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Putting the Self Into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model
Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins
Department of Psychology
University of California, Davis
Self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame, pride) are fundamentally important to a wide
range of psychological processes, yet they have received relatively little attention
compared to other, more “basic” emotions (e.g., sadness, joy). This article outlines
the unique features that distinguish self-conscious from basic emotions and then ex-
plains why generally accepted models of basic emotions do not adequately capture the
self-conscious emotion process. The authors present a new model of self-conscious
emotions, specify a set of predictions derived from the model, and apply the model to
narcissistic self-esteem regulation. Finally, the authors discuss the model’s broader
implications for future research on self and emotion.
Willy Loman, the protagonist of Arthur Miller’s
Death of a Salesman, experiences such profound
shame from failing to achieve the American dream that
he commits suicide by the final act of the play. In Wil-
liam Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Lady Macbeth is so
overwhelmed by guilt after murdering her king, she
hallucinates spots of blood on her hands and takes her
own life. Oedipus, the tragic hero of Sophocles’
Oedipus Rex, is plunged into epic shame when he real-
izes that he killed his father and married his mother.
Oedipus refrains from suicide but stabs out his eyes so
he will never have to look himself, or others, in the face
again. And in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the infamous
Narcissus is so consumed by pride that he chooses eter-
nal self-reflection over the possibility of a meaningful
romantic relationship.
As these four stories illustrate, self-conscious emo-
tions, such as shame, guilt, and pride, play a central
role in motivating and regulating people’s thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors (Campos, 1995; Fischer &
Tangney, 1995). Self-conscious emotions drive people
to work hard in achievement and task domains (Stipek,
1995; Weiner, 1985), and to behave in moral, socially
appropriate ways in their social interactions and inti-
mate relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heather-
ton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Retzinger,
1987). Most people spend a great deal of time avoiding
social approbation, a strong elicitor of shame and em-
barrassment. We worry about losing social status in the
eyes of others and, as Goffman (1955) noted, our every
social act is influenced by even the slight chance of
public shame or loss of face. In fact, according to the
Cooley–Scheff Conjecture, we are “virtually always in
a state of either pride or shame” (Scheff, 1988, p. 399).
Researchers have linked self-conscious emotions to
a wide variety of outcomes. Guilt, for example, has
been found to be centrally involved in reparative and
prosocial behaviors such as empathy, altruism, and
caregiving (e.g., Batson, 1987; Baumeister et al., 1994;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has been shown to
mediate the negative emotional and physical health
consequences of social stigma; victims of physical
abuse (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 2002) and HIV-posi-
tive men (Kemeny, 2002) suffer poorer emotional and
physical health if they feel ashamed of their stigma.
Shame is also associated with depression and chronic
anger (Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Lewis, 1971;
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney,
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) and is a core component
of the narcissistic, antisocial, and borderline personal-
ity disorders (see Harder, 1995, for review).
Despite their centrality to psychological function-
ing, self-conscious emotions have received consider-
ably less attention from emotion researchers than the so
called basic emotions such as joy, fear, and sadness
(Campos, 1995; Fischer & Tangney, 1995).1Over the
Psychological Inquiry Copyright © 2004 by
2004, Vol. 15, No. 2, 103–125 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
1Although Ortony and Turner (1990) argued against the useful-
ness of the basic emotion concept, their position was refuted by
Ekman (1992a), Izard (1992), and Panksepp (1992), all of whom
pointed to the extensive empirical evidence supporting the concept.
Regardless of this debate, the underlying theoretical notion that a rel-
atively small subset of emotions holds a special status because of
their biological and psychological importance is unquestionably a
central concept in the current emotion literature. Its continued impor-
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past couple of decades, the field of emotion research has
expanded dramatically (Hébert, 2002), exemplified by
the new area of “affective science” and the emergence of
a new APA journal, Emotion, in 2001. However, the in-
crease in emotion research as a whole has not been
mirrored by a corresponding increase in research on
self-conscious emotions, despite the call of psycholo-
gists such as Fischer and Tangney (1995). In fact, of the
66 articles published to date in Emotion, only two have
discussed self-conscious emotions, and in neither case
are these emotions the focus of the article.
There are both theoretical and methodological rea-
sons for the lack of research on self-conscious emo-
tions. In the emotion literature, researchers have
focused on emotions that are biologically based,
shared with other animals, pan-culturally experienced,
and identifiable via discrete, universally recognized fa-
cial expressions—in other words, emotions that can be
studied without reliance on verbal reports of internal
experience (e.g., Davidson, 2001; Ekman, Levenson,
& Friesen, 1983; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998).
From this perspective, only a small subset of the vast
number of emotions represented in the natural lan-
guage—anger, fear, disgust, sadness, happiness, and
surprise—are considered important (Ekman, 1992b;
Izard, 1971). These six have been labeled “basic” emo-
tions because of their biological basis, evolved origins,
universality, and location (in most cases) at the basic
level in a hierarchical classification of emotion terms
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Shaver, Schwartz,
Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). Self-conscious emotions,
in contrast, show weaker evidence of universality:
Their antecedents, phenomenological experience, and
consequences differ across cultures (Eid & Diener,
2001; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Menon
& Shweder, 1994), and there is less evidence that they
have pan-culturally recognized facial expressions
(Ekman, 1992b). Moreover, self-conscious emotions
are subsumed by basic emotions in linguistic hierarchi-
cal classifications (e.g., sadness subsumes shame, joy
subsumes pride; Shaver et al., 1987).
Researchers interested in the self have also paid rel-
atively little attention to self-conscious emotions, fo-
cusing instead on the broad dimensions of positive and
negative affect. Although affective processes are in-
voked to explain a wide range of findings in the self lit-
erature, specific emotions—self-conscious or
basic—are rarely assessed or incorporated into theoret-
ical models. For example, in discussing self-esteem
maintenance, Tesser (2001) argued that “many self-de-
fense mechanisms are mediated by affect” (p. 68), but
did not specify which particular emotions are involved.
Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that movement to-
ward a self-regulatory goal (i.e., reduction of a discrep-
ancy) produces a generalized feeling of positive affect
whereas movement away from a self-regulatory goal
produces negative affect. In our own research, we have
argued that self-enhancement biases temporarily in-
crease positive affect, but we also failed to specify the
precise emotions experienced by self-enhancers
(Robins & Beer, 2001). Given the lack of emphasis on
any specific emotions, it is not surprising that self-con-
scious emotions have received so little attention in the
self literature. Nonetheless, we believe that specific
self-conscious emotions are critically involved in
many of these findings. For example, self-enhance-
ment processes may be driven by the desire to promote
feelings of pride and avoid feelings of shame.
Aside from these theoretical issues, methodological
roadblocks have also hindered research on self-con-
scious emotions (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss,
1989). Self-conscious emotions (with the possible ex-
ception of embarrassment) may be more difficult to
elicit in the laboratory than basic emotions, such as
fear, disgust, and joy. Experimental procedures used to
elicit basic emotions (e.g., photographs, film clips)
seem less effective in eliciting self-conscious emo-
tions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an ethical ma-
nipulation that would generate shame in all
individuals, partly because self-conscious emotions re-
quire more psychologically complex and individual-
ized elicitors. Furthermore, even if self-conscious
emotions could be effectively elicited, it might be more
difficult to measure the resultant emotional experi-
ences. Tangney and her colleagues have developed re-
liable self-report measures of self-conscious emotional
dispositions (e.g., the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3;
Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000), how-
ever standardized procedures for assessing on-line
self-conscious emotions from nonverbal behaviors are
only beginning to be developed (Keltner, 1995; Tracy
& Robins, 2004b). In contrast, there are a variety of
coding schemes for assessing dispositional and on-line
basic emotions through verbal and nonverbal behav-
iors, such as the Emotion-Facial Action Coding Sys-
tem (EM-FACS) for coding facial expressions (Ekman
& Rosenberg, 1997).
Although the historical emphasis on basic emotions
is understandable, we believe the time is ripe to devote
greater attention to self-conscious emotions. The theo-
retical and methodological lessons learned from the
study of basic emotions can be applied in research on
the more psychologically complex self-conscious
emotions. A better understanding of the antecedents
and dynamics of self-conscious emotions will provide
insights into the mechanisms underlying a wide range
of psychological phenomena. Moreover, regardless of
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TRACY & ROBINS
tance is exemplified by a recent debate in the APA journal Emotion
about which emotional states should be included within the basic
emotion category (e.g., Rozin & Cohen, 2003). In fact, Rozin and Co-
hen (2003) opened their target article with the statement, “There is
much evidence suggesting that there is a set of basic emotions, as de-
fined and evidenced by a number of investigators” (p. 68).
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whether self-conscious emotions are universal and
have clear-cut neurobiological bases, if an individual
subjectively feels ashamed, guilty, embarrassed, or
proud, then that, in itself, is an important psychological
event with implications for future behavior, decisions,
and mental and physical health. Finally, the method-
ological impediments to the study of self-conscious
emotions are not intractable. Indeed, similar issues
were raised several decades ago, when many psycholo-
gists argued that emotions in general could not be stud-
ied scientifically. A handful of emotion researchers
questioned this claim and struggled against the zeit-
geist to develop the field of affective science. We be-
lieve it is time to approach the study of self-conscious
emotions in the same systematic and comprehensive
manner.
In fact, it is already clear from the extant research
that the study of self-conscious emotions can be fruit-
ful. The few researchers who have studied self-con-
scious emotions have made great progress toward
understanding their development, expressions, func-
tions, and consequences (e.g., Fischer & Tangney,
1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Lewis, 2000;
Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Miller, 1995; Stipek, 1983;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, there is little
empirical research on the antecedent cognitive pro-
cesses that generate self-conscious emotions (but see
Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney et al., 1996;
Weiner, 1985). Appraisal theorists, who have exten-
sively tested their models of the cognitive processes
thought to elicit the whole range of emotions, typically
pay little attention to the family of self-conscious emo-
tions in particular (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman,
1991; Scherer, 2001).
In our view, self-conscious emotions need to be
treated as a special class of emotions. As cognition-de-
pendent emotions (Izard, Ackerman, & Schultz, 1999),
self-conscious emotions require a distinct theoretical
model specifying their antecedent cognitions. The ab-
sence of such a model may have impeded self-con-
scious emotion research and contributed to the relative
neglect of these emotions. As Levenson (1999) noted,
“What is needed is not a single theory of emotion, but
rather a set of emotion theories for different families of
emotions [including] one for the self-conscious emo-
tions” (p. 493).
In the following section, we describe the unique set
of features that distinguish self-conscious from basic
emotions. We then explain why generally accepted
models of basic emotions do not adequately capture
the self-conscious emotion process. We next present a
new appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions
and demonstrate the model’s utility by applying it to
narcissistic self-esteem regulation. Finally, we con-
clude by discussing the model’s broader implications
for research on self and emotion. We hope this article
will stimulate theory and research on self-conscious
emotions and will remind psychologists that when it
comes to motivating complex human behaviors,
self-conscious emotions are perhaps the most basic.
Distinctive Features of Self-Conscious
Emotions
Self-Conscious Emotions Require
Self-Awareness and Self-Representations
First and foremost, self-conscious emotions differ
from basic emotions because they require self-aware-
ness and self-representations. Although basic emo-
tions such as fear and sadness can and often do involve
self-evaluative processes, only self-conscious emo-
tions must involve these processes (Buss, 2001; Lewis
et al., 1989; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A sense of
self, as conceived by self theorists since James (1890),
includes an ongoing sense of self-awareness (the “I”
self) and the capacity for complex self-representations
(the “me” self, or the mental representations that con-
stitute one’s identity). Together, these self-processes
make it possible for self-evaluations, and therefore
self-conscious emotions, to occur.
As we will explain in greater detail below, people
tend to experience self-conscious emotions, such as
pride and shame, only when they become aware that
they have lived up to, or failed to live up to, some ac-
tual or ideal self-representation. Events that do not ac-
tivate self-evaluative processes may generate basic,
but not self-conscious, emotions. For example, a per-
son may feel great happiness after winning either the
lottery or an athletic event. Presumably, the former
event would not involve any self-evaluation, whereas
the latter would elicit a self-evaluative process (e.g.,
“What does my athletic achievement mean for my tal-
ents and abilities?”). As a result, only the latter
event—success in athletics—would also generate a
self-conscious emotion, such as pride (unless the per-
son takes personal credit for having chosen the win-
ning lottery numbers). Consistent with this account,
comparative studies suggest that animals who likely
lack the capacity for self-awareness do not experience
self-conscious emotions, whereas animals who may be
self-aware (e.g., chimpanzees and orangutans) display
emotional reactions that can be interpreted as pride,
shame, and embarrassment (Hart & Karmel, 1996;
Hayes, 1951; Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Yerkes &
Yerkes, 1929). Thus, the primary distinctive character-
istic of self-conscious emotions is that their elicitation
requires the ability to form stable self-representations
(me), to focus attention on those representations (i.e.,
to self-reflect; I), and to put it all together to generate a
self-evaluation. Importantly, these same
self-evaluative processes can also lead to the experi-
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ence of basic emotions; however, unlike self-con-
scious emotions, basic emotions can also be elicited in
the absence of self-evaluation.
