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politics of identity – ii
Will Kymlicka
Being Canadian
WHEN QUESTIONS ARE RAISED ABOUT THE NATURE OF CANADIAN
identity, they tend to focus on how ‘being Canadian’ relates to various
sub-state group identities, such as Québécois, Aboriginal, and immi-
grant groups. It is often said that there is a distinctively or uniquely
Canadian way of reconciling or accommodating these identities, as
a ‘multicultural’, ‘multination’ or ‘post-modern’ state. I think that
perceptions of Canadian uniqueness on issues of internal diversity
are much exaggerated, and I shall return to that point in the second
half of this paper. But Canadian identity, like all identities, has an
external as well as an internal dimension. Canada is situated within
certain larger regional or geopolitical contexts – for example, it is
part of the New World, part of the West, part of the global com-
munity – and each of these strongly shapes Canadian identities.
Canadian identity is continually being renegotiated not only in
relation to internal sub-group identities, but also in relation to
these external international or transnational identities.
These external dimensions of Canadian identity are, I believe,
quite important. Canadians tend to have a particular view of the role
they play in the larger world, and attach importance to how they
are perceived by other countries. Indeed, concerns about Canada’s
status in the world often affect the way the internal dimensions of
Canadian identity are negotiated. In this article, therefore, I shall
start by examining the external dimensions of Canadian identity,
before turning to the more familiar debates about internal diversity.
People have political identities at various levels from the local to
the global. In one sense, ‘being Canadian’ is just one identity within
this larger set of identities. Yet, for most people, being Canadian has
implications for these other identities. Part of what it means to be
Canadian (or at least to be a ‘good Canadian’) is to accept certain
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
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Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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2GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
roles or responsibilities with respect to these other forms and levels
of human society. In this section, I shall discuss how ‘being Canadian’
affects three such larger identities.
Canadians as citizens of the world. One of the most powerful aspects
of Canadian identity is the belief that Canadians are good citizens of
the world. Canadians think of themselves as having played a useful
and constructive role in international affairs, as UN peacekeepers,
as ‘honest-brokers’ in various international negotiations or conflict
resolutions, and as supporters of virtually every important inter-
national legal or political initiative, such as the recent International
Criminal Court or the international convention against landmines.
It is important to emphasize that this is seen as a national char-
acter trait, part of the national identity, and as an obligation of
national citizenship. Many ‘cosmopolitan’ political theorists have
argued that people’s national identities – i.e., their identities as citi-
zens of particular nation-states – interfere with the recognition of
their obligations as ‘citizens of the world’, and that the former must
be downplayed or transcended in order to promote the latter.1Yet
the link between national identities and cosmopolitan responsibil-
ities is more complicated than that. In Canada, to be indifferent
to our obligations as citizens of the world is seen as ‘unCanadian’.2
We find the same situation in many other Western democracies.
Norway is a good example: there is nothing more characteristically
Norwegian than being active in international diplomacy and inter-
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
1Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in For Love of Country:
Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1996; Gillian Brock, ‘Liberal
Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism: Locating the Disputes’, Public Affairs Quarterly,
16:4, 2002, pp. 307–27.
2Cosmopolitans argue that it is important for people to think of themselves as
‘citizens of the world’, and to feel a strong sense of obligation to all human beings,
whether or not they are our co-nationals. I agree with this. But cosmopolitans typically
assume that the most effective way to get people to fulfil their obligations to non-
nationals is to present these obligations as flowing solely from individual to individual
on the basis of our common humanity, unmediated by appeals to national identity. I
doubt this. In many cases, I think the most effective way to get people to take seriously
their international obligations is to present them as a matter of national honour and
national identity: i.e., that it is the ‘Canadian’ thing to do, and that it would cast shame
on Canada’s reputation internationally if Canadians were seen as selfish or indiffer-
ent. Many charitable organizations are well aware of this, and build appeals to national
identity into their fund-raising campaigns. They have found, through experience,
that appealing to national identity is an effective way of raising money to help non-
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national aid. Indeed, Canadians rather envy and resent the fact that
Norway has become the preferred ‘honest broker’ in places like the
Middle East or Sri Lanka. This is the sort of role that Canadians feel
that they are uniquely qualified as a country to perform.
In this sense, Canadians distinguish themselves from Americans,
who are seen as prone to isolationism, unilateralism and excessive
suspicion of international agencies like the UN or UNESCO. When
Canadians participate in international affairs, it is seen as reflecting
and reinforcing our distinctiveness as a nation from our neighbours
to the south.
Like most aspects of national identity, this idea of ‘Canadians as
good citizens of the world’ is more mythology than fact. Canada’s
contribution to foreign aid is abysmally low compared to most
Western European countries, and Canada’s negotiating position on
some international treaties – like the Kyoto climate change treaty –
is embarrassingly selfish and self-serving. And even Canada’s vaunted
contribution to peacekeeping – singled out by the UN for a special
honour – has been dramatically eroded by scandal and budget cuts.3
But national identities are matters of perception, and it is clear
that Canadians perceive themselves as good citizens of the world.4
BEING CANADIAN 3
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
nationals. People who identify strongly with their nation often want their nation to be
well-respected by others, and to be seen as a decent and honourable society. This
national vanity, if you like, can be turned into a powerful motivation for international
humanitarianism. It’s important to clarify here that this is a debate over motivation,
not philosophical justification. If we ask why these international obligations are indeed
matters of moral obligation, the answer will appeal to universal ideals of common
humanity, not to ideas of national identity or national honour. But if we ask how best
to motivate people to act upon these humanitarian obligations, the answer in some
cases, I believe, is to appeal to national identity. Strong national identities can be a
resource, not an obstacle, to motivating people to fulfil international obligations. Cos-
mopolitans also typically assume in order to ‘make room’ for ideas of being a citizen
of the world, we need to reduce the psychological room occupied by the idea of being
a citizen of a particular nation. But here again, I think that feelings of national citi-
zenship can be levered to support ideas of world citizenship, in those countries where
internationalism is seen as part of the national character or national tradition.
3Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia tortured a boy to death.
4According to a 1997 survey, 94% of Canadians agreed with the statement that
‘Canada is a world leader in working for peace and human rights around the world’.
Apparently, most people around the world agree that Canada is a world-leader in this
regard, according to the 20-country survey reported in Angus Reid Group, Canada
and the World: an International Perspective on Canada and Canadians, Angus Reid Group,
Ottawa, 1997.
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4GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Canadians also like to believe that this perception is widely shared
around the world, and that Canadians are respected and trusted
internationally.5This aspect of Canadian self-identity is reinforced in
countless ways. Teenagers are told that when they travel abroad that
they should put a Canadian flag on their backpack, to help ensure
a friendly welcome. They are also told, in passing, that they may
encounter some Americans who have put Canadian flags on their
backpacks, as a safeguard against anti-Americanism.
Advertisers often are able to capture a national identity better than
any scholarly description. A recent television ad. in Canada showed
a group of astronauts walking on a desolate planet who are suddenly
surrounded by menacing aliens pointing their guns directly at
the astronauts. The astronauts slowly turn around to point out the
Canadian flag on the pack attached to their uniforms. The aliens
then drop their guns, give the ‘thumbs-up’ signal, and embrace the
Canadian astronauts. This is almost a perfect expression of ‘being
Canadian’. Canadians would like to think that no matter where they
go, in this world or other worlds, their good reputation will proceed
them, and a Canadian flag will ensure a warm welcome.6
Similar sentiments attach to a Canadian passport. Canadians were
outraged to learn that Mossad, the Israeli secret service, uses forged
Canadian passports when on missions in other countries to kidnap
or assassinate its enemies. But I suspect that the outrage was mixed
with a degree of silent satisfaction, since part of the reason why
Mossad uses Canadian passports is that people carrying them are
more likely to be respected, trusted and helped by state officials
around the world. Indeed, I think that Canadians might have been
disappointed if Mossad had judged that some other passport was now
more respected internationally.
