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Cognitive Domains of the Mood System
Abstract
ABSTRACT One possible outline of the interrelationship between mood and cognition makes use of a fourfold framework mood-state introspections yield a report of the mood, mood-sensitive judgments are influenced by mood, metamood experiences include thoughts about the mood, and mood-related traits predict the likelihood of being in a mood Three studies were conducted to investigate the relation between mood introspection and mood-sensitive judgment (e g, mood-related changes in judgments about “objective” events such as belief in the probability of a nuclear war) These same studies also examined the metamood experiences and mood-related traits occurring simultaneously with the above moods and judgments Judgment was mood-sensitive across all studies Factor analysis of the various measures was supportive of the partial independence of the four domains Mood introspection, mood-sensitive judgment, and mood-related traits appeared on separate factors Metamood experience was factorially complex and was distributed across factors Interrelations among the domains were described The relevance of the framework for representing personality and psychopathology was discussed, as was the influence of mood on everyday judgments
Background
Mood disturbances have historically remained a core criterion in diagnosing major depressive episode. DSMs have illustrated this criterion with depressed, hopeless, discouraged, cheerless, and irritable mood, suggesting interchangeability. Extant research has examined individual forms of mood disturbance to depression severity. Less examined is the heterogeneity in mood disturbances and its implication to their association to depression presentations and outcomes.
Method
The current study used a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults with unipolar major depressive disorder to study the association between specific forms of mood disturbances to depression severity, chronicity, or symptoms, above and beyond other forms, as well as their relations to functional impairment, suicidal outcomes, and psychiatric comorbidity via generalized linear models.
Results
Cheerless and hopeless mood were associated with depression severity. Hopeless and irritable mood were associated with depression chronicity. Different forms of mood disturbance showed differential relations to depressive symptoms. Cheerless, hopeless, and irritable mood were associated with depression-specific functional interference, incremental to depression severity. Cheerless, hopeless, and discouraged mood were associated with passive suicidal ideation. Hopeless mood was associated with active suicidal ideation. Hopeless and irritable mood were associated with both suicide plan and suicide attempt. Different forms of mood disturbance demonstrated differential associations to comorbid psychiatric conditions.
Discussion
The relations between different forms of mood disturbances and various aspects of depression are nuanced. Theoretically, these relations highlight the potential utility in acknowledging the complexity and heterogeneity in mood disturbances. Clinically, our results suggest potential utility in routinely monitoring mood disturbances.
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Understanding how entrepreneurs’ positive affect influences firm innovation through the cognitive processes (e.g., entrepreneurial alertness to business opportunities) is important because emotions often impact evaluations and judgments of opportunities and (subsequent) firm engagement in innovative activities. Using data involving Iranian entrepreneurs, we find that (1) Tang, Kacmar, and Busenitz’s (2012) three alertness components unfold sequentially (i.e., information scanning and search leads to information association and connection which in turn leads to opportunity evaluation and judgment); (2) positive affect has a positive impact on all three alertness dimensions; and (3) evaluation and judgment impacts firm incremental innovation positively. Implications and future research directions are discussed.
After losing a close other, individuals usually confide in an empathic friend to receive comfort and they seem to have a heightened desire for mood-congruent, consoling music. Hence, it has been proposed that affect-congruent music acts as a social surrogate for an empathic friend. Thus, we hypothesized that listening to comforting music, as a response to a social loss experience, provides a sense of empathic company as indicated by reduced loneliness and heightened empathy. We further predicted that distracting music would have a stronger impact on the listeners’ mood in comparison to comforting pieces. To test these assumptions, an experiment with two factors was designed: (1) Sadness was induced by an approved guided imagery method where participants visualized either their father dying (social loss), losing their eyesight (non-social loss), or shopping for groceries (control condition). (2) After the mood induction, the listening task included either comforting or distracting music that participants selected themselves. Psychometric measures for mood and loneliness were collected before and after the mood induction and after the music listening. The data were analyzed with mixed model ANOVAs. The results showed a significant reduction of loneliness and a relevant rise in empathy and mood due to listening to self-selected music, irrespective of the listener’s mood or the applied listening strategy, which suggests that private musical engagement in general can provide mood-repair and a sense of connection. This beneficial effect of private musical engagement supports the notion that not only music production but also its perception engenders social cognition. Overall, the findings corroborate the idea of music as a social surrogate.
The authors examine the possibility that personality traits linked to positive and negative affect susceptibilities also influence performance on a mood-sensitive cognitive task: likelihood judgment is of possible positive and negative future events. In Study 1, participants (n = 104) filled out personality questionnaires, rated their current mood states, and rated the likelihood that positive and negative future events would occur. Results confirmed the hypothesis that affect-related traits predict likelihood judgments. Moreover; the personality effects were not mediated by current mood states. A second study (n = 81) replicated these personality effects on judgment in the context of manipulated moods (positive, sad, fearful, and neutral). As in Study 1, personality effects on judgment were not mediated by mood states. The authors suggest that the traits of extraversion and neuroticism include stable cognitive structures that can bias judgment in affect-congruent directions.
Three studies found that self-esteem moderates the relation between mood and self-evaluation. In Study 1, a standard mood-induction procedure was used to induce positive, negative, or neutral moods in low self-esteem (LSE) Ss and high self-esteem Ss. Afterward, Ss evaluated their specific qualities and characteristics (e.g., How smart are you? How kind are you?). Both self-esteem groups evaluated themselves favorably in a positive mood, but LSE Ss were more apt to lower their self-evaluations in a negative mood. Study 2 found a similar, though weaker pattern using a noncognitive, musical mood induction; Study 3 found that these effects occur with variations in naturally occurring mood over a 6-week period. The authors suggest that the tendency for LSE people to respond to negative moods with self-depreciation contributes to psychological distress.
Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to the ability to perceive, manage, evaluate, and use emotions. Broadly speaking, emotional intelligence addresses the emotional, personal, social, and survival dimensions of intelligence, which are often more important for daily functioning than the more traditional cognitive aspects of intelligence. The concept of emotional intelligence has brought new depth to the understanding of human intelligence; it enhances the ability to evaluate one’s general or overall intelligence.
