Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism: Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia

Abstract

Denmark, Norway and Sweden are still among the most corporatist democracies in the world. Although corporatism has declined in Scandinavia over the last decades, it still exists, albeit at a lower level. Based on comparative and longitudinal data, we argue that this is a consequence of the disruption of some of the prerequisites to corporatist exchange. Neither governments nor the relevant interest groups in Scandinavia control what their exchange partner desires to the same extent as they did during the heyday of corporatism. Despite the involvement of different factors in the three countries, the main pattern is the same. Consequently, the character of state–interest group relations in Scandinavia is not as distinctive as it used to be.

Full text

PerOla Öberg,Torsten Svensson,Peter Munk
Christiansen,Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard,
Hilmar Rommetvedt and Gunnar Thesengoop_1343 365..391
Disrupted Exchange and Declining
Corporatism: Government Authority and
Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia
FOR MANY DECADES, DENMARK, NORWAY AND SWEDEN HAVE BEEN
among the most corporatist liberal democracies in the world.1Corpo-
ratism is still comparatively viable in Scandinavia, but has declined
over the last decades.2There are several possible explanations for this
development, and in this article we explore one of them: whether
some basic prerequisite for corporatist exchange has been disrupted.
We understand corporatism as a mutually beneficial exchange
between interest groups and government.3The basic exchange
mechanism is that some actors control something that others desire.
We assume that governments still desire acquiescence to public policy,
while interest groups still desire public policy that is favourable to
1A. Lijphart and M. M. L. Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in
Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of Political
Science, 21: 2 (1991), pp. 235–56; A. Siaroff, ‘Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies:
Meaning and Measurement’, European Journal of Political Research, 36: 2 (1999),
pp. 175–205.
2J. Blom-Hansen, ‘Still Corporatism in Scandinavia? A Survey of Recent Empirical
Findings’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 23: 2 (2000), pp. 157–81; P. M. Christiansen
et al., ‘Varieties of Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in
Scandinavian Policy Making’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 22: 1 (2010), pp. 22–40.
3G. Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks’, in J. H.
Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1984; O. Molina and M. Rhodes, ‘Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future
of a Concept’, Annual Review of Political Science, 5 (2002), pp. 305–31; L. Baccaro and
M. Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe: Understanding Government Choice’,
Comparative Political Studies, 41: 10 (2008), pp. 1323–48.
Government and Opposition, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 365–391, 2011
doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01343.x
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

them. We focus on whether actors still control their exchange part-
ners’ desires, that is, if governments and interest groups are trust-
worthy actors in corporative exchanges. As outlined below, a credible
exchange partner needs to have means, motive and opportunity, or
mandate and unity (opportunity), assets (means) and intent (motive).
Hence our investigation into possible disturbance in essential pre-
requisites for corporatist exchange in Scandinavia. If we can find
some disruption, we have taken a step further in understanding
de-corporatization; if not, we have to look for explanations elsewhere.
AN EXCHANGE MODEL OF CORPORATISM
In the wake of the seminal work of Philippe Schmitter and his
reintroduction of ‘corporatism’,4several definitions of the term have
been presented, and further dimensions added to Schmitter’s exten-
sive list. Corporatism is often viewed as a system of concertation
between particular economic interests – mainly labour market part-
ners – and the state, and includes several (often different) structural
features and outcomes.5This conception tends to merge how public
and private interests interact with the conditions for and conse-
quences of intermediation.
Corporatism as a political exchange may be understood as a game
that takes place in institutionalized arenas in which each actor con-
trols resources that the others desire. The state controls public
expenditure and legislation. Furthermore, the state can privilege
selected organizations by granting them the status of group repre-
sentatives in the policy-making process;6the position of selected
partner is crucial when organizations recruit adherents. Interest
4P. C. Schmitter, ‘Still in the Century of Corporatism’, Review of Politics, 36: 1
(1974), pp. 85–131; P. C. Schmitter, ‘Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-
Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going’, in
G. Lembruch and P. C. Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, London,
Sage, 1982.
5Cf. Molina and Rhodes, ‘Corporatism’; L. Baccaro, ‘What is Alive and What is
Dead in the Theory of Corporatism’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41: 4 (2003),
pp. 683–706.
6C. Offe, ‘The Attribution of Public Interest to Interest Groups: Observations
on the West German Case’, in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interest in Western Europe,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 136–7.
366 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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groups may also possess resources desired by the state: they ‘control’
their members,7for example by binding them to negotiated agree-
ments. Claims by radical members may be made satisfiable8through
interest intermediation.9In contrast to Baccaro and Simoni’s decla-
ration of this type of exchange as ‘a peculiarity of electorally weak
governments facing weakened unions’,10 we argue that corporatism
presupposes that both actors control resources demanded by the
other. The question is not whether the government/organizations
are weak or strong, but whether the government/organizations can
and will deliver in mutual exchanges.
Corporatism understood in terms of an ‘exchange relationship’11
is not confined to the labour market and negotiations on wages,
profits, and economic policy. Corporatist arrangements may exist in
a multitude of policy areas: ‘democratic corporatism as a structure for
bargaining does not predetermine either the issues to be joined or
the content of agreements’.12 The crux of corporatism is institution-
alized political exchange between privileged interest groups and
the state. A corporatist exchange assumes that organizations control
internal opinions, while the state controls authoritative decision-
making. An exchange does not need to be symmetrical (however
defined), but it can be realized only when the state offers policies of
interest to the organizations which, in return, provide tacit consent,
approval or active support of government policy that is of interest to
the state. In real life, of course, it is politically disputed what those
7A. Cawson, ‘Varieties on Corporatism: The Importance of the Meso-level of
Interest Intermediation’, in A. Cawson (ed.), Organized Interest and the State, London,
Sage, 1985, p. 6.
8Offe, ‘The Attribution of Public Interest to Interest Groups’, pp. 126 ff.
9P. C. Schmitter, ‘Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal
Change in Western Europe’, in P. C. Schmitter and G. Lembruch (eds), Trends Toward
Corporatist Intermediation, Beverly Hills and London, Sage, 1979, p. 93; P. C. Schmitter,
‘Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe
and North America’, in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interest in Western Europe, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 295.
10 Baccaro and Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe’, p. 1340.
11 J. S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1994; P. O. Öberg, Särintresse och allmänintresse: Korporat-
ismens ansikten, Uppsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1994; Molina and Rhodes,
‘Corporatism’.
12 H. L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University
Press, 2002, p. 87.
367DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

interests are; neither the government nor the interest organizations
are unitary actors. The simplified theoretical model is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Exchange between state and organized interests requires that one
party is in control of resources in which the other is interested. Thus
we need to pinpoint what it takes for the state to control ‘favourable
public policy’ and for interest groups to control ‘disciplined, moder-
ated opinions’. We argue that state authority and interest group
capability presupposes a strong mandate to engage in exchanges, a
high degree of unity, mobilization of relevant assets and a sincere
intent to engage in corporatist exchanges (that is, corporatist-friendly
attitudes) on both sides of the exchange. Without these features,
actors are not trustworthy exchange partners.
One fundamental prerequisite is the mandate to make decisions
within the relevant sphere. For a government, this means sovereignty
– controlling legislation at central government level.13 Correspond-
ingly, interest groups need to organize a relevant constituency with
legitimate interests: they have to be accepted as the representative
of that specific interest, otherwise they do not have a legitimate
mandate to participate in public policy-making.
13 L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of
Multi-Level Governance’, American Political Science Review, 97: 2 (2003), p. 234.
Figure 1
An Exchange Model of Corporatism
Disciplined, moderated opinions
(support of public decisions)
Favourable public policy
(legislation, financing and status)
Interest
organizations
The state
(government
authorities)
Control of
Control o
f
Interest in
Interest in
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Mandate alone is not enough; a certain level of unity to make
efficient decisions is also required.14 The government must be able to
gather support from a parliamentary majority,15 while interest groups
have to be sufficiently cohesive to represent their members effec-
tively; in other words, to have a high degree of representational
monopoly.16 Both parties must retain a capacity for making binding
commitments if credible exchange is to take place.17
These prerequisites will be of scant interest to the counterpart if
not matched by relevant assets. Even a cohesive and united govern-
ment will be constrained in its ability to offer favourable and credible
policy deals when it is under economic pressure. Similarly, an interest
group must be able to mobilize members who are willing to support
leadership decisions made in corporatist exchanges and, ultimately,
to back the government involved. Governments that are punished
at the ballot box for corporatist exchanges will soon come to see
corporatism as a liability.18
Finally, even if the exchanging actors have mandate, unity and
assets, these essentials are not worth much if fundamental values
clash with engagements in corporatist exchanges. Leaders cannot
credibly assert that they are in control of favourable public policy or
disciplined, moderated opinions without a sincere intent to partici-
pate in exchanges and compromises.19 Potential exchanging parties
will be cautious about long-term exchanges if their counterparts do
not embrace fundamental positive ideas about corporatism. We call
this ‘corporatism-friendly attitudes’. Table 1 sums up the prerequi-
sites for trustworthy actors in corporatist exchanges.
According to corporatist theory, all this should be important when
actors determine whether to participate in corporatist exchange or if
there are better options. So, if required properties are in decline,
14 Wilensky, Rich Democracies.
15 Cf. S. Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’,
in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT, Yale
University Press, 1966.
16 Schmitter, ‘Still in the Century of Corporatism’; Schmitter, ‘Reflections on
Where’.
17 Molina and Rhodes, ‘Corporatism’, p. 325.
18 Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks’.
19 M. Anthonsen and J. Lindvall, ‘Party Competition and the Resilience of Corpo-
ratism’, Government and Opposition, 44: 2 (2009), p. 170.
369DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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non-corporatist options such as lobbying will be relatively less costly,
and corporatism will decline (given that benefits of other options are
constant).
Before we proceed to examine changes in the prerequisites for
corporatist exchanges, we must obtain a clearer picture of how and
over what period corporatism has declined.
CORPORATISM IN SCANDINAVIA
Scandinavian corporatism worked as an exchange system during
most of the twentieth century. Organized groups were compara-
tively strong and, occasionally, the state even intervened in order
to strengthen interest groups – by encouraging centralization of
trade unions, for example.20 The purpose was to make organiza-
tions capable of moderating members’ demands and to secure
industrial peace. In exchange, unions obtained comprehensive
20 N. Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrörelse, Stockholm, LiberFörlag, 1980; cf. Öberg,
Särintresse och allmänintresse; A. S. Nørgaard, The Politics of Institutional Control: Corporat-
ism in Danish Occupational Safety and Health Regulation and Unemployment Insurance,
1870–1995, Aarhus, Politica, 1997.
Table 1
Required Properties for Trustworthy Partners in Corporatist Exchange
Prerequisite Descriptive definition
Government Interest group
Mandate
(authority to make
decisions)
Control over policy at
national/central
government level
Organizations with
authority to bargain
with central
government
Unity
(ability to act as
unitary actor)
Strong government
vis-à-vis parliament Organizational
cohesiveness and
representational
monopoly
Assets
(exchange relevant
resources)
Sufficient financial
resources, control
of allocation of
privileges
High membership,
membership support
(control of votes)
Intention
(corporatist-friendly
attitudes)
Positive attitude
to corporatist
actors/exchanges
Positive attitudes to
participation in
corporatist exchanges
370 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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welfare policies, protective measures and the right to collective
bargaining and to strike. Corporatist exchange was also evident
in Scandinavian agricultural policy. During the twentieth century,
the state exchanged rationalization in the food business for exten-
sive economic support to agriculture and the inclusion of farming
organizations in policy-making and policy implementation.21 Similar
stories can be told about other policy areas, notably public welfare
services.22
For a long period – especially during late 1940s to mid-1960s –
consensus among Scandinavian political elites was that strengthening
rather than undermining particular interest groups was the best way
to gain political control. Numerous institutional forums were created
for discussion and bargaining between high-ranking civil servants and
interest groups. During most of the twentieth century, such arrange-
ments were important parts of the political process in Scandinavia.
This practice changed after the 1970s, however.
Declining Corporatism Since the 1970s
The development of corporatism has not been the same across all the
Scandinavian countries. Focusing on selected reforms, Lindvall and
Sebring, and Anthonsen and Lindvall find declining corporatism in
Sweden, but not in Denmark.23 Compston argues that concertation
and corporatism increased in Norway and Denmark in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but decreased in Sweden.24 Regini argues that in
the same period concertation continued in Norway, whereas both
21 F. Just, ‘Agriculture and Corporatism in Scandinavia’, in P. Lowe, T. Marsden
and S. Whatmore (eds), Regulating Agriculture, Abingdon, Davis Fulton Publishers,
1995; A. A. Farsund, ‘Stabilitet og endring i norsk landbrukspolitikk’, RF-rapport 2004/
072, Stavanger, RF-Rogalandsforskning, 2004; Öberg, Särintresse och allmänintresse.
