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14
The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli
The Fragmentation of Global Governance
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis
•
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and
Fariborz Zelli
1
Introduction
Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts
of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions to
solve particular governance challenges. Only very recently have scholars begun
to investigate the middle level, that is, larger systems of institutions and gover
-
nance mechanisms in particular areas of world politics, which are sometimes re-
ferred to as regime complexes, clusters, or networks.
2
In this article, we conceive
of such clusters of norms, principles, regimes and other institutions as the “gov-
ernance architecture” of an issue area.
3
We focus our analysis on one aspect of
global governance architectures that, we argue, is turning into a major source of
concern for observers and policy-makers alike: the “fragmentation” of gover-
nance in important issue areas of world politics. Our investigation is driven by
an apparent lack of consensus in the academic literature on the consequences of
fragmentation. In the different strands of academic research that we outline in
this article, we ªnd different predictions that range from a positive, afªrmative
assessment of fragmentation to a rather negative one.
A key example is global climate governance, where the advantages and dis
-
1. For valuable comments on previous versions of this research, we thank Steinar Andresen, Mar
-
cel Berk, Daniel Bodansky, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Dagmar Droogsma, Christian Flachs
-
land, Nitu Goel, Aarti Gupta, Alex Haxeltine, Andries Hof, Mike Hulme, Willem Thomas van
Ierland, Norichika Kanie, Bo Kjellén, Eric Massey, Benito Müller, Lars Müller, Henry Neufeldt,
Sebastian Oberthür, Kate O’Neill, Youba Sokona, Johannes Stripple, Simon Tay, Michael Wrig
-
lesworth, and Oran R. Young, as well as the three anonymous reviewers of GEP. This research
was part of the European research program “Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting
European Climate Policy” (“ADAM Project”). The ADAM Project lasted from 2006 through
2009 and was funded by the European Commission under its sixth framework research pro
-
gram (Global Change and Ecosystem Priority, contract no. 018476).
2. For the concept of regime complexes, see for instance Raustiala and Victor 2004. On clustering,
see Gehring and Oberthür 2006, 364–366; von Moltke 2005; and Young 1996.
3. The analytical problem of governance architectures has been identiªed as one of ªve major fu
-
ture challenges in the emerging ªeld of earth system governance research. See the Science and
Implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance Project, a core activity under the Interna
-
tional Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (Biermann et al.
2009).
Global Environmental Politics 9:4, November 2009
© 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
advantages of a fragmented governance architecture have become important el
-
ements in proposals and strategies for future institutional development. Several
plans for a future climate governance architecture have been put forward that
explicitly assert the value of fragmentation—often referred to as “diversity”—or
at least implicitly accept it. Others, however, remain supportive of a more inte
-
grated overall architecture. And yet, political science lacks a conceptual frame
-
work for the comparative study of different types and degrees of fragmentation
of global governance architectures.
In this article, we attempt to help resolve this problem. In the next section,
we seek to conceptualize the notion of global governance architectures and dif
-
ferent types and degrees of their fragmentation. After that, we illustrate these
concepts in the ªeld of global governance in response to climate change. Then
we analyze key hypotheses on the relative advantages and disadvantages of frag
-
mentation. Finally, in conclusion, we provide a brief discussion of how to ad
-
dress the possibly harmful effects of fragmentation of the global climate gover
-
nance architecture.
Conceptualization
Architectures of Global Governance
The term “global governance architecture” is now widely used in the literature.
4
It has been employed to describe the broader institutional complex in areas of
international relations such as international security,
5
ªnance,
6
trade,
7
and pro-
tection of the environment.
8
There is no commonly agreed deªnition. We
deªne the term here as the overarching system of public and private institutions
that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. This system com
-
prises organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations,
and decision-making procedures.
9
Architecture can thus be described as the
meta-level of governance.
10
We locate this meta-level between two other concepts frequently used in
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 15
4. See for instance Hurrell 2007; MacIntyre 2002; Muldoon 2004; and Young 2008a, to name but
a few.
5. Aybet 2000; and Kernic 2006.
6. Fanelli 2008; Peuker 2006; Soederberg 2004; and Thirkell-White 2007.
7. Das 2007; and Wilkinson 2000.
8. Aldy and Stavins 2007; Biermann 2007 and 2008, 287–290; Ivanova and Roy 2007; and Kanie
2007.
9. International regimes are deªned as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and de
-
cision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of inter
-
national relations.” Krasner 1983, 2. International institutions, as the more generic term, com
-
prise international regimes, international organizations and implicit norms and principles. See
Keohane 1989, 3–4.
10. O’Neill 2007, 2009. On the role of overarching norms, see also the Science and Implementa
-
tion Plan of the Earth System Governance Project (Biermann et al. 2009), which suggests norms
as one of four crosscutting themes in earth system governance research.
international relations research: “regimes” and “order.” On the one hand, the
concept of architecture is broader than the concept of international regimes,
which are in most cases distinct institutional elements of a larger governance ar
-
chitecture. Here, the concept of architecture allows for the analysis of situations
of both synergy and conºict between different regimes or other types of institu
-
tions across a given issue area. It also allows us to study synergy and conºict be
-
tween the overarching norms and principles that govern these interactions, and
to analyze overarching norms and principles that run through distinct regimes,
for example the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and re
-
spective capabilities that is common to many modern institutions in the ªeld of
global environmental governance.
11
On the other hand, through its focus on a particular issue area, the con
-
cept of governance architecture is narrower than the notion of order. Both con
-
cepts share a focus on the overarching governance structures that reach beyond
single regimes. Yet while international order reºects the organization of the en
-
tire system of international relations,
12
architecture is a more appropriate con
-
cept for distinct issue areas of global governance. Moreover, the concept of inter-
national order often implies an optimistic bias regarding the coherence and
internal coordination of the international system. Architecture, for its part, is
more neutral and accounts for dysfunctional and non-intended effects too.