In all of these ways, Canadians nurture and cherish an identity
as good citizens of the world, and view their flag and passport as
internationally-recognized symbols of that goodness. And part of
what it means to be a (good) Canadian is to protect this reputation,
and to pass it on to the next generation of Canadians as a kind of
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
5For evidence that Canadians are indeed viewed around the world as ‘honest’,
‘friendly’ and ‘polite’ (but not very ‘sexy’), see Angus Reid, Canada and the World.
6It was therefore a shock to many Canadians when Canada was singled out in a
recent Al Qaeda message as a possible target for terrorist attack. This has led to a
public debate about whether Canadians travelling overseas should no longer sport the
Canadian flag.
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national heritage. One is a good Canadian nationalist by being a
good internationalist.
Canadians as part of the West. While Canadians think of themselves
as honest brokers in world affairs, mediating between East and
West, North and South, the reality is that Canada is firmly embedded
within ‘the West’ economically, politically, militarily and culturally.
Like all Western countries, Canada is a secular constitutional liberal-
democracy, with a market economy and a welfare state, and is linked
with other Western democracies through a dense set of alliances
and agreements. That this Western model of economics and politics
should be adopted is completely undisputed in Canada. Few
Canadians doubt that this model is the recipe for a successful country,
and most would applaud the adoption of this model elsewhere.
However, the reality is that Western-style liberal-democracy has not
spread that widely or quickly around the world, and there have always
been various international forces that see themselves in conflict with
Western liberal-democratic values, whether it be Nazis, communists,
tribal warlords or religious fundamentalists. Canadians do not gen-
erally talk about these conflicts in Huntingtonian terms of a ‘clash
of civilizations’, or as a matter of ‘the West versus the rest’. It would
be considered arrogant to talk openly about the superiority of
Western civilization, and entirely unacceptable to talk about the
superiority of Christianity or the white race. In part because of ideas
of being an honest broker, and in part because of internal diversity,
Canadians attempt to avoid explicit or aggressive assertions of
‘Westernness’.
However, deep down, I think most Canadians would agree that
being Canadian includes ‘being Western’, and this aspect of the
Canadian identity arises particularly in times of global crises, like
September 11th. I suspect that most Canadians believe that there
is a core set of Western countries that are more or less successful,
surrounded by countries to the east and south that are in varying
degrees corrupt, poor, repressive and unstable. Canadians might be
less likely than Americans to blame this state of affairs on develop-
ing countries themselves, and more likely to accept that the West
itself is partly responsible for creating or perpetuating these prob-
lems. However, Canadians conveniently attribute this responsibility
to either European imperialism or American multinational corpora-
tions and American foreign policy, and so tend to think of Canada
itself as relatively blameless.
BEING CANADIAN 5
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6GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Canada as part of the ‘New World’. While part of the West, Canada
strongly differentiates itself from the ‘Old World’ of Europe. Canada
has largely been built by settlers and immigrants who have left the
constraints of the old world behind, to start a new life in a new land.
Of course, Canada was not a terra nullias, and the process of colo-
nization and settlement in Canada involved many injustices to the
indigenous peoples. I shall return to that issue below. But Canadians
think of their country as a young, modern society, free from the old
hierarchies, cultural prejudices and embedded traditions of the Old
World. It is, Canadians like to think, a classless, meritocratic and
democratic society, open to newcomers and to new ideas.7
The flip-side of this self-image of Canada as a young New World
country is the acknowledgement that our society and cultural life
lack the historic depth of old-world European countries. Canadians
who travel to Europe inevitably talk about ‘the sense of history’
one gets walking in many European cities or driving through the
countryside. They also admire the artistic and cultural treasures that
abound in Europe. But Canadians also typically get frustrated with
the closed nature of European societies, where it seems one has to
have lived there for many years (if not generations) in order to figure
out how things work. Since Canadian institutions have had to make
themselves understandable to waves of immigrants over the past 150
years, the ‘rules of the game’ tend to be pretty clear and simple, and
not dependent on the sort of dense local cultural knowledge that
many European institutions seem to presuppose.
Much of this ‘new world/old world’ contrast is of course mythical.
Immigrants to Canada find much of Canadian society baffling, and
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
7For polling evidence that Canadians are indeed more open than Europeans to
change in general, see Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference:Canadian Value Change in
Cross-National Perspective, Peterborough, Broadview, 1996, pp. 97–101. Openness to
immigrants is reflected in Canada’s policy of admitting 1% of its population each year
as new immigrants – the highest per capita immigration rate in the world alongside Aus-
tralia. Surveys show that many Canadians think this is ‘too many’, and one political party
(the Canadian Alliance) has campaigned on the platform of cutting the intake to 0.5%
a year. This is often described as an ‘anti-immigration’ platform, but 0.5% is roughly
equivalent to the American level of immigration. In other words, the debate between
‘pro-immigration and ‘anti-immigration’ parties in Canada is a debate between those
who think Canada should be tied (with Australia) for first in the world in per-capita
immigration and those who think Canada should be tied (with the US) for second in
the world in per-capita immigration. Even the ‘anti-immigrant’ section of the Canadian
populace is more welcoming of immigrants than most European citizens.
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many European institutions have become more open in recent years
to accommodate the needs of immigrants and EU integration. Yet
the perception persists. Canadians cherish a self-image of a young
and open society – open to mobility, to newcomers and to new ideas
– where the weight of history is lighter and less stifling of individual
initiative or cultural diversity.
Canadians as non-Americans. So Canadians are citizens of the world,
the West, and the New World. In all three of these respects, Canadians
are like Americans. Indeed, looked at objectively, the two national
identities have much in common. And yet what defines being
Canadian, perhaps above all else, is precisely not being an American.
This contrast with America goes back to the American Revolution,
although the character of the contrast has changed dramatically over
the years. Historically, the first contrast was precisely over the revo-
lution. Despite several attempts by Americans to cajole or force the
British colonies in Canada to join the revolution against Britain, the
settlers in what is now Canada remained loyal to the Crown. And
this Loyalist streak was reinforced by the huge numbers of Loyalist
refugees from the United States who fled to Canada after losing the
War of Independence.
For much of Canadian history, therefore, it has been common
to distinguish a ‘deferential’ and ‘communitarian/conservative’
Canadian identity from a ‘revolutionary’ and ‘liberal/individualist’
American identity. This contrast persisted perhaps even up to the
Second World War. Some scholars argue that it persists to this day.8
In fact, however, the liberal/conservative positions have largely
been reversed. Surveys suggest that Americans are more conservative
and deferential to authority on many issues, such as gay rights,
the rights of prisoners, racial intermarriage, and gender equality.9
BEING CANADIAN 7
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
8Seymour Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States
and Canada, Ottawa C. D. Howe Institute, 1990.
9See Nevitte’s discussion of several of these examples in The Decline of Deference,
including evidence that Canadians are less deferential to authority than Americans
(p. 79); more permissive of political protest (p. 96); more open to and welcoming of
change (p. 97); more tolerant of homosexuality and divorce (p. 217), and more egal-
itarian regarding gender relations (p. 248). For example, Americans are more than
twice as likely as Canadians to believe that ‘the father must be the master in his own
house’ (44% vs 19%), and the difference has been growing (Michael Adams, Better
Happy than Rich?Canadians,Money and the Meaning of Life, Toronto, Penguin, 2000,
pp. 25–7.
