sovereignty, territoriality, and international legitimacy. Finally, the author applies this notion in examining China’s conflicts with India in 1962 and with the Southeast Asian countries involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands.
China's evidently unstoppable “rise” energizes PRC political and intellectual elites to think seriously about the future of international relations. How will (and should) China's international roles change in the forthcoming decades? How should its leaders put the country's rapidly-increasing power to use? Foreign China specialists have tended to use an overly-streamlined “resisting” the West versus “co-operating” with it (or even simpler “optimistic” versus “pessimistic”) scale to address such questions, partly reflecting the divide between Realism and Neoliberalism in American international relations theory. By 2002, a near-consensus had developed (though never shared universally) that China had become an increasingly co-operative power since the mid-1990s and would continue to pursue the policy prescriptions of Neoliberal international relations theory. But using more nuanced “English school” analytical techniques – and examining the writings of Chinese elites themselves, aimed solely at Chinese audiences – this article discovers an unmistakably cynical Realism to be still at the core of Chinese thinking on the international future. Even elites who appear sincere in their promotion of co-operation firmly reject “solidarism” among the world's leading states and insist upon upholding the difference between China and all others. Many demand – and foresee – China using its future power to pursue world objectives that would depart in significant respects from those of the other leading states and non-state actors.
The Japanese Twenty-one Demands toward the Chinese government headed by Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1915 marked a milestone in Sino-Japanese relations as well as in the Chinese response to imperialism. Yet studies on the event, particularly on its consequence and influence in China, are still insufficient. Studies by Chinese scholars have not gone far beyond Wang Yun-sheng's publication of collected materials more than fifty years ago. The only book-length study on the event is the first volume of Li Yu-shu's study, published in Taiwan. This last does not even cover the whole period of Sino-Japanese negotiations. His second volume has not yet appeared. Li's contribution is that he has made use of more Japanese documents than Wang. In mainland China, the most current study on the event is a chapter on the Demands in the first volume of the work by Li Hsin and Li Tsung-i. This chapter is based primarily on the works of Wang and Li Yu-shu. Compared with Japanese studies on other landmarks of Sino-Japanese relations, the coverage of this episode is rather thin. There is only one book-length study, published in 1958. As for works in English, Madeleine Chi's book has a chapter dealing with the Sino-Japanese negotiations. Two general works examine the event from a broader perspective.
Thesis--University of Washington. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [303]-343). Photocopy.
1 reel. Thesis--Chicago University.
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington
China: Humiliation and the Olympics
- Schell
Lun Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlüe Xin Linian Zhong de Xin Anquan Guan
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Historical Legacies and Non/Traditional Security: Commemorating National Humiliation Day in China Paper presented at Renmin University) at <http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/china
- William A Callahan
- William A Callahan
From Might to Right: Liang Qichao and the Comforts of Darwinism in Late-Meiji Japan The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao's " Century of Humiliation Then and Now / 31 © 2010 Center for International Studies, Inha University Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China
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