Thus, architecture, as conceptualized here, does not presuppose a normatively
loaded understanding of global order.
Fragmentation of Governance Architectures
Instead, high degrees of fragmentation are a frequent characteristic of global
governance architectures, and conceptualizing governance architectures in dif
-
ferent issue areas allows for the comparative analysis of different degrees and
types of fragmentation. We advance the notion of global governance architec
-
ture in particular for this reason: because it allows for the analysis of (the many)
policy domains in international relations that are not regulated, and often not
even dominated, by a single international regime in the traditional understand
-
ing. Many policy domains are instead marked by a patchwork of international
institutions that are different in their character (organizations, regimes, and im
-
plicit norms), their constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope
(from bilateral to global), and their subject matter (from speciªc policy ªelds to
universal concerns).
These situations we understand as fragmented global governance architec
-
tures. This notion of fragmentation relates to earlier debates in the 1970s on in
-
terlocking institutions,
13
which were followed by more recent studies on institu
-
16 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
11. Rajamani 2005.
12. Bull 1977.
13. Aldrich 1979; Galaskiewicz 1979; Guetzkow 1966; Pfeffer and Salanick 1978; and Schmidt and
Kochan 1977.
tional “interlinkages,” “overlaps,” “interactions,” or “interplay.”
14
While these
studies analyzed dyadic relations between distinct institutions (for instance be
-
tween the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] under the World Trade
Organization [WTO])
15
and interlinkages across policy domains (for example
trade-environment linkages), the concept of fragmentation of global gover
-
nance architectures focuses on the overall institutional setting in which distinct
institutions exist and interact. The question of fragmentation of global gover
-
nance architecture is thus broader than the mere focus on institutional interac
-
tion, which is but one element in the architecture research program.
The notion of fragmentation is widely employed in international legal lit
-
erature.
16
Some see fragmentation here as a sign of the expansion of interna
-
tional law to previously unregulated ªelds, such as international commerce, hu
-
man rights, or the environment.
17
As Koskenniemi and Leino put it, “[s]pecial
regimes and new organs are parts of an attempt to advance beyond the political
present that in one way or another has been revealed unsatisfactory.”
18
Increas
-
ingly, scholars in international relations and international economics also refer
to the “fragmentation” of arrangements, especially regarding environmental
governance.
19
Some authors also conceptualize fragmentation in a broader
socio-cultural sense as the opposite of globalization.
20
Similar phenomena are
captured at times under different terminology, including the “decentraliza-
tion”
21
or “multiplicity” of global environmental governance,
22
“division of la-
bor” among international norms and institutions,
23
or, with a more negative
connotation, “treaty congestion.”
24
Regarding our conceptualization of fragmentation, three points are im-
portant to emphasize. First, we use the term fragmentation as a relative concept.
All global governance architectures are fragmented to some degree; that is, they
consist of distinct parts that are hardly ever fully interlinked and integrated.
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 17
14. Andersen 2002; Biermann and Brohm 2005; Chambers 2001; Falkner and Gupta 2009; Gehring
and Oberthür 2004; Gupta and Falkner 2006; Gupta 2008; King 1997; Oberthür and Gehring
2006a, 2006b; Rosendal 2001; Selin and VanDeveer 2003; Stokke 2001; van Asselt, Gupta, and
Biermann 2005; Young 1996 and Young et al. 2008; and Zelli 2008.
15. For example Andersen 2003, 2008; and Rosendal 2001, 2006.
16. See for example Hafner 2000, 2004; International Law Commission 2006; and Koskenniemi
and Leino 2002.
17. Lindroos and Mehling 2005.
18. Koskenniemi and Leino 2002.
19. For instance, Andresen 2001; Bernstein and Ivanova 2007; Biermann 2008, 287–290; Kanie
2007; Najam 2005; and van Asselt 2007b, 52.
20. Clark 1997; and Menzel 1998.
21. The concept of fragmentation differs from that of decentralization. While we concur that much
of what we cover under fragmentation is similar to processes of decentralization, we also be
-
lieve that this term presupposes a governance center and, as a consequence, a periphery, which
reduces its value for our research purposes.
22. Ivanova and Roy 2007.
23. Haas 2004, 8; and Siebert 2003.
24. Weiss 1993, 697ff.
Non-fragmented, “universal” architectures are theoretically conceivable as op
-
posite of fragmentation: an architecture would be universal if all countries rele
-
vant in an issue area are subject to the same regulatory framework; participate in
the same decision-making procedures; and agree on a core set of common com
-
mitments. Empirically, however, such a situation is difªcult to trace in current
world politics. Even one of the most widely supported international treaties, the
convention on the rights of the child, has been ratiªed by 193 parties yet not by
the United States and Somalia,
25
and its optional protocols on children in
armed conºicts and on child pornography and prostitution lack ratiªcation by
all nations. Fragmentation, in other words, is ubiquitous. Yet the degree of frag
-
mentation varies from case to case. The concept of architecture allows here for
the comparative analysis of issue areas and policy domains, and for the study of
overarching phenomena that the more restricted concept of regimes could not
capture.
Second, we consider both the concepts of architecture and fragmentation
to be value-free. We assume neither an a priori existing state of universal order
nor a universal trend towards order. In most empirical cases, architectures are
likely to result from incremental processes of institutionalization in interna-
tional affairs that are decentralized and hardly planned. In other words, the con-
cept of architecture does not assume the existence of an “architect.”
