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... It should be noted that basic research on debiasing suggests that once a bias is established, it can be very persistent (Epley, 2004). This is attested to by research on debiasing, that is, research on how to reduce the biasing effects of anchors. ...
... This is attested to by research on debiasing, that is, research on how to reduce the biasing effects of anchors. This research has shown that many methods that reduce the detrimental effects of other biases seem ineffective at reducing anchoring effects (Epley, 2004). Ineffective debiasing methods for anchors include explicit warnings, domain expertise, and incentives to increase effortful thought (Wilson et al., 1996;Wright & Anderson, 1989;Epley & Gilovich, 2006). ...
We framed crime victims as lucky, through downward counterfactual comparisons, and tested this “luck framing” influence on observers’ judgments of the victims. Victims framed as lucky and aware (Experiment 1) or unaware (Experiment 3) of their luck were rated as in need of less social support than victims who were not framed as lucky. This luck framing effect generalized to victim compensation: lucky aware victims were rated as deserving of less compensation compared to unlucky victims (Experiment 2). In contrast, luck framing of victims had little influence on observers’ judgments of the severity of the sentence a perpetrator should receive (Experiment 4). Taken together, for crime victims it can be bad to be thought of as lucky.
... This is an example of inductive inference. People use inductive inference to reason about similar intuitive cognitive phenomena such as affective forecasting (D. T. Gilbert et al., 2002), judgmental anchoring (Epley, 2004), anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2007), and various social biases . The inductive inference process involves interpreting data from mental simulations, verbal reports, and behavioral observations within a known framework of accessible theories and hypotheses (Higgins, 1996). ...
Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.
... This is an example of inductive inference. People use inductive inference to reason about similar intuitive cognitive phenomena such as affective forecasting (D. T. Gilbert et al., 2002), judgmental anchoring (Epley, 2004), anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2007), and various social biases (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004a). The inductive inference process involves interpreting data from mental simulations, verbal reports, and behavioral observations within a known framework of accessible theories and hypotheses (Higgins, 1996). ...
Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett's intentional systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article reviews the evidence for a teleological default in light of Dennett’s intentional systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates, ultimately suggesting that individuals rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.
... While participants in the bonus information treatment were also told of the potential cost savings from switching, having received the $50 payment, they may have come to be strongly influenced by that amount in valuing the cost of switching; hence, discounting the true benefits of further search activity. There is much evidence of anchoring, even over goods and services that people have experience consuming (see Epley, 2004 for a review). Several studies, including a recent Government Report into the energy sector in Victoria (Thwaites et al., 2017), have noted that people are inexperienced consumers of energy; i.e., they are unfamiliar with the decision environment and that this is exacerbated by the complexity of the exercise. ...
We conduct an online randomized controlled experiment in Australia in order to examine whether government initiatives to encourage the use of energy comparison sites increase consumer search and result in lower prices. Despite significant price variations across energy retailers, our experiment indicates that while providing information about the potential gains from using the government-owned Victoria Energy Compare (VEC) website encourages participants to visit the website, it is not effective in inducing them to contact, or switch, retailers who are providing better offers. Moreover, low-income individuals who visited the VEC website due to the availability of a $50 bonus are less likely to contact retailers for a better deal in order to switch retailers, and end up paying a higher cost of per unit kWh electricity and spending more on total electricity expenditure. Our findings imply that promoting government-initiated comparison sites is not sufficient to increase competition and that providing consumers with financial incentives for using these sites in order to encourage competition and improve outcomes of the energy poor may potentially backfire.
... the pattern of responses is interesting, especially when considering the scale on which participants reported. That the scale provided was from 0 to 1000 names suggests the potential for participants' anchoring between 30-50% of the scale (Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004; see also Hertzog, Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994), perhaps taking the anchor as a hint about how to respond (Epley, 2004). Future studies can assess under what conditions younger and older adults' metacognitive awareness are affected by the scale on which they report. ...
