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Abstract
Most nations have experienced an internal armed conflict since 1960. Yet while civil war is central to many nations' development, it has stood at the periphery of economics research and teaching. The past decade has witnessed a long overdue explosion of research into war's causes and consequences. We summarize progress, identify weaknesses, and chart a path forward. Why war? Existing theory is provocative but incomplete, omitting advances in behavioral economics and making little progress in key areas, like why armed groups form and cohere, or how more than two armed sides compete. Empirical work finds that low per capita incomes and slow economic growth are both robustly linked to civil war. Yet there is little consensus on the most effective policies to avert conflicts or promote postwar recovery. Cross-country analysis of war will benefit from more attention to causal identification and stronger links to theory. We argue that micro-level analysis and case studies are also crucial to decipher war's causes, conduct, and consequences. We bring a growth theoretic approach to the study of conflict consequences to highlight areas for research, most of all the study of war's impact on institutions. We conclude with a plea for new and better data. ( JEL D72, D74, O17)
... The incidence of violent conflict has undergone clear fluctuations in recent history, which would suggest that the intensity of refugee migration, rather than increasing at a linear pace, has shown variations over time as well. The number of civil wars, for example, increased significantly in the second half of the twentieth century and peaked in the early 1990s (Blattman and Miguel 2010;Fearon and Laitin 2003). Approximately 30 percent of sub-Saharan African countries experienced a civil war in the 1990s. ...
... There are also indications that the geography of refugee migrations has shifted. First, civil wars are increasingly concentrated in a limited number of lower-income countries that experience recurrent cycles of war (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Afghanistan, Burundi, and Sudan are notable examples of countries engulfed in this "conflict trap" (Collier and Sambani 2002). ...
... and 2018, which seems to reflect an increase in civil wars in the 1990s (Blattman and Miguel 2010) after the end of the Cold War. The 1990s was a particularly volatile decade with insurgencies arising in various countries, such as Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia. ...
This paper studies the long-term evolution of global refugee migration, with a particular emphasis on the post-World War II period. We use the UNHCR Population Statistics Database to explore the intensity as well as the geographical spread and distance of refugee migrations at a global, regional, and country level between 1951 and 2018. The analyses refute the idea that there has been a substantial and linear increase in the intensity of global refugee migration. Moreover, problems with coverage and quality of earlier data give reason to think that levels of past refugee migration were underestimated. Apparent increases in the global number of displaced are mainly driven by the recent inclusion of other populations (such as the internally displaced and people in “refugee-like” situations) and countries that were previously excluded from statistics. Yet the analyses reveal several geographical shifts in refugee migration over the past decades. Refugees tend to come from a shrinking number of origin countries and go to an increasing number of destination countries. This trend reflects an overall long-term global decline in the levels of violent conflict and a concentration of recurrent conflict cycles in a few particular states. The average distance between origin and residence countries has increased over time, although the vast majority of refugees continue to stay near origin countries. Refugee populations continue to be concentrated in countries with low to medium GDP levels, and there has not been a major increase in South-North refugee migration.
... Reduced social control due to increasing population size may also contribute to other forms of deviance (e.g., corruption), which are expected to require an expansion of the government (more police, establishment of anti-corruption agencies etc.) as a countermeasure, leading to a positive association between population and government size. Finally, population size is a strong positive predictor of domestic conflict such as civil war (for a review, see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and terrorism (for a review, see Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). For instance, increases in population size may result in more conflict by exacerbating resource scarcity, distributional conflicts or environmental degradation (e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Brückner, 2010). ...
... Finally, population size is a strong positive predictor of domestic conflict such as civil war (for a review, see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and terrorism (for a review, see Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). For instance, increases in population size may result in more conflict by exacerbating resource scarcity, distributional conflicts or environmental degradation (e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Brückner, 2010). In turn, increased risk of violent conflict can be expected to increase government size, as grievances may have to be met with higher public spending on social policies (education, health, social security etc.) (e.g., Taydas and Peksen, 2012) or with more public spending on security, the police and the military in order to suppress conflict. ...
... Here, it is a priori unclear whether the effect of population size on government size is more or less pronounced in richer economies. On the one hand, richer countries tend to be less affected by violent conflict (e.g., civil wars; see Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Thus, richer countries may have to devote fewer resources to anti-conflict measures as their populations grow, so that the effect of population size on government size may become weaker as the level of economic development increases. ...
We examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies).
... Greater income inequality has been associated with higher risks of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Civil wars seem more likely when state wealth is easily appropriated or divorced from the citizenry, as with some naturalresource wealth and foreign aid flows (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Excessive inequality may motivate the poor to engage in illegal activities, or at least divert resources from productive uses. ...
... We also checked the data and these points are not the individual outlier countries. Hoeffler, 2004;Fearon and Laitin, 2003;Sambanis, 2005;Fearon, 2008;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Esteban and Ray, 2011). Higher quality of institutions is associated with lower income inequality (in line with Parcero and Papyrakis, 2016) and lower risk of civil war and conflict (in line with Caselli andTesei, 2016, Musayev, 2014). ...
... This holds when we control for inequality. We find that higher inequality is associated with higher conflict, in line with the literature (i.e., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;Fearon and Laitin, 2003;Sambanis, 2005;Fearon, 2008;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Esteban and Ray, 2011). ...
How does high dependence on natural resources affect income inequality? Surprisingly little is known about the impact of high dependence on primary goods on income distribution. Building on insights from the resource curse literature, this paper studies the relationship between income shocks through changes in commodity prices and income inequality in a panel of 80 countries from 1990 to 2016. We analyze differentiated effects of commodity price shocks depending on the type of commodity (labor vs. capital-intensive). We also study differences across world regions and explore potential mechanisms by looking at different types of inequality (pay vs. capital rents). Results show that commodity price shocks have an impact on income inequality. However, this impact depends on the type of commodity and inequality
... However, in many cases, maintaining quality education during a conflict is extremely difficult, and efforts by the central government to rebuild education have not been as successful as expected. Cross-country empirical research confirms the impact of a wide range of conflicts on human capital [1,2]. All experiences caused by conflict, including physical destruction [3], housing destruction [4], or forced displacement [5] have negatively impacted various forms of education, which has sometimes resulted in low school enrollment [6] and attainment [7], while also lowering test scores of students even enrolled in school [6,8]. ...
... While resilience is often discussed in terms of visible behavioral and neurobiological concepts, Masten [32] finds that resilience is evident in the cultural practices of individuals and communities. 1 Mothers in the community play a critical role in providing support to schools such as supervision of students and social-emotional guidance [33]. Teachers and parents serve as the foundation for community change by facilitating interactions that foster creativity, collaboration, and responsibility [34]. ...
... The Conflict Catalog by Peter Brecke (1999) is the source used for large-scale conflicts, which are conflicts with more than 32 casualties.It is not the only data source which covers the entire period studied here, but it has the advantage that it includes all major conflicts both among and within countries. Other datasets, such as the UNDP/PRIO database, only include conflicts with more than 1000 casualties (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Another high quality alternative data source is the Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), ...
... The literature also suggests that there is a negative relationship between civil wars and GDP per capita; Blattman and Miguel (2010) estimate that in the period 1960-2006 the incidence of civil war is highest (almost 30%) for the poorest countries and lowest (close to zero) for the richest countries. This negative link is a recent development, however. ...
Personal security is a very important component of the standard of living. Security is not only
reduced by deficient health or poverty – on which separate chapters are included in this volume – but also
by serious crimes and by war and other large-scale conflicts. These are potentially important threats to
personal security of human beings, hence recent trends of homicide rates, for example, have received great
attention in the general public (UNOCD, 2011). Other threats to personal health and life cannot be studied
with consistent definition. For example, consistent evidence on terrorism, environmental hazards or
accidents at the workplace are not available for the 19th and early 20th century – at least not on a global
scale.
... Therefore, the analysis of economic consequences of violent political conflict and instabilities has been attracting increasing attention from science in recent years. Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide a comprehensive review of the existing economic literature on this topic. Impacts of price shocks and volatility on the well-being of the most vulnerable parts of a population depends on many factors (FAO, 2011). ...
... We address the question of whether and to what extent varying degrees of intensity of political conflict affect the volatility of food prices, that is, whether and to what extent they create uncertainty in markets for basic consumption goods. We therefore contribute to the developing literature which assesses the economic effects of political conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). ...