22 B. Rothstein, ‘State Structure and Variations in Corporatism: The Swedish Case’,
Scandinavian Political Studies, 14: 2 (1991), pp. 149–71; B. Rothstein, Den korporativa
staten, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 1992; T. Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk, Oslo,
Universitetsforlaget, 1994; P. M. Christiansen and A. S. Nørgaard, Faste forhold – Flygtige
forbindelser, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2003.
23 J. Lindvall and J. Sebring, ‘Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in
Sweden’, West European Politics, 28: 5 (2005), pp. 1057–74; Anthonsen and Lindvall,
‘Party Competition’.
24 H. Compston, ‘The End of National Policy Concertation? Western Europe since
the Single European Act’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5: 3 (1998), pp. 507–26.
371DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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Sweden and Denmark experienced less concertation in labour
market policy and the regulation of industrial relations.25
Although the picture is not totally unambiguous – because of
important disparities in how main concepts are defined, operation-
alized and measured26 – there is ample evidence of decline in
Scandinavian corporatism since the 1970s.27 All these studies analyse
corporatism across different policy areas over time, through com-
parative case studies of policy-making and/or indicators of the
institutional organization of policy-making in general. In terms of
description, they all reach roughly similar conclusions: corporatism
has declined in all Scandinavian countries since the 1970s.
Christiansen et al. have shown that corporatism in relation to the
preparation of policy has gone down in all three countries whereas
corporatism in implementation processes are more varied.28 Figure 2
is calculated from data published by Christiansen and colleagues,
and shows the number of policy-preparing committees that include
interest groups. Although not perfect, we consider it to be a reason-
able indicator of corporatism, given the vast array of studies that
reach similar conclusions on the basis of different research designs.
25 M. Regini, ‘Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of European
Economies to Globalization’, Politics and Society, 28: 1 (2000), pp. 5–33.
26 Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties of Democracy’, p. 24.
27 Sweden: J. Hermansson, Politik som intressekamp, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik,
1993; J. Hermansson, A. Lund, T. Svensson and P. O. Öberg, Avkorporativisering
och lobbyism, Swedish government official report, SOU 1999:121; B. Rothstein and J.
Bergström, Korporatismens fall och den svenska modellens kris, Stockholm, SNS förlag,
1999; P. O. Öberg and T. Svensson, ‘Power and Institutions in Industrial Relation
Regimes’, Worklife in Transition, 2005:12, Stockholm, National Institute for Working
Life, 2005. Denmark: J. Blom-Hansen, ‘Organized Interests and the State: A Disinte-
grating Relationship? Evidence from Denmark’, European Journal of Political Research,
39: 3 (2001), pp. 391–416; Christiansen and Nørgaard, Faste forhold.Norway: Nordby,
Korporatisme på norsk; H. Rommetvedt, ‘Norway: Resources Count, But Votes Decide?
From Neo-Corporatist Representation to Neo-Pluralist Parliamentarism’, West European
Politics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 740–63; see also P. Selle and Ø. Østerud, ‘The Eroding of
Representative Democracy in Norway’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 4 (2006),
pp. 551–68; T. Tranvik and P. Selle, ‘The Rise and Fall of Popular Mass Movements:
Organizational Change and Globalization – The Norwegian Case’, Acta Sociologica,50:
1 (2007), pp. 57–70. Norway and Denmark: P. M. Christiansen and H. Rommetvedt,
‘From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives, and Organized Interests
in Denmark and Norway’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 22: 3 (1999), pp. 195–220.
Scandinavia: Blom-Hansen, ‘Still Corporatism in Scandinavia?’
28 Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties of Democracy’.
372 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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Corporatist structures related to policy preparation have been weak-
ened, but not dismantled since the 1970s.
In Denmark, corporatism peaked around 1980. An analysis of
government-sponsored bills in policy sectors with strong traditions
of corporatism point in the same direction,30 and so do a number
of comparative case studies.31 Analyses of Norwegian corporatism
that use slightly different indicators also point to c. 1980 as the peak
29 Some would argue that the percentage of committees with representatives from
interest organizations is the most relevant measure. However, each committee repre-
sents a decision-making opportunity in which interest organizations may or may not
be represented. If the ‘importance’ of the committees is constant, then the absolute
number of committees with representatives from interest organizations is the best
measure of corporatism (i.e. the number of decision-making opportunities in which
organized interests are allowed to participate). We believe that the substantial decrease
in the number of committees with interest organization representation more than
compensates for a possible (but not documented) increase in the ‘importance’ of each
public committee with interest group representation.
30 Christiansen and Nørgaard, Faste forhold, pp. 106–8.
31 J. Blom-Hansen and C. Daugbjerg (eds), Magtens Organisering: Stat og interesseor-
ganisationer i Danmark, Herning, Systime, 1999; P. M. Christiansen, A. S. Nørgaard and
N. C. Sidenius, Hvem skriver lovene?, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2004.
Figure 2
Corporatism in Scandinavia, 1970–2005 (1980 =100)a
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Norway Denmark Sweden Poly. (Sweden)
Note:aCorporatism is measured by the number of policy-preparing
committees that include organized interests. Due to the lack of Swedish
observations we added a polynomic tendency line (R2=0.52).29
Source: Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties in Democracy’.
373DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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of corporatism.32 The turning point in Swedish corporatism is
more difficult to establish, due to a paucity of data points. Whereas
Figure 2 suggests that Swedish corporatism has declined since the
1970s (or even earlier), Hermansson’s analysis of 12 policy areas
suggests that interest groups dominated policy-preparing com-
mittees until around 1980;33 Rothstein and Bergström also point
to the early 1980s as a turning point, as does Lewin.34 The decline
does not appear as dramatic in Sweden as in Norway and Denmark.
In general, the pattern suggests that, whatever changes have
occurred in the prerequisites for corporatist exchanges, they are
probably more dramatic and time specific (that is, taking place
in the 1980s) in Norway and Denmark than in Sweden. Might
changes in the properties needed for government and interest
groups to be trustworthy partners in corporatist exchange be part
of the explanation?
WEAKENED GOVERNMENTS?
Mandate
Control over national or central government policy may be under-
mined by three factors: sovereignty may have been transferred to
the international or European level; political power may have been
devolved to the local level; or the autonomy of governments may
have decreased due to the internationalization or globalization of
the economy. All factors have been highlighted in the literature.35
Central governments and democratic principals may ‘decide more
about less’.36
32 Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk, pp. 71–2; Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.
