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Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2007, pp. 441--460
Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations:
Societal Implications
Daniel Bar-Tal∗
Tel-Aviv University
Eran Halperin
Haifa University
Joseph de Rivera
Clark University
It is well established today that emotions are an important part of most societal
dynamics. The current article focuses on the role of different collective emotional
elements in creating, preserving, and resolving conflicts. The main premise is
that collective emotions play a pivotal role in shaping individual and societal
responses to conflicting events and in contributing to the evolvement of a social
context that maintains the emotional climate and collective emotional orientation
that have developed. The first part of the article provides a conceptual framework
to discuss the relations between conflict, context, and collective emotions. The
second part uses the conceptual framework to discuss the societal implications of
the articles presented in this issue. Taken together, the parts create a platform for
future research on the role of collective emotions in conflict resolution and the
construction of cultures of peace.
In recent decades, social psychology (Fiske, 1981; Zajonc, 1980), as well
as other disciplines such as political science (e.g., Marcus & MacKuen, 1993)
and sociology (e.g., Scheff, 1990), have shifted their focus from pure cognitive
research to a more integrative perspective, which combines aspects of cognition
and emotion. This development took place as a result of recognition that emotions
constitute a central element of the human repertoire and that the study of their
∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Edu-
cation, Tel Aviv University, P.O.B. 39040, Tel-Aviv 69978 [e-mail: daniel@post.tau.ac].
441
C
2007 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
442 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
functioning is a prerequisite for the understanding of individual and collective
behaviors (Frijda, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Mackie, Devos, & Smith,
2000).
Of special importance for us is the assumption that just as individuals may
be characterized by a dominant emotion, societies, too, may develop a collective
emotional orientation (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). This process occurs as a
result of particular societal conditions, common experiences, shared norms, and
socialization in a society (Kitayama & Markus, 1994). The understanding of the
central role of emotions within social and political contexts, with the acknowledg-
ment of their potential to become a societal phenomenon, leads almost naturally
to their examination as part of intragroup and intergroup processes. This issue
concerns the role of collective emotions in situations of intergroup conflict and
peace making.
Yet research on the role played by emotional climate and other collective
emotions in conflicts and conflict resolution is only at its primary stages. Hence,
the goals of this article are twofold: first, to provide a conceptual framework to
discuss further the societal implications of the articles presented in this issue,
mainly in reference to the relations between conflict and emotional climate, and
second, to place the resulting insights in a platform for future research on the role
of collective emotions (as a general term) in conflict resolution and constructing
a culture of peace.
The interrelations between context, emotions, and actions are the raw material
for this framework. The main premise underlining the present view is that collective
emotions (a general term) play a pivotal role both in shaping the individual and
societal responses to conflicting events (i.e., collective and group-based emotions)
and in contributing to the evolution of a social context that maintains the collective
emotions that have developed.
Formation of Collective and Group-Based Emotions
Collective emotions have been defined in a relatively general way as emotions
that are shared by large numbers of individuals in a certain society (Stephan &
Stephan, 2000). Group-based emotions are defined as emotions that are felt by
individuals as a result of their membership in a certain group or society (Smith,
1993). Both concepts suggest that individuals may experience emotions, not nec-
essarily as a response to their personal life events, but also in reaction to collective
or societal experiences in which only a part of the group members have taken part.
But while the former concept suggests that group members may share the same
emotions for a number of different reasons, the latter refers only to emotions that
individuals experience as a result of identifying with their fellow group members.
However, an accumulation of many group-based emotional responses to a societal
event can easily turn into what we define as a collective emotion. Note, too, that
Collective Emotions in Conflict 443
we may distinguish social groups formed by social relationships from groups that
are simply based on a common attribute (such as “businessmen”). Barbalet (1998)
points out that in the former a collective emotion may lead to common action
with a group goal even though individual members of the group may experience
different personal emotions because they occupy different roles in the group. By
contrast, collective emotions in the second sort of group lead to the “common ac-
tion” of individuals who are subject to the same conditions as when businessmen
feel confident that there is a good business climate.
The initial work by de Rivera (1992) focused on the context in which collective
emotions are evoked. He suggested that it is important to differentiate emotional
atmosphere from emotional culture and emotional climate. Atmosphere refers to
emotions that arise when members of a group focus their attention on a specific
short-term event that affects them as a group. Emotional culture refers to the
emotional relations that are socialized in any particular culture. Emotional climate,
the focus of the present issue, refers to the collective emotions experienced as
a result of a society’s response to its sociopolitical conditions. More recently,
Bar-Tal (2001) has suggested the concept of a collective emotional orientation,a
concept that refers to the characterizing tendency of a society to express a particular
emotion. He provided some criteria to identify such characterizing orientation; for
example, he noted that the emotion and the beliefs that evoke a particular emotion
are widely shared by society members and appear frequently in the society’s public
discourse, cultural products, and educational materials. These orientations may
even characterize entire “civilizations,” as when Mo¨ısi (2007) refers to “cultures”
of fear, humiliation, and hope in the Western, Islamic, and Eastern worlds.
A number of scholars have pointed to the important behavioral implications of
collective or group-based emotions when there are conflicts between groups and
societies (see, e.g., Bar-Tal, in press; Petersen, 2002; Volkan, 1997). We would
like to suggest that context is the most important factor affecting the potential
construction of these emotions. Moreover, as will be elaborated, we argue that in
addition to other aspects of context, the emotional element of context has great
potential to influence emotional reactions and subsequent behavior. We propose
that in contrast to individual emotions, which are sometimes related to a dispo-
sitional system or physiological mechanisms, collective or group-based emotions
are solely formed as a consequence of experiences in particular societal context.
Lasting and Transitional Contexts and Emotions
The claim that individuals and collectives operate within context and that their
behavior is influenced by it can be considered common knowledge. Yet despite the
importance that social scientists attach to context, its definition is vague and elusive
(Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). In general, it loosely refers to the environment and
the background in which individuals and collectives live and act. As such, context
444 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
includes not only natural physical features of the environment (e.g., mountains,
sea coast, storms), or the physical environment constructed by humans (e.g., cities,
roads, televisions, planes, etc.), but it also refers to more abstract social, political,
economic, and cultural elements. These, in turn, include everything human beings
construct, create, form, organize, and implement (e.g., ideas, regimes, economic
systems, institutions, cultural products, among others).
Sociological theories have generally accepted the basic assumption that the
study of social contexts is essential for understanding the functioning of societies
(Bourdieu, 1990; Parsons, 1951). Recently, Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-
Volpe (2004) have defined social context as the “general and continuing multilay-
ered and interwoven set of material realities, social structures, and shared belief
system that surround any situation” (p. 103). They are “the most common source
of individual feelings, thoughts, and actions” (Markus, 2004, p. 3). Focusing only
on the social contexts and leaving the physical ones, we may distinguish among
various social contexts on the basis of their level of temporality. On one side of the
dimension are lasting cultural contexts expressed in cumulative symbols that are
created to communicate a particular meaning about all that is experienced in the life
of a particular society (Geertz, 1993; Keesing, 1974). The symbols consist of such
tangible and intangible elements as works of art, scripts, habits, rules, narratives,
myths, concepts, or knowledge relating to a group and other categories. Together
they represent the shared repertoire that provides meaning and rules of practices
for society members, forming the basis for what may be termed emotional culture.
In contrast to these relatively stable cultural contexts are more transitional
contexts that are formed as a result of particular structural socio-political relations
in a society, major events, or major information. They form the basis for emotional
climates. Of special interest to us is the assumption that different contexts help
to form particular emotional orientations. First, we comment on the cultural con-
text and the formation of emotions, and then we focus on the relatively temporal
contexts and elaborate on its effect on the formation of collective emotions
Cultural Context and Emotions
It has been known for many years that each culture has its own repertoire
of emotions and norms of emotional expressions, which result from many differ-
ent factors, among them the culture’s particular history, economic conditions, and
topographical living space. A society may be characterized by sensitization to,
evaluation of, and expression of a particular emotion (see, e.g., Levine & Camp-
bell, 1972). This repertoire is learned from an early age, as society members are
socialized to acquire the culturally approved emotional orientation. They learn
what emotions are approved, what cues to attend to in order to feel a particular
emotion, and how, when, and where to express the emotion (Averill, 1990; Lewis
& Saarni, 1985). This learning is also done beyond the family setting, via political,
Collective Emotions in Conflict 445
educational, and cultural mechanisms, including the mass media and other chan-
nels of communication. Children absorb cultural information, and it shapes their
perspectives of their social world, including the emotions they express. In the words
of Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998), “Children and adults actively use
the locally available cultural practices to generate meaningful interactions. ... To
engage in culturally patterned relationships and practices, people must coordinate
their responses to their particular social milieu” (pp. 916–917).
It is thus not surprising that like individuals, societies can become character-
ized by a particular emotional orientation. For example, an Inuit group called Utku,
who live in the Arctic Circle, disapprove of anger and suppress it (Briggs, 1970).
The Japanese have a specific emotion in their emotional repertoire called “amae,”
which expresses a passive object of love, a kind of helplessness, and the desire to
be loved (Morsbach & Tyler, 1986). Paez and Vergara (1995) found differences in
feelings of fear among Mexicans, Chileans, Belgians, and Basque Spaniards. The
Chileans were found to be characterized by the highest level of fear, whereas the
Mexicans had the lowest. Bellah (1967) proposed that hope characterizes Ameri-
can society: It is a central ingredient in what he called the “civil religion” of the
United States. It is this sort of emotional orientation that de Rivera (1992) termed
emotional culture.
Transitional Context and Emotions
The present issue focuses on transitional contexts that are humanly
constructed—either as a result of a sociopolitical economic structure that soci-
ety members have established and/or as a result of major events and/or as a result
of major information. Transitional context consists of the physical, social, politi-
cal, economic, military, and psychological conditions, relatively temporary in their
nature, that make up the environment in which individuals and collectives function
(Bar-Tal & Sharvit, in press). In transitional context we do not include events or
major sets of information with limited effect on emotions that last a short time. In
this context we include intractable conflicts, wars, revolutions, peace processes,
regimes of terror, information about major threats, and so on that have lasting
effects for at least a period of few months and sometimes even for many years.
As noted, in this type of context psychological conditions are also included.
They emerge together with other conditions (economic, political, etc.) and be-
come inseparable from the features of the environment. Specifically, the context
provides signals and cues; when these are perceived and cognized by individuals
and collectives, they create the psychological conditions that become an inherent
part of the societal environment of society members. Our fundamental proposition
is that the perceived and cognized psychological conditions also include various
emotional aspects. That is, human beings can appraise a context (its psychological
conditions) as being threatening, harmonious, peaceful, and so forth. In turn, the
446 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
appraisal triggers thoughts, attitudes, and emotions that lead to various kinds of
behaviors (see Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This conception is in line with the view
of Kurt Lewin (1947), who suggested that the behavior of a group, as that of an
individual, is greatly affected by perception of the environment, which implies
psychological climate.
At this point we can take a step further and refine the above proposition by
suggesting that psychological conditions include an emotional field, which can
be considered an emotional context that triggers particular emotions (de Rivera &
Paez, this issue). That is, the emotional context transmits salient cues and signals
that evoke a particular emotion among society members. When such emotional
context lasts for a period of time, society members who live in this context become
attuned to the cues and signals. They become predisposed to respond to them and
eventually may be characterized by the particular emotion. These cues and signals
are usually transmitted by societal channels of communication, including mass
media, and the learning may be later generalized and automatized. With time, the
society may create various cultural products (e.g., literature, films, paintings, and
so on) that refer to the emotion and beliefs that evoke it. This development extends
the emotional context and may lead to the development of an emotional collective
orientation that characterizes a society (Bar-Tal, 2001).
The crucial premise of the above connection is that context of which emo-
tional context is part and that evokes emotion becomes collective emotions are
often humanly constructed and we focus on these types of contexts. That is, indi-
viduals, groups, or societies are responsible for the creation of events, institutional
arrangements, political policies, or major information that serve as a context, in-
cluding emotional context, that eventually evoke particular emotion. It becomes
collective emotion experienced by at least a significant part of society members
(see, e.g., Corradi, Weiss Fagen, & Garreton, 1992). The humanly constructed
context can be of negative or positive characteristics that elicit mainly either neg-
ative or positive beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. The negative context may be of
threatening, stressful, or unjust nature, while the positive context can be peaceful
or harmonious. The former may evoke beliefs about insecurity and distrust, as well
as emotions of fear, anger, and hatred. The latter may evoke beliefs of security and
trust as well as emotions of hope and tranquility.
Evoking Collective Emotions
Emotional contexts shape the way society members frame events. More specif-
ically, a collective response to conflict- or peace-related events is affected by the
temporary collective or group-based emotional reaction to the event, which is
closely related to the social and emotional context. From the perspective of ap-
praisal theorists, the manner in which a person interprets a certain environmental
stimulus has a decisive effect on the emotion that he or she will develop (see
Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 2001; Roseman, 1984).
Collective Emotions in Conflict 447
Appraisal, or alternatively, understanding of the context, depends on past col-
lective experiences and cultural norms, among other things. Smith (1993) and
Mackie et al. (2000) have pointed out that the identification of individuals with
a collective or a group influences their appraisal of events. In our view, the con-
cepts of emotional climate and collective emotional orientation lead intuitively to
the understanding that the long-term emotional context plays a major role in the
appraisal process of major information and major events. In a way, the emotional
climate and collective emotion orientation are part of the lens through which group
members interpret conflictive or peaceful events.
Moreover, in contrast to the appraisal process of individual emotions, which
takes place mostly inside the individual’s “black box,” most of the appraisal process
of group-based and collective emotions takes place in the public sphere, including
the mass media and public speeches. Hence, the potential influence of human
beings both on the development of the emotional context and on the occurrence of
collective emotions in response to societal events is relatively high.
Of importance is the well-established negative-positive asymmetry (Peeters &
Czapinski, 1990). A number of theorists (see Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999) postulate
that evaluation and action are based on an input from two separate and specialized
channels: One is related to negative information, and the other deals with positive
information processing. The first one is threat related, the second is appetitive.
There is considerable evidence in psychology that negative events and informa-
tion tend to be more closely attended and better remembered and that they strongly
influence evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies (see reviews by Cacioppo
& Berntson, 1994; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). This tendency reflects adaptive
behavior because negative information, especially related to threats, may require
immediate adaptive reactions to the new situation. In essence the asymmetry sug-
gests that transitional contexts, which include negative psychological conditions,
are more intense than transitional contexts that include positive psychological
conditions. Hence, the negative emotions may have a greater influence on hu-
man behavior than the positive ones (Jarymowicz, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal,
2006).
But the two categories of negative and positive emotions should not be viewed
in a uniform manner. The growing literature about emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lewis
& Haviland-Jones, 2000) has made efforts to distinguish among different emo-
tions and identify their exclusive antecedents, appraisals, affects, and response
properties.
Specific Emotions
In addition to the collective emotions described and assessed by de Rivera,
Kurrien, and Olsen in this issue, we must consider some collective emotional
orientations that are particularly important in the context of conflicts.
448 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
Fear
Fear is defined as a primary aversive emotion that arises in situations of per-
ceived threat and danger to organisms (persons) or their environment (the society),
and it enables them to respond to them adaptively (Gray, 1989; ¨
Ohman, 1993;
Rachman, 1978). Reactions of fear may be aroused through a conscious appraisal
of the situation. But in many cases, they are activated automatically allowing un-
conscious processing (LeDoux, 1996). A collective fear orientation cuts deeply
into the psychic fabric of society members and becomes linked with a social ethos
of conflict. The main problem with fear as a collective emotional context is its
stability above and beyond the changing of the actual or social context. Collective
fear orientation tends to limit the perspective of members of the society by binding
the present to past experiences related to the conflict and by building expectations
for the future exclusively on the basis of the past (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003). It also causes great mistrust and delegitimization of the adver-
sary. In studies carried out in Israel, a negative correlation was found between
collective fear and support for the peace process (Arian, 1989; Gordon & Arian,
2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005). Finally, the collective fear orientation is a major
platform for violence. A society in fear tends to fight when it copes with threatening
conditions.
On the other hand, in some situations, the prolonged orientation of a society
toward fear and insecurity in conjunction with acute threatening events might
increase its motivation to achieve peace (Zartman, 2000). Recently, Rosler (2006)
found that fear messages were central in all peace proposals within the Israeli
public discourse.
Hatred
Hatred may be defined as a secondary, extreme, and continuous emotion
that is directed at a particular individual or group and denounces that individual
or group fundamentally and all-inclusively (Sternberg, 2003). Often, hatred is a
direct reaction to protracted harm perceived as deliberate, unjust, and stemming
from an inner evil character of the hated individual or group (Halperin, 2007).
Hatred towards outgroups includes a wide cognitive spectrum that produces a
clear distinction between the hated outgroup and the ingroup and consequently
delegitimizes the hated outgroup (Bartlett, 2005). Behaviorally, hatred may lead
people to a desire to remove the hated outgroup. It may involve the use of active
political means against the object of hatred (Watts, 1996) or the establishment
of extremist, racist parties that base their political campaigns on hatred toward
outgroups (Mudde, 2005). Therefore, it would not be too far-reaching to suggest
that collective hatred is one of the most influential motivational forces in every
conflict (Petersen, 2002).
Collective Emotions in Conflict 449
Besides its direct behavioral implications, hatred is closely related to inter-
group or ethnic symbols, which play a significant role in the preservation or the
escalation of conflicts (Kaufman, 2001). Further, the extremist, continuous, and
all-inclusive nature of hatred hinders the resolution of conflicts. The fact that hatred
is directed to the fundamental character of the hated society rather than to spe-
cific behaviors makes a process of reconciliation or forgiveness difficult. Hence,
in many ways, moderating levels of intergroup hatred is an essential part of every
process of conflict resolution or reconciliation (Staub, 2005).
Hope
Hope consists of cognitive elements of aspiring and expecting a positive goal
accompanied by positive feelings about the anticipated events or outcomes (Snyder,
2000; Staats & Stassen, 1985; Stotland, 1969). It refers to positive goals to which
individuals and collectives aspire and believe may be attained (Averill, Catlin, &
Chon, 1990). Thus, collectives may aspire to goals of equality, security, prosperity,
and peace that they can achieve. Hope may arise in a context of deprivation, when
individuals and collectives become aware that there is a possibility their needs
may be met. It requires the use of imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, mental
exploration of novel situations, and even risk taking (Fromm, 1968). Once hope
arises, it serves as a prism for the worldview as well as a source for collective
mobilization and action to achieve the set goal.
Security
Security is similar to hope in that it is also based mainly on the cognitive
foundations accompanied by general good feeling (Bar-Tal & Jacobson, 1998;
Smith & Lazarus, 1993). It is based on appraisal of an event(s), condition(s), or
situation(s) (all are parts of a context) as an indicator of threat or danger (primary
appraisal) and on an evaluation of available defenses and the ability to cope with
the perceived threat or danger (secondary appraisal). Accordingly, people form
beliefs about being secure when they do not perceive threats or dangers, or perceive
threats or dangers that they believe they will be able to overcome. But it should be
recognized that this is a multidimensional concept as individuals and collectives
differentiate among different domains in which they can appraise security. Thus,
as shown in this issue by Mahoney and Pinedo security may refer independently
to such domains as physical survival, economic welfare, or cultural well-being. It
can also refer to individual and collective security separately (Bar-Tal, Jacobson,
& Freund, 1995).
Maslow (1970) viewed security as one of the basic needs that has to be satisfied
for the well-being of humans. Thus, a sense of security comes with feelings of
satisfaction, tranquility, contentment, and peace. In contrast, a lack of security is
450 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
accompanied by frustration, fear, and dissatisfaction and may lead to the most
extreme behaviors, including violent conflicts, wars, and even genocide (Staub &
Bar-Tal, 2003).
Societal Implications
In the second part of this article we point out the societal implications of the
articles presented in this issue. This is done within the proposed framework that
suggests that humanly constructed contexts are responsible for the formation of
the most destructive emotional climates and that therefore, human beings should
act to change the context to construct a positive emotional climate. We also rely
on the conception proposed by the article of Fernandez-Dols, Carrera, Hurtado de
Mendoza, and Oceja, who point out that emotional climates are based on formed
societal conventions, which often serve as key factors in the justification and
explanation of social order. First, we refer to the formation of the negative context
and negative emotional climate. Second, we discuss the human intervention that
aims at changing the negative context and thus improving the emotional climate.
Finally, we discuss the conditions that are needed for the construction of a culture
of peace that is underlined by a positive emotional climate.
Formation of a Negative Emotional Climate
It must be recognized that in many cases a negative emotional climate has
developed from a negative context. In turn, the negative emotional climate evokes
negative beliefs and emotions that lead to defensive or aggressive behavior. The
resulting context may be dominated by beliefs that foster insecurity, threat, and
stress as well as emotions of fear, anger, hatred, and so on. A number of articles in
the present issue focus on humanly constructed negative contexts and the severe
psychological consequences these caused.
For example, two articles describe the emotional effects of March 11, 2004,
terrorist attack in Madrid that resulted in 191 deaths and more than 1,500 injuries.
The article by Conejero and Etxebarria distinguishes between the personal emo-
tions and the collective emotions that were evoked and shows how measures of
emotional climate contribute to our ability to predict the behavior that resulted.
The article by P´aez, Ubillos, and Gonz´alez-Castro concentrates on the way of cop-
ing with this terrifying event. Both articles show that the terror attack in Madrid
influenced collective as well as individual emotions within the Spanish society.
Another example of an extremely negative humanly constructed context is
presented by Lykes, Beristain, and P´erez-Armi˜nan, who describe the emotional
reactions of Maya communities in Guatemala after four decades of internal armed
conflict, political repression, and political violence. According to the authors,
between 50,000 and 100,000 people were violently killed during the nearly 40 years
of conflict, most of them assassinated in group massacres aimed at destroying the
Collective Emotions in Conflict 451
community. Moreover, throughout this horrible conflict, more than 400 villages
of the Highland indigenous population were burned to the ground and more than
one million people were displaced.
Finally, the article by Kanyangara, Rim´e, Philippot, and Yzerbyt regarding the
Rwanda genocide reminds us of the darkest side of human nature. Even in present
times, humanly constructed intergroup conflicts have the potential to create the
most extreme form of mass murder and killing. In Rwanda, between April and
July 1994, approximately one million Tutsis were murdered, in addition to tens of
thousands of Hutus (Kanyangara, Rim´e, Philippot, & Yzerbyt, current issue). As
in the Spanish and Maya cases, the mass killing had an enormous emotional impact
on society members in Rwanda. Both survivors of the genocide and perpetrators
expressed high levels of negative emotions (i.e., fear, sadness, and guilt) as well
as negative assessment of their society’s emotional climate.
Changing the Negative Emotional Climate
Because negative contexts are created by humans, it seems evident that people
should try to change them in order to create contexts that foster positive emotional
climates that lead to positive human behavior. Ruiz shows that prisons, whose em-
ployees report more positive emotional climates, have prisoners who report less
negative climates, and that when a positive climate predominates amongst pris-
oners, there is less negative climate among employees. We know how to improve
prison climates and should do so. It is becoming increasingly clear that traumatic
events such as bombings, disappearances, and massacres not only injure the indi-
viduals who are most affected but also threaten the fabric of the entire community
or society. But it is also been shown that a society can pull itself together so that
the emotional atmosphere of fear, sadness, and anger dissipate and the emotional
climate can maintain a generally positive character. At least, Conejero and Etxe-
barria show that this was true in the case of Spanish society, and the article by
P´aez, Ubillos, and Gonz´alez-Castro suggests that this recovery is aided by pub-
lic demonstrations that reinforce feelings of collective solidarity. Participation in
demonstrations was shown to be associated with the perception of a more posi-
tive emotional climate 8 weeks later, even when initial perceptions and affect are
controlled.
However, a recovery of emotional climate may be more difficult when a
society has been greatly weakened. A belief in justice is shattered by policies of
impunity, and scars from the trauma of massacres affect the emotional climate in
ways that hinder the development of a culture of peace. Thus, the article by Lykes,
Beristain, and Cabrera about Guatemala shows that without community support
and the ability to organize collective rituals, grief is left unresolved and people
flounder. The authors implicitly argue for the necessity of support from outside
the affected society and describe two attempts to restore a positive climate. The
first involves a trial in which people from a community attempt to obtain justice.
452 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
Although the trial reawakened intense suffering and fear and community support
was divided, the initial fear of those who participated was replaced by anger and a
desire to remember rather than forget what had happened. A more positive social
climate may have been obtained. The authors stress the importance of interpreting
participation in the trial as an act of resistance to oppression, thus encouraging a
self-image that overcomes fear and powerlessness with confidence and worth. The
second attempt involves enlisting the surviving women of a community to create
a photo-text of their history. Again, fear and sorrow are reawakened, and there is
anxiety about the procedure, but as these negative feelings are faced the women
develop self-confidence and begin to believe in the possibility of building a better
future. Although it is unclear how much these attempts increased the extent of
solidarity and hope in the emotional climate, they do appear to have diminished
the extent of fear and despair.
The article by Kanyangara, Rim´e, Philippot, and Yzerbyt describes the at-
tempt to use Gacaca trials to rebuild society in Rwanda. In contrast to the attempt
to restore a sense of justice by using criminal justice trials, the Gacaca trials at-
tempt to further reconciliation by the public recognition of the suffering of victims
and the admission of guilt by those who perpetrated that suffering. On the one
hand, the trials appear to have achieved a degree of reconciliation. The authors
demonstrate that the trials were successful in decreasing negative stereotypes and
the perception of outgroup homogeneity in both groups of survivors and perpetra-
tors. Furthermore, although there was an increase in the guilt of perpetrators, there
was not an increase in the anger of survivors. Thus, one may argue that the trials
were a successful ritual in increasing community cohesion. On the other hand,
neither group reported increases in the positive aspects of the country’s emotional
climate, estimates of the general emotional climate declined, and the survivors
who testified experienced personal increases in fear, anxiety, sadness, disgust, and
shame. They also reported a sharp increase in the negative aspects of the country’s
emotional climate. Hence, although the trials succeeded in diminishing prejudice,
they do not seem to have improved the country’s emotional climate and may have
even worsened the climate for victims.
All three articles show that participation in public rituals does not necessar-
ily relieve negative affect. On the contrary, participation leads to higher levels of
emotional upset. However, it also appears to support the personal growth of par-
ticipants and to have generally beneficial effects for the community. At least, this
is true when the design of rituals reinforces social support cohesion.
Formation of Culture of Peace via Positive Climate
A formation of a positive context that can be characterized as a culture of
peace via creation of positive climate should be the objective of the international
community. A positive emotional climate may be defined as one in which people’s
Collective Emotions in Conflict 453
emotional relationships are characterized by a concern for others, sensitivity to
others’ needs, freedom, trust, and security. This does not mean that there is no
anger, fear, or dissatisfaction. However, it presumes that there is more trust and
solidarity than hostility and disunity, more personal security than insecurity, more
hope than despair, more confidence in institutions than dissatisfaction and anger
at authority, and more tranquility than fear in public.
Under such psychological conditions, it is postulated that individuals will
experience more peace in the sense of inner harmony and compassion, that com-
munities will have norms and institutions that promote the resolution of conflicts
without violence, and that there will be societal support for the sort of environ-
ment that allows people to fulfill their basic needs and support the global culture
of peace endorsed by the UN General Assembly.
The findings presented by de Rivera, Kurrien, and Olsen in this issue demon-
strate that nations have emotional climates with different degrees of social trust
and social anger/fear. These climates are independent of an individual’s social
class and associated with the degree to which the nation has a culture of peace.
The extent to which a nation has a culture of peace that is characterized by high
liberal development and low violent inequality affects the percentage of persons in
different social classes and the extent to which communities manifest differences
in security. The amount of personal security can be distinguished from estimates of
the collective emotions that constitute emotional climate and are more influenced
by nation than by social class. It is the subjective experience of national emotional
climate, rather than personal emotional experience, that appears most related to
objective indices for the culture of peace in the different nations. Indeed, this ob-
servation is well documented in the study reported by Mahoney and Pinedo, who
showed that the experience of human security depends more on national emotional
climate than socioeconomic status and that for community samples, a large part
of human security depends on support from family and friends.
Rim´e’s thinking reminds us that an education for peace must aim at generating
a climate of hope that it is possible to win peace and not just war. Thus, the social
sharing in demonstrations cannot simply be anger against war; it must also be for
the cooperation needed to create a culture of peace. It must invoke the collective
memory of successful nonviolent actions around the war and create a climate of
hope that will reinforce the solidarity needed to overcome the political obstacles
to peace.
The article by Basabe and Valencia shows that a nation’s factor scores on
objective measures of the culture of peace promoted by the United Nations are
significantly related to subjective measures of a nation’s values and emotions.
Each of the four crucial factors is significantly related to important values. Liberal
development is positively related with valuing individualism and opposing unequal
power distribution, and countries with higher scores appear to have emotional
climates characterized by more trust and less negative emotionality. However,
454 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
the valuing of individualism and power equality is not related to national scores
on violent inequality and state use of violence. Low scores on these important
factors are related to the extent to which the people of a nation value harmony. By
implication, to have a society scoring well on all three dimensions of peacefulness
one needs a culture that cultivates not only individualism and equality but also
harmony.
In this regard, it is important to note that individualism and harmony are
not opposing values. On the one hand, this means we do not have to choose be-
tween them. On the other hand, one does not imply the other and a society may
need to deliberately strive to cultivate both. Finally, although the values related
to nurturance appear similar to many of those related to liberal development, it
is striking that national scores on this factor are related to higher scores on pos-
itive emotionality (rather than lower scores on negative emotionality). Certainly,
the findings suggest that a fully developed culture of peace requires a blend-
ing of both competitive and cooperative capability as well as an emotional cli-
mate in which positive emotions predominate without the inhibition of negative
emotions.
Rather than relating the dimensions of a culture of peace to national values
and emotional climate, Diener and Tov relate the dimensional scores of nations
and the subjective well-being (SWB) of individuals to the attitudes of citizens that
may be related to peace. They find that liberal development and national happi-
ness foster or reinforce ideologies that are bases for a culture of peace such as
individual rights, democratic participation, and nonviolence. Thus, both national
scores on liberal development and individual scores on SWB are negatively re-
lated to prejudice, and the negative relationship between happiness and prejudice
increases as a nation’s liberal development increases; so, happy individuals in de-
veloped nations are even less likely to be prejudiced than happy individuals in less
developed nations. Congruently, a nation’s scores on violent inequality are related
to the endorsement of military rule and autocracy.
Diener and Tov make a convincing argument that happiness may be an im-
portant aspect of a culture of peace, a sustaining base and not simply a by-product
of peace. They point out that nation-level SWB is related to prioritizing civil and
political freedom over economic stability and maintaining social order, and that
this is true even after one controls for person-level SWB and GDP. Thus, we
may be able to speak of happiness as reflecting a national norm or being an as-
pect of emotional climate that supports attitudes needed for a culture of peace.
However, at an individual level their argument is more ambiguous. Although in-
dividual SWB was associated with many attitudes important for a peaceful soci-
ety, and some of these were not moderated by national SWB or GDP, it (unlike
national SWB) was also associated with confidence in the armed forces and a
greater willingness to fight for one’s nation. The contradictory significant re-
lationships between national and individual SWB raise important questions for
Collective Emotions in Conflict 455
the psychological underpinnings of a culture of peace, specifically how people
perceive state use of violence, negotiation, nonviolent attitudes, and the struggle for
justice.
The dimensions of culture of peace are positively related to an emotional cli-
mate of trust and a general permissiveness toward emotions. However, the dimen-
sions are orthogonal and it seems likely that the competitive values that promote
liberal development often lead to an increasing disparity between those with abil-
ity and resources and those who lack these advantages. The achievement of both
liberal development and equality in nations such as Norway appears to require poli-
cies that combine the incentives of capitalism with programs deliberately aimed at
offsetting inequality by systems of progressive taxation and adult education that
work toward preventing the segregation of rich and poor.
Unfortunately, the independence of the dimensions of culture of peace sug-
gests that liberal development has little to do with either violent inequality or
state use of violence; the data presented by de Rivera, Kurrien, and Olsen show
that positive emotional climate is not necessarily related to state use of nonviolent
means. Diener and Tov demonstrate that the extent of an individual’s happiness (as
opposed to the amount of national happiness) is positively related to confidence
in the military and willingness to fight for one’s nation. Thus, it would appear that
state violence can only be controlled by the development of international norms
and, ultimately, some system of world government. People seem predisposed to
ingroup favoritism and have a commitment to different belief systems that make it
difficult to achieve global solidarity. However, it may well be possible to separate
ethnic and state identities so that conflicts can be isolated and contained by a global
state identity. In the case of the United States, this development might be furthered
by the creation of a Department of Peace.
Conclusions
The present issue concerns macro-level social and political psychology fo-
cusing on a particular aspect of societal behavior—its emotional repertoire. The
articles in this issue clearly suggest that society members experience collective
emotions not only as a result of directly experiencing events that evoke particu-
lar emotion but also by identifications with the society as a collective. Moreover,
the articles suggest that societies function in a context that signals psychological
conditions that include an emotional climate.
Of importance is our premise that many of the transitional contexts are hu-
manly constructed and that they foster the development of different types of emo-
tional climates, which lead to an experience of particular beliefs and emotions.
Unfortunately, human beings in different parts of the world live under humanly
constructed contexts that foster negative climates that lead to such reactions as
fear, anger, hatred, insecurity, and mistrust. Among them are violent conflicts,
456 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
ethnic cleansings, terror attacks, total regimes, institutionalized exploitations and
discriminations, and so on.
Living in context with such negative climates is a dreadful experience for many
people, causing much misery and suffering. The question that arises is whether
people living under these conditions can improve their well-being. The ability to
improve depends very much on the freedom, resources, and knowledge that people
have. In some situations a change in emotional climate may require the aid of those
living in more fortunate contexts.
A change of emotional climate can have two distinct forms. The first, and
the more modest one, includes only a moderation of negative emotional elements
such as fear or hatred. In that case the parties can at best achieve a “negative” form
of peace—a violence-free system (Galtung, 1996). A second form of change is
mainly about the growth of positive elements of emotional climate such as hope,
security, and trust between rival parties. Such a climate is a springboard for the
establishment of positive forms of peace: “a cooperative system, beyond passive
peaceful coexistence, one that can bring forth positively synergistic fruits of the
harmony” (Galtung, 1996, p. 61).
That it may be possible to improve climates, even in cases of intractable con-
flict, is suggested by the peaceful resolutions of conflict in South Africa, some
countries in Latin America, and hopefully, Northern Ireland. Lederach (1997) has
pointed out that reconciliation requires some way of marrying truth and mercy,
justice and peace, and some way of acknowledging past wrongs yet looking for-
ward to a common future. We have only begun to explore the collective rituals
that can create an emotional climate that will foster the reconciliation needed for
a culture of peace. The construction of new restorative contexts with such ele-
ments as truth and reconciliation commissions, apology, public trials, economic
restoration, political integration, democratization, reparation payments, and so on
is an essential foundation for the formation of such a positive climate (Bar-Tal &
Bennink, 2004). These acts require cooperation between the parties which were
in conflict. But the present issue suggests also that some of the construction of the
new context can be carried out within the framework of collective self-healing.
Collective self-healing refers to acts carried by the society with the goal to reduce
grief, pain, and suffering. This can be carried out via active participation in so-
cial and political activities, taking control over one’s life and destiny, establishing
a network of psychological services, commemorative projects, or ritualistic acts
(Nets & Bar-Tal, in press).
We realize that conflicts are inseparable from human life, but we also know
that they do not have to be conducted with violence and discrimination. It is thus
important to construct a context that fosters peaceful conflict resolution. Human
beings can learn to carry out their conflicts with nonviolent struggle, negotiation,
mutual respect, and consideration. We also believe that inequality, injustice, or
lack of freedom is not a necessary part of human life. These evils are humanly
Collective Emotions in Conflict 457
constructed and therefore can be changed. It is thus important to establish and
maintain emotional climates of security, trust, hope, and freedom. Cultures of
peace can be established. They depend on the political culture that is maintained
by our societal institutions and socialization agents. It is our hope that this will be
the chosen direction.
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460 Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera
DANIEL BAR-TAL is Professor of Social Psychology at the School of Education,
Tel Aviv University. His research interest is in political and social psychology
studying psychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making. He
has published over 15 books and over 150 articles and chapters in major social
and political psychological journals and books. He served as a President of the
International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his
work.
ERAN HALPERIN is a PhD Candidate in the division of government and political
theory, school of political science, Haifa University. He has a BA in Political
Science and Psychology and a MA in Political Science from the University of
Haifa. His PhD dissertation examines the role of hatred in politics. His research
interests include political psychology, emotions and politics, emotions in conflict,
and intergroup hatred. He is also a Project Coordinator of the National Resilience
Project and the Psychological Aspects of Terrorism Project at the National Security
Studies Center, Haifa University.
JOSEPH DE RIVERA is Professor of Psychology at Clark University and Director
of its program of peace studies. He is the author or editor of a number of books
(including The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, and Field Theory as
Social Science: Studies of Lewin’s Berlin Group). He has edited issues on emotional
experience for American Behavioral Science, and Social Justice, co-edited a prior
issue for Journal of Social Issues, and recently edited an issue on assessing cultures
of peace for Peace and Justice.
