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The Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the Normative Case for Postconflict Reconstruction
Abstract
Abstract The past two decades have witnessed the proliferation of comprehensive international missions of peacebuilding and reconstruction, aimed not simply at bringing conflict to an end but also at preventing its recurrence. Recent missions, ranging from relatively modest involvement to highly complex international administrations, have generated a debate about the rights and duties of international actors to reconstruct postconflict states. In view of the recent growth of such missions, and the serious challenges and crises that have plagued them, we seek in this article to address some of the gaps in the current literature and engage in a critical analysis of the moral purposes and dilemmas of reconstruction. More specifically, we construct a map for understanding and evaluating the different ethical imperatives advanced by those who attempt to rebuild war-torn societies. In our view, such a mapping exercise is a necessary step in any attempt to build a normative defence of postconflict reconstruction. The article proceeds in two stages: first, we present the various rationales for reconstruction offered by international actors, and systematize these into four different “logics”; second, we evaluate the implications and normative dilemmas generated by each logic.
... Until recently, the question of what needs to be done and the policies that should be followed after an intervention has taken place have to a great extent been ignored. Most of the discussion has focused on the details for the implementation of the responsibility to rebuild (e.g., who should do the rebuilding (Pattison 2013) and the rationale behind state rebuilding narratives (Gheciu and Welsh 2009)), and has eschewed a critical examination of whether the constitutive elements and current priorities of the responsibility to rebuild can have a positive contribution to the goals of a military humanitarian intervention more broadly, and post-conflict reconstruction in particular, and what its possible negative effects might be 3 . This article aims to fill this void and to answer the question of whether the responsibility to rebuild-as it is currently being interpreted-is the appropriate framework for post-intervention reconstruction. ...
... Yet, despite the overarching consensus on the necessity for a post-intervention strategy, the rationale and specific methods of that strategy are often in contention. Gheciu and Welsh (2009) have identified four imperatives behind states' rationales for rebuilding; that is, special responsibilities incurred in using force, projection of norms and values, national interest and defense of society, and restoration of self-determination. The ways through which interventions are conducted have been at the center of attention for decades and their focus has significantly shifted. ...
This article examines the relationship between the responsibility to rebuild and post-intervention reconstruction. It aims to determine whether the current interpretation of the responsibility to rebuild is the appropriate framework for attaining the goals of post-intervention reconstruction. The article argues that, despite the urgent need for a post-intervention strategy in the aftermath of humanitarian interventions, the responsibility to rebuild, as it is currently being framed, can end up undermining the goals of post-conflict reconstruction by dissuading states from participating in atrocity prevention, inadvertently increasing atrocity crimes and delegitimizing military humanitarian interventions. The analysis identifies the need for the responsibility to rebuild to incorporate an increased respect for post bellum proportionality and self-determination.
... It has, in turn, also spawned accusations of neo-colonialism. However, there is no systematic, normative theory of post-conflict peacebuilding (Gheciu & Welsh, 2009). ...
... In their detailed work on the ethics and justification of post-conflict peacebuilding, Gheciu & Welsh (2009) have identified three main contexts of the ethical debate of post-conflict peacebuilding, which are: 1. The debate on the content of jus post bellum; 2. On the literature on trusteeship and international administration; 3. The literature on IC's responsibility to rebuild. ...
This paper examines the key global debates on liberal peace and peacebuilding and their nexus with the Sri Lankan conflict, the efforts to resolve the conflict and the ensuing local discourses. The end of the cold war heralded the possibility of a liberal world order. This triumph of the liberal order underlined a normative assumption of "the end of history", not as a static closure, but as embodying an ideology with the potential for delineating the optimal form of governance for a state, its economy and citizens1. Since the end of the cold-war, liberal peace has become the main policy framework that has been used by the International Community (IC) to engage with and intervene in conflict ridden states as a means for creating global peace by stabilising states and strengthening global markets2. However, the liberal peace thesis and the attendant liberal peacebuilding interventionist frameworks for local and global peace have spurned a critical discourse that questions the validity of the thesis and the effectiveness of its policy and practice outcomes. Sri Lanka mirrors the global debates and policy impact of the ideological framework of the global thesis, as it has a history of liberal governance (traceable to the 19th century) and liberal peacebuilding (traceable to the 20th century).
... General arguments about intervention within international discourse are used here in order to show that motivations for social transformation do not have to be wholly negative. Welsh and Ghecu (2009) discuss the 'cosmopolitan imperative' (p126) in regards to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and this can be applied in order to show moralising and helpful contributions and motivations behind intervention. This is a concept that supports reconstruction and intervention in post-conflict environments as it calls upon a worldly moral responsibility to assist the vulnerable and to promote universal values of peace and stability. ...
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has rapidly grown to become an ‘integral’ part of international intervention efforts within conflict ridden societies (Andersen, 2011, p5,10). It has become a ‘common’ but ‘contested’ element of state-building that has permeated the international community's consciousness (Hänggi, 2004, p3, Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, p133).
