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Understanding processes of ethnic control: Segmentation, dependency and co-optation in post-communist Estonia

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Abstract

Amidst an arguably exhaustive range of studies regarding ethno–politics in post–communist Estonia, this article sets out a new framework derived from Ian Lustick’s model of ethnic control. We argue that one of the key reasons for ethnic peace and stability in Estonia over the past ten years has been a considerable degree of control instituted by the Estonian political community over its sizeable Russian–speaking minority. We analyse this control using Lustick’s three main indicators of segmentation, dependence and co–optation. In addition, we differentiate within each of these categories between structural, institutional and programmatic levels of control measures. Our aim is to place Estonia into a better comparative perspective by bringing to light its particular configuration of control mechanisms. The article concludes with an assessment of what this configuration might mean for future ethno–political developments.

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... Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -states in the second group -became part of the Soviet Union in 1940. During the Soviet era, Russian-speaking enclaves developed in those countries with Russian-speaking media, government services, cultural resources and educational institutions (Pettai and Hallik, 2002). Those countries have received a lot of attention in relation to their ethnopolitics, which differed considerably one from another. ...
... On the other hand, Latvia and Estonia adopted stringent citizenship laws and excluded large parts of their populations from public life. Pettai and Hallik (2002) show that, after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, citizenship in the restored Estonian state was only being granted to the citizens of the pre-occupied republic and their descendants, while Soviet-era immigrants had to fulfil naturalization requirements. In the 1992 parliamentary election, out of 101 newly elected deputies, all were ethnic Estonians. ...
... On the other hand, the EU accession process, as well as pressures from other international organisations, pushed Estonia towards integration programmes and a policy of multiculturalism, which Pettai and Hallik (2002) call a 'co-optation' strategy. ...
Book
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The paper “Making the State Work: Lessons from 20 Years of Public Administration Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union” reviews literature analysing more than 20 years transition in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with the main objective of bringing together existing research for practitioners in an accessible manner. The literature reviewed highlights a number of important lessons-learned after the political transitions beginning in 1989. The post-1989 development took many different directions in terms of economic, social and political reforms. The main difference in post-1989 institutional development has been between the countries that were part of the FSU and the countries that formed part of the external empire in CEE (including the Baltic republics that were normally incorporated into the Soviet Union). The post-Soviet countries still maintained the conceptual and institutional legacy of the Soviet Union, often combined with the gradual return to the traditional or patriarchal rule of the past, associated with little economic modernisation and the re-emergence of the traditional authority of clan connections. Meanwhile, the CEE countries generally returned to their pre-Soviet institutions and practices that made the democratic transition less vulnerable to the misuse of power and the reversal to autocratic or semi-totalitarian regimes.
... Smith 1996). Thanks to Pettai and Hallik (2002), however, a more detailed consideration of the ethnic control model was developed in order to explain the absence of conflict with the minority group. Similarly, also Commercio adopted Lustick's notion of control, although he proposed the category of 'partial control', in order to describe the phenomenon when self-defined titular nations (in his analysis, Estonia and also Latvia) "control the political sector, but share control of the economic sector with the respective Russian minorities" and perspectives of economic prosperity encourage the "acceptance of the system" by the dominated (2007,82). ...
... Agarin 2013). At the same time, 'Estonian multiculturalism' was deemed to be used by the ethnic core politicians to buttress majority dominance, through co-optation and without concrete implications for truly effective minority policies (Pettai and Hallik 2002). A similar arrangement remained in place for the package related to the years 2014-2020, with some specifications of the translation of television and radio programs and just a shortly mentioned consideration of social and economic rights. ...
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This volume examines the concept of ethnic domination and its manifestations in Israel (within the Green Line) and Estonia. Ethnic domination is a method of managing ethnic differences in multiethnic contexts through asymmetrical power relations, in accordance with an ethnonationalist ideology, whereby a group is subordinated to another holding the power, albeit not intent to directly eliminate the subaltern. The volume compares the predicament of Israeli Palestinian citizens and Estonian Russian-speakers in different dimensions (state-citizenship, government-parliament, parties). Also, the analysis explains the divergent trajectories of the cases: the tightening of the condition of Israeli Palestinian citizens and the democratization of ethnic politics in Estonia.
... It is a specific process of institutional adjustment where either the exercise or the burden of power, or both, are increasingly shared between existing power holders and other power centers to stabilize an institution (Selznick 1964;Dickson 2000;Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Examples of co-optation from the domestic realm include the co-optation of labor unions (Lehmbruch 1984), churches (Abdullah 2015), or ethnic minorities (Pettai and Hallik 2002) into the institutions of democratic states, as well as the co-optation of opposition parties (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), regional leaders (Reuter and Robertson 2015), private entrepreneurs (Dickson 2000(Dickson , 2008Gerschewski 2019), elite networks (Hale 2015), or rebel groups (Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer 2005, 124-125;Salehyan 2019) into the institutions of autocratic regimes (Wintrobe 1998;Geddes et al. 2018). Examples from the international realm include the co-optation of local chiefs into colonial empires (Crowder 1964;Trotha 1994, 261) or of client states into hegemonic orders (Lake 2009). ...
... Moreover, co-optors have to offer less far-reaching privileges to gain support from co-optees that are in agreement with the purpose and principles of the existing order. This is also the reason why, in multi-ethnic states, the leaders of the ruling majority try to incorporate reform-minded, moderate leaders from minorities rather than radical or even revolutionary leaders (Pettai and Hallik 2002). They understand that moderates are easier and cheaper to co-opt than radicals. ...
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As emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institutions adapt to underlying global power shifts? We propose an (institutionalist) theory of strategic co-optation that differs from both (realist) accommodationist and (liberal) integrationist theories. Drawing on isolated treatments of strategic co-optation from other domains – domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present – we develop a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to shifts in the global distribution of power. The theory specifies the concept, the conditions and the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We conceptualize co-optation as a specific form of adaptation where established powers trade institutional privileges for emerging powers' institutional support. We theorize the conditions under which emerging and established powers are (more or less) likely to strike a co-optation deal. In addition, we identify endogenous dynamics that may render co-optation precarious and thus subject to instabilities. While the ambition of this paper is primarily theoretical, we provide various empirical illustrations of how strategic co-optation is used to adapt international institutions to contemporary shifts in the global distribution of power.
... Because the wider population associated the communist party with illegitimate foreign (Russian) domination and most of the party members were indeed hard-liners with anti-independence and anti-democratic attitudes, it was almost impossible to convert the party to the successful left-wing communist successor party (Taagepera 1993). Ultimately the only reasonable strategy available was to constitute the party as an ethnic minority party for the Russian-speakers, but even in that case it proved to be difficult for the ethnic parties to mobilize large sections of the Russian voters (at least in the 1990s) (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
... For example Pettai (2012) refers to these issues while talking about the Estonian Communist Party and its opportunities to make a successful come-back in the early 1990s. One must also consider the ideological appeal of these parties, especially to the Russian minority, for whom it was very difficult to construct any attractive and encompassing ideological formulas in the 1990s (see Pettai and Hallik 2002). There is also no doubt that the exclusive citizenship laws (which did not grant citizenship automatically to all permanent residents of Estonia and Latvia and denied citizenship to the Soviet-era immigrants -most of the Russian speakers (see ) affected the opportunities for the Russian minority to get politically organized and to found the powerful ethnic parties in a form of communist successor parties or the left-wing parties already in the early 1990s. ...
Thesis
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The study of the Baltic States provides new pathways for advancing the sociological approach of party system analysis in general and in the CEE context in particular. It further allows us to consider several empirical issues related to cleavages in the Baltic States, but also extends the scope of the sociological approach into new spheres of research and even allows us to pursue even a limited theoretical innovation in the field.
... The overrepresentation of indigenous elites inside the state can be attributed (among others) to a unifying nationalist strategy of "ethnic control" in Estonia and Latvia (Pettai and Hallik, 2002). This national ideology of "partial exclusion", which restricted in practice the fundamental rights (including the right to vote 31 ) of many ethnic Russians through restrictive citizenship legislation from 1992 (Steen, 2010), which put the Russian parties in "eternal opposition", had (next to multiple negative) one main positive effect: it avoided detrimental political competition (Pettai, 2005) and limited the EU's and Russia's "fractionalization power" 32 . ...