Third, empirical research on fragmentation of global governance architec-
tures depends on the perceived scale of the problem. The larger this scale, the
higher the degree of fragmentation is likely to be. Fragmentation is evident in
more narrowly deªned global governance architectures, that is, between parallel
policies and regimes in the same issue area for example in areas such as climate
governance or governance of plant genetic resources.
26
It is here where the con-
cept of architecture and the comparative analysis of different degrees and types
of fragmentation are likely to be most fruitful.
Yet fragmentation is a useful concept also at a higher scale, that is, the
comparative analysis of entire policy domains. For instance, in global environ
-
mental politics more than 700 multilateral agreements are in force.
27
Most have
evolved independently, cover different geographic and substantial scopes, and
are marked by different patterns of codiªcation, institutionalization, and cohe
-
sion. A decade ago, in response to this fragmentation, a United Nations task
force recommended stronger cooperation between multilateral environmental
institutions to facilitate synergies and promote policy coherence.
28
This frag
-
mentation has also been at issue in numerous policy proposals that call for the
18 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
25. Todres, Wojcik, and Revaz 2006; and Verhellen 2000.
26. McGee and Taplin 2006; Raustiala and Victor 2004; and van Asselt 2007a. We understand the
term “issue area” in a narrow sense compared to the more generic term “policy domain.” Envi
-
ronment and trade constitute two different policy domains, whereas, for instance, climate
change and biological diversity are two issue areas, both pertaining to the domain of environ
-
ment.
27. Mitchell 2007.
28. United Nations General Assembly 1998.
clustering and integration of environmental institutions, notably through estab-
lishment of a world environment organization, to create a less fragmented ar-
chitecture in this ªeld.
29
While some observers support a world environment or-
ganization to tackle fragmentation in global environmental governance,
30
others oppose the idea of “organizational tinkering”
31
and emphasize the bene-
ªts of a more fragmented architecture.
32
The creation of the WTO and of the
World Intellectual Property Organization are examples of similar strategies to
address a fragmented global governance architecture in a policy domain.
33
Also
the International Law Commission has included fragmentation in its work pro-
gram.
34
Another indicator for growing attention among policy-makers is the in-
creasing recognition of interlinkages with other treaties in legal documents.
35
Degrees of Fragmentation
Degrees of fragmentation can be assessed on a number of criteria. We employ
here three criteria to differentiate between degrees of fragmentation: degree of
institutional integration and degree of overlaps between decision-making sys
-
tems; existence and degree of norm conºicts; and type of actor constellations.
Based on these criteria, we propose to differentiate between three types of frag
-
mentation (see Table 1): (1) synergistic fragmentation, (2) cooperative frag
-
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 19
29. Arguments against and in favor of such a new organization are compiled in Biermann and
Bauer 2005.
30. Biermann 2000; Charnovitz 2005; and Kirton 2005.
31. Najam 2005.
32. Najam 2005; Oberthür and Gehring 2005; and von Moltke 2005.
33. Zelli 2007.
34. International Law Commission 2006.
35. For an overview see Neumann 2002, 317ff.; Pauwelyn 2003, 237ff.; and Wolfrum and Matz
2003, 120–133.
Table 1
Typology of Fragmentation of Governance Architectures.
Synergistic Cooperative Conºictive
Institutional
integration
One core institution,
with other institu
-
tions being closely
integrated
Core institutions with
other institutions that are
loosely integrated
Different, largely
unrelated institu
-
tions
Norm
conºicts
Core norms of insti
-
tutions are integrated
Core norms are not
conºicting
Core norms
conºict
Actor
constellations
All relevant actors
support the same in
-
stitutions
Some actors remain out
-
side main institutions, but
maintain cooperation
Major actors sup
-
port different in
-
stitutions
mentation, and (3) conºictive fragmentation. In empirical research, boundaries
between these three types will not be clear-cut; the criteria and types are meant
as a conceptual tool to determine and compare degrees of fragmentation of dif
-
ferent issue areas in comparative research. Likewise, long-term analyses might
ªnd that an architecture has shifted from one type of fragmentation to another.
We speak of a situation of synergistic fragmentation when (a) the core insti
-
tution includes (almost) all countries and (b) provides for effective and detailed
general principles that regulate the policies in distinct yet substantially inte
-
grated institutional arrangements. An example is the 1985 Vienna Convention
and its 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
and its amendments from London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Montreal
(1997), and Beijing (1999).
36
Each amendment to the protocol adds new sub
-
stances to the regulative system, including decision-making procedures on fur
-
ther policies on these substances. Each amendment requires ratiªcation by gov
-
ernments. Since not all governments have ratiªed all amendments, and since
only parties to an amendment can participate in the respective decision-
making, the governance architecture on ozone depletion comes close to a sys-
tem of ªve concentric circles, with the 1987 Montreal Protocol having the most
parties, and each of the four amendments a more restrictive reach. However, the
overarching Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol govern all amendments
in every important aspect, serving as integrative umbrella and authority in link-
ing the different amendments and political processes. No signiªcant institu-
tions exist on this issue outside the framework of the Vienna Convention and
the Montreal Protocol, which shows a high degree of integration within this
governance architecture.
We speak of a situation of cooperative fragmentation when an issue area is
marked by (a) different institutions and decision-making procedures that are
loosely integrated, (b) when the relationship between norms and principles of
different institutions is ambiguous; and/or (c) when the core institution does
not comprise all countries that are important in the issue area. Policies in the
same area are then deªned, decided and monitored through different institu
-
tions, or through core institutions, on the one hand, and individual countries
that are not part of this institution on the other. However, overall integration
within the governance architecture in the issue area is sufªcient to prevent open
conºicts between different institutions. One example is the relationship be
-
tween the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereaf
-
ter “climate convention”) and the detailed provisions of its Kyoto Protocol that
has initially not been ratiªed by all major nations, and is still not ratiªed by the
United States. We discuss this in more detail in the next section.
