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Crises as Learning Triggers:
Exploring a Conceptual
Framework of Crisis-Induced
Learning
Edward Deverell
CRISMART/Swedish National Defence College and Utrecht University School of Governance, PO Box 27805,
SE 115 93 Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail: edward.deverell@fhs.se
This article contributes to the debate on organizational learning from crisis by shedding
light on the phenomenon of crises as learning triggers. To unveil theoretical patterns of
how organizational crisis-induced learning may appear and develop, I suggest a con-
ceptual framework based on concept categories and answers to four fundamental
questions: what lessons are learned (single- or double-loop)?; what is the focus of the
lessons (prevention or response)?; when are lessons learned (intra- or intercrisis)?; is
learning blocked from implementation or carried out (distilled or implemented)? The
framework’s applicability is explored in a study of how a Swedish utility and the city of
Stockholm responded to two large-scale blackouts in Stockholm. The final sections
suggest four propositions for further research.
1. Introduction
The literature on organizational learning has so far
been vague and elusive. Its guiding concept is
characterized by confusion and scholars find the phe-
nomenon hard to define, isolate, measure and apply
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levy, 1994; Berends, Boersma, &
Weggeman, 2003; Common, 2004; Dekker & Hanse
´n,
2004). Nonetheless, lately, there has been a steep
increase in studies on organizational learning. The
literature on organizational learning from crises, on
the other hand, has remained scarce (for exceptions
see, e.g., van Duin, 1992; Carley & Harrald, 1997;
Dekker & Hanse
´n, 2004; Smith & Elliott, 2007). In
order to increase theoretical understanding of the
process of organizational learning, and how it relates
to crisis management, this article aims to shed light on
the phenomenon of crises as learning triggers by
designing a concrete conceptual framework for re-
search on organizational learning from crises. The
framework is then applied to a case study of organiza-
tional learning patterns from a series of two incidents.
The case study shows how two organizations – the
semi public energy utility Birka Energi and the Stock-
holm city command and control unit (led by the City
Executive Office and the Fire Department) – managed
two consecutive local cable fires that led to local
blackouts in Stockholm in March 2001 and in May
2002. The underlying cause of the first blackout was a
failure of design. The system lacked redundancy. Back-
up cables were placed right next to the main cables.
A fire in the main cable threatened the entire system.
Once the main cable ignited, the fire spread to back-up
cables, leaving no reconnection options. The second
case can be characterized as a failure of learning and
quality control. Temporary repairs during the first fire
were not sufficiently monitored and shortcomings in
the deficient repairs were not noticed appropriately
(Go
¨ransson, 2002). The events were dramatic for the
residents, the power company and leading city actors.
The fires caused power outages that affected eight
districts in Stockholm’s northwestern suburbs. These
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Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009
districts were left partially or totally without power.
The blackout seriously affected businesses and public
administrations as well as the daily lives of residents as
some 50,000 people and 700 businesses employing
30,000 people were deprived of electrical power and
electricity-dependent comforts. The blackouts were
two of the most comprehensive power outages ever
to strike Sweden and the largest power disturbances
witnessed in the history of electricity distribution in
Stockholm. In the Swedish national setting, both the
duration and the scope of the blackouts were without
modern precedent (Aktuellt, 2001).
Thecasestudywasconstructedandexaminedby
thorough process-tracing, which resulted in detailed
case-study narratives (Stern, 1999; George & Bennett,
2004) and detection of 51 crisis-induced lessons.
These were structured according to conceptual cate-
gories designed to answer the questions of What is
learned (single- or double-loop lessons)?; What is the
focus of learning (prevention or response)?; When does
learning take place (intra- or intercrisis)?; Is learning
blocked from implementation or does it come full circle
(lessons distilled or implemented)? The case-study
design affects the possibilities to generalize the find-
ings to a larger set of organizations. However, this
article contributes to build theoretical knowledge and
theoretical generalizations rather than making empiri-
cal generalizations (Yin, 2003). This should be useful
because there is a lack of developed theory to build on
within crisis learning theory. In line with the theore-
tical ambitions, the propositions that are suggested
in the concluding sections are left to further research
to test.