This work will be an investigation into whether or not SSR can be considered a ‘Northern Project’ that aims to impose liberal norms and values. The structure of this work is as follows; an exploration will be launched into what this work perceives a Northern Project to be, using unique definitional parameters that takes inspiration from Nicholls (1999) work on ideological political projects. This exploration has found two core elements of a Northern Project; the imposition of certain values and ideas and the aim of social transformation. These two elements are underpinned by the creation and promotion of liberal peace and its ideals.
... 3 The higher commitment that post-conflict rebuilding requires compared to intervention and prevention makes UN member states hesitant to endorse it (Schnabel 2012). Some scholars are seeking to return it to the international peace agenda in light of the risk of post-intervention violence (for example, Gheciu and Welsh 2009;Bose and Thakur 2016;Keränen 2016), such as that seen in post-intervention Libya where rebels perpetrate rampant lawlessness and human rights violations (Bachman 2015). More recently, the term peacebuilding seems to have slipped away from the UN's rhetoric , with it focusing more on institution-building for good governance. ...
This book interrogates the common perception that liberal peace is in crisis and explores the question: can the local turn save liberal peacebuilding? |
Presenting a case for a liberal renaissance in peacebuilding, the work interrogates the assumptions behind the popular perception that liberal peace is in crisis. It re-examines three of the cases that ignited the debate – Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste – and evaluates how these transitional administrations implemented their liberal mandates and how local involvement affected the conduct of their activities. In so doing, it reveals that these cases were neither liberal nor peacebuilding. It also demonstrates that while local involvement is imperative to peacebuilding, illiberal local involvement may prelude a return to an elite-centred status quo and reinforces or creates new forms of conflict and violence. Using both liberal and critical lenses, the author ultimately argues that the conceptual and operational departure from the holistic and comprehensive origins of liberal peacebuilding in fact paved the way for the crisis itself. |
Drawing on analysis from in-depth field research and interviews, this book will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, statebuilding, security studies and International Relations in general. |
https://www.routledge.com/International-Peacebuilding-and-Local-Involvement-A-Liberal-Renaissance/Simangan/p/book/9780367024123
... 74 Finally, two Canadian scholars of international relations, Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh, provide valuable overviews of the moral concerns embedded in strategies for peacebuilding. 75 They note that international peacekeeping operations became far more complex in the early 1990s when compared with operations performed during the Cold War era. In the latter period the limited aim of peacekeeping was to provide a buffer zone between combatants and to monitor ceasefires. ...
The war in Iraq has generated a vast amount of commentary, popular and scholarly, on a broad range of topics. This note reviews literature on three issues of particularly great moral significance that have arisen from the experience of U.S. military action in Iraq. There is the jus ad bellum question of the legitimacy of preventive war, the jus in bello matter of the treatment of detainees, and the jus post bellum concern of the responsibilities of occupiers.
... 84 To that extent, Bellamy argues that the PBC 'goes some way towards formalising the idea that international society bears a collective responsibility for 81 Gheciu and Welsh 2009, 135. 82 Gheciu and Welsh 2009, 135. 83 Fleck 2012, 96. ...
This article considers the issue of who should rebuild after war. Many leading advocates of the relevance of
jus post bellum for Just War Theory adhere to the ‘Belligerents Rebuild Thesis’, which holds that those who have been involved with the fighting – such as the victor, just belligerent, unjust aggressor or humanitarian intervener – should be tasked with the responsibility to rebuild. By contrast, this article argues that there is a collective, international duty to rebuild that should be assigned primarily according to the agent's ability to rebuild – and not necessarily to the belligerents. The article also claims that, in contrast to the prevailing view, considerations of jus post bellum do not play any moral role in the justifiability of a war. Accordingly, defending the Belligerents Rebuild Thesis by invoking the alleged moral relevance of jus post bellum
for Just War Theory is mistaken.
The relationship between the environment and mass violence is complex and multi-faceted. The effects of environmental degradation can destabilize societies and cause conflict. Attacks on the environment can harm targeted groups, and both mass violence and subsequent transitions can have harmful environmental legacies. Given this backdrop, it is notable that the field of transitional justice has paid relatively little attention to the intersections between mass violence and environmental degradation. This article interrogates this inattention and explores the limitations and possibilities of transitional justice as a means of addressing the environmental harms associated with mass violence. The article makes four key claims. First, that the "dominance of legalism" in transitional justice has produced anthropocentric understandings of harm which exclude environmental harms and victims. Second, that transitional justice’s tendency towards neo-colonialism has led to the disregarding of worldviews that might encourage more environmentally inclusive responses to violence. Third, that transitional justice’s inability to redress structural inequalities has often left environmental injustices intact. And fourth, that the field’s complicity in normalizing neoliberal capitalism both overlooks environmental harm and facilitates future environmental degradation. In light of these claims, the article considers whether, and where opportunities might exist, for "greener" responses to mass violence.
