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Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship
Abstract
At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo-American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy-making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness.
... Nevertheless, the US-UK relationship was tested with trade disputes, Trump's critiques about the UK's response to terrorism and PM May's handling of Brexit, and his comments on intra-party Conservative leadership struggles (BBC News 2018; Sabbagh 2018). The faithful ally role is also contested domestically in the UK, given the high political price the UK pays for sustaining it, not least in terms of-at times unpopular-diplomatic and military support for the United States (Porter 2010). ...
The international roles states play in world politics are bound up with the ways in which sovereignty is constructed within the international system. While scholarship on sovereignty has recognized its social construction, and role research emphasizes social interactions as shaping roles and role behaviors, little work has explored the relationship between sovereignty and roles. Linking roles and sovereignty offers a distinct perspective on the social construction of sovereignty, providing a broad conception of socialization, emphasizing agency, and bridging domestic politics and international relations. We develop the concept of a “sovereignty–role nexus” through an examination of Brexit, revealing, through processes of role contestation and role socialization, multiple and competing constructions of the nature and value of sovereignty. While Brexit is unique, we suggest that these dynamics will affect other cases where states face role changes linked to sovereignty concerns.
This article introduces the concept of political myth to foreign policy analysis. It explains how myth can influence the construction of foreign policy events and decisions and creates a new lens that analysts can use to study this. To do that, this article draws upon conceptual literature on political myth to explain what myth is and how it shapes discursive constructions of the world. Adopting an interpretivist approach, it then uses the concept as a lens to analyze the impact that the Blair Poodle myth has had on the construction of the US–UK “special relationship” from 2002 to 2022 and considers how this has influenced the diplomatic behavior of five UK prime ministers. It finds that the myth has been integral to negative constructions of the “special relationship” over the past twenty years and has inspired political action, including protests, resignations, and more formal diplomatic engagement with the United States.
When Operation Banner was launched in 1969 civil war threatened to break out in Northern Ireland and spread over the Irish Sea. Uncivil War reveals the full story of how the British army acted to save Great Britain from disaster during the most violent phase of the Troubles but, in so doing, condemned the people of Northern Ireland to protracted, grinding conflict. Huw Bennett shows how the army's ambivalent response to loyalist violence undermined the prospects for peace and heightened Catholic distrust in the state. British strategy consistently underestimated community defence as a reason for people joining or supporting the IRA whilst senior commanders allowed the army to turn in on itself, hardening soldiers to the suffering of ordinary people. By 1975 military strategists considered the conflict unresolvable: the army could not convince Catholics or Protestants that it was there to protect them and settled instead for an unending war.
The close bonds of cooperation between the US and UK are highly institutionalised and are exemplified across a range of closely aligned areas of mutual interests. These are namely intelligence, nuclear and military collaboration. The Anglo-American Special Relationship, however, has been severely strained by events over the last seventy years. This article will examine the validity of any special relationship that may exist between the US and UK. In doing so it will reveal how State Department-led intervention in Northern Ireland between 2003 and 2007 strained the workings of this alliance even as it enjoyed a resurgence under George W. Bush and Tony Blair during the Global War on Terror. It will also establish how the unusual organisational framework and decision-making process at the State Department, vis-à-vis Northern Ireland, exacerbated transatlantic relations. The autonomous freedom to direct US foreign policy in the region brought the George W. Bush administration's Northern Ireland special envoys into direct diplomatic conflict with the most senior actors inside the British government. This article will expand on the extent of this fall-out and provide original first-hand accounts on how diplomatic relations between these old allies became so fraught.
On completion in 1956, the design of the Cambridge American Military Cemetery at Madingley intentionally downplayed individual sacrifice in favour of an emphasis on government-led collective endeavour to uphold national ideals. The design commemorated the defeat of the Axis but in the Cold War also reaffirmed these ideals to allies and ideological enemies alike. Yet from the beginning, the meaning of Madingley has been fluid, negotiated and transcendent of the original fixed design. This article explores the impact of major social and cultural change, the rhetorical activity of politicians, institutional imperatives and the desires of local host communities on the meaning of this major node of Anglo-American commemorative culture. In doing so, it traces the growth of an emphasis on individual service and sacrifice that has replaced the original focus on government-led national enterprise with a more portable meaning able to support the desires of different commemorative constituencies. American politicians have used this to garner support for their policies, institutions have used it as a survival strategy and the host nation has used it as a comforting mask to obscure awkward disparities in national power. Although the commemorative meaning of the site has changed radically, it remains a window on the wider conservative dynamics of Anglo-American commemorative culture.