2. Crisis, learning and lesson-drawing
Crisis is defined in this article as a situation that
subjects a community of people, such as an organiza-
tion, a state or a municipality, to a serious threat to its
basic structures or fundamental values and norms,
which, under time pressure and uncertainties, necessi-
tates making crucial decisions (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2006,
p. 42). Following a definition put forth by Argote (1999)
and Schwab (2007), organizational learning is seen to
occur ‘when experience systematically alters behaviour
or knowledge’ (Schwab, 2007, p. 233). This view
on organizational learning clearly distinguishes between
cognition and behaviour, which, according to
most views, is the essence of learning (Dekker &
Hanse
´n, 2004, p. 219). In addition, it does not,
like other definitions (see, e.g., Bennett & Howlett,
1992),
1
distinguish specifically between lessons distilled
– that is lessons observed that do not change actual
behaviour, and lessons implemented – that is lessons
observed that change individual and organizational
behaviour. Thus, both types of learning processes are
studied here.
The relation between crisis and learning is unclear in
the literature. Organization scholars highlight the effect
that crises have on learning and change. Two
such notable sub fields are organizational learning
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 808; Common, 2004) and
management communication (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer,
2003; Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005). Studies
within the fields of policy analysis and public adminis-
tration tend to see crisis as an opportunity for learning
that may open up windows of reform required for
change (Keeler, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993;
Kingdon, 1995; Birkland, 2006). Recent evidence from
the crisis management literature, however, shows that
learning does not necessarily follow from crises (Elliott
& Smith, 1993; Fortune & Peters, 1995; Toft & Reynolds,
1997; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Boin, McConnell, & ’t Hart,
2008). The literatures of crisis management, public
administration and organizational learning thus present
divergent views on the potential impact of crises on
learning. Furthermore, what organizations learn, and
when that learning takes place is rarely delved into
(Roux-Dufort, 2000; Nohrstedt, 2007). Research on
crisis and learning so far concludes that it ‘remains an
open question’ whether crises trigger or forestall
learning and change (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius,
2005, p. 134). Clearly, there is a need to increase
knowledge on the relation between crisis and learning.
This article takes on this task by explicitly targeting
these puzzling aspects of the crisis-induced learning
process.
This article studies learning from crisis as a series of
crisis-induced lesson-drawing processes. Although I do
not focus on learning from other jurisdictions to
improve government reform programmes as Richard
Rose (1993), I draw on his conception of lesson-
drawing, which understands a lesson as crafted within
the organizational structure by organizational mem-
bers. A lesson is designed on the basis of experience
and thus ‘requires a cause-and-effect model’, which
shows how the lesson can achieve a desired goal if
adopted (Rose, 1993, p. 13). In the midst of crisis, this
cause and effect loop might be difficult to distinguish as
acting and thinking under time pressure, value complex-
ity and uncertainty may be interwoven (cf. Flin, 1996).
Nevertheless, I noted that a crisis-induced lesson was
distilled when new information or knowledge based on
the crisis experience was declared in statements by
organizational members, for real or rhetorical reasons
(Clarke, 1999; see also Birkland in this symposium). The
lesson is considered as implemented when it leads to a
systematic alteration of behaviour. Therefore, when
examining the data, I looked for new insights, knowl-
edge and understandings as well as more concrete and
visible actions and changes taking place.
180 Edward Deverell
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009 &2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
3. A conceptual framework for
crisis-induced learning
Lalonde (2007), in a recent study, set the stage for a
learning model for organizational resilience and im-
proved crisis-coping capacities. She claimed that crisis
management studies do not seem ‘to lead to a crisis
management learning model that fosters organizational
resilience in coping with crises’ (Lalonde, 2007, p. 95).
In line with this call for studies that uncover practical
implications for crisis managers, I use the case-study
method, which remains close to real-life situations
(Flyvberg, 2006). The case study was constructed using
a process-tracing approach aimed at pointing out what
stimuli actors act on (George & Bennett, 2004). The
selected case includes narratives of two cable fires that
caused blackouts in eight commercial and residential
city districts in Stockholm, affecting some 80,000
people. The detailed process-tracing and reconstruc-
tion of the crisis management and crisis aftermath
processes identified the Stockholm city command and
control unit and the power company Birka Energi as the
case’s main actors.
The case is particular as it involves repeated crisis
events and thus an opportunity to learn from crisis.
