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Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy
Abstract
In this article we advocate a liberty and private property rights approach to the issue of abortion.
... Consequently, much of the vitriol aimed at libertarianism and its laissez-faire attitude has included morbid references to child abuse and exploitation which would supposedly result from its implementation. It is therefore imperative that more work be done on the topic of children's rights in order to reinforce the philosophical framework developed by Murray Rothbard [9] and expanded on by Walter Block and others [2], [3], [5], [6]. The purpose of this paper is to provide an independent rational foundation for the conclusions drawn by Block and co-authors [2], [5] and to expand on parts that are insufficient. ...
... In a nontrivial sense, people never stop developing psychologically, as they gain wisdom from every new experience, reflection, and insight as long as they live. 6 Apart from these laws being arbitrary, there is no single age that can be justifiably chosen at all, regardless of how strong the evidence was in its favor, since every individual person develops at a different rate. A universally designated age of consent or majority is a consequence of the inflexible and domineering nature of the state apparatus, which enables certain groups of people to impose their own ways of life onto others. ...
... 5. While the rights of children in utero are derived in exactly the same way as their postnatal counterparts, the political implications of this are not in the scope of this paper but are sufficiently analyzed from a libertarian perspective in [3] and [6]. 6. ...
Libertarianism has often found itself under attack from those with misplaced maternal instincts, who champion the state as the honorable protector of the vulnerable – and there is no one more in need of protection than a helpless infant. Consequently, much of the vitriol aimed at libertarianism and its laissez-faire attitude has included morbid references to child abuse and exploitation which would supposedly result from its implementation. It is therefore imperative that more work be done on the topic of children’s rights in order to reinforce the philosophical framework developed by Murray Rothbard [9] and expanded on by Walter Block and others [2], [3], [5], [6]. The purpose of this paper is to provide an independent rational foundation for the conclusions drawn by Block and co-authors [2], [5] and to expand on parts that are insufficient.
... There might be extenuating circumstances.12 For more on this see:Block (1977Block ( , 2001Block ( , 2003Block ( , 2004Block ( , 2008Block ( , 2010A, 2010B, 2011Block ( , 2016,Block & Whitehead (2005), and Epstein vs. ...
... I had been publishing on the evictionist doctrine for many years (Block, 1977, 1978, 2001, 2004A, 2008, Block and Whitehead, 2005. My debate with Wisniewski started with his publication 2010A, where he criticized evictionism on the ground that "if one voluntarily initiates the causal chain which leads to someone else ending up on his property, the latter person cannot be considered a trespasser. ...
... This author accurately summarizes Block and Whitehead (2005) and is kind enough to characterize it as "creative thinking!" Here is his succinct and correct summary of my view: " It will not satisfy those whose premise is that even the fertilized egg is a human person with an inherent right to life, but it does deal with the third trimester and promises to move ever closer to dealing with even that extreme position. ...
This paper raises three concerns regarding self-ownership rhetoric to describe autonomy within healthcare in general and reproductive justice in specific. First, private property and the notion of “ownership” embedded in “self-ownership,” rely on and replicate historical injustices related to the initial acquisition of property. Second, not all individuals are recognized as selves with equal access to self-ownership. Third, self-ownership only justifies negative liberties. To fully protect healthcare access and reproductive care in specific, we must also be able to make claims on others to respect, protect, and fulfill our positive rights. As much as nondomination remains an urgent demand for reproductive rights, it does not go far enough to ensure reproductive justice.
This chapter considers various theological ethical processes and compares the different ways in which they balance reason, experience, revelation, scripture and tradition. Examples considered are middle axioms, mishnaic exegesis, Biggar’s Barthian Thomism, liberation theology in various traditions and particular stances of theology, for example feminist, black and narrative theology. Liberation theology is often criticized as mere politics and some branches of liberation theology do employ analysis based on secular political analysis. For example, Latin American liberation theology drew strongly on Marxist economic analysis and feminist theological ethics relies on secular feminist work. This chapter considers areas of theological ethics that draw explicitly on secular philosophy and political theory, and secular disciplines and sciences, both social and physical. The theory of process is tested by reference to a number of examples including arguments around gender and sexuality, issues of disability and equality.
Only a libertarian would think to base an analysis of the abortion controversy on private property rights. The present paper does just that. On that basis, it concludes that evictionism is the only policy compatible with libertarianism. This essay then uses this analysis to criticize the views on this subject of five scholars associated with this political philosophy: Feser, Goodwin, Mosquito, Sadowsky, Vance and Watkins.
The present article is devoted to developing a libertarian understanding of whether natural rights may or may not underpin human rights and, if so, how. Libertarianism is first defined in terms of the nonaggression principle (NAP), in answer to the question “What is the proper use of force?” This provides a basis for the libertarian positions on property rights, taxation, and many other issues, including human rights. Various philosophical rationales for the NAP are explored, including utilitarianism, religion, and natural rights. The basis of human rights is then examined. Every ethical tradition supports the nonaggression principle, which makes it an ideal candidate for the fundamental basis of human rights. Unfortunately, other traditions expand upon human rights by adding “positive” rights that ultimately violate the NAP. The conclusion takes up the application of libertarian principles to three issues, which could be viewed as human rights questions: discrimination, abortion, and the “trolley problem.” The last one involves taking one life to save many others.