Why do states join wartime coalitions despite the absence of a salient threat or strong ties to the coalition leader? We argue states make unexpectedly high contributions to coalition warfare as a costly signal of their desire for a stronger relationship with the coalition leader. Conventional theories insufficiently explain why states without immediate security interests or strong ties to the lead state over-contribute relative to their capacity. Using newly compiled data on troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), we find states are most likely to contribute a higher share of their armed forces when their relationship with the US has unrealized alliance potential. States with under-performing alignments leave substantial room for subsequent gains to be had from signaling their commitment to the leading coalition actor. Our finding helps explain why states risk the costs of war—casualties and domestic accountability—by participating in coalition warfare.
The Anglo-American military relationship is a vital yet neglected area of study. This article argues that the British military have actively cultivated a relationship with the U.S. military that has contributed to the longevity of the broader so-called “Special Relationship,” even in the Trump era. The article contends that the complexities of the military relationship can best be captured by the theoretical lens provided by Lowndes and Roberts that combines different strands of institutionalism to focus on rules, practices, and narratives. The intense linkages between the United States and United Kingdom have become routinized, enabling them to adapt their peacetime cooperation to conflicts, and thereby address post-Cold War security challenges. The article draws upon semi-structured interviews with senior British military officers as well as policy documents to explore how these patterns of collaboration have become ingrained in patterns of both thinking and behavior.
Ahead of the Brexit vote, numerous commentators speculated about the negative impact this would have on the US–UK ‘special relationship’, projecting a decline in influence if Britain left the EU. In the aftermath of the vote, and particularly with the election of Donald Trump, the context for discussing security relations between the two countries has shifted considerably due to the fallout both events have had for the two governments, both internally and externally. This chapter will examine this shift in perspective by focusing on three topics. Firstly, the pre-Brexit assumptions of commentators on the ‘special relationship’ and US and UK foreign policy experts more generally will be discussed. Secondly, the views of President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May with respect to the relationship will be examined, as well as their personal interactions and relevant policy priorities since each took office. Investigation of this topic will also seek to shed light on the commentary of ‘special relationship watchers’ during this period. Finally, the current state of the more long-standing bureaucratic relationships, especially in the defence and intelligence fields, will be highlighted and contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the leadership.
Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain’s participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.
This chapter explores influence of the distribution of power on the persistence of the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR). The first section measures the distribution of both hard power and soft power between the UK and the USA in the post-Cold War era. Based on the measurement of hard power and soft power of these two countries, this chapter then proposes that the asymmetrical distribution of power of the UK and the USA largely exerts positive influence on the persistence of the AASR in the post-Cold War era. It argues that mutual reciprocity and “the Americans benignly lead and British optionally follow” behaviour model contribute to the persistence of the AASR in the post-Cold War era.
After analysing merits and drawbacks of the traditional categorisation of different schools, the first section of this chapter puts forward an updated version of categorisation of different schools. In comparison to the traditional categorisations, this new categorisation can better represent nuanced arguments of scholars of Anglo-American relations. The second section explains why it is appropriate and imperative to construct a new theory of alliance persistence and to what extent it has more explanatory power than explanations other scholars have offered in helping unpack the puzzle that the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR) has persisted to date. The third section puts emphasis on explaining the key variables of this new theory of alliance persistence and how they relate to the persistence of the AASR.