People see themselves as better than average in many domains, from leadership skills to driving ability. However, many people-especially older adults-struggle to remember others' names, and many of us are aware of this struggle. Our beliefs about our memory for names may be different from other information; perhaps forgetting names is particularly salient. We asked younger and older adults to rate themselves compared with others their age on several socially desirable traits (e.g., honesty); their overall memory ability; and their specific ability to remember scientific terms, locations, and people's names. Participants demonstrated a better-than-average (BTA) effect in their ratings of most items except their ability to remember names, which both groups rated as approximately the same as others their age. Older adults' ratings of this ability were related to a measure of the social consequences of forgetting another's name, but younger adults' ratings were not. The BTA effect is present in many judgments for both younger and older adults, but people may be more attuned to memory failures when those failures involve social consequences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
Subjective expectation data on education has been increasingly used by social scientists to better understand current investments in human capital. Despite its recognised value by scholars, there is little evidence about how the elicitation of such data might be sensitive to questionnaire design. Using a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design, we analyse how sensitive the elicitation of subjective expectation data on educational outcomes is to anchors. Our study provides causal evidence on whether collecting data on parental education before the elicitation of parental expectations on their children’s educational outcomes anchors the elicitation of the latter; and whether parental expectations on their older offsprings anchors their expectations on their younger children. We find that mothers (main respondents) who have been exposed to the anchored treatments report more pessimistic parental expectations. When splitting our sample into low and high educated mothers, we find that low educated mothers who have been allocated to anchored treatments are more likely to report lower levels of education than those in the non-anchored treatment. Anchored treatments also increase non-response in both high and low educated mothers, however, the effect is larger on the former. When assessing the accuracy of expectations to predict educational outcomes, we observe that anchored expectations have higher predictive power. Our findings inform to what extent the collection of subjective expectations data is subject to anchoring and which type of elicitation (anchored or non-anchored) should be considered according to the main purpose of the elicitation (i.e., item response vs prediction).
This study aims to understand the use of the anchoring effect as a manipulation tool and irrationality of consumers in stores. In terms of methodological purpose, this study, designed with the perspective of the realist approach of postmodern science, aims to make not only theoretical but also practical contribution to merchandising.
In this study using an experimental method, participants were asked to charge the same products. The products for which the participants are priced consist of 5 clothes, the first of them is higher priced and quality; following four products are low-priced and poor quality clothing. While only the first product had a price tag in the experimental group, all products in the control group were presented without a price tag.
The experimental group exposed to anchoring charged 390.31% higher –ready to pay- prices for the same products compared to the control group. Moreover, they charged an average of 192.13 TL for products with a market price of 10-20 TL. While these findings show that consumers who are exposed to manipulative anchoring can be more irrational, at the same time, the thinking time of the participants while determining prices was measured and secondary inferences were made accordingly. In this context, while finding a negative correlation between the price cchahrged to the products and the thinking time, using an anchor as a manipulation tool reduces the thinking times. These findings show that anchoring can be used as a manipulation tool.
While this study is one of the pioneering studies that uses anchoring theory intensively in the field of merchandising, it is a special study in terms of measuring the use of anchors as a manipulation tool.
On the other hand, the research, which is applied by an experimental method, carries the harmony of theory-practice and takes into account the time variable, and carries originality and importance in the field of merchandising.
Keywords: Merchandising, Anchoring Theory, Anchors, Consumer Behaviours, Manipulating Consumers, Manipulations, Pricing, Store Design.
Bu çalışma bir manipülasyon aracı olarak çıpalama etkisinin mağazalarda kullanımını ve tüketicilerin irrasyonalitesini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Yöntemsel olarak ise Postmodern bilimin Realist Yaklaşım’ı çerçevesinde tasarlanan çalışmada merchandising alanına sadece teorik değil, pratik bir katkı yapmak da amaçlanmıştır.