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8GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Scholars have written extensively about the ‘decline of deference’ in
Canada, and the rise of a very liberal and individualist outlook.10
Indeed, from a Canadian point of view, Americans some-
times appear as almost hidebound conservatives, unable or unwill-
ing to adopt new constitutional provisions to meet new conditions
(e.g., the ERA), or to repudiate old provisions that are obsolete
(e.g., the right to bear arms). By contrast, Canada has been a virtual
laboratory regarding the constitutional entrenchment of liberal
values.
So the nature of the contrast between American and Canadian
identities is not a matter of primordial or essentialist differences.
It is continually shifting. Yet it is universally taken for granted by
Canadians that such a contrast exists and will endure. Since the
actual content of the contrast is not fixed, there is a constant need
to redefine and reinforce the distinction. Canadians look for dif-
ferences with Americans, and highlight them, wherever possible.
Indeed, this is partly what underlies the image of Canadians as
citizens of the world. Much of the self-satisfaction that comes
from this image is derived from the contrast with the (allegedly)
inward-looking and unilateralist Americans.11
Perhaps the most common contrast that is drawn today, however,
is the idea that Canada is a ‘kinder and gentler’ country. Canada and
the US share the same basic ideals of liberal constitutionalism, but
Canadians view their society as less violent, more caring for the sick
or disadvantaged, less punitive, more environmentally responsible,
and more confident that government policies can actually make a
difference in people’s lives. Canadians like to think they have a better
balance between public services and private markets. It is perhaps no
coincidence that The Affluent Society – John Kenneth Galbraith’s influ-
ential critique of the US for its obsessive focus on private wealth to
the neglect of public goods like schools, roads and parks – was written
by an expatriate Canadian.12 The same contrast is nicely captured in
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
10 Nevitte, The Decline of Deference.
11 I say ‘alleged’ because the evidence suggests that Americans are much less
isolationist than many people (including their own political leaders) suppose. See
Steven Kull and I. M. Drestler, Misreading the Public:The Myth of a New Isolationism,
Washington, Brookings Institution, 1999.
12 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1958.
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the title of a recent best-selling book: The Efficient Society: Why Canada
is as Close to Utopia as it Gets.13 The idea of Canada as a utopia is a
stretch, but this perception of having found the right balance of
public and private has been reinforced by the fact that Canada has
had the highest score on the annual UN Human Development Index
for three of the past five years. Needless to say, this UN ranking is
always widely reported in newspapers and loudly trumpeted by
politicians.
As always, ideas of Canada as ‘kindler, gentler’ country are partly
mythical. For example, while Canadians have for a generation prided
themselves on the idea that we have liveable cities, unlike the decay-
ing inner cities of the US, the reality is that Americans have recently
invested huge amounts in revitalizing their city centres, while the
infrastructure of Canadian cities has been deteriorating. And
Canada’s environmental laws are often worse than their American
counterparts. (Forty-eight out of fifty states in the US have a better
environmental record than Ontario, Canada’s largest province.) It is
striking how Canadians are able to overlook any such embarrassing
facts that contradict their preferred self-image.
In all of these respects, ‘being Canadian’ is seen as different from,
and morally superior to, ‘being American’. To an outside observer,
this Canadian tendency to make moralizing comparisons with the US
must seem rather tiring and pathetic. And indeed much of it is. But
we could find similar tendencies in all countries. This is ‘nation-work’
– the ongoing work of producing and reproducing national identi-
ties and allegiances – and one can find it in all countries.14 It is not
a pretty sight in any country.
In the Canadian case, however, it also serves another function.
Much of this moralizing contrast serves as a compensation for an
even deeper-seated sense of Canadian inferiority vis-à-vis the US.
Canadian attitudes towards the US are not only tinged with envy of
its power and wealth, but also chastened by the knowledge that many
talented Canadians emigrate to the US to pursue their careers in
film, music, academia and business. Canadians know that the US is
‘where the action is’, and that Canada simply cannot compete with
BEING CANADIAN 9
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
13 Joseph Heath, The Efficient Society: Why Canada is as Close to Utopias at it Gets,
Toronto, Viking, 2001.
14 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage, 1997.
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10 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
the US in terms of the resources it can provide gifted scientists, entre-
preneurs, artists or scholars.15
A particularly galling example arose several years ago when
Wayne Gretzky, then the world’s greatest ice hockey player, left
Edmonton to play for Los Angeles. What made this galling was not
just that he was immensely popular in Canada, but the fact that most
Americans do not even care about ice hockey. It is the national game
in Canada, but is one of the least popular professional sports in the
US. The fact that the US was able to outbid Canada even in ice
hockey, a field of endeavour they care very little about, reinforced
the message that in virtually all areas of life, Canada is essentially a
glorified farm team producing talented people for the American big
leagues. This ‘brain drain’ is perceived to be so powerful that it is
difficult for people who remain in Canada to be recognized as world-
class in their field. After all, if they are so good, why aren’t they in
the States? At times, then, being Canadian means ‘being not quite
good enough or ambitious enough to play in the big leagues in
the US’.
All of this may help to explain the Canadian tendency to make
moralizing contrasts with the US. Winning a few moral victories
provides a salving compensation for deeper feelings of inferiority.16
Whatever the explanation, the tendency to define ‘Canadian’ as
‘non-American’ has important effects on Canadian public debate.
There is a nearly universal assumption that the state has the respon-
sibility to preserve ‘the Canadian way’, which by definition is differ-
ent from ‘the American way’. As a result, public policy proposals are
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
15 For a description of the strong pull that the US has on talented Canadians,
see Jeffrey Simpson, Star-Spangled Canadians: Canadians Living the American Dream,
Toronto, Harper-Collins, 2000. Right-wing parties in Canada claim that people move
to the US because of its lower tax-rate, and so argue that Canada should cut the tax
rate in order to maintain our best and brightest. However, as Simpson shows, the main
motivation for emigrating to the US is not taxes or income more generally, but rather
greater opportunity for professional accomplishment. American companies are more
likely to be at the cutting edge of product development; American universities and
hospitals are more likely to be at the cutting edge of research; American NGOs are
more likely to have a seat at the table of influential projects; and so on.
16 It also soothes some of the resentment that comes from the fact that the US
seems to take Canada’s support for granted on international issues, without asking for
Canada’s advice, and without showing much gratitude for the support. This is a sore
spot, but it seems that most of America’s allies feel the same way.
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often debated, not on their own merits, but rather in terms of
whether they would lead to the ‘Americanization’ of Canada.
On most issues, the effect has been to disable the right, and to
slow down the right-wing trend that has affected many Western
democracies. Dismantling the welfare state, privatizing education
and health care, and deregulating the economy are all seen as ‘the
American way’, and hence as prima facie suspect. This partly explains
why Canada, almost alone amongst OECD countries, has avoided an
increase in economic inequality in the 1990s. A strong welfare state
is seen as central to avoiding Americanization.
However, the antipathy to Americanization has also disabled
the left. After all, many of the most interesting and important
proposals for progressive change come from American intellectual
circles, and some of them have been adopted in the US, particularly at
the state level (e.g., California’s environmental laws). There is much
here for the Canadian left to learn from. And the American left is the
most obvious source of allies for the Canadian left, given the com-
monalities of language, history and law. Yet these potential sources of
inspiration and alliance are largely ignored. Having constructed
a national identity and political platform on the idea of resisting
Americanization, it would be difficult for the left to suddenly argue
that the solutions to our problems can be found south of the border.