Case narratives are based on data from commissioned
investigations, media sources and interviews. These
multiple data sources were used to increase reli-
ability by balancing statements and mitigating uncertain-
ties within the respective source data. Further,
sources include semi-structured interviews with 12
decision makers at the city and six key decision
makers at the power company. Interviewees were
selected on the basis of their roles in the management
of the incidents (according to organizational hierarchy
and secondary sources). Taken together, the data
provided for a thick narrative of the crisis event,
including phases before, during and after the actual
crisis impetus.
The process-tracing approach was carried out by
reconstructing the crisis management and decision-
making processes into a crisis narrative, and then
dissecting the narratives into occasions for critical
decision making, each of which were closely examined
(Stern, 1999). This approach helps the researcher
pinpoint lessons and learning episodes, observe how
actors involved in crisis management make use of
lessons learned and discover the causal nexus between
the two phenomena of crisis and learning. Instances
from the crisis narrative and decision-making analysis
that depict periods when experience alters knowledge
or behaviour were interpreted as a lesson taking place.
By using a coding sheet rooted in the four previously
mentioned conceptual categories (what is learned;
when; what is the focus; and is learning implemented?),
51 crisis-induced lessons were identified. As the analy-
sis required coding of non-visible constructs, inter-
coder reliability was required to confirm reliability (cf.
Nohrstedt, 2007). An inter-coder reliability test was
carried out by a department colleague assigned to code
the lessons independently by using the four criteria
outlined below. After the inter-coder reliability test, the
analysis was revised and lessons that came out as
ambiguous were removed from the analysis.
3.1. What is learned – single- or double-loop
learning?
Argyris and Scho
¨n’s (1978, 1996) distinction between
single- and double-loop learning is probably the most
influential categorization of organizational learning.
Other theorists have presented similar categorizations,
but none has been cited with such intensity (Fiol &
Lyles, 1985; Dodgson, 1993; Rose, 1993; Lipshitz,
2000). Single-loop learning is achieved when organiza-
tional members detect and correct divergences and
flaws in the organization and its procedures, without
inquiring into basic organizational premises and norms
(Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1978, p. 18ff). Hence, single-loop
learning processes permit organizations to carry out
and achieve present policies and objectives. Such
learning works best when the external environment
changes slowly or when organizational premises and
the environment are not in conflict. In times of rapid
change, however, managers may feel an urge to under-
take inquiries that question the organizational status
quo. Such double-loop learning inquiries may take the
form of restructuring of organizational norms, strate-
gies and assumptions associated with those norms.
This deeper form of learning presupposes that error
detection becomes not only connected to strategies,
and assumptions for effective performance (single-loop
learning), but also to ‘the very norms which define
effective performance’ (Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1978, p. 22).
To double-loop learn, actors need to detect and
correct errors by inquiring into and – if necessary –
modifying the underlying norms, policies and objectives
of the organization (Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1978, p. 3). This
radical adjustment means that old understandings are
discarded as new ones are added. Operationalizing
these concepts can be difficult. For instance, a learning
process starting out as single loop might end up as a
double loop and vice versa. This study, however,
understands the learning in question as dependent on
the initial intention.
In summing up, the question of what is learned is
addressed by coding lessons either as single-loop
lessons that inquire into organizational errors and
shortcomings or as double-loop lessons that inquire
into broader issues of organizational objectives, norms
and working procedures.
Crises as Learning Triggers 181
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Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009
3.2. What is the focus of learning – prevention or
response?
Prevention and response are two basic foci of crisis-
induced learning. The former pertains to finding the
cause of the crisis, and making sure that it does not
happen again. This is learning how to avoid being
subjected to the same or a similar crisis in the future.
The latter pertains to minimizing consequences of the
same or a similar event by enhancing crisis management
capacities. This is learning how to respond to the crisis
events (at hand or in the future). Both foci are essential
for organizational resilience. However, Wildavsky
(1988), in his seminal piece on risks and safety, argued
that a strategy of resilience – that is, learning from error
how to bounce back after accidents and crises (similar
to the focus of response) – is more efficient than
spending resources on anticipatory measures to pre-
vent accidents from occurring (similar to the focus of
prevention). It should be mentioned, however, that the
line between minimizing risk of repeat and minimizing
consequences is thin at times. Inquiring into root causes
of a single crisis is not always fruitful (Shrivastava, 1987).