... Rather, Estonia might well have ended up more like Moldova, wracked by inter-ethnic tension and caught in an ambiguous geopolitical gray zone." (Pettai, 2005, p. 29;Pettai and Hallik, 2002). ...
Article
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The European Union (EU) and domestic " change agents " have promoted the rule of law in post-Soviet Europe with varying results. While the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) succeeded in establishing the rule of law, Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) did not. Why did EU-driven legal, judicial and anti-corruption reforms not produce the rule of law in the latter group? I argue that divided elites (reformers) in laggard EaP countries engage in detrimental political competition that creates incentives to misuse the law, the prosecution and judicial structures as " political weapons ". The result of this power struggle is an erratic reform process which produces reform pathologies of Europeanization (e.g. legal instability and incoherence, reinforced fragmentation and politicization) that undermine the rule of law. Instead of serving as an external check on rule-of-law abusing reformers, the EU empowers reformist but unaccountable " change agents " in a partisan way, thus creating incentives for the accumulation and abuse of power, especially after regime changes. Reformers in the advanced Baltic States have avoided detrimental political competition, the fragmentation of the state and many reform pitfalls through de facto exclusion of ethnic Russians from the political and judicial system. This policy of partial exclusion allowed elites in Estonia and Latvia to build consensus, to create a unitary state, including strong, unified and independent horizontal accountability structures (e.g. judiciary, Ombudsman, Constitutional Court etc.) which in turn were able to check the executive. The argument is supported by an empirical, indicator-based analysis of the rule of law and several interviews with representatives in Brussels, Strasbourg and Chisinau.
... Fourth, the Estonian case is about the abrupt change in the very nature of the integrational context. The nation state model based on the legal continuity principle, and therefore, including a redefinition of the legal status of post-war migrants from the Soviet Union, became the basis for many new social and political institutions and policies (Pettai & Hallik 2002). The extremely neo-liberal character of the market reforms and the ethnic nation state ideology created a new kind of opportunity structure, contributing to the emergence of new economic and ethnic inequalities (Vetik & Helemäe 2011b). ...
... They were ascribed the status of firstgeneration immigrants after the fall of the Soviet Union, which makes them quite different to first-generation immigrants in Western countries. They also considered themselves to be members of the majority nation of the Soviet Union and were merely moving from one part of the Soviet Union to another (Pettai & Hallik 2002). They were not obliged by either official policies or institutions to consider themselves as immigrants. ...
Article
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The disadvantages experienced by immigrants in education and labour markets have been of growing concern in many countries in recent years. However, little research has been undertaken on ethnic inequalities in labour markets in Eastern Europe, and especially in post-Soviet societies. This article considers the integration of the immigrant population into the labour market in post-Soviet Estonia, where the context and peculiarities of the arrived population are quite different from the assumptions of Western immigrant integration theories. The Russian-speaking population arrived in Estonia after World War II as internal migrants, because Estonia was part of the Soviet Union. A remarkably high proportion of them were well educated. After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, the context of integration changed radically, and the legal status of internal Soviet Union migrants was redefined. To account for these societal and political changes, we suggest making an analytical distinction between generations of immigrants in a demographic sense (being born in Estonia) and an integrational sense (becoming an integral part of the host society, in the labour market - having more similar patterns to those of the native population in the context of labour market outcomes). This distinction impacts differently on different age cohorts and we analysed outcomes of labour market integration alongside both nativity generations and age cohorts. Our analysis based on the 2011-2013 Labour Force Surveys shows that, while in most Western countries there are tendencies of convergence between natives and second-generation immigrants regarding structural integration, in Estonia the dynamics are different. The net disadvantage of young second-generation immigrants relative to their Estonian counterparts is either more pronounced compared to the disadvantage of their 'parents' age cohort relative to their Estonian peers (with regard to the risks of unemployment or chances of obtaining a high occupational position) or becoming less pronounced, but only for the highly educated portion of second generations (in terms of self-assessed over-education). Keywords: Structural Integration, Immigrants, First and Second Generation, Post-Soviet Estonia
... However, as the overall medium for inter-ethnic communication across the USSR, 3 In this regard, see: G. Smith et al. 1994;G. Smith 1996, Järve 2000, Pettai-Hallik 2002, Pettai-Kallas 2009 the Russian language also assumed a growing societal role in Estonia during the Soviet period. Russian was taught at all stages of the curriculum in Estonianlanguage schools, while a parallel network of Russian-language primary and secondary schools (as well as some institutions of higher learning) existed alongside those teaching in Estonian. ...
... A similar perception has again been articulated in political and media discourse following recent events in Ukraine, although at the time of writing these have not led to any occurrence of unrest in a Baltic setting. Securitization and the logic of ethnic control thus remain salient features of the Estonian political order, and this acts as an obstacle to any regulation of minority issues according to the autonomy principle (Pettai-Hallik 2002;Pettai-Kallas 2009). ...
... Because the wider population associated the communist party with illegitimate foreign (Russian) domination and most of the party members were indeed hard-liners with anti-independence and anti-democratic attitudes, it was almost impossible to convert the party to the successful left-wing communist successor party (Taagepera 1993). Ultimately the only reasonable strategy available was to constitute the party as an ethnic minority party for the Russian-speakers, but even in that case it proved to be difficult for the ethnic parties to mobilize large sections of the Russian voters (at least in the 1990s) (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
... For example Pettai (2012) refers to these issues while talking about the Estonian Communist Party and its opportunities to make a successful come-back in the early 1990s. One must also consider the ideological appeal of these parties, especially to the Russian minority, for whom it was very difficult to construct any attractive and encompassing ideological formulas in the 1990s (see Pettai and Hallik 2002). There is also no doubt that the exclusive citizenship laws (which did not grant citizenship automatically to all permanent residents of Estonia and Latvia and denied citizenship to the Soviet-era immigrants -most of the Russian speakers (see Budryte 2005)) affected the opportunities for the Russian minority to get politically organized and to found the powerful ethnic parties in a form of communist successor parties or the left-wing parties already in the early 1990s. ...
Article
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The Estonian and Latvian party politics stand apart from the Central and Eastern European mainstream for two principal reasons: the peculiar absence of the communistsuccessor parties and the right-wing-inclined ideologically unbalanced party competition. All these features seem to be framed by unique cleavage constellations in which the ethnic cleavage is effectively merged with the communist-anti-communist cleavage. The article seeks to explain these exceptional features, while applying to the theory formulated by Herbert Kitschelt, in which different types of communist regime legacies are linked with cleavage formation and the evolution of party systems. However, the analysis demonstrates that Kitschelt’s original argument on the Latvian and Estonian cases was misleading and therefore a new type of communist legacy was proposed - the ethniccolonial communism, which enables to provide a more convincing explanation and opens up new research perspectives on the subject.
... In Estonia and Latvia, but not in Lithuania, most of the Russian-speakers became 'aliens' after the introduction of citizenship regulations that excluded individuals who were not citizens of the pre-Soviet republics or their descendants. Although many of them have eventually become citizens, Russian-speakers were -and still are -underrepresented in shaping public institutions and decision-making bodies (Pettai and Hallik 2002;Cianetti 2019;Podolian 2020). Thus, there are reasons to believe they feel less involved in the political life of their country. ...
... Ethnic Estonians benefitted more than did others because they constituted 92 percent of the population in 1940 (Andersen 1997, Brubaker 2011. During the transitional and formative decade (1990s), Estonians emerged better off socio-economically than did Russophones thanks to their citizenship, official language proficiency, and superior assets and skills (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
Preprint
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In ethnic democracies, the ethnic majority dominates the state in ways that subordinate a large ethnic minority. We ask how minorities fare in the economic sphere in an ethnic democracy and what are the forces that shape government policies toward them. We develop a new framework that consists of negative and positive determinants of economic policy toward ethnic minorities and apply it to two ethnic democracies: Israel (in its pre-1967 borders) and Estonia. We find that while the negative determinants are generally stronger than the positive ones, certain factors encourage economic advancement of minorities. As long as minority economic power does not threaten majority hegemony, the state's character or territorial integrity, government policies in ethnic democracies may potentially improve minority economic status in order to reduce overt ethnic discrimination in the labor market, avert ethnic unrest, enhance aggregate economic growth, address labor shortages, and increase support for minority-led local government.