Self-Conscious Emotions Emerge
Later in Childhood Than Basic
Emotions
A second distinctive feature of self-conscious emo-
tions is that they develop later than basic emotions
(Izard, 1971). Previous research suggests that most ba-
sic emotions emerge within the first 9 months of life
(e.g., Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, & Stenberg,
1983); in fact, the primacy of these emotions in ontog-
eny is one reason for their classification as basic (Izard,
1992). In contrast, even generalized feelings of
self-consciousness (typically labeled as an early form
of embarrassment) do not develop until around 18 to
24 months (Lewis, 1995). More complex self-con-
scious emotions, such as shame, guilt, and pride,
emerge even later, possibly by the end of the child’s
third year of life (Izard et al., 1999; Lewis, 1995;
Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992; Stipek, 1995).2
One explanation that researchers have proffered for
the later development of self-conscious emotions is
that they require the capacity for self-awareness and
the formation of stable self-representations (Lewis,
1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Supporting this as-
sumption, self-awareness develops around 18 to 24
months, the same age that the first self-conscious emo-
tion makes its appearance (Hart & Karmel, 1996;
Lewis et al., 1992). Moreover, Kochanska, Gross, Lin,
and Nichols (2002) found that children who showed
early “signs of self” (including mirror self-recognition
and verbal self-description) at 18 months were more
likely to show behavioral displays of a self-conscious
emotion (guilt) following a mishap (e.g., breaking a
toy) at 33 months.
Self-conscious emotions may also emerge later be-
cause children must first come to understand that par-
ticular rules and standards determine what is
appropriate social behavior, and that their own behav-
ior will be evaluated by others according to these stan-
dards (Lewis, 2000; Lewis et al., 1989; Stipek, 1983).
Eventually, as children come to develop an elaborated
theory of mind, they learn that significant others, most
often parents or caregivers, view them from an exter-
nal, evaluative perspective (Cooley, 1902; Wellman &
Lagattuta, 2000). External evaluations (e.g., “Mommy
gets mad when I spill milk”) can be internalized when
the child develops the capacity for self-awareness and
then transformed into the stable self-evaluations (e.g.,
“I am bad when I spill milk”) essential for self-con-
scious emotions (Retzinger, 1987; Schore, 1998). Con-
sistent with this developmental account, as children
grow older they come to depend less on external stan-
dards and more on their own, internalized norms for
judging behavior. For example, when younger chil-
dren discuss their shame and guilt experiences they fo-
cus on the reactions of others (e.g., “I am afraid that
others won’t like me anymore”), but older children
tend to use their own standards to make self-evalua-
tions (e.g., “I feel stupid”; Ferguson, Stegge, &
Damhuis, 1991).
Self-Conscious Emotions Serve
Primarily Socialized Needs
Emotions are likely to have evolved through natural
selection to serve two primary kinds of func-
tions—promoting the direct attainment of survival and
reproductive goals (which we will refer to as survival
goals) and promoting the attainment of social goals
(e.g., getting along and getting ahead), which are more
distally related to survival and reproduction. As social
creatures, social goals are probably essential for our
survival, but their attainment represents a more inter-
mediary step toward adaptive fitness than the direct at-
tainment of survival goals; for example, the social goal
of befriending a future ally is a more intermediary step
toward survival than fleeing a predator. Basic emo-
tions clearly serve survival and social functions. For
example, fear may cause an individual to run away
from danger, thereby enhancing his or her chances for
survival; but fear (e.g., of social scorn) may also cause
an individual to act in a socially appropriate manner,
thereby enhancing his or her ability to meet social
goals of getting along with others.
In contrast, self-conscious emotions seem to pro-
mote the attainment of specifically social goals
(Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Humans evolved to navi-
gate within a social structure that has complex layers of
multiple, overlapping, and sometimes nontransitive
social hierarchies (e.g., the highest status hunters were
not always the highest status warriors). Consistent with
this account, self-conscious emotions seem to be pres-
ent only in humans and other species (e.g., great apes)
with highly complex and frequently shifting social hi-
erarchies (de Waal, 1989; Keltner & Buswell, 1997).
Survival and reproduction have depended on overcom-
ing numerous complicated social problems, including
“dyadic, triadic, or group-level cooperation; smooth
group functioning; cheating; detection of cheaters;
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2Of course such studies are complicated by the difficulty of assess-
ing discrete emotions in infants and young children, and it is possible
that the apparent age difference in the emergence of basic versus
self-conscious emotions reflects the inability of researchers to assess
self-conscious emotions at an early age. However, in these develop-
mental studies, self-conscious emotions are assessed through behav-
iors such as gaze aversion (e.g., shame) and expanded posture and
raised arms (pride; Lewis et al., 1992), which are relatively easy to
code in young children.
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intragroup (and, particularly, intrasexual) competition,
and intergroup competition” (Sedikides &
Skowronski, 1997, p. 92). Self-conscious emotions
may have evolved in species with complex self-repre-
sentations and self-awareness to coordinate and moti-
vate behaviors essential to these social dynamics.
Collectively, the self-conscious emotions are assumed
to promote behaviors that increase the stability of so-
cial hierarchies and affirm status roles. For example,
researchers have argued that embarrassment and
shame evolved for purposes of appeasement, guilt for
encouraging communal relationships, and pride for es-
tablishing dominance (Baumeister et al., 1994; Gilbert,
1998; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tracy & Robins,
2003c). More specifically, the expression of shame
may draw forgiveness and sympathy from onlookers
(Keltner & Harker, 1998), and the expression of pride
may promote social status by increasing the individ-
ual’s visibility to others following a socially valued
achievement (Tracy & Robins, 2003c).3
In addition to serving these communicative and in-
terpersonal functions, self-conscious emotions may
also serve intrapsychic functions. Self-conscious emo-
tions guide individual behavior by compelling us to do
things that are socially valued and to avoid doing
things that lead to social approbation (Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). We strive to achieve, to be a “good
person,” or to treat others well because doing so makes
us proud of ourselves, and failing to do so makes us
feel guilty or ashamed of ourselves.4Put simply, soci-
ety tells us what kind of person we should be; we inter-
nalize these beliefs in the form of actual and ideal
self-representations; and self-conscious emotions mo-
tivate behavioral action toward the goals embodied in
these self-representations. Thus, although we might
know cognitively that we should help others in need, it
takes the psychological force of an emotion such as
guilt to make us act in altruistic ways. By reinforcing
prosocial behaviors—encouraging us to act in ways
that promote social acceptance—self-conscious emo-
tions facilitate interpersonal reciprocity, a social ar-
rangement that is highly beneficial in the long term
(Trivers, 1971).
Self-Conscious Emotions Do Not Have
Discrete, Universally Recognized
Facial Expressions
All six of the basic emotions have a discrete, univer-
sally recognized facial expression (Ekman, 2003). In
contrast, researchers have failed to find a distinct facial
expression for any self-conscious emotion. They have,
however, found a distinct expression that includes
bodily posture or head movement combined with fa-
cial expressions for embarrassment, pride, and possi-
bly shame (Heckhausen, 1984; Keltner, 1995; Lewis et
al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004b). As Lewis (2000)
noted, “Self-conscious emotions cannot be described
solely by examining a particular set of facial move-
ments; they necessitate the observation of bodily ac-
tion more than facial cues” (p. 623). In fact, pride can
be reliably identified from a postural display involving
the full upper body (revealing an expanded posture),
but it cannot be recognized when observers are shown
the face alone (Tracy & Robins, 2004b).
A number of theorists have argued that emotions
necessarily have universal, discrete nonverbal expres-
sions (e.g., Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992b). According
to this perspective, emotions evolved to communicate
needs to an individual’s conspecifics, so every emotion
should have an expressive signal reflecting its evolu-
tionary origins (Ekman, 1992b). This argument has
been used to exclude self-conscious emotions from the
category of basic emotions, or to include them only as
potential emotions until a discrete expression is uncov-
ered (Ekman, 1994). However, there are several rea-
sons why self-conscious emotions may not have a
discrete facial signal. First, they may be effectively
communicated through more complex nonverbal be-
haviors than a simple, immediate facial muscle move-
ment (Barrett & Campos, 1987). As mentioned earlier,
at least a few of the self-conscious emotions are com-
municated through postural changes or bodily move-
ment, which may be as effective in communication as
facial expressions (Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Robins,
2004b). These signals may be more complex than fa-
cial expressions but this fits with their more complex
messages. In other words, a quick facial expression
may be adequate for telling conspecifics, “Run!”, but a
more complex bodily expression may better convey
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3We do not mean to imply that only those animals who experience
self-conscious emotions show appeasement or dominance behaviors.
We believe that in humans self-conscious emotions are the mecha-
nisms that motivate these behaviors, and it is likely that emotions
have certain advantages as behavioral motivators (for a brief discus-
sion of these advantages, see Scherer, 1994). In animals who do not
experience self-conscious emotions, the motivational system for ap-
peasement, dominance, and other social behaviors may be based in
more primitive stimulus-response mechanisms.
4Interestingly, this motivational function of self-conscious emo-
tions may develop later than the subjective experience of the emo-
tions. Graham (1988) examined relations among causal attributions,
guilt and pride feelings, and behaviors in children of various ages.
She found that controlling for reported feelings of guilt and pride re-
moved any relation between attributions and behaviors in older chil-
dren but had no effect on the relation between attributions and behav-
iors in younger children (ages 5 and 6). This suggests that young
children need to think through appropriate behavioral responses to
guilt-provoking events, rather than be automatically motivated by
their feelings. For older children and adults, self-conscious emotions
may save precious cognitive resources; we do not need to cognize
moral responses to our bad behavior because we are motivated to act
by our feelings alone (and, as the partial correlations suggest, if we
did not feel guilt there would be no relation between the event and our
responsive behavior).
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the message, “I just did something that makes me de-
serve high status.”
Second, self-conscious emotions may be expressed
more frequently through language than through non-
verbal expressions. Self-conscious emotions may have
evolved more recently than basic emotions, as social
groups and social interactions became more complex
and varied forms of communication, including linguis-
tic communication, became possible (P. Ekman, per-
sonal communication, March 2002). In other words, at
the point in our evolutionary history when self-con-
scious emotions emerged, linguistic and gestural forms
of communication may have been available to be
co-opted for verbal expression of emotions. Although
facial expressions have the advantage of being auto-
matic and immediate, self-conscious emotions com-
municate messages that are typically less urgent than
basic emotions and perhaps allow for more deliberate
processing and the production of linguistic forms of
communication. For example, conveying one’s guilt
over a social transgression is important, but it is impor-
tant over a longer time frame than conveying one’s fear
about the presence of a predator.
A third possible explanation for the absence of fa-
cial signals in self-conscious emotions is that ex-
pressing these emotions may sometimes be
maladaptive, making it more important that they can
be regulated. Facial expressions are more difficult to
regulate than body movements and posture because
many of the facial muscle contractions involved are
involuntary responses. Although in contemporary so-
ciety we may wish we could control the expression of
all our emotions (e.g., avoid showing fear in front of
our boss), in our evolutionary history it was clearly
more adaptive that our (basic) emotions be automati-
cally expressed. The expression of self-conscious
emotions, however, may be less directly essential to
survival and, in some cases, may be detrimental to
fitness. For example, in many cultures it is consid-
ered unacceptable to openly display pride, and such
displays may lower a person’s likeability or spur the
formation of coalitions against the person (Eid &
Diener, 2001; Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000;
Paulhus, 1998; Zammuner, 1996). Furthermore, indi-
viduals regulate not only the expression but also the
experience of self-conscious emotions. Shame is such
a self-damaging and painful emotion that its experi-
ence may be automatically suppressed through elabo-
rate cognitive reappraisals. Clinicians have discussed
“bypassed shame”—shame that has been transformed
through regulation into some other emotion, usually
anger or hostility (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, Retzinger, &
Ryan, 1989). If regulation is the norm for self-con-
scious emotions, we may not expect a reliably associ-
ated discrete expression for each.
In summary, there are several possible explanations
for the absence of facial expressions in self-conscious
emotions, all of which suggest that these emotions are,
as a group, distinct from basic emotions.
Self-Conscious Emotions Are
Cognitively Complex
A fifth distinctive feature of self-conscious emotions
is that they are more cognitively complex than basic
emotions (Izard et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000). Izard and his
colleagues labeled shame, guilt, and pride “cogni-
tion-dependent” emotions, in comparison with the rela-
tively “cognition-independent” basic emotions (Izard et
al., 1999, p. 92). To experience fear, individuals need
very few cognitive capacities; they must simply ap-
praise an event as threatening survival goals (e.g., Laza-
rus, 1991). To experience shame, however, an individ-
ual must have the capacity to form stable
self-representations; internalize an external, societal, or
parental perspective on those self-representations; and
reflect on the discrepancy between his or her own be-
havior, external evaluations of that behavior, and vari-
ous self-representations. In other words, the individual
must take into account goals far beyond survival: goals
related to identity and ideal-self-representations. In ad-
dition, self-conscious emotions require additional ap-
praisals beyond goal relevance and congruence; they re-
quire complex causal attributions (Graham & Weiner,
1986). As we will explain when we describe our process
model, self-conscious emotions cannot occur unless the
eliciting event is attributed to internal causes—the self.