33 Hermansson, Politik som intressekamp, p. 450.
34 Rothstein and Bergström, Korporatismens fall, p. 152; L. Lewin, ‘The Rise and
Decline of Corporatism: The Case of Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research,26
(1994), pp. 59–79.
35 For example, B. Western, ‘A Comparative Study of Corporatist Development’,
American Sociological Review, 56: 3 (1991), pp. 283–94; Compston, ‘The End of National
Policy Concertation?’
36 T. Bergman and K. Strøm, ‘Shifting Dimensions of Citizen Control’, Scandina-
vian Political Studies, 27: 2 (2004), p. 89.
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An important aspect of reduced state mandates is the integration
of national into European policy-making. Europeanization has
affected the functioning of Scandinavian democracy, including
the autonomy of national governments, albeit in different ways.37
Denmark was the early starter, as it became a member of the
European Union (EU) in 1973. Sweden’s and Norway’s bilateral
trade agreements developed into the European Economic Area
(EEA) agreements in 1992,38 and Swedish membership of the EU in
1995; Norway is formally still a non-member. Through the EEA, both
Norway and Sweden have been subject to increasing EU regulation
since the 1980s, just as Denmark has been. The influence of EU
regulation increased with the surge in EU rules after the passing of
the Single European Act in 1986. From the early 1990s, the pace of
rule-making in the EU levelled off.39
Decentralization of authority to local governments or inde-
pendent state agencies may also weaken the authority of central
government. Most salient are the increased independences of central
banks. While e.g. the Swedish Central Bank, Riksbanken, was used as
a monetary instrument until the mid 1980s, it is now ranked the most
independent together with the European Central Bank.40 The evi-
dence of local government autonomy during the period under inves-
tigation is mixed, however.41 In general, decentralization and local
37 T. Bergman and E. Damgaard (eds), Delegation and Accountability in European
Integration: The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union, London, Frank
Cass, 2000.
38 Ø. Østerud, ‘Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway’, West European Politics,
28: 4 (2005), p. 709.
39 J. Blom-Hansen and J. G. Christensen, Den europæiske forbindelse, Aarhus, Aarhus
University Press, 2004, pp. 56–8.
40 T. Svensson, ‘Globalisation, Marketisation and Power: The Swedish Case of
Institutional Change’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 25: 3 (2002), pp. 197–229;
C. Crowe and E. E. Meade, ‘The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the
World’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21: 4 (2007), p. 72.
41 T. Tranvik and P. Selle, ‘State and Citizens in Norway: Organisational Society
and State–Municipal Relations’, West European Politics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 852–71; J. G.
Christensen, Delegation and Administrative Organization: An Overview of Danish Regulatory
Administration 1950–2000, Aarhus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University,
2005; P. Lægreid, S. Opedal and I. M. Stigen, ‘The Norwegian Hospital Reform:
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law, 30: 6 (2005), pp. 1027–64; I. Elander and S. Montin, ‘Decentralisation and
Control: Central–Local Government Relations in Sweden’, Policy and Politics, 18: 3
375DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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government autonomy in Scandinavia were probably at their highest
in the 1970s.
Finally, with regard to economic globalization, all Scandinavian
countries are open economies, but further liberalization of capital
may have left national governments with less political control. Eco-
nomic openness creates exit options for firms and renders states
more vulnerable; vulnerability makes it harder for state representa-
tives to meet demands from interest groups. Indicators of capital
transactions show an increase in openness among the three countries
since the 1960s.42 Capital flows were liberalized in Sweden during the
1970s and 1980s, when Norway and Denmark were catching up, but
a dramatic increase in liberalization took place in the 1990s in all
countries.
The development and consequences of decentralization are in-
conclusive. However, Europeanization increased constraints on gov-
ernment authority in the 1980s, as did economic liberalization in the
1990s. Taken together, this indicates a weakened central government
mandate.
Unity
Scandinavian governments are most often minority governments.43
In the period 1971 to 2006, Sweden had majority coalition govern-
ments for three and a half years. In Norway, a majority coalition ruled
for a little more than two years between 1971 and 2005. Since 1971,
Denmark has been ruled by a majority government for only one and
a half years. Apart from Italy, opposition parties in Scandinavia
have the greatest influence on government policy among 18 West
European countries, according to an expert survey.44
(1990), pp. 165–80; D. Feltenius, ‘Relations Between Central and Local Government in
Sweden During the 1990s: Mixed Patterns of Centralization and Decentralization’,
Regional & Federal Studies, 17: 4 (2007), pp. 457–74; Svensson, ‘Globalisation, Marke-
tisation and Power’.
42 D. Quinn, ‘The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation’,
American Political Science Review, 91: 3 (1997), p. 535.
43 F. J. Christiansen and E. Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy under Minority
Parliamentarism: Scandinavia’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14: 1/2 (2008), pp. 48–50.
44 Christiansen and Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy’, p. 50.
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It seems, furthermore, that governments have been weakened
vis-à-vis parliaments during the period under study. In 1970, there
were five political parties in parliament in each of the three countries;
since then, the parliaments have become more fragmented. In 1973,
the number of parties in the Danish Folketing doubled and remained
at 10–11 parties for the rest of the 1970s; in the 1980s and 1990s, 8–10
parties were represented, and after 2000, 7–8 parties. In the 1973
Norwegian election, two new parties gained representation and, since
then, 6–8 parties have been represented in the Storting. In Sweden,
a sixth party gained representation in 1988 and since 1991 seven
parties have been represented in the Riksdag.
Fragmentation does not equal conflict between government
and parliament. Corporatism is a potential conflict-reducing mecha-
nism,45 but government–parliament relations became more dissent-
ing in Norway and Denmark during the 1980s, and parliamentary
opposition more assertive. It is true, though, that weak Danish minor-
ity governments did not have long tenures during the 1970s, and the
government would always resign if it encountered legislative defeats.
In the 1980s, Danish centre-right governments struggled to get the
budget passed, and, in some policy areas, ‘alternative majorities’
passed laws contrary to government policy.46 Yet, the government
did not resign. In addition, in the late 1970s and especially from
the 1980s onwards, the number of legislative agreements – forlig –
increased significantly.47 The opposition parties, partners to these
agreements, were given the power to veto future policy changes.