United States and United Kingdom have based their relations on common cultural and historical links and, as Winston Churchill first articulated the notion of a ‘special relationship’, both countries share traditions, values, interests, and institutions of national and international nature. Although the basic elements were important in formulation of the special relationship, there have been a lot of disagreements between the two countries. The aim of this paper is to analyze the ups and downs of the ‘special relationship. There are arguments that this relationship is not so special and many say that it is in jeopardy and this relationship has been the subject of much mockery and criticism, as UK power and capacity has diminished and the U.S. has become more dominant, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This paper argues that, in spite of what analysts maintain, this ‘special relationship’ should continue, because America and Britain need each other. This paper is written in the historical comparative method aiming at giving a general overview of this relationship. Different from other countries in the world, with which America is looking for other special relationships, Britain has the same commitment to peace, freedom and democracy, and it is willing to fight and stand for these values. America needs companions in its mission of the world leadership, as the only superpower and Britain has a unique role in Europe, being tied to the U.S. by conviction, but also belonging to Europe by necessity.
DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2016.v5n3p45
Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.
The makers of British strategy faced a hard world. Britain’s resources were stretched to the limit. Its armed forces struggled to wage multiple minor wars against guerrillas on far-away continents. Its recent war had featured atrocities against civilians, spurring an outcry from liberal opinion at home and a renewed debate about the purpose of Britain in the world. At home, a society wanting more social welfare made increasing demands on the coffers of the state. Abroad, a power shift was underway. The rise of new giants challenged the status quo, splitting attention and resources between different military capabilities. How should British forces be configured, given the next war could be against guerrillas on the frontiers of empire, or against the conventional forces of nation-states? It had rarely seemed so difficult to balance depleting resources with far-flung commitments. Projecting power at long range had proved to be exhausting and demoralizing. Some prophets argued that military force — even state power itself — was losing its utility, that the future was enlightened dialogue and trade in a more cosmopolitan and tight-knit global village, or that new technologies and costs would make major wars too expensive, too horrific and too futile to be thinkable. These interlocking problems triggered formal enquiries and the attempt to institutionalize strategy in the shape of a formal advisory forum.
Britain’s participation in the Iraq war was beset by controversy before the invasion even began. Many observers expected disaster, and seemed vindicated as the country fell into a sprawling insurgency.1 Mistakes made early in the occupation appeared to have sparked an unstoppable descent into vast destruction. Then a radical decision by President Bush, in January 2007, altered this trajectory.2 By August 2006, civilian fatalities in Iraq averaged over 1,500 per month, alongside almost 100 American military dead. Yet by June 2008, civilian fatalities per month were down to around 200, and American military killed under a dozen.3 The surge of 30,000 soldiers, matched by changed tactics, doctrine, and Sunni politics, showed defeat was not inevitable. One of Britain’s main objectives in entering the war had been to cement Anglo-American relations. Poor military performance in Iraq is widely perceived to have damaged these relations.4 This chapter asks why the British army failed to emulate its American allies in conducting a successful counter-insurgency (COIN) in Iraq.
The 9/11 attacks were the most devastating terrorist attacks in history. The death toll of 2977 people, old, young, women, men, from all walks of life, including over 400 firefighters and other emergency workers, and the spectacle of some 200 people choosing to jump to their deaths rather than die in the flames, were a tremendous blow. Nevertheless, despite its enormity, it was still a terrorist attack — a remarkably successful attack, but of no real strategic importance. Despite the number of fatalities (more than were inflicted at Pearl Harbor, where 2403, mainly servicemen, were killed), it was more a blow to American prestige and self-regard than it was a serious threat to US interests and power. The United States was by far the world’s most powerful country before the attacks and it remained by far the most powerful country after them. Indeed, 9/11 did not affect the strategic position of the United States at all. It was the ill-judged nature of the US response that did that. Al-Qaeda was a terrorist threat, at best a few hundred strong, certainly capable of symbolic, indeed spectacular, attacks, but it could not at any stretch of the imagination be seriously considered as a military threat. Instead of responding to the attacks as a terrorist threat, however, the Bush administration chose to use them as a way of reasserting US power in the Middle East, as an opportunity to move against those states — Iraq, Iran and Syria — that were seen as obstacles to US domination of the region.