Political instabilities and violent political conflict have in recent years risen substantially throughout the world. Especially in the Middle East and North Africa they have grown to decisive factors permanently challenging the livelihoods of millions. We assess whether and to what extent varying intensities of conflict impact economic activity in Palestine which has been subject to substantial violent political conflict for decades. In particular, we analyse the relationship between various intensity levels of political instability measured by conflict-caused fatalities and uncertainty of weekly food prices in the West Bank between 2004 and 2011 using a GARCH model. We consider four food commodities covering vegetables, fruits and animal products. Banana and milk prices are found not to show clustered volatility while onion and pear prices do. The impact of varying conflict intensities on weekly average prices appears to be modest. This might suggest that effects happen on a temporally and geographically more disaggregated scale.
... Other studies employ the unified growth model (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002). Using experience from WWII (Tilly, 1975;Dunne et al., 2005;Blattman and Miguel, 2010) show that in the long-run wars can creates positive externalities like technological development through sophisticated military training and creates a skillful workforce that paves way for strong institutions and thus contribute to rapid development. ...
This study investigates the spatial effects of armed conflict on Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) economic growth, focusing on Central Africa, East Africa, and West Africa. Utilizing Spatial Durblin Model (SDM), the analysis reveals significant spatial effects of armed conflict intensity, indicating that conflict in neighboring countries influences conflict levels within a focal country. The study finds a weak or inconclusive relationship between GDP per capita (GDPpc) and conflict intensity, with East Africa showing a significant negative association, suggesting that higher economic prosperity in neighboring countries may mitigate conflict. Conversely, higher corruption levels in Central and West Africa are positively associated with increased conflict intensity, highlighting corruption’s destabilizing influence. Spatial lag SDM results suggest potential benefits of regional economic cooperation in reducing conflict intensity. Moreover, significant positive spatial autocorrelation underscores the interconnected nature of conflict within SSA, with West Africa exhibiting more pronounced spatial spillover effect. Findings from Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) models confirm the weak association between GDPpc and conflict intensity but emphasize the consistent positive association between corruption and conflict intensity. Additionally, the Spatial Error Model (SEM) reaffirms corruption’s detrimental impact on governance and stability. Additionally, the hypothesis of a significant difference in the effect of armed conflict across different SSA subregions is supported, with Central Africa experiencing the strongest negative impact on economic growth, followed by East and West Africa. The study highlights substantial regional heterogeneity in the economic consequences of armed conflict, emphasizing the need for regionally tailored policy interventions to address conflict-related economic disruptions in SSA.
... very year, tens of millions of individuals and families are forcibly displaced by armed conflict, creating enormous humanitarian, social and economic costs 1,2 . Recent estimates indicate that the number of people living in proximity to conflict has doubled since 2007 3 . ...
Nearly 50 million people globally have been internally displaced due to conflict, persecution and human rights violations. However, the study of internally displaced persons—and the design of policies to assist them—is complicated by the fact that these people are often underrepresented in surveys and official statistics. We develop an approach to measure the impact of violence on internal displacement using anonymized high-frequency mobile phone data. We use this approach to quantify the short- and long-term impacts of violence on internal displacement in Afghanistan, a country that has experienced decades of conflict. Our results highlight how displacement depends on the nature of violence. High-casualty events, and violence involving the Islamic State, cause the most displacement. Provincial capitals act as magnets for people fleeing violence in outlying areas. Our work illustrates the potential for non-traditional data sources to facilitate research and policymaking in conflict settings.
... Les conflits civils et les guerres concernent un grand nombre de pays depuis les années 1960 puisque 20 % des nations ont connu au moins 10 ans de guerre civile (Blattman et Miguel [2010]). Ce sont ainsi les pays en développement et, particulièrement, plusieurs pays du Moyen-Orient qui sont touchés par les guerres civiles à répétition mais aussi par des instabilités politiques, ces deux phénomènes étant susceptibles d'avoir des répercussions négatives sur l'évolution de la croissance économique. ...
This paper displays the war and political instabilities impact on the rate of the GDP
growth concerning fifteen Middle-East countries and particularly Lebanon during the
period of 1970-2013. It analyses the asymmetries in the variation of the rate of GDP
growth of these fifteen countries and estimates endogenously a threshold of growth
from which the political instabilities or war enhance two levels of impact on GDP
growth. In this paper, we show that the economies of the fifteen countries go quickly
from recession regime to growth regime and that the threshold of growth is seen to be
high. This phenomenon concerns Lebanon specially that records also a certain resilience since its GDP evolution, which is very erratic notably during the civil war of
1975-1990, returns towards its long-run value rapidly after an exogenous shock.
... These factors are often captured under the umbrella term 'informal institutions' and relate to so-called 'prosocial preferences', thus the inclination to behave in the best interest of other individuals (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1995). As argued by Blattman & Miguel (2010) and Wood (2008), enhancing our understanding of the impact of wartime violence on these institutional and social processes is key for our understanding of a society's postwar recovery and transformation. Persistent parochial preferences (i.e. ...
We study changes in inter-and intra-ethnic trust in Rwanda. We focus on the impact of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, which is a case of group-selective violence marked by a clear perpetrator-and victim-group as well as within-group variation with respect to exposure to violence. In our empirical analysis, we rely on more than 400 individual life histories in which intra-and inter-ethnic trust were systematically ranked for all life history years. Overall, we find that, while intra-ethnic trust remains largely unchanged, inter-ethnic trust decreases with the onset of violence and sharply so for those targeted in the genocide. Inter-ethnic trust gradually recovers over time. Only a subset of the victim-group, namely those with the highest probability of individual physical exposure to violence, portray signs of continued outgroup mistrust, 17 years after the genocide. Our results suggest that taking into account the element of time, establishing a fine-grained differentiation of the relevant in-and outgroups in the conflict, as well as identifying the level of exposure to violence, are necessary steps to better understand the impact of political violence on trust. Regarding theory, our findings further qualify what is known about the twofold theoretical foundation of trust relationships, namely that changes in interpersonal trust reside in altered personal predispositions due to traumatic experiences and/or evolving experiences of trustworthiness in social interaction.
... We further suggest that such quasi experimental settings can be useful in teasing out causality in the civil conflict literature. This can be particularly useful in the civil conflict literature which is rife with both specification and endogeneity problems (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). ...
In this paper, we use machine learning to show that conflict is path-dependent. This confirms scientifically what has hitherto been anecdotal speculation or indirect inference. We then develop a mathematical model to explore one possible pathway that explains the persistence of conflict once it starts. There are three types of cultures in a boundedly rational population of State Actors and Insurgents, peaceable, warring, and bargainers. The distribution of these types is different in each population. Evolutionary dynamics determine which of these three cultures might predominate. Our simulations suggest that it is rational for people to learn to be warlike even in environments where state actors are willing to give large side payments to "buy" peace to avoid bargaining failure, and where both state actors and insurgents are extremely patient and therefore are potentially committed to peace deals. This suggests that cultural learning can be a hitherto ignored explanation for why conflict is path-dependent. Culture and social institutions are inseparable. Our analysis, therefore, places culture as an important factor in the study of the effects of institutions and public choice on war and peace.
... Finally, we contribute to work on ethnic conflict in developing countries (see Blattman and Miguel [2010] for a summary), and we do so in two ways. First, we construct a novel dyadic dataset, which includes information on the ethnic identity and ancestral characteristics of all actors involved in an ethnic civil conflict. ...
This paper examines the role of ethnic-based gender norms in explaining the occurrence and intensity of sexual violence in conflict. We generate a novel dyadic dataset that contains information on the ethnic identity of the actors involved in 33 ethnic civil conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2009 and their use of sexual violence. After exploiting ancestral economic, family, and societal arrangements, we construct and validate an ethnic-based gender inequality index. We control for a large set of fixed effects and find empirical support for two interrelated hypotheses. First, gender-unequal armed actors are more likely to be perpetrators of sexual violence. Second, we consider the perpetrator's gender norms relative to the victim's. Applying a gravity approach, we find that sexual violence is driven by a specific clash of conceptions on the appropriate role of men and women in society: sexual violence increases when the perpetrator is more gender-unequal than the victim. We show that (i) these patterns are specific to sexual violence and do not explain general violence within a conflict; (ii) differences in other dimensions of culture unrelated to gender do not explain conflict-related sexual violence.
