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Elementos económicos de una propuesta de reforma en materia de federalismo fiscal en México
Abstract
The paper presents a summary of the theory of fiscal decentralization for a federal government. Possible applications of the theory to the case of Mexico are discussed. Finally, a reform consisting of a partial decentralization of the personal income tax is simulated.
... Algunos otros trabajos resaltan aspectos parciales del fenómeno como la dependencia de las entidades federativas y municipios o realizan ejercicios de simulación cuantitativa [Ibarra Salazar et. al., 1999y 2003. Finalmente se señalan los trabajos desde la perspectiva de la teoría política [Rodríguez, 1999;Acevedo García, 1987], que otorgan un predominio a este elemento [todos los anteriores en Soria, 2004]. ...
Se intenta determinar si las transferencias del Fondo de Aportaciones
para Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM) se distribuyen con criterios
compensatorios. Se utiliza la Encuesta nacional a presidentes
municipales, 2002, en un modelo GMM en dos etapas. Los resultados
econométricos sugieren que a pesar de existir redistribución, ésta
es débil y que el fondo podría compensar aún más. Es decir, en la
asignación de los recursos que reciben los municipios por parte de los
gobiernos estatales existe un espacio de discrecionalidad relacionado de
manera estadísticamente significativa con variables político-económico.
Asimismo, se encuentra que un determinante importante en la asignación de los recursos al interior del municipio es nuevamente la variable
población.
In this paper we examine a proposal to distribute the federal revenue sharing transfers, consisting in that every state maintain the coefficient of participation in the General Transfer Fund. In addition to avoiding the reduction in the coefficient of every state, with the modification of the distribution system, our proposal implies the elimination of the zero sum effect. In its operation, the proposed scheme requires additional monetary resources corresponding to a fixed proportion of the federal income from which the share to distribute is determined. In order to approach the viability of our proposal, we present ex-post (1991-1996) and ex-ante (1996-2001) simulations, taking as the reference year 1996.
This article tries to determine whether federal transfers called FISM are distributed in a redistributive manner. We use the Municipal Mayors National Survey (2002) in a two step- GMM model. Empirical results suggest that although these transfers are redistributive, there is still a discretionary room. That is these transfers could be more redistributive. The discretionary room is associated to population, which in turn is related with electoral vote. Thus, there is some political variable in the distribution of this Fund.
This paper examines the interplay of environmental policies with trade policies (tariffs) in a context of bilateral trade and imperfect competition.
The authors reconsider the literature on redistribution within a federation with mobile agents. They conclude that redistribution is a function best assigned to the national government; local governments with diverse preferences for redistribution distort individual migration decisions. The authors also examine the fiscal externality literature, which has made an efficiency argument for interregional transfers. They show that, if local governments have the same preferences for redistribution, the Nash equilibrium is efficient. If preferences are diverse, the authors show that nationally imposed interregional transfers do not address the source of the inefficiency. Nevertheless, interregional transfers are shown to be a part of decentralized behavior.