We also explain how further causal attributions about
the stability and globality of causes may distinguish
among different self-conscious emotions. Basic emo-
tions can involve these kinds of complex cognitive pro-
cesses, but, unlike self-conscious emotions, they also
can (and often do) occur with much simpler appraisals
(Le Doux, 1996).
Given the previous set of distinctive features, it be-
comes apparent that self-conscious emotions need to
be conceptualized in a somewhat different manner
than basic emotions. In the next section, we briefly ex-
plain why existing theories and models of emotions do
not fully capture the self-conscious emotion process.
We then present a new model tailored to the psycho-
logical processes governing the elicitation of self-con-
scious emotions.
Process Model of Self-Conscious
Emotions
Background
According to most emotion theorists, emotions are
initiated by the perception of a stimulus, which is eval-
uated (appraised) either consciously or unconsciously,
setting off an “affect program” (e.g., Ekman, 1992b).
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The affect program is assumed to be a discrete neural
pattern that produces a coordinated set of responses,
including action readiness and associated behaviors,
physiological changes, a discrete facial expression,
and a subjective feeling state. This model provides an
adequate account of basic emotions. For example, an-
ger occurs when a particular stimulus is appraised as
thwarting a survival goal (Lazarus, 1991), generating
an affect program that leads to a coordinated set of re-
sponses including the behavioral impulse to oppose or
resist (Frijda, 1987), autonomic nervous system activ-
ity related to the flight-or-fight response (Levenson,
Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991), a discrete facial
expression characterized by narrowed eyes, lowered
eyebrows, and tightened lips (Ekman & Friesen,
1975), and the subjective feeling of anger.
The central limitation of this model is that it as-
sumes a very simple appraisal process focused on sur-
vival goals, which may not be appropriate for
self-conscious emotions. It is unlikely that any quick
and simple cognitive process will generate shame in all
individuals. Thus, we turned to a second body of re-
search, on appraisal theories of emotion, to revise and
extend the generic model.
Appraisal theories were developed specifically to
describe the cognitive appraisals that distinguish
among emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991;
Scherer, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The two
most essential appraisals in almost all these theories in-
volve evaluations of whether the eliciting event is (a)
relevant to and (b) congruent with the individual’s
goals and needs (e.g., Lazarus, 1991). The goals at
stake are generally viewed as survival and reproduc-
tion; most appraisal theorists agree that emotions
evolved to serve adaptive functions. Events that are
congruent with survival goals (e.g., escaping from a
predator) generate positive emotions such as joy and
relief; those that are incongruent (e.g., being caught by
a predator) generate negative emotions such as fear
and anger. Beyond appraisals of relevance and congru-
ence, there is little consensus about which other ap-
praisals generate and differentiate among specific
emotions. A number of theories have been advanced
(e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 2001;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), but
their exact components, stimulus checks, or core-rela-
tional themes vary (Frijda, 1987).
Several of these theories include appraisals related
to self-conscious emotions; for example, most include
an appraisal of self-relevance or self-compatibility.
However, appraisals of self-relevance are sometimes
conflated with appraisals of general goal relevance
(e.g., Frijda, 1987). In addition, the theories that men-
tion self-relevance tend not to explicate what it means
and seem to imply a very rudimentary notion of
self—the ability to distinguish between self and
other—which is very different from the elaborate
self-awareness and self-representations that we think
are essential to self-conscious emotions. Other theo-
rists include appraisals about whether the cause of the
eliciting event is located within the self, and have pro-
posed appraisal dimensions such as agency, account-
ability, and responsibility (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith,
1988; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Roseman, 1991; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Weiner,
1985). These appraisals about causal locus are be-
lieved to distinguish between self-conscious and
non-self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame vs. anger),
however they do not distinguish among different
self-conscious emotions, such as shame vs. guilt (e.g.,
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Gehm & Scherer, 1988;
Russell & McAuley, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Furthermore, these various notions of causal locus
(e.g., responsibility vs. agency) are conceptually dif-
ferent, however there is no clear model of which are
most relevant to self-conscious emotions. Thus, al-
though existing appraisal theories suggest some poten-
tially relevant appraisal dimensions, they do not
provide a clear, consensual picture of the precise set of
appraisals that generate self-conscious emotions, or
provide a model that links the relevant set of appraisals
in a theoretically coherent manner.
A final limitation of extant models of basic emotions,
when applied to self-conscious emotions, is that they do
not fully incorporate self-evaluative processes. For ex-
ample, there is little discussion of the role of more com-
plex self-processes, such as self-focused attention, the
activation of stable self-representations, and the process
of reflecting on discrepancies between a current
self-state and some evaluative standard relevant to
one’s identity (e.g., an ideal self-representation). A
complete process model of self-conscious emotions re-
quires the inclusion of these elements, as was made clear
by our discussion of the distinctive features.
Overview of Model
Figure 1 shows a proposed model of the self-con-
scious emotion process. The model builds on previous
theory and research on causal attributions and emo-
tions (e.g., Covington & Omelich, 1981; Jagacinski &
Nicholls, 1984; Weiner, 1985); cognitive appraisals
and emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991, Scherer, 2001;
Roseman, 2001; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988); the cogni-
tive antecedents of shame, guilt, and pride (e.g., H. B.
Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 2000; Tangney, 1991); and
self-evaluative processes (e.g., Brown, 1998; Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Cooley, 1902; Duval & Wicklund,
1972; Higgins, 1987).
One benefit of the proposed model is that it gener-
ates specific, testable hypotheses. In each following
section, we state a prediction derived from the model
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and then describe the theoretical and empirical ratio-
nale for it.
Survival Goal-Relevance: Is the Event
Relevant to Survival and
Reproduction?
Prediction 1: Events appraised as relevant to sur-
vival goals will lead to one of the basic emotions.
As shown in Figure 1, the first appraisal in the pro-
posed model is the same as that in most other appraisal
theories: an evaluation of whether the eliciting event is
relevant to survival and reproduction (e.g., Lazarus,
1991).5Events appraised as survival-goal relevant in-
clude those that immediately affect fitness, such as the
sudden approach of a poisonous snake; as well as those
that influence fitness much more slowly, such as wait-
ing for the results of an important medical test. Events
appraised as relevant to an individual’s survival goals
will lead to one of the basic emotions, according to ap-
praisal and functionalist theories of the basic emotion
process (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Nesse, 1990; Roseman,
2001; Scherer, 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2001). If an event
is appraised as irrelevant to survival goals, it will elicit
no emotion—unless it is appraised as relevant to iden-
tity goals (see below).6
Attentional Focus on the Self:
Activation of Self-Representations
Prediction 2: Self-conscious emotions require
attentional focus directed toward the objective,
“me” self, activating self-representations.
As shown in Figure 1, the next cognitive process
in the model involves attentional focus. Many events
direct attention toward the self rather than toward
the external environment. The resultant state of
attentional focus has been labeled objective
self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) or self-fo-
cused attention (Carver & Scheier, 1998); it is defined
as a particular form of consciousness in which atten-
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TRACY & ROBINS
Figure 1. Process model of self-conscious emotions. The dotted arrow connecting “Locus Attribution” and “Embarrassment” indicates that a
public self-representation must be activated in order for embarrassment to occur. “A-O Pride” signifies achievement-oriented pride, discussed in
a later section.
5Figure 1 implies a clear order and a serial, step-by-step sequence
of conscious appraisals. However, the actual process presumably in-
cludes numerous feedback loops and may work bidirectionally and in
parallel. Moreover, many of the appraisal processes are likely to oc-
cur implicitly (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Nonetheless, to simplify
explanation of the model, we discuss the emotion process described
in Figure 1 as if it occurred in a simple serial order. Appraisal theo-
rists have argued that representational models such as this usefully
elucidate appraisal theories of emotions (Kappas, 2001), and several
theorists have proposed models that seem to work in a clear sequen-
tial order (e.g., Scherer, 2001). Furthermore, even if the processes de-
scribed in Figure 1 actually occur simultaneously or in parallel, our
model can elucidate the mental algorithms through which these pro-
cesses are integrated to determine which particular self-conscious
emotion is produced.
6It is possible, however, that there exists a small class of eliciting
events that can produce emotions without appraisals of goal rele-
vance. For example, viewing a work of art or a beautiful landscape
might elicit joy or awe with no cognitive mediation.
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tion (I) is focused on one’s stable self-representations
(me) (Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1998). This state
of self-focused attention and corresponding activated
self-representations allows individuals to make reflex-
ive self-evaluations.
An individual’s stable self-representations may in-
clude actual or current self-representations (“I am in-
dependent”), ideal or hoped-for self-representations
(“I want to become more independent”), and ought
self-representations about fulfilling important obliga-
tions and duties (“My parents think I should become
more independent”) (Higgins, 1987). These self-repre-
sentations may concern past, present, and future selves
(Markus & Nurius, 1986; Wilson & Ross, 2001) and
may refer to private (personal) and public (relational,
social, and collective) aspects of the self (Robins,
Norem, & Cheek, 1999). Collectively, these various
forms of self-representations constitute a person’s
identity.
According to our theoretical model, self-representa-
tions must be activated (either explicitly or implicitly)
for self-conscious emotions to occur. When attention is
directed toward the self, activating self-representa-
tions, the individual can make comparisons between
these representations and the external emotion-elicit-
ing event. These comparisons are a necessary causal
element of self-conscious emotions. In contrast, we be-
lieve that individuals cannot experience self-conscious
emotions when their attention is directed exclusively
outward toward the external environment, preventing
the activation of self-representations. For example,
when individuals are absorbed in a state of “flow,” in
which all attention is focused on a particular, often
challenging, activity, they tend not to become self-con-
scious (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
What causes attentional focus to be placed on the
self? Self-focused attention may be evoked automati-
cally by events that have a prior history of relevance to
self-representations (e.g., achievement situations for
students), or by events that naturally draw attention to
the self, such as seeing one’s reflection in a mirror. In-
deed, much experimental research on self-awareness
has used mirror placement to induce self-focused at-
tention (Buss, 1980; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier
& Carver, 1977). Furthermore, because the “me” self
may be activated at an implicit level, self-conscious
emotions may still be generated even when individuals
are highly motivated to avoid them. For example, a stu-
dent who fails an exam may avoid thinking explicitly
about what this event means for her or his self-repre-
sentations. At an implicit level, however, her or his
goals and self-representations may well be activated,
eventually generating shame or guilt despite her or his
attempt to defend against these emotions.
Our emphasis on the importance of self-focused at-
tention is supported by previous research showing that
self-focus intensifies emotional experiences. Studies
have shown that objective self-awareness can lead to
emotional discomfort and negative affect regarding the
self, presumably because attentional focus on the self
often promotes the recognition of self-flaws (e.g.,
Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Consistent with these find-
ings, Carver and Scheier (1998) argued that individu-
als must place attentional focus on the self to recognize
the discrepancies between current self-states and goal
states (e.g., ideal-self standards) that produce positive
or negative emotional experiences. They have shown
that experimentally induced self-focused attention ac-
centuates the intensity of positive or negative emotions
(e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1977). In a rare study that ex-
amined the role of self-focused attention in the genera-
tion of specifically self-conscious emotions, Beer et al.
(2002) found that patients with a brain lesion in their
orbital-frontal cortex did not experience embarrass-
ment after behaving in a socially inappropriate manner
unless they viewed a videotape of their behavior, pre-
sumably enhancing self-focused attention in patients
who lack the capacity to become automatically
self-aware.
Identity Goal-Relevance: Does it
Matter For How I See Myself?
Prediction 3: Appraisals of identity-goal rele-
vance are necessary for the elicitation of self-con-
scious emotions.
When attentional focus is directed toward self-rep-
resentations, events can be appraised for their rele-
vance to identity goals (see Figure 1). This appraisal
concerns whether particular events are important or
meaningful for who a person is and who he or she
would like to be (i.e., for one’s identity). In general,
any event relevant to an important self-representation
is likely to be appraised as relevant to an identity goal.
In contrast, an event that is relevant to an individual’s
proximal adaptive fitness will be appraised as sur-
vival-goal relevant. For example, if a man camping in
the woods sees a bear, he is likely to appraise this event
as relevant to his survival goals and feel fear—a basic
emotion. However, if he is camping with his girlfriend,
and his awareness of her presence activates self-fo-
cused attention on his self-representations regarding
gender-stereotypical camping behavior, seeing a bear
may also be appraised as relevant to his identity goals.