... 8 Our model shares some similarities with Besley and Persson (2010) who study why weak states are often plagued by civil disorder which reinforce low investments in legal and fiscal capacity. 9 In focussing on foreign aid and conflict, our paper relates to Dube and Naidu 7 See the survey by Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an overview of the literature on civil wars. 8 They argue that the main routes that link poverty and civil war are low repressive capabilities resulting from weak armies and bad road connectivity. ...
Nepal has seen a significant reduction in poverty over the period 1995–2010 which encompasses the decade-long Maoist-led civil war. So was the post-conflict provision of economic resources to districts related to their involvement in promoting the Maoist cause? We tackle this question combining theory and empirics. Our model predicts that poorer districts are more likely to support the Maoists and in return they get promised economic gains conditional on the Maoists prevailing post-conflict. Combining data on conflict with consumption expenditure data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey and data on foreign aid, we test these predictions. Our panel data estimates and our cross-sectional analysis consistently find strong support for our hypotheses. These are confirmed by the IV analysis that we perform at the panel level.
... Historical and macroeconomic approaches have focused on mutual reinforcement mechanisms at the national level (Tilly 1975;Besley and Persson 2011). A recent body of microeconomic studies has studied the consequences of exposure to combat and violence (Voors et al. 2012;Jha and Wilkinson 2012;Bauer et al. 2016), but has not been able to address the effects of institutional processes and changes -beyond those related to the exercise of violence -that take place in conflict zones (Blattman and Miguel 2010;Balcells and Justino 2014). An emerging literature in political science on 'rebel governance' has started to produce evidence on the forms of local governance, economies, and institutions that emerge in armed conflict (Arjona et al. 2015), but knowledge about the lasting impacts of these forms of governance is hitherto very limited. ...
... It is generally assumed that societies that experience high-levels of violence suffer from weak social capital (Blattman and Miguel 2010;Cassar et al. 2013;Grosjean 2014), and that social transformation requires an increase in the density of social ties (Colletta and Cullen 2000;De Luca and Verpoorten 2015). The World Development Report 2011, for example, considers the destruction of social capital to be one of the costs of violence and advocates for community-driven development programs in order to reconstruct social capital and strengthen social cohesion, especially in areas affected by conflict (World Bank 2011). ...
Research and policy circles often emphasize the importance of social capital in achieving social transformation and economic development. There is also, however, potentially a ‘dark side’ to social capital. This study investigates the relationship between two different types of social capital—structural and cognitive—using two different measures of political violence: self-reported support for political violence and self-reported participation in political violence. We theorized that cognitive social capital will facilitate social cohesion within a community, enabling particularized trust between neighbours and a shared identity. On the other hand, structural social capital, or associational membership, potentially facilitates the diffusion of grievances and facilitates collective mobilization. Accordingly, we predict that higher levels of structural social capital will be associated with support for and participation in political violence, whilst higher levels of cognitive social capital will be associated with less support for and participation in political violence. We then test these predictions using Afrobarometer data on 40,455 individuals living in 27 African countries. Multivariate regression analysis confirms that indicators of structural and cognitive social capital have contrasting relationships with support for and participation in political violence. While particularized trust and national identity are negatively associated with political violence, religious and community associational membership are positively associated with political violence. In addition, we find that strength of attachment to a social identity, regardless of whether to an ethnic or national identity, is an important indicator of political violence.
... Other publications taken into consideration deal with the economic aspects of civil war and separatism (Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol, 2008;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Cederman et al., 2015). They investigate the causality between civil war and poverty, religion, or education. ...
The aim of this study is to contribute to the theory of exogenous economic shocks and their equivalents in an attempt to explain business cycle fluctuations, which still do not have a clear explanation. To this end the author has developed an econometric model based on a regression analysis. Another objective is to tackle the issue of hybrid threats, which have not yet been subjected to a cross-disciplinary research. These were reviewed in terms of their economic characteristics in order to complement research in the fields of defence and security.
Keywords: hybrid threats, business cycle, economic growth, hybrid wars
JEL Classification: H56, F52, E66, P47, C12
... It is associated with a variety of direct and indirect effects strongly affecting living conditions of households during and after conflict (Justino, 2011). The directly observable consequences can be catastrophic, the impact felt years after the end of conflict and often borne unequally across the population (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003;Justine, 2005;Murthy and Lakshminarayana, 2006;Lai, 2007;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Buvinic et al., 2012;León, 2012;Kecmanovic, 2012;Ali, 2013). ...
The armed conflict in Northern Uganda led to a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). After the government announced the declaration of free movement on 30 October 2006, a large number of IDPs left camps. Transition from camp life to post‐camp life has important implications for population well‐being. This paper uses the Ugandan National Household Survey conducted in 2005‐2006 and 2009‐2010 and a difference‐in‐differences method to estimate changes in IDPs' well‐being measured by self‐reported heath as well as household food consumption. We do not find a significant effect of leaving camps on self‐reported illness and household food consumption but we find a significant effect on the choice of healthcare providers utilised. The postcamp effect was estimated to increase the use of non‐free health providers, an effect composed of more visits to informal providers and greater choice of formal private providers, when formal providers are utilised. Those findings shed light on policy‐relevant issues in the areas of land rights, recovery of public health systems and gender inequalities in well‐being.
... In 2016, at least 357 million children (one child in six globally) were living in conflict-affected states, and the number had been steadily rising since the 2000s (Bahgat et al., 2017). Conflicts and exposure to violence can have devastating effects on children's education, health, and overall well-being, with long-term repercussions on children's life course outcomes, as well as on the next generation (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014;Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone, & Osili, 2017;Blattman & Miguel, 2010;Justino, Leone, & Salardi, 2014;Shemyakina, 2011). ...
This study relies on a unique precrisis baseline and five-year follow-up to investigate the effects of emergency school feeding and generalised food distribution (GFD) on children’s schooling during conflict in Mali. It estimates programme impact on child enrolment, absenteeism, and attainment by using a difference in differences weighted estimator. School feeding led to increases in enrolment by 10 percentage points and to around an additional half-year of completed schooling. Attendance among boys in households receiving GFD, however, declined by about 20 per cent relative to the comparison group. Disaggregating by conflict intensity showed that receipt of any food assistance led to a rise in enrolment mostly in high-intensity conflict areas and that the negative effects of GFD on attendance were also concentrated in the most affected areas. School feeding mostly raised attainment among children in areas not in the immediate vicinity of conflict. Programme receipt triggered adjustments in child labour. School feeding led to lower participation and time spent in work among girls, while GFD raised children’s labour, particularly among boys. The educational implications of food assistance should be considered in planning humanitarian responses to bridge the gap between emergency assistance and development by promoting children’s education.
... Втората група публикации, които ще бъдат разгледани, са свързани с икономическите аспекти на гражданските войни и сепаратизма (Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol, 2008;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Cederman et al., 2015). В тези публикации като причина за възникването на конфликта се предполага корелацията между избухването на гражданската война и бедността, религията или образованието. ...
Целта на изследването е да обогати теорията за екзогенните икономически шокове и техните разновидности. По този начин
ще могат да се обяснят флуктуации на бизнес-цикъла, които в настоящия момент нямат категорично обяснение. Изведен е иконометричен модел в резултат на извършен регресионен анализ. На следващо място се допълва и материята за хибридните заплахи, които все още не са добре изследвани интердисциплинарно. Представен е икономическият поглед
върху тях, с цел да бъдат надградени изследванията в областта на сигурността и отбраната.
Ключови думи: хибридни заплахи, бизнес цикъл, икономически
растеж, хибридни войни.
JEL: H56, F52, E66, P47, C12.Ножаров, Щ. (2019). Хибридните заплахи като екзогенен икономически шок, сп. Народностопански архив, бр.4, стр.23-33
EBSCO Accession Number: 139480859
http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=e1b1d178-baec-4c42-bf6e-3e0376ff36cc%40sessionmgr101&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=139480859&db=bsu
... The sizable literature on the impact of military conflicts on macroeconomic outcomes provides mixed evidence concerning the negative short-run consequences of conflicts on economic growth, per capita income, exports, and external debt (Collier, 1999;Stewart et al., 2001) and also on the positive effects on economic growth leadership, managerial and organizational skills that are seen in the aftermath of war (Koubi, 2005;Bellows and Miguel, 2009;Miguel and Roland, 2011;Coupe and Obrizan, 2016a). There is a growing body of literature that studies the microeconomics of conflicts (Verwimp et al., 2018) where the analysis of microdata gives evidence of a negative, long-run impact of armed conflicts on health, education, and labor market outcomes of war veterans, the internally displaced population, and others directly affected by military violence (Ghobarah et al., 2003;Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Kondylis, 2010;Miller and Rasmussen, 2010;Calderón-Mejía et al., 2015). This paper estimates a contemporaneous impact of military violence on civilians' well-being, using micro-level individual survey data to study the case of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. ...
