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L’Italia: Una Crisi Nella Crisi (Italy: A Crisis within the Crisis)

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The article synthesizes the large and extending literature on the financial and economic crisis from a Post-Keynesian point of view. The authors take on the position that the international and internal real imbalances are serious and worrying, but yet they are not the cause of the crisis or of its tremendous dimension. The flawed and insufficient regulation of finance is the prime cause of the crisis, as well as it is one of the main hindrances to expansionary macroeconomic policies that may less painfully drive developed countries out of the crisis. It then examines the most recent developments in the euro-area, claiming that we are not facing a sovereign debt crisis but rather a speculative attack on the euro. Finally, the article considers specifically the situation of Italy, currently at the hearth of such an attack, and suggests that the country was already facing critical developments before the 2007/2008 crisis. Thus, the policy measures so far suggested to exit the current stressful situation, in so far as they ignore this fact, seriously run the risk of proving insufficient or altogether noxious.
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