Analyses demonstrate that governments rarely make corporatist
exchanges and forlig at the same time.48
The Norwegian Storting also became more assertive. Whereas
governments of the 1970s were almost never defeated in parliaments,
this happened more often during the 1980s and 1990s, especially
45 Rokkan, ‘Norway’; Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist
Networks’.
46 E. Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries, Oslo, Scandina-
vian University Press, 1992.
47 F. J. Christiansen, Politiske forlig i Folketinget, Aarhus, Politica, 2008.
48 A. S. Nørgaard and R. Klemmensen, ‘Hvorfor stemmer oppositionen for reger-
ingens lovforslag? Korporatisme og parlamentariske forlig i Danmark, 1958–1999’,
Politica, 41: 1 (2009), pp. 67–90.
377DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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on budget issues.49 Dissenting committee recommendations also
increased in this period. The fragmentation of parliament had an
impact on government stability when the populist Progress Party
brought down the centre-right coalition in 1986. Since the 1980s,
numerically fragile minority governments in Norway have relied
increasingly on ad hoc coalitions and on ‘the favours of several
opposition parties at the same time’, and power ‘shifted from the
executive to the legislative branch and the cabinet’s agenda control
eroded’.50
Sweden did not witness the same increase in parliamentary asser-
tiveness. Until 1976, and again from 1982 until 1991, Social Democrat
minority governments ‘could trust the Communist Party to keep
them in power without raising many specific demands for negotiated
policy concessions by the Social Democrats’.51 Without the fear of
being ousted, the government could form ad hoc coalitions with the
opposition parties. As in the Danish case, the fact that a government,
as a last resort, can use its block majority may lead to broad coopera-
tion.52 The centre-right coalitions from 1976 to 1982 commanded
a majority for most of the period, and were comparatively strong
governments. Because coalition partners had different political pref-
erences they crafted specific coalition agreements on governments’
policy agenda,53 leaving cabinet and individual ministers without
much room to manoeuvre. In sum, government unity has cracked
somewhat as parliaments have become more fragmented and
assertive. Interest groups can rely less than before on governments’
capacity to control what interest groups want in return in corporatist
exchange.
49 H. Rommetvedt, The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament, London, Frank Cass, 2003;
Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.
50 K. Strøm, H. M. Narud and H. Valen, ‘A More Fragile Chain of Governance in
Norway’, West European Politics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 796 ff.
51 T. Bale and T. Bergman, ‘Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract
Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand’,
Government and Opposition, 4: 3 (2006), p. 432.
52 C. Green-Pedersen and L. H. Thomsen, ‘Bloc Politics vs. Broad Cooperation?
The Functioning of Danish Minority Parliamentarism’, Journal of Legislative Studies,
11: 2 (2005), pp. 153–69.
53 K. Strøm and W. Müller, ‘The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements in
Parliamentary Democracies’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5: 3 (1999), pp. 255–82.
378 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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Assets
If a government has sufficient mandate and unity it does not
automatically imply that the government controls sufficient assets
to carry out exchanges with interest groups. Governments must have
the means to supply advantageous policies to interest organizations
to persuade them to engage in exchanges.
Like other Western countries, Scandinavia – especially Sweden
and Denmark – experienced an economic downturn from the
mid-1970s in the aftermath of the first oil crisis. Growth continued
to decline during the 1980s in Denmark and Norway, whereas it
increased in Sweden until the dramatic downturn in the 1990s. The
presence of North Sea oil has meant that growth has been consis-
tently higher in Norway than in Denmark or Sweden,54 but economic
stagnation did not curb governments’ public spending.
Declining growth was accompanied by rising unemployment
and strained public budgets, particularly in Denmark and Sweden.
Figure 3 shows public debt as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to
2004. In the early 1970s, Denmark and Sweden ran surpluses, but in
54 OECD, OECD Factbook 2009, Paris, OECD.
Figure 3
Public Finances: Public Sector Net Savings, 1970–2004 (percentage of GDP)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–4
Denmark Norway Sweden
Source:Handbook of Nordic Statistics, Nordic Statistical Secretariat, various
years; National Accounts of OECD Countries, Paris, OECD, 1995–2006.
379DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

the late 1970s, continuous deficits implied dramatically increased
public debt, not to be reined in until the late 1980s. Apart from in the
early 1990s, debt has been brought under control in recent years: the
deficits in Norway decreased after the 1970s and, except for a brief
period in early 1990s, budget deficits have not been a problem in
Norway, due to the oil.
Scandinavian public sectors grew significantly in the 1960s and
1970s. Growth in public expenditure continued at a slower pace
during the 1980s and early 1990s, since when the size of the public
sector as a proportion of GDP has been almost constant.55
Whether governments behaved economically irresponsibly in the
1970s is not the issue here; for interest groups, there was definitely
something to be gained through corporatist exchanges with govern-
ments that continually increased spending in the face of stagnating
growth. In the 1980s and 1990s, assets shrank as deficits were curbed
and the growth of public expenditure levelled out, except during
the Swedish crisis in the early 1990s. As argued in the welfare state
literature, the 1980s paved the way for a retrenchment agenda.56
Being involved in negotiations on deregulation and retrenchment
may be of the utmost importance for interest organizations. Still, it is
safe to say that the attainable slices of the cake have become smaller.
Intention: Attitudes Towards Corporatism
For corporatist exchanges to occur, means and opportunity are not
enough. The government must also have the inclination and the
motive. Scandinavian corporatism has been termed ‘left-handed’:
social democrats and unions have been seen as responsible for cre-
ating and maintaining corporatist arrangements.57 The traditional
55 Ibid., various indicators. The OECD has no comparable data on public sector
size going back to the 1970s. Data exist on tax revenues as a proportion of GDP since
the 1960s and data on public social and other welfare expenditure go back to 1980.
The indicators suggest that public sector growth was high in the 1970s, moderate in the
1980s and almost zero in the 1990s, with the exception of Sweden in the early 1990s,
during the crisis.
56 P. Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2001.
57 D. Cameron, ‘Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Rep-
resentation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society’, in J. H. Goldthorpe
(ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984,
380 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

statutory connections between unions and party have come to an
end, but strong informal ties persist in the form of recruitment
and representation, although more so in Sweden and Norway than
in Denmark.58 Assuming that social democratic preferences for
corporatism are stable over time and that centre-right governments
are more hostile towards corporatism, weakened social democratic
government power indicates that governments have, for political
reasons, become less engaged in corporatist exchanges.