Instead, the Canadian left says that Canada should look to the
social democratic states of Western Europe for inspiration. But these
countries are too far away, and too different in their history, demo-
graphics and legal culture, to provide models that resonate with the
Canadian public. As a result, the Canadian left is largely ineffective.
Everyone knows that the left is opposed to the Americanization of
Canada, but it is difficult to tell what they positively stand for, or what
vision they have for the country.
These, then, are some of the international dimensions of
Canadian identity. ‘Being Canadian’ is to be a good citizen of the
world; to be committed to Western values and anxious about possi-
ble threats to them, but hesitant to talk about a clash of civilizations;
to celebrate the self-consciously modern and classless society that is
possible in the New World, open to newcomers and new ideas; and
to have a tortured relationship with the US, asserting moral superi-
ority as a kinder and gentler country, but tacitly acknowledging that
Canada cannot compete with the US for the development and exer-
cise of talents and skills.
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12 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
These international aspects of being Canadian are, I think, largely
shared across ethnic and linguistic lines in Canada.17 As I discuss
below, it may indeed be something that helps keep the country
together. This is a useful corrective to the view, often repeated, that
there is no such thing as a shared Canadian identity, and that there
is just the ‘masochistic’ celebration of difference.18
DIVERSITY WITHIN CANADA
However, this commonality in views about Canada’s place within the
larger world is counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by deep dis-
agreements about the management of diversity within Canada.
According to Leslie Lazcko, Canada is ‘a statistical outlier’ amongst
the Western democracies in its degree of ethnic, linguistic and reli-
gious diversity.19 Learning how to accommodate this internal diver-
sity, while still maintaining a stable political order, has always been
one of the main challenges facing Canada, and remains so today.
These struggles have resulted in a number of legal and institu-
tional reforms, from official bilingualism to multiculturalism to
Aboriginal rights. These are often lumped together under the
heading of ‘the Canadian model’ of diversity, and are sometimes said,
both by defenders and critics, to be unique. According to The Econ-
omist, for example, The ‘Canadian model’ – whether of disintegra-
tion or of holding together in some new, postmodern version of the
nation-state – is going to be an example to avoid or follow for all but
a few federations, for all multicultural societies, especially immigrant
ones, for countries whose borders reflect conquest more than geog-
raphy, and for all states riven or driven by nationalism.20
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
17 It should be noted, however, that Canada is a regionalized country, and there
are regional variations in these attitudes. There is a strand of right-wing populism in
Western Canada, particularly Alberta, that does not share some of the attitudes I have
just described, particularly regarding the international community (towards which it
is more sceptical) and the United States (towards which it is more friendly).
18 Richard Gywn, Nationalism without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being
Canadian, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1995.
19 Leslie Laczko, ‘Canada’s Pluralism in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, 17:1 (1994), pp. 20–41.
20 ‘Survey of Canada’, The Economist, 29 June 1991, page 3.
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My own view, however, is that Canada’s approach to internal
diversity is not so different from other Western democracies. On
the contrary, the Canadian approach is best understood as an out-
growth or application of the same basic liberal-democratic values that
are shared by all Western democracies. And, as a result, the way in
which national and sub-state identities are negotiated and accom-
modated in Canada is, in many respects, as in other Western
countries.
To explain this, I need to say a few words about Canada’s ethnic
diversity. Canada is a ‘British settler society’, in the sense that Canada
emerged from the union of four British colonies, and it was the
British colonists and colonial administrators who established
many of the dominant institutions which still govern us. But the
British have never been alone on this territory, and they have
become an ever-decreasing percentage of the population. We can
divide Canada’s increasing ethnocultural diversity into two broad
categories.
The first source of ethnocultural diversity in Canada is the peoples
who were here before the British – namely, the Aboriginal peoples
and French-Canadians. They formed complete and functioning soci-
eties, long-settled on their own territory, with their own institutions
operating in their own language, prior to being incorporated into
British North America. This incorporation was involuntary – the
result of colonization and conquest. However, efforts have been
made to turn this involuntary incorporation into a more voluntary
federation of peoples, either through the signing of treaties with
Aboriginals, or the negotiation of Confederation with French-
Canadians. But neither group is satisfied with its current status within
Canada, and both have sought greater powers of self-government so
as to maintain their status as culturally distinct and self-governing
societies within the larger state.
The other major source of ethnocultural diversity in Canada is
immigration. This too has been a long-standing feature of Canadian
history, going back to the Irish immigrants in the 1840s, and occur-
ring in waves ever since. As a result, Canada now contains people
whose ancestral roots lie in all four corners of the world. These immi-
grant groups have a very different history from the ‘nations within’.
They are the result, not of the involuntary incorporation of complete
societies settled on their historic homeland, but rather of the deci-
sion of individuals and families to leave their original homeland for
BEING CANADIAN 13
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 13
14 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
a new life. This choice was more or less voluntary, at least in the sense
that many of their friends and family chose to stay, and it was made
by people who knew that they were entering a new society with its
own established laws and institutions.
I will refer to these groups as ‘immigrant groups’, since their
origins in Canada lie in the act of immigration. But for some groups,
particularly those from Northern Europe, these origins lie quite far
in the past, so that the bulk of the group’s members today are not
immigrants, but rather the children, grandchildren or even great-
grandchildren of the original immigrant. It seems slightly odd, there-
fore, to describe German–Canadians or Ukrainian–Canadians as
‘immigrant groups’. Many people use the term ‘ethnic group’
instead, and I too will use that term in places. But the fact that these
groups were formed initially through immigration is pivotal in under-
standing their status in Canada, and in understanding how and why
they differ from our ‘nations within’.
How then does being Canadian relate to these subgroup identi-
ties? I shall start with immigrant ethnic groups, and then consider
the Aboriginal peoples and French Canadians.21
Immigrant groups. In the past, Canada had an assimilationist
approach to immigration. Immigrants were encouraged and ex-
pected to assimilate to the pre-existing society, with the hope that
over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born
Canadians in their speech, dress, recreation, and way of life gener-
ally. Any groups that were seen as incapable of this sort of cultural
assimilation were prohibited from emigrating to Canada, or from
becoming citizens. (This was reflected in rules excluding Asians and
Africans in the first half of the twentieth-century).
However, since the late-1960s, we have seen a dramatic reversal in
this approach. There were two related changes: first, the adoption
of race-neutral admissions criteria (the ‘points system’), so that im-
migrants to Canada are increasingly from non-European (and often
non-Christian) societies; and secondly, the adoption of a more
‘multicultural’ conception of integration, one which expects that
many immigrants will visibly and proudly express their ethnic
identity, and which accepts an obligation on the part of public insti-
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
21 For a more detailed discussion of these three trends, see my Politics in the
Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism,Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2001, chs. 5–9.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 14
tutions (like the police, schools, media, museums, etc.) to make rea-
sonable accommodations of these ethnic identities.
These two changes have dramatically changed Canadian society,
but it is important to realize that the same two-fold change has
occurred in all of the other traditional countries of immigration, like
Australia, New Zealand, the United States or Britain. All of them have
shifted from discriminatory to race-neutral admissions and natural-
ization policies. And all of them have shifted from an assimilationist
to a more multicultural conception of integration. Of course, there
are differences in how official or explicit this shift to multicultural-
ism has been. In Canada, as in Australia and New Zealand, this shift
was formally and officially marked by the declaration of a multi-
cultural policy by the central government. By contrast, the US does
not have an official policy of multiculturalism at the federal level. Yet
if we look at lower levels of government in America, such as states
or cities, we will find a broad range of multiculturalism policies. If
we look at state-level policies regarding the education curriculum,
for example, or city-level policies regarding policing or hospitals,
we shall find that they are often indistinguishable from the way
provinces and cities in Canada deal with issues of immigrant ethno-
cultural diversity. As in Canada, they have their own diversity pro-
grammes and/or equity officers. As Nathan Glazer, the Harvard
sociologist puts it, ‘we are all multiculturalists now’.22 Similarly, in
Britain, while there is no nation-wide multiculturalism policy, the
same basic ideas and principles are pursued through their race rela-
tions policy.23 All of these countries have accepted the same two-fold
change at the heart of the Canadian model: i.e., adopting race-
neutral admissions and naturalization policies, and imposing on
public institutions a duty to accommodate immigrant ethnocultural
diversity.