This paper investigates the contemporaneous effect of conflict on civilians living outside of the conflict zone. Applying a multi-dimensional concept of well-being, it uses two large household surveys over 2012–2016 to analyze how the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war affected the financial well-being and health of people in both countries. We find that the conflict significantly worsened financial well-being in both countries. The impact mostly operates by worsening expectations about financial well-being and is inversely related to the distance from the conflict zone. Our analysis indicates an increase in chronic diseases in Ukraine over a longer period. Mental health is negatively impacted in both countries at the earlier stages of the conflict. However, in Russia this effect is significant only in the region bordering the conflict zone, while in Ukraine it is significant in regions farther away from the conflict zone.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has caused harm, leading to loss of life and homes being destroyed. These tragic consequences have impacted all levels of society and sparked economic outrage. When evaluating the aftermath of the conflict, it is crucial to recognize the role played by media platforms like Twitter in amplifying the effects on individuals and communities. The widespread influence of Twitter directly influences consumers and their behaviors. Researchers have employed sentiment analysis to study the messages shared on Twitter within market contexts and the global economy. This analysis is valuable for understanding people's viewpoints on subjects or incidents. In a study, researchers examined a dataset comprising 27,926 tweets gathered between 20 February 2022, and 19 February 2023. The study aimed to highlight how the invasion impacted sectors and regions regarding conditions alongside related sanctions. The conclusions drawn from this research hold implications for business sectors, markets, and their functioning. Furthermore, it offers insights into how the public perceives the ongoing war, which has academic and industrial ramifications of its own. The manuscript explores computational methods used to analyze sentiment on Twitter, uncovering the complex interplay between consumer actions and social media within the Russian–Ukraine conflict.
Climate change impacts on the social–ecological conditions that communities depend on may increase the vulnerabilities to new conflicts. Yet, the communities that will be most impacted by climate change, as noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are already conflict‐affected communities. Here, we present the results of a systematic review of quantitative and qualitative studies (n = 212) in Spanish and English on the climate–conflict relationship. We found that most studies are focused on a direct relationship between climate change and violent conflict, and there has been less attention on a contextual or indirect relationship in already conflict‐affected communities. Studies on this contextual or indirect relationship suggest a climate change–conflict cycle that is negatively reinforcing, whereby violent conflict increases climate change vulnerability and feedback from climate change increases violent conflict vulnerability. While limited in number, such studies provide important insights enabling further conceptual development and empirical examination of how climate impacts interact with violent conflict, and how governance efforts can simultaneously support peacebuilding and climate change adaptation. Drawing this work together with the latest frameworks in conflict studies and adaptation, we sketch out a promising synthetic agenda, focusing on how to design policies and projects that build synergistic capacities and address cumulative and interactive impacts of climate change and violent conflict. Without such insight, efforts to treat climate and conflict in parallel may be ineffective or even counterproductive, worsening violent conflict and, in turn, further reducing the capacities of communities to build peace and resilience.
Political instability in developing countries can be detrimental to the business environment. I examine how a sudden end to instability affected businesses in Haiti from 1905 to 1927. In 1915, after a tumultuous 4 years that saw seven different men serve as president, US Marines landed in Haiti and ended the conflict. Using new data on foreign-owned businesses operating in Haiti, I show that the number of foreign businesses increased rapidly after the end of instability. I present evidence that the businesses responded to lower uncertainty and increased trust in who held the executive power.
In this paper, I study the causal relationship between violence and human capital accumulation. Due to a power vacuum left in conflict zones of Colombia after the 2016 peace agreement, large spikes in violence were reported in the municipalities of the country dominated by the rebel group FARC. I compare student test scores in municipalities that experienced the increase in violence to the ones that did not, before and after the national peace agreement. I find that a 10% increase in the homicide rate reduces average high school test scores by approximately 0.03 standard deviations. However, this impact is greater in the case of poor students who suffered a reduction of about 0.1 standard deviations per subject area, equivalent to 3.3 percentage points out of the final score. I also consider heterogeneity by gender finding a slightly larger negative impact on female students. This disparate effect on women and on the poorest students adds new evidence to the literature on the effects of armed conflict on learning outcomes.
How does terrorism affect child mortality? We use geo‐coded data on terrorism and spatially disaggregated data on child mortality to study the relationship between both variables for 52 African countries between 2000 and 2017 at the 0.5 × 0.5° grid level. Our estimates suggest that moderate increases in terrorism are linked to several thousand additional annual deaths of children under the age of five. A panel event‐study points to economic effects that are larger and compound over time. Interrogating our data, we show that the direct impact of terrorism tends to be very small. Instead, we theorize that terrorism causes child mortality primarily by triggering adverse behavioral responses by parents, medical workers, and policymakers. We provide tentative evidence in support of this argument.
This paper analyses the impact of the 2002–2011 period of instability in Côte d'Ivoire on child health. It uses two rounds of DHS surveys (1998–1999 and 2011–2012) and geo‐referenced data on conflict event locations, which gives more precise estimates of the effects of conflict on child welfare. Regressions using both spatial and temporal variations of conflict events across birth cohorts show a negative association between proximity to conflict events and child height‐for‐age z‐score. The study also suggests that maternal stress and disruptions of healthcare services are possible channels through which conflict affects child wellbeing.
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.
The Arab Spring (AS) marked an unprecedented event in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and it generated political and economic uncertainties and triggered violent conflicts and political rifts. This paper empirically examines the short-run and long-run effects of the AS on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the MENA region and to individual MENA countries. The empirical analysis is implemented through the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel models, using different empirical specifications. The benchmark results show that the AS has led to important reductions in FDI inflows to the MENA region. A more detailed empirical analysis reveals significant variations in the AS effects on FDI inflows across MENA countries and it underscores distinct patterns over different time periods. These findings imply that governments in the MENA region are required to maintain political stability, and to adopt distinctive policies that lessen the adverse implications of the AS and that set favorable conditions for FDI inflows in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era.
En diferentes contextos se ha podido identificar que la exposición a la violencia durante una guerra civil influye en la participación política de los individuos. Esta investigación se cuestiona si debido al periodo de reducción de violencia durante el proceso de paz en Colombia existió una relación entre haber sido afectado por la violencia derivada del conflicto armado y la participación política. A partir de las encuestas del Barómetro de las Américas de 2011, 2016 y 2018 se realiza un análisis de cómo la afectación individual de la violencia influye en la participación electoral —votación a elecciones presidenciales— y la participación no electoral —asistencia a cabildo abierto y protesta pública—. Es posible señalar que en un periodo de reducción de la violencia hay una relación positiva entre ser afectado por la violencia y los mecanismos de participación no electoral, razón por la cual los mecanismos de participación que construyen visiones de grupo y que garantizan reivindicaciones locales tienen mayor relevancia para las personas afectadas por la guerra.
Despite its invaluable contribution to the field of comparative economics, the socialist calculation debate has focused on the narrow topic of the impossibility of the rational economic calculation under socialism. The literature on new institutional economics suggests that economic development is determined by economic and political institutions which are far more complex than the issue of economic calculation. To bridge the gap between the calculation debate and new institutional economics, this paper utilizes the historical case studies of Perestroika and Deng's China to demonstrate relationship between state capacity and economic calculation. We argue that rational economic calculation requires the state's institutional ability to make a credible commitment to constraints inhibiting public predation.
The extension of voting rights epitomizes the construction of modern democracies. This paper empirically investigates the effect of such an enfranchisement on political violence in the context of the US Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, which forbade discrimination in voting. The formula the VRA used to determine the counties it applied to generated both geographic and temporal local discontinuities in enfranchisement. This paper’s empirical strategy takes advantage of these features by comparing the evolution of political violence in geographically close covered and non-covered counties. Difference-in-differences estimates indicate that VRA coverage halved the incidence and the onset of political violence. Additional empirical evidence implies that voting became the new institutionalized way to state political preferences. Indeed, VRA coverage mostly decreased electoral and small-scale strategic violence. This result is not explained by disaggrievement. Extensions suggest that new strategies of political action may explain a decrease in violence after enfranchisement.