More often than not, crises are results of a series of
interlinked events, shortcomings and flaws (Perrow,
1984; Reason, 1990), which may be triggered by human,
organizational and technical causes (Shrivastava, 1987).
This article’s take on the issue is to distinguish between
the two foci on the basis of the aim of the lesson, rather
than on its outcome.
In summary, I analyse the focus of learning by
distinguishing between learning focused on accident
prevention – when lessons aim at minimizing risks of
crisis reoccurrence or on improving preparedness –
and learning focused on response – when lessons aim at
improving the crisis response or at minimizing the
consequences of the crisis.
3.3. When are lessons learned – inter- or
intracrisis?
The distinction between inter- and intracrisis learning is
understood as a matter of timing. Following Moynihan
(2008, p. 352), intercrisis learning is defined as ‘learning
from one crisis and making changes to prepare for
another’, while intracrisis learning refers to ‘learning
that seeks to improve response during a single crisis
episode’ (see also Moynihan in this symposium). Ac-
cording to Moynihan (2008), research on intracrisis
learning is not as developed as research on intercrisis
learning. Intracrisis learning is activated in the midst of
stress, uncertainty, time pressure and demands for
rapid action. Crisis-induced learning triggers tell orga-
nizational members that they need new routines and
procedures to manage the events at hand. These acute
crisis characteristics make intracrisis learning more
difficult than intercrisis learning (Dror, 1988; Lagadec,
1990), which happens when there, is in general, more
time to contemplate. Some caveats should be men-
tioned, however. First, these propositions apply to fast-
burning crises, rather than slow-burning ‘crises after
the crisis’ where systemic flaws are incubated and
eventually erupt to the detriment of public trust in
authorities and institutions, or creeping crises like for
instance chronic environmental crises that takes years
to erupt and to solve (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001). Second,
lesson drawing from crisis is a dynamic process that is
not easlily located in a single point in time (e.g., during
or after an incident). For example, lessons may be
initiated by individual inquiry in the intracrisis period,
but a more thorough investigation may be postponed to
the intercrisis period. Post crisis these lessons may be
pushed to the fore in a more formal manner by for
instance organizational inquiries and investigations.
Thus, it can be a thorny task to determine whether
the lesson in question is an intra- or an intercrisis
lesson. Third, the distinction between intracrisis learn-
ing and improvisation becomes unclear. Both improvi-
sation and learning are responses to new information.
The distinguishing factor between the two is that the
learning is based on previous experience, while impro-
visation is based on real-time experience (Miner, Bass-
off, & Moorman, 2001). That said, lessons have been
coded according to when the particular problem was
first inquired into.
In sum, the issue of when learning takes place is dealt
with by coding lessons as, on the one hand, intracrisis
learning, initiated during the crisis and, on the other, as
intercrisis learning, initiated after the crisis.
3.4. Lesson implementation – are lessons distilled
or implemented?
Distinguishing between the processes of observing
lessons and implementing lessons is related to the
distinction between cognition and behaviour. Most
definitions of organizational learning agree that learning
entails both cognition (change in states of knowledge)
and behaviour (change in organizational outcome)
(Dekker & Hanse
´n, 2004). But separating cognition
from behaviour may cause concern when real events
and processes are to be analysed. Implicit in many views
of learning, it is assumed that we ‘learn the right
lessons’ (Boin et al., 2008; Birkland, 2006), but when
learning from crisis does occur, it does not necessarily
lead to performance improvement. Further, behaviour
is not necessarily an accurate reflection of cognition
and vice versa. Nevertheless, a distinction is made
between the concepts of lessons distilled and lessons
implemented, by connecting the cognitive activity taking
place as shortcomings are observed to the behavioural
activity played out as lesson are acted upon. If the
182 Edward Deverell
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009 &2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
lesson was only noticed but not carried out to the
extent that it altered organizational behaviour, it is
understood as a lesson distilled. Whereas if the case
narratives show evidence stating that the lesson was
carried out, it is understood as a lesson implemented.
Evidence of implementation is found in statements from
investigation reports, media reports and interviews.