Indigenous peoples. In the past, Canada had the goal and expecta-
tion that its indigenous peoples (the Indians, Inuit and Metis) would
eventually disappear as distinct communities, as a result of dying out,
or inter-marriage, or assimilation. Various policies were adopted to
BEING CANADIAN 15
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
22 Nathan Glazer, We are All Multiculturalists Now, Cambridge, Har vard University
Press, 1997.
23 For the British model of multiculturalism through race relations, see Adrian
Favell, Philosophies of Integration:Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and
Britain, revised edn, New York, St Martin’s Press, 2001.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 15
16 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
speed up this process, such as stripping indigenous peoples of their
lands, restricting the practice of their traditional culture, language
and religion, and undermining their institutions of self-government.
However, there has been a dramatic reversal in these policies,
a change which in Canada started in the early 1970s. Today, the
Canadian government accepts, at least in principle, the idea that
Aboriginal peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct soci-
eties within Canada, and that they must have the land claims, treaty
rights, cultural rights and self-government rights needed to sustain
themselves as distinct societies. Key events here included the repu-
diation of the assimilationist 1969 White Paper on Indian Policy, the
Supreme Court’s recognition of Aboriginal land title in the Calder
decision, the revalidation of older treaties, the signing of new
treaties, such as the James Bay and Nunavut agreements with the
Inuit and Cree, and the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal
rights in the 1982 Constitution.
These changes have dramatically affected the status of indigenous
peoples in Canada. But here again, Canada is not unique in this shift.
We see the same pattern in all of the other Western democracies that
contain indigenous peoples. Consider the revival of treaty rights
through the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, the recognition of
land rights for Aboriginal Australians in the Mabo decision; the crea-
tion of the Sami Parliament in Scandinavia, the evolution of ‘Home
Rule’ for the Inuit of Greenland; and the laws and court cases
upholding self-determination rights for American Indian tribes (not
to mention the flood of legal and constitutional changes recogniz-
ing indigenous rights in Latin America). In all of these countries,
there is a gradual but real process of decolonization taking place, as
indigenous peoples regain their lands and self-government.
The Québécois. The Québécois are Canada’s main example of a sub-
state nationalist movement. Other examples in the West include the
Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the
Flemish in Belgium, the French- and Italian-speaking minorities in
Switzerland, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy,
or the Hispanics in Puerto Rico in the United States. In all of these
cases, we find a regionally-concentrated group that conceives of itself
as a nation within a larger state, and mobilizes behind nationalist
political parties to achieve recognition of its nationhood, either in
the form of an independent state or through territorial autonomy
within the larger state.
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 16
In the past, all of these countries (except Switzerland) have
attempted to suppress these forms of sub-state nationalism. To have
a regional group with a sense of distinct nationhood was seen as a
threat to the state. In the Canadian case, various efforts were made
in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries to erode this sense of dis-
tinct French-Canadian nationhood, including restricting minority
language rights, abolishing earlier forms of autonomous self-
government, and encouraging anglophones to settle in the French-
Canadians’ traditional territory, so that the minority would become
a minority even in its homeland. Similar stories apply to most of the
other Western cases of sub-state nationalism.
However, these policies have gradually been repudiated. Today, all
of the countries I have just mentioned have accepted the principle
that these sub-state national identities will endure into the indefinite
future, and that their sense of nationhood and nationalist aspira-
tions must be accommodated in some way or other. This accommo-
dation has typically taken the form of what we can call ‘multination
federalism’: that is, creating a federal or quasi-federal sub-unit in
which the minority group forms a local majority, and so can exercise
meaningful forms of self-government. Moreover, the group’s
language is typically recognized as an official state language, at least
within their federal sub-unit, and perhaps throughout the country as
a whole.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, only Switzerland and
Canada had adopted this combination of territorial autonomy and
official language status for sub-state national groups. Since then,
however, virtually all Western democracies that contain sizeable sub-
state nationalist movements have moved in this direction. The list
includes the adoption of autonomy for the Swedish-speaking Aland
Islands in Finland after the First World War, then autonomy for South
Tyrol and Puerto Rico after the Second World War, then federal
autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain in the
1970s, for Flanders in the 1980s, and most recently for Scotland and
Wales in the 1990s.24 Here again, the Canadian model of accommo-
BEING CANADIAN 17
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
24 France is the main exception, in its refusal to grant autonomy to its main sub-
state nationalist group in Corsica. However, even here, legislation was in fact adopted
to accord autonomy to Corsica, and it was only a strange ruling of the Constitutional
Court which prevented its implementation. France too, I think, will soon join the
bandwagon.
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18 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
dating sub-state nationalism falls within the usual patterns of Western
democracies.
CANADIAN EXCEPTIONALISM?
In all three of these areas, therefore, Canada’s shift to accommodat-
ing diversity is simply one manifestation of a much larger trend
throughout the West. In all of these countries, including Canada,
these changes have been strongly contested, and remain controver-
sial. Yet the overall trends are fairly consistent throughout the West
towards greater recognition of diversity.
I emphasize this because it is often seen as a distinctively
Canadian characteristic to tolerate and accommodate diversity. For
some, this is a distinctive virtue of Canadians’ national character,
for others it is distinctive failing, But in reality, it is not distinctively
Canadian at all. It reflects underlying sociological and political
factors that affect all Western democracies.25 Canadians who are
exposed to Spanish debates over the accommodation of Catalan
nationalism, or to Australian debates about immigrant multicultur-
alism, or to New Zealand’s debates about the place of indigenous
peoples, will find much that is familiar. In all of these cases there are
the same powerful forces pushing for greater recognition of diver-
sity, resisted by the same entrenched interests and by the same fears
of fragmentation and instability, with broadly similar outcomes.
Canada is distinctive in having to deal with all three forms of diver-
sity at the same time. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have
been grappling with issues of immigration and indigenous peoples,
but have no sub-state nationalist movements. Belgium, Switzerland,
Spain and Britain, by contrast, have been grappling with issues of
both sub-state nationalism and immigration, but have no indigenous
peoples. Canada is unusual in having to confront all three issues at
the same time.
Also, Canada is distinctive in the extent to which it has not only
legislated, but also constitutionalized, practices of accommodation.
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
25 I have elsewhere discussed these underlying sociological factors under four
headings: demographics; rights-consciounsess; democracy; and geopolitical security.
See ‘Canadian Multiculturalism in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Is Canada
Unique?’, Constitutional Forum, forthcoming.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 18
Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism is enshrined not only
in statutory legislation, but also in section 27 of the Constitution.
No other Western country has constitutionalized multiculturalism.
Canada’s commitments to Aboriginal and treaty rights are similarly
constitutionalized, in section 35, in a stronger or more explicit
fashion than most Western countries. And so too with Canada’s
commitments to federalism and official language rights.