... In Estonia and Latvia, but not in Lithuania, most of the Russian-speakers became 'aliens' after the introduction of citizenship regulations that excluded individuals who were not citizens of the pre-Soviet republics or their descendants. Although many of them have eventually become citizens, Russian-speakers were -and still are -underrepresented in shaping public institutions and decision-making bodies (Pettai & Hallik 2002;Cianetti 2019;Podolian 2020). Thus, there are reasons to believe they feel less involved in the political life of their country. ...
Article
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The Baltic presidents have in common that they are supposed to embody the 'nation' and to provide an image of their countries abroad. But can the president embody the people if "the people" itself is divided? In this paper, we will focus on public trust in the presidency between the majority and minority population in the Baltic states. Drawing on public opinion surveys, the aim is to examine the determinants of public trust in the presidential institution and support for the performance and principles of the political system as well identification with the political community itself. Among our findings, we conclude that ethnic or linguistic identity explains trust to a considerable degree, which suggests that trust is not only an expression of specific political support but also part of a more deep-seated, diffuse support.
... The ethnic aspect of democracy -more precisely the Citizenship Law, which restricted citizenship to individuals who were citizens in June 1940 and their descendants, and established the requirements of the knowledge of Estonian and passing a citizenship examination for naturalization -is relatively central to the criticism. Many scholars who have explored post-Soviet Estonian nationbuilding (for example, Kolstø 2002;Kymlicka 2000;Lagerspetz 2001;Lauristin & Heidmets 2002;Pettai & Hallik 2002;Smith 2003, among many others) have also discussed the question of whether Russians might mobilize to protest. Most of them have remained relatively skeptical about the possibility of mobilization for different reasons: 'social' citizenship, the lack of leaders, the specificity of the political 'market', etc. ...
... At the very beginning of the reform process, the full extent of the social and economic cleavages, ripping the united people of the Singing Revolution into the 'winners' and 'losers' of transition, was difficult to foresee. The deepest concerns at this stage were related to the future status of the Russian-speaking minority in the Estonian nation state (Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002;Pettai & Hallik, 2003;. ...
Book
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This collective monograph can be seen as a retrospective logbook of the long journey of the research group “Me. The World. The Media” (in Estonian “Mina. Maailm. Meedia”, abbreviated as MeeMa). The book offers a reflexive review of the long-term experience of researching the transformations in Estonian society, particularly by using the lens of social morphogenetic analysis developed by Margaret Archer and her co-workers. Specifically, the book aims to re-conceptualise the main results of the empirical studies from 2002 to 2014 by synthesising different theoretical perspectives on social change.
... В то же время у последних наблюдается острая потребность закрепить в пространстве публичной коммуникации сегменты, воспроизводящие и развивающие их коллективную этнокультурную идентичность [Волков, 2013: 188-193]. Аналогичная ситуация складывается и в Эстонии, где существующие межэтнические отношения можно описать в терминах доминирования, контроля или подчинения меньшинств [Pettai, Hallik, 2002;Järve, 2005]. ...
... Though further research would be needed to establish this with certainty, it appears that this model of managing ethno-cultural differences is quite pervasive throughout Central and Eastern Europe and its proliferation was arguably facilitated by transnational actors during the Euro-Atlantic pre-accession period (Horváth 2002). 6 Despite its empirical relevance, the model of unequal accommodation remains severely undertheorized in the literature, and comparative investigations and case studies about it are scarce (e.g., see Medianu 2002;Pettai and Hallik 2002;Kiss and Székely 2016). This shortcoming is even more striking when taking into account the abundance of studies on the consociational arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g., Belloni 2004;Kasapović 2005;Balić and Izmirlija 2013;Hodžić and Mraović 2015;Orlović 2015) or even the burgeoning comparative research of autonomy arrangements in Eastern Europe (Smith and Cordell 2007;Smith 2013;Malloy et al. 2015). ...
Chapter
This chapter discusses the notions of ethnic parallelism and the “Minority Society”, which have occupied a central role in the political program and self-representation of Transylvanian Hungarian elites since the interwar period and which were taken for granted by community leaders after 1989. Also, the chapter provides an overview of the thick institutional network meant to underpin the Hungarian societal segment (or pillar), which has played a key role in reproducing ethnic boundaries. The chapter emphasizes that ethnic parallelism can be regarded both as an ethno-political program and as a social reality, but in this latter respect encapsulation is far from perfect, as some fields are imperfectly encapsulated (e.g., education, the churches, mass media), while others are primarily not ethnically integrated (e.g., the economy).
... There has been little assimilation, however, because neither side is keen on assimilating. 9 Proud of their language and cultural heritage, Russian speakers apply them in schools and communal institutions (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
Article
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In the modern era, the grand forces of modernism, liberalism and nationalism have opposed and minimized societal diversity in Western states. The Civil Rights Movement in the USA and the flow of millions of unassimilable immigrants, mostly Muslims, to Europe opened Western societies to cultural diversity. But liberal multiculturalism in the West consists mainly of endorsement of subcultures, non‐discrimination and inclusion. It falls short of instituting consociational components like cultural autonomy and power‐sharing. Fear and unease in the West increasingly give priority to majority over minority rights. While all Western democracies object to societal diversity, they differ in the way they handle it: liberal democracies deny it, consociational democracies institutionalize it and ethnic democracies partially allow and partially subordinate it. These three different strategies are evident in the way representative cases of Western democracies, namely the USA, Switzerland and Estonia, respectively, cope with societal diversity.
... The other basic explanation rests on the structural opportunities which TOS open up. One can assume that TOS being socially acceptable (or being a mechanism of hegemony in other words) also serve as a mechanism for the incorporation and cooptation of ethnic spokespersons into the system of government (Lustick, 1979;Pettai and Hallik, 2002). ...
Article
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This paper examines opportunities and possibilities for national minority councils (NMC's) to serve as a channel for dialogue and cooperation between national minorities, governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations within the Republic of Serbia and across this state. The main objective of this paper is to review the constitutional and legal framework of trans-ethnic cooperation in Serbia. In order to achieve this, I am analysing the constitutional and legal status of NMC's, and their competences and role in the trans-ethnic cooperation in Serbia and across it. The model of trans-ethnic cooperation and its functioning in practice is analysed especially within the case study of the Slovak NMC in Serbia. The previous framework of cooperation was restricted by the decision of the Serbian Constitutional Court in 2014. Remaining opportunities and possibilities for NMC's in trans-ethnic cooperation are not fully used in practice. There is no systematic cooperation of the Slovak NMC with other organisations of ethnicities within and across Serbia. Trans-ethnic cooperation is not so common and is conducted usually on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, the existing institutional and legal model for trans-ethnic cooperation is relatively good. NMC's can and should be active agents fostering trans-ethnic cooperation in and beyond Serbia.
... Instead, Lithuania perceives the Polish community as a threat to its social coherence. When the Polish political party, Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (AWPL), conducted by Valdemar Tomaszevski, formed a coalition with Lithuanian Russians, it strengthens the negative image of Lithuanian Poles in the eyes of the Lithuanian majority.34 What is more, the Lithuanian government believes the aim of Russia's compatriot policy is to support the Polish minority to be granted exclusive rights and eventually a special status to the Russian community(s) in all of the Baltic States. ...
Article
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The occupation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine brought minority issues to the top of the Baltic security agenda. Although experts estimate that a separatist scenario for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is not probable, the issue of national minorities has already been included into the security concept as a potential source of danger to stability and national identity. While there is need to analyze political risks in the Baltics, the concept of securitization will be applied to the topic of national minorities. This paper addresses the problem of national minorities’ political integration and loyalty to the state. For the empirical analysis, the paper will use secondary data of surveys conducted in 2014-2017, exposing opinions and beliefs of minorities in the Baltic States referring to their domestic and foreign policies, NATO, Ukrainian crisis and relations with Russia. As a result, the concluding suggestion is made that more attention should be paid to political cohesion and minority policy management: 1) to optimize the minority development; 2) to predict potential risks in the region, and 3) to prevent further threats from Russia.