Killean considers the applicability of Environmental Restorative Justice (ERJ) in transitional settings. Bringing critical transitional justice scholarship into dialogue with the emerging body of environmental restorative justice literature, this chapter argues that ERJ offers a challenge to two of the transitional justice field’s limitations. First, an ERJ approach offers a challenge to transitional justice’s anthropocentrism, by creating space for the recognition and representation of other-than-human victims of conflict. Second, ERJ offers a challenge to the field’s neo-colonial tendencies, by facilitating the design of mechanisms that are more inclusive of Indigenous harms and understandings of justice. By entrenching an ERJ ethos, the chapter argues that transitional justice may present one effective vehicle for rethinking relationships between diverse human communities and the natural world.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law.
This paper aims to make recommendations that will reinvigorate the third limb of R2P: the responsibility to rebuild in light of the recent actions to protect civilians from state-sponsored human rights violations in Libya and Yemen that have caused more harm than intended and have failed to rebuild the devastated lives that needed protection. We will recommend a responsibility to rebuild by design approach. This approach posits that in all collective interventions, the responsibility to rebuild should be hard designed in the range
of activities to be undertaken to ensure that not only are human rights violations stopped, but also lives are rebuild and states restored to peace.
This chapter offers a philosophical analysis of CBDR-RC. My goal is to investigate the conceptual grounding of the principle and provide a taxonomy of relevant moral criteria for differentiation in the distribution of responsibility. Whereas these criteria will not provide easy answers, they can constitute way signs on a path to politically or legally effective distribution of responsibilities. The conclusion furthermore indicates that the relative weight of these criteria is context specific; i.e. will vary according to the object of responsibility. That means that, if CBDR-RC is applied to other areas of law in the future, the criteria are likely to play out differently according to the specific global challenge that requires collective action.KeywordsCBDR-RCenvironmental lawresponsibilityphilosophy of lawmoral principlesglobal justice
As we face new challenges from climate change and the rise of populism in Western politics and beyond, there is little doubt that we are entering a new configuration of world politics. Driven by nostalgia for past certainties or fear of what is coming next, references to normalcy have been creeping into political discourse, with people either vying for a return to a past normalcy or coping with the new normal. This book traces main discourses and practices associated with normalcy in world politics. Visoka and Lemay-Hébert mostly focus on how dominant states and international organizations try to manage global affairs through imposing normalcy over fragile states, restoring normalcy over disaster-affected states, and accepting normalcy over suppressive states. They show how discourses and practices come together in constituting normalization interventions and how in turn they play in shaping the dynamics of continuity and change in world politics.
The 'responsibility to protect' (RtoP) expresses the moral imperative to respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. So far, the debate on RtoP has focused almost exclusively on conflict resolution through institutional change. Various forms of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military intervention have been discussed as means to address the institutional roots of violent conflict. What has too often been neglected, however, is the need for more immediate forms of civilian protection. This need emerges from the complexity and uncertainty of conflict resolution: successful conflict resolution takes time, and it is unfortunately rare. Therefore, it is necessary to complement efforts at conflict resolution with more immediate forms of protecting civilians. Traditionally, the right to asylum and humanitarian aid have been the two primary means to provide such protection. In the case of most intra-state conflicts, however, these means are insufficient. When a state engages in genocide, pursues campaigns of ethnic cleansing, or commits war crimes against its own population, it likely has no intention to let people seek the safety of asylum in other countries, or to allow for humanitarian aid. In response to such situations, the community of states has a moral obligation to establish safe areas and provide them with the legal mandate and military resources necessary to offer reliable protection.
Over the last twenty-five years, I have served the citizens and the government of the United States. I have been a soldier (a private, a noncommissioned officer, and an officer) in the U.S. Army. My assignments have been unique, enriching, and demanding. As a teenager, I enlisted for three years as an M1 tank crewman (loader and gunner). After my enlistment, I returned to college and enrolled in ROTC. Upon graduation, I was commission as an infantry officer. As an infantry officer, I have served in mechanized and light infantry assignments (as a rifle platoon leader, support platoon leader, headquarters and headquarters company executive officer, company commander, and division G3 assistant planning and operations officer). I also have had the opportunity to train both U.S. and foreign soldiers. As an active component/reserve component observer controller, I trained and evaluated U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units. As an infantry battalion executive officer I assisted, planned, and resourced training for a fourteen-week infantry soldier course. In addition, I have conducted security forces assistance for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and for the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Reconciliation broadly refers to one kind of response to conflict among ideas, memories, and/or individuals. It involves a process through which a certain goal or end-state is achieved. Below I survey two general kinds of reconciliation. The first is reconciliation as the process of rendering intelligible seemingly incompatible ideas, accounts, or memories. The second is reconciliation as the process of repairing and rebuilding damaged relationships. A central ethical question surrounding reconciliation concerns the justifiability of its pursuit. Accounts of reconciliation must distinguish it from, for example, resignation or acquiescence to injustice and oppression.
Despite the growing focus on issues of socio-economic transformation in contemporary transitional justice, the path dependencies imposed by the political economy of war-to-peace transitions and the limitations imposed by weak statehood are seldom considered. This book explores transitional justice's prospects for seeking economic justice and reform of structures of poverty in the specific context of post-conflict states.