In this case, the event would also generate self-con-
scious emotions. He may valiantly attempt to fight the
bear, which could generate pride if he scares the bear
away. Alternatively, he may run and scream in terror,
which could generate shame or guilt because he has
failed to live up to his “boyfriend as protector” iden-
tity, particularly if he leaves his girlfriend behind to be-
come bear food. As a result, at times, survival and
identity goals may come into conflict and promote
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seemingly maladaptive human behavior if identity
goals prevail. For example, the camper’s attempt to
fight the bear is consistent with his identity goals but
not with his survival goals. Similarly, a battered wife
may choose to remain in a maladaptive abusive rela-
tionship, in part because it meets her identity goals
about marriage and motherhood.
According to our model, events appraised as rele-
vant to identity goals will generate self-conscious
emotions, assuming subsequent appraisals (described
later) occur. (Importantly, events appraised as relevant
to identity goals can also generate basic emotions, as
we discuss later.) As shown in Figure 1, events ap-
praised as irrelevant to identity goals will not generate
self-conscious emotions.7
There is little research specifically examining how
appraisals of identity-goal relevance influence the
self-conscious emotion process. By distinguishing be-
tween survival and identity goals, our model thus pro-
vides an important direction for future studies. Another
novel aspect of our model is that it articulates the full
range of self-representations that may be involved in
the appraisal of identity-goal relevance. An event may
be appraised as identity-goal relevant because it acti-
vates an actual, ideal, or ought self (Higgins, 1987); a
past, present, or future self (Markus & Nurius, 1986);
and a private or public aspect of the self (Buss, 1980).
These various representations are likely to influence
the self-conscious emotion process in complex ways
that are beyond the scope of this article but that could
be fruitfully explored in future research. For example,
it seems possible that guilt more frequently stems from
activation of a past self-representation (“Why didn’t I
study enough last quarter?”) whereas pride is often
linked to a future self-representation (“I would like to
become an ‘A’ student”).
Identity-Goal Congruence: Is This
Event Congruent With My Goals For
Who I Am and Who I Want to Be?
Prediction 4: Positive self-conscious emotions
(e.g., pride) are elicited by appraisals of identity-goal
congruence, and negative self-conscious emotions
(e.g., shame, guilt, embarrassment) are elicited by ap-
praisals of identity-goal incongruence.
When an event has been appraised as relevant to
identity goals, the next step in our model is for it to be
appraised as congruent or incongruent with these goals
(see Figure 1). This appraisal determines the valence of
the outcome emotion; positive or pleasurable emotions
are elicited by goal-congruent events, and negative or
displeasureable emotions are elicited by goal-incon-
gruent events (Lazarus, 1991).8
How do individuals decide whether an event is con-
gruent or incongruent with identity goals? As noted
previously, appraisals of identity relevance activate
current self-representations, which may be linked to
multiple aspects of an individual’s stable identity (i.e.,
actual, ideal, ought self; past, present, or future self;
private or public self). For example, the event of failing
an exam might activate the current self-representation
“failing student.” To determine goal congruence, this
current self-representation is compared with the indi-
vidual’s stable, long-term self-representations, includ-
ing actual self-representations (“I am a successful
student”), ideal self-representations (“I want to be a
successful student”), and so on (e.g., Higgins, 1987).
In this case, the student may notice a discrepancy be-
tween the current self-representation (failing student)
and actual and ideal self-representations, and would
thus appraise the event as identity-goal incongruent.
As shown in Figure 1, this appraisal will eventually
elicit a negative self-conscious emotion such as shame
or guilt. Conversely, performing well on an exam
would activate the current self-representation “suc-
ceeding student,” which would be congruent with the
student’s actual and ideal self-representations and
would thus generate a positive self-conscious emotion
such as pride.
As can be seen from this example, appraisals of
identity-goal congruence may be highly complex be-
cause events can be congruent or incongruent with a
wide range of often-conflicting self-representations.
For example, performing well on an exam could be
congruent with a private actual self-representation, “I
am a successful student” but incongruent with a public
actual self-representation “I am a fun-loving bohemian
who doesn’t care about school.” Similarly, this event
could be congruent with a relational ought self-repre-
sentation, “My parents want me to be a successful stu-
dent,” but incongruent with a social ought
self-representation, “My friends think I should be a
fun-loving bohemian who doesn’t care about school.”
Although our model incorporates various self-rep-
resentations into its conceptualization of identity-goal
relevance and congruence, it does not predict whether
the self-conscious emotion process works differently
when different types of self-representations are acti-
vated. Although it seems likely that any form of con-
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TRACY & ROBINS
7It is quite possible for an event to be appraised as relevant to sur-
vival and identity goals, in which case the person might experience a
combination of basic and self-conscious emotions. For example, the
bear-encountering camper will likely experience fear and pride,
should he choose to fight the bear.
8Although not shown in Figure 1, the appraisal of goal-congru-
ence would lead to two separate paths, depending on congruency or
incongruency. The subsequent series of appraisals are identical, how-
ever the outcome emotions are either positive or negative. To sim-
plify the figure, we combine the two paths and show the specific posi-
tive and negative emotions at the end of the model.
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gruence will produce a positive emotional experience
and any form of incongruence a negative one, the par-
ticular self-representations activated may influence the
subsequent processes specified by the model and ulti-
mately elicit different emotions. In fact, Higgins
(1987) theorized that discrepancies between different
types of self-representations (actual self vs. ought self
vs. ideal self) generate different forms of negative af-
fect (dejection vs. agitation emotions). However, Hig-
gins did not specify which processes distinguish
between a dejection-related self-conscious emotion
such as shame and a dejection-related non-self-con-
scious emotion such as sadness. Furthermore, Higgins
argued that a discrepancy between one’s actual and
ideal self produces shame but not guilt, whereas a dis-
crepancy between one’s actual and ought self produces
the opposite pattern. Contrary to this prediction,
Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, and Barlow (1998)
found that actual-ought and actual-ideal discrepancies
were related to shame proneness, however neither
form of discrepancy was related to guilt proneness.
Thus, the distinction between these different forms of
self-discrepancies may be less important than are other
subsequent appraisals, elaborated later, in determining
whether a self-conscious or non-self-conscious emo-
tion will occur, and, if self-conscious, which particular
emotion will occur.
Our emphasis on the role of discrepancies between
current self-representations and more stable self-repre-
sentations is based on earlier conceptualizations of self
and emotions. Cooley (1902) and James (1890), for ex-
ample, discussed the affective consequences of com-
parisons between actual and ideal self-states. Carver
and Scheier (1998) proposed that positive and negative
affect are the output of a cybernetic self-regulation
process. According to their model, awareness of a dis-
crepancy between a current self-state and some
evaluative standard (e.g., an ideal self-representation)
generates negative affect, whereas reduction of such a
discrepancy generates positive affect. Our model
builds on this view by specifying the distinct types of
negative and positive emotions that are generated by
these discrepancies.
Internality Attributions: Did the Event
Occur Because of Something About
Me?
Prediction 5: Self-conscious emotions require at-
tributions to internal causes, whereas basic emotions
do not.
When an event has been appraised as either congru-
ent or incongruent with identity goals, the next step is
to determine the cause of the event (see Figure 1). This
decision involves a set of appraisals, the most impor-
tant of which concerns the causal locus of the eliciting
event: Is the event due to an internal (within the indi-
vidual) or external (outside the individual) cause?9
This question can be phrased as “Am I responsible for
the event?” or, because it need not imply intentionality,
“Did it occur because of something about me?” This
distinction is particularly important in the case of em-
barrassment, where internal appraisals are often made
about events for which the individual had no responsi-
bility or intentionality (e.g., being the recipient of
spilled soup). Appraisals of causal locus may occur
spontaneously for events ranging from failure on an
important exam to receiving an angry glare from a
stranger in the street. In appraisal theories of emotion,
this judgment is referred to as credit or blame to one-
self (Lazarus, 1991), accountability (Smith & Lazarus,
1993), agency (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Roseman,
1991), responsibility (Frijda, 1987), or “causal attribu-
tion check” (Scherer, 2001).
The appraisal of causal locus has been studied ex-
tensively by attribution researchers, and a large body
of empirical and theoretical work has demonstrated the
importance of internality attributions in determining
behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions to
achievement and interpersonal situations (e.g., Heider,
1958; Peterson, 1991; Weiner, 1985). In particular,
self-attributions are critically involved in self-esteem
regulation: To maintain self-esteem, individuals take
credit for success and externalize blame for failure
(Greenwald, 1980; Harvey & Weary, 1984). Thus,
self-attributions influence and are influenced by
self-evaluative processes and consequently play a cen-
tral role in the generation of self-conscious emotions.
As shown in Figure 1, self-conscious emotions oc-
cur when individuals attribute the eliciting event to in-
ternal causes (Lewis, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002;
Weiner, 1985).10 Supporting this claim, studies have
shown that internal attributions for failure tend to pro-
duce guilt and shame, and internal attributions for suc-
cess tend to produce pride (Weiner, 1985; Weiner,
Graham, & Chandler, 1982). Research by emotion the-
orists on the appraisal dimensions of agency and
self-accountability also supports this distinction: Both
appraisals are associated with the experience of
self-conscious emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988;
Roseman, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).
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TARGET ARTICLE
9People can attribute an event to both internal and external causes
(Robins, Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). In this case, our model
would predict that the person would experience basic and self-con-
scious emotions (e.g., anger and shame).
10Of note, the self-focused attentional state that sets in motion the
self-conscious emotion process tends to promote appraisals about
causal locus (because self-focused attention leads to questioning
about why a self-impacting event happened) and also encourages
making internal attributions. Studies have shown increased self-fo-
cused attention leads to increased self-blame for events (Cohen,
Dowling, Bishop, & Maney, 1985; Duval & Wicklund, 1973;
Fenigstein & Levine, 1984). This illustrates one way in which the
various appraisal processes are intricately entwined.
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In contrast, attributing events to external causes
leads to basic emotions instead. Thus, our model pre-
dicts, and studies have shown (Russell & McAuley,
1986), that basic emotions such as anger can be elicited
by identity-goal relevant events (e.g., exam failure) if
they are blamed on external rather than internal causes.
In fact, in contemporary society, this causal pathway
may be the most typical route for the elicitation of ba-
sic emotions, given how rarely threats to survival oc-
cur. People are more likely to become angry or fearful
because they have made an external attribution for a
threat to their identity, such as an insult from a
coworker or friend, than from a direct threat to their
survival. Supporting this argument, Markus and
Kitayama (1991) asserted that most emotions are elic-
ited by self-oriented concerns. Nonetheless, basic
emotions can be elicited by appraisals about survival
and reproductive goals alone, and it is likely that they
evolved primarily to help individuals in achieving
these goals.
In summary, our model extends previous re-
search on the relation between internality attribu-
tions and self-conscious emotions by suggesting
that these attributions (a) mediate the relation be-
tween self-representations or identity goals and
outcome emotions and (b) determine which class of
emotions (basic vs. self-conscious) results from ap-
praisals of identity-goal relevance.
Stability and Globality Attributions: Is
it Something I Always Do? Is it
Something About Who I Am?
Two other causal attributions, beyond causal locus,
may be important for the elicitation of self-conscious
emotions and, more specifically, for differentiating
among self-conscious emotions (see Figure 1). These
two attributions concern the stability, or permanence,
of causes, and the globality, or generality, of causes.
Central to the attribution process, these two causal fac-
tors have been empirically linked to various emotional
states (e.g., Brown & Weiner, 1984; Covington &
Omelich, 1981; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski,
1994; Tangney et al., 1992; Weiner et al., 1982;
Weiner & Kukla, 1970).
When an internal attribution has been made, ap-
praisals about stability become questions about
whether the event was caused by something stable and
unchanging about the person, such as ability, or by
something unstable, such as effort in a particular situa-
tion. For example, a student who makes an internal at-
tribution for failing a math exam might blame her lack
of intelligence (a stable cause), or she might blame her
lack of studying for this particular exam (an unstable
cause).
Appraisals about the globality of internal causes be-
come questions of whether the event was caused by
something about the individual as a whole or by some-
thing specific about the person. To use the same exam-
ple, the exam-failing student might blame her failure
on being globally unintelligent, or on her lack of spe-
cific skills in mathematics. Although these two attribu-
tion dimensions are theoretically independent, in
everyday causal attributions the two are frequently
conflated and highly correlated; that is, stable causes
are more likely to be global, and unstable causes are
more likely to be specific (Peterson, 1991).
According to the model, globality and stability attri-
butions influence which particular self-conscious emo-
tion is elicited. As shown in Figure 1, shame and hubris
(a globalized form of pride discussed in greater detail
later) are caused by global, stable attributions; guilt
and a more achievement-oriented pride are caused by
specific, unstable attributions. In the next section, we
discuss in detail the precise appraisal process that pro-
duce each of the main self-conscious emotions (shame,
guilt, pride, and embarrassment) and present specific
predictions concerning globability and stability.11
Cognitive Antecedents That
Distinguish Among Self-Conscious
Emotions
Prediction 6: Shame requires attributions to stable,
global aspects of the self.