... The result was that all those permanent residents (citizens of the ESSR) who were not citizens of Estonia as of 16 July 1940 (or descendants of such citizens) in no time became foreigners. After obtaining independence, the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was predominantly looked upon not as a historical ethnic minority, but as the Soviet invasion legacy for which the common minority rights approach is unacceptable (Pettai and Hallik, 2002). ...
... The neo-liberal stance was a conscious political choice against corporatist developments typical of, for example, Nordic corporatist societies, but also introduced vulnerabilities vis-à-vis economic crises (Kattel and Thorhallsson 2013). Distinct from its typical neoliberal economic policies, the Estonian state embraces a conservative ideological stance in policy areas such as citizenship and language policy, which can be described as ethnic control (Pettai and Hallik 2002). While admitting the existence of radically divergent interpretations on the Baltic (legal and political) situations, some scholars believe that once the status of national languages is re-established (i.e., the undoing of the political, demographic and social legacies of half a century of Soviet rule), the Baltic states can continue their language policies contributing to national and multilingual traditions (Hogan-Brun et al. 2007). ...
Chapter
Estonian language policy and planning (LPP) research has begun to expand beyond its decades-long focus on the integration and the Russian minority and on the state’s central role in policymaking. These traditional and critically important areas of focus, however, threaten to obscure other important and fascinating trends in Estonian LPP. Critical areas such as the Anglicization of higher education, the practices of transnational families and corporations, the changed security discourse, dynamic regional language communities, and the emergence of important political agents in LPP, in addition to the state, are also in need of attention. This edited volume aims to help expand our understanding of the dynamism of language policy and planning by exploring the ways in which Estonian-based research in the field reveals shifting borders and new centers of LPP influence and power.
... The other basic explanation rests on the structural opportunities which TOS open up. One can assume that TOS being socially acceptable (or being a mechanism of hegemony in other words) also serve as a mechanism for the incorporation and cooptation of ethnic spokespersons into the system of government (Lustick, 1979;Pettai and Hallik, 2002). ...
Article
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The article analyses trans-ethnic organizational settings (TOS) – multi-ethnic nongovernmental organizations, autonomous parts of the public sector or recurrent organized practices designed for the promotion of inter-ethnic accord and communication between ethnicities and public authorities. Most of these low-profile power-sharing arrangements have been established in the post-Soviet countries, and they range from a statehood resting on the very idea of multi-ethnic coalition (breakaway Transnistria) to official or semi-official ‘assemblies of peoples’ (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and coordinative bodies for minority NGOs (Belarus and some provinces of Ukraine). The constant features of all these settings are the patronizing involvement of the state and the principle of inter-ethnic cooperation which justifies and guides all the related activities. The author investigates why TOS as a rule exhibit durability and a high level of popular support combined with a lack of explicit state compulsion and resistance from minority rank-and-file despite the fact that TOS provide virtually no assets and opportunities to ethnic groups involved. Several mutually compatible explanations rest on discarding the view of ethnic groups as internally cohesive social entities and independent actors, and can be looped into two categories, namely discursive accommodation and institutional cooptation of ethnic activism.
... Figure 2The constitution of a neoliberal dominant social bloc in Estonia followed the independence from the Soviet Union, the dissolution of communism, and the new set of economic and political actors that the construction of a democratic polity and a market economy involved (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997; Smith 2001). The Soviet Union's hostility toward Baltic independence and the pro-Soviet demonstrations of a small but vocal group within the large Russian speaking minority in Estonia helped to forge a tight connection between independence, ethnicity, and economic policy orientations favoring radical reforms (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997, 95–7; Pettai and Hallik 2002; Smith 2001). Radical reformers became true nation builders by condemning Soviet legacies, rejecting state intervention, and exacerbating strong feelings against the Russian minority who were over-represented in heavy industry. ...
Article
The global financial crisis has stimulated much research about the resilience of neoliberalism. However, concrete mechanisms of neoliberal resilience are yet to be elaborated. This article elaborates such mechanisms by incorporating Amable’s notion of institutional hierarchy into Mahoney and Thelen’s gradual institutional change theory. In doing this, it provides a dynamic and politically grounded framework to analyze institutional resilience. Neoliberalism is maintained over time because dominant social blocs defend those policies and institutions that they perceive as more favorable to their interests (high hierarchy institutions), while allowing degrees of freedom in those that matter less (low hierarchy institutions). Four mechanisms account for the resilience of high hierarchy institutions: marginal adjustment, solidification, accommodation and compromise. I explore the potential of this framework by comparing the trajectory of two related policy domains, exchange rates and industrial policy, in countries with a long history of neoliberal policymaking: Chile and Estonia.
... There has been little assimilation, however, because neither side is keen on assimilating. 9 Proud of their language and cultural heritage, Russian speakers apply them in schools and communal institutions (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
Article
Full-text available
... He encouraged Estonia and Latvia to provide the Russophone population with a genuine opportunity to integrate within the state, formally by acquiring citizenship and substantively through cultural and educational means, so as to enhance the chances that the Russophone minority would embrace Estonian or Latvian identity rather than act to modify it or prevent its consolidation. 60 Programmes have subsequently been undertaken to adapt non-titular citizens into the pre-set titular-dominant state and society (Pettai and Hallik 2002). ...
Chapter
This chapter discusses the future of Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus. It examines the prospect of their repatriation to Turkey within the framework of the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Cyprus. Although ordinarily repatriation has a positive connotation of going home, in the case of the Turkish settlers, repatriation or homecoming may mean the displacement for another home. This chapter begins with a short overview of the history of the settler issue in Northern Cyprus and its evolution. It then considers the problems the prospect of repatriation may impose on the vision of a future unified Cyprus. It also discusses the modalities which are currently negotiated for addressing this issue. Because these modalities are framed in the shadow of international human rights law, the implications of some human rights standards for the conflict are also examined. Lastly, the proposed modalities are examined in comparison with the alternative solution for the settler issue which was adopted in the Baltic states during the 1990s.
... influenced much more by past histories and structures than by single authoritative decisions." 38 Others note that while on a structural level, the estonian economy under the Soviet regime was segmented along ethnic lines coinciding with bureaucratic lines (Russians worked mainly in enterprises ruled by branch authorities from Moscow, while estonians worked in enterprises managed by estonian authorities), the political decisions of estonia's postsocialist authorities had a significant impact on ethnic inequalities in socio-economic domain and at University College Dublin on October 19, 2015 eep.sagepub.com Downloaded from emerging entrepreneurship. ...
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In postcommunist Estonia, the topic of inequality was considered “embarrassing.” The dominant popular assumption was that inequalities just happen naturally. Class and inequality discourse was effectively marginalized due to long-lasting success in focusing attention on nationalizing issues. A “transition culture” that lionized the capitalist future has also contributed to the marginalization of class discourse. Because of this marginalization, and the power of national/ethnic discourse and transitional culture, those most economically vulnerable were deprived of the cultural and discursive resources to resist the most extreme market-oriented policies. Sociologists did discuss inequality more seriously, but mostly according to a gradational and functional stratification paradigm: the central focus has been on individual attributes that divide people into classes. The analysis focusing on relations of exploitation and domination have been virtually absent in postcommunist Estonia. We conclude that the main challenge for Estonian social science is to incorporate concepts of power, exploitation, and domination perspective into study of inequality.
... influenced much more by past histories and structures than by single authoritative decisions." 38 Others note that while on a structural level, the estonian economy under the Soviet regime was segmented along ethnic lines coinciding with bureaucratic lines (Russians worked mainly in enterprises ruled by branch authorities from Moscow, while estonians worked in enterprises managed by estonian authorities), the political decisions of estonia's postsocialist authorities had a significant impact on ethnic inequalities in socio-economic domain and at University College Dublin on October 19, 2015 eep.sagepub.com Downloaded from emerging entrepreneurship. ...