To sum up, the question of whether lessons are carried
out or blocked is addressed by coding lessons as either
distilled – that is lessons noticed by organizational
members but not subsequently acted upon – or lessons
implemented – that is lessons noticed by organizational
members and subsequently acted upon and corrected.
4. Crisis narrative of the 2001 and 2002
Stockholm blackouts
Early morning on 11 March 2001, a technical failure
occurred in a local cable tunnel in northwestern Stock-
holm. The power company control room interpreted it
as a minor failure. A few hours later, a second failure
occurred, along with disturbances in communication
cables (Hornyak, 2001). Now operators suspected
more than an everyday event and notified the Fire
Department. Matters turned worse as the local net-
work lacked redundancy. Power distribution stations
were dependent on feeder cables from a single regional
transformer station. Connecting cables ran through the
same tunnel and they all burned down in the blaze
(Stockholms Fire Brigade, 2001; Go
¨ransson, 2002). This
tightly coupled event (Perrow, 1984) led to a 37-hour
power failure in eight city districts inhabited by 50,000
people, and 700 companies employing another 30,000.
The power company publicly announced that the
system would be restored by the evening (Karlsson,
2001, press release). Thus, most local stakeholders
failed to recognize the severity of the situation. There
was a gap between operational rescue service and
societal coordination of crisis management efforts
(Stockholms Fire Brigade, 2001; Hallander, 2002). The
real dimension of the damages came to power company
managers’ attention 8 hours into the blackout. A new
press release, which initiated societal crisis manage-
ment and coordination, stated that power would return
on 13 March at 22:00 hours. In accordance with a newly
drafted plan, representatives of city agencies gathered
at the Fire Department Rescue Centre. Eventually,
operational experts found a temporary way to repair
the damaged cables, thus ending the blackout before
nightfall on 12 March.
However, makeshift repairs became the groundwork
for crisis reoccurrence. The tunnel was not sufficiently
decomtaminated (Go
¨ransson, 2002) and repairs were
not adequately controlled (Branger, 2002; Karlsson,
2002). Late afternoon on 29 May 2002, new faults in the
same tunnel sparked a fire. Again operators interpreted
events as minor and mundane, but further problem
indications led to increased awareness. Experiences from
2001 made it reasonably clear that the cable fire had
caused serious damages. As the rescue service mission
was executed the city manager and fire chief again made
plans for a coordinated response. The city command and
control repeated the response from 2001. The blackout
lasted for 52 hours and it ended as operational experts
temporarily connected the local utility’s network to the
national grid (Tunnel-branden, 2002).
5. Organizational learning from the
crisis episodes
By tracing the processes of the utility’s crisis manage-
ment during and following the first crisis event, 20
crisis-induced lessons were revealed. Most lessons
originated from the operational level. They were in
general single-loop inquiries into problems noticed by
the management on how to minimize the consequences
if a similar failure would occur again, rather than how to
prevent a repeat of the failure. Looking back at the
previous incident, the 2002 accident investigator com-
mented on the changes made after the 2001 crisis:
From this list it may be concluded that many of the
measures are (electro-) technical rather than fire
protective, and most focussed on the 11 kV-side. No
specific measures were taken towards redundant or
fire separated cable design [and] the cable joints
were not covered with fire protective paint after the
repair work after the last fire (Go
¨ransson, 2002).
Process-tracing analyses provided some evidence of
crisis improvisation at Birka Energi during the first
crisis, but not for intracrisis learning based on prior
experience. Possibly, the limited managerial crisis ex-
perience within the company made lesson-drawing
during the first event difficult and reflections were,
deliberately or not, cast aside until the crisis aftermath
(Markusson, 2002). Further, the one major lesson in the
crisis aftermath that questioned imperfections in sys-
tem design as an underlying cause of the accident –
namely to increase network redundancy by building a
new production plant – was not implemented. As the
manager of operations put it:
We probably thought that this would not happen
again. Therefore everything that one in hindsight
might think should have happened probably did not
happen. But we were working with solutions [. . .]
and we thought that we had taken care of the most
acute stuff with the measures that we had taken
while changing the design (Karlsson, 2001).