Prediction 7: Guilt requires attributions to unsta-
ble, specific aspects of the self.
Prediction 8: Embarrassment requires appraisals
of identity-goal relevance and incongruence regarding
a public identity, and attributions to internal causes.
Prediction 9: Hubristic pride requires attributions
to stable, global aspects of the self.
Prediction 10: Achievement-oriented pride re-
quires attributions to unstable, specific aspects of the
self.
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11Another possible self-conscious emotion is humiliation. There is
little previous empirical research on humiliation, outside of the clini-
cal literature. In fact, in Tangney and Fischer’s (1995) volume on
self-conscious emotions, the index includes only two mentions of hu-
miliation. In both of these mentions, humiliation is referred to as a
variant of shame. Others have emphasized that humiliation cannot
occur in absence of a humiliating other; that, unlike shame, it is de-
pendent on a dyadic relationship (e.g., Gilbert, 1997; Miller, 1988).
We believe that humiliation occurs when attentional focus is directed
specifically toward the “public” self (as in the case of embarrass-
ment) and is blamed on internal, stable, global causes (as in the case
of shame). In general, further research is needed before any clear con-
clusions can be made regarding humiliation, and we hope that the
model proposed here can help generate testable hypotheses about the
causal antecedents of this emotion.
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Shame and guilt. According to our model, shame
and guilt are elicited by a common set of cognitive pro-
cesses. For both emotions, an individual must focus atten-
tion on some aspect of the self, activating public and/or
private self-representations; appraise the event as relevant
to and incongruent with identity goals; and attribute the
cause of the event to some internal factor, blaming the self
for the situation. Thus, as a number of emotion theorists
have argued (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Tomkins, 1963), shame
and guilt have similar elicitors. What distinguishes the
causal antecedents of the two emotions, however, are sta-
bility and globality attributions: Shame involves negative
feelings about the stable, global self, whereas guilt in-
volves negative feelings about a specific behavior or ac-
tion taken by the self (Lewis, 1971; Lewis, 2000; Tangney
& Dearing, 2002). Following this theoretical conception,
our model specifies that internal, stable, global attribu-
tions (“I’m a dumb person”) lead to shame, whereas inter-
nal, unstable, specific attributions (“I didn’t try hard
enough”) lead to guilt. To take a typical example from the
interpersonal domain, an individual who cheats on his re-
lationship partner will likely feel guilt if he blames his
cheating on a one-time, specific behavior but will feel
shame if he blames it on his stable inability to be a gener-
ally good boyfriend.
Several lines of research support this distinction be-
tween shame and guilt. In particular, research on achieve-
ment attributions has shown that individuals who blame
poor performances on ability (an internal, stable factor)
are more likely to feel shame, whereas individuals who
blame poor performance on effort (an internal, unstable
factor) are more likely to feel guilt (Brown & Weiner,
1984; Covington & Omelich, 1981; Jagacinski &
Nicholls, 1984; Tracy & Robins, 2002). Examining attri-
butions and emotions in a more general sense (beyond
achievement events only), Tangney et al. (1992) found
that shame-prone individuals tend to make internal,
global attributions for negative events, although they
failed to find the corresponding positive correlation be-
tween internal, specific attributions and guilt.
Using an innovative approach, Niedenthal et al.
(1994) found that participants who were instructed to
make counterfactual statements about changing a sta-
ble, global aspect of their self-concept (e.g., “If only I
were a better friend”) reported greater shame and less
guilt in response to a hypothetical scenario than did
those told to make counterfactuals changing their spe-
cific behavior (e.g., “If only I had not flirted with his
date”). In a separate line of research, studies on behav-
ioral outcomes of emotions have shown that shame of-
ten leads to escapist or hiding behaviors, suggesting
irremediable impact to the stable, global self (see
Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). In contrast,
guilt has been associated with reparative behaviors,
suggesting impact to aspects of the self that can be
changed (Barrett, 1995; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears,
& Manstead, 1998).
Embarrassment. Similar to shame and guilt,
embarrassment requires an appraisal of identity-goal
relevance and identity-goal incongruence, and attribu-
tions to internal causes. However, unlike shame and
guilt, embarrassment does not seem to require any fur-
ther attributions, and as conceptualized in our model,
embarrassment can occur only when attentional focus
is directed toward the public self, activating corre-
sponding public self-representations. That is, an indi-
vidual can become embarrassed by events blamed on
internal, stable, and global aspects of the public self,
such as repeatedly being publicly exposed as incompe-
tent; or by events blamed on internal, unstable, and spe-
cific aspects of the public self, such as spilling soup on
one’s boss.
This account implies that embarrassment is less
cognition dependent than shame or guilt, both of which
seem to depend on additional appraisal dimensions.
Supporting this claim, embarrassment emerges earlier
in childhood than shame or guilt (Lewis et al., 1989).
This finding led Lewis et al. (1989) to place embarrass-
ment within a first class of self-conscious emotions,
and guilt and shame within a second class of self-con-
scious emotions that “require more cognitive capacity”
(p. 148). Similarly, Izard et al. (1999) included shame,
guilt, and pride but not embarrassment within the cate-
gory of cognition-dependent self-conscious emotions.
According to our model, if the two additional, more
complex appraisals (stability and globality) are made
in cases when public self-representations are activated,
then shame or guilt will co-occur with embarrassment.
Thus, the key distinctive features of embarrassment
are its relative cognitive simplicity and the fact that
attentional focus must be specifically directed toward
the public self (Edelmann, 1987; Keltner & Buswell,
1997; Miller, 1995). To feel embarrassed an individual
must become aware of a discrepancy between public
aspects of the self, such as one’s appearance, and oth-
ers’ evaluations (Edelmann, 1985; Miller, 1995). The
relevant identity goals concern one’s externally pre-
sented identity. Consistent with this theoretical con-
ception, individual differences in the tendency to
become embarrassed correlates with public self-con-
sciousness (Edelmann, 1985); in addition, in one
study, participants only reported feeling embarrassed
in the presence of real or imagined others (Tangney et
al., 1996). It is noteworthy that traditional accounts
used this public-private distinction to differentiate be-
tween shame and guilt, viewing shame as a public
emotion and guilt as a private one (e.g., Buss, 1980;
Darwin, 1872). However, researchers have asked par-
ticipants to report the actual antecedents of their shame
and guilt experiences and discovered that both shame
and guilt can occur in response to public or private
elicitors (Tangney et al., 1996), although shame is
more commonly elicited in public contexts (Smith,
Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Thus, we believe that
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shame and guilt can result from the activation of a pub-
lic or private self-representation, whereas embarrass-
ment is linked exclusively to the public self.12
Existing theories of embarrassment provide some-
what conflicting accounts of its precise cognitive ante-
cedents (Edelmann, 1985; Keltner & Buswell, 1997;
Miller, 1995; Parrott & Smith, 1991; Sabini, Garvey,
& Hall, 2001; Tangney et al., 1996). Given the limited
consensus, our model restricts its claims to the few ar-
eas where there is agreement: Embarrassment requires
attentional focus on the public self, appraisals of iden-
tity-goal relevance and incongruence, and internal at-
tributions. Our more controversial claim, that
embarrassment is less cognitively elaborated than guilt
or shame, requires further empirical support.
Two forms of pride: Achievement-oriented and
hubristic. According to our model, people feel pride
when their attention is focused on themselves, activating
public and/or private self-representations; when they ap-
praise events as relevant to and congruent with identity
goals; and when they attribute the cause of events to
some internal factor, taking credit for the situation.13 Par-
alleling shame and guilt, stability and globality attribu-
tions differentiate between two forms of pride. Global
pride in the self (“I’m proud of who I am”), which Lewis
(2000) referred to as hubris and Tangney et al. (1992) re-
ferred to as “alpha pride,” may result from attributions to
internal, stable causes. Conversely, a feeling of pride
based on specific achievements (“I’m proud of what I
did”) may result from attributions to internal, unstable
causes (Lewis, 2000; Tangney et al., 1992).
The conceptual distinction between these two forms
of pride is supported by evidence that the same emo-
tion (pride) can lead to highly divergent outcomes. On
one hand, narcissistic hubris may contribute to aggres-
sion and hostility, interpersonal problems, relationship
conflict, and a host of self-destructive behaviors
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, 1999;
Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1977; Morf & Rhodewalt,
2001; Wink, 1991). On the other hand, pride in one’s
achievements may promote positive behaviors in the
achievement domain (Weiner, 1985) and contribute to
prosocial investments and the development of a genu-
ine and deep-rooted sense of self-esteem (Herrald &
Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus, 1991).
We have conducted several studies that provide em-
pirical support for the distinction between achieve-
ment-oriented and hubristic pride. In one study, we
found that the two variants of pride have distinct
elicitors; attributing a hypothetical success to ability (a
global, stable cause) leads to greater feelings of superi-
ority (i.e., hubristic pride) than does attributing the
same success to effort (a specific, unstable cause)
(Tracy & Robins, 2002). In another study, we analyzed
the semantic similarity among words that participants
used to label photos of individuals displaying the pride
expression. We found two distinct clusters, one reflect-
ing achievement-oriented pride (including words such
as triumphant and achieving) and the other reflecting
hubristic words (e.g., haughty,egotistic,arrogant). In
a third study, participants wrote about actual pride ex-
periences and rated the extent to which each of a set of
pride-related words described their feelings. A factor
analysis of their ratings revealed two independent fac-
tors: one included achievement-oriented pride words
such as confident,triumphant, and achieving, and the
other included hubristic words such as arrogant,supe-
rior, and cocky (Tracy & Robins, 2003b). Thus, there
is preliminary evidence for two forms of pride that are
semantically and experientially distinct.
In summary, our model integrates previous research
and theory to formulate a separate causal pathway
leading to each self-conscious emotion and explains
how these pathways fit within the broader set of cogni-
tive processes necessary for the elicitation of the fam-
ily of self-conscious emotions. In addition, our model
extends previous conceptions of shame and guilt to the
domain of positive self-conscious emotions by speci-
fying separate causal pathways to two parallel forms of
pride (achievement oriented and hubristic). Finally,
the proposed model integrates theory and research on
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TRACY & ROBINS
12Lewis (2000) distinguished between embarrassment as conceptu-
alized here and a form of embarrassment he labeled “embarrassment as
exposure,” which occurs in response to praise or any public attention.
Lewis noted that this latter form of embarrassment does not require any
negative evaluation of self, and unlike the former, it is not associated
with increases in cortisol levels (Lewis & Ramsay, 2002). We believe
that embarrassment as exposure may be better conceptualized as a gen-
eralized form of self-consciousness than as a form of embarrassment.
Consistent with this view, Miller (1995) argued that “awareness of
one’s social self alone does not cause [embarrassment] to occur. In-
stead, mature embarrassment seems to result from the acute realization
that one’s social self is imperiled and that others maybe judging one
negatively” (p. 326). Thus, we distinguish generalized self-conscious-
ness from embarrassment, the latter of which seems to be an evolved
mechanism for appeasement following a social transgression and re-
quires a comparatively complex self-evaluative process.
13One seemingly contradictory example is the experience of vicar-
ious pride. Consider the case of a person who feels pride while watch-
ing someone else win an athletic event. This could generate pride,
first, because the individual experiencing pride directly takes credit
for the outcome (e.g., as might the athlete’s coach). Second, the indi-
vidual could experience pride because he or she includes the other
within his or her self-representations. For example, if the athlete rep-
resents the individual’s country in the Olympics, then the individual
might experience national pride because the event is congruent with
his or her ideal collective self-representations (e.g., “My nation is
good at sports”). Similarly, if the individual is the athlete’s parent, he
or she might experience pride because the event is congruent with his
or her ideal relational self-representations (e.g., “I’m a good father”).
Finally, the event could elicit pride because the individual has an em-
pathic response toward the athlete (e.g., “That could have been me”),
which could occur even when the individual has no prior psychologi-
cal connection to the athlete. These processes are likely to occur for
other self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment (e.g., the indi-
vidual could feel embarrassed watching the athlete trip on the way to
picking up her medal).
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self-representations, self-focused attention, and
self-discrepancies with theory and research on ap-
praisal models of emotion and the causal attribution
process. As a result, our model generates testable pre-
dictions about the cognitive antecedents of self-con-
scious emotions. In the next section, we demonstrate
how our model can be used to better understand a par-
ticular personality process, namely, narcissistic
self-esteem regulation.
An Application of the Model: The Case
of Narcissism
Prediction 11: Narcissistic individuals will engage
in appraisal processes that promote feelings of
hubristic pride and minimize shame. These processes
include a tendency to chronically focus attention on the
self; appraise positive events as identity-goal relevant
and congruent and negative events as identity-goal ir-
relevant and incongruent; and make internal, stable,
global attributions for success and external attributions
for failure.