This chapter examines the current state of emotional intelligence by comparing various models and approaches, as well as exploring the existing neurological evidence.
Accurate behavioral measurement is essential to developing a science of leadership, yet accurate measurement has remained elusive. The use of follower reports of leader behavior creates challenges given that a large body of basic and applied research suggests that behavioral ratings reflect not only recall of actual behaviors, but also inferences based on semantic memory, which may vary among individuals. In this paper, we examine several explanations for rater effects that are associated with follower individual differences, contextual factors, and even research methods, such as the type of measure used, that may bias ratings of leader behavior. We also develop a conceptual model to illustrate these processes. Finally, we offer potential solutions to increase accuracy in follower reports of leader behavior.
The eight studies reported on here examine the attributes lay persons attach to emotional experiences and develop a self-report scale for assessing individual differences in these attributes. Lay persons were asked to freely report attributes of emotions and their answers were content analyzed. Thus, a self-report scale was developed and its internal structure, reliability over time, and associations with meta-mood, Eysenck's personality dimensions, negative affectivity, and control and attentional focus variables were examined. Findings showed that persons spontaneously appraise emotions in terms of eight categorical attributes, which are structured around two orthogonal theories: a threat appraisal and a benefit appraisal of emotions. In addition, the self-report measure that was developed for assessing the superordinate theories, was found to be internally valid, reliable over time, concurrently valid, and significantly related to other affective and personality constructs.
Depressed and elated mood states may produce distinct information processing styles that can affect performance on deductive and inductive reasoning tasks differentially. Seventy-two undergraduates were asked to view a set of two film clips designed to induce either elated, neutral or depressed moods. One clip preceded each of two reasoning tasks, a deduction task and an induction task. We predicted that subjects in a depressed mood would exhibit impoverished performance relative to the other two conditions on the inductive reasoning problems but enhanced performance on those that involved deductive reasoning. Conversely, we expected subjects in an elated mood to perform worse than those in depressed and neutral moods on the deductive reasoning task, but better on the inductive reasoning task. Response times provided partial support for these hypotheses. Subjects in the elated mood condition performed significantly slower than those in both the neutral and depressed conditions on deductive reasoning problems, whereas subjects in the depressed mood condition performed significantly slower than those in the neutral condition on inductive reasoning problems. Implications for understanding mood-influenced cognitive styles are discussed.
Seven studies assessed the relation between lay theories of emotion (“threat” and “benefit” appraisal) and cognitions and behaviors in positive and negative emotional episodes. Studies 1 and 2 examined such a relation via the assessment of the habitual cognitions and behaviors persons evince in negative (Study 1) and positive emotional states. Studies 3 through 7 assessed whether and how appraisals of emotion affect some frequently observed cognitive-behavioral consequences of positive and negative affect induction, such as self-focused off-task cognitions, causal attribution, helping behavior, optimism, and creativity. Threat appraisal of emotion was related to negative self-evaluation, off-task cognitions, pessimism, and passivity during negative emotions, and to causal search during positive emotions. Benefit appraisal was related to active coping with, and emotional expressiveness of negative emotions and to the generalization of positive emotions to other behavioral-cognitive areas (altruism, optimism, creativity). The results are discussed in terms of a goal approach to emotion and personality.
This article presents a framework for emotional intelligence, a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one's life. We start by reviewing the debate about the adaptive versus maladaptive qualities of emotion. We then explore the literature on intelligence, and especially social intelligence, to examine the place of emotion in traditional intelligence conceptions. A framework for integrating the research on emotion-related skills is then described. Next, we review the components of emotional intelligence. To conclude the review, the role of emotional intelligence in mental health is discussed and avenues for further investigation are suggested.
The mood-congruent judgment effect refers to the fact that when a mood and an idea are similar in pleasantness, the idea will generally seem better in some way. For example, when people are happy, they will judge pleasant concepts as richer in their associations, pleasant attributes as more applicable, and pleasant examples of categories as more typical. This mood-related component of cognition is viewed longitudinally among normal students for the first time here. The authors demonstrate that over time, changes in mood covary with changes in judgment in normal individuals.
According to the mood-congruency hypothesis, happy material is learned better in happy moods, and sad material is learned better in sad moods. One explanation of the effect is provided through the associative network model of mood; moods activate concepts with similar valence, which in turn activate still other, similarly valenced material. The greater density of associations that are available when a mood is activated renders mood-congruent material easier to learn and remember. Certain controversies exist concerning the effect; for example (a) it may be easily alterable-or even caused-by instructions, (b) it may be related to mood strength, and (c) it may be moderated by personality variables. One hundred and ninety-six participants went through mood-congruency procedures. Mood congruency appeared, was unrelated to various instructional manipulations, unrelated to reported mood strength, and mostly unrelated to personality variables. Such a pattern suggested a spreading-activation explanation, perhaps due more to cognitive priming than mood per se.
The mood-congruent memory effect states that happy people will better remember happy than sad materials, whereas sad people will better remember sad than happy materials (or remember such material equally). Clinical studies and those employing experimentally induced moods find evidence formood-congruent memory, but results from both types of studies can be explained by nonmood influences. Mood-congruent memory has not yet been found in normal people in everyday moods. The authors find evidence for the effect among normal individuals in three studies (N = 614). This supports prior experimental and clinical findings-and means that mood and memory constantly covary in everyday experience.
Key-words Mood congruence, likelihood estimates, naïve theories, experimental demand Abstract Studies have found that positive moods are associated with more optimistic likelihood estimates than are negative moods. However, it is still unclear whether these effects can be attributed to the direct influ- ence of mood and to which extent they could be at least partially explained in terms of application of naïve theories. In Experiment 1, we observed mood congruence-like effects among participants who were simply asked to apply their naïve theories regarding the effects of mood on likelihood estimates. Experiment 2 revealed that mood congruence effects (moods being manipulated) were obtained only when participants were not constrained to respond honestly. 8IFOQBSUJDJQBOUTHBWFUIFJSFTUJ
The study of emotion has primarily evolved out of two disciplines, sociology and psychology. Each area has evaluated this phenomenon from a multitude of perspectives. Emotional intelligence has its roots within the psychological discipline. There has been a surge of interest throughout the 1990s in the area of emotional intelligence, and two different views of this phenomenon are emerging. The first perspective is called a “mixed-model” and is commonly associated with Goleman. This model is broader and a more inclusive description of emotional intelligence. The second perspective is referred to as an “ability-model,” which is a more restrictive description of emotional intelligence and is associated with Salovey and Mayer. These models form the foundation for research and practice into the role of emotional intelligence in human resource development.