Developed democracies proliferated over the past two centuries during an unprecedented era of economic growth, which may be ending. Macroeconomic forecasts predict slowing growth throughout the twenty-first century for structural reasons such as ageing populations, shifts from goods to services, slowing innovation, and debt. Long-run effects of COVID-19 and climate change could further slow growth. Some sustainability scientists assert that slower growth, stagnation or de-growth is an environmental imperative, especially in developed countries. Whether slow growth is inevitable or planned, we argue that developed democracies should prepare for additional fiscal and social stress, some of which is already apparent. We call for a ‘guided civic revival’, including government and civic efforts aimed at reducing inequality, socially integrating diverse populations and building shared identities, increasing economic opportunity for youth, improving return on investment in taxation and public spending, strengthening formal democratic institutions and investing to improve non-economic drivers of subjective well-being.
Despite informality being the norm in conflict-affected countries, most estimates of the impact of conflict on economic activity rely on formal sector data. Using high-frequency data from Afghanistan, this paper assesses how surges in conflict intensity affect not only the formal sector, but also informal and illicit activities. Nighttime light provides a proxy for aggregate economic activity, mobile phone traffic by registered firms captures fluctuations in formal sector output, and the land surface devoted to poppy cultivation gives a measure of illicit production. The unit of observation is the district and the period of reference is 2012–2016. The results show that an increase in conflict-related casualties has a strong negative impact on formal economic activity in the following quarter and a positive effect on illicit activity after two quarters. The impact on aggregate economic activity is negative, but more muted.
In this paper, we investigate the nexus between ethnicity and violent conflict in the Congo. We make three interlocking arguments. First, we argue that ethnicity is a defining political resource in the Congo's politics and violent conflicts, which we call 'ethnic capital'. Second, we argue that the high political value of this ethnic capital is sustained by engrained discourses and practices of ethnicity. These discourses and practices permeate the Congo's political order, shape people's understanding of politics, conflict and political identities , and have contributed to the formation of an unstable, centrifugal , and fragmentary political order. Third, we argue that conceptualising ethnicity as capital dismantles the artificial dualism between the symbolic realm of identities and the material realm of the economy and makes it possible to move beyond primordialist, instrumentalist and purely symbolic understandings of the nexus between conflict and ethnicity. Ultimately, what is at stake in this competition is the distribution of symbolic and material resources.
The new millennium brought renewed attention to improving the health of women and children. In this same period, direct deaths from conflicts have declined worldwide, but civilian deaths associated with conflicts have increased. Nigeria is among the most conflict‐prone countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa, especially recently with the Boko Haram insurgency in the north. This paper uses two data sources, the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey for Nigeria and the Social Conflict Analysis Database, linked by geocode, to study the effect of these conflicts on infant and young child acute malnutrition (or wasting). We show a strong association in 2013 between living close to a conflict zone and acute malnutrition in Nigerian children, with larger effects for rural children than urban children. This is related to the severity of the conflict, measured both in terms of the number of conflict deaths and the length of time the child was exposed to conflict. Undoubtedly, civil conflict is limiting the future prospects of Nigerian children and the country's economic growth. In Nigeria, conflicts in the north are expected to continue with sporadic attacks and continued damaged infrastructure. Thus, Nigerian children, innocent victims of the conflict, will continue to suffer the consequences documented in this study.
These days profitable development and the need to create new urban land uses to ask needs of urban residents has gradually declined and these located in the incorrect place. It causes, the distribution of green spaces in the city was often inappropriate and social injustice is created. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the 15 regions of the Isfahan municipality in order to determine regions which have priority for the development of urban green space. Isfahan is one of the metropolises in Iran that has many environmental problems such as drought and water crisis, lack of proper urban land for developing of green space, air pollution, increasing population and vehicles and etc. So a systematic planning in the field of optimum locating for green spaces is very necessary. This paper looking for answering this question: What is the priority of creating green spaces in 15 regions of Isfahan? So at first 18 parameters which are effective in the construction of green spaces have been determined. Based on the data available of these parameters in the 15 regions, F’ANP model has been used in order to build composite index and evaluate regions.Isfahan, with an area of over 550 square kilometers and a population of more than two million, is the third metropolis in the center of Iran. Service range of this city consists of 15 regions which this paper has been studied separately. Any prioritization requires the selection of indicators and criteria which related to that category. The importance of each of these indicators is indicated with considering the weight for each indicator. Among the effective indicators choosing the right place (which was discussed in the theoretical foundations), indicators which are compatible with conditions of Isfahan, were selected and studied in the 15 regions.
In the first step, 18 key indicators have been extracted from theoretical literature. In the second step these indicators according to documents and information available are calculated in the 15 regions and required data have been provided in order to analyze indices. In the third step obtained data are considered as model’s inputs. The reason for using this method is that it covers one of the most important methodological problems in the field of location and prioritization. Previous studies show that prioritizations have so far been according to the subjective methods. In order word weight of influencing parameters have been done by experts and researchers.
Mentality of the parameters' weight are resolved by F’ANP model. In fact, the Isfahan’s environment determines parameters' weight and how to prioritize by determining relationships between parameters. This paper is in the category of applied research and it’s methodology is analytical-descriptive.
In this model, the adequacy of the sample size which be evaluated by test Sphere s’Bartlett and Kaiser- Meyer- Olkin (KMO) is more important than the amount of the sample size. So as long as if the values of these two tests do not reach the standard level, the sample size should increase or communalities should change. In this paper with regards to limitations of checked options (15 regions), suitable amount of these tests is obtained by reducing the number of variables. Therefore, 8 parameters deleted in order to increase the accuracy of the model. Then the factors are named according to the gender and nature of the indicators (Table1). After removing some indicators, the amount of KMO and Bartlett’s test are arrived to the standard value (Table2). These values show that the accuracy of the model is acceptable.
At the end of the research, composite index of need for green space development is calculated. So achieved weights are multiplied by the values of each indicators. The result of this operation shows values of indicators. The following formula has been used in order to build composite index:
〖NGSD 〗_i=∑_(j=1)^J▒〖W_(F^' ANP j ) QV_ij 〗
In this formula 〖NGSD〗_i is composite index of need for green space development which belongs to region i. ، W_(F^' ANP j ) is the relative weight of indicator j which is obtained from F’ANP model as output. And QV_ij is the amount of score indicator j in region i.
Then 15 regions of Esfahan have been prioritized by achieved composite index. These scores mean that the each region which is weaker in each indicator, it’s score is lower too. In fact less score indicates the more critical in existing green space in the region. So that region should be located at the higher priority of developing of green space.
Green space in the city is one of the most important indicators which affects the quality of life. With the growing urbanization, green spaces have been damaged by city managers for supplying other needs of citizens or by Land traders. So these days choosing the right priority of the development of green spaces and right place to create green space is more important than the past. So we can say this is one of the most important managerial needs in the modern cities. So far, many studies have been done in theoretical literature on urban planning and the environment. Lack of systematic approach which is far from the minds of experts is one of the most important gaps in this theoretical literature. The purpose of this article is to provide a method which is based on a systematic approach.
For this purpose, 18 parameters which explain how to prioritize the development of green spaces have been evaluated using the F'ANP model.
The results indicate that three factors of "physical and functional needs", "natural and environmental needs" and "economic and social needs" explain the priority of the need to develop green space in Isfahan.
The findings show that regions of 8 and 10 placed in the top priority and region of 9 placed in the least priority. The results of this research have been checked with reports of the need to develop green space which is done in the municipality of Isfahan that results confirm the prioritization of this model.
This indicates that we can achieve valuable results in terms of prioritization by applying a systematic approach to this issue and by using systematic multivariate methods of evaluation.
Evidence on the consequences of war for community cohesion is mixed, pointing to both positive and negative effects of conflict. This study examines symmetry of force between warring actors as an explanation of heterogeneous conflict effects. Using survey data from 224 Colombian villages, I compare cohesion in communities exposed to asymmetric and symmetric conflicts, a guerrilla war between rebels and the state and a more conventional war between rebels and paramilitary groups, respectively. I find that symmetric war increases participation in community organizations, while asymmetric war decreases trust. Evidence suggests three mechanisms that explain these findings. Symmetric war increases cohesion (i) by spurring individuals to band together to cope with significant disruption of services and (ii) by strengthening group identities that map onto fairly clear wartime cleavages. Asymmetric war reduces cohesion (iii) by instilling fear and suspicion linked to wartime experiences of civilian collaboration and denunciations.