Self-conscious emotions such as shame and
hubristic pride are assumed to fuel narcissistic self-es-
teem regulation (Robins, Tracy, & Shaver, 2001;
Wright, O’Leary, & Balkin, 1989). Thus, our model of
these emotions should provide a unique, process-ori-
ented perspective on the self-regulatory system gov-
erning narcissistic personality processes. Our model’s
utility can be demonstrated by using it to gain insight
into an important personality dimension, narcissism
which has received considerable attention from self re-
searchers (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).
Individuals with narcissistic tendencies report high
self-esteem but are thought to hold implicit negative
self-representations (e.g., Broucek, 1991; Kernberg,
1975; Morrison, 1989; Tracy & Robins, 2003a; Wat-
son, Hickman, & Morris, 1996). In addition, these indi-
viduals are highly motivated to self-enhance and
self-aggrandize (John & Robins, 1994; Morf &
Rhodewalt, 2001), presumably because maintaining
biased self-representations allows them to prevent
their implicit low self-esteem from becoming explicit.
The coexistence of explicit positive and implicit nega-
tive self-representations, combined with a strong
self-enhancement motive, has important implications
for the self-conscious emotion process.
Narcissists, like to all individuals, regulate self-es-
teem by striving to increase pride and avoid shame.
Our model points to the reappraisals that likely facili-
tate this regulatory process. For example, to avoid
shame, individuals may appraise negative events as
identity-goal incongruent, externally caused, or inter-
nally caused but due to an unstable, specific aspect of
the self. Conversely, to increase pride individuals may
appraise positive events as identity-goal relevant and
internally caused. In fact, these regulation processes
may be the same cognitive mechanisms through which
self-enhancement processes take effect. The experi-
ence of both forms of pride enhances self-esteem, the
experience of shame diminishes self-esteem (Tangney
& Dearing, 2002), and one accepted definition of
self-esteem is “the balance between pride and shame
states in a person’s life, taking into account both dura-
tion and intensity” (Scheff, 1988, p. 399). Thus, our
model describes the mechanisms behind self-esteem
regulation. For narcissistic individuals, this regulatory
process functions in an extreme, even pathological,
manner. Regardless of the actual eliciting event and
circumstances, a narcissist will rigidly follow the regu-
latory pathways in the model that lead to hubristic
pride and away from shame.
From this perspective, narcissism should have a
powerful effect on each of the pathways in the model.
First, narcissism may promote excessive attentional
focus on the self. In fact, narcissists score higher on
projective measures of chronic self-focus (Emmons,
1987) and use more first-person singular pronouns (I,
me) in their speech (Raskin & Shaw, 1988). Chronic
self-focused attention will increase the narcissist’s vul-
nerability to all self-conscious emotions, making regu-
lation (of shame and guilt) all the more important.
Second, narcissism may influence appraisals of
identity-goal relevance. Those who actively seek
self-enhancement opportunities may be prone to find-
ing identity-relevant meaning in many positive events
and, consequently, experience frequent pride. For ex-
ample, the narcissistic premed student might feel posi-
tive self-conscious emotions not only from a high score
on an exam but also from speaking in her class, talking to
a professor after class, proving herself smarter than a fel-
low classmate, and countless other events that can easily
be appraised as identity-goal relevant and congruent to a
self-enhancer. Narcissism may also influence the ten-
dency to regulate self-conscious emotions through re-
appraisals. Narcissists may reappraise negative events
as irrelevant to identity goals by, for example, shifting
the importance of various identity goals (e.g., “It’s ok
that I failed my exam because I don’t want to be a doctor
anyway—I’d rather look cool to my friends”).
Third, narcissistic self-enhancement biases may
promote external attributions for failure. The narcis-
sistic premed student is more likely to blame her pro-
fessor than herself for failing an exam, and studies
suggest she may become angry and possibly even ag-
gressive as a result (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998).
The “shame-rage spiral” observed in clinical research
has been noted to be particularly characteristic of nar-
cissists (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1998). At an implicit
level, narcissists may be very similar to other individ-
uals with low self-esteem, who tend to globalize fail-
ure (Brown & Dutton, 1995), which, in our model,
means experiencing shame. Thus, for a narcissist, in-
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ternalization of failure would be internalization of
global failure, leading to shame without any possibil-
ity of guilt. The only regulatory solution for these in-
dividuals is to externalize blame, and experience
anger and rage instead.14
Conversely, narcissists may be vigilant of opportu-
nities to internalize positive events, taking credit for
successes whenever possible. Furthermore, their glob-
alizing tendencies may encourage not only internal at-
tributions but stable and global ones as well. For
example, after receiving a high score on her math
exam, the narcissist may think, “I’m smart and talented
at everything I do,” whereas a non-narcissistic person
may also make an internal attribution but think, “I’m
pretty good at math,” or even “I’m learning the mate-
rial in this math class very well.” Interestingly, narcis-
sists may make self-serving attributions even when
positive events are not actually internally
caused—narcissists tend to take credit for events that
may be caused by others (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd,
1998). Part of the reason for these excessively global
and stable internal attributions may be that positive
self-representations are too essential to the narcissist to
be left to the whim of actual accomplishments. Indeed,
without these representations, narcissists would be
overwhelmed by shame and low self-esteem
(Kernberg, 1975). Thus, narcissists may regulate both
to avoid shame and to experience conscious feelings of
hubristic pride. If this is the case, we can surmise that
whereas achievement-oriented pride may enhance au-
thentic self-esteem, hubristic pride may enhance nar-
cissistic, inflated self-esteem.
In summary, the proposed model helps us conceptu-
alize personality tendencies in terms of processes,
rather than by simply linking an individual-difference
construct to an outcome. For example, we have prelim-
inary data showing that narcissistic individuals tend to
be prone to experiencing both forms of pride (Tracy &
Robins, 2004a), however few theories have outlined
the mechanisms that produce this emotional disposi-
tion. Our model suggests several possible,
nonmutually exclusive paths: Narcissism might pro-
mote chronic self-focused attention; it might promote
evaluations of identity-goal relevance and congruence
for positive events; or it might generate internal attri-
butions for positive events. Any one, or all, of these
mediating mechanisms could account for the empirical
link. In this way, the model moves beyond predicting
simple correlations by also presenting a host of mediat-
ing processes that might explain why some individuals
are prone to experience particular emotions. Similarly,
when a personality tendency does not show theoreti-
cally predicted links to emotion—for example, indi-
viduals who score high on measures of narcissism tend
not to report experiencing shame despite clinical theo-
ries that shame underlies the disorder—the model
points to several possible explanations. Narcissists
may not focus attention on the self when negative
events occur; they might deny that an event is incon-
gruent with or even relevant to identity goals; or they
might make external attributions for negative events
and feel anger instead of shame.
Implications for Research on Self and
Emotion
In this article, we presented a comprehensive theo-
retical model of self-conscious emotions. This model
describes the cognitive processes that generate on-line,
momentary emotions and provides a framework for
conceptualizing how narcissism—a broad individ-
ual-difference variable—influences several aspects of
the self-conscious emotion process. We conclude by
discussing several implications of this model for re-
search on the role of affect in self-processes.
Traditionally, research on the self and research on
emotion have been disconnected, stemming, perhaps,
from their divergent theoretical roots. Self researchers
began including affect in their models only within the
past few decades and even now rarely move beyond
noting that self-processes may be affect driven. These
researchers tend not to identify the specific emotions
that drive particular self-processes. Meanwhile, emo-
tion researchers have focused on the biological under-
pinnings of basic emotions, causing them to downplay
complex psychological processes and to devote less at-
tention to emotions that require an understanding of
the self—self-conscious emotions. As a whole, this di-
vide has hurt research on the self, research on emo-
tions, and most notably, research on topics that exist at
the interface between the two areas (e.g., self-esteem
regulation). The theoretical model proposed here at-
tempts to integrate these two areas of research, and to
provide a potentially fruitful synthesis that suggests
several major directions for future research.
Our model generates testable hypotheses about the
on-line process of self-conscious emotion activation
and thus has important implications for future and ex-
tant research. Our model also can facilitate reinterpre-
tation of previous research findings.
To better understand the functions and outcomes of
the emotions that mediate self-processes, researchers
must specify the exact emotions involved in these pro-
cesses. For example, if self-enhancement increases
positive affect, is this because it causes people to feel
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14The idea that implicit shame is the cause of narcissistic rage is
supported by studies of “Type A” coronary heart disease survivors.
These patients have been found to “harbor insecurities and in most
cases insufficient self-esteem … not immediately apparent to the
therapists or the participants themselves” (Friedman & Ulmer, 1984,
p. 167). Other research supports the idea that these hostile patients are
narcissistic: They tend to frequently use the words, I,me, and my in
conversations (Williams, 1988).
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joy, achievement-oriented pride, hubristic pride, or
some other positive emotion? From a discrete emo-
tions perspective, these emotions will produce diver-
gent behaviors, thoughts, and feelings, so
differentiating among them is meaningful and neces-
sary. Using our model, self-enhancement researchers
could trace the process to a particular outcome emotion
and then empirically test whether that emotion is more
likely to be experienced than others. For example, do
people self-enhance to feel pride or a generalized posi-
tive affective state? To test this question empirically,
researchers need to move beyond assessing only broad
affective dimensions.
If researchers do begin to identify and assess spe-
cific emotions rather than rely on global categories
such as negative affect, the precision and predictive
power of our models may be increased. If we can focus
on the particular emotion that accounts for the relation
between two variables, the resultant correlation will be
stronger than one found using a composite of different
emotions, some relevant and some irrelevant. For ex-
ample, if anger is the specific emotion that accounts for
the relation between a manipulated ego threat and out-
come aggression, anger feelings may be a significant
mediator of this relation whereas negative affect aver-
aged across a set of emotions may not be. In a recent
study on this effect, Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, and
Stucke (2001) linked ego threats to aggression but
failed to find a mediation effect of generalized nega-
tive affect. Our model specifies a more precise predic-
tion: Shame externalized into anger will significantly
mediate the threat-aggression relation.
Indeed, our model has other implications for the
large body of experimental research on reactions to
feedback. Numerous studies have shown that, follow-
ing an ego threat, low self-esteem individuals tend to
experience negative affect and withdraw from the task
(Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Brown & Dutton,
1995). From a functionalist perspective, this with-
drawal can be interpreted as a behavioral outcome of
shame (Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). Thus, the
negative affect reported by individuals with low
self-esteem may more specifically reflect feelings of
shame, and the outcome behaviors may be part of a co-
ordinated functional response. If failure represents a
stable, global, shortcoming of the self, the adaptive so-
lution is to withdraw and avoid repeated attempts at
success or social contact, which might further reveal
the self’s inadequacies. Supporting this account,
Brown and Marshall (2001) found that most of the
shared variance between self-esteem and affect is ac-
counted for by self-conscious emotions, specifically
shame and pride.
Individuals with defensive or contingent self-es-
teem, however, react very differently to negative feed-
back. As previously mentioned, rather than quietly
disengage, these individuals become angry, hostile,
and even aggressive following failure (Bushman &
Baumeister, 1998; Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, &
Harlow, 1993). Although researchers rarely question
the mechanism behind this outcome, it certainly war-
rants attention. Individuals with contingent self-es-
teem are those who base feelings of self-worth entirely
on feedback from others, so negative feedback should
reduce self-esteem and promote shame, not anger. The
fact that anger occurs instead implies a regulatory pro-
cess, demanding further explanation. Earlier, we ar-
gued that instead of blaming themselves for failure and
consciously experiencing shame, narcissists (who tend
to have contingent self-esteem) blame others and feel
the anger and hostility that follow from an external at-
tribution. This regulatory process may be the explana-
tion for the angry and aggressive response seen in these
studies. Thus, by specifying separate causal pathways
for different emotions, our model explains why stable
individual differences (e.g., low self-esteem vs. narcis-
sistic self-esteem) promote different reactions to the
same negative feedback, and how distinct emotions
mediate these processes.
To take another prominent example from the self
literature, our model has important implications for
dominant accounts of the role of affect in self-regula-
tory processes. As we explained earlier, Carver and
Scheier (1998) have argued that a discrepancy between
a current self-state and a goal state results in negative
affect. We have built on their model to argue that dis-
crepancies between current and ideal states generate
specifically shame or guilt; in other words, distinct
negative self-conscious emotions. This more precise
prediction is possible because, in our model, the locus
attribution is critical: Internal attributions are the ap-
praisals that determine whether basic or self-conscious
emotions occur. Even in Carver’s (2001) most recent
model, there is no distinction made between internal
and external attributions. As a result, movement to-
ward a self-regulatory goal (i.e., reduction of a discrep-
ancy) is assumed to produce a set of high-activation
positive emotions, including elation, excitement, and
joy, regardless of whether the discrepancy reduction is
attributed to internal or external causes. In contrast, our
model specifies that internal attributions for achieve-
ment generate achievement-oriented or hubristic pride
(depending on the globality and stability of the internal
attribution), but external attributions for the same out-
come produce joy instead. Thus, our model generates
predictions with a high degree of fidelity when individ-
uals self-regulate to achieve identity-relevant goals.