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility To Protect considers who should undertake humanitarian intervention in response to an ongoing or impending humanitarian crisis, such as found in Rwanda in early 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and Darfur more recently. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect asserts that when a state is failing to uphold its citizens' human rights, the international community has a responsibility to protect these citizens, including by undertaking humanitarian intervention. It is unclear, however, which particular agent should be tasked with this responsibility. Should we prefer intervention by the UN, NATO, a regional or subregional organization (such as the African Union), a state, a group of states, or someone else? This book answers this question by, first, determining which qualities of interveners are morally significant and, second, assessing the relative importance of these qualities. For instance, is it important that an intervener have a humanitarian motive? Should an intervener be welcomed by those it is trying to save? How important is it that an intervener will be effective and what does this mean in practice? The book then considers the more empirical question of whether (and to what extent) the current interveners actually possess these qualities, and therefore should intervene. For instance, how effective can we expect UN action to be in the future? Is NATO likely to use humanitarian means? Overall, it develops a particular normative conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. It uses this conception of legitimacy to assess not only current interveners, but also the desirability of potential reforms to the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention.
Despite the commitment made by all heads of state attending the 2005 World Summit to uphold the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P), atrocity crimes continue to be committed by states and nonstate actors. This essay argues that assessments of R2P’s effectiveness too often overlook the political nature of the principle-with the strengths and weaknesses that this status entails-and apply rigid standards of success that both underestimate its contribution to building capacity to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes and overemphasize the role of military intervention. It also suggests that R2P is best understood as a “duty of conduct” to identify when atrocity crimes are being committed and to deliberate on the best form of collective response. The cases of Libya and Syria have nonetheless raised fundamental questions about the prospect of catalyzing international efforts to protect populations, particularly when there is disagreement over the costs and benefits of a coercive response.
Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s armed conflicts demonstrate the need for norms to govern the aftermath of war. Therefore, jus post bellum is welcomed as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional branches— jus ad bellum and jus in bello . Jus post bellum is meant to function as moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. While many agree on the importance of a third branch, an important question is often overlooked: After war, how should we distribute post war duties? This question deserves more attention, because uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric. Two specific questions need answering. First: Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in the creation of a just and stable peace.
In recent years, efforts have been made to create a new norm in international affairs stating that victorious states have an obligation to rebuild those whom they have defeated in war. This chapter challenges the arguments put forward in favor of this norm, showing that they rest on four false assumptions concerning: the alleged post-bellum nature of the rebuilding process; the supposed justice of the wars waged by liberal democratic states; the compatibility of the obligation to rebuild with the Western just war tradition; and the ability of states to successfully rebuild their defeated enemies. The chapter concludes that the practical application of the norm would be counterproductive, as it would serve mainly to allow states which have waged unjust wars to continue unjust occupations of conquered territories.
This chapter discusses recently completed and current United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and assesses whether or not the consensus General Assembly resolution at the 60th anniversary UN Summit adopting the responsibility to protect has had any impact on these operations. The resolution contained two levels of responsibility. The first level established an individual State responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second level mandated that the international community, through the United Nations had the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter to protect these same populations. Moreover, the resolution states that the United Nations through the Security Council is prepared to take collective Chapter VII enforcement action ‘in a timely and decisive manner’ if peaceful means were inadequate and the national authorities manifestly failed to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes. It is that second level of responsibility that results in a dramatic impact on the practice of United Nations peacekeeping. In an article completed just before the passing of this groundbreaking resolution, I argued that the three separate components of the responsibility to protect; the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild, had already been incorporated into a number of peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the Security Council has incorporated into its resolutions specific mandates to use force to protect civilian populations and also other mandates that assist in prevention, reaction and rebuilding of shattered societies. This chapter will bring that research up to date and will also examine in detail the change in mandate for the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire (or Ivory Coast). This operation is probably the clearest example to date of providing a clear Security Council direction to ensure the responsibility to protect in a peacekeeping operation.
While the normative and legal aspects of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine have been explored in great detail, scholars have largely overlooked the more practical question of whether and how international military action can avert mass atrocities. To shed light on this question, this article investigates the ‘strategic logic’ of preventive humanitarian intervention, or the assumed link between external military action and the desired outcome of preventing or stopping mass killing. It contends that there are five fundamental and seemingly irremediable tensions in this logic, all of which cast doubt on the feasibility of preventive humanitarian intervention and on the long-term prospects of R2P.
This article explores the ethics of peacebuilding. It argues that the perspectives of two moral theories currently dominate peacebuilding discourse: duty-based and consequentialist thinking. While these moral theory perspectives possess merits there are also important limits, which are particularly important for peacebuilding. The article argues that if peacebuilding is genuinely to contribute to collective flourishing then we need to recognize and act upon a more holistic ethics of peacebuilding practice. Considerations drawn from ethics of care and virtue ethics are therefore proposed to expand considerations of what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘right’ within peacebuilding interventions.