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In postcommunist estonia, the topic of inequality was considered " embarrassing. " The dominant popular assumption was that inequalities just happen naturally. Class and inequality discourse was effectively marginalized due to long-lasting success in focus-ing attention on nationalizing issues. A " transition culture " that lionized the capitalist future has also contributed to the marginalization of class discourse. Because of this marginalization, and the power of national/ethnic discourse and transitional culture, those most economically vulnerable were deprived of the cultural and discursive resources to resist the most extreme market-oriented policies. Sociologists did discuss inequality more seriously, but mostly according to a gradational and functional strati-fication paradigm: the central focus has been on individual attributes that divide people into classes. The analysis focusing on relations of exploitation and domination have been virtually absent in postcommunist estonia. We conclude that the main challenge for estonian social science is to incorporate concepts of power, exploitation, and domination perspective into study of inequality.
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Having recently emerged from its unenviable status as the runt of international law, the phenomenon of statelessness nonetheless eludes traditional international legal instruments. Confronted with questions of nationality that typically fall within the domain of sovereignty, international and regional human rights bodies struggle to rein in the increasingly creative measures that states adopt to obscure the production and persistence of statelessness. This Article uncovers and dissects the different ways in which states manufacture statelessness not through explicitly discriminatory laws and unequal treatment, but through manipulating ostensibly neutral criteria for nationality. The Article identifies three such criteria that are not traditionally considered “suspect” categories for the grant or denial of nationality: time, territory, and administrative practice. It also suggests doctrinal, policy, and strategic tools for identifying and responding to the types of statelessness that are not a collateral consequence of state failure or incompetence, but the outcome of state intentionality.
Article
In the mid-2000s, India turned from a nuclear pariah of the international community into a de facto recognized nuclear power. Why and how did this status elevation come about? Realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives point to important motivations but fail to elucidate the process of India’s (re-)integration. Our strategic cooptation argument conceives of India’s status upgrade as an exchange of institutional privileges for institutional support. To stabilize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States and other nuclear powers offered India the privilege of being recognized as nuclear power—and of taking part in international nuclear trade—in return for India’s promise to provide additional support to the non-proliferation regime. This deal materialized because India was able and willing to provide the needed support and because the institutional setting provided favorable conditions for circumventing and overcoming third-party resistance. We thus establish “strategic cooptation” as a mode of adapting international security institutions.
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This article develops the concept of ecological imaginary to analyse collectively held beliefs, conceptions and metaphors around nature, and how they express notions of “good” and “bad” socio-ecological ordering. Through vignettes from Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, a Baltic former Soviet republic, it critically examines the ideological work ecological imaginaries do to delegitimize socialism. Empirically I offer evidence on how local elites use the imaginaries of ecosystems and wastelands to “other” the Soviet-socialist past, and to justify a peculiar mix of neoliberal, pro-nationalistic and technoutopian policies. The article makes two contributions to the underexplored space between political ecology and postsocialist theory. First, the ecological imaginaries framework opens up possibilities for advancing a critical political ecology perspective beyond the realm of ostensibly environmental and environmentalist practices, and across a wider range of phenomena such as ecological nationalism, green gentrification and digital natures. Second, by drawing out the ways in which imaginaries allow elites and other social actors to neutralize socialist options in the present, I contribute to a rethinking of the concept of postsocialism by refocusing it on the ideological work of the notion that socialism belongs to the past.
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This article explores the Estonian ‘integration’ project, which was launched in the early 1990s to bridge the differences between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians by assimilating the latter with the former. Since the project will soon turn thirty, it is timely to ask whether it has been a success. This article employs Grigorii Golosov’s index of political party nationalization to understand whether the ‘integration’ project has helped to narrow the ideological divide between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians. In other words, the study asks whether ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians vote for the same political parties in comparable proportions or there are ‘Estonian’ and ‘Russian’ parties in the country. The analysis of the outcomes of four local and four parliamentary elections that took place in Estonia in 2005—2019 shows that by the mid-2000s Estonia achieved a considerable level of political party system nationalization at both national and local levels. At the national level, political party system nationalization remained high in 2007—2019 despite significant changes in the country’s political party system. At the local level, however, political party system nationalization has been diminishing since 2013, leading one to conclude that the Estonian ‘integration’ project has failed to close the ideological divide between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians.
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While much of this book is about mass attitudes, values and identities, Chap. 3 is also concerned with political behaviour: how and to what extent does political culture translate into support for various party alternatives? The first section is a reflection on the formation and configuration of parties and cleavages in the aftermath of the Soviet period, followed by a concise outline of the party development in the three countries. It proceeds with a section on public perceptions of conflict dimensions separating the political parties, before zooming in on the left/right dimension. Estonia and Latvia stand out in a regional context in the sense that left/right is effectively fused with ethnic divisions; that the majority populations tend to vote for parties on the right and the minority populations opt for leftist parties. In Lithuania, the notion of left and right was also part and parcel of the independence movement, but was never a byword for ethnic divisions.
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Евроинтеграцијама се приписује моћ благотворног деловања на реализацију права етничких група унутар држава кандидата за чланство у Европској унији. У том смислу, процес приступања Унији има пацификујућа дејства на унутардржавне етничке конфликте, будући да се од државе очекује да, пре самог приступања, реши спорове и постигне унутрашњу политичку стабилност. Наиме, од државе кандидата очекује се да својим мањинским етничким заједницама обезбеди права у складу са стандардима одређеним актима и вредностима уграђеним у темеље Европске уније. Процес евроинтеграција, сам по себи, подразумева усаглашавање државе са системом, вредностима и законодавством Уније. Поред унапред предвиђеног усклађивања, које је једнако за све државе кандидате, евроинтеграције пружају Унији могућност да напредак државе услови испуњењем одређених критеријума, који се, између осталог, односе и на статус мањина. Евроинтеграције, наравно, нису једини фактор који утиче на регулацију етничких односа, која је одређена и деловањем унутрашњних околности удржави кандидату за чланство.Циљ овог рада је д аистражи домете евроинтеграција као механизма са снагом регулације унутардржавних етничих сукоба. У ту сврху, биће испитана улога ЕУ и ефекат интеграционих процеса на проблем руског становништва у Естонији, албанско питање у Македонији и курдско питање у Турској.
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In international relations, conditionality is a variable phenomenon, with its forms and effectiveness differing, depending on the political strength players bring to the dispute at hand. Often, the country being conditioned will show its opposition to such efforts by foot-dragging or citing countervailing political principles such as state sovereignty. Estonia represents a case where conditionality has been resisted on the basis of an elaborate international legal doctrine, which pre-determined a number of basic parameters of the minority situation before conditionality could even be applied. In this chapter we will show how at a preliminary point in time (in 1989–91), Estonia applied a special doctrine of ‘legal restorationism’ in terms of how it interpreted the very nature of its statehood. This in turn pre-defined a number of fundamental conditions relating to the country’s large Russian-speaking minority, including citizenship and possible collective political recognition. As a consequence, later conditionality, be it from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, or the European Union (EU), was confronted with a legal straightjacket, which ultimately limited much of its effectiveness. International conditionality did succeed in altering certain details of minority policy, but in relation to major questions, such as citizenship rights and the political recognition of minorities, it was severely constrained by the legal doctrine already in place. The resulting minority rights regime has been one of ethnic control and the predominance of an ethnically understood Estonian nation-state.
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This article contributes to the growing debate on democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), by expanding on Béla Greskovits’s distinction between backsliding and hollowness, suggesting ways to broaden and specify the concept of hollowness, and discussing the relationship between hollowness and backsliding. Estonia and Latvia provide illustrations of two stable democracies, which nevertheless have consolidated tendencies for an elite-driven and ethnic-majority-driven democratic process hollowed out of its democratic contestation. This is what I call “technocratic” and “ethnic” hollowness. This double hollowness consolidated during EU accession, which created a favourable context for well-positioned ethnic majority elites to push forward ethnocentric and neoliberal agendas while restricting the space for debating them. However, far from a symptom of backsliding in the sense of a regression into authoritarianism, double hollowness is in fact central to these democracies’ stability. Such stability will have to be destabilised in order to improve their democratic quality.