As with our reinterpretation of the findings of feed-
back manipulation studies, this reinterpretation may
improve our understanding of the behavioral outcomes
of self-regulation. Carver and Scheier (1998) argued
that discrepancies motivate behaviors that produce
faster progress toward a goal state (i.e., increased effort
to achieve goals). When we view the negative affect
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that is generated by these discrepancies as guilt, we can
integrate functionalist theories of emotions into our in-
terpretation and explain why discrepancies motivate
progress-oriented behaviors: Guilt functions to pro-
mote reparative action (Barrett, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz,
1984; Tangney, 1991). Furthermore, when discrepan-
cies motivate withdrawal and avoidance rather than in-
creased effort toward reducing the discrepancy, we can
make predictions about why this might be the case.
From a functionalist perspective, we need not assume
that the overarching theory is wrong; instead, we can
hypothesize that shame, rather than guilt (and rather
than overly broad negative affect), is the mediating
emotion in such cases.
One notable exception to the general absence of a
discrete emotions perspective in self research is Hig-
gins’ (1987) theoretical work on self-discrepancies.
As mentioned earlier, Higgins articulated distinct sets
of negative emotions that result from discrepancies
between different self-schemas. For example, a dis-
crepancy between one’s actual self and ought self was
hypothesized to produce specifically anxiety-related
emotions, such as fear and guilt, rather than broad
negative affect. More recently, Higgins argued that
researchers must now ask the “second-generation
question” stemming from his work: Under what con-
ditions do self-discrepancies lead to predicted distinc-
tive emotional patterns (Higgins, 1999)? Our
proposed model builds on Higgins’ original concep-
tion that different emotions are related to different
self-processes and responds to his second-generation
call by providing a deeper understanding of the pro-
cesses involved.
Finally, our model can provide an explanatory
framework for conceptualizing cultural differences in
emotion. A large body of research suggests that cul-
ture has a profound influence on emotions. The im-
pact of culture is likely to be particularly pronounced
for self-conscious emotions, which require evalua-
tions of a self that is, at least in part, shaped by cul-
ture. Research suggests that a wide range of
self-evaluative processes vary in important ways
across cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, &
Kitayama, 1999). For example, Markus and
Kitayama (1991) argued that individuals from
collectivistic cultures tend to hold interdependent
self-construals, viewing the self as embedded within
and dependent on a larger social context, whereas
those from individualistic cultures tend to hold more
independent self-construals, viewing the self as pri-
marily separate from the social context. According to
Markus and Kitayama, these cultural differences in
self-construals lead to cultural differences in emo-
tion. Specifically, “other-focused” emotions such as
shame may be more commonly experienced and lead
to greater positive outcomes in individuals with inter-
dependent views of self, whereas “ego-focused” emo-
tions such as pride may be more commonly experi-
enced and self-enhancing for those with independent
views of self (see also, Eid & Diener, 2001; Menon &
Shweder, 1994; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).
However, despite these important cultural differ-
ences, we believe that the basic processes described
by our model—the particular antecedent appraisals
that elicit different emotions—generalize across cul-
tures. In other words, although a person from a
collectivistic culture may feel shame more frequently
than a person from an individualistic culture, our
model predicts that the same set of appraisals and at-
tributions elicits shame in both people. Supporting
this idea, Scherer and Wallbott (1994) studied 37 cul-
tures and found considerable cross-cultural similari-
ties in the appraisal processes that generated and
distinguished among emotions. Nonetheless, culture
may exert a strong influence on the way that individu-
als appraise emotion-eliciting events, and these cul-
tural differences in appraisal can account for
differences in the prevalence of particular emotions
(Mesquita, 2001).
Our model provides the basis for making predic-
tions about the appraisal processes that mediate cul-
tural differences in emotion. A person from a
collectivistic culture, who presumably has an interde-
pendent self-construal, may not appraise an individ-
ual achievement as identity-goal congruent unless
this achievement reflects well on his family, too. As a
result, the same event—for example, making an intel-
ligent comment in class that draws attention from oth-
ers—may lead to divergent emotions depending on
culture. For a person from an individualistic culture,
who presumably has an independent self-construal,
this event will likely be appraised as congruent with
the culturally determined identity goal of appearing
smart to those around her. If she also appraises the
event as internally caused, she will experience pride.
In contrast, an individual with a more interdependent
self-construal may feel shame instead of pride, be-
cause he might appraise this event as relevant to the
culturally determined identity goal of fitting in with
those around him, and as incongruent with this goal.
Other cultural differences in appraisal pro-
cesses—such as the tendency for people from indi-
vidualistic cultures to make more self-serving
attributions for success and failure than people from
collectivistic cultures (Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama,
Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995)—will produce similar
differences in emotions. Thus, culture may affect how
frequently particular emotions occur, by influencing
individuals’ propensity to make particular appraisals
(Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). In summary, our model
predicts that cultures differ in the prevalence and con-
sequences of self-conscious emotions, but not in the
cognitive processes that generate and distinguish
among them.
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Conclusion
Although all emotions can involve the self, only
self-conscious emotions cannot occur independently
of elaborate self-processes. Using the proposed model,
we can ask new questions about the causes of self-con-
scious emotions in various individuals. For example,
did Willy Loman succumb to suicide because he could
no longer distract himself from attentional focus on the
self? Did Lady Macbeth see spots of blood after realiz-
ing that murder was incongruent with her identity goal
to be a good person? Was Oedipus’ shame the result of
an internal, stable, and global attribution for his fa-
ther’s death and his incestuous relationship with his
mother? Did Narcissus appraise his current public
self-representation as congruent with ideal public
self-representations? We leave these questions to liter-
ary scholars, but we hope similar ones will be asked of
the emotional and self-processes studied in psycholog-
ical research.
Notes
Jessica L. Tracy was supported by a predoctoral fel-
lowship from National Institute of Mental Health
Grant T32 MH2006. We thank Jennifer Beer, Robin
Edelstein, Simona Ghetti, Erik Noftle, Jennifer Pals,
Phil Shaver, Gina Sutin, and Kali Trzesniewski for
their helpful comments on this article.
Jessica L. Tracy, University of California, Depart-
ment of Psychology, Davis, CA 95616–8686. E-mail:
jltracy@ucdavis.edu
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... Shame is typically a more unsettling and painful emotion since the judgments often focus on the self, not simply one's behavior. Ashamed people feel worthless and exposed and fear rejection from society or groups important to them, thus evoking the impulse to hide and avoid the situations that trigger shame (Tracy et al., 2007). Independent of the presence of others, the thought of how one would negatively appear to others is often present (Lewis, 1971;Tracy et al., 2007). ...
... Ashamed people feel worthless and exposed and fear rejection from society or groups important to them, thus evoking the impulse to hide and avoid the situations that trigger shame (Tracy et al., 2007). Independent of the presence of others, the thought of how one would negatively appear to others is often present (Lewis, 1971;Tracy et al., 2007). Guilt, however, seems to be more adaptive and less disruptive. ...
... Shame and guilt are not inherently problematic or maladaptive emotions (Taihara & Malik, 2016), as they can effectively function to inhibit disruptive behavior. However, persistent, excessive levels of shame are linked with difficulties in emotion regulation, aggression, destructive behavior, and maladaptive coping strategies (Rahim & Patton, 2015;Tracy et al., 2007). This includes destructive behaviors like suicidal ideation, harmful substance use, and sexual risk-taking (Rahim & Patton, 2015;Saraiya & Lopez-Castro, 2016;Tracy et al., 2007). ...
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Shame and guilt are universal emotions meant to elicit socially approved behaviors and inhibit antisocial behavior. Excessive feelings of shame and guilt—shame especially—are linked to various destructive behaviors, difficulties in emotion regulation, maladaptive personality traits, psychological difficulties, and negative impacts on treatment outcomes. These make it especially important to have a valid instrument to evaluate the mechanisms related to these emotions. No validated self-report instrument measuring generalized shame and guilt was available in Norwegian. The Personal Feelings Questionnaire (PFQ-2) is designed to measure the level of generalized shame and guilt. This project’s aim was to translate the PFQ-2 into Norwegian and evaluate the clinical utility and psychometric properties of a Norwegian version of the PFQ-2. Data were collected from students at a local university college in Norway (N = 320, age: M = 25.4, SD = 8) and patients at a local outpatient psychiatric hospital (N = 53, age: M = 31.4, SD = 10.43). To be able to evaluate the factor structure of the Norwegian version of the PFQ-2, the dataset was divided in two by random selection with a 50/50 split. First an Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on one half of the sample (N = 180) and then a Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the other half (N = 193). According to the EFA the factor structure was similar to the original factor structure, with the exception of one item (item 6). Confirmatory factor analysis showed a good goodness of fit for the two factors measuring shame and guilt. The internal consistency was high in both subscales (shame, α = 0.818, and guilt, α = 0.834). The instrument showed further adequate construct validity, where the clinical sample experienced greater shame than the community sample (M = 17, SD = 6.887 vs. M = 13, SD = 5.311) and stronger guilt (M = 18, SD = 5.248 vs. M = 14, SD = 15.210). The subscales correlated with other constructs, as expected. The PFQ-2—with the suggested adjustment of moving one item (item 6) from the shame scale to the guilt scale—can be used to evaluate the levels of feelings of shame and guilt among adults in Norway.
... Some are considered selftranscendent positive emotions (e.g. elevation, gratitude, awe; Yaden et al., 2017), whereas others are more self-centered in nature (e.g., pride, in particular, hubristic pride; Tracy & Robins, 2007;Tracy et al., 2011). According to the self-centeredness/selflessness happiness model (Dambrun & Ricard, 2011), only self-transcendent positive emotions should promote authentic and lasting happiness (i.e., well-being and inner peace). ...
... For example, we do not know what type of gratitude they experienced the most during the meditation session (e.g., gratitude for themselves, gratitude for the organizers of the study, gratitude for the experience during the meditation, gratitude for life in general). On the basis of on the literature, we assumed that gratitude, elevation, and awe were self-transcendent emotions (Stellar et al., 2017;Yaden et al., 2017) and that pride was more a self-centered emotion (Dambrun et al., 2011;Tracy et al., 2007). This assumption is probably partly true, but it is important to explore this dichotomy further. ...
... This assumption is probably partly true, but it is important to explore this dichotomy further. For example, distinguishing and assessing both authentic and hubristic pride (Tracy et Robins, 2007;Tracy et al., 2011) would be informative. It is also possible that elevation can both promote selftranscendence, but at the same time feeling that one is improving could lead to a phenomenon of feeling superior, which is sometimes observed in mind-body practices such as yoga or meditation (Vonk et al., 2021), which might in turn evoke self-centeredness. ...
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In two randomized controlled trials, we tested the effect of two attentional mindfulness meditation practices on positive mental health. We hypothesized that attentional meditation would increase various positive emotions (gratitude, interest, hope, pride, elevation, and awe) via three processes induced by mindfulness (body awareness, meta-awareness, and self-transcendence) and that positive self-transcendent emotions would in turn increase positive mental health (well-being and inner peace). This hypothesis was tested in two randomized online experiments. Participants were assigned to either a body scan meditation, a breath meditation, or a condition in which they listened to a story (active control). Various positive emotions, mindfulness-induced processes, and well-being/inner peace were assessed with self-reports. Experiment 1 (n = 166) revealed that practicing a 21-min body scan or breath meditation significantly increased positive emotions (in particular, elevation, gratitude, and pride) and that self-transcendence significantly mediated that effect. Experiment 2 (n = 127) replicated these findings in regard to positive emotions with a shorter, 11-min practice and revealed that two self-transcendent positive emotions (elevation and gratitude), but not pride-a more self-centered positive emotion-significantly mediated the effect of attentional meditation practice on well-being and inner peace. The implications of these results are discussed.
... Moral emotions are elicited by self-evaluations on one's personal attributes or behaviors in light of the prevailing social norms (Tracy et al., 2007). In particular, pride arises from positive selfevaluations, shame from negative self-images on one's own personal attributes, and guilt from negative arousal on having inflicted harm on others . ...
... The capability of self-evaluation requires certain cognitive skills (Tracy et al., 2007): children ought to have awareness of the self, of the social norms, and the ability to take others' perspectives, in order to carry out self-evaluations. Research showed that children can show self-awareness from the age of two (Bulgarelli et al., 2019), and have basic understandings of social norms or values already in toddlerhood (Hardecker et al., 2016). ...
... Restricted access to social learning can affect the early development of moral emotions in DHH children (Tracy et al., 2007). Cross-sectional research showed that DHH children displayed lower levels of shame, guilt, and pride compared to their TH peers, with these differences apparent as early as preschool age . ...