On June 6, 1995, baseball legend Mickey Mantle was placed on the transplant waiting list after being diagnosed with end-stage liver disease caused by hepatitis, liver cancer, and years ofalcohol abuse. Two days later,he underwent surgery, despite the factthat the average liver transplantpatient waits 67 days. His doctors claimed that Mantle received no preferential treatment; rather, his gravely ill status placed him at the top ofthe list. Yet,becauseof Mantle's original liver cancer, he died two months later. Given that 804 patients died in 1995 while awaiting a liver transplant, Mantle's case and others like his raise questions about which of the 7,400 liver patients on the waiting list should have received the 3,900 livers that became available that year. Societyhasto confront this andsimilarquestions becauseofthe severe shortage of transplantable organs. Organs are not the only goods rationed in the United States—they are just the most controversial. Hunting permits, oil drilling leases, cellular telephone licenses, and radio frequencies are other examples of rationed resources. The distinguishing feature of these goods is that prices alone are not permitted to allocate the commodity; as a result, someone must determine how they will be distributed. There are many ways that goods can be rationed, such as lotteries, first-come, first-served, and coupons. As a consequence ofprice con- trols, gasoline was rationed in the 1970s, largely on a first-come, first- served basis.' The result was long lines at the pumps and an effective
Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with it, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this labour being the unquestionable Property of the labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others…. Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that Indians who hath killed it; ʹtis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the Civilizʹd part of Mankind, who have made and multiplied positive Laws to determine Property, this original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by vertue thereof, what Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that great and still remaining Common of Mankind; or what Ambergriese any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state Nature left it in, made his Property who takes that pains about it.
The sort of omission that is punished by statute is neglect of a duty or obligation. Generally some obligations are thought to be deserving of enforcement. They then properly belong in a society's legal code. Other obligations are merely moral and are outside the purview of law. Thus, only omission of a legally binding obligation is a matter for law enforcement. The question to be considered here is: Should there be an enforced legal duty of Parents to support their minor children?l11 ~i~bili~~ under the law for a wrongful injury ought to be based on direct connection to an intentional action of a rights-invading sort. Consider the following example, taken from an article by Daniel Dinello: A hospital has two patients, Jones and Smith. Each has only one kidney as a result of previous operations. Jones will die in two hours unlm he receives a heart transplant. Smith has a severe kidney infection in his one remaining kidney. If Smith does not receive a kidney transplant, he will die in approximately four hours, when jonesdies, his kidney can be transplanted to Smith, Or Smith could be killed, and his heart transplanted to Jones. By hypothesis, circumstances are such that there are no other hearts or kidneys available within the time necessary to save either person.121 In this example, Smith and Jones are receiving all appropriate medical care except for the transplants. Smith is not killing Jones by being slightly healthier? It is Jones's heart ailment that is killing him. However, if Jones stabs Smith (taking care, of course, not to damage Smith's heart) or the doctors (perhaps acting as Jones's agents) stab Smith, the intentional stabbing is what kills Smith. - .Theauthor wouldlike to thank the Law and Liberty Project of theinstitute forHumaneStudiesforsupport in the writing of this paper. With the importance of causality thus noted, we can now go on to distinguish between commission and omission. Anglo-American law generally follows the idea of causality in making this distinction. The distinction is clear and bold in the traditional reasonings of the law. Francis H. Bohlen writes: There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active miscon- duct working positive injury to others and ~assive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to benefit others. or to protect them from harm not created by anv wrondul act of the defendmtW ~~,-~.~ ~ ~ ~~ ~-~~ ~~~. The basis for the distinction goes back to the principle of causality in stressing that misfeasance is an attack upon the victim's rights, whereas nonfeasance lets him alone, but without having received a boon that might have been conferred upon him. Bohlen therefore goes --A- urr iu bay;
The world of political economy can be divided into two camps: those who wish to rid society of all commercial interactions, and those who think that engaging in any market activity should be legal. These are of course end points on the spectrum; most views fall in between. Radin occupies a position very much toward the anti free enterprise end of this continuum. The goal of the present essay is to defend economic freedom against her critique. This shall be done by citing, and then critically commenting on, her text.
A reply to Kronman on topics surrounding alienability, law, and paternalism.
The recent paper by B-R should be applauded for bringing to light an extremely important and controversial public policy issue.
The authors of this note have been students of antitrust, regulation, and related microeconomic policy issues for over fifteen
years. Yet, they can safely say that they have never encountered a single policy that is more at odds with the public welfare
than is the current organ procurement policy.
As economists, it is easy to describe and analyze the tremendous inefficiencies, waste, and market distortions created by
the current altruistic system. But as human beings, they authors are incensed at the unnecessary suffering and loss of life
that is caused by the current policy and is so poorly revealed in formal diagrams. Hopefully, B-R's paper, along with this
corrective note, will help to spawn a more rational public policy toward cadaveric organ procurement.
Required request laws that mandate hospital personnel to request organ donations have not substantially increased the supply of organs for transplantation. Frustration caused by the continuing shortage of organs has led several experts to promote controversial options for expanding the pool of available organs, including the offer of financial incentives. Pilot programs to test the use of incentives are warranted, but such experiments must be approached cautiously, given the moral qualms they might raise and the availability of other options. One promising strategy is to install standardized hospital procedures to ensure that all potential donors are identified, that every family is approached about the possibility of donation, and that the request is properly structured. The second strategy is to refocus public education to encourage family discussion about organ donation so that the families of those individuals who are disposed to donate will be more likely to grant consent when asked.