This decision to constitutionalize these practices of accommoda-
tion is one example of a more general feature of the Canadian expe-
rience: namely, the decision to highlight these practices in Canada’s
national narratives. While the actual practices of accommodation in
Canada are not unique, Canada is unusual in the extent to which it
has built these practices into its symbols and narratives of nation-
hood. Canadians tell each other that accommodating diversity is an
important part of Canadian history, and a defining feature of the
country. This is unlike the United States, for example. In practice, as
I’ve noted, the US does accord self-government and treaty rights to
American Indians, regional autonomy and language rights to Puerto
Rico, and multicultural accommodations to immigrant groups. But
these are peripheral to the self-conception of many Americans, and
are not considered defining features of the American identity or its
national narrative. Americans accommodate diversity in practice, but
they do not shout that fact from the rooftop, as Canadians sometimes
do.
In other words, accommodating diversity has a symbolic salience
in Canada that is not matched in most other Western countries. This
is probably a mixed blessing. The self-conscious affirmation of diver-
sity at the symbolic and constitutional levels has probably helped
provide members of various groups in Canada with a stronger sense
of security and comfort, and given them the courage and conviction
to fight more effectively for changes in their public institutions. On
the other hand, the preoccupation with symbols has also probably
heightened opposition to these changes. The experience of other
countries suggests that it is sometimes easier to push through
changes to accommodate minorities if it is done quietly, with as little
fanfare as possible.
BEING CANADIAN 19
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
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20 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
THE ‘UNITY’ QUESTION
The trend to recognizing diversity in Canada raises a puzzle: what
turns this crazy quilt of ethnocultural diversity into a coherent func-
tioning country? What is the nature of the ‘social glue’ that binds the
country together?
Many commentators assume that for the country to function, citi-
zens must have a strong sense of identification with Canada as a polit-
ical community, an identification that stands over and above their
more particularistic sub-group identities. They must have a strong
feeling of ‘being Canadian’, in addition to their feelings of belong-
ing to sub-groups.
Constructing such a pan-Canadian sense of identity has required
dramatic changes to Canada’s historic self-images and traditions. For
much of its history, Canada was seen by its rulers as essentially a
(white) British country, an outpost of British culture and civilization
in the New World. Non-British groups, including French, Aboriginal
and immigrant groups, were at best tolerated, at worst excluded
entirely. This was reflected in the predominance of the English lan-
guage over French within the federal government, the adoption of
British symbols and holidays, and in rules that excluded Asians and
Africans from emigrating to Canada, and that excluded Aboriginals
from citizenship.26 Needless to say, many minority groups had diffi-
culty feeling Canadian when it was defined in this narrowly white/
British way.
Since the 1950s, however, concerted efforts have been made to
construct a ‘made-at-home’ Canadian identity that essentially severs
the connection with Britain, while reaching out to minority groups
within Canada. This is reflected in the adoption of a new flag in place
of the Union Jack, a new national anthem and national holidays, a
new made-at-home constitution, as well as the adoption of official
bilingualism, official multiculturalism and the adoption of race-
neutral admissions policy and other forms of anti-discrimination
policy. All of these have dramatically changed the look of Canadian
institutions, to appear more open and inclusive of Canada’s diversity.
These attempts at redefining Canadian identity to accommodate
internal diversity have had some unexpected results. Some com-
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
26 Sylvia Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism, Toronto,
Oxford University Press, 1991.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 20
mentators worried that these changes would alienate Canadians of
British origin, who remain the single largest group in Canada. In
reality, however, no matter how much they complain about minori-
ties being ‘coddled’ in Canada, Canadians of British origin remain
steadfastly patriotic. Indeed, their attachment to Canada has actually
grown since the 1960s, and they are more likely than ever to identify
themselves as Canadians rather than in terms of any sub-state provin-
cial or ethnic identity.27
These changes have also had some success in instilling a pan-
Canadian identity amongst immigrant groups. These groups often
doubt the sincerity of the dominant society’s commitment to multi-
culturalism, which they sometimes see as purely rhetorical. But most
immigrants nonetheless appreciate the symbolism, and acknowledge
that many institutions like the schools or media have in fact made
serious efforts to accommodate immigrant ethnicity. Indeed, studies
show that many highly-skilled immigrants who could have gone to
Britain or Germany, and probably made more money, nonetheless
chose to come to Canada because it was seen as a more welcoming
country for immigrants.28
However, attempts to construct a pan-Canadian identity have
failed at their main goal – namely, to strengthen Canadian identity
amongst the Québécois. After all, these efforts at building a pan-
Canadian identity were instigated by the rise of a separatist move-
ment in Quebec in the 1960s, and were primarily aimed at nurturing
Quebecer’s feelings of identification with Canada. Since the 1960s,
however, the number of Quebecers who identify themselves as
‘Canadian’ rather than ‘Québécois’ has steadily dropped.29 Con-
structing a new pan-Canadian identity was primarily intended to dis-
place the centrality of Britishness in Canada, to make room for the
Québécois. Yet, ironically, it has had the opposite effect. It has
BEING CANADIAN 21
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
27 Nevitte, Decline of Deference, p. 73; Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The
Struggle for National Unity, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1997.
28 On the other hand, if immigrants have a choice between Canada and the United
States, they typically chose the US.
29 Polls in Canada often ask whether Quebecers think of themselves as ‘Canadian
only’, ‘more Canadian than Québécois’, ‘equally Canadian and Québécois’, ‘more
Québécois than Canadian’ or ‘Québécois only’. The numbers of people reporting
their identity as primarily or equally Canadian has dropped regularly. See McRoberts,
Misconceiving Canada; Matthew Mendelsohn, ‘Measuring Identity and Patterns of
Attachment: The Case of Quebec’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, forthcoming.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 21
22 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
strengthened Canadian identity amongst British-origin Canadians,
while reducing the feeling of Canadianness amongst the Québé-
cois.30
This failure has led many commentators to try to rethink the
possible sources of an overarching pan-Canadian identity. One
approach, derived from Rawlsian and Habermasian schools of
thought, invokes shared constitutional values. According to this view,
so long as all Canadians share a commitment to the basic political
values enshrined in the Canadian constitution, they should identify
with Canada as a country.31
Unfortunately, this seems false in the Canadian case. In the past
40 years, we have seen a clear convergence between English and
French on basic political values, such that political values are virtu-
ally identical in the two communities (e.g., regarding freedom of
speech, women’s rights, the rights of defendants, etc.). Yet in pre-
cisely the same time, as we have seen, the number of Quebecers who
identify themselves as ‘Canadian’ rather than ‘Québécois’ has sig-
nificantly dropped.32
This should not be a surprise, since there is no reason why
Quebecers could not pursue these common political values in their
own constitution adopted for their own separate state. The fact that
30 million people in Canada, or 300 million people in Europe, gen-
erally agree on the political values that should be respected in any
constitution does not yet tell us whether they should form one
country, or two, or twenty.33
Since common political principles seem too ‘thin’ a basis for an
overarching Canadian identity, some commentators have argued that
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
30 See McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada; chs. 6–7.
31 See, for example, O. A. P. Shabani, ‘Who is Afraid of Constitutional Patriotism?’,
Social Theory and Practice, 28:3 (2002), pp. 419–43.
32 We can find similar examples within the Aboriginal community. The increasing
influence of Western values and Western education within Aboriginal communities
has not guaranteed that Aboriginals ‘feel Canadian’. While some Aboriginal leaders
reject Western liberal values, even those who generally accept them do not always iden-
tify themselves as Canadian.