We speak of a situation of conºictive fragmentation when an issue area is
marked by different institutions that (a) are hardly connected and/or have dif
-
ferent, unrelated decision-making procedures, (b) have conºicting sets of prin
-
20 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
36. United Nations Environment Programme 2007.
ciples, norms, and rules, and (c) have different memberships and/or are driven
by actor coalitions that accept, or even advance, these conºicts. One prominent
example is the regulation of access and beneªt sharing of plant genetic re
-
sources. Here, two regimes attempt to regulate this issue, the Convention on Bi
-
ological Diversity and the TRIPS Agreement. The latter seeks to strengthen and
harmonize systems of intellectual property rights, whereas the former reafªrms
sovereign rights of states over biological resources.
37
The negotiations of both
regimes, which partly took place in parallel, were marked by intense conºicts
between developing and industrialized countries. Consequently, the relevant
rules of the biodiversity convention remain rather abstract and imprecise, and
the United States did not ratify the convention. As Rosendal suggests, a virtual
“arms race” has taken place through additional agreements that try to ºesh out
the regulations of both regimes.
38
Several regional accords on intellectual prop
-
erty rights have been adopted that favor one approach over the other.
39
While
some bilateral agreements on bio-prospecting endorse the biodiversity conven
-
tion, other bilateral agreements between industrialized countries (notably the
United States and the European Union) and developing countries on intellec-
tual property rights include provisions that even exceed TRIPS demands. In ad-
dition, different negotiating forums on access and beneªt sharing and prior in-
formed consent have been established within the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization.
40
In empirical research, these three ideal types of fragmentation in global
governance architectures will hardly be clear-cut, and the boundaries may re-
main difªcult to ascertain in speciªc cases. In addition, the three types are not
mutually exclusive, but may coexist to some degree within the same architec-
ture. The three types are thus meant to serve as a conceptual tool for compara-
tive empirical analysis in order to advance understanding of the causes and con-
sequences of fragmentation in global governance architectures. Based on the
conceptualization of these three ideal types of governance fragmentation, com
-
parative empirical research can shed light on the core question of the relative
costs and beneªts of different types and degrees of fragmentation. In addition, it
becomes possible to analyze in much more detail possible political, legal, and
institutional solutions to problems of fragmentation, which may depend on the
types and degrees of fragmentation at hand.
The Case of Global Climate Governance
This section uses the case of global climate governance to illustrate how
the typology developed in section 2 can be applied in practice. We show that
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 21
37. For a detailed analysis of the conºictive constellation between the biodiversity convention and
the TRIPS agreement, see for instance Görg and Brand 2006; and Rosendal 2001, 2006.
38. Rosendal 2006, 94.
39. Raghavan 2000; Rosendal 2006, 21; and Zerbe 2007.
40. Andersen 2003, 2008.
the governance architecture in this area has elements of all three types of
fragmentation—synergistic, cooperative, and conºictive—but that the overall
situation is best described as a case of cooperative fragmentation.
First, the core of the climate governance architecture has elements of syner
-
gistic fragmentation. The institutional core of the architecture is the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ratiªed by almost all na
-
tions. The convention lays down a number of fundamental principles. These in
-
clude the “ultimate objective” of climate governance to prevent “dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (article 2),
41
the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and a
precautionary approach (article 3). In addition, the convention provides for a
sizeable international bureaucracy for administrative support, data collection,
and policy development, as the organizational nodal point of the governance
architecture in this area.
42
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is part of the larger climate
convention and shares its basic principles.
Yet in addition, the climate governance architecture has strong elements of
cooperative fragmentation, which is the most ªtting overall description. The pro-
tocol provides for quantiªed emissions limitation and reduction obligations
only for industrialized countries, and includes several new institutional mecha-
nisms (such as international emissions trading, the Clean Development Mecha-
nism and various funding arrangements) that go beyond the convention and
that do not apply to all nations. Importantly, one of the world’s largest green-
house gas emitters, the United States, is party only to the convention and not to
the protocol, which creates a high degree of fragmentation within the regime. It
also opens up new venues and opportunities of forum shopping for both public
and private actors.
43
This fragmentation is obvious in current negotiations on
future climate governance, which occur in separate tracks for the convention
and the protocol.
44
The 2007 and 2008 conferences of the parties showed the in
-
creased complexity, with dozens of agenda items discussed in more than thirty
contact groups and informal negotiations, and many items postponed to later
sessions.
45
In addition to the UN climate regime, there are an increasing number of
additional institutional governance arrangements at different levels. Some ar
-
rangements, such as Methane to Markets, are public-private partnerships regis
-
tered with the UN Commission on Sustainable Development after the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development. Other initiatives, such as the Car
-
bon Sequestration Leadership Forum and the International Partnership for a
Hydrogen Economy, are not registered with the Commission on Sustainable
Development, even though their form is similar. Other initiatives include high-
22 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
41. Gupta and van Asselt 2006.
42. Busch 2009.
43. On forum shopping, see Hafner 2000; and Raustiala and Victor 2004.
44. Clémençon 2008.
45. See for instance International Institute for Sustainable Development 2007b.
level ministerial dialogues, such as the Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean En
-
ergy, and Sustainable Development, initiated by the meeting of the Group of
Eight in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005.
46
The start of the European Union emissions trading scheme in 2005
marked the launch of another UN-independent initiative. Although based on
the Kyoto Protocol, the trading scheme’s start did not depend on the protocol’s
entry into force. In October 2007, the International Carbon Action Partnership
was launched. This initiative comprises the European Union and other coun
-
tries and regions that have created (or plan to create) carbon markets through
mandatory cap-and-trade systems, but is not formally linked to the climate con
-
vention. Finally, there are sub-national initiatives such as California’s Global
Warming Solution Act and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the United
States, as well as private institutions that attempt to regulate issue areas relevant
for climate governance, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project or the Investor
Network on Climate Risk.