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The introduction outlines the conceptual framework, the levels of analysis, and the main arguments of the volume. The core concept of the book is minority political agency, which has two complementary dimensions: political claim-making and community organizing. While interethnic bargaining is central to the former, for the latter the idea of ethnic parallelism is of key importance at both the discursive and institutional level. The chapters of the volume are grouped into three broad parts, according to their level of analysis. The first three chapters discuss macro-level phenomena, the next five focus on the meso-level (the institutional network providing the backbone of a Hungarian societal pillar), and the last three deal with the consequences of the interplay of the macro- and meso-level on micro-level phenomena.
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This chapter presents an account of the external citizenship policies of kin-states towards co-ethnic minorities in postcommunist Europe. Several Central and Eastern European countries have introduced kinship-based preferential treatment after 1989, granting easier access to citizenship for ethnic kin groups living in other countries. The chapter argues that restitutive external citizenship was introduced as part of democratic transition and historical reconciliation in the postcommunist region. The internationalization of minority protection was another important factor that triggered kin-state activism in external minority protection. In newly restored states where the proportion of titular majorities was relatively low, external citizenship and the parallel exclusion of resident ethnic/national minorities served nation-building projects.
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This article embeds the small state experiences in East Central Europe into the broader comparative political economy literature. These broader debates have developed three propositions—one about the need for liberal orthodoxy in small, vulnerable states, a second about special forms of comparative advantage such small states might develop, and the third about the capacities of small states to adapt through consultation and compensation. We demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each in East Central Europe, and we then analyze a key scope condition for small states’ successful adaptation, namely the buffering function from the international system. Existing literature overemphasizes the impact of domestic strategies and downplays the contribution of the international system when accounting for small states’ successes (and failures) in recovering after major shocks. Only when domestic strategies are supported (rather than undercut) by external factors can small states recover and adapt.
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“Socialism” became largely discredited all over Central and Eastern Europe with the collapse of communism, but perhaps more so in the Baltic countries. The three Baltic countries have in common a half-century long history as Soviet republics, but they differ from the rest of the Soviet Union in important respects. Not only because they experienced independence and democratic institutions in the Interwar period but also because they have somehow managed to cut themselves loose from the post-Soviet region, largely dominated by Russia, and aligned themselves with Europe and the West. However, their common Soviet legacy also sets them apart from what we usually call “Central and Eastern Europe”. In particular, they were not in charge of state borders and, thus, could not control the patterns of migration within the USSR. As a result, Estonia and Latvia experienced dramatic population changes over the decades. By 1989, one in three Estonians were from a non-Estonian Soviet republic, usually Russia, without much knowledge about Estonia and the Estonian language. In Latvia, almost half the population was of non-Latvian background at the onset of independence. As the two Soviet republics were loosening the ties with Moscow towards the end of the perestroika period, they were obliged to navigate a very delicate demographic situation. In the spirit of the time, many Russianspeakers were positive about independence, or at least greater autonomy within the USSR, while others fiercely opposed the idea. The majority remained, however, rather passive. The popular fronts—the Estonian Rahvarinne and the Latvian Tautas fronte—kept an inclusive approach towards the minorities, notably in terms of citizenship, but were challenged by more radical nationalists who started a process of registering all pre-Soviet citizens and their descendants and wanted to restrict the body of citizens to these groups. Meanwhile, the former communist parties all but vanished.1 When the two countries eventually introduced their citizenship laws, the Soviet threat was gone, Russia weakened and the radicals had won the argument: practically all Soviet-era immigrants were automatically excluded and it would take many years before the bulk of them became citizens. Many Balts feared that a forceful Russian population, vested with strong political representation, could disassemble the newly independent states and unravel several key priorities (such as security and defence arrangements and European alignments). The overriding notion was that the minority population would have to be co-opted into the citizenry on a gradual basis (Pettai and Hallik 2002). But even with a weak minority presence within the party systems, the ethno-linguistic cleavage was in fact firmly established from the outset and became more dominant as the minority electorate grew stronger and more vocal. This process is still taking place.
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Estonian constitutional politics is based on the principle of legal continuity of the pre-1940 Estonian state. Accordingly, none of the cornerstones of Estonian foreign, economic or identity politics has ever been questioned by the relevant political forces. The Estonian political consensus has notably resulted from the existence of the ethnic cleavage underlying the party competition. Constitutional politics has thus been shaped predominantly by the national conservative, market-oriented and pro-European parties that have been in power for most of the time following the regaining of independence. The failed amendment initiatives were above all submitted by the oppositional Centre Party that has sought to counterbalance this political dominance with the introduction of direct presidential elections and public initiatives.
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An exotic and bohemian setting to a western journalist, to others a country of almost “European” standing—this was the young Estonian republic in which the individuals of the political generation that constitutes the empirical case in this book grew up.1 This chapter is an attempt to portray the state and society in which their early socialization took place, with a particular focus on exploring the predominating cultural themes that could have influenced these individuals in an enduring manner. I seek to describe basic cultural features of interwar Estonia through the eyes of my interviewees in order to have some knowledge about the country that was left behind: Estonia between the two wars.
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This paper focuses on the provision of help and care to the older generation, comparing the situation of those in Estonia with migrant backgrounds to those with nonmigrant backgrounds. The empirical evidence suggests that, in the case of Estonia, the main factor determining attenuated family solidarity is proximity between family members. Thus, mainly first-generation migrants whose parents live more than 100 km away are at risk from weakened family bonds. The analysis points out significant gender differences, where men are more often deprived of help and emotional support. More relations of solidarity in migrant families where different generations move together are assumed, but the empirical evidence for this conjecture is far from conclusive.
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"Estonia's entrepreneurs: liberal community or ethnic separateness?" presents a study if integration processes in Estonia's business community and its perceptions by the actors in the field. The issue is scrutinized whether the Soviet-time separation of economy into a local (Estonian) and a 'Union' (now referred to as a Russian or non-Estonian) sectors is still retained. Results of three focus-groups - Estonians, non-Estonians and mixed corporations owned by individuals or respective ethnic origin - serve as a data base. Due to rational character of their activities and respectively to the minimal inclination to ethnic prejudices business communities are often regarded and a kind of key groups working for an integration. This is what renders studies among these group members especially interesting.
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Though its economy is tiny, Estonian has occupied a central role in the European debate about the merits of neo-liberalism. Ever since its transition to a market economy the country has pursued consistently neo-liberal strategies. Advocates on neo-liberalism argue that the country has fared very well in doing so and should serve as a model for other countries, especially those in crisis ridden Southern Europe. Critics instead argue that overall economic success has been modest while the chosen strategy has incurred substantial social costs. Moreover, much of its success should be attributed to factors other than it neoliberal policies. The current paper tries to assess the merits of neoliberal policies in Estonia and the reasons for their resilience. It first traces the main economic policy strategies since independence to clarify to what extent its neo-liberal reputation is justified. The next section looks at the economic and social outcomes of such policies. Though overall economic performance has lagged behind expectations and poverty and income inequality are relatively high, no serious challenge to neo-liberal policies has even been mounted. Though in part this due linguistic cleavages which have divided the potential opposition, and the presence of a safety valve in the form of labour migration to the more prosperous Nordic economies, the main reason for the resilience of neoliberalism in Estonia is the absence of any credible alternative for a small and highly open economy in combination with the increase in prosperity significant sections of the population have experienced.
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Democracy and civic society in Latvia are strongly affected by a multifaceted gap between the ethnic majority and minorities within contemporary Latvian society. The political elite are crucial actors in the politics of integration in Latvia. Postcolonial theories can help evaluate and explain the insufficiency of current integration policies in Latvia in respect to the participation of ethnic minorities in Latvia. Current integration challenges will be examined here based on two related issues of Latvian integration policies: (1) the process of naturalization and (2) the conflicting concepts of the twentieth-century Latvian history, especially the occupation in 1940. Both issues should be “revisited” using postcolonial explanatory potential in order to identify the causes of the long-lasting failure of integration policies in Latvia.
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The competing definitions of "Russian" by authorities in the Baltic countries and by representatives of local Russians are studied. Russian leaders used the policies, initially undifferentiated, toward "nontitular populations" to evoke a broad definition based on the language spoken. To split up this Russian-speaking aggregate, local authorities have used various methods, ranging from assimilation to new classifications based on the date of settlement or ethnic origins. Russian spokesmen have adapted variously to these new classifications through efforts to reformulate, resist and, in some cases, appropriate them.