This chapter examines humanitarian governance, the increasingly organized and internationalized attempt to enact the highest moral principle of the preservation of life, the enhancement of welfare, and the reduction of human. Conventional approaches to this global governance for the collective good has tended to focus on how states and nonstate actors produce cooperation and expand welfare for the most vulnerable and marginalized populations. I explore how an alternative tradition of governance, one that draws from critical theory, points to additional (and not always so charitable) causes and effects of the global governance of humanity. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science Volume 16 is May 10, 2013. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/catalog/pubdates.aspx for revised estimates .
Abstract Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion of jus post bellum in just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content of jus post bellum will necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become “extended” in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of “just peace terms,” is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this situation, this article argues that an engagement by jus post bellum with the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension of jus post bellum's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to “just occupation,” namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition of jus post bellum to just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized.
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Since the mid-1990s, the United Nations and other multilateral organizations have been entrusted with exceptional authority for the administration of war-torn and strife-ridden territories. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor, these organizations have assumed responsibility for governance to a degree unprecedented in recent history. These initiatives represent some of the boldest experiments in the management and settlement of intra-state conflict ever attempted by third parties. This book is a study of recent experiences in the international administration of war-torn territories. Examines the nature of these operations-their mandates, structures, and powers-and distinguishes them from kindred historical and contemporary experiences of peacekeeping, trusteeship, and military occupation. Analyses and assesses the effectiveness of international administrations and discusses, in thematic fashion, the key operational and political challenges that arise in the context of these experiences. Also reflects on the policy implications of these experiences, recommending reforms or new approaches to the challenge posed by localized anarchy in a global context. Argues that despite many of the problems arising from both the design and implementation of international administrations-some of them very serious-international administrations have generally made a positive contribution to the mitigation of conflict in the territories where they have been established.
Exploring the challenge of rehabilitating countries after civil wars, this study finds that attempting to transform war-shattered states into liberal democracies with market economies can backfire badly. Roland Paris contends that the rapid introduction of democracy and capitalism in the absence of effective institutions can increase rather than decrease the danger of renewed fighting. A more effective approach to post-conflict peacebuilding would be to introduce political and economic reform in a gradual and controlled manner.
I start from the assumption that the responsibility to protect human rights is an international responsibility. Protecting human rights is not just a matter of each state protecting the rights of its own citizens, even though this is one of its primary functions and (arguably) a condition of its legitimacy. For various reasons that I will come to shortly, making human rights protection purely an internal responsibility of states is not going to be effective in many cases. So the wider responsibility falls on that rather elusive entity ‘the world community’. Now let me immediately specify, for purposes of the present discussion, the scope of the responsibility to protect. First, the human rights at stake are to be understood in a fairly narrow sense, as basic rights – rights to life, bodily integrity, basic nutrition and health, and so forth. When we invoke the international responsibility to protect, we are thinking about those all-too-familiar instances in which human beings are being placed in life-threatening situations, in which they are being starved, or terrorised, or evicted from their homes, or are dying from disease – in other words are caught up in what we have learnt to call humanitarian disasters. We are not primarily thinking in this context about rights that fall outside this core, such as rights to free speech or political participation, important though these may be in other respects.
The ideal, once it is embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is the stuff of politics. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power.
E. H. Carr
[T]he crucial question is not what principle is acknowledged but who is accepted as the authoritative interpreter of the principle or, to put it in institutional terms, how the process of legitimization works.
Inis Claude, Jr.
At this pivotal point in history, a fundamental and oft-raised issue is “international governance.” Means of effective governance are seen as necessary to more complex arrangements of world order. But achieving effective governance ultimately will mean the existence of institutions that legislate, that is, institutions that make decisions binding on the whole. As a general matter, states have been skeptical of, if not hostile toward and consequently unwilling to accept, such governance. The United Nations Security Council is a notable exception; in the sometimes broad, sometimes narrow, area of international peace and security, the Security Council has taken decisions in the name of, and binding upon, the entire international community.
The theory that democratic states do not go to war with one another depends upon the claim that such states can recognize each other as democracies and act pacifically in accordance with this recognition. This article argues that analyses of the democratic peace and security communities can benefit from a fuller and more critical engagement with the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Kantian liberalism involves subtle yet powerful processes of identity construction, and the processes of mutual recognition with which these identities are intertwined play essential constitutive and disciplining roles in the development of political relations. These processes of recognition are not merely sociological puzzles, but rather overtly political practices that both entail and enable the exercise of considerable power. The social construction of democratic security communities builds upon these liberal structures of identity and discipline, a situation demonstrated in the case of NATO.
What do we owe Iraq?America is up to its neck in nation building--but the public debate, focused on getting the troops home, devotes little attention to why we are building a new Iraqi nation, what success would look like, or what principles should guide us.What We Owe Iraqsets out to shift the terms of the debate, acknowledging that we are nation building to protect ourselves while demanding that we put the interests of the people being governed--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or elsewhere--ahead of our own when we exercise power over them.Noah Feldman argues that to prevent nation building from turning into a paternalistic, colonialist charade, we urgently need a new, humbler approach. Nation builders should focus on providing security, without arrogantly claiming any special expertise in how successful nation-states should be made. Drawing on his personal experiences in Iraq as a constitutional adviser, Feldman offers enduring insights into the power dynamics between the American occupiers and the Iraqis, and tackles issues such as Iraqi elections, the prospect of successful democratization, and the way home.Elections do not end the occupier's responsibility. Unless asked to leave, we must resist the temptation of a military pullout before a legitimately elected government can maintain order and govern effectively. But elections that create a legitimate democracy are also the only way a nation builder can put itself out of business and--eventually--send its troops home.Feldman's new afterword brings the Iraq story up-to-date since the book's original publication in 2004, and asks whether the United States has acted ethically in pushing the political process in Iraq while failing to control the security situation; it also revisits the question of when, and how, to withdraw.