The authors examine the possibility that personality traits linked to positive and negative affect susceptibilities also influence performance on a mood-sensitive cognitive task: likelihood judgments of possible positive and negative future events. In Study 1, participants (n = 104) filled out personality questionnaires, rated their current mood states, and rated the likelihood that positive and negative future events would occur. Results confirmed the hypothesis that affect-related traits predict likelihood judgments. Moreover, the personality effects were not mediated by current mood states. A second study (n = 81) replicated these personality effects on judgment in the context of manipulated moods (positive, sad, fearful, and neutral). As in Study 1, personality effects on judgment were not mediated by mood states. The authors suggest that the traits of extraversion and neuroticism include stable cognitive structures that can bias judgment in affect-congruent directions.
Body concept and body esteem were examined among 147 male patients (mean ages 45–58 yrs) in 4 medical groups (cardiac, spinal-cord injured, alcoholic, and domiciliary). To study body concept, multidimensional scaling was used to extract the dimensions organizing 33 body parts. Three dimensions, head–body, arm-leg, and inside–outside, organized bodily experience for the groups. To study body esteem, a principal components analysis was applied to esteem ratings of the same body parts; head and body dimensions emerged, suggesting correspondence between cognition and affect. Body concept was stable across medical groups, whereas body esteem underwent dramatic, illness-related changes. A serial chain model of body concept is proposed to synthesize these and related findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Mood congruency refers to a match in affective content between a person's mood and his or her thoughts. The mood-congruent judgment effect states in part that attributes will be judged more characteristic, and events more likely, under conditions of mood congruence. Thus, the happy person will believe good weather is more likely than bad weather (relative to such a judgment in a state of mood incongruence). Three studies showed that the effect generalizes to non-self-relevant judgments with natural mood. Study 1 (
N = 202) generalized it across a variety of specific emotions, Study 2 (
N = 1,065) generalized it across a variety of tasks, and Study 3 (
N = 524) generalized it to a nonlaboratory, statewide sample. The 3 studies redefine mood-congruent judgment more broadly and thereby inform the debate about its underlying mechanisms. The relation between mood-congruent judgment and personality is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
describe research from other laboratories as well as our own designed to examine emotional influences in perception / evaluate different models of the organization of emotional memory and discuss the implications of such models for the efficiency and the content of perception
particularly interested in the role of discrete emotions in perception, where emotions are phenomenal states that are associated with distinctive expressive displays, eliciting events, and subjective feeling tone (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
While life satisfaction is commonly measured as an aggregate of individual life domains, the characterisation of such domains is uncertain. This study attempts to group 173 different domains names derived from the literature under seven headings as used by the Comprehensive Quality of Life Scale (ComQol). It was found that 68% could be classified in this way. Moreover, due to the repeated use of some domain names, the ComQol classification included 83% of the total reported data. The ComQol domain data did not differ from single-item global measures of life satisfaction and the within-study variance was lower using the ComQol rather than the original domains. A hierarchy of domain satisfaction was found which was dominated by the domain of intimacy. The other ComQol domains were quite tightly clustered within a range of 1.08 standard deviations. No difference was found between normative data and data gathered from people with a chronic medical condition, but people selected on psychiatric criteria had a lower life quality, most particularly in the domain of intimacy. It is concluded that life satisfaction, and therefore subjective well-being, can be economically and validly measured through the seven ComQol domains.
The decisions of business leaders and government officials are currently guided by economic and social indicators. It is proposed that accounts of well-being be collected on an ongoing basis to complement the existing indicators. Accounts of subjective well-being would track the societal groups where happiness, life satisfaction, engagement, and positive feelings are high versus low, would indicate the activities that people find enjoyable versus unpleasant, and would monitor changing levels of well-being over time. The accounts would serve decision-makers by making important information on well-being and ill-being available to them. They would also greatly help applied psychology by drawing more attention and interest to important outcomes that are likely to result from psychological interventions.
Les décisions des chefs d’entreprise et des responsables gouvernementaux se fondent actuellement sur des indicateurs sociaux et économiques. On propose de recueillir des données relatives au bien-être de façon continue en complément des indicateurs existants. Les mesures du bien-être subjectif détecteraient les groupes sociaux où le bonheur, la satisfaction de vivre, le sens des responsabilités et les sentiments positifs sont élevés ou bas, indiqueraient les activités que les gens trouvent agréables ou non et suivraient avec le temps les changements dans le niveau du bien-être. Ces mesures seraient utiles aux décisionnaires en mettant à leur disposition des informations importantes sur le bien-être et son contraire. Elles seraient aussi d’un grand secours pour la psychologie appliquée en accordant davantage d’attention et d’intérêt aux conséquences importantes susceptibles de résulter des interventions psychologiques.