Crises as Learning Triggers 183
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Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009
Process-tracing narratives of the city command and
control unit’s management of the events revealed nine
lessons triggered by the 2001 blackout. These lessons
related to the issue of minimizing consequences in the
event of a similar crisis (i.e., how to improve perfor-
mance). A possible reason why there were no lessons
of prevention was that the capacity to really prevent a
repetition lay within the powers of the utility, while the
city could only call attention to issues of preventing
crisis repetition. However, the city owned 50% of the
company and could put pressure on the utility, not least
through its consumer power being one of the utility’s
largest clients. But as the city planned to sell its
holdings, such a strategy could affect potential buyers’
interests (Cederschio
¨ld, 2003; Kleist, 2003).
The city’s lessons from the 2001 incident were of the
intercrisis type. Most lessons were regarded as struc-
tural single-loop learning pertaining to the rescue
service mission, the structure of the coordination
group or information and communication routines
(Kleist, 2001; Stockholms Fire Brigade, 2001; Svensson,
2001). All but one of the city’s lessons was codified
either in planning documents or by decisions made
during the 2002 crisis.
In terms of the second crisis, the Vice President of
the utility described the May 2002 cable fire and black-
out as a technical and credibility failure and ‘a disaster in
terms of engineering’. Moreover, he added: ‘In terms of
the strictly technical aspects, unsuccessful repair work a
year earlier and to not maintain the power supply [. . .].
That’s really a low-water mark for us’ (Gustafsson,
2002). However, the 2002 crisis was also an opportu-
nity to put lessons of 2001 to the test. Several lessons
that were first considered after the first episode were
reiterated and implemented during the second black-
out. In all, 17 lessons learned by the power company
from the 2002 event were identified from process-
tracing crisis narratives. Most pertained to minimizing
consequences of the failure (or of a similar potential
future failure), although six lessons focused on crisis
prevention. There was a noticeable increase in the
number of intracrisis lessons at the utility following
the second incident, and there was a steep increase in
double-loop learning lessons questioning organizational
culture and working procedures (Gustafsson, 2002).
Lessons were also implemented to a higher degree in
2002 than in 2001. This applies to intra- and intercrisis
lessons, as well as single-loop lessons, and even more so
to double-loop lessons (six out of seven). Taken
together, this suggests more soul-searching at the
company after the second event compared with the
first.
The process-tracing of the city’s management of the
second blackout points to five lessons learned by the
city’s command and control unit from the second event,
all of which dealt with the issue of crisis response and
how to minimize consequences of a similar future crisis.
Three lessons required investigations into organiza-
tional routines during crises and were thus double-
loop lessons. Most of these were also implemented.
The first incident also led to a substantial learning
programme in the form of the city’s long-term crisis
management investigation and overhaul of procedures
and protocols. The programme was called for by the
Fire Department in the post hoc evaluation and subse-
quently sanctioned by the Commissioner of Finance 8
months after the incident (Carlsson, 2002; Jidling,
2004). The second crisis, however, did not provide
novel takes on learning. Similar to the actual crisis
response, learning from the second crisis in most
accounts continued in previously established tracks. In
the words of the City Director:
The second time we had the answers, so we did
exactly as the last time. I can’t say we changed
anything either. On the contrary, it ran more
smoothly the second time. I think everyone felt
more at ease. The first time there was some
uneasiness. [. . .] But I think that everyone that was
involved in this one felt more comfortable (Kleist,
2003).
The one notable exception from repeating procedures
established from the first blackout was the city’s inter-
crisis lesson to monitor the utility’s pledged reforms
more closely by a series of meetings, which shows that
the city prioritized its accountability role more follow-
ing the second event compared with the first.
6. Discussion
On a theoretical level, what can the learning analysis of
the two blackouts tell us about what organizations learn
from crisis? In general, an incident produces more
inquiries into easy to notice crisis triggers and opera-
tional errors than into more concealed, underlying
norms and procedures (van Duin, 1992; Toft & Rey-
nolds, 1997). However, it is important not to overlook
evidence of single-loop learning generated by crisis-
learning analyses (Roux-Dufort & Metais, 1998). Many
analysts see double-loop learning as the only true
learning (Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1978; Dodgson, 1993).
However, I argue that in-depth analyses of single-loop
learning processes are equally important teachers of
how learning processes come about and evolve from a
theoretical as well as from a practical perspective.
