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Sur l'existence d'une solution kantienne du problème des biens collectifs
Abstract
On s'interroge, dans cet article, sur la signification et la portée de la solution dite kantienne du problème soulevé par l'inefficacité de la fourniture volontaire d'un bien collectif. Cette solution n'est, d'abord, pas authentiquement kantienne dans la mesure où elle se réduit à l'utilisation d'un argument de généralisation philosophiquement banal et néglige sans raison des aspects importants de la procédure de l'impératif catégorique. Ce kantisme " ordinaire ", de toute façon, ne convient plus dès que l'on abandonne l'hypothèse que les individus sont identiques. La cause en est qu'aucune norme morale ne peut, à elle seule, tenir parfaitement lieu de l'institution de coordination qui est nécessaire pour résoudre le problème des biens collectifs. Ni une variante, définie en termes de règles, de l'éthique parétienne ni le kantisme authentique ne peuvent remédier à cette situation. Tout au plus ce dernier peut-il apporter une contribution au bon fonctionnnement des institutions susceptibles de conduire à un résultat optimal telles que les procédures lindahliennes. /// This paper questions the meaning and scope of the so-called kantian solution of the problem raised by the inefficiency of the voluntary provision of a public good. First and foremost, this solution is not truly kantian since it generally amounts to the philosophically well worn generalisation argument and injustifiably disregards important characteristics of the categorical imperative procedure. Morover, in any case, this "everyday Kantianism" fails as soon as individuals are not assumed identical. In fact no moral norm on its own can function as a perfect substitute for the coordination institution which is required to solve the public good problem. Finally, neither a "rule-paretian" system of morality nor true kantianism can remedy the situation, although the latter may help to ensure the proper working of institutions specially designed to lead to efficient outcomes such as Lindahl-type processes.
... Cette hypothèse semble se diffuser et différents développements l'intègrent désormais (Laffont, 1975;Sen, 1975;Collard, 1978;Cornes et Sandler, 1984;Roemer, 1996;etc.). Ce succès pourrait selon Wolfelsperger (1999) provenir de la mention dans l'article fondateur de l'économie publique de Samuelson (1954) de la solution kantienne. ...
... Cependant, comme l'indique Wolfelsperger (1999), une telle solution au dilemme du prisonnier suppose de résoudre en fait deux questions distinctes. La première concerne l'existence d'une solution: en supposant que tout le monde assume l'universel dans ses préférences, peut-on caractériser la solution du jeu comme étant Pareto-optimale? ...
... En admettant que ce genre de modèle constitue une solution au dilemme du prisonnier, il ne s'agit pas vraiment d'une solution kantienne. La philosophie retenue et la conditionnalité du principe conduisent à qualifier ce cadre de kantisme au quotidien (« everyday kantianism », Elster, 1989Elster, , 1995, de kantisme ordinaire (Wolfelsperger, 1999), ou de principe d'engagement rationnel (Harsanyi, 1980) (7). Cette proposition n'est cependant pas la seule à avoir été formulée: deux autres approches se référant explicitement à Kant ont été proposées. ...
Kantian moral philosophy has become a reference sometimes invoked in economics as an example of a solution to the problem of co-ordinating agents. The present article provides a critical overview of the literature. Kantian economics refers to a set of principles that are more or less related to Kant's moral philosophy. The first in the set is the principle of generalization. It is the foundation of an ordinary Kantism. The distinction between the principle of generalization and the principle of reciprocity underscores the importance of the principle of unconditionality. Finally, the notion of commitment is closer to this philosophy, but used in a broader sense. It can give rise to different interpretations.
The Icelandic banking crisis provides a useful example of how the global economic downturn transformed into a domestic crisis and then transformed again into an international conflict. Rather than a strict economic analysis, discussion around the economic causes and potential cures surrounding the Icelandic banking crisis have been framed in terms of ethics. The analysis shows that ethical paradigms based on consequences, in line with Kant's hypothetical imperative, do not align well with categorical imperatives based on duty when considering international political conflicts. It is unclear that any accounting would have the potential to achieve reconciliation.
This paper tries to extend Sen's capability approach by introducing the issues of personal responsibility and collective capability, in addition to those of individual capability and collective responsibility. In addressing the issue of the subject's responsibility, we turn to the phenomenological tradition. This approach uses the concept of the person rather than that of the individual. In the analytical philosophy tradition the individual is defined by a set of freedoms and capabilities. The phenomenological approach, in contrast, views the person as embedded in a network of social relationships that determine a set of rights and obligations. In most situations, personal obligations have to be satisfied before the person can move on to satisfy his/her rights and freedoms. This means that freedom is viewed as being derived from responsibility, thus inversing the order of the capability approach. The subject's responsibility becomes fundamental, and a part of the 'richness' of the person. Responsibility expresses the capability to feel and be responsible, not only ex-post (i.e. once freedom has been exercised), but also ex-ante, by the capacity to exercise self-constraint on a voluntary basis in order to satisfy one's obligations towards others. Within his or her structure of capabilities, the person has to manage the twofold interacting sets of freedoms and responsibilities during the decision-making process. When we consider the person's agency, introducing responsibility leads, via commitment and social interactions, to a stronger vision of agency. However, this vision, which includes responsibility and social interactions, generates a collective capability that can be represented by a structure composed of the various personal capability structures.
The prisoners' dilemma game stands as a seminal case of the conflict between individual and collective rationality. Some scholars have suggested that Kantian duty-based ethics can prevent the suboptimal outcomes associated with the game. I argue that this claim is too strong, because Kant's moral theory does not entail specific duties requiring cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games. I support this argument in terms of Kant's categorical imperative, and also with reference to his distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Eastern Economic Journal (2009) 35, 137–143. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.20
We examine, both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good, some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct. The notion of morality considered captures the intuition (often attributed to Kant) that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized. We propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategy sets and their preferences. We show that it is easy to find examples of games in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the only existing ‘Kantian’ code of conduct leads to a Pareto-inefficient outcome. We then more specifically examine the issues of existence and Pareto-efficiency of Kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a public good. We find in this context that there is no conflict between morality and Pareto-efficiency since any Kantian norm of behavior is Pareto-efficient. We also prove the existence of a Kantian norm of individual contribution.
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