47
In sum, some arrangements explicitly relate to the institutional core, such
as the EU emissions trading scheme (which in 2008 connected to the transac-
tion log of the climate convention) or public-private partnerships to implement
the climate convention. Other initiatives are connected to the UN regime
mainly through the participation of key actors in various forums. Most initia-
tives acknowledge the UN process, even though many do not provide for a coor-
dination mechanism that could ensure mutual compatibility.
Finally, the climate governance architecture shows indications of conºictive
fragmentation. In particular, the 2005 Asia-Paciªc Partnership on Clean Develop-
ment and Climate departs from key features of the UN climate regime, notably
the consideration of climate change impacts and the differentiation between in-
dustrialized and developing countries. Even though not being comparable to
the UN regime in terms of ªnancial endowment or membership, the Asia-
Paciªc Partnership still provides an alternative to international climate action
that may reduce incentives for complying with, or signing up to, international
legally binding commitments.
48
A similar initiative is the Major Economies Pro
-
cess on Energy Security and Climate Change launched by the United States in
2007.
49
This Process includes 17 of the world’s largest economies and aims at a
long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal;
50
its relation to the UN cli
-
mate regime is ambiguous and partially conºictive. For example, during the
2007 conference of the parties to the climate convention, the delegation of the
European Union threatened to boycott the next session of the US-initiated Ma
-
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 23
46. Group of Eight 2005.
47. Pattberg and Stripple 2008.
48. For more details on the relation between the Asia-Paciªc Partnership and the UN climate re
-
gime, see Christoff and Eckersley 2007; McGee and Taplin 2006; and van Asselt 2007a.
49. The process is continued by the new US administration under President Obama as the Major
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, with 16 world leaders. It is too early to ascertain
whether and how the recent change in US government will affect this analysis.
50. De Coninck et al. 2008; and White House 2007.
jor Economies Process. As argued by Germany’s Environment Minister Sigmar
Gabriel, “[n]o result in Bali means no Major Economies Meeting.”
51
Representa
-
tives from the Group of 77 and China, too, argued that the UN climate regime
should remain the central platform for addressing action on climate change.
52
Importantly, these instances of fragmentation in climate governance are
intentional.
53
The Asia-Paciªc Partnership and similar proposals—backed by
the United States—were created not out of ignorance of the climate regime but
because of it, at a time when the climate convention and the Kyoto Protocol were
well established and in force. In addition, the emergence of numerous initia
-
tives outside of the climate regime indicates that the global climate governance
architecture may become more fragmented over time. Many new initiatives in
-
clude the United States, which has rejected the Kyoto Protocol; most are not (or
are only loosely) linked to the UN climate regime; and the compatibility of
some norms and principles with those of the core institution is often ambigu
-
ous.
Nonetheless, the overall architecture of climate governance, at present, can
be best characterized as an example of cooperative fragmentation.
Consequences of Fragmented Governance Architectures
Different degrees of fragmentation of governance architectures are likely to
show different degrees of governance performance. More integrated governance
architectures may promise a higher effectiveness in terms of solving the core
problems in an issue area. Yet this claim is contested, and several authors em-
phasize the potential beneªts of a multitude of agreements, institutions, and
approaches within an overall fragmented architecture. Claims in favor and
against stronger or lesser fragmentation are found in a variety of literatures,
ranging from international relations and international law, to the comparative
study of environmental policy. In this section, we review these claims, orga
-
nized around the question of (1) the relative speed of reaching agreements; (2)
the level of regulatory ambition that can be realized; (3) the level of potential
participation of actors and sectors; and (4) the equity concerns involved.
The four aspects of speed, ambition, participation, and equity are interre
-
lated, and eventually will have a bearing on overall governance performance.
While we use them here to structure arguments on the consequences of fragmen
-
tation, the criteria we presented in Table 1 help assess the degree of fragmenta
-
tion. This assessment of existing propositions views fragmentation as a contin
-
24 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
51. Sigmar Gabriel, quoted in Der Spiegel OnLine, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,523211,00.html, accessed 8 July 2009.
52. International Institute for Sustainable Development 2007a. To some extent, this reluctance to
-
wards US initiatives is in line with predictions by the scholarly literature on non-hegemonic re
-
gimes. See for instance Brem and Stiles 2009.
53. For a discussion of the problems related to intentional interplay, see Young 2008b.
uum, with different claims as to the relative positive or negative consequences
of higher (conºictive) or lower (synergistic) degrees of fragmentation.
Speed
Proponents of fragmentation in governance architectures emphasize, ªrst, that
small-n agreements that encompass only the most important countries may on
average be faster to negotiate and to enter into force. Fragmentation, in its coop
-
erative form with different memberships, loosely integrated institutions and
common core norms, could thus be a positive quality of governance architec
-
tures, or at least not a reason for concern. With regard to climate governance,
Victor for instance favors an approach of one “club” that involves small num
-
bers of nations that would negotiate and review climate policy packages.
54
Oth
-
ers have suggested that the United States should conclude alternative, regional
agreements with like-minded countries, for example in Latin America,
55
or with
China and, possibly, other key developing countries.
56
Bodansky, for instance,
argued for an “institutional hedging strategy” with the United States becoming
the creator of “a more diversiªed, robust portfolio of international climate
change policies in the long term.”
57
In terms of actor constellation, such re-
gional or small-n agreements could incorporate the world’s largest greenhouse
gas emitters and allow for experimentation with alternative international regu-
latory frameworks. For some, such an approach would allow more profound ne-
gotiations with “moderate” developing countries, while avoiding interference or
obstruction by “hard-line” developing countries.