Nonetheless, and in line with previous research (van
Duin, 1992; Boin et al., 2005), this learning analysis
shows processes of organizations that mostly drew
lessons of single-loop learning type. Moreover, the
double-loop lessons that were drawn did not relate
184 Edward Deverell
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009 &2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
to everyday organizational norms, objectives or work-
ing procedures. Instead, they mostly related to organi-
zational working procedures during crisis, which
accordingly leads us to our first proposition.
Proposition 1: If organizations that experience a crisis
engage in double-loop learning, then lessons will pertain
to specific crisis procedures and structures rather than
to general organizational norms and policies.
The distinction between single- and double-loop
learning has several merits; not least, it helps research-
ers operationalize the highly abstract and thorny con-
struct that is learning (Levy, 1994; Stern, 1997; Berends
et al., 2003). However, the Argyrian conceptualizations
may underestimate the crucial distinction between
reflective and mechanistic learning. To settle what
learning is and how it can be distinguished from less
reflective change is not an easy task. Both single- and
double-loop learning presuppose cognitive reflection.
But as prior research on the topic shows, and as this
study reiterates, such critical and deeper reflection is
not a conventional response to crises. Rather than
engaging in reflective cognition and analytical investiga-
tions in response to crises, managers tend to resort to
mechanic adaptation and reflex reactions in response to
failures and external threats (Staw, Sandelands, &
Dutton, 1981).
Moving to the issue of what the focus of learning from
crisis is, the traditional view on learning from crisis is
understood as primarily preventing new accidents from
taking place (van Duin, 1992). However, this learning
analysis indicates that organizational response patterns
can be contrary to this view. The case demonstrates
organizations failing in crisis prevention, but picking up
lessons on how to act in the event of a crisis. Further,
crises that stem from technical system failures are
complicated matters that rarely derive from a single
root cause (Shrivastava, 1987). Rather these kinds of
failures result from combinations of causes and multiple
factors, embedded in the social and organizational
environment (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1990; Pidgeon,
Turner, Toft, & Blockey, 1992). Inquiring into causes is
thus a complicated and resource-intensive task, which
may be a reason why – as did the organizations in the
case under study here – crisis actors opt to delve
deeper into issues of resilience and crisis management
capacities rather than developing preparedness for
unanticipated events (cf. Wildavsky, 1988). This brings
us to the second proposition:
Proposition 2: Organizations that are subjected to
crisis experiences are likely to learn how to act at
the event of a crisis while they will still find it difficult
to learn how to prevent future crises.
In terms of the issue of when learning takes place,
previous research has emphasized that the crisis char-
acteristics of time pressure, uncertainty and values at
play make it difficult for actors to learn in the midst of a
crisis (Dror, 1988; Lagadec, 1990; see also Moynihan in
this symposium). The learning analysis of the first
incident supports this proposition. No clear traces of
lesson drawing during crisis were found from the
analysis of the first crisis event. Double- and single-
loop intracrisis learning was instead initiated during the
second crisis. Possibly, these intracrisis lessons were in
some respects connected to implicit contemplations
raised by the first crisis. Surprisingly enough, however, I
did not find a significant difference in the number of
double-loop lessons drawn during crisis, compared with
double-loop lessons drawn post crisis, which suggests
that organizations that are not experienced crisis
copers are unlikely to enjoy sudden rises in intracrisis
lesson drawing. Although there are examples presented
in the literature of organizations without recent rele-
vant experiences that learn during crisis, as for example
presented in the case of the outbreak and containment
of Exotic Newcastle Disease among poultry in the state
of California in 2002 (see Moynihan in this symposium),
inexperienced organizations required to manage a crisis
seem likely to become too caught up in crisis manage-
ment and operational activities to find time for intra-
crisis lesson drawing. But, if crisis managers do find the
time, creativity and reflection to learn during the crisis
and implementation of such lessons does not necessa-
rily come harder than implementation of lessons post
crisis. This brings us to our third proposition:
Proposition 3: Organizations with recent crisis-coping
experiences are more likely to initiate comprehen-
sive intracrisis learning in the midst of the crisis than
those who lack recent crisis experience.
The fourth and final question of this article con-
cerned the issue of implementing lessons from crisis.