Why are some post-conflict societies more successful than others in achieving peaceful reconstruction? To provide an answer to this question, this PhD research project aim to focus on state capacity as an important determining factor in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction process. This imperative research question is linked to an important literature, which analyze the causal link between state capacity and conflict (Braithwaite and McBride et al., 2011). Scholars such as Sobek (2010) and Thies (2010) argue that while state capacity has no measurable effect on conflict, conflict on the other hand is a strong predictor of state capacity. This argument is affirmed by Tilly (1985), Levi (1988) and Brewer (1989) research, which show that protracted wars have played an important role in the development of state capacity. As for academics such as Besley and Persson (2008, 2009b and 2010), they suggest that the risk of a civil war decreases the incentives for the government to invest in the capacity of the state. Despite the above-mentioned literature affirming the linkage between state capacity and violent conflict, there is still limited knowledge regarding the causal factors explaining some post-conflict society's ability to achieve a successful reconstruction and avoid conflict recurrence, and others' inability to achieve similar outcomes.
The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of Livestock rustling on head teachers’ instructional leadership in public primary schools in Laikipia North Sub-County. This study was guided by the following objectives: to determine the effects of livestock rustling on head teachers’ provision of instructional resources in public primary schools in Laikipia North Sub-County and to establish the effect of livestock rustling on head teachers’ protection of instructional time in public primary schools in Laikipia North Sub-County. This study was anchored on Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of humanneeds theory. The study adopted descriptive survey design. The target population of this study comprised of 24 headteachers and 231 teachers in public primary schools in Laikipia North Sub-County. The researcher purposively sampled 18 primary schools for data collection. Therefore, all the 18 head teachers from the 18 public primary schools sampled participated in the study. Simple random sampling was used to select 108 teachers for data collection. Questionnaires and document analysis were used to collect data from the respondents. Prior to the study, a pilot study was carried out to test
the validity and reliability of the research instruments. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics such as mean, mode, median and percentages according to the stated objectives of the research. Quantitative data was presented in descriptive statistics such as frequency distribution tables, pie charts, and tables. Qualitative data was analyzed thematically to provide more information to support quantitative data. The research found out that livestock rustling affected supervision of instruction as a result of high absenteeism, regular displacement of families’ livestock rustling affects provision of instructional resources sponsors withdraw their financial support to schools as a results of livestock rustling. Due to increased absenteeism and displacement Head teachers are not able to protect instructional time. Headteachers and teachers stated that livestock rustling affected academic achievement. The research recommends the government to provide security in Laikipia North Sub-County in order to shun livestock rustling
Common political economy models point to rationalist motives for engaging in conflict but say little about how income shocks translate into collective violence in some cases but not in others. Grievance models, in contrast, focus on structural origins of shared frustration but offer less insight into when the deprived decide to challenge the status quo. Addressing these lacunae, we develop a theoretical model of civil conflict that predicts income loss to trigger violent mobilization primarily when the shock can be linked to pre-existing collective grievances. The conditional argument is supported by results of a comprehensive global statistical analysis of conflict involvement among ethnic groups. Consistent with theory, we find that this relationship is most powerful among recently downgraded groups, especially in the context of agricultural dependence and low local level of development, whereas political downgrading in the absence of adverse economic changes exerts less influence on ethnic conflict risk. Economic explanations feature prominently in the scientific study of civil war. A central argument links loss of income, growing unemployment, and increasing living costs to the rise of in-surgent organizations through reducing opportunity costs of violent behavior (Collier and Hoef-fler 2004; Fearon 2008; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 1994). Yet, the opportunity cost model of conflict remains debated. Theoretically, criticism has focused on the individualistic nature of the opportunity-cost framework and its inattention to the roles of social networks and collective agency in shaping political mobilization (Cramer 2002; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Empirically, much of the statistical evidence has come from country-level growth-conflict regressions , criticized for the risk of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and for untenable assumptions about the transmission effect between aggregate growth fluctuations and changes in individual material conditions (Bazzi and Blattman 2014). To advance our understanding of how negative changes in economic conditions can act as a catalyst of civil conflict, this study reformulates and examines the relationship between income shocks and rebellion at the more theoretically appropriate group level. While reduced opportunity costs can provide a powerful impetus for individual acts of resistance, economic theories of organized political violence also must recognize the importance of collective agency. Increased economic hardship that affects dispersed individuals with little else in common carries little potential for violent mobilization. An income shock that disproportionally affects members of a distinct social group, in contrast, can be cognitively linked to a common identity and raise awareness of shared misery, thereby overcoming barriers to collective action. The salience of the group dimension has a strong theoretical backing in the grievance literature, which emphasizes how structural inequalities in the distribution of assets and privileges among identity groups are central forces of contention (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 1993; Stewart 2008; Østby 2008). Yet,
We study how territorial control by criminal organizations affects economic development. We exploit a natural experiment in El Salvador, where the emergence of these criminal organizations was the consequence of an exogenous shift in American immigration policy that led to the deportation of gang leaders from the United States to El Salvador. Upon arrival, the gangs gained control over many urban areas and re-created a system of borders to protect their territory from outsiders. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, we find that individuals in gang-controlled neighborhoods have less material well-being, income, and education than individuals living only 50 meters away but outside of gang territory. None of these discontinuities existed before the arrival of the gangs. A key mechanism behind the results is that gangs restrict individuals’ mobility, affecting their labor market options by preventing them from commuting to other parts of the city. The results are not determined by selective migration, differential exposure to extortion and violence, or differences in public goods provision.
Relation between natural resource abundance and economic performance
Doğal Kaynak Bolluğu Ekonomik Performans İlişkisi
Topik ketimpangan menjadi isu yang hangat dalam perdebatan pembangunan di Indonesia, terutama di daerah perdesaan yang dalam satu dekade terakhir mengalami peningkatan ketimpangan. Studi ini bertujuan melihat berbagai faktor dalam kerangka modal penghidupan dan mengaitkannya dengan dinamika ketimpangan yang terjadi di wilayah perdesaan. Termasuk dalam modal penghidupan adalah sumber daya manusia, sumber daya alam, modal infrastruktur fisik, modal keuangan, dan modal sosial. Hasil analisis studi ini diharapkan memberi gambaran mengenai tantangan yang dihadapi dalam upaya pengurangan ketimpangan, terutama hal-hal yang menghalangi masyarakat kelompok termiskin untuk melakukan mobilitas sosial ke tingkat kesejahteraan yang lebih tinggi.
Analisis dalam studi ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif melalui teknik analisis deskriptif dengan menampilkan tabulasi silang antara indikator-indikator yang mewakili masing-masing modal penghidupan di satu sisi dan kelompok kesejahteraan di sisi lain. Sumber data utama yang digunakan adalah, antara lain, Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional (Susenas), Riset Kesehatan Dasar (Riskesdas), Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), Sensus Penduduk, Sensus Pertanian, Sensus Potensi Desa, dan data Peta Kemiskinan Indonesia.
Beberapa hal yang diduga berkaitan dengan atau turut berkontribusi pada ketimpangan ekonomi perdesaan terlihat melalui studi ini, seperti rendahnya capaian pendidikan kelompok termiskin perdesaan, dominasi kelompok terkaya dalam penguasaan lahan pertanian, pembangunan infrastruktur fisik yang lebih tersebar di desa-desa maju, serta ancaman kohesi sosial yang bersumber dari keberagaman identitas dengan diiringi sikap primordialisme dan berujung pada konflik sosial. Faktor-faktor ini selanjutnya akan disempurnakan pada kertas kerja kedua dan ketiga dengan menguji kekuatan kontribusi masing-masing faktor dan membandingkan besarannya dalam menjelaskan perubahan ketimpangan perdesaan. Berdasarkan temuan dari ketiga kertas kerja tersebut, implikasi kebijakan yang lebih konkret dapat diformulasikan.