What does feminism have to offer the debate on the British approach to counterinsurgency? We argue that gender is a valuable analytical tool that can shed light on why some policies and strategies are privileged over others, particularly in the military field where ideas of manliness and soldiering have long been mutually reinforcing. In analysing the British approach to counterinsurgency, we argue firstly that both ‘enemy-centric’ and ‘population-centric’ strategies are in tension, and secondly that it is an association between masculinity and combat that accounts for the dominance of the former. The enemy-centric approach emphasises taking the initiative and using force effectively to defeat the insurgents. It emphasises, in other words, traits and practices associated with masculinity: action, strength, decisiveness. Those advocating a more population-centred approach, emphasising the importance of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population, risk appearing soft, indecisive and weak, attributes associated with socially-constructed femininity. Whilst we do find evidence of an alternative military masculinity associated with the population-centric approach, which privileges ideas of restraint, control, intelligence and compassion, it is a model of masculinity which is subordinate and marginalised.
'From Rivalry to Partnership' is the first to study a potentially valuable way forward in tackling the challenges of Africa, namely bilateral partnerships. The book evaluates the significance and strength of the emerging Anglo-French partnership and explores how far this and other forms of 'bilateral' and 'bi-multi' cooperation might serve as a valuable alternative or complement to traditional unilateral and multilateral approaches in Africa. Practitioners, established academic experts as well emerging scholars in the field bring to bear a sophisticated synthesis of neoclassical realism and 'discursive institutionalism' and findings from over 100 research interviews to explore how joint approaches and bilateral partnerships have been used to address the challenges of Africa. In developing this argument, the editors explore: * Anglo-French cooperation in Africa * other bilateral partnerships in Africa, notably the Nordic states and the US * the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership * the China-Africa partnership and its implications for the EU-Africa partnership and for leading European states Written in a clear and accessible style, 'From Rivalry to Partnership' offers a much needed fresh insight into whether and how bilateral partnerships make a real difference to people's lives on the African continent.'
Ever since, Goldman Sachs coined the term BRICS academics, and policy makers have struggled to come to terms with the effects and the impact of rising powers on world politics. The German government has tried to stay abreast of the changing global power dynamics by entering the so-called strategic partnerships with China and India, as well as aiming for a more systematic approach towards rising powers as laid out in the ‘Gestaltungsmaechtekonzept’ (transformative powers concept) published under the Merkel government in 2012. Against this background, this article inquires on the depth and scope of Germany’s strategic partnerships towards Asia’s rising powers. It finds that despite new institutional developments such as intergovernmental consultations at ministerial level, the strategic partnerships with Delhi and Berlin are still lacking in substance due to a discrepancy of policy preferences and interests in a variety of policy fields.
At the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British government in the metropole and the British-led Indian government found themselves at odds in their interpretation of the political situation in Afghanistan, leading them to pursue different policies towards this difficult interlocutor. Heather Campbell analyses the primary sources documenting the difficulties of this decision-making process, and suggests that a sound knowledge of history may be a useful foundation for policy-makers seeking to shape the future of the UK's relationship with Afghanistan.
Obama's election in 2008 as the United States’ first self-styled Pacific President drew a hearty round of ‘end of the affair’ editorials about Anglo-American relations. His first term was littered with ‘snubgates’, serious irritations in policy areas regarded as being core to the special relationship, and indications of an accelerating US departure from Europe with his premier foreign-policy strategy declared to be a pivot to Asia. His return for a second term in 2013 augers a continuation of first-term adjustments in US foreign policy and greater domestic focus given a divided Congress and a bitterly split and war-weary United States with domestic priorities to the fore. Doomsayers - or so-called terminalists - have been repeatedly gainsaid by the Lazarus-like quality of the relationship in the past but can the Anglo-American special relationship survive in the Obama environment? This article suggests it can and sets out the author's rather unfashionable argument in four parts: the weight of history; the canons of international-relations theory; the importance of considering interest and sentiment in explaining the special relationship's resilience; and a relativist argument that suggests the United States still really does have no better ally than the United Kingdom.
Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.
As the tenth anniversary of the US-UK invasion of Iraq approaches, and with the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry yet to be published, public debate is likely to focus once again on the events surrounding the political decision to go to war. However, many argue that this will overshadow the most important lessons for the UK: those that can be drawn from the conduct of military operations in southeastern Iraq, in the period between 2003 and 2007. Geraint Hughes offers a timely reminder why Operation Telic must not be forgotten, surveying the British experience of the conflict in Iraq at the political, strategic and military levels.
Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas non frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn. [Further info / access via: http://www.asghost.co.uk/links/pages/about.htm#2012 ]
In March 2010 the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) recommended that the appellation ‘special relationship’ no longer be used to describe Anglo-American relations. This article examines and extrapolates upon the report as a means of gaining insights into the contemporary special relationship. It argues that the period 2008–2010 was unusual in Anglo-American relations insofar as governments on both sides of the Atlantic signalled a cooling of the special relationship. However, it is argued that this shift was in high-level ‘mood music’ as political distance was sought from the Bush–Blair years rather than in the substance of Anglo-American relations or in British commitment to the special relationship. Of perhaps more long-term significance is the apparent mismatch between the ‘power and interest’ and the ‘sentimental myth’ dimensions of the special relationship. The FAC Report hinted at this in terms of expectation management of what the contemporary Anglo-American relationship could deliver to Britain. However, the gap between these two dimensions of the special relationship is potentially highly significant and though British governments clearly recognise this they remain unwilling to develop a newly modulated communicative discourse designed to better align them. Potential political vulnerability, it seems, is preferred to challenging a sentimental myth of Anglo-American relations that has over time become culturally embedded.
This article explores the maritime condition of the UK, examining what strategic conditions govern the future choices regarding the naval force structures the nation may adopt. One of the fundamental aspects of that strategic environment is the UK's relationship with the USA. The question of what sort of naval capability best meets the UK need to contribute to a credible, global, Anglo-American maritime power structure is discussed, focusing on the future role of the UK carrier force.
This article introduces this special issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies by discussing the British model of counter-insurgency. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer associated the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ with Britain's apparently successful counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948–60). The phrase ‘hearts and minds’ is generally associated with a less coercive approach to counter-insurgency which emphasises the importance of using ‘minimum force’ in order to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. This article argues that the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ does not accurately describe Britain's highly coercive campaign in Malaya. The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights. Britain's counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland did not deploy the same levels of coercion that were used in Malaya but, nevertheless, considerable levels of coercion were used which did not succeed in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local people. The various interpretations of ‘hearts and minds’ leads to confusion about what degree of consent should be expected from the people and the implication of this for the use of force. While the term ‘hearts and minds’ does not accurately represent Britain's experience of counter-insurgency in the retreat from Empire; in the post-Cold War period the British military has been generally more ‘political’ and less coercive in its approach to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq than the more conventional US approach to counter-insurgency. The British approach to counter-insurgency has influenced the recent development of US counter-insurgency doctrine but there are still considerable differences in the British and US approach to counter-insurgency which has led to severe tensions in the relationship between these allies. The ‘hearts and minds’ description of the British approach to counter-insurgency may be useful in public relations terms but it undermines the theory as a guide to operations because it can be interpreted in such divergent ways. The future may be to more carefully and practically specify in what contexts and circumstances the deployment of force is legitimate.
The Labour government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) marked the end of almost twenty years during which Labour had been little more than a bystander in British defence policy-making. The ‘foreign policy-led’ SDR marked an impressive and authoritative debut, emulated by other national governments. Ten years later, however, the SDR is a fading memory. British defence is out of balance and facing immense stress, and calls are mounting for a new strategic defence review. This article examines the difficult choices which a defence review would have to make. But a defence review also requires the governmental machinery with which to analyse and understand defence, and with which those difficult choices can be made. The article argues that this machinery is wearing out. Defence policy, planning and analysis in the United Kingdom have reached a state of organizational, bureaucratic and intellectual decay which may be irrecoverable.
Apoptosis occurs through precise cellular pathways, whereas necrosis is generally thought of as a nonspecific cellular response to external damage. However, identification of a chemical inhibitor of necrotic events suggests that specific molecular pathways can also trigger necrosis.
As Tony Blair gets lambasted for backing the Iraq war, it is worth noting that the current strain in U.S.-British relations is hardly the first induced by war. Twenty-four years ago, London was dismayed by Washington's lack of support during the Falklands War-an episode that shows both how complex the allies' relationship has been during times of crisis and how resilient it can be afterward.