Crisis-induced lessons may be blocked from implemen-
tation for a number of reasons depending on what kind
of resistance and support the lesson may trigger in the
organizational complex. In addition, as this study in-
dicates, double-loop lessons, that in hindsight may
appear to be more or less ‘given’, may also be blocked
from implementation due to for instance shifting prio-
rities, financial costs or excess attention on easier to
implement single-loop lessons. This leads to the inter-
esting issue of interaction between the two learning
types. Single- and double-loop learning is not contrary
to each other or mutually exclusive. But there are
paradoxical elements here. Double-loop efforts may
cause actors to overlook or forego useful single-loop
lessons (van Duin, 1992; Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1996). Like-
wise, placing a great deal of attention on single-loop
lessons may cause organizations to miss out on valuable
double-loop learning. From my learning analysis, I found
that a large number of the power company’s lessons
Crises as Learning Triggers 185
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Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 17 Number 3 September 2009
triggered by the second incident were implemented
(compared with lessons triggered by the first event).
The study does not show specific differences in the
ratio of implementation of intra- compared with inter-
crisis lessons. However, the case analysis does indicate
that single-loop lessons become implemented as long as
implementation does not come at what is interpreted
as an extensive cost. Moreover, and based especially on
case findings from the 2002 incident analysis, when
critique and credibility loss increased, financial costs
were set aside and lesson implementation came easier.
This brings us to the fourth proposition:
Proposition 4: If there is external critique toward the
organization and credibility loss, then implementa-
tion of crisis-induced lesson will be carried out at a
greater rate.
This proposition emphasizes the role of mass media
and politics in crisis-induced learning. Thus, it points
to an impending risk of current crisis management.
External critique clearly matters. But it does not
necessarily mean that the ‘right lessons’ are being
learned (Birkland, 2006). On the contrary, mediatiza-
tion and politicization may cause crisis managers to lose
track of operational lessons and underlying organiza-
tional lessons and instead pay excessive attention to
symbolic crisis learning verbalized by and framed in
terms of buzzwords that may hamper critical reflection
(see Hanse
´n in this symposium), or documented and
laid down in merely rhetorical fantasy learning docu-
ments (see Birkland in this symposium).
7. Conclusions
Compared with most of the experimental approaches
presented in this symposium, this article adopts a
slightly more orthodox approach to crisis learning by
reviewing relevant literatures and outlining four specific
aspects of the crisis learning process. Possibly and
hopefully, the framework laid out in this article will
help researchers to dissect and structure the complex
process of crisis-induced learning. Increased structuring
of the field is needed for at least two reasons. First, it
may assist in fostering a theoretical understanding of
these intricate processes (Mitroff, Alpaslan, & Green,
2004). Second, increased structuring may be helpful in
enhancing practical capabilities to draw lessons from
crisis experience, which is vital for creating robust and
reliable organizations and for decreasing the risks of
future crisis (Argyris & Scho
¨n, 1978, p. 5).
Although this study aimed to provide a conceptual
analysis, the empirical component has also been clearly
highlighted. Even more empirical studies on crisis-
induced learning are required in order to increase
knowledge about processes of how, when and what
organizations learn from crisis experiences (cf. Moyni-
han in this symposium). More specifically, we need to
know more about deeper double-loop learning pro-
cesses, and not least, more about seemingly mundane
single-loop learning. Research on both types of learning
processes is required for building knowledge on the
complicated relation between single- and double-loop
learning and how one affects the other. Hopefully, by
clarifying key concepts and putting forth propositions
for further research, this article has made a modest
contribution to this crucial and growing field. Taken
together, the propositions presented here show the
difficulties of learning from crisis, even in a case that
offers conditions that are relatively conducive to crisis
learning.
2
This should make the call for further research
on the topic even more pertinent.
Notes
1. Bennett and Howlett’s (1992) conception of learning
suggests that learning is best studied from the behavioural
outcome perspective. The authors argue that the con-
ceptualization of learning as an intervening variable be-
tween agency and change may never be successfully
operationalized. They stress that ‘It may be impossible
to observe the learning activity in isolation from the
change requiring explanation. We may only know that
learning is taking place because policy change is taking
place’ (Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p. 290).
2. Examples of such conditions are: similarity between the
crisis events, relatively short time between crisis events
and low personnel turnover in the management groups.
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