33 Wayne Norman, ‘The Ideology of Shared Values’, in Joseph Carens (ed.), Is
Quebec Nationalism Just? Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995, pp. 137–59;
David Schneiderman, ‘Human Rights, Fundamental Differences? Multiple Charters
in a Partnership Frame’, in Guy Laforest and Roger Gibbins (eds), Beyond the Impasse:
Toward Reconciliation, Montreal, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1998.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 22
we need to find a ‘thicker’ source of common identity, like a sense
of common history. A feeling of being Canadian, on this view, would
be tied up with common feelings of pride or shame about various
events in Canadian history. Unfortunately, French and English often
have quite different views on Canadian history. It is even more diffi-
cult to persuade immigrants that being Canadian should be defined
by one’s feelings towards events that predated their arrival in Canada.
Charles Taylor suggests another possible basis for an overarching
Canadian identity: namely, the value of diversity itself. He expresses
the hope that Canadians could come to see the management of deep
diversity as an ‘exciting’ collective endeavour.34 A more crass version
of this argument, much trumpeted lately by the federal government,
is that being a bilingual multicultural country gives Canada a com-
petitive advantage in the global marketplace, and thereby increases
our GNP. But it seems unlikely that most Canadians feel this way
about diversity. For most Canadians, I suspect, diversity is an ineradi-
cable fact about Canada that needs to be accommodated, but they
find the endless issues it raises to be painful and tiring rather than
exciting or enriching. And even if people did find diversity to be
exciting, the fact is that even if Quebec separates, each of the result-
ing states would still be very ethnically and linguistically diverse, and
so would still presumably offer the excitement or economic benefits
that flow from diversity.
So we have a variety of theories about the sources of pan-
Canadian identity, including common political principles, shared
history, and the aesthetic or economic value of diversity itself. I
suspect that while each of these has resonance with some Canadians,
none of them provides a secure foundation for constructing or main-
taining a strong feeling of Canadian identity amongst all Canadians,
particularly amongst the Québécois. As we have seen, the evidence
of declining Canadian identification in Quebec suggests that these
factors are insufficient.
Yet this focus on constructing a strong sense of pan-Canadian
identity amongst all citizens may be misplaced. The ability of Canada
to function as a country may not depend on such an identity. After
all, the basic functioning of the Canadian state has not been adversely
affected by the gradual decline in Canadian identity amongst
BEING CANADIAN 23
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
34 Charles Taylor, ‘Shared and Divergent Values’, in Ronald Watts and D. Brown
(eds), Options for a New Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, pp. 53–76.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 23
24 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Quebecers. Indeed, on many criteria, like the UN Human Develop-
ment index, Canada has actually outperformed many Western
democracies over the past ten to fifteen years.
It seems that having a strong Canadian identity is not a precondi-
tion for citizens to cooperate in the functioning of pan-Canadian insti-
tutions. Indeed, there is interesting evidence that feelings of trust and
legitimacy in Canadian institutions have remained strong in Quebec
even when Canadian identity has diminished.35 There are many
people for whom being Canadian is becoming a less and less impor-
tant part of their identity, yet who remain willing to participate actively
in Canadian institutions, to accept the legitimacy of their decisions,
and to do their fair share to uphold those institutions.
Why would people who do not feel a strong sense of being
Canadian nonetheless continue to trust and participate in Canadian
institutions? There are probably several overlapping factors here,
including inertia, risk-aversion, economic self-interest, personal
bonds. Part of the explanation may even lie in Canada’s international
reputation. Surveys show that support for secession drops consider-
ably when it is made clear that this would mean Quebecers would
no longer have Canadian citizenship and Canadian passports.36
Even people who lack a feeling of Canadian identity can nonetheless
see the international benefits that flow from being recognized as a
Canadian.
But here again, perhaps we are looking in the wrong place for our
explanations. Why would people who do not feel a strong sense of
Canadian identity nonetheless trust pan-Canadian institutions?
Perhaps because those institutions are in fact trustworthy: they
operate according to fairly high standards of the rule of law, human
and minority rights, democratic accountability, constitutional safe-
guards, an impartial police force and independent judiciary, and
so on. Even Quebec nationalists who do not feel a strong sense of
Canadian identity acknowledge that francophones are generally
treated fairly in federal decisions about government contracts, civil
service hiring, public service delivery, economic development plans
or urban infrastructure projects. More generally, pan-Canadian insti-
tutions help to guarantee the basic freedom and security of individ-
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
35 See Mendelsohn, ‘Measuring Identity’.
36 Some defenders of ‘sovereignty-association’ have implied that a sovereign
Quebec could still enjoy Canadian citizenship and passports.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 24
uals, and to provide reasonably good and efficient public services,
for both English and French, while also supporting a prosperous
economy. Quebec nationalists cooperate in the successful function-
ing of pan-Canadian institutions because those institutions do in fact
function successfully for both English and French: they enable
Quebecers to lead good lives as individuals, and to thrive as a
community.
Of course, most Quebecers think that an independent Quebec
state could also operate according to the same high standards of le-
gitimacy and efficiency. Some think it could even do a better
job, and so support secessionist political parties. They look forward
to the day when Quebec exists outside the Canadian state. But in
the meantime, their lack of a strong sense of Canadian identity
does not prevent them from recognizing that Canadian institutions
are generally trustworthy and effective, and hence worthy of
cooperation.37
The success of political institutions in the modern age depends
heavily on the active and willing cooperation of citizens. Commen-
tators have typically assumed that this sort of active and willing coop-
eration will only arise if citizens have a strong sense of identification
with the country. But this assumption may be mistaken. Perhaps
citizens will cooperate whenever they view political institutions as
trustworthy (i.e., even-handed between individuals and groups) and
BEING CANADIAN 25
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
37 This may seem to resurrect Rawls’s account of social unity. After all, have I not
just agreed with Rawls that people cooperate in political institutions because they view
these institutions as reasonably just? However, Rawls goes further and argues that this
perception of the justness of institutions guarantees social unity, and leads people to
view themselves as members of ‘one cooperative scheme in perpetuity’. So for Rawls,
where people perceive public institutions as just, they will not support secession. In
the Canadian case, however, while perceptions of just institutions lead to cooperation,
they have not undermined secessionist beliefs. Rawls rightly emphasizes the impor-
tance of a broad consensus on certain political principles and of the public’s percep-
tion that these principles are upheld by public institutions. These are indeed necessary
conditions of a viable and just liberal-democracy. But Rawls also argues that where
these conditions are met, this is a sufficient condition of political unity – i.e., that these
conditions guarantee that people will continue to want to live together in a single
state. And this, it seems to me, is wrong in the Canadian case. These conditions help
to sustain day-to-day cooperation with pan-Canadian institutions, but do not resolve
the question of whether the Québécois would like to secede and form a separate
state. For more on my disagreement with Rawls on this point, see my Politics in the
Vernacular, ch. 5.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 25
26 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
effective (i.e., providing good services).38 The strength of identifica-
tion with the country may not be the crucial variable.39
Many will find this an unsatisfactory account of the ‘social glue’
that enables diverse countries like Canada to function. It may seem
too provisional or contingent. No doubt there is more to be said
about the sources of social unity. However, whatever the answer to
this question of social unity, it is unlikely to be distinctive to Canada.
The factors that explain how Canada functions, despite its rich diver-
sity, will almost certainly be the same factors that explain why other
multi-nation states like Britain, Belgium or Switzerland continue to
function successfully. In all of these cases, the sense of ‘being British’,
‘being Belgian’ or ‘being Swiss’ is becoming less important to some
people’s identities, supplanted by either sub-state or supra-state iden-
tities. Yet they all continue to function more or less successfully as
prosperous democracies, reproducing the public institutions and
generating the public services that enable most individuals and
groups to thrive. If this seems a mystery, it is not a uniquely
Canadian mystery.