Subjective well-being (SWB) comprises people's longer-term levels of pleasant affect, lack of unpleasant affect, and life satisfaction. It displays moderately high levels of cross-situational consistency and temporal stability. Self-report measures of SWB show adequate validity, reliability, factor invariance, and sensitivity to change. Despite the success of the measures to date, more sophisticated approaches to defining and measuring SWB are now possible. Affect includes facial, physiological, motivational, behavioral, and cognitive components. Self-reports assess primarily the cognitive component of affect, and thus are unlikely to yield a complete picture of respondents' emotional lives. For example, denial may influence self-reports of SWB more than other components. Additionally, emotions are responses which vary on a number of dimensions such as intensity, suggesting that mean levels of affect as captured by existing measures do not give a complete account of SWB. Advances in cognitive psychology indicate that differences in memory retrieval, mood as information, and scaling processes can influence self-reports of SWB. Finally, theories of communication alert us to the types of information that are likely to be given in self-reports of SWB. These advances from psychology suggest that a multimethod approach to assessing SWB will create a more comprehensive depiction of the phenomenon. Not only will a multifaceted test battery yield more credible data, but inconsistencies between various measurement methods and between the various components of well-being will both help us better understand SWB indictors and group differences in well-being. Knowledge of cognition, personality, and emotion will also aid in the development of sophisticated theoretical definitions of subjective well-being. For example, life satisfaction is theorized to be a judgment that respondents construct based on currently salient information. Finally, it is concluded that measuring negative reactions such as depression or anxiety give an incomplete picture of people's well-being, and that it is imperative to measure life satisfaction and positive emotions as well.
Subjective well-being (SWB) comprises people’s longer-term levels of pleasant affect, lack of unpleasant affect, and life
satisfaction. It displays moderately high levels of cross-situational consistency and temporal stability. Self-report measures
of SWB show adequate validity, reliability, factor invariance, and sensitivity to change. Despite the success of the measures
to date, more sophisticated approaches to defining and measuring SWB are now possible. Affect includes facial, physiological,
motivational, behavioral, and cognitive components. Self-reports assess primarily the cognitive component of affect, and thus
are unlikely to yield a complete picture of respondents’ emotional lives. For example, denial may influence self-reports of
SWB more than other components. Additionally, emotions are responses which vary on a number of dimensions such as intensity,
suggesting that mean levels of affect as captured by existing measures do not give a complete account of SWB. Advances in
cognitive psychology indicate that differences in memory retrieval, mood as information, and scaling processes can influence
self-reports of SWB. Finally, theories of communication alert us to the types of information that are likely to be given in
self-reports of SWB. These advances from psychology suggest that a multimethod approach to assessing SWB will create a more
comprehensive depiction of the phenomenon. Not only will a multifaceted test battery yield more credible data, but inconsistencies
between various measurement methods and between the various components of well-being. Knowledge of cognition, personality,
and emotion will also aid in the development of sophisticated theoretical definitions of subjective well-being. For example,
life satisfaction is theorized to be a judgment that respondents construct based on currently salient information. Finally,
it is concluded that measuring negative reactions such as depression or anxiety give an incomplete picture of people’s well-being,
and that it is imperative to measure life satisfaction and positive emotions as well.
A number of investigators have suggested that affective states influence the focus of attention. One recent proposal is that negative moods increase self-focus. This review considers the evidence that bears on this hypothesis. Conceptual issues pertaining to the construct of self-focus are discussed first. Next, the various parameters that influence attentional focus are presented in order to provide a way of organizing the mood/selffocus literature. Studies that have used state measures of mood and self-focus are considered in this context. Methodological limitations of existing studies are discussed and directions for future work provided.
The purpose of the present research was to analyze the psychometric properties of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) in sport context. The TMMS is a 24-item self-report measure that assesses perceived emotional intelligence, which is the extent to which people believe they pay attention to their emotions and are capable of distinguishing and regulating them. Participants were 368 athletes (257 male, 111 female; M age=21.4 yr., SD=5.5; range=14-40). Factor validity was tested via Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Based on factor loadings, covariances, and modification indices, the TMMS was reduced to a 22-item model. This respecification showed adequate reliability and construct validity. Multistep analysis of invariance indicated that the factor structure of the TMMS is invariant across sex. Predictive validity was assessed through path analysis. The results support the use of the Spanish version of the TMMS in a sport context.
Most academics agree that emotions and moods are related but distinct phenomena. The present study assessed emotion-mood distinctions among a non-academic population and compared these views with distinctions proposed in the literature. Content analysis of responses from 106 participants identified 16 themes, with cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), experience (15%) and consequences (14%) the most frequently cited distinctions. Among 65 contributions to the academic literature, eight themes were proposed, with duration (62% of authors), intentionality (41%), cause (31%), consequences (31%) and function (18%) the most frequently cited. When the eight themes cited by both academics and non-academics were rank ordered, approximately 60% overlap in opinion was evident. A data-derived summary of emotion-mood distinctions is provided. These data should prove useful to investigators interested in developing a clearer scientific distinction between emotion and mood than is currently available.
This article reviews evidence for the roles that mood states and personality traits play in the processing of emotion-congruent information across different cognitive tasks. Evidence is reviewed for 3 emotion-congruency frameworks, each summarizing a different route to emotional processing: the traditional approach, a moderation approach, and a mediation approach. Most of the traditional literature includes studies that examine the effects of moods and traits on emotional processing separately; these studies have yielded some inconsistent findings. The moderation and mediation approaches offer potential solutions to the lack of consistency obtained in the traditional literature by allowing for the combined effects of personality traits and mood states on the processing of emotional information. The moderation approach suggests that mood states interact with individual differences in emotion-relevant personality traits to influence emotion-congruent processing. The mediation approach suggests that personality traits predispose individuals to certain mood states, which then influence emotional processing. These approaches provide a framework for understanding the literature and a starting point for future research on emotion-congruent processing.
Numerous studies show that happy individuals are successful across multiple life domains, including marriage, friendship, income, work performance, and health. The authors suggest a conceptual model to account for these findings, arguing that the happiness-success link exists not only because success makes people happy, but also because positive affect engenders success. Three classes of evidence--crosssectional, longitudinal, and experimental--are documented to test their model. Relevant studies are described and their effect sizes combined meta-analytically. The results reveal that happiness is associated with and precedes numerous successful outcomes, as well as behaviors paralleling success. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that positive affect--the hallmark of well-being--may be the cause of many of the desirable characteristics, resources, and successes correlated with happiness. Limitations, empirical issues, and important future research questions are discussed.