Kata kunci: ketimpangan, modal penghidupan, perdesaan
This study characterizes the oil market as a nonlinear-switching phenomenon and examines its dynamics in response to changes in geopolitical risks over low- and high-risk scenarios. We separate the shocks due to geopolitical acts from those due to geopolitical threats to address whether the serious effects of geopolitical risks are mostly due to increased threats of adverse events or to their realization as acts. While we find the acts to generate a positive and strong impact on oil price dynamics, the effect of threats appears to be moderate or non-significant. Imperfect information in the oil price determination, the history of oil supply disruptions emanating from geopolitical events, the continued rise in populism in the world, oil market volatility, multifractility and the time-varying degree of weak-form efficiency have been advanced to explain the unforeseen responses of oil prices to geopolitical threats. To accommodate recent oil-related events, we construct a composite geopolitical risk indicator by accounting for contemporaneous sources of geopolitical risks, namely global trade tensions, US-China relation risks, US-Iran tensions, Saudi Arabia’s uncertainty and Venezuela’s crisis. The combined effects have an outsized impact on oil prices.
Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816-1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.
Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary. Regardless of which data set one chooses to employ, it is undeniable that civil war—including revolutions, secessionist wars, and ethnic revolts of various sorts—has superseded interstate war as the most frequent and destructive form of armed conflict in the international system. Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 75) report that there were only 25 interstate wars between 1945 and 1999, whereas five times as many civil wars (127) occurred during the same period, resulting in five times as many deaths Address correspondence to
"Civil war conflict is a core development issue. The existence of civil war can dramatically slow a country's development process, especially in low-income countries which are more vulnerable to civil war conflict. Conversely, development can impede civil war. When development succeeds, countries become safer―when development fails, they experience a greater risk of being caught in a conflict trap. Ultimately, civil war is a failure of development.
"'Breaking the Conflict Trap' identifies the dire consequences that civil war has on the development process and offers three main findings. First, civil war has adverse ripple effects that are often not taken into account by those who determine whether wars start or end. Second, some countries are more likely than others to experience civil war conflict and thus, the risks of civil war differ considerably according to a country's characteristics including its economic stability. Finally, Breaking the Conflict Trap explores viable international measures that can be taken to reduce the global incidence of civil war and proposes a practical agenda for action.
"This book should serve as a wake up call to anyone in the international community who still thinks that development and conflict are distinct issues." Source: Amazon -- https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Conflict-Trap-Development-Research/dp/0821354817/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1550856279&sr=8-1&keywords=breaking+the+conflict+trap
This article surveys the current state of development economics, a subject that studies growth, inequality, poverty and institutions in the developing world. The article is organized around a view that emphasizes the role of history in creating development traps or slow progress. This ‘non-convergence’ viewpoint stands in contrast to a more traditional view, also discussed, based on the notion of economic convergence (across individuals, regions or countries). Some specific research areas in development economics receive closer scrutiny under this overall methodological umbrella, among them political economy, credit markets, legal issues, collective action and conflict.
This article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries. Three alternative measures of nearness-contiguity, length of contiguous borders, and distance of closest approach-are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences. We present short-run panel estimates (at five-year intervals) and long-run (1961-95) panel estimates for the world. Generally, the distance measures, novel to this study, and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries. Unlike earlier studies, we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries. Both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact.
I present a model of the interaction between a government, a terrorist organization, and potential terrorist volunteers in which, as a result of an endogenous choice, individuals with low ability or little education are most likely to volunteer to join the terrorist organization. However, the terrorist organization screens the volunteers for quality. Consequently, the model is consistent with two seemingly contradictory empirical findings. Actual terrorist operatives are not poor or lacking in education. And yet lack of economic opportunity and recessionary economies are positively correlated with terrorism. The model also endogenizes the effect of government counterterrorism on mobilization. Government crackdowns have competing effects on mobilization: they decrease the ability of terrorists to carry out effective attacks (making mobilization less attractive), and they foment ideological opposition to the government and impose negative economic externalities (making mobilization more attractive). This provides conditions under which government crackdowns increase or decrease mobilization.
A major unexplored area in the field of international politics is the consequences of major war for members of the international system in terms of power lost or gained. This paper explores these shifts of power among neutrals, winners, and losers as a result of these wars, using a sample of 32 cases and time series analysis. The findings register unexpected but systematic patterns after major conflicts; while winners and neutrals are affected marginally by the conflict, losers' powers are at first eroded. Over the long run (15–20 years), though, the effects of the loss dissipate; losers accelerate their recovery and soon resume antebellum status. It is this phenomenon that the authors call the phoenix factor.
Political scientists have conducted only limited systematic research on the consequences of war for civilian populations. Here we argue that the civilian suffering caused by civil war extends well beyond the period of active warfare. We examine these longer-term affects in a cross-national (1999) analysis of World Health Organization new fine-grained data on death and disability broken down by age, gender, and type of disease or condition. We test hypotheses about the impact of civil wars and find substantial long-term effects, even after controlling for several other factors. We estimate that the additional burden of death and disability incurred in 1999, from the indirect and lingering effects of civil wars in the years 1991-97, was approximately equal to that incurred directly and immediately from all wars in 1999. This impact works its way through specific diseases and conditions and disproportionately affects women and children.
The “bottom billion” is a concept introduced in my eponymous book, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It.
This book presents a revisionist view of the sources of nationalism, the relationship of the nation to culture, and the implications of nationalism and cultural heterogeneity for the future of the nation-state. It accepts the now-standard view that national identities are not inherited traits but constructed communities in order to serve political ends. But the resulting national identities do not emerge from some metaphorical plebiscite as had been suggested by some; rather they result from efforts by people to coordinate their identities with people who share at least some cultural traits with them. Coordination leads to powerful social and cultural ties that are hard to unravel, and this explains the persistence of national identities. Understood as the result of coordination dynamics, the implications of national homogeneity and heterogeneity are explored. The book shows that national heterogeneity is not, as it is sometimes accused of being, a source of hatred. Nonetheless, there are advantages to homogeneity for the production of public goods and economic growth. Whatever the positive implications of homogeneity, the book shows that in the current world, classic nation-states are defunct. Heterogeneity is proliferating not only due to migration but also because small groups in many states once thought to be homogeneous are coordinating to demand national recognition. With the prohibitive costs of eliminating cultural heterogeneity, citizens and leaders need to learn how best to manage, or even take advantage of, national diversity within their countries. Management of diversity demands that we understand the coordination aspects of national heterogeneity, a perspective that this book provides.
The article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity: the state's ability to raise revenue from taxes. It starts from the simple observation that external war tends to generate common interests across groups in society, whereas internal, civil war entails deep conflicting interests across groups. Our model predicts that—compared to a society without conflict—civil wars lead to smaller investments in fiscal capacity, whereas prospects of external war generally lead to larger investments. Correlations in international data on conflicts and taxation are, by and large, consistent with these predictions.
The study of resilience in development has overturned many negative assumptions and deficit-focused models about children growing up under the threat of disadvantage and adversity. The most surprising conclusion emerging from studies of these children is the ordinariness of resilience. An examination of converging findings from variable-focused and person-focused investigations of these phenomena suggests that resilience is common and that it usually arises from the normative functions of human adaptational systems, with the greatest threats to human development being those that compromise these protective systems. The conclusion that resilience is made of ordinary rather than extraordinary processes offers a more positive outlook on human development and adaptation, as well as direction for policy and practice aimed at enhancing the development of children at risk for problems and psychopathology. The study of resilience in development has overturned many negative assumptions and deficit-focused models about children growing up under the threat of disadvantage and adversity.
The Earth's human population is expected to pass eight billion by the year 2025, while rapid growth in the global economy will spur ever increasing demands for natural resources. The world will consequently face growing scarcities of such vital renewable resources as cropland, fresh water, and forests. Thomas Homer-Dixon argues in this sobering book that these environmental scarcities will have profound social consequences--contributing to insurrections, ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and other forms of civil violence, especially in the developing world. Homer-Dixon synthesizes work from a wide range of international research projects to develop a detailed model of the sources of environmental scarcity. He refers to water shortages in China, population growth in sub-Saharan Africa, and land distribution in Mexico, for example, to show that scarcities stem from the degradation and depletion of renewable resources, the increased demand for these resources, and/or their unequal distribution. He shows that these scarcities can lead to deepened poverty, large-scale migrations, sharpened social cleavages, and weakened institutions. And he describes the kinds of violence that can result from these social effects, arguing that conflicts in Chiapas, Mexico and ongoing turmoil in many African and Asian countries, for instance, are already partly a consequence of scarcity. Homer-Dixon is careful to point out that the effects of environmental scarcity are indirect and act in combination with other social, political, and economic stresses. He also acknowledges that human ingenuity can reduce the likelihood of conflict, particularly in countries with efficient markets, capable states, and an educated populace. But he argues that the violent consequences of scarcity should not be underestimated--especially when about half the world's population depends directly on local renewables for their day-to-day well-being. In the next decades, he writes, growing scarcities will affect billions of people with unprecedented severity and at an unparalleled scale and pace. Clearly written and forcefully argued, this book will become the standard work on the complex relationship between environmental scarcities and human violence.