CONCLUSION: THE BANALITY OF IDENTITY POLITICS
What general lessons, if any, does the Canadian experience with iden-
tity politics hold? I would say that the Canadian story confirms one
familiar view about modern identities, while challenging another. It
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
38 The same dynamic would almost certainly exist in reverse if Quebec were to
secede. Even if a clear majority in Quebec voted to secede, there would still be many
anglophone and immigrant Quebecers who identify more with Canada than Quebec,
and who would therefore have trouble identifying with their new country. Yet so long
as the new Quebec state operated in accordance with high standards of the rule of
law, human and minority rights, impartiality, democratic accountability and so on,
then these people would almost certainly cooperate to ensure the successful func-
tioning of Quebec institutions. Their lack of a strong sense of Quebec identity would
not prevent them from recognizing and participating in trustworthy and legitimate
institutions.
39 Russia provides some confirming evidence from the opposite direction. There
are very high levels of national identification with the Russian political community,
but very little willingness to cooperate with the institutions of the state, which are seen
as neither impartial nor effective. Strong identification does not guarantee active
cooperation; weak identification does not preclude active cooperation.
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 26
is often said that identities today are multi-level, fluid, relational,
porous, constructed, contested, and overlapping. The complex and
changing relationships that I have described between sub-state,
national and international identities in Canada clearly attest to all of
these attributes of modern identities. None of the identities I have
described is unchanging or uncontroversial, and none can be under-
stood outside its connections to (and reciprocal influence on) the
other wider or narrower identities that coexist in Canada.
This constructivist and relational approach to identity has
become a platitude in the literature, so I shall not belabour the
point. However, there is one aspect of the Canadian story which
challenges one of the received wisdoms of the literature. According
to many commentators, ‘identity politics’ involve a fundamentally
different political dynamic from ‘interest politics’. In particular,
identity claims are said to be less subject to democratic deliberation
and negotiation than interest claims, and hence a greater threat to
democracy.
According to Claus Offe, for example, in identity conflicts ‘both
sides tend to insist on both the non-negotiable as well as the non-
arguable (that is, the absence of the possibility of inter-group rational
debates) nature of their respective claims’.40 Nothing could be
farther from the truth in the Canadian context. Minority group
leaders in Canada have no end of arguments that they offer in the
media, the courts, and the legislature in the hope of persuading
members of the larger society. Indeed, this is precisely why minor-
ities seek political representation in the legislature or on government
advisory and regulatory bodies (and also greater access to the
media). If Offe were correct, there would be no point in minority
groups seeking representation on decision-making bodies in which
they would be a numerical minority. If their claims are non-arguable,
they would have no hope of persuading others of their views, and no
hope of affecting the ultimate outcome. In reality, minority groups
believe that, even though they lack the votes or vetoes needed to win
by themselves, they can use their presence to persuade members of
other groups of their position.
BEING CANADIAN 27
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
40 Claus Offe, ‘“Homogeneity” and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with
Identity Conflicts with Group Rights’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 6:2 (1998), p. 120.
Cf. Offe, ‘Political Liberalism, Group Rights and the Politics of Fear and Trust’, Studies
in East European Thought, 53 (2001), pp. 167–82.
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28 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Similarly, identity claims are eminently ‘negotiable’. Identity
politics in Canada is an unending series of such democratic
negotiations. Consider a typical example regarding official language
rights. Francophones start by claiming that all public services
should be available in their mother-tongue wherever they live in
Canada. The state starts by limiting French-language provision to a
few public services in a few regions. They then discuss, argue,
negotiate and bargain, and the result is some provisional compro-
mise which provides a significant level of French-language services
(but not all services) in significant regions of Canada (but not
all). This is normal, everyday democratic politics, no different in its
structure from decision-making about taxes or environmental
regulation.
Or consider demands by indigenous peoples in Canada regarding
the development of natural resources on their traditional territory.
Indians and Inuit in Canada start by demanding the right to make
all of the development decisions and keep all the royalties; the state
starts by demanding the right to control resource development and
to keep all the revenue. They discuss and negotiate, and arrive at
some provisional agreement to share decision-making control and
royalties.
Or consider indigenous land claims. Indigenous groups start by
demanding that all of the land taken from them historically be
returned; the state starts by saying that indigenous title is null and
void. They then discuss and bargain, and the result is a provisional
agreement that returns some but not all of the land wrongfully taken
from indigenous peoples.
I could go on and on listing such examples. Consider policies to
enhance the political representation of minorities, or affirmative
action, or the division of powers between Ottawa and Quebec, or
the accommodation of minority religious holidays. All of these
issues have been (provisionally) settled in Canada through normal
processes of democratic debate and negotiation, in which all sides
give reasons and make compromises. The demands of identity
groups are no different in this respect from other political actors or
movements. In short, identity politics in Canada is simply everyday
democratic politics.
For those who have been raised on fears about the inherently
explosive and irrational nature of identity politics, what is perhaps
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
GOOP4 17/4/03 05:06 PM Page 28
most striking about identity politics in Canada is its utter banality.41
The ebb and flow of political mobilizations around immigrant mul-
ticulturalism, Québécois nationalism and indigenous decolonization
barely raise an eyebrow anymore. It is as predictable, peaceful and
indeed (for most Canadians) boring as mobilizations around tariff
barriers, transportation policy, or tax cuts.
Here again, I don’t think this is unique to Canada. Identity poli-
tics throughout the West have become routinized and domesticated
as part of everyday processes of democratic deliberation and negoti-
ation.42 This may make the topic of identity politics less interesting
for scholars and citizens, but is arguably a good sign for the maturity
of our political culture and the robustness of our democratic
institutions.43
BEING CANADIAN 29
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2003
41 By saying it is banal, I don’t mean to imply it is trivial or benign. On the con-
trary, the process of publicly negotiating identities occurs within in a field of power
relations that construct and sustain various forms of assimilation, inequality, oppres-
sion, hierarchies and expertises. Powerful actors seek to contain or shape this process
of negotiation, including both state actors and corporate actors, trying to bend it to
the logic of governmentality or corporate profitability. Identity politics is not immune
to the power relations that affect all other forms of domestic politics, including Offe’s
‘interest politics’. That indeed, is my point: identity conflicts are located within the
same everyday logic of negotiation and power that shapes all domestic politics. For
a discussion of the way the state seeks to strengthen itself by defining the field of
identity negotiation in Canada, see Richard Day, Multiculturalism and the History of
Canadian Diversity, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000. For a discussion of
how identity negotiations in Canada are shaped by global market forces, see Yasmeen
Abu-Laban, Selling Diversity:Immigration,Multiculturalism,Employment Equity and
Globalization, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 2002. I’d like to thank Jim Tully for
pushing me on this point.
42 For a more detailed critique of Offe’s claim that identity claims are non-nego-
tiable, see my ‘The Impact of Group Rights on Fear and Trust: A Response to Offe’,
Hagar: International Social Science Review, 3:1 (2002), pp. 19–36. Offe provides no evi-
dence for this claim other than to cite an article where Hirschman makes the same
claim (Albert Hirschman, ‘Social Conflict as Pillars of Democratic Market Society’,
Political Theory, 22:4, 1994, pp. 203–18). Unfortunately, Hirschman provides no evi-
dence for the claim either. For a related critique of Offe and Hirschman, and a descrip-
tion of how identity claims are democratically managed through negotiated
compromises, see Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, New York, Routledge,
1999, ch. 4–5.
43 For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I’d like to thank Richard Bellamy, Sue
Donaldson and James Tully.
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