We comment on the article by Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren (1985) in which they failed to find mood-congruent learning (MCL). MCL occurs whenever subjects learn more about materials that are congruent with their moods (e.g., depressed subjects learn more sad material). Hasher et al. failed to observe MCL with normal college students who scored high versus low on the Beck Depression Inventory and an affect checklist; in contrast, positive MCL has been observed with clinically depressed patients and with normals given laboratory mood inductions. Hasher et al. argue that moderately depressed normal students may be qualitatively different from clinically depressed patients and mood-induced subjects. Although we accept the findings of Hasher et al., we think it is also plausible that MCL may be a general though small effect which is present among normal college students as well.
Describes experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in Ss by hypnotic suggestion to investigate the influence of emotions on memory and thinking. Results show that (a) Ss exhibited mood-state-dependent memory in recall of word lists, personal experiences recorded in a daily diary, and childhood experiences; (b) Ss recalled a greater percentage of those experiences that were affectively congruent with the mood they were in during recall; (c) emotion powerfully influenced such cognitive processes as free associations, imaginative fantasies, social perceptions, and snap judgments about others' personalities; (d) when the feeling-tone of a narrative agreed with the reader's emotion, the salience and memorability of events in that narrative were increased. An associative network theory is proposed to account for these results. In this theory, an emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categorization. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Factor-analytic evidence has led most psychologists to describe affect as a set of dimensions, such as displeasure, distress, depression, excitement, and so on, with each dimension varying independently of the others. However, there is other evidence that rather than being independent, these affective dimensions are interrelated in a highly systematic fashion. The evidence suggests that these interrelationships can be represented by a spatial model in which affective concepts fall in a circle in the following order: pleasure (0), excitement (45), arousal (90), distress (135), displeasure (180), depression (225), sleepiness (270), and relaxation (315). This model was offered both as a way psychologists can represent the structure of affective experience, as assessed through self-report, and as a representation of the cognitive structure that laymen utilize in conceptualizing affect. Supportive evidence was obtained by scaling 28 emotion-denoting adjectives in 4 different ways: R. T. Ross's (1938) technique for a circular ordering of variables, a multidimensional scaling procedure based on perceived similarity among the terms, a unidimensional scaling on hypothesized pleasure–displeasure and degree-of-arousal dimensions, and a principal-components analysis of 343 Ss' self-reports of their current affective states. (70 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Investigated the role of affect in judgments of risk in 4 experiments. 557 Ss were recruited on college campuses and read paragraphs modeled after newspaper reports that described fatal or nonfatal accidents or (Exp III) positive events. Ss were later asked to estimate the chances of specific fatal or nonfatal accidents happening to them and/or to the population in general. Experimental manipulations of affect induced by report of a tragic event produced a pervasive increase in Ss' estimates of the frequency of many risks and other undesirable events. Contrary to expectation, the effect was independent of the similarity between the report and the estimated risk: An account of a fatal stabbing did not increase the frequency estimate of homicide more than the estimates of unrelated risks such as natural hazards. An account of a happy event that created positive affect produced a comparable global decrease in judged frequency of risks. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Numerous previous studies found monopolar rather than bipolar dimensions of affect (defined as emotion represented in language), but they may have included methodological biases against bipolarity. The present study of 150 undergraduates' self-report data on 11 affect scales showed that response format and acquiescence response style significantly shifted correlations between hypothesized opposites away from showing bipolarity. When these biases were taken into account, pleasure was the bipolar opposite of displeasure and arousal of sleepiness. In turn, pleasure–displeasure and degree of arousal formed a 2-dimensional bipolar space that accounted for almost all of the reliable variance in R. E. Thayer's (1970) 4 factors of activation plus a measure of depression. Dominance and submissiveness factors were also included in the study, but invalidity of the scales used precluded any conclusions regarding their bipolarity. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined the directionality of the relationship between realism in judging personal control and depression. Depressed and elated mood states were induced transiently in 40 naturally nondepressed and 40 depressed females (Beck Depression Inventory and the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List), and the impact of these transient mood states on susceptibility to the illusion of control was assessed. Naturally nondepressed Ss gave accurate judgments of control while naturally depressed Ss showed an illusion of control and overestimated their impact on an objectively uncontrollable outcome. Mood induction groups showed predicted changes in self-reported affect and a behavioral measure of depression. These results are in contrast to those of L. B. Alloy and L. Y. Abramson (1979). An implication of the present findings may be that therapeutic interventions for depression that successfully remediate depressive symptoms may also increase depressed individuals' susceptibility to the illusion of control. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Comments on the failure of L. Hasher et al (see record
1986-03061-001) to find either an overall reduction in story recall or selectivity effects in recall due to mildly depressed mood state. It is suggested that their negative findings may be the result of a weak individual difference mood manipulation and that the story recall task may make insufficient encoding demands to reveal the effects of mood on recall. Although the negative findings of Hasher et al appear valid, the conditions of their experiments are those which appear least likely to produce mood effects on recall. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Proposes that verbal reports are data and that accounting for them, as well as for other kinds of data, requires explication of the mechanisms by which the reports are generated, and the ways in which they are sensitive to experimental factors (instructions, tasks, etc). Within the theoretical framework of human information processing, different types of processes underlying verbalization are discussed, and a model is presented of how Ss, in response to an instruction to think aloud, verbalize information that they are attending to in short-term memory (STM). Verbalizing information is shown to affect cognitive processes only if the instructions require verbalization of information that would not otherwise be attended to. From an analysis of what would be in STM at the time of report, the model predicts what could be reliably reported. The inaccurate reports found by other research are shown to result from requesting information that was never directly heeded, thus forcing Ss to infer rather than remember their mental processes. (112 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Investigated the functional relations among cognitive appraisal and coping processes and their short-term outcomes within stressful encounters. The authors used an intraindividual analysis of the interrelations among primary appraisal (what was at stake in the encounter), secondary appraisal (coping options), 8 forms of problem- and emotion-focused coping, and encounter outcomes in a sample of 85 married couples (females aged 35–45 yrs and males aged 26–54 yrs). Findings show that coping was strongly related to cognitive appraisal; the forms of coping that were used varied depending on what was at stake and the options for coping. Coping was also differentially related to satisfactory and unsatisfactory encounter outcomes. Findings clarify the functional relations among appraisal and coping variables and the outcomes of stressful encounters. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Investigated the structure of intra-individual mood (P-factors) for the presence of 2 dimensions of self-reported current mood—Positive and Negative Affect—found previously in interindividual R-factor analyses (A. Tellegen, 1980). 23 undergraduates completed a 60-item mood adjective checklist for 90 consecutive days. Quantitative comparisons of each S's 1st 2 rotated P-factors to the R-factor dimensions resulted in the identification of the 2 dimensions for 21 Ss, underscoring the congruence of the 2-dimensional structure identified within and across Ss. The belief that the idiographic study of individuals, rather than being antithetical to scientific psychology, can provide information of value and relevance to nomothetic description was basic to the investigation. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Research suggests that, whereas induced happiness tends to facilitate the recall of positive material, induced mild sadness often does not facilitate the recall of negative material symmetrically. These results are compatible with those reported by L. Hasher et al (see record
1986-03061-001) but also suggest that their failure to observe effects of mild depression on recall should not be overgeneralized to conclude that affective states other than mild sadness have negligible effects on cognitive processes. Possible mediators of these phenomena are discussed, and their potential relevance to the understanding of clinical depression and of the cognitive representation of various affective states is considered. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two field studies investigated the time course of the effect of feeling good on helping. 42 Ss were given small packets ("free samples") of stationery by a confederate who went from door to door. Then, at different intervals, each S received a "wrong number" telephone call during which he/she had the opportunity to help. Results show that Ss who had received stationery helped more than did those in either of 2 control groups. The effect declined gradually over time, and by 20 min after receipt of the stationery, the experimental group did not differ from the control groups. The time course of the decline in helpfulness and the basic relationship between good mood and helping are discussed in terms of cognitive processes. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Discusses the paradoxical discrepancy involved in the statistical calculation of the percentage of variation in batting performance that is attributable to skill differentials among major-league baseball players, which is discrepant with intuitions about the influence of skill in batting performance. This discrepancy is discussed in terms of habits of thought about variance explanation. It is argued that percentage variance explanation is a misleading index of the influence of systematic factors in cases where there are processes by which influences cumulate to produce meaningful outcomes. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in Ss by hypnotic suggestion to investigate the influence of emotions on memory and thinking. Results show that (a) Ss exhibited mood-state-dependent memory in recall of word lists, personal experiences recorded in a daily diary, and childhood experiences; (b) Ss recalled a greater percentage of those experiences that were affectively congruent with the mood they were in during recall; (c) emotion powerfully influenced such cognitive processes as free associations, imaginative fantasies, social perceptions, and snap judgments about others' personalities; (d) when the feeling-tone of a narrative agreed with the reader's emotion, the salience and memorability of events in that narrative were increased. An associative network theory is proposed to account for these results. In this theory, an emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categorization.
Examined the effect of depressed mood on the accessibility of memories of past real-life experiences of a pleasant or unpleasant nature. By means of a mood induction procedure, 30 students (mean age 19.2 yrs) were made happy on one occasion and depressed on another. The 2 mood states differed significantly on self-report, speech-rate, and recall-latency measures. Stimulus words to which Ss had to associate past pleasant or unpleasant experiences were presented in each mood condition, and latency of retrieval was measured. Time to retrieve pleasant memories, relative to time to retrieve unpleasant memories, was significantly longer when Ss were depressed than when they were happy, suggesting a differential effect of mood on the accessibility of these 2 types of memory. Results are considered in relation to state-dependent learning and activation of memories, and their implications for models and treatment of depression are discussed. It is suggested that cognitive models of depression need to be extended to include a reciprocal relation between thought content and depressed mood. (24 ref)
Two studies investigated the effect of good mood on cognitive processes. In the first study, conducted in a shopping mall, a positive feeling state was induced by giving subjects a free gift, and good mood, thus induced, was found to improve subjects' evaluations of the performance and service records of products they owned. In the second study, in which affect was induced by having subjects win or lose a computer game in a laboratory setting, subjects who had won the game were found to be better able to recall positive material in memory. The results of the two studies are discussed in terms of the effect that feelings have on accessibility of cognitions. In addition, the nature of affect and the relationship between good mood and behavior (such as helping) are discussed in terms of this proposed cognitive process.
Tested 2 sets of hypotheses, derived from cognitive–behavioral theories of depression, that (a) compared to a sample of nondepressed controls, depressed Ss would underestimate the frequency of reinforcement and overestimate the frequency of punishment received during an ambiguous laboratory task; and (b) when given the opportunity to self-reinforce or self-punish, depressed Ss would self-reinforce less often and self-punish more often than controls. Three of these predictions were supported. In an experiment with 24 depressed and 21 nondepressed undergraduates (Beck Depression Inventory), depressed Ss recalled less positive and more negative feedback than controls. As expected, these differences were significant only at a high rate of reinforcement and at a low rate of punishment. In the latter condition, however, depressed Ss were accurate in their recall, while nondepressed Ss underestimated the frequency of negative feedback. Depressed Ss self-reinforced less often than controls, but there were no differences in rates of self-punishment. Implications for cognitive and behavioral theories of depression are discussed. (22 ref)
In three experiments we explored the relation between normal variation in depressed mood and memory in college students. Subjects read and subsequently recalled stories whose protagonists experienced good, bad, and neutral events. Contrary to predictions arising independently from capacity theory and from schema theory, the recall of depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in either overall level or in affective content. The results are not easily handled by a conceptualization of depression, tied to schema theory, which proposes that negative cognitions are important for the initiation and maintenance of depression. The general usefulness of induction procedures in research on the depressive syndrome is discussed.
This article provides a critical review of the empirical literature on the role of depression and elation in biasing mnemonic processing. Two classes of effects—state dependence and mood congruence—are examined. The latter, which involves the enhanced encoding and/or retrieval of material the affective valence of which is congruent with ongoing mood, is the more extensively researched of the two and is thus the focus of much of the present review. Though the support for claims of such a phenomenon is impressive in its size, consistency, and diversity, a number of questions remain. These include whether such effects are linked to mood states per se, and the possible role that such effects may play in the development of persistent depression.