This article explores UK involvement in the war in Iraq since the invasion of 2003. It explores three different dimensions of UK involvement: British control over the four southern governorates, the role of UK policy-makers and advisors in Green Zone politics, and British policies on the international stage in support of their stance in and towards Iraq. It does so by placing British foreign policy under the Blair government in the context of the overall objective of serving as a transatlantic bridge, a position that is central to how British foreign policy-makers operate but which has become increasingly incoherent in light of the severe differences between the United States and the major continental European states over the invasion of Iraq. The effect of British involvement, however, has not been neutralized by this incoherence; in fact, in crucial dimensions, it has added to the process of Iraq's fragmentation.
One of the least expected but most significant events of recent years is that which led to a profound crisis in the transatlantic relationship. The argument advanced here is that the split between a number of European states and the United States of America not only casts doubt on the idea of the ‘West’ but also brings into question various liberal theories of international politics that suggest that the two regions are so bound together by ideology, interest and institutions that a serious disagreement between them was, and presumably remains, unlikely. This it is suggested both fails to explain the original rift and underestimates the very profound differences that continue to divide the US and Europe. A more complex and abrasive kind of relationship is in the making. Unfortunately, those who have thus far tended to shape the debate about the transatlantic relationship in general, and indeed the extent of US hegemony in particular, either seem historically unable or theoretically unwilling to grasp the extent of change now occurring in one of the most important regions in the international system.
This article argues that the British government's deliberate exclusion of international law from colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army to suppress opponents with little restraint. The oft-assumed national inhibitor, the principle of ‘minimum force’, was actually widely permissive. As a result exemplary force was employed to coerce the Kikuyu civilian population in Kenya into supporting the government rather than the insurgents. Apparently random acts were thus strategic, and emerged in three forms: beatings and torture, murders, and forced population movement. The article argues that such harsh measures were seen as necessary and effective; they were a form of indirect policy and did not arise from a disciplinary breakdown.
Britain has been chief accomplice in the ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT) from the outset. This article examines the underside of that voluntary servitude—the complicity in torture and abuse, humiliation and rendition. It asks, inter alia, what we know, and how we know, and why we should care.
Can history help the ‘war on terror’? It is a cliché that 9/11 changed the world. But the idea that the war is exceptional lacks historical perspective. Assuming a radically new threat, the Bush administration proclaimed a theology rather than a coherent strategy. It articulated the ‘war on terror’ as a utopian and unbounded quest for absolute security. It did not effectively measure costs against risks or orchestrate ends, ways and means. This led the United States into exhausting wars of attrition. A more careful dialogue with the past can address this. Containment, America's core idea during the Cold War, supplies a logic that can inform a prudent strategy. Like Soviet communism with its fatal self-contradictions, Al-Qaeda and its terror network is ultimately self-destructive without major military operations. America and its allies can contain it with more limited measures in the long term as it destroys itself. The US should show restraint, doing nothing to hinder the growing Islamic revolt against Al-Qaeda. In other words, fight small and wait.
The resignation of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister and the transition from Bush to Obama in the US mark the end of the second revival of the US–UK special relationship. The classic era of the special relationship began under the Labour government in the 1940s, though it was Winston Churchill who inspired the concept. It ended with the resignation of Harold Macmillan in 1963. Margaret Thatcher revived close personal relations with the US President as a guiding principle of UK foreign policy and Tony Blair successfully revived them again, even though the end of the Cold War had transformed the framework of transatlantic relations. Over the past 60 years US–UK relations have embedded specific security arrangements which have persisted, largely unquestioned, through the ups and downs of political relations at the top: close links between the two countries' armed forces; access to defence technology and procurement; intelligence ties through the UKUSA Agreement; a semi-independent nuclear deterrent and provision of military bases in the UK and its overseas territories. Public debate on the costs and benefits of these links has been limited; successive governments have discouraged a wider debate. The Obama administration enters office with few of the personal ties to Britain and to English culture, which have underpinned the special relationship. Earlier US administrations have approached relations with the UK from the perspective of US interests, while many British political leaders have felt—and have hoped to find in Washington—a sentimental attachment to Anglo–American partnership. British foreign policy would benefit from a reassessment of the structures of US–UK relations in terms of British interests, costs and benefits.
British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.
The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post-1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.
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