Deneysel bir yöntem kullanan araştırmada katılımcılardan ürünlere fiyat biçmesi istenmiştir. Fiyatlanan ürünler beş kıyafetten oluşmaktadır. Bunlardan ilk sırada yer alan ürün yüksek fiyat ve kaliteye sahipken sonraki ürünler düşük fiyat ve kaliteli ürünlerden oluşmaktadır. Deney grubunda ilk ürünün fiyat etiketi varken diğerlerinde fiyat etiketi bulunmamaktadır. Kontrol grubunda ise hiçbir üründe fiyat etiketi bulunmamaktadır.
Çıpalamaya maruz kalan deney grubu aynı ürünlere deney grubuna gore %390,31 daha yüksek bir ödemeye hazır oldukları fiyatı biçmişlerdir. Buna ek olarak piyasa fiyatı 10-20 TL arasında değişen düşük kaliteli ürünlere de ortalama 192,13 TL fiyat biçmişlerdir. Bu bulgular bir çıpalama aracı olarak kullanılan fiyat etiketinin tüketicileri daha irrasyonel olmaya yönelttiği tespit edilirken katılımcıların ürünlere fiyat biçmek için kullandıkları süreler de ölçülmüş ve buna bağlı olarak tali bulgular üzerinden tartışma yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda ürünlere biçilen fiyat ile düşünme süreleri arasında negatif korelasyon tespit edilirken çıpanın bir manipülasyon aracı olarak kullanılması düşünme sürelerini düşürmektedir. Bu bulgular çıpalamanın bir manipülasyon aracı olarak kullanılabildiğini göstermektedir.
Bu çalışma, merchandising alanında Çıpalama Teorisini yoğun bir şekilde kullanan öncü çalışmalardan biri iken, çıpaların manipülasyon aracı olarak kullanımının ölçülmesi açısından da özel bir çalışmadır. Öte yandan deneysel bir yöntem uygulanan araştırma teori-pratik uyumunu taşımakla birlikte süre değişkenini de dikkate almasıyla merchandising alanında özgünlük ve önem taşımaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Merchandising, Çıpalama Teorisi, Çıpalama, Tüketici Davranışları, Manipülasyon, Tüketici Manipülasyonu, Fiyatlandırma, Mağaza Tasarımı
While human-centered system design has actively sought to reduce cognitive biases in decision-making, a gap exists on the distinct role of media features in decision-support systems (DSS). Intuitively, we may presume that DSS interactivity and revisability remedy such biases. Yet, experiments reported herein reveal that combining the two features may conversely aggravate such bias. These features have been studied as distinct factors moderating bias in decision-criteria rating tasks in two experiments (sample sizes: n1 =96 for first; for second with criteria vividness controlled, n2=429). Such study emanates from a novel view of DSS as persuasive communication media. Thus, a unique adaptation of Media Synchronicity Theory to a computer–human communication context ensues. This promotes the isolated study of interactivity and revisability, alongside their interaction. Hence, the study finds statistically significant bias reductions for revisability treatments without interactive feedback. Such real-time automatic feedback, surprisingly, makes no impact in the majority of cases. Vividness controlled, it is still revisability-only cases indicating any reduction in possible order effects bias (despite extra effort required). Thus, a fresh case is made to evaluate interactivity and revisability separately in DSS media, with empirical evidence that – together – they could be ‘doing more harm than good’.
Results of four studies support the notion that anchoring effects are mediated by mechanisms of hypothesis-consistent testing and semantic priming. According to the suggested Selective Accessibility Model, judges use a hypothesis-consistent test strategy to solve a comparative anchoring task. Applying this strategy selectively increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge which is then used to generate the subsequent absolute judgment. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that absolute estimates depend on the hypothesis implied in the comparative task, suggesting that a hypothesis-testing strategy is used to solve this task. Study 3 shows that limiting the amount of knowledge generated for the comparative task retards absolute judgments. This suggests that knowledge rendered easily accessible in the comparative judgment is used for the subsequent absolute judgment. Finally, Study 4 suggests that self-generation of knowledge contributes to the robustness of the effect, thus resolving the seeming inconsistency that anchoring effects are at the same time remarkably robust and mediated by typically fragile semantic priming mechanisms.
Anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate to a previously considered standard—have proved to be remarkably robust. Results of two studies, however, demonstrate that anchoring can be reduced by applying a consider-the-opposite strategy. Based on the Selective Accessibility Model, which assumes that anchoring is mediated by the selectively increased accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge, the authors hypothesized that increasing the accessibility of anchor-inconsistent knowledge mitigates the effect. Considering the opposite (i.e., generating reasons why an anchor is inappropriate) fulfills this objective and consequently proves to be a successful corrective strategy. In a real-world setting using experts as participants, Study 1 dem-onstrated that listing arguments that speak against a provided anchor value reduces the effect. Study 2 further revealed that the effects of anchoring and considering the opposite are additive.
Research on judgmental anchoring - the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard - has demonstrated that implausible anchors pro- duce large effects. We propose an insufficient adjustment plus selective accessibil- ity account for these effects. Specifically, judges may adjust from an implausible anchor until a plausible value for the target is reached and may then test the hypoth- esis that the target's extension is similar to this value. If this is indeed the case, then differentially extreme implausible anchors should produce similar absolute esti- mates, because adjustment from any implausible anchor should terminate at the same value. Results of two studies are consistent with this prediction. They show that implausible anchors that differ extremely produce similar absolute estimates. The implications of these findings for alternative models of anchoring are dis- cussed. Human judgment under uncertainty is often influenced by salient judgmental anchors. In what is probably the best known demonstra- tion of such anchoring effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), partici- pants first received a comparative judgment task in which they were asked whether the percentage of African nations in the UN is higher or lower than an arbitrary number (the anchor) that had been deter- mined by spinning a wheel of fortune (i.e., 65% or 10%). In the subse- quent absolute judgment task, participants were asked to give their
It was hypothesized that overt movement can either augment or inhibit certain cognitive activities depending on whether the movement has been positively associated with or negatively associated with that cognitive activity in the past. Seventy-two subjects who believed that they were testing headphone sets engaged in either vertical, horizontal, or no-instructed head movements while listening to a simulated radio broadcast. Subjects in the vertical headmovement conditions agreed with the editorial content of the radio broadcast more than did those in the horizontal head-movement conditions. This effect was true for both counterattitudinal and proattitudinal editorial content. A surreptitious behavioral measure indicated that vertical movements in the counterattitudinal message condition and horizontal movements in the proattitudinal message condition were more difficult than vertical movement in the proattitudinal message condition or horizontal movement in the counterattitudinal message condition. The processes involved are compared with context learning wherein: (1) the generation of counterarguments is learned in the context of horizontal head movement with poor transfer to vertical head movement; and (2) the generation of agreement responses is learned in the context of vertical head movement with poor transfer to horizontal head movement.
Ss asked to generate their own hypotheses expressed less confidence that they were true than did other Ss who were presented with the same hypotheses for evaluation. This finding holds across domains varying from prediction and social inference to general knowledge questions. Furthermore, Ss who generated their own hypotheses appeared to be more sensitive to their accuracy than were Ss who evaluated the hypotheses. The results are interpreted as evidence that the hypothesis generation task leads Ss to consider more alternative hypotheses than Ss who are asked to evaluate a prespecified hypothesis. This interpretation is supported by experiments demonstrating that the difference between generation and evaluation disappears if a closed set of alternatives is specified or if a delay is inserted between hypothesis generation and confidence assessment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Effects of extreme versus moderate numerical anchors are investigated. Similar to past results in attitude change, three separate data collections show that extreme anchors can have less influence on judgments than more moderate anchors. Though difficult to account for using traditional “anchor-and-adjust” and recent “selective accessibility” views, the findings are consistent with theories of attitude change. Implications of an attitude-change view of numerical anchoring are discussed.