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Introduction This chapter will discuss how, despite two decades of democratic transformation, Estonia still faces massive statelessness. It will be argued that both social and political factors explain such a state of affairs. On the one hand, national integration remains a complicated issue for Estonian society, while on the other hand, there is strong path dependence in the way the issue of citizenship is framed in a still divided political landscape. The discussion will be based mostly on two datasets compiled by the author and his collaborators – a public opinion poll, conducted in spring 2008 and an in-depth interview study connected to the poll carried out in April 2008. The analysis will be divided into two sections: the first part will focus on the reasons of statelessness as the stateless persons themselves see it; the second part will discuss the relationship between citizenship status and socioeconomic as well as sociocultural adaptation among Estonian Russians, aiming to highlight broader structural obstacles to overcoming the statelessness status. In the literature on Estonian ethnopolicy two diverse trends can be identified. One trend is based on the concept of nation building and holds that “the historical need to define the position of the Estonian nation concerning the position and future of the new Russian minority in the country has accelerated the transformation of Estonia from an ethnic nation (characterized by the historically dominant position of defensive nationalism) to a modern civic nation” (Lauristin and Heidmets 2002). © 2012 Renato Boschi and Carlos Henrique Santana editorial matter and selection.
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This chapter places the issue of minority rights in the wider legal and theoretical context of rights and classifies them as political rights. Drawing on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe, it then analyses the politics involved regarding the rights of national minorities. Constitutionally enshrined rights are both a traditional safeguard against the arbitrary use of power and the foundation for participation in a polity. Rights that are enforceable reflect the values on which a political system is founded. The notion of rights has become more elaborate and differentiated over time. In T. H. Marshall's classic study 'Citizenship and Social Class', social rights were not necessarily tied to citizenship, a political and economic reality that still holds today.
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Much of the political science literature suggests that a cohesive political community is advantageous-if not a precondition-for a stable democracy. Forging a cohesive community is obviously a more complex matter in a multi-ethnic setting. This article will consider the prospects of building political communities in the Baltic countries-three countries that, to various extents, struggle to balance ethnic pluralism, nation building, and democracy. The article examines the relationship between political community and democracy from a theoretical perspective, followed by an outline of the nation-building strategies taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after re-establishing independence in the early 1990s. Drawing on survey data, we use territorial attachment to tap the sense of political community in the three countries. Notably, our figures disclose that most of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia identify themselves as "Russians," and not at all with the country they reside in. This suggests that the contested issue of citizenship rights in the two countries has not been particularly conducive for creating cohesive political communities. We then move to the political regime and set out to examine the character of regime support in the three countries. Can we envisage solid support for democracy and its institutions in the absence of a cohesive political community? As it appears, regime support is not contingent on territorial identity. Our data disclose that many Baltic inhabitants draw a clear distinction between their own experiences with different political systems and what they perceive as relevant regime options today.
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This paper examines the consociational approach to the study of deeply divided societies and notes its weaknesses. It argues that the absence of a well-developed alternative “control” approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models. Control models, focusing on how superordinate groups manipulate subordinate groups rather than on the emergence and functioning of elite cartels, need to be developed—not only for the study of stable, deeply divided societies in which consociational models are inappropriate, but also as a means of eliminating certain theoretical problems that have been raised as criticisms of consociationalism. The paper includes a critical review of the literature that is available to guide study of control in deeply divided societies, and concludes with recommendations for the shape of an analytical framework within systematic comparison.
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Estonia's institutional legitimacy appears to be much more closely linked to its democratic performance than to its success in managing the economy.
Book
The Baltic States examines the struggles of the Baltic peoples for national self-determination. It is divided into two parts. Part one explores their nationalist awakening, how the realization of national self-determination during the inter-war years of independent statehood manifested itself, and the impact that fifty years of subsequent incorporation into the Soviet Union has had on Baltic politics and national cultures. Part two examines the nationalist reawakening in the late 1980s, the re-establishment of Baltic national self-governance in 1990-91 and the problems that these countries now face as sovereign entities.
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This is the second volume in a two‐volume series on democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The series focuses on three major aspects of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe: institutional engineering, transnational pressures, and civil society. This volume analyses the external parameters of democratic consolidation in 13 European countries: how different international actors and various economic, cultural, and security types of transnational pressures have shaped democratic politics in the region. The aim is to contrast a set of democracy theories with empirical evidence accumulated in Eastern Europe over the past 10 years. The volume tries to avoid complex debates about definitions, methods, and the uses and misuses of comparative research. Instead, it establishes what has really happened in the region, and which of the existing theories have proved helpful in explaining these developments. The Introduction sets out the distinctive features of the post‐communist wave of democratization, examines the aims and methods of major international actors, and considers the determinants of their impact on the political development of Eastern Europe. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part presents a conceptual and comparative analysis. The second consists of detailed studies of individual countries undergoing democratic consolidation. Case study chapters deal with the following countries: Estonia and Latvia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, the states of former Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and finally Russia. The concluding chapter identifies a set of variables responsible for the enormous impact of external factors on democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. It conceptualizes the interplay of internal and external factors impinging upon democracy, and shows the interplay of different positive and negative types of external pressures, such as conditionality.
Article
The collapse of the USSR resulted in a decline of institutions which had supported the dominance of ethnic Russians throughout the periphery of the country. In their place new institutions and mechanisms have been developed to regulate the access of people of different nationalities to power, resources and prestige. This article provides a comparative analysis of ethnic transformation in ten of the fourteen successor states of the former Soviet Union. The analysis identified five types of ethnic transformation in the successor states. In the Baltics the attempts of titular ethnic groups to secure predominance over ethnic Russians and radically transform institutions of the Soviet state resulted in the creation of exclusive ethnic democracies. In Central Asia an elite-negotiated transformation led to the emergence of ethnocracies in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while the regimes formed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were characterized by a mixture of ethnocratic and consociationalist features. In Moldova a failed attempt at unification with Romania eventuated in policies directed towards the creation of a Moldovan ethno-territorial federation. Finally, in Ukraine gradual reforms and attempts to abolish any ethnic hierarchy have led to the creation of consociationalism, in which ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, Russophones and Ukrainophones share power over the state.