In the last fifteen years, the number, size, and scope of peacekeeping missions deployed in the aftermath of civil wars have increased exponentially. From Croatia and Cambodia, to Nicaragua and Namibia, international personnel have been sent to maintain peace around the world. But does peacekeeping work? And if so, how? In Does Peacekeeping Work? Virginia Page Fortna answers these questions through the systematic analysis of civil wars that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. She compares peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping cases, and she investigates where peacekeepers go, showing that their missions are crucial to the most severe internal conflicts in countries and regions where peace is otherwise likely to falter. Fortna demonstrates that peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool, dramatically reducing the risk that war will resume. Moreover, she explains that relatively small and militarily weak consent-based peacekeeping operations are often just as effective as larger, more robust enforcement missions. Fortna examines the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping, paying particular attention to the perspective of the peacekept--the belligerents themselves--on whose decisions the stability of peace depends. Based on interviews with government and rebel leaders in Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Does Peacekeeping Work? demonstrates specific ways in which peacekeepers alter incentives, alleviate fear and mistrust, prevent accidental escalation to war, and shape political procedures to stabilize peace.
Standard one-sector growth models often have the counterfactual implication that economies with access to similar technologies will converge to a common balanced growth path. We propose an elaboration of the Diamond model that permits multiple, locally stable stationary states. This multiplicity is due to increasing social returns to scale in the accumulation of human capital. -Authors
This chapter begins by reviewing the variety and uniformity of features found in suicide missions (SMs) and among their organizers. It then reviews what is known about the perpetrators, arguing that the persons who die in SMs and the conditions that promote their self-sacrifice are fairly uniform, and although they are rare they are not historically or psychologically abnormal. This raises the further question of how different suicide attackers really are from other people who sacrifice their lives for a cause. To answer it, the similarities and differences between modern SMs on the one hand, and both heroism and some cases of proto-SMs on the other are explored. It is shown that despite the diversity of their purposes, the modern progeny of SMs shares the same roots, which emerged during an extraordinarily violent period in Lebanon. Despite the rapid spread of SMs across the world since 1981, the limits to their further spread are discussed, showing among other things that religious beliefs can both encourage and discourage SMs.
The volunteer armed forces play a major role in the American youth labor market, but little is known about the effects of voluntary military service on earnings. The effects of military service are difficult to measure because veterans are both self-selected and screened by the military. This study uses two strategies to reduce selection bias in estimates of the effects of military service on the earnings of veterans. Both approaches involve the analysis of a special match of Social Security earning records to administrative data on applicants to the armed forces. The first strategy compares applicants who enlisted with applicants who did not enlist, while controlling for most of the characteristics used by the military to select soldiers from the applicant pool. This is implemented using matching methods and regression. The second strategy uses instrumental variables that were generated by an error in the scoring of the exams that screen military applicants. Estimates from both strategies are interpreted using models with heterogeneous potential outcomes. The empirical results suggest that soldiers who served in the early 1980s were paid considerably more than comparable civilians while in the military, and that military service is associated with higher employment rates for veterans after service. In spite of this employment gain, however, military service led to only a modest long-run increase in the civilian earnings of nonwhite veterans while actually reducing the civilian earnings of white veterans.
The existing quantitative literature on war takes the independent nation-state as the self-evident unit of analysis and largely excludes other political types from consideration. In contrast, the authors argue that the change in the institutional form of states is itself a major cause for war. The rise of empires and the global spread of the nation-state are the most important institutional transformations in the modern age. To test this hypothesis, the authors introduce a new data set that records the outbreak of war in fixed geographic territories from 1816 to 2001, independent of the political entity in control of a territory. Analysis of this data set demonstrates that wars are much more likely during and because of these two transformations. For the transformation to the modern nation-state, the authors confirm this hypothesis further with logit regressions that control for variables that have been robustly significant in previous research. The results provide support for the main mechanisms that explain this time dependency. Modern nation-states are ruled in the name of a nationally defined people, in contrast to empires, which govern to spread a faith across the world, to bring civilization to backward people, or to advance the world revolutionary cause. The institution of the nation-state thus introduces incentives for political elites to privilege members of the national majority over ethnic minorities, and for minority elites to mobilize against such political discrimination. The resulting power struggles over the ethno-national character of the state may escalate into civil wars. Interstate wars can result from attempts to protect co-nationals who are politically excluded in neighboring states. The reported research thus provides a corrective to mainstream approaches, which exclude ethnic and nationalist politics as factors that would help understanding the dynamics of war.
A model of the economic effects of civil war and the post-war period is developed. A key feature is the adjustment of the capital stock through capital flight. Post-war this flight can either be reversed or continue, depending partly upon how far the capital stock has adjusted to the war. The model is tested on data for all civil wars since 1960. After long civil wars the economy recovers rapidly, whereas after short wars it continues to decline. We then consider the effect of the compesition of economic activity, distinguishing between war-vulnerable and war-safe activities. Evidence for Uganda shows such compositional effects to be substantial.
Theory: A synthetic theoretical model built on both deprivation and resource mobilization arguments is constructed to explain ethnopolitical rebellion for the 1980s and to provide risk assessments for the early 1990s. Hypotheses: We hypothesize that ethnopolitical groups which produce residuals well below the regression line will likely exhibit rebellious behavior in the early 1990s. Methods: We use a three stage least squares estimator, analyze the coefficients and their standard errors, and also examine the residuals. Results: We find broad support for the theoretical synthesis, but focus attention on the risk assessments. In addition to identifying ethnopolitical groups that did resort to greater violence in the early 1990s, the theoretical model helps us explain why a number of groups that the analysis suggested would rebel in the early 1990s have not in fact done so.
Democratization processes involving religious parties are risky, particularly when these parties are on the verge of winning mandates in critical elections. Religious parties face a commitment problem. Even when willing to comply with the emerging democratic order, they find it difficult to signal credibly that, once in power, they will subject themselves to democratic control. Yet for democratization to succeed incumbents must be convinced that religious parties will behave democratically. A comparison of nineteenth century Belgium and contemporary Algeria shows that established, centralized, autocratic, and hierarchical religious institutions can have a positive effect on democratization processes because they make it possible for religious parties to overcome commitment problems.
This paper is a systematic analysis of the comparative method. Its emphasis is on both the limitations of the method and the ways in which, despite these limitations, it can be used to maximum advantage.
The comparative method is defined and analyzed in terms of its similarities and differences vis-à-vis the experimental and statistical methods. The principal difficulty facing the comparative method is that it must generalize on the basis of relatively few empirical cases. Four specific ways in which this difficulty may be resolved are discussed and illustrated: (1) increasing the number of cases as much as possible by means of longitudinal extension and a global range of analysis, (2) reducing the property space of the analysis, (3) focusing the comparative analysis on “comparable” cases (e.g., by means of area, diachronic, or intranation comparisons), and (4) focusing on the key variables.
It is argued that the case study method is closely related to the comparative method. Six types of case studies (the atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant case analyses) are distinguished, and their theoretical value is analyzed.
Since the establishment of the United Nations, great powers have rarely let small wars burn themselves out. Bosnia and Kosovo are the latest examples of this meddling. Conflicts are interrupted by a steady stream of cease-fires and armistices that only postpone war-induced exhaustion and let belligerents rearm and regroup. Even worse are U.N. refugee-relief operations and NGOs, which keep resentful populations festering in camps and sometimes supply both sides in armed conflicts. This well-intentioned interference only intensifies and prolongs struggles in the long run. The unpleasant truth is that war does have one useful function: it brings peace. Let it.
Employing analytical tools borrowed from game theory, Carles Boix offers a complete theory of political transitions. It is one in which political regimes ultimately depend on the nature of economic assets, their distribution among individuals, and the balance of power among different social groups. Backed by detailed historical research and extensive statistical analysis from the mid-nineteenth century, the study reveals why democracy emerged in classical Athens. It also covers the early triumph of democracy in nineteenth-century agrarian Norway, Switzerland and northeastern America as well as its failure in countries with a powerful landowning class.
Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.
These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.