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Moral emotions such as shame, guilt and pride are crucial to young children’s social-emotional development. Due to the restrictions caused by hearing loss in accessing the social world, deaf and hard of hearing (DHH) children may encounter extra difficulties in their development of moral emotions. However, little research so far has investigated the development trajectory of moral emotions during preschool years in DHH children. The present study used a longitudinal design to explore the development trajectories of shame, guilt, and pride, in a sample of 259Chinese DHH and typically hearing (TH) preschoolers aged 2 to 6 years old. The results indicated that according to parent reports, DHH children manifested lower levels of guilt and pride compared to their TH peers, yet the manifested levels of shame, guilt, and pride increased throughout the preschool time at a similar pace in all children. Moreover, whilst guilt and pride contributed to increasing levels of psychosocial functioning over the preschool years, shame contributed to lower social competence and more externalizing behaviors in DHH and TH preschoolers. The outcomes imply that early interventions and adjustment to hearing loss could be useful to safeguard the social development of children with severe hearing loss, and cultural variances shall be taken into consideration when studying moral emotions in a Chinese cultural background.
... Just as a cross-culture study revealed, Chinese students reported lower levels of anger than German students in mathematics classrooms (Frenzel et al., 2007a). Moreover, pride is a self-aware, positive emotion for Western learners (Tracy et al., 2007); however, it is a less welcome and undesirable emotion for Asian learners because too much pride will hinder their progress (Scollon et al., 2005). Notably, because learning is situational, learners might experience a range of emotions depending on the environment, including class, learning, and examination situations (Pekrun, 2006). ...
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International assessments indicate that Chinese students tend to exhibit lower levels of positive learning emotions compared to their Western counterparts. While prior research frequently highlights the impact of culture on emotions, it often falls short in examining the specific mechanisms through which culture influences emotions. By focusing on the culture-related factor-relational concerns in emotions, this study investigated the link between relational concerns and academic emotions, as well as the mediation role of cognitive appraisals in that relation, using the control-value theory as a framework. The data was collected from 1900 students (50.9% male; Mage = 13.88, SDage = 1.16) in 76 mathematics classrooms across 11 secondary schools in Jiangsu, China. Findings demonstrated that relational concerns were of relevance to academic emotions directly and indirectly. In detail, relational concerns had no direct effects on positive emotions but had indirect favourable effects on positive emotions through intrinsic value. Although control-value appraisals mediated in relational concerns and negative emotions, relational concerns showed a robust direct and negative effect on negative emotions. Findings are important to understand Chinese students’ emotions and thus improving their positive learning experiences.
... Future research should aim to encompass a broader spectrum of emotions, including a greater variety of positive emotions (e.g., awe, contentment), self-conscious or social emotions (e.g., embarrassment, guilt, pride, shame), and selftranscendent emotions (e.g., compassion, gratitude). These emotions are crucial indicators of introspection and selfassessment (Stellar et al., 2017;Tracy et al., 2007) and could unveil a more intricate set of Wellbeing factors, enhancing the scope of longitudinal Wellbeing assessments. ...
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Effective and efficient Wellbeing measurement is essential within the social sciences and public health. Wellbeing is described as a three-factor construct composed of Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect, yet there are few measurement models validated for the increasingly popular use of longitudinal, app-based assessment. We explored Wellbeing measurement in a postsecondary student sample, including two mechanistic indicators described in Mindfulness-to-Meaning Theory: Decentering and Positive Reappraisal. Across two studies, we compared and validated popular measurement models for each construct. The most parsimonious Wellbeing model indicated only a two-factor structure comprised of positive (e.g., happiness, life satisfaction, and flourishing) and negative dimensions (e.g., anger, sadness, and anxiety). A third study revealed that a three-factor structure for Wellbeing was only supported when sampling a greater diversity of positive emotions than the earlier studies. Furthermore, while the Mindfulness-to-Meaning pathway to Wellbeing was replicated, only some operationalizations of Decentering and Reappraisal accounted for variance in Wellbeing. Concrete recommendations for the longitudinal assessment are provided. This research contributes not only to our understanding of Wellbeing, but also informs its optimal assessment in longitudinal research such as clinical trials and experience sampling studies.
... The term "culture" refers to historically driven and socially transmitted things such as language, symbols, values, norms, rituals, laws, artifacts, and institutions (Tracy et al., 2007). ...
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This scoping review delves into the emotional complexities faced by individuals with chronic diseases, focusing on shame and guilt across diverse cultural contexts. This literature overview underscores the significant role of shame and guilt in the lives of individuals with chronic diseases and emphasizes the necessity of expanding the understanding of culturally related shame and guilt concerning chronic diseases. Findings underscore the need for targeted interventions in the emotional landscape of chronic illnesses and cultural sensitivity while talking about chronic conditions.
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Shame is a self-conscious emotion influenced by the quality of the parent-child relationship. Although much research has assessed shame as a one-dimensional construct, shame is characterized by multiple dimensions. Considering the need to measure different aspects of shame, the present study aimed to confirm the three-factor structure of SHAME questionnaire and to analyze the network structure in Italian population. The second aim was to assess associations between shame dimensions and perceived dysfunctional parenting styles. Four-hundred-sixty-four participants responded to an online survey that contained the Italian version of the SHAME (SHAME-I), the Other as Shame Scale, to assess the convergent validity of the SHAME-I with an Italian-validated measure, and the Measure Of Parental Style to assess dysfunctional parenting. Confirmatory factor analysis showed a good fit of the three-factor model, and items were arranged in the network consistently with the dimensions to which they belonged. Correlations showed good convergent validity for the SHAME-I. In addition, SHAME-I dimensions showed positive associations with perceived dysfunctional parenting. The SHAME-I seems to be a valid instrument that considers shame in its multidimensionality. Items with erotic, social exclusion, and disvalue cues had higher importance in the network. Lastly, specific SHAME-I dimensions were differently associated with dysfunctional parenting.
Chapter
In contrast to previous conceptualizations of episodic self-esteem as a cognitive assessment of one’s own self, recent proposals have categorized this phenomenon as an affective state. In this vein, self-esteem has been regarded as a self-conscious emotion (Salice, Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride. Emotion Review 12(3): 193–205, 2020) and an existential feeling (Bortolan Self-Esteem and Ethics: A Phenomenological View. Hypatia 33(1): 56–72, 2018; Self-esteem, Pride, Embarrassment, Shyness. In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion, ed. Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer, 358–368, London/New York: Routledge, 2020). While concurring with these recent accounts on the affective nature of self-esteem, this chapter also argues that none of them fully captures its nature. It argues that self-esteem is better understood as an umbrella term for a group of intentional feelings in which the subject valuates herself and senses fluctuations in her own value. The chapter also discusses the place of self-esteem feelings within the affective mind.
Thesis
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist die differenzierte Erforschung verschiedener Konstrukte der Selbstregulation sowie die Untersuchung von Verhaltensproblemen im Kontext der Moralentwicklung und die Überprüfung eines Messinstruments zur Erfassung moralischer Konstrukte im Kindesalter. Zunächst wurde ein systematisches Review, einschließlich einer Meta-Analyse, durchgeführt. Die anschließenden empirischen Analysen basieren auf Quer- (Npilot = 194, NT1 = 348) und Längsschnittdaten (NT2 = 189) von Grundschulkindern und deren Sorgeberechtigten. Die moralische Entwicklung in der mittleren Kindheit ist komplex und wird von verschiedenen Faktoren beeinflusst. Diese Arbeit hebt die Rolle der Selbstregulation, insbesondere der Emotionsregulation, hervor und betont die Bedeutung einer differenzierten der Konzepte. Darüber hinaus verdeutlicht die Arbeit die Notwendigkeit eines validen Messinstruments zur Erfassung differenzierter moralischer Konstrukte. Sie zeigt auf, dass sowohl zu niedrige als auch zu hohe moralische Vorstellungen mit Verhaltensproblemen assoziiert sein können.
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Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responses were specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion.
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All basic psychological processes have proved remarkably difficult to define, but perhaps none has been as resistant as the concept of emotion. It has at times been considered synonymous with certain classes of stimulation, with patterns of facial expression, with autonomic reactivity, with the disruption of behavior, with perception of peripheral autonomic and muscular feedback, with rather special states of consciousness, and with thalamic, hypothalamic, or limbic activity. None of these definitions has proved adequate, and the time has come to attempt a different approach in characterizing the inclusion and exclusion criteria of emotion. In this chapter, we do not presume to solve the recurrent problem of definition. However, we will propose a new working defiition of emotion. it differs from others in rejecting the possibility of an ostensive definition of emotion. That is, no emotional state is ever specified by a single, unambiguous behavioral measure, or even by a pattern or set of behaviors. Emotions can sometimes be inferred from facial or vocal expressions, sometimes from observing the person's train of thought, at times by noting what the person chooses to do, and on occasion, even from what the person does NOT do; to attempt to determine the pattern of behavior that specifies an emotional state seems doomed to imprecision because at any given time, totally dissimilar behaviors can be produced by the same emotional process. Emotions are such protean and abstruse phenomena that we feel the first step in describing the nature of emotions involves specifying what emotions do, rather than cataloging their physical attributes. What permits classification of these diverse manifestations into a single unitary category is, thus, the common functions served by the diverse expressions and instrumental activities.
Chapter
One of the most commonly reported emotions in people seeking psychotherapy is shame, and this emotion has become the subject of intense research and theory over the last 20 years. In Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture, Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews, together with some of the most eminent figures in the field, examine the effect of shame on social behaviour, social values, and mental states. The text utilizes a multidisciplinary approach, including perspectives from evolutionary and clinical psychology, neurobiology, sociology, and anthropology. In Part I, the authors cover some of the core issues and current controversies concerning shame. Part II explores the role of shame on the development of the infant brain, its evolution, and the relationship between shame as a personal and interpersonal construct and stigma. Part III examines the connection between shame and psychopathology. Here, authors are concerned with outlining how shame can significantly influence the formation, manifestation, and treatment of psychopathology. Finally, Part IV discusses the notion that shame is not only related to internal experiences but also conveys socially shared information about one's status and standing in the community. Shame will be essential reading for clinicians, clinical researchers, and social psychologists. With a focus on shame in the context of social behaviour, the book will also appeal to a wide range of researchers in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and evolutionary psychology.
Article
In this chapter, I describe a model of shame and guilt development that highlights the importance of these emotions for regulation of both the individual's transactions with the environment and the individual's devel­opment of self. The model is described in terms of seven basic principles. Principle 1: Shame and guilt are "social emotions." As such, they are (1) socially constructed, (2) invariably connected with (real or imagined) social interaction, (3) endowed with significance by social communication and/or relevance to desired ends (see below), and (4) associated with appreciations (appraisals) regarding others, as well as the self. Principle 2: Shame and guilt serve important functions. The shame "family" and the guilt "family," like other emotion "families" (groups of related emotions), are defined in terms of the intrapersonal-, interpersonal-, and behavior-regulatory functions they serve for the individual. Shame reflects and organizes different transactions between individuals and environment more than guilt does. Moreover, the differences in functions served by shame versus guilt are observable. For example, shame functions to distance the individual from the social environment; guilt functions to motivate reparative action. Principle 3: Shame and guilt are associated with particular appreciations (appraisals), and these appreciations are different for shame than they are for guilt. Appreciations are intimately connected to the functions that the emotions serve for the individual in the environment. Principle 4: Shame and guilt each are associated with particular action tendencies, which make sense given the appreciations and functions they involve. Shame is associated with avoidance and withdrawal Guilt, on the other hand, is associated with outward movement, aimed at reparation for a wrongdoing. Principle 5: Shame and guilt aid in the development of a sense of self. Shame and guilt experiences contribute in important ways to the child's development of a sense of self. Such experiences highlight the importance and consequences of a child's behavior, including successes and failures. As a result, they highlight the kind of behaviors the child can (or cannot) and does (or does not) do. In addition, such experiences highlight how others view the child and his or her behavior, which also helps the child to learn how to evaluate himself or herself. Principle 6: Cognitive understandings do not determine the emergence of shame and guilt. Broad cognitive understandings, such as of "the categorical self," standards and rules for behavior, or personal responsibility for behavior are neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of guilt nor shame. Such understandings do, however, contribute to the nature of shame and guilt experiences as well as the conditions under which these emotions can occur. Principle 7: Socialization is crucial to the development of shame and guilt. Socialization experiences play a major role in the development of shame and guilt. Socialization causes the child to care about the opinions of others, making the child want to follow social standards. It teaches the child about rules and standards for behavior, and endows particular standards with significance. All of these are central to the development of shame and guilt.
Article
Reviews the major controversy concerning psychobiological universality of differential emotion patterning vs cultural relativity of emotional experience. Data from a series of cross-cultural questionnaire studies in 37 countries on 5 continents are reported and used to evaluate the respective claims of the proponents in the debate. Results show highly significant main effects and strong effect sizes for the response differences across 7 major emotions (joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt). Profiles of cross-culturally stable differences among the emotions with respect to subjective feeling, physiological symptoms, and expressive behavior are also reported. The empirical evidence is interpreted as supporting theories that postulate both a high degree of universality of differential emotion patterning and important cultural differences in emotion elicitation, regulation, symbolic representation, and social sharing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)