58
Likewise, Barrett argues for a
multi-track climate treaty system, with protocols for research and development
into mitigation technologies; the development and diffusion of these technolo-
gies; funding for adaptation; and geo-engineering.
59
Similarly, Sugiyama and
Sinton suggest an “orchestra of treaties” that would have many elements de
-
scribed here as cooperative fragmentation. This orchestra of treaties would com
-
plement the climate convention with a focus on mitigation and adaptation
technologies, clean development in developing countries, and carbon mar
-
kets.
60
Countries could apply a pick-and-choose strategy and sign only those
treaties that promote their own interests.
However, it is doubtful whether the speed of reaching small-n initial
agreements would indeed improve the overall governance performance. An ar
-
chitecture with a cooperative or conºictive degree of fragmentation produces
solutions that ªt the interests only of the few participating countries. There is no
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 25
54. Victor 2007.
55. Bodansky (2002, 6) suggests Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, traditionally close allies of the
United States and, in the case of Mexico, even members of NAFTA.
56. Stewart and Wiener 2003.
57. Bodansky 2002, 1.
58. Bodansky 2002, 6.
59. Barrett 2007.
60. Sugiyama and Sinton 2005.
guarantee that other countries will join. A quick success in negotiating small-n
agreements might run counter to long-term success, when important structural
regime elements have not been sufªciently resolved.
61
A certain degree of instant
problem solving through a small-n agreement might provide disincentives for
third-party countries to engage in climate action and could further disintegrate
the overall negotiation system.
The 1987 Montreal Protocol illustrates many of these problems. Even
though the protocol was relatively quickly negotiated within the OECD group,
major developing countries did not accept it. Two years after adoption of the
protocol, only 10 had ratiªed the treaty, and of the 13 developing countries
whose chloroºuorocarbon consumption appeared to rise in 1987 most sharply,
only Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela had joined.
62
In August 1989, a UN work
-
ing group hence warned that “for the Protocol to be fully effective in its purpose
of controlling the emissions of chloroºuorocarbons and halons, all countries
must become Parties.”
63
Both China and India agreed to ratify the treaty only af
-
ter substantial changes to its basic structure had been made. In the ozone re
-
gime, the Southern contribution to the problem was small, yet threatened to
grow. In climate governance, by contrast, the Southern role is much larger from
the outset. Regional agreements of a few like-minded players, in the hope that
others will later follow, do not promise to bring the long-term trust and regime
stability that is needed in the climate domain. An “institutional hedging strat-
egy”
64
with different policies and regimes scattered around the globe might
hence eventually move towards a more conºictive degree of fragmentation with
conºicting norms and different actors supporting different institutions. This
outcome might wreak havoc on the larger goal of building long-term stable cli-
mate governance.
65
Ambition
Some strands of cooperation theory suggest that small-n agreements within a
fragmented architecture might prove more progressive and far-reaching. While a
universal architecture might include all nations and ideally even reach full com
-
pliance, its eventual norms and standards could be rather low and modest. So-
called “narrow-but-deep” agreements that achieve substantial policy goals with
relatively little participation may be superior to a situation of a less demanding
regime even if it has full participation and compliance (“broad-but-shallow”).
66
A fragmented architecture could also increase opportunities for side-payments.
26 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
61. Biermann 2005; and van Asselt 2007a.
62. Kohler, Haaga and Camm 1987.
63. Informal Working Group of Experts on Financial Mechanisms for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol 1989, para. 8.
64. Bodansky 2002.
65. See also Müller et al. 2003; and Biermann 2005.
66. Aldy, Barrett and Stavins 2003.
Bilateral agreements among countries may allow for concessions that govern
-
ments would ªnd unacceptable to grant to a larger group of states. Such con
-
cessions could include bilateral trade concessions, the bilateral exchange of
technology, or support for enhanced political inºuence in international organi
-
zations. In a 2007 position paper for the UN climate negotiations, the United
States has indicated that “[i]n some cases, it may be most appropriate for some
activities to be undertaken in other multilateral fora.”
67
At the same time, the
United States, Japan, and Canada have expressed support of sectoral ap
-
proaches,
68
although there is no international agreement on their usefulness.
69
Some strands of the literature on environmental policy analysis also sug
-
gest that fragmentation and regulatory diversity increase innovation and thus
overall governance performance.
70
In federal political systems, for instance, reg
-
ulatory competition may allow for the development of different solutions in
different regulatory contexts, of which the most effective will “survive” and be
diffused to other regulatory contexts. Fragmentation may enhance innovation at
the level of the ªrm or public agency and increase innovation in the entire sys
-
tem. A key tenet is the notion of diffusion of innovation, including innovations
of policies, technologies, procedures, and ideas. This is also central to the claim
of environmentally beneªcial consequences of trade, which would reduce
artiªcial barriers to the free transfer of technologies and products, and thus in-
crease efªciency and innovation.
71
Stewart and Wiener, for example, propose
that the United States should initially stay outside the Kyoto framework and
seek to establish a new framework with China and, possibly, other key develop-
ing countries. This would address the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emit-
ters and allow for experimentation of alternative international climate regula-
tory frameworks.
72
However, quickly negotiated small-n agreements might decrease also the
level of ambition in the long run. At a later stage, when interest-constellations
change and new situations arise, it might be difªcult to reach agreement within
the international community without an existing overall agreement that in
-
cludes those structural elements. In addition, smaller agreements only with few
like-minded countries will decrease the opportunity for creating package deals,
which will minimize overall policy acceptance and effectiveness.