The United Nations is frequently the object of blame for ""failing' ' to act in response to what are deemed to be ethical imperatives. Implicit in such condemnations is an understanding of the United Nations as a body that has moral duties, and possesses the various capacities for deliberating and acting that would make this a reasonable conception. Yet this portrayal of the United Nations as a moral agent is one that should only be invoked with great care, and some qualification. By constructing a model of ""institutional moral agency'', and examining whether the United Nations meets its criteria, this article aims to offer a preliminary account of the internal features, and enabling conditions that would allow the United Nations to bear the related burdens of duty and blame in international politics. It also suggests who—or what— might bear these burdens when the United Nations is incapable of acting.
Sadly, there are few restraints on the endings of wars. There has never been an international treaty to regulate war's final phase, and there are sharp disagreements regarding the nature of a just peace treaty. There are, by contrast, restraints aplenty on starting wars, and on conduct during war. These restraints include: political pressure from allies and enemies; the logistics of raising and deploying force; the United Nations, its Charter and Security Council; and international laws like the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Indeed, in just war theory—which frames moral principles to regulate wartime actions—there is a robust set of rules for resorting to war (jus ad bellum) and for conduct during war (jus in bello) but not for the termination phase of war.
International diplomacy has been one of a number of practices which have performatively constituted “Bosnia” as a particular place with specific people, so that it could be rendered as a problem requiring a particular solution. Even when, as in the case of the Dayton accords, negotiators claim they have desired the reintegration of Bosnia, their reliance on a powerful set of assumptions about identity, territoriality and politics—a particular political anthropology—has meant the ethnic partition of a complex and heterogeneous society is the common product of the international community's efforts. Paying attention to the role of cartography, this paper explores the apartheid-like logic of international diplomacy's political anthropology, the way this logic overrode non-nationalist options and legitimised exclusivist projects during the war, and considers the conundrum this bequeaths Bosnia in the post-Dayton period as a number of significant local forces seek to overcome division.This article is accompanied by a web-site which presents the relevant maps from the periods of international diplomacy discussed here, along with a further commentary. Referred to in the article as Campbell (1999), this web-site can be accessed at http://www.newcastle.ac.uk/~npol/maps/bosnia
This paper examines the post-war reconstruction programme in Afghanistan, arguing that it contains the seeds of radical social change. The paper analyses the tensions of the present reconstruction project in light of the past experience of similar programmes launched by Afghan rulers and their foreign supporters. The central argument is that the conflation of post-war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social change. Simultaneously the prominent foreign role in the undertaking has increasingly had negative effects. As a result, the entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the problems caused by the growing insurgency.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in questions about justice after war (jus post bellum), fuelled in large part by moral questions about coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, it has become common to argue that jus post bellum is a third strand of Just War thinking. This article evaluates this position. It argues that that there are broadly two ways of understanding moral requirements after war: a minimalist position which holds that moral principles derived largely from jus ad bellum and jus in bello concerns should constrain what victors are entitled to do after war and a maximalist position which holds that victors acquire additional responsibilities that are grounded more in liberalism and international law than in Just War thinking. Finding problems with both approaches, the article argues that it is premature to include jus post bellum as a third element of Just War thinking and concludes by setting out six principles to guide future thinking in this area.
7th ed. Terminologický slovník
Our narrower obligations often blind us to larger social responsibilities. The moral claims arising out of special relationshipsâfamily, friends, colleagues, and so onâalways seem to take priority. Strangers ordinarily get, and ordinarily are thought to deserve, only what is left over. Robert E. Goodin argues that this is morally mistaken. In Protecting the Vulnerable, he presents a comprehensive theory of responsibility based on the concept of vulnerability. Since the range of people vulnerable to our actions or choices extends beyond those to whom we have made specific commitments (promises, vows, contracts), we must recognize a much more extensive network of obligations and moral claims. State welfare services, for example, are morally on a par with the services we render to family and friends. The same principle widens our international, intergenerational, and interpersonal responsibilities as well as our duties toward animals and natural environments. This book, written with keen intelligence and unfailing common sense, opens up new perspectives on issues central to public policy and of critical concern to philosophers and social scientists as well as to politicians, lawyers and social workers.