Before 1970, social democratic parties had a remarkably strong
governmental position in all three countries.59 The Danish party was
the weakest of the Scandinavian social democratic parties and was
accustomed to govern in various coalitions. The Norwegian party
had a stronger electoral base and ruled in splendid isolation for
decades, but had to leave ministerial posts twice in the 1960s. In a
historical perspective, a seemingly everlasting Social Democratic
hegemony in Sweden was broken when the first non-socialist gov-
ernment in the post-war era was established in 1976 and stayed in
power for six years. In Figure 4, the strength of the social democrats
since 1970 is measured in terms of the average proportion of left-
wing cabinet seats.
The Swedish Social Democratic Party dominated government
a little less than its Norwegian sister party in the 1970s, but it kept
its relative strength during the 1980s, in contrast to the situation in
Norway and Denmark. In Norway, the Social Democrats were out of
power for five years in the first half of the 1980s (1981–86). When
they regained power, governing had become more difficult because
the government had no stable majority support in parliament.60 In
the early 1980s, the Conservative government declared explicitly
that it would downsize the corporatist apparatus in order to reduce
pp. 143–78; H. Heclo and H. Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden, Philadelphia,
Temple University Press, 1987; Western, ‘A Comparative Study of Corporatist
Development’; D. Rueda, ‘Left Government, Policy and Corporatism. Explaining the
Influence of Partisanship on Inequality’, World Politics,60(2008),p.385.
58 E. H. Allern, N. Aylott and F. J. Christiansen, ‘Social Democrats and Trade
Unions in Scandinavia: The Decline and Persistence of Institutional Relationships’,
European Journal of Political Research, 46: 5 (2007), pp. 616, 628.
59 Allern et al., ‘Social Democrats and Trade Unions in Scandinavia’; Christiansen
and Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy’.
60 Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’; Strøm et al., ‘A More Fragile Chain of Governance’.
381DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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the power of interest groups.62 In Denmark, the Social Demo-
crats were out of power for more than 10 years (1982–93). In the
1990s, Norwegian and Danish Social Democrats regained some of
their strength, but then the tide shifted again. Norwegian Social
Democrats were out of office in 2001 and 2005, and the Danish
Social Democrats lost government power in 2001. As Figure 4 shows,
the Swedish Social Democrats are still the strongest in Scandinavia,
even though a centre-right majority coalition assumed power in
2006.
There are good reasons for interest groups to question whether
governments in Scandinavia have stable intentions to engage in
corporatist exchanges. Governments are short-lived and formerly
reliable social democratic governments have to find ways to stay
in power other than seeking allies among interest groups.
61 The average share of left-wing parties in government – see E. Huber, C. Ragin
and J. D. Stephens, ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, Northwestern University
and University of North Carolina, 1997; and D. Brady, J. Beckfield and J. Stephens,
‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, 2004 (updated from E. Huber, C. Ragin and
J. Stephens, ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’) – equals that of the social demo-
crats in all the Scandinavian countries because no other left-wing party has been in
government, except the Norwegian government 2005–9, which included Sosialistisk
Venstreparti.
62 Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk.
Figure 4
Average Social Democratic Share of Cabinet Seats, 1970–2006 (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000-06
Denmark Norway Sweden
Source: Brady et al., ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, and public
sources.61
382 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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WEAKENED INTEREST GROUP CAPABILITIES?
Mandate
In a liberal democracy, one precondition to enabling interest groups
to participate in public policy-making is that they have a mandate to
speak on behalf of their members. Focusing on the statutory author-
ity of the confederations of labour market organizations over their
affiliates – that is, the degree of centralization – an index combining
the employer side and the union side shows little change since the
1970s.63 The degree of centralization has consistently been lower in
Denmark than in Norway and Sweden, but has not changed much
in any of the three countries.
Unity
An increasing number of unions and growing union fragmentation
would be two signs that there was less unity, and, consequently, the
unions would be less reliable partners in corporatist exchange. Two
indicators are relevant, but they point in different directions (see
Table 2). First, the number of unions has decreased in all three
countries since the 1960s. Unions have merged to meet the rise of
new occupations and a changing industrial structure. Since the 1970s
white-collar unions have become the largest unions in Scandinavia.64
Second, the number of confederations of labour market organi-
zations has increased with the growth of white-collar and professional
and academic confederations of labour market organizations. Thus,
the share of union members in LO, the blue-collar confederation,
has decreased and trade union concentration has diminished. The
figures for inter-confederate concentration have been falling since
the 1960s (Herfindahl concentration index).65 In Sweden, the
63 K.-O. Lindgren, Roads from Unemployment, Uppsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis,
2006. Cf. M. Wallerstein, M. Golden and P. Lange, ‘Unions, Employers’ Associations
and Wage-Setting Institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950–1992’, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 50: 3 (1997).
64 Ibid.; B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser, The Societies of Europe. Trade Unions in Western
Europe since 1945, London, Macmillan, 2000.
65 Brady et al., ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’. The Herfindahl index is
H=S(Si)2.S
iis the share of union members in confederation iand the sum includes
all confederations. The denominator in the calculation of Sialso includes union
383DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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concentration decreased most during the 1960s, but continued to fall
during the 1970s, after which it stabilized. In Norway and Denmark,
a decreasing concentration was most pronounced during the 1970s,
but continued during the 1980s. According to Ebbinghaus and
Visser, who employ a slightly different measure, concentration
continued to drop in Sweden and Denmark during the 1990s, but
stabilized in Norway.66 However, LO membership in Norway declined
continually from 83 per cent of the organized workforce in 1956 to
51 per cent in 2002.67
In sum, the number of unions has decreased since the 1960s.
Potentially, this may strengthen the unions’ capacity to talk with one
voice and engage in corporatist exchanges with government, but
stronger and more consolidated affiliates may also weaken the con-
federations’ capacity to talk on behalf of their members. Fragmenta-
tion was significant during the 1970s and continued in the 1980s and
1990s. Historically, blue-collar confederations of labour market orga-
nizations have been the dominant partners in corporatist exchanges.
With a diminishing working class and growing middle class, the
difference between blue-collar and white-collar organizations has
members who are not affiliated with a peak organization; cf. Wallerstein et al., ‘Unions,
Employers’ Associations and Wage-Setting Institutions’, p. 383.
66 Ebbinghaus and Visser, The Societies of Europe. Cf. also Allern et al., ‘Social
Democrats and Trade Unions in Scandinavia’.