A 1-sided exact test, based on the unconditional distribution of the common Z statistic, is proposed for the hypothesis of equal stress probabilities in a 2 × 2 comparative trials contingency table. The need for an exact test is justified by the fact that the Type I error probabilities of the large-sample (normal) test may turn out to be more than twice the nominal significance level. Power comparisons reveal that the new test performs considerably better than Fisher's exact test and, in some cases, is even more powerful than the randomized conditional test. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Although personality traits are commonly assumed to be represented in memory as schemata, little research has addressed whether such schemata can be learned from observation. Subjects in three studies classified 60 person instances into group members and nonmembers as defined by the instances' match to a complex personality prototype. To simulate learning of fuzzy categories, each person instance provided conflicting cues to group membership. Learning for instances' group membership was excellent across studies. In Study 1, frequency of cues indicating group membership was greatly overestimated among nongroup instances. In Study 2, schema-consistent memory bias was revealed for person instances. In Study 3, schemata of consistently positive (or negative) traits were learned faster than arbitrary schemata. The findings implicated frequency sensitivity of memory (Estes, 1986), and a model of probabilistic cued-memory retrieval was developed to account for the effects. The findings were then discussed in relation to everyday cognitive performance.
Reanalyses of a number of studies of self-reported mood indicate that Positive and Negative Affect consistently emerge as the first two Varimax rotated dimensions in orthogonal factor analyses or as the first two second-order factors derived from oblique solutions. The two factors emerged with varying sets of descriptors and were even replicated in several data sets characterized by possible methodological problems noted by earlier writers (acquiescence response bias, inappropriate response formats, and so on). The results thus strongly attest to the stability and robustness of Positive and Negative Affect in self-report. Because this same two-dimensional configuration has also been consistently identified in all of the other major lines of mood research, it is now firmly established as the basic structure of English-language affect at the general factor level.
The person–situation debate remained unresolved for many decades because researchers did not realize that behavior can be situationally specific at the item level and cross-situationally general at the aggregate level. Research that supported the specificity position examined single instances of behavior or did not properly aggregate behavior over items as well as occasions and was therefore unable to provide evidence for the existence of broad, stable response dispositions, or traits. A detailed examination of four classic studies and of a more recent study by Mischel and Peake (1982), all of which examined multiple items on many occasions, revealed that, in all cases, commitment to a procedural paradigm that emphasized relationships among individual items of behavior resulted either in the use of inappropriate procedures or in the misinterpretation of data. The most common problems concerned inappropriate procedures for item selection and retention, the failure to properly take into account reliability, and, most important, the failure to recognize the importance of attending to relationships among aggregates of items. The data from all studies, despite different conclusions by the authors, provided remarkably similar findings, including impressive evidence for stable, broad response dispositions, and for considerably stronger cross-situational relationships than had been reported.
Miron's comments on J. Kuusinen's paper (see 43:(10) raise a number of critical questions about semantic differential technique and the theory of meaning which lies behind it. The present author responds that semantic differential technique ordinarily measures certain affective features of total meaning, closely related to the dimensions of emotion or feeling, which appear to be universal in the human species. Semantic differential technique highlights these affective features at the expense of other semantic features more familiar to linguists because it forces most qualifier scales to be used metaphorically with most concepts, and the rule seems to be that metaphorically used scales rotate toward those affective dimensions on which they have their highest loadings. This is simultaneously the reason why the semantic differential technique is not a general procedure for discovering semantic features, even though evaluation, potency, and activity (E-P-A) are very significant features of human meaning systems. As to theory, the author concludes that although the E-P-A features of meaning have a many-to-one relation to significates (as must any subset of features), the representational of mediation behavior theory as wholes do not. The differences that remain seem to be matters of preference in metaphysics.
Two studies in which the parameters of construct accessibility in depression were examined are reported. In Experiment 1, depressed and nondepressed subjects were required to name the colors of tachistiscopically presented depressed-content, neutral-content, and manic-content words. Because of the predicted accessibility and interference effects of the depressed-content words, the depressed subjects were expected to demonstrate longer response latencies to these words than to the non-depressed-content words. This response pattern was found for the depressed subjects; the nondepressed subjects did not demonstrate differential response latencies. In Experiment 2, a mood-induction paradigm was used to investigate whether the interference effects obtained in Experiment 1 were due to temporary mood differences between the depressed and nondepressed subjects, or were a function of more stable depression-associated patterns of information processing. Although predicted group differences were obtained on a mood adjective checklist, no effects were found for task performance. These results suggest that transient mood is not a sufficient explanation for the results obtained in Experiment 1. The implications of the present findings for the understanding of both construct accessibility and depression are discussed, and directions for future research are suggested.
Five studies on the relation between positive and negative affect are reported. In Studies 1 and 2 we found that positive feelings were remembered as being nearly independent of negative feelings in the past year, but the two types of affect were moderately negatively correlated for the past month. In Studies 3 and 5, subjects completed daily mood reports for 70 and 30 days, respectively. In Study 4, subjects completed three-week, daily, and moment mood reports and also filled out reports when they experienced strong emotions. The principal finding was that the relation between positive and negative affect differed greatly depending on the time frame. The strongest negative correlation between the two affects occurred during emotional times. The correlation decreased in a linear fashion as the time span covered increased logarithmically. It appears that positive and negative affect are independent in terms of how much people feel in their lives over longer time periods. Researchers need to focus on the processes that underlie both positive and negative affect and that are responsible for producing their relative independence.
Three studies are reported that examine the relations between personality and happiness or subjective well-being. It is argued that (a) one set of traits influences positive affect or satisfaction, whereas a different set of traits influences negative affect or dissatisfaction; (b) the former set of traits can be reviewed as components of extraversion, and the latter as components of neuroticism; and (c) personality differences antedate and predict differences in happiness over a period of 10 years, thus ruling out the rival hypothesis that temporary moods or states account for the observed relations. A model of individual differences in happiness is presented, and the separate and complementary roles of trait and adaptation-level theories in explaining happiness are discussed.