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Despite their importance, the citizenship policies of the states of the former Soviet Union have received little attention, normally centred around the exclusive provisions for automatic citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, and Russian protests about these provisions. This article discusses these cases. This article discusses five domestic and international consequences of the citizenship policies. Citizenship plays a major role in forging identities in newly independent states. Citizenship brings political and economic rights. The resulting idea of discrimination and increase in the "Russianness' of ethnic Russians abroad has international consequences. International consequences are not limited to relations among Russia and its neighbours. Russia has pushed dual citizenship as a way for Russians abroad to be protected from discrimination. The other newly independent states, however, fear dual citizenship as a way for Russia to increase its control over the former Soviet territory. The tensions over dual citizenship have been strongest between Russia and Ukraine, reinforcing disagreements over how connected the two states should be. -from Author
Article
Journal of Democracy 7.1 (1996) 133-147 Unlike most of the other post-Soviet states, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- forcibly annexed by Josef Stalin in 1940 -- regard themselves officially as "restored" rather than "new" sovereignties. Among the results of this emphasis on continuity with the interwar republics is an approach to citizenship that is much narrower than those found elsewhere within the borders of the former USSR. Four years after independence, significant portions of the populations of Estonia and Latvia remain "stateless." Lithuania, though it also followed the legal approach of restoring the previous state, has avoided creating a large stateless population by making naturalization automatic upon the request of permanent residents. The Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies have drawn widespread criticism. Early in those countries' independence and democratization processes, Western critics took aim at citizenship and residency laws for nontitular groups. The Baltic states, in keeping with their own view of independence as a restoration of pre-1940 sovereignty, brought the citizenship laws of that era back into effect. More recently, Western leaders have been voicing concern about the legal, political, and cultural rights of ethnic Russians and other minorities in the Baltics. The Russian Federation has joined Western governments and international organizations such as the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in urging Estonia and Latvia to adopt more inclusive policies. Russian officials have equated the restrictive citizenship laws with human rights violations against Russian minorities in the Baltics, even comparing the Estonian and Latvian strategy to "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia. Such charges are unfair, for the Baltic states have made significant efforts to protect the legal and cultural rights of Russian and other minorities. Nonetheless, the Estonian and Latvian approaches to citizenship have left large Russian minority populations outside the states' political communities. The citizenship laws of the "restored" Baltic democracies must be seen in their larger context, which includes not only the aforementioned distinction between the restored state and the new state, but also the distinction between citizenship based on descent and citizenship based on territorial residence; the citizenship laws adopted by other states in the former USSR; and the policies used by several democracies in Western Europe (where a good deal of criticism of the Baltics' citizenship requirements has originated). One of the most basic rights of a state is to say who is a citizen, meaning one possessing full political rights within the state; thus only the number of states determines the number of variations of possible citizenship laws. Yet numerous international declarations express a desire to reduce the stateless population. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "everyone has the right to a nationality [i.e., `citizenship']," and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." Similarly, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness stipulates that a state acquiring territory "confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of the transfer or acquisition." In 1992, the CSCE repeated that "everyone has a right to a nationality" and that member states should "take measures, consistent with their constitutional framework, not to increase statelessness." Nevertheless, it is up to each country, and not international law or international organizations, to determine the rules for membership in its polity. The attribution of citizenship at birth by jus sanguinis (the law of blood descent) or by jus soli (the law of the soil) is straightforward for most individuals. Most children satisfy both conditions: their parents are citizens, and they are born on the territory of the state of which their parents are citizens. For those who do not satisfy both conditions, various combinations also result in citizenship by attribution. For example, children with one parent who is a U.S. citizen are entitled to U.S. citizenship, regardless of the place of birth (jus sanguinis). Likewise, children born in the United States or its territories are entitled to citizenship, regardless of the status of their parents (jus soli). This approach, which combines the hereditary transfer of citizenship with the territorial, is characteristic of immigrant and formerly colonial societies. Migrants...
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This article sketches out a conceptual framework for exploring the diasporic politics of the Russians in the post-Soviet borderlands. Specific consideration is given to the Russians within Estonia and Latvia, the only two postSoviet states not to grant automatic citizenship to all those resident within their sovereign spaces in 1991. The essay not only examines the Russians in relation to the homeland regimes or nationalizing states in which they are located but also looks at the role of transnational political actors- specifically, the state patron (Russia) and Western transnational political institutions (notably the OSCE)- in shaping diasporic politics. It is argued that by examining the relationships among 'the ethnic patron', 'the West' and 'nationalizing state', we are better placed to understand the ways in which the differing representations of homeland by the Russian minorities themselves are being reconstituted as part of a diverse and unravelling community of identity politics, limited political opportunities and survival strategies.
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The process of democratization in the Baltic states has been coloured by the question of the political integration of the formerly-dominant Russian-speaking communities. This paper compares the extent of ethnic differences in the experience of democracy in these three states with those in ten other East European societies in the mid-1990s. It examines how polarized ethnic groups are in terms of their satisfaction with the democratic process, representation and responsiveness and where the Baltic states stand in terms of the extent of such ethnic polarization compared with the range of situations found in former-communist Eastern Europe. The Baltic states are shown to be distinct from each other, with Estonia having the most polarized experience of democratic processes, and the findings generally undermine notions of Baltic exceptionalism with regard to democracy and ethnic relations. Finally, we consider the possible implications for membership in the European Union of the experience of unequal involvement in the democratic process in these societies.
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Attitude towards one's past, the farewell to the communist past, has become a vital matter on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The failure of the “building of communism” project has, besides a devastated environment, left behind it a spiritual “homelessness.” For Russians, for whom communism was the path to global power, the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant a collapse of their national identity. “Look back in anger” might be the most concise way of characterizing their attitude to their history of the past seventy years. The same might be said of the other peoples of the former USSR. Sovietologists who treated the Soviet Union as one entity and placed the Baltic nations into the same category as the other “fraternal” people created insurmountable problems for an understanding of Baltic developments, and Estonian, in particular.
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We may summarise the prevailing tendencies as follows: (1) The legislation contained a systematic distortion. While the distortions cannot be seen in the individual laws when viewed, they appear in varying forms from law to law and are hidden by the many different designations or categories which the legislation utilises, and which to a greater or lesser degree are relevant for the Russians. There is a prevailing tendency of discrimination against the Russians. (2) There has been a gradual tightening of restrictions toward the Russians. Estonian citizenship and residence permits have become the decisive lines of demarcation which exclude the Russian population. Only by passing through the 'eye of the needle' which is citizenship can the Russians achieve equality with the Estonians. This process has been effectively blocked by the Estonian politicians and the administrative authorities. It can certainly be foreseen that the Russians will in time, i.e. over many years, achieve Estonian citizenship. However, only by a change in nationalities policy can there occur changes in the foreseeable future. (3) The fundamental redistribution of values and restoration of property under privatisation has already taken place. To a considerable degree, the process has been to the advantage of the Estonians. No kind of legislation could change this unless a new expropriation and redistribution takes place. Such a turn of events is highly unlikely.
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Although a number of commentaries exist on the citizenship question in Estonia and Latvia, there is as yet no study that develops a conceptual framework which considers the particularity of these citizen-state formations and the implications that follow for ethnic relations. Based on a series of decrees culminating in their respective citizenship laws of 1992 and 1994, both Estonia and Latvia opted to exclude a third of their permanent residents, made up mostly of the Russian-speaking population, from being granted an automatic right to membership of the citizenpolity. This differed from the other post-Soviet states who granted citizenship to all those permanently residing within their bounded territory at the moment the declaration of statehood. This article, therefore, aims to redress this blank spot in conceptual theorizing by considering Estonia and Latvia as polities that come close to resembling ethnic democracies.
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L'A. etudie les concepts d'Etat, d'Etat-nation et de democratie a travers la cas specifique d'une des republiques socialistes sovietiques, l'Estonie. Il s'interroge sur la facon dont les identites politiques peuvent etre construites (et detruites) et se demande comment les logiques de l'Etat et de la democratie peuvent en arriver a se detruire mutuellement
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The collapse of the Soviet Empire provides several instances where the presence of Russian-speaking minorities constitute a potential challenge to the consolidation of former Soviet Republics as independent democracies. This paper uses national sample surveys undertaken in 1993 and 1995 to examine ethnic relations in Estonia. Using the framework of exit, voice and loyalty as a basis for interpreting reactions to the choices presented in this context, it is shown that several years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the two main ethnic groups remained firmly opposed over issues of citizenship and minority rights, an opposition accentuated by their relatively limited degree of internal differentiation. Assimilation of Russian-speaking minorities was not accepted by ethnic Estonians, and was not sort by Russians. For several reasons, however, Russians showed no strong signs of reacting by endorsing either secession or emigration as a solution to the exclusion of many of them from full citizenship. The analysis points to a continuing tension in the position of Russian-speakers within the new state, with the eventual emergence of a mobilized ethnic political voice within Estonia as a likely outcome.
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Since its publication this important study has become established as a central work on the vast and contested subject of modern nationalism. Placing historical evidence within a general theoretical framework, John Breuilly argues that nationalism should be understood as a form of politics that arises in opposition to the modern state. In this updated and revised edition, he extends his analysis to the most recent developments in central Europe and the former Soviet Union. He also addresses the current debates over the meaning of nationalism and their implications for his position. Breuilly challenges the conventional view that nationalism emerges from a sense of cultural identity. Rather, he shows how elites, social groups, and foreign governments use nationalist appeals to mobilize popular support against the state. Nationalism, then, is a means of creating a sense of identity. This provocative argument is supported with a wide-ranging analysis of pertinent examples—national opposition in early modern Europe; the unification movement in Germany, Italy, and Poland; separatism under the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires; fascism in Germany, Italy, and Romania; post-war anti-colonialism and the nationalist resurgence following the breakdown of Soviet power. Still the most comprehensive and systematic historical comparison of nationalist politics, Nationalism and the State is an indispensable book for anyone seeking to understand modern politics.
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