67 T. A. Stokke, ‘Organisasjonsgraden på arbeidstakersiden’, Notat 1995:13, Oslo,
Fafo, 1995; K. Nergaard and T. A. Stokke, ‘Organisasjonsgrader og tariffavtaledekning
i norsk arbeidsliv 2004/2005’, Rapport 518, Oslo, Fafo, 2006.
Table 2
Union Organizational Structure, 1960–90
1960 1970 1980 1990
Denmark Number of LO unions 53 45 33 30
Number of confederations 2223
Inter-confederational concentration 67 64 53 50
Norway Number of LO unions 41 35 34 29
Number of confederations 1133
Inter-confederational concentration 64 58 48 42
Sweden Number of LO unions 44 29 25 23
Number of confederations 2233
Inter-confederational concentration 61 51 46 45
Source: Wallerstein et al., ‘Unions, Employers’ Associations and Wage-
Setting Institutions’, pp. 381–5.
384 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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almost disappeared. Although the changes in the organizational
landscape did not take place at exactly the same time across Scandi-
navia, governments have had to pay attention and speak to more and
more powerful organizations than they used to. Hence, interest
groups (at least unions) do not have the same control over a united
membership as in earlier times.
Assets
An interest group’s main asset in its exchanges with government is
the number of members it can persuade to accept the deals struck
over public policies. Organized groups have to deliver support – or at
least tacit acceptance – to be a viable exchange party. In general, the
involvement of citizens in organizations is high in Scandinavia,
although it has been declining in recent years.68 However, not all
organizational membership is relevant to corporatist exchanges.
Interest groups have to organize important groups. In addition to a
united membership, organizations may use electoral support – that is,
members’ votes – in the exchange with governments. Focusing on
the role of unions, we analyse union density and the voting behaviour
of union members as a proxy for the political asset that unions
exchange with governments.
Figure 5 shows ‘adjusted’ union density from 1970 to 2003. In
Denmark and Sweden, union density increased in the 1970s and
continued to grow in Sweden until 1995, after which it decreased
quite significantly.69 In Denmark, union density peaked in around
1980 at 79 per cent. By 2003, it had dropped to 70 per cent. In both
Denmark and Sweden, the loss of members is most significant among
young people.70 Union density is still relatively high in all three
68 J. Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press,
2004, pp. 108–9; E. Amnå, ‘Associational Life, Youth, and Political Formation in
Sweden: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Trends’, in L. Trädgårdh (ed.), State
and Civil Society in Northern Europe, New York, Berghan, 2007; Tranvik and Selle, ‘The
Rise and Fall of Popular Mass Movements’.
69 J. Visser, ‘Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries’, Monthly Labor Review,
January (2006), p. 45.
70 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, pp. 114–15; A. Fransson, M. Larsson,
I. Goding and Å. Forsell, ‘Röster om facket och jobbet. Ungdomar och facket’, Rapport
5, Stockholm, LO, 2007.
385DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

countries, especially in Denmark and Sweden, but it has fallen sig-
nificantly in recent decades.
Unions – not to mention other organized interests – are more
attractive parties to a corporatist exchange if they can deliver political
support in the form of votes or can threaten the opposite. Since the
1970s, social democratic governments have been unable to rely on
unions’ abilities to deliver their members’ vote.
Net electoral volatility – that is, interparty shifts in electoral
support – has increased since the 1960s (Figure 6). In Norway and
Denmark, volatility rose dramatically in the 1970s, only falling off
slightly in the 1980s. In Sweden, volatility has increased since 1970,
but at a slower pace. By the 1980s and 1990s, volatility levels were
converging in Scandinavia.
With increasing volatility, the capacity of unions to deliver their
members’ votes to the social democratic parties also decreased. The
share of Norwegian LO union members voting social democrat fell in
early 1980s, increased a little up until the mid-1990s, and decreased
significantly afterwards. In Denmark, the share of blue-collar social
democrat voters has fallen since the late 1970s.71 In Sweden, the social
71 J. Andersen, O. Borre, J. Goul Andersen and H. J. Nielsen, Vælgere med omtanke:
En analyse af Folketingsvalget i 1998, Aarhus: Systime, 1999, p. 81.
Figure 5
Union Density in Scandinavia, 1970–2003
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Denmark Norway Sweden
Source: Visser, ‘Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries’, Monthly Labor
Review, January (2006), p. 45.
386 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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democratic share of LO votes has decreased since the 1980s.72 Union
members are no longer the only core constituency of social democrat
governments; salaried employees – notably in the public sector – have
become equally important.
Trade unions, one main corporatist actor, are still comparatively
powerful in Scandinavia. However, union density and class-based
voting have declined. Increasingly, Scandinavian governments
cannot take it for granted that interest groups control an asset that is
an essential component in a corporatist exchange.
Corporatist-Friendly Attitudes
The decline in Scandinavian governments’ corporatist-friendly
attitudes is mirrored by attitudes among interest groups. Moreover,
there are indications that the willingness to use the corporatist
channel when influencing public policy is decreasing: the traditional
participants in corporatist exchanges are less trusted and, instead,
individualism is more widespread.
72 H. Oscarsson and S. Holmberg, ‘Swedish Voting Behavior’, Swedish Election
Studies Program, Göteborg University, February 2007.
Figure 6
Net Electoral Volatility, 1948–98
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1945–59 1970–77 1979–901960–69 1991–98
Denmark Norway Sweden
Source: D. Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1999, pp. 125–6.
387DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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According to the World Values Surveys (1981/82, 1990, 1996,
2000), citizen confidence in unions has been stable or increasing
in Norway since 1980, whereas it fell significantly in Denmark and
Sweden in the 1980s, after which it stabilized.73 Perhaps the high
member density in Denmark and Sweden – not the case in Norway –
explains the divergent development in union confidence.74 In
Sweden, unions are among the least trusted institutions, together
with parties and EU institutions.75
In common with citizens in many other countries, Scandinavians
have become more individualistic;76 comparative studies show that
Scandinavia is among the most post-materialistic countries in the
world.77 Corporatist exchanges revolve around distributional and
materialist conflicts that are organized collectively and hierarchically.