73
Economic modeling projects that compared different hypothetical univer
-
sal and fragmented climate regimes—based on criteria of environmental effec
-
tiveness, cost effectiveness, and cost distribution—also concluded that the more
fragmented a regime is, the higher the costs are to stabilize greenhouse gas con
-
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 27
67. UNFCCC 2008a, 87.
68. UNFCCC 2008a, 88; 2008b, 9; 2008c, 11.
69. International Institute for Sustainable Development 2008.
70. Jänicke and Jacob 2006.
71. Tews, Busch, and Jörgens 2003.
72. Stewart and Wiener 2003.
73. Folmer et al. 1993; Haas 1980; and IPCC 2001, 626–627.
centrations at low levels, because more ambitious reduction targets need to be
achieved by a smaller number of countries.
74
As Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins con
-
cur, “[c]urrent understanding of the beneªt and cost functions characterizing
climate change suggest that the latter type of policy [broad-but-shallow] is more
likely to satisfy the dynamic efªciency criterion. Since marginal emissions con
-
trol costs increase steeply, a broad-but-shallow policy would result in lower
overall costs.”
75
Similarly, economic model calculations show that emission trading brings
both higher environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness if based on a
universal architecture. If one compares the relative costs of four possible archi
-
tectures for emissions trading—global trading based on the Kyoto Protocol, for
-
mal linking of regional emission trading, indirect linkages of regional emissions
trading through common acceptance of credits, and a mixed approach that
combines elements of these three scenarios—then one ªnds that an environ
-
mentally ambitious global trading approach is the best to control global emis
-
sions, while formal linking of emission trading systems can be a fallback op
-
tion. A more fragmented architecture, for example through indirect linking, is
less likely to lead to a comprehensive and effective response.
76
In addition, regulatory fragmentation in combination with free trade and
economic competition might result in the general decline of environmental
standards, the so-called “race to the bottom.” This hypothesis has only limited
empirical support regarding current environmental policies. However, the in-
creasing future needs of more stringent environmental policies, notably in cli-
mate governance, will also increase costs of regulation, which will then make
regulatory differentials in some sectors more relevant for a “race to the bottom”
scenario (also known as the “chilling effect”
77
). This problem is central to do-
mestic complaints by energy-intensive industries in many countries.
78
Related is
the concern of a general regulatory “chaos” not only in environmental issue ar
-
eas, but also in associated domains such as energy, agriculture, or transport. For
example, investors in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism have
emphasized the importance of clear signals of a long-term commitment of all
actors to one stable process. In sum, governance architectures of the conºictive
type that do not unite all major actors in one coherent and consistent regulatory
framework and that include conºicting norms and principles are likely to send
confusing messages to all, thus reducing the overall performance of the system.
Participation
Some suggest that a higher degree of fragmentation might reduce entry costs for
actors, including private entities such as industry and business. The role of pri
-
28 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
74. Hof, den Elzen and van Vuuren 2010.
75. Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003, 378.
76. Flachsland et al. 2010.
77. Eckersley 2004.
78. van Asselt and Biermann 2007.
vate actors and new forms of governance beyond the state are a key concern in
recent institutional scholarship on the environment.
79
A loose network of vari
-
ous institutions, many of which might be public-private, could make it easier
for business actors to engage in rule making and thus help creating regulatory
systems that are easy to implement and affordable from a business perspective.
In addition, a fragmented governance architecture might make it easier to
broaden the coverage of relevant sectors. A positive understanding of (synergis
-
tic) fragmentation could circumvent negotiation stalemates among countries
that may have been caused by attempts to ªnd a universal agreement. For exam
-
ple, the Kyoto Protocol does not yet require emission reductions from aviation
and international maritime transport, whereas the European Union has taken
up aviation in its emissions trading scheme. Thus, higher degrees of cooperative
fragmentation where key norms are not in conºict may allow for more and dif
-
ferent policy approaches, which could facilitate the inclusion of more relevant
actors and areas than would be feasible through a more integrated but static ar
-
chitecture.
Yet again, serious problems may outweigh beneªts. First, conºictive frag-
mentation, where different actors pull in different directions, may complicate
linkages with other policy areas. There may be strong economic implications—
in terms of international competitiveness—if one coalition of states adopts a
stringent policy (for example binding emission ceilings), while other coalitions
opt for a less rigorous way of reducing emissions (for example voluntary
pledges). This, in turn, could have severe ramiªcations for the world trade re-
gime that unites both coalitions under one uniform umbrella. A less frag-
mented architecture, on the other hand, could allow for systematic and stable
agreements between the institutional frameworks of the world trade regime and
environmental institutions. Since a fragmented architecture may decrease entry-
costs for private actors, it is also conceivable that business actors use regulatory
fragmentation to choose among different levels of obligation, thereby starting a
race-to-the-bottom within and across industry sectors.
80
Equity
A fragmented architecture might offer solutions that are speciªcally tailored
for speciªc regions and thus increase equity by better accounting for special cir
-
cumstances. Reinstein, for example, proposed a bottom-up process in which
countries—similar to trade negotiations—would put on the table acceptable cli
-
mate policies and measures in line with national circumstances.
81
Some lawyers
also argue that increased fragmentation in international law is a way of accom
-
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 29
79. Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Falkner 2003; Jagers and Stripple 2003; Jordan 2008; Pattberg
2005, 2006; and Pattberg and Stripple 2008.
80. Vormedal 2008.
81. Reinstein 2004.
modating different interests of states. As a result, specialized regimes may better
serve the interests of governments and have higher compliance rates.
82
Yet, fragmented architectures also raise serious concerns of equity and fair
-
ness. Cooperation theory assumes that bilateral and small-n agreements grant
more bargaining power to larger and more inºuential countries, while large-n
agreements allow smaller countries to enter into coalitions, such as the Group
of 77 and China, that protect their collective interests from encroachment by
larger countries. In the end, perceptions of inequity and unfairness are linked to
policy effectiveness through its legitimacy—a governance system that is not seen
as fair by all parts of the international community is likely to lack in overall ef
-
fectiveness.
83
As stressed by Benvenisti and Downs, “powerful states have in
-
creasingly turned to fragmentation to maintain their control."
84
Fragmentation
allows powerful states to opt for a mechanism that best serves their interests, in
the form of “forum shopping,”
85
or to create new agreements if the old ones no
longer ªt their interests.
In the same vein, many climate-related initiatives like the Asia-Paciªc Part
-
nership, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, or the Methane to Mar-
kets partnership include leading developed and developing countries while ex-
cluding least developed countries.
86
The investment agendas of these initiatives
therefore do not reºect the immediate interests of many of those countries that
are most affected by climate change. The bulk of developing countries thus con-
tinue to support the multilateral approach in climate policy as in other policy
domains. Less fragmented and more integrated architectures allow the South to
count on its numbers in diplomatic conferences and gain bargaining power
from a uniform negotiation position. They allow for side-payments across nego-
tiation clusters within an issue area and across different policies, and minimize
the risk for developing countries to be coerced into bilateral agreements with
powerful nations that might offer them suboptimal negotiation outcomes.
87
For
the many smaller and medium-sized developing countries, unity is strength,
and multilateralism may seem its core guarantee. Since the emergence of the cli
-
mate issue, the South has therefore sought to bring all negotiations under the
UN framework and to frame global warming as an overarching political prob
-
lem with implications far beyond mere environmental policy.
30 • The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures
82. Hafner 2004, 859, argues that a “less-than-global approach seems particularly necessary when
different States clearly hold different beliefs about what basic values should be preserved by in
-
ternational regulation.”
83. On the link between legitimacy and effectiveness, see Andresen and Hey 2005; and Dingwerth
2005. In general on the role of accountability and legitimacy as analytical problems in earth
system governance research, see the Science and Implementation Plan of the IHDP Earth Sys
-
tem Governance Project (Biermann et al. 2009).
84. Benvenisti and Downs 2007, 626.
85. Hafner 2000; and Raustiala and Victor 2004.
86. Ott 2007, 18.
87. Abrego et al. 2003.
Conclusions
This article has focused on the issue of fragmentation, which we see as a ubiqui
-
tous structural characteristic of global governance architectures today. We have
shown that different types of fragmentation exist, and have conceptualized the
debate by differentiating between three degrees of fragmentation, which we
termed synergistic, cooperative, and conºictive. Subsequently we have illus
-
trated these concepts in the ªeld of global climate governance. Building on this
conceptualization, we have discussed the potential consequences of different
degrees of fragmentation. We found that different types of fragmentation are
likely to have different degrees of performance. While cooperative forms of frag
-
mentation may entail both signiªcant costs and beneªts, we did not ªnd con
-
vincing arguments in favor of a high, or conºictive, degree of fragmentation. On
balance, conºictive fragmentation of global governance architectures appears to
bring more harm than positive effects, and can generally be seen as a burden on
the overall performance of the system. On the other hand, what we described as
“synergistic fragmentation” might often be a realistic second-best option in a
world of diversity and difference in which purely universal governance architec-
tures are more a theoretical postulate than a real-life possibility.
This raises the policy question of how to minimize extreme cases of
conºictive fragmentation and how to address some of the negative effects of co-
operative fragmentation. This policy question is particularly important for the
area of climate governance. Here it seems crucial to increase synergies within the
policy area, to better integrate processes under the climate convention and the
Kyoto protocol and to reduce duplication, for instance in the current parallel
negotiations on technology transfer in different arenas. Negotiations leading to
future agreements should address key topics—such as deforestation, technology
transfer, or capacity building—in only one forum. Regarding the cooperative
and partially conºictive fragmentation between UN climate governance and cli
-
mate arrangements outside this umbrella, it is imperative to open these institu
-
tions to additional members. For example, the Asia-Paciªc Partnership could be
broadened to also include least developed countries and small-island develop
-
ing states in the region, and to ensure through formal declarations or clauses
better integration with the overall UN processes. Furthermore, formal coordina
-
tion between these arrangements and the UN negotiations could ensure that
they work towards common objectives.
88
The UN climate regime also needs to
be better coordinated with non-environmental institutions in order to mini
-
mize conºictive fragmentation, most importantly with regard to the WTO. Rus
-
sia’s ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that linking both arenas
can create additional incentives for countries to support climate policies. Better
integration can help identify similar constellations of actors. For instance, like
the climate regime, the WTO is hosting discussions on the transfer of climate-
friendly goods and services in the special session of the WTO Committee on
Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli • 31
88. van Asselt 2007a.
Trade and Environment. As long as this discussion remains within the WTO and
is not linked to similar debates in the climate regime, integration is unlikely.
Policy-makers have recognized this problem: in 2007, trade ministers, senior
trade ofªcials and the WTO director-general met for the ªrst time during a con
-
ference of the parties to the climate convention to discuss trade-related aspects
of climate change. Yet this meeting also reºected the increasing fragmentation
of the climate governance domain, with only a few countries—and none from
Africa—represented.
Finally, yet importantly, our analysis shows that major scholarly literatures
offer conºicting statements regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages
of fragmentation. This calls, we argue, for a continuation of this line of work,
both through more in-depth empirical studies of fragmentation in particular
policy domains and through larger comparative study programs that reach be
-
yond the environmental policy domain. Such studies could also provide theory-
driven explanations for the causes and consequences of fragmentation of given
architectures, as well as for possible changes of the degree of fragmentation over
time. This article, with its typological overview of degrees and consequences of
fragmentation and its review of relevant academic writing, offers one starting
point on which such further research could build.
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