The international administration of troubled states-whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor-has seen a return to the principle of trusteeship: i.e. situations in which some form of international supervision is required in a particular territory in order both to maintain order and to foster the norms and practices of fair self-government. This book rescues the normative discourse of trusteeship from the obscurity into which it has fallen since decolonization. It traces the development of trusteeship from its emergence out of debates concerning the misrule of the East India Company (Ch. 2), to its internationalization in imperial Africa (Ch. 3), to its institutionalization in the League of Nations mandates system (Ch. 4) and in the UN trusteeship system, and to the destruction of its legitimacy by the ideas of self-determination and human equality (Ch. 5). The book brings this rich historical experience to bear on the dilemmas posed by the resurrection of trusteeship after the end of the cold war (Ch. 6) and, in the context of contemporary world problems, explores the obligations that attach to preponderant power and the limits that should be observed in exercising that power for the sake of global good. In Ch. 7, the book concludes by arguing that trusteeship remains fundamentally at odds with the ideas of human dignity and equality.
Twenty years ago, in the pages of the, Journal of Common Market Studies, Hedley Bull launched a searing critique of the European Community's "civilian power" in international affairs. Since that time the increasing role of the European Union (EU) in areas of security and defence policy has led to a seductiveness in adopting the notion of "military power Europe". In contrast, I will attempt to argue that by thinking beyond traditional conceptions of the EU's international role and examining the case study of its international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty, we may best conceive of the EU as a "normative power Europe".
The original comparative mission of JCMS testifies to the propensity of the EU, since its inception, to project its model on to the rest of the world. This article argues that narratives of projection are indeed key to the EU's global influence and that, in this particular sense, the idea of Europe as a civilian power is more relevant than ever. But such narratives require our engagement with their reflexive nature: what is usually projected is not the EU as is, but an EUtopia. At a time when both the EU and the international trade system are undergoing crises of legitimacy, EU actors can learn a lot from the remedies suggested for the global level by such an EUtopia.
Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the United States (address to the conference onThe European Union: Its Role and Power in the Emerging International System
- Ambassador Guenter
- Burghardt
Ambassador Guenter Burghardt, Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the United States (address to the conference on ''The European Union: Its Role and Power in the Emerging International System,'' Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, October, 3–5, 2003) (emphasis added).
30 For an examination of the origins and operationalization of the so-called liberal peace thesis, see Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil ConflictsThe Challenge of Rebuilding Kosovo
- Bernard Instance
- Kouchner
30 For an examination of the origins and operationalization of the so-called liberal peace thesis, see Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 2. 31 See, for instance, Bernard Kouchner, ''The Challenge of Rebuilding Kosovo,'' NATO Review 47, no.
Barroso Stresses Balkans' Future in EU International Herald Tribune
- See
16 See ibid., pp. 464–68, for a discussion of these principles. 17 Nicholas Wood, ''Barroso Stresses Balkans' Future in EU,'' International Herald Tribune, February 17, 2006; available at www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/17/news/balkans.php. 18 For a clear articulation of the international harm principle, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
48 ICISS is clear in saying that intervention should ideally be authorized by the Security Council But this does not answer the question of which actor(s) should mount an intervention or reconstruction missionThe Responsibility to Protect and the Logic of Rights
- Goodin
Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 125. 48 ICISS is clear in saying that intervention should ideally be authorized by the Security Council. But this does not answer the question of which actor(s) should mount an intervention or reconstruction mission. 49 David Rodin, ''The Responsibility to Protect and the Logic of Rights,'' in Oliver Jü and Keith Krause, eds., From Rights to Responsibilities: Rethinking Interventions for Humanitarian Purposes (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006).
58 A. Gheciu's interviews with British, American, and Canadian officials 59 For further elaboration, see Chesterman, You, the People, p. 252. 60 See David CampbellApartheid Cartography: The Political Anthropology and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia
- Feldman
Feldman, What We Owe Iraq, p. 22. 58 A. Gheciu's interviews with British, American, and Canadian officials, May–July 2008. 59 For further elaboration, see Chesterman, You, the People, p. 252. 60 See David Campbell, ''Apartheid Cartography: The Political Anthropology and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia,'' Political Geography 18, no. 4 (1999), pp. 395–435.
32 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 7. 33 See, for exampleThe Alliance's Strategic Concept dfe9a9a6bb8e0d4443256bc3005201fb?OpenDocument. 37 For an analysis of the ''morality of states'' perspective, see, for instance
- R J Vincent
and the ''Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo,'' UN Security Council Document S/1999/779, July 12, 1999. 32 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 7. 33 See, for example, ''The Alliance's Strategic Concept,'' NATO Press Release, Washington, DC, April 23–24, 1999; available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 34 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 12, 2003; available at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 35 Speech by Indian Ambassador to the United Nations, Kamalesh Sharma, UN doc. S/PV.4497, March 26, 2002. 36 Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia, Shanghai, October 21, 2001; available at www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/ dfe9a9a6bb8e0d4443256bc3005201fb?OpenDocument. 37 For an analysis of the ''morality of states'' perspective, see, for instance, R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 113–15.
Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in TermsThe EU Takes Responsibility and Makes a Difference
- See Ian
22 See Ian Manners, ''Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?'' Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2000), p. 241. 23 Javier Solana and Per Stig Moeller, ''The EU Takes Responsibility and Makes a Difference,'' Jyllands Posten, September 7, 2006; available at www.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/TheMinister/ SpeechesAndArticles/Archives2006/EuropeTakesResponsibility.htm (accessed March 5, 2009).
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 29 For a more detailed analysis, see Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the ''New Europe'': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War
- Martin Wight
Martin Wight, ''Western Values in International Relations,'' in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 128. 28 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); see the foreword by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, p. xxiv. 29 For a more detailed analysis, see Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the ''New Europe'': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005);
Xinhua News Agency 40 Speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations See also the speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United NationsChina Says Afghan People Must Have Final Say in Their FutureExporting Hazards
- Shen Guofang
- . S Un
- Pv
- Zhenmin
- . S Un
- Pv
'Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement Welcomes 'New Stage' in Cambodian Settlement,'' Xinhua News Agency, September 11, 1990. 40 Speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Shen Guofang, UN doc. S/PV.4057, October 25, 1999. See also the speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Liu Zhenmin, UN doc. S/PV.5512, August 15, 2006. 41 ''China Says Afghan People Must Have Final Say in Their Future,'' Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 12, 2001. 42 Speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Shen Guofang, UN doc. S/PV.4272, February 5, 2001. 43 Henry Shue, ''Exporting Hazards,'' in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue, eds., Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 135–36. See also Goodin, Protecting the Vulernable, pp. 126–27.
p. 412; and Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, p. 26Humanitarian Intervention and State SovereigntyThe Tower of Babel
- Jackson
Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 412; and Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, p. 26. 54 Responsibility to Protect, p. 44. 55 Mohammed Ayoob, ''Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,'' International Journal of Human Rights 6, no.1 (2002), p. 93. 56 Michael Oakeshott, ''The Tower of Babel,'' in his Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), pp. 478–79.
The Responsibility to Protect Human RightsA Few Words on Nonintervention'' (1859)
- David Miller
David Miller, ''The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights,'' article presented to the International Symposium on Justice, Legitimacy, and Public International Law, University of Bern, December, 15–17, 2006. 51 John Stuart Mill, ''A Few Words on Nonintervention'' (1859), in Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed., Essays on Politics and Culture (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 368–84.
Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of
- Robert E Goodin
Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1985).
International Territorial Administration; and David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding
- Between Bain
- Anarchy
- Society
- Wilde
Bain, Between Anarchy and Society; Wilde, International Territorial Administration; and David
Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
At War's End: Building Peace after Civil ConflictsThe Challenge of Rebuilding Kosovo 32 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 7. 33 See, for example, ''The Alliance's Strategic Concept
- Bernard Kouchner
30 For an examination of the origins and operationalization of the so-called liberal peace thesis, see Roland
Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
ch. 2.
31 See, for instance, Bernard Kouchner, ''The Challenge of Rebuilding Kosovo,'' NATO Review 47, no.
4 (1999); and the ''Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Interim Administration in
Kosovo,'' UN Security Council Document S/1999/779, July 12, 1999.
32 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 7.
33 See, for example, ''The Alliance's Strategic Concept,'' NATO Press Release, Washington, DC, April
23–24, 1999; available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
New Stage' in Cambodian Settlement 40 Speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations
- Shen Guofang
- Un Doc S Pv
Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement Welcomes 'New Stage' in Cambodian Settlement,'' Xinhua News
Agency, September 11, 1990.
40 Speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Shen Guofang, UN doc. S/PV.4057, October
25, 1999. See also the speech by Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Liu Zhenmin, UN doc.
S/PV.5512, August 15, 2006.
The EU Takes Responsibility and Makes a Difference Jyllands Posten
- Javier Solana
- Per Stig Moeller
Javier Solana and Per Stig Moeller, ''The EU Takes Responsibility and Makes a Difference,''
Jyllands Posten, September 7, 2006; available at www.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/TheMinister/
SpeechesAndArticles/Archives2006/EuropeTakesResponsibility.htm (accessed March 5, 2009).
Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away See also Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction
- William For
- Ralph Bain
- Wilde
For more critical analyses see, for example, William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and
the Obligations of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Ralph Wilde, International
Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn
Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Simon Chesterman,
You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
Responsibilities of Victory See also David SchefferThe Security Council and International Law on Military Occupations The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since
- Bellamy
Bellamy, ''Responsibilities of Victory,'' p. 605. See also David Scheffer, ''The Security Council and
International Law on Military Occupations,'' in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and
Dominik Zaum, eds., The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and
Practice since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 580–607.
Barroso Stresses Balkans' Future in EU International Herald Tribune available at www.iht.com/articles
- Nicholas Wood
17 Nicholas Wood, ''Barroso Stresses Balkans' Future in EU,'' International Herald Tribune, February 17,
2006; available at www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/17/news/balkans.php.
18 For a clear articulation of the international harm principle, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A
Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
15 The term is drawn from David Miller. See ''Distributing Responsibilities
15 The term is drawn from David Miller. See ''Distributing Responsibilities,'' Journal of Political Philosophy
9, no. 4 (2001), p. 454.