The trade union is the archetype of this type of organization. Indi-
vidualistic attitudes and post-materialistic values are not easily trans-
formed into distributional policy exchanges or fitted easily into the
structure of interest groups and traditional party lines. A prominent
expression of this value change is that mass movements in Scandina-
via are changing. New organizational types – single-issue organiza-
tions, leisure groups, local mobilization and so on – are becoming
more important platforms for civic engagement.78 As argued by Goul
Andersen with special reference to Denmark – although the point
also applies to Norway and Sweden – the issue is not so much declin-
ing organizational involvement per se, but that ‘part of what is lost in
73 O. Listhaug and M. Wiberg, ‘Confidence in Political and Private Institutions’, in
H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds), Citizens and the State, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1995, pp. 304–5; J. Goul Andersen and J. Hoff, Democracy and Citizenship in
Scandinavia, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
74 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, p. 115.
75 S. Holmberg and L. Weibull, ‘Svenska trender 1986–2006’, Gothenburg,
SOM-Instituttet, 2006, p. 7.
76 C. Welzel, R. Inglehart and H.-D. Klingemann, ‘The Theory of Human Devel-
opment: A Cross-Cultural Analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003),
pp. 368–9.
77 R. Inglehart and W. E. Baker, ‘Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persis-
tence of Traditional Values’, American Sociological Review, 65: 1 (2000), pp. 19–51.
78 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati; Tranvik and Selle, ‘The Rise and Fall
of Popular Mass Movements’; D. Wollebæk, ‘The Decoupling of Organizational
Society: the Case of Norwegian Voluntary Organizations’, Voluntas, 19 (2008),
pp. 351–71.
388 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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terms of collective mobilization seems to be gained in terms of more
individual political participation, including among workers’.79
Consequently, Scandinavian governments cannot trust that inter-
est groups can rely on corporatist-friendly attitudes among their
members.
DISRUPTED CORPORATIST EXCHANGE IN
SCANDINAVIAN CORPORATISM
There have indeed been changes in the properties that are
required of a trustworthy partner in corporatist exchange, as Table 3
summarizes.
There is good reason to believe that changes in the prerequisites
of exchange have contributed to changes in the relationship between
government and interest group in Scandinavia. The patterns revealed
show that the conditions for strategic calculations over whether to
engage in corporatist exchange or not have changed. Although
timing differs and the factors involved are of different importance in
the three countries, the main pattern is the same.
In Denmark, corporatism declined during the 1980s for a number
of reasons: continuous decentralization to local government and
increasing Europeanization reduced government autonomy, and the
79 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, p. 205 (our translation).
Table 3
Summary of Findings
Prerequisites for
trustworthy exchanges Government Interest group
Mandate Declined No Change?
(Europeanization) (Formally centralized)
Unity Declined somewhat Declined
(Fragmentation) (Fragmentation)
Assets Declined Declined
(Strained public budgets) (Electoral volatility)
Intention Declined Declined
(Less social democracy) (Individualism)
389DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
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opposition in the Folketing became more assertive. Cutbacks and
retrenchment reforms in the 1980s implied weakened government
control over essential factors in corporatist exchange. At the same
time, fragmented unions, with declining member density, could
not mobilize citizens to the same extent as they had previously. Even
when Social Democrat-led governments could have engaged in cor-
poratist exchanges, they had little political incentive to privilege
corporatist actors. Interest organizations could not deliver what the
state desired in the exchange.
In Norway, corporatism also declined rapidly during the 1980s,
although not because of increasing decentralization of authority. EU
regulation also reduced government autonomy in Norway, but it was
not as extensive as in Denmark. Rather, the government’s capacity to
make corporatist exchanges was weakened by the increasing asser-
tiveness of the opposition in the Storting and by parliamentary
fragmentation. The economy deteriorated rapidly in the 1980s, but
public budgets were never as strained as in Denmark and Sweden.
Moreover, the centre-right governments from 1981 to 1986 were
ideologically opposed to privileging corporatist actors in the policy
process. The organizational landscape was changing, too. New types
of interest group were not able to discipline their members and
control politically relevant resources. The capacity of both govern-
ment and interest organizations to make corporatist exchanges was
weakened.
In Sweden the story is somewhat different. Corporatism began to
decline earlier, but not so abruptly and dramatically as in Norway
and Denmark. Still, compared to its heyday, corporatism is weaker in
Sweden too, according to most studies and indicators. Arguably, the
governments of the 1970s and 1980s controlled fewer resources that
could be used in exchange in corporatist bargains. Although union
density continued to increase until the mid-1990s, electoral volatility
has increased consistently since the 1960s, and the Social Democrat
stronghold among organized labour has declined since the early
1980s. Popular confidence in unions has also dwindled and new
forms of organizational involvement have become more prevalent.
Since the 1980s, organized interests increasingly do not control
the resources that made them attractive partners in corporatist
exchanges in the past.
It is important to emphasize that corporatist exchange develops
over time within complicated institutional structures shaped by
390 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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former decisions and experiences. Ideological motives and strategic
action in the political arena should, of course, not be disregarded.
In Norway and Denmark in the 1980s, the government, due to
increasing political and economic constraints, could not – and, for
ideological reasons, would not – make the exchanges that previous
social democrat governments had. Decorporatization in Sweden was,
to an important extent, driven by the employers’ confederation,
which had close links to the ruling Conservative Party. However, in
line with the exchange theory of corporatism, we have emphasized
that growing fragmentation and parliamentary assertiveness make it
hard for contemporary Scandinavian governments to meet disparate
demands from more diverse interest organizations. In order to
handle complicated parliamentary negotiations, it may be easier to
keep extra players out of the game,80 not least because organized
interests and, notably, unions do not control the political assets that
often made them inevitable parties to corporatist exchanges with
governments in the past.
Changed costs and benefits associated with other means of poli-
tical influence for interest organizations may, of course, influence
the exchange. These are omitted from this article, which treats the
outside options as constant. However, our guess is that an investi-
gation of outside options would most likely leave our conclusion
unchanged. For instance, growing lobbying has been an effect of
the re-evaluation of corporatist exchange, rather than increasing
possibilities for lobbying.81
Thus, the core of corporatism is not ‘an alliance between the weak
and the weakened’.82 Rather, corporatism presupposes actors that
control the resources that are of interest to the exchanging partners.
This means that, even if governments with strong ideological motives
to reinstate corporatism return to power, it will not be an easy task.
80 Nørgaard and Klemmensen, ‘Hvorfor stemmer oppositionen for regeringens
lovforslag?’.
81 Rothstein and Bergström, Korporatismens fall; J. Johansson, SAF och den svenska
modellen. En studie av uppbrottet från förvaltningskorporatismen 1982–91, Uppsala, Acta
Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2000; Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.
82 Baccaro and Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe’, p. 1342.
391DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd