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1 23
Public Organization Review
A Global Journal
ISSN 1566-7170
Public Organiz Rev
DOI 10.1007/
s11115-011-0156-5
The Need to Establish the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons:
A Proposal for the Future
Jorge Morales Pedraza
1 23
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The Need to Establish the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Biological Weapons: A Proposal for the Future
Jorge Morales Pedraza
#Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
Abstract Biological weapons are considered, by the international community, as a
weapon of mass destruction. When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was
negotiated during the 1960s and early 1970s, the negotiators considered unnecessary
the establishment of an international organisation to supervise the implementation of
the Convention’s provisions by the State parties. It is important to highlight that
since the entry into force of the BWC, the international situation has significantly
changed. For this reason perhaps the moment has arrived to consider again the
proposal of settling down such an organisation in the framework of the strengthening
the BWC.
Keywords BCW .Biological weapons .Non-proliferation of biological weapons .
Biological agents .Toxins .Internationalorganisation .United Nations .United Nations
Security Council .Conference of States Parties .Executive Committee .Technical
Secretariat
Introduction
A biological weapon
1
is commonly classified, by the international community, as
weapons of mass destruction. It fact, a biological weapon is the first type of weapons
of mass destruction that were destroyed within a specific timeframe, as a result of the
implementation of an international instrument adopted by the international
community with this specific purpose. This international instrument is called the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Public Organiz Rev
DOI 10.1007/s11115-011-0156-5
1
Biological weapons consist of biological agents and the munitions, equipment, or means employed in
their delivery. (Tulliu and Schmalberger 2003).
J. Morales Pedraza (*)
Consultant on International Affairs Former Ambassador and former IAEA’s Senior Manager,
Vienna, Austria
e-mail: jmorales47@hotmail.com
e-mail: jmorales547@yahoo.com
Author's personal copy
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Bio-
logical Weapons Convention or BWC).
The BWC is the first international instrument that bans the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition and use of a specific type of weapons of mass
destruction, forcing all States parties to destroy such weapons and delivery systems
before the entry into force of the Convention for them.
Biological weapons make deliberate use of pathogenic materials to inflict death or
harm in humans, animals, and even plants. For this reason, this type of weapon can
be used against military as well as civilian targets under certain conditions.
Most biological agents used as a weapon are living organisms that can reproduce
and multiply following their dispersion, and this quality allows biological agents to
multiply their effect against enemy forces during a military conflict.
It is important to stress that some biological agents used as a weapon can spread
disease from one contaminated organism to another, making them a very dangerous
instruments of war. Biological agents causing contagious disease used in a military
conflict have the potential to trigger an epidemic, especially if local sanitation
conditions are poor, causing great impact not only in the civilian population but in
the enemy armed forces as well.
However, it is important to be aware of the following: Military forces using
biological agents as a weapon during a military conflict can be affected too, if these
forces are not adequately protected with appropriate clothing and equipment.
The above-mentioned elements in addition to the absence of a national authority
acting as a focal point for the Convention, a weak national implementation
mechanism in force in several of the BWC’s State parties, inadequate legislation
and norms in force in some BWC's States parties, the lack of administrative
measures adopted in some BWC’s State parties in order to ensure compliance with
the Convention’s provision constrain implementation effectiveness.
Also, limited participation by some BWC’s State parties in the implementation of
confidence building measures adopted by the Conference of States Parties,
particularly in the presentation of information regarding biological activities and
institutions involved in carrying out these activities in their territories, among others,
represent important limitations that are impeding what the BWC reaches as the main
objective for which it was adopted so many years ago.
In summary, it can be stated that: Two international instruments prohibit the use
of biological weapons in a military conflict. One of these instruments is the Geneva
Protocol of 1925.
2
The second instrument is the BWC in force since 1975.
3
According to the BWC, no biological weapons as such should be in the military
arsenals of any of the State parties. However, it is important to know that the BWC
allows State parties to possess small amount of biological agents for preservation,
protection, or for other peaceful purposes.
2
The Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of
all analogous liquids, materials or devices; prohibits also the use of bacteriological methods of warfare,
and commits the parties to exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the Protocol. (WMD
Commission’s report 2006).
3
In 2009, the BWC has 163 State parties –fewer than either the NPT or the CWC. Thirteen States have
signed but not ratified the Convention, while 19 States have neither signed nor ratified it.
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The biological weapons non-proliferation regime
The biological weapons non-proliferation regime has been structured around the
BWC,
4
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and a group of national and international laws
and regulations.
The main purpose of this regime is to keep biological weapons out of the military
arsenals of the State parties.
It is important to single out that the BWC embodies the principle known as the
“general-purpose criterion”under which all relevant activities are prohibited unless
they can be justified for any peaceful purposes permitted under the Convention.
According to Article I, “each State party undertakes never and in any circumstances
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types
and in quantities that have no justifications for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes”. (BWC’s text 1972)
When the BWC is analysed in detail,
5
it is easy to identify a group of obligations
that each State party has. These obligations are clearly spell out in Articles I, II, III,
IV, V, and VII. At the same time, it is also easy to recognise the following
deficiencies in the text of the BWC:
a) Lack of clarity in the definition of what should be considered as a biological
agent and a biological weapon;
b) Absence of a comprehensive list of biological agents, equipment and facilities
that should be forbidden or subject to international control;
c) Lack of a clear definition of what should be considered as a means of delivery of
a biological weapon;
d) Lack of a clear definition of what should be considered as a quantity justifiable
from the point of view of preservation, protection, or for other peaceful
purposes;
e) There is no obligation to declare the amount of biological agents destroyed by
each BWC’s State parties after the entry into force of the Convention for them.
f) There is no mechanism within the BWC that can be used to confirm that a
BWC’s State party destroyed all biological weapons in their possession before
the Convention enter into force for this State;
g) Absence of an international organisation with the mandate of supervising the
implementation of the Convention’s provisions in all State parties;
h) Absence of a verification mechanism to verify compliance, or to detect any
possible violation of the BWC’s provisions by any State party.
With the purpose of trying properly with the above issues, the international
community should carry out additional efforts to identify the appropriate measures
that can be adopted to eliminate these deficiencies and, at the same time, to
strengthen the BWC as much as and as soon as possible.
4
The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975. During World War I an attempt was made by German
forces to use pathogens for the purpose of sabotage. During World War II, biological weapons were used
by the Japanese military forces in attacks and in experiments conducted against wartime opponents.
During the war, other States also conducted biological warfare research.
5
See the BWC’s text for additional information.
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On the other hand, national authorities should continue adopting concrete
measures to reinforce national implementation of the BWC’s provisions by:
a) Transforming all treaty’s obligations into national law;
b) Enforcing the legislation once breaches are identified;
c) Adopting specific methods for monitoring relevant research work with bio-
logical agents and toxins carried out within the national territory of all BWC’s
State parties.
In the last case, it is important to stress the following: Monitoring relevant
research activities using biological agents and toxins is a very important task,
because biological weapons and their associated technologies have a large
dual use. It can be used in a vast array of legitimate activities, including
biomedical, bioscience and biodefence research and development, as well as
in offensive military activities. Because of the above and due to the
comprehensive nature of the BWC’s prohibitions, the execution of the
Convention’s provisions needs to include the continuous oversight of peaceful,
prophylactic and protective life science activities to prevent their misuse or
misapplication. (Lentzos 2007)
The organisation for the prohibition of biological weapons (OPBW)
When the BWC was negotiated during the 1960s and early 1970s, the negotiators
considered unnecessary the establishment of an international organisation to
supervise the implementation of the Convention’s provisions by the State parties.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was given the responsibility of
considering any denounce of presumed violation or non-compliance with the
obligations and commitments assumed by any BWC’s State party, presented by any
other State party. However, there is no other organ, within or outside the United
Nations system, with the responsibility of supervising the implementation of the
Convention’s provisions by the State parties.
Many States supported, during the negotiation process of the BWC, the idea of
settling down an international organisation in order to supervise the implementation
of the Convention’s provisions by all State parties.
6
Some other States considered, at
that time, that there was no need to establish such organisation with the above-
mentioned purpose. However, this group of States is now thinking that, due to the
current change in the international situation, the establishment of such organisation
could be relevant for strengthening the BWC. A third group of State parties still has
no particular opinion on this matter.
The following alternatives related with the establishment of an international
organisation associated with the BWC, could be considered:
1. The creation of a new international organisation, which can be called
“Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons”(OPBW), within or
6
Other States considered that the OPCW should be the international organisation designated to supervise
the implementation of the BWC’s provisions by the State parties.
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associated with the United Nations system, with the mandate to supervise the
implementation of the BWC’s provisions by all State parties;
2. The designation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), as the organisation responsible for the supervision of the implementa-
tion of the BWC’s provisions by all State parties
7
;
3. Change the current mandate of the Special Implementation Unit (SIU), with the
purpose of acting as the provisional Secretariat of the Convention
8
and later on
as the international organisation with the mandate of supervising the
implementation of the BWC’s provisions by all State parties.
If a new international organisation associated with the BWC is going to be
established in the future, then it should have the following main organs: a) A
Conference of States Parties, the supreme governing body on which every State
party as a member of the organisation is represented; b) An Executive Committee, an
intergovernmental but with restricted (and partly rotating) membership, regularly
elected on a regionally representative basis by the Conference; and c) A Technical
Secretariat, the supporting body of international civil servants headed by a Director
General (Sims 2006).
A Protocol to the BWC containing all elements related with the establishment and
operation of the OPBW and with the implementation mechanism to be used by the
Technical Secretariat to supervise the implementation of all BWC’s provisions by the
State parties, should be adopted.
The Conference of States Parties
The Conference of States Parties shall be the main policy-making organ of the new
organisation. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of the
BWC, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Committee
and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference of State Parties may make recommen-
dations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related with the BWC rose
by a State party or brought to its attention by the Executive Committee.
The Conference of States Parties shall oversee the implementation of the BWC’s
provisions, and act in order to promote the main objectives and purposes of this
important international instrument. The Conference of States Parties shall review
compliance with the BWC’s provisions by the State parties. It shall also oversee the
activities of the Executive Committee and the Technical Secretariat and may issue
guidelines, in accordance with the Convention, to either of them in the exercise of
their functions. In addition, the Conference of States Parties shall:
a) Consider and adopt, at its regular sessions, the program and budget of the
organisation submitted by the Executive Committee, as well as other reports
presented by the Technical Secretariat;
7
Perhaps when all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities are already destroyed,
this proposal could have more chance to be accepted by the OPCW’s Member States.
8
A SIU has been created within the United Nations’Secretariat with the purpose to deal with some of the
activities mentioned in point 3.
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b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by all Member States;
c) Elect the members of the Executive Committee;
d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat;
e) Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Committee submitted by the
latter;
f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its
functions, in accordance with the Convention’s provisions;
g) Foster international cooperation in all matters related with the use of biological
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes;
h) Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the
implementation of the BWC;
i) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the BWC’s provisions
and to redress and remedy any situation, which contravenes its provisions.
The Executive Committee
The Executive Committee shall be composed by 43 members distributed in the
following manner:
a) Seven States from Africa;
b) Twelve States from Asia, including the Middle East;
c) Seventeen States from Europe and North America, including Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus;
d) Seven States from the Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Executive Committee shall elaborate the rules of procedure and submit them
to the Conference of States Parties for approval. The Executive Committee shall
elect a Chairman, two Vice-chairmen and the Secretary.
Each member of the Executive Committee shall have one vote. The Executive
Committee shall take decisions on matters of substance by consensus. However, if a
consensus cannot be reached on a specific item of the agenda, then the decision
should be adopted by a two-thirds majority of all members present and with the right
of voting. The Executive Committee shall take decisions on questions of procedure
by a simple majority of all members present and with the right of voting. When the
issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall
be treated as a matter of procedure, unless otherwise decided by the Executive
Committee by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
The Executive Committee shall be the executive organ of the new organisation. It
shall be responsible to the Conference of States Parties. The Executive Committee
shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it by the Protocol to the BWC
to be adopted in the future, as well as those functions delegated to it by the
Conference of States Parties. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the
recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference of States Parties and
assure their proper and continuous implementation.
The Executive Committee shall promote the effective implementation of the
BWC. It shall supervise the day-to-day operation of the Technical Secretariat,
cooperate with the national authority of each State party and facilitate consultations
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and cooperation among these States, and between them and the Technical
Secretariat. The Executive Committee shall:
a) Consider and submit to the Conference of States Parties for approval the draft
program and budget of the organisation;
b) Consider and submit to the Conference of States Parties for approval, the draft
report of the organisation on the implementation of the BWC, the report on the
performance of its own activities, and any other special reports as it deems
necessary or requested by the Conference of States Parties;
c) Make arrangements for the regular and special sessions of the Conference of
States Parties, including the preparation of the draft agenda;
d) Adopt the updated list of biological agents, equipment and facilities that should be
forbidden or subject to international control prepared by the Technical Secretariat;
e) Analyse the outcomes of the application of the implementation mechanism included
in the Protocol to the BWC to be adopted in the future, and of the verification
mechanism to be applied by the Technical Secretariat in all BWC’s State parties.
The Executive Committee shall also:
a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and with other international
organisations on behalf of the organisation, subject to prior approval by the
Conference of States Parties;
b) Approve agreements or arrangements related with the implementation of verification
activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with all BWC’s State parties.
The Executive Committee shall consider any issue or matter within its competence
affecting the BWC and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance
and cases of non-compliance and, as appropriate, inform State parties and bring the issue
or matter to the attention of the Conference of States Parties.
In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-
compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for under the BWC,
the Executive Committee shall consult with the State parties involved and, as
appropriate, request these States to take all necessary measures to redress the
situation within a specified time.
To the extent that the Executive Committee considers further action to be
necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:
a) Inform all State parties of the issue or matter;
b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference of States Parties;
c) Make recommendations to the Conference of States Parties regarding measures
to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.
The Executive Committee, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, shall
bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, to a
special session of the Conference of States Parties. The Conference could decide
to give the Executive Committee the authorisation to inform directly the UNSC
on any violation or non-compliance with the Convention’s provisions submitted
by any State party and considered as extremely serious and urgent and with a
negative impact for international peace and security. The Conference of States
Parties could also approve a decision of getting the attention of the United
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Nations General Assembly and the UNSC on the same issue or matter, if
international peace and security are at risk.
The Scientific Advisory Board
Due to the technical characteristic of the BWC, it is important to consider the possibility
of establishing a Scientific Advisory Board within the Executive Committee. The
mandate of the Scientific Advisory Board should include all technical issues associated
with the implementation of the BWC’s provisions, particularly to assess scientific and
technical development in all areas relevant to the BWC.
9
Without any doubt, prudent constraints on certain research activities in all fields
relevant to the BWC will increase trust among all State parties. It is important to
stress that the BWC remains vulnerable if a concrete mechanism for the control of
research in all fields relevant to the BWC in all State parties cannot be established
with this purpose in the future.
The Special Implementation Unit (SIU)
The establishment of the SIU within the United Nations’Secretariat is, without any
doubt, an important step towards the establishment of an international organisation
for the supervision of the implementation of the BWC’s provisions in the future.
The current SIU’s mandate could be extended, step by step, in order to include,
among others, the following activities:
a) Preparation of the Conferences of States Parties, in closed cooperation with the
United Nations’Secretariat;
b) Elaboration of relevant reports for the consideration of the Conferences of States
Parties;
c) Support the work of any expert group to be established by the Secretary
General, with the objective of clarifyng any presumed non-compliance or
violation of the Convention’s provisions by any State party;
d) Identification of new biological agents to be included in the list of biological
agents and technologies that should be under international control.
A verification mechanism for the BWC
When the BWC was approved, no verification mechanism was adopted. The reason
was the lack of agreement on this important subject among the negotiators.
The absence of a verification mechanism of the BWC is an important limitation that
this international instrument has. This limitation impede that the Convention can fulfil
9
The Scientific Advisory Board should be established even in the case that no agreement could be
reached regarding the establishment of a new international organisation to supervise the implementation of
the Convention’s provisions in the coming years.
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adequately its mandate and without restrains and is making more difficult the process
of strengthening the biological weapons non-proliferation regime. For this reason,
perhaps could be useful to reopen, in a future Conference of States Parties or
Annual Meeting of States, the consideration of this important issue. However, any
discussions to be held on this issue should be transparent and flexible and should
take into account all possible alternatives presented by different BWC’s State
parties. It is also important that during the discussions of this issue, all difficulties
encountered so far in the process of reaching an agreement on the need to have a
verification mechanism for the Convention should be considered in detail.
The negotiations for the adoption of a verification mechanism for the BWC were
suspended in 2001, due to the opposition of the USA’s Administration to accept the
recommendations included in the VEREX’s report.
10
This situation has delayed the
consideration of several other important proposals related with the strengthening of
the biological weapons non-proliferation regime.
The main arguments used by the USA’s Administration to reject a verification
mechanism for the BWC are, among others, the following:
a) The BWC cannot be verified effectively, because biological production facilities
are dual-use;
b) A negotiated regime cannot be sufficiently intrusive to detect clandestine
facilities. In additional of what have been said before, the adoption of a
verification regime can generate false confidence that a country is in compliance
with the Treaty, when in fact is not;
c) Highly intrusive inspections by multinational teams can expose both govern-
ment and commercial facilities to foreign espionage. In particular, the loss of
valuable trade secrets can weaken the competitive edge of the US biotechnology
and pharmaceutical industries. (Bailey 2002)
Point c above could be the main reason why the USA’s Administration is against the
adoption of a verification mechanism for the BWC. Regrettably, some other countries
share the USA’s position, particularly those countries with important and large
biological and biotechnology facilities. Several other States consider that the above-
mentioned difficulties could be overcome, if State parties have the political willto do so.
The BWC’s protocol on verification
What are the main characteristics of the BWC’s Protocol on verification? This
Protocol, prepared by a group of international experts, relies on three-pillar
architecture:
a) Mandatory declarations;
10
The final VEREX’s report containing a set of recommendations was presented to a Special Conference
of States Parties in 1994. The Conference agreed to develop a legally binding instrument to strengthen the
effectiveness of the BWC in the field of disarmament.
Negotiations on a verification protocol began in 1995 and continued through 2001, when they were
brought to a sudden halt by the withdrawal of the USA’s support. For additional information see the
VEREX’s report.
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b) Declaration follow-up procedures;
c) Investigations of non-compliance concerns.
The first pillar requires that State parties submit declarations on activities that were
carried out in a group of facilities during certain period located in their territories or under
their jurisdiction or control, and on facilities of relevance to the BWC. These declarations
are built largely upon a set of confidence building measures adopted earlier, but making
the necessary adjustment in order to ensure that the requirements are unambiguous and
very clear the items that the declarations should include (Pearson 2000).
The second pillar is based on a package of measures that include infrequent randomly
selected transparency visits to declared facilities, declaration/clarification procedures
and voluntary assistance visits. Randomly selected transparency visits will be infrequent
and are intended to ensure that declarations are consistent with requirements. The
BWC’s Protocol on verification also enables these visits to provide advice and technical
assistance to State parties, furnishing a useful bonus (Pearson 2000).
The scope of the second set of measures is very wide and includes from
written correspondence through a consultative meeting for, if necessary, a
clarification visit. In addition to the above measures, the BWC’sProtocol
includes also the possibility to carry out voluntary assistance visits in order to
help requesting States to implement the BWC’s Protocol, or to participate in
technical cooperation activities in the field of life sciences exclusively with
peaceful purposes.
The third pillar is divided into two categories: a) Field investigations; and b)
Facility investigations. The former measure covers instances in which exposure of
humans, animals, or plants to biological agents has given rise to concern about
possible non-compliance or alleged use of biological weapons. In other words, when
there has been an unusual outbreak of disease that appears not to have been caused
naturally. These measures, which are confrontational and comparable to challenge
inspections under the CWC, are highly political in nature and will be extremely rare
events. They are, however, vital elements of the overall regime (Pearson 2000).
The BWC’s Protocol includes two different types of verification measures. The first
group of this type of measures is related with the biological agents that should be
prohibited, or subject to international control. The second group is related to the
prohibition of the production and use of the delivery systems of this type of weapons.
There are two different categories of verification measures that have been
included in the BWC’s Protocol: Measures to be applied outside relevant facilities
for the BWC, and measures to be applied inside these facilities.
The areas in which the proposed verification mechanism could be applied are the
following:
a) Development;
b) Acquisition or production;
c) Storage or retention.
The BWC’s Protocol includes potential verification measures in terms of the
following main criteria:
a) Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and
quality of information they provide, and fail to provide;
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b) Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
c) Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
d) Their organisational, financial, legal, and safety implications;
e) Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial develop-
ment and other permitted activities and their implications for the confiden-
tiality of commercial proprietary information. (UBWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8
1993)
OtherprovisionsoftheBWC’s Protocol are related with the implementation
of Article VII. These provisions include measures promoting international
scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes among States parties,
such as monitoring and controlling infectious disease and improving bio-safety
(Pearson 2000).
Since the adoption of the BWC, developing State parties has long been
pressuring developed State parties, without success, in order to elaborate
specific measures to ensure the full implementation of Article X.
On the other hands, there is a general appreciation that measures under
Article VII will bring benefits, particularly to the developing countries.
Over time, such measures will promote the Protocol’s universality and will
help build much-needed infrastructure within these States. They will also
increase transparency and build confidence in compliance with the Convention
(Pearson 2000).
The biological threat poses multifaceted challenges and, for this reason,
requires multifaceted solutions. So far, however, there is little agreement on how
to move forward to confront those threats. The different positions adopted by the
BWC’s State parties on this important issue can be grouped in the following
manner: Some States have abandoned any hope of strengthening the BWC
through the adoption of a verification mechanism. Some others still have hopes
that there is a chance of adopting some kind of verification mechanism, but after
important modifications of the current proposal included in the VEREX’sreport.
Others States now want to move on and build bridges between collective, treaty-
based mechanisms and other approaches, with the view of creating the
indispensable trust among State parties and the necessary conditions that allow
the consideration of a verification mechanism in the future. This third approach
could be a good one, in case that the first two approaches are considered
unacceptable by some State parties at this stage.
Due to the importance of the BWC, State parties should continue making all
necessary efforts to increase, step by step, trust among them and, based on the
trust reached, try to build a multilaterally verification mechanism acceptable to
all State parties.
Bioterrorism
The global threat of bioterrorism requires a global response that only the United
Nations can coordinate, and this approach has been recognised in the global
counterterrorism strategy adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
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September 2006 (Hatch 2007). The strategy adopted called for several biological
initiatives, including:
a) Mobilisation of biotechnology stakeholders to develop a program in order to
ensure that advances in biotechnology are not used for terrorist purposes;
b) Development, together with future OPBW’s Member States, of a single
comprehensive database on biological incidents;
c) Revitalisation of the Secretary General’s capabilities for investigating allegations
of the use of biological weapons.
11
The revitalisation of the Secretary General’s capabilities is one of the measures
already adopted, in order to enforce the ban on biological weapons. This
measure is very important because the BWC has no investigational mechanism
of its own that can be used for this purpose. In this regards, it is important to
single out that a core unit of experts (SIU) was established within the United
Nations Disarmament Department in order to mobilise additional scientific
expertise from both within and outside the United Nations system, when needed.
The SIU would assist the Secretary General in fulfilling its responsibilities
regarding the implementation of the BWC’s provisions and in the implementation of
the bioterrorism strategy. The activities to be carried out by the SIU are, among
others, the following:
a) How to achieve adequate transparency in dual-use activities;
b) Whether and how to set national and international standards for dual-use
research projects and develop mechanisms for advance review, approval and
monitoring of them;
c) How to define the directions of biological research that are most likely to
contribute broadly to human welfare;
d) How to concentrate global biotechnology resources with the purpose of
achieving established goals.
In addition to the above tasks, the SIU should prepare the procedures to be used
during the implementation of the Secretary General’s capabilities to investigate
alleged use of biological weapons by any State party.
Taking into account the situation around the BWC’s Protocol proposal on
verification perhaps should be interesting to consider the following idea: If an
appropriate BWC compliance regime is adopted by the State parties, then its
inspectorate could be established on the basis of any current United Nations’
biological investigation mechanism in place.
There are also other interesting possibilities that could be investigated: A
competent United Nations’investigational capability could be included in
the new international organisation to be established (OPBW), with the
objective of supervising the implementation of the BWC’s provisions, or
within the OPCW’s verification machinery, once all chemical weapons have
been destroyed.
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The OPBW can assume this responsibility in the most effective manner, once established.
J.M. Pedraza
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A major element in an effective verification regime is likely to be the monitoring
of dual-use biological facilities by maintaining a constant possibility of inspection,
with specified access required.
12
The OPCW’s verification mechanism, and the IAEA’s safeguards system,
including the Additional Protocol, properly modified to take care of the specificities
of the biological weapons, could be used also as reference mechanisms to develop
the BWC’s verification system.
Specific measures
If the establishment of the OPBW is an acceptable proposal for the BWC’s State
parties, then the new organisation should focus on the following activities, in
order to contribute to the overall regime for control of the hostile uses of the life
sciences:
1. To reach the universality of the BWC as soon as possible.
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2. To reach the universality of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as soon as possible.
3. To request the withdrawal, before the IX Conference of States Parties, of all
reservations presented by all BWC’s State parties to the Geneva Protocol of
1925.
4. To strengthen all international and national instruments in force in the field
of non-proliferation of biological weapons, including monitoring and
reporting.
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5. To establish a national authority in all State parties in order to ensure the full
implementation of the Convention’s provisions at national level. The national
authority established should act as the focal point for all activities related with
the implementation of the BWC’s provisions;
6. To prohibit the transfers of material and equipment considered sensitive
from the point of view of the BWC to any other State not parties of the
Convention;
7. To supervise the transference of material and equipment considered sensitive
from the point of view of the BWC among all State parties;
8. To promote the adoption of a code of ethic and a code of practices, with the
purpose of impeding the undue use of certain biological agents by scientists
working in biology and biotechnology in all State parties;
9. To promote the adoption of all necessary decisions to reinforce the trans-
formation of the BWC’s provisions into national legislation, with the purpose
of criminalising the execution of activities that violate the BWC’s provisions;
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The experience in the work of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC could be also very useful in this regards.
13
The universality of the BWC should go hand by hand with the universality of the CWC, in order to
ensure that no chemical and biological weapons are in the military arsenals of any State under any
circumstance.
14
In the absence of the OPBW, Annual Meetings of State Parties of the BWC should be supported. The
main purpose of these meetings is to review the implementation of the BWC’s provisions by all State
parties.
The Need to Establish the Organisation for the Prohibition...
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10. To promote public information dissemination related with the use of biological
agents as a weapon, with the purpose of increasing the awareness of the population
on the negative and long-term effects that the use of biological weapons could have;
11. To adopt counterterrorism intelligence measures with the purpose of avoiding
the use of biological weapons by terrorism groups;
12. To support the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board as an independent
panel of experts, with the purpose of providing scientific and technical advice
to the OPBW, to the Annual Meetings of State Parties, or to the Conference of
States Parties.
Conclusion
Compared with other multilateral treaties and agreements in the fields of non-
proliferation, disarmament and arms control, the BWC suffers from a lack of institutional
arrangement. Without any doubt, an independent and solid structure is needed with the
purpose of strengthening the BWC, to channel collective support for this relatively
fragile treaty regime and to enable State parties to work together more effectively in
keeping biological weapons outside military arsenals of all BWC’sStateparties.
The appropriate answer to overcome the lack of an institutional arrangement in
the field of biological weapons is the establishment of the OPBW, or as an
alternative, the designation of the OPCW to supervise the implementation of the
BWC’s provisions by all State parties in the future.
References
Ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a
scientific and technical standpoint; VEREX’s report, UBWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8; United Nations;
24 September 1993.
Bailey, K. C. (2002). Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. National Institute for Public Policy, October 2002, pp. 1–29.
Hatch Rosenberg, B. (2007). A counter bioterrorism strategy for the new UN Secretary General. The
Acronym Institute, Spring,1–12.
Lentzos, F. (2007). Ongoing monitoring for implementing the BWC. Disarmament Diplomacy, Summer
(85), 1–10.
Pearson, G. S. (2000). The protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is within reach. Arm Control
Today, 2000,1–7.
Sims, N. (2006). Strengthening structures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: options for
remedying the institutional deficit. Disarmament Forum, September, 17–26.
Text of the Biological Weapon Convention of 1972; p. 1–5.
Tulliu, S., & Schmalberger, T. (2003). Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arm Control,
Disarmament and Confidence-Building. UNIDIR /2003/22, 2003, pp. 1–240.
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, Weapon of Mass
Destruction Commission, final report, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006; pp. 1–227.
Jorge Morales Pedraza is now a Consultant on International Affairs and has a University Diploma in
Mathematic and another in Economy Sciences. He was diplomatic of his country with the rank of
Ambassador for more than 26 years and he was appointed as Ambassador and Permanent Representative
to the IAEA in the 1980s and to the OPCW in the 1990s.
J.M. Pedraza
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