30 women gave 9-point rating scale judgments of the dissimiliarity of emotional expression of each of 78 pairs of facial poses formed from combinations of 13 diverse stimuli of the Lightfoot Series. The dissimilarity ratings were converted to interstimulus distances. These findings were compared with the distances one would exepct on the basis of the 3 Schlosberg scales of facial expression. Concluded that a 2-dimensional system would appear to be adequate: pleasant-unpleasant and tension-sleep, or perhaps a slight variant of the latter. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The territory that psychologists explore is still largely uncharted; so to find Eysenck’s model for personality in the middle of this terra incognita is rather like stumbling across St. Pancras Station in the heart of the African jungle. Faced with this apparition, one’s first question is, not “does it work?”, but “what’s it for?” This, indeed, is the right question to ask. Eysenck’s model bestrides the field of personality like a colossus. There have been other attempts to describe personality, notably Cattell’s and Guilford’s, and other attempts to explain it, above all, Pavlov’s and Teplov’s: but no one has tried to achieve both these aims on the same scale as Eysenck. In consequence, it is extremely difficult to see the Eysenckian edifice in perspective: there are too few other buildings with which to compare it, only the surrounding trackless jungle. It is by asking “what’s it for?” that we can best provide this perspective. In answer to this question, Fig. 8.1 dis plays what I take to be the general structure of Eysenck’s theory of extra version-introversion (E-I) and neuroticism (N).
Investigated the functional relations among cognitive appraisal and coping processes and their short-term outcomes within stressful encounters. The authors used an intraindividual analysis of the interrelations among primary appraisal (what was at stake in the encounter), secondary appraisal (coping options), 8 forms of problem- and emotion-focused coping, and encounter outcomes in a sample of 85 married couples (females aged 35–45 yrs and males aged 26–54 yrs). Findings show that coping was strongly related to cognitive appraisal; the forms of coping that were used varied depending on what was at stake and the options for coping. Coping was also differentially related to satisfactory and unsatisfactory encounter outcomes. Findings clarify the functional relations among appraisal and coping variables and the outcomes of stressful encounters. (47 ref)
19 female undergraduates rated their emotions in a wide variety of work, recreation, social, and solitary situations sampled over a 30-day period. Ss were also administered the Personality Research Form and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Although predictable relations were found between certain personality traits and specific emotions averaged across situations, when chosen situations were distinguished from imposed situations, other meaningful results were obtained. Both temperament and nontemperament personality traits were found to be related to specific emotions. Implications for research on situation selection and the status of personality traits are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This book has been written primarily for the purpose of furnishing my students with a brief manual to supplement the lectures on Psychology. At the same time it aims to give the wider circle of scientific scholars who are interested in psychology, either for its own sake or for the sake of its applications, a systematic survey of the fundamentally important results and doctrines of modern psychology. In view of this double purpose, I have limited myself in detailing facts to that which is most important, or to the examples that serve most directly the ends of illustration, and have omitted entirely those aids to demonstration and experiment which are properly made use of in the lecture-room. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The author's intent is to write about abnormal people in a way that will be valuable and interesting to students new to the subject. A first course in abnormal psychology is not intended to train specialists. Its goal is more general: it should provide the student with the opportunity to whet his interest, expand his horizons, register a certain body of new facts, and relate this to the rest of his knowledge about mankind. I have tried to present the subject in such a way as to emphasize its usefulness to all students of human nature. I have tried the experiment of writing two introductory chapters, one historical and the other clinical. This reflects my desire to set the subject-matter in a broad perspective and at the same time to anchor it in concrete fact. Next comes a block of six chapters designed to set forth the topics of maladjustment and neurosis. The two chapters on psychotherapy complete the more purely psychological or developmental part of the work. In the final chapter the problem of disordered personalities is allowed to expand to its full social dimensions. Treatment, care, and prevention call for social effort and social organization. I have sought to show some of the lines, both professional and nonprofessional, along which this effort can be expended. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Six experiments with a total of 168 college students failed to provide stable evidence for mood-dependent retrieval (MDR), a special case of context-dependent memory. In Exps 1–3, interlist interference was increased in order to make mood a more salient retrieval cue. Exps 4–6 introduced attributions of causal belonging in order to strengthen the bond between items to be remembered and the emotions they caused. In Exp 6, items to be remembered were S-generated. These manipulations failed to produce an MDR effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The latest edition of this popular, successful text. Focuses on the theme of life development and provides numerous cases. Covers all major approaches, including the psychoanalytic, neo-analytic, client-centered and behavioral. Features new material on homosexuallity and minorities, more illustrations and an improved design.
There is currently common agreement that moods are organized responses that affect many psychological subsystems, including the cognitive subsystem. The pleasant versus unpleasant quality of an individual''s mood was the dependent measure in this study, which examined cognitive correlates of mood level. A set of tasks hypothesized to change with mood, an adjective scale measuring present mood state, and four personality scales were administered to 194 students. Results indicate that three tasks—giving advice to others, estimating the probability of events, and subjective ratings of associations to words—are correlated with mood state and mood-related traits (e.g., emotional distress). Because of the measurement of mood along a pleasant-unpleasant continuum, the present findings of cognitive change can be generalized to any mood that is mostly pleasant or unpleasant. Results also indicate that individuals low in neuroticism had greater correspondence between self-reported mood and performance on affect-sensitive tasks. The changes in cognition are discussed in the context of a spreading-activation view of mood effects and a depressive-schema theory of information processing. More generally, the results suggest that moods lead to broad influences on cognitive responses over considerable portions of an individual''s life-span.
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1967. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-224). Photocopy.
It is hypothesized that when an individual experiences a change in mood there are concomitant changes in performance at cognitive and psychomotor tasks. The present study attempts to identify tasks which are mood-sensitive. The nature of affect-sensitive tasks will yield information about how mood influences behavior. Further, to the extent that relationships between mood and affect-sensitive tasks are found, clients may be motivated to change their mood by a knowledge of expectable improvements in performance. Ten tasks and a mood-adjective checklist were administered to 106 subjects. Four of the tasks showed statistically significant relationships with self-reported mood. Results were promising for further investigations of affect-sensitive tasks.
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