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Metacognitive Theories



This paper proposes a framework for understanding people's theories about their own cognition. Metacognitive theories are defined broadly as systematic frameworks used to explain and direct cognition, metacognitive knowledge, and regulatory skills. We distinguish tacit, informal, and formal metacognitive theories and discuss critical differences among them using criteria borrowed from the developmental literature. We also consider the origin and development of these theories, as well as implications for educational research and practice.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
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Educational Psychology Papers and Publications Educational Psychology, Department of
Metacognitive eories
Gregory Schraw
University of Nebraska - Lincoln,
David Moshman
University of Nebraska - Lincoln,
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Schraw, Gregory and Moshman, David, "Metacognitive eories" (1995). Educational Psychology Papers and Publications. Paper 40.
Published in Educational Psychology Review 7:4 (1995), pp. 351–371.
Copyright © 1995 Plenum Publishing Corporation. Used by permission.
Metacognitive Theories
Gregory Schraw and David Moshman
Department of Educational Psychology, 1313 Seaton Hall,
University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588–0641
This paper proposes a framework for understanding people’s theories about their own
cognition. Metacognitive theories are de ned broadly as systematic frameworks used
to explain and direct cognition, metacognitive knowledge, and regulatory skills. We
distinguish tacit, informal, and formal metacognitive theories and discuss critical dif-
ferences among them using criteria borrowed from the developmental literature. We
also consider the origin and development of these theories, as well as implications for
educational research and practice.
Keywords: metacognition, self-regulation, metacognitive theories, knowledge
Hardly anyone questions the reality or importance of metacognition. Yet
among those who study it, there is considerable debate about the scope and
meaning of the term and the nature and interrelations among the various types
of metacognitive knowledge and processes that have proliferated in the psy-
chological literature (Alexander, Schallert, and Hare, 1991). The purpose of
this paper is to consider how individuals consolidate different kinds of meta-
cognitive knowledge and regulatory skills into systematized cognitive frame-
works that we refer to as metacognitive theories.
To do so, it is necessary to distinguish speci c components of metacog-
nitive knowledge (e.g., conditional knowledge) and metacognitive regulation
(e.g., comprehension monitoring) from the systematic integration of these
components (e.g., theoretical knowledge about variables affecting cognitive
performance). The question of how individuals coordinate their knowledge
about cognitive structures has received little attention from researchers (see
King and Kitchener, 1994; Kitchener, 1983; Kuhn, 1989). We propose that in-
dividuals construct metacognitive theories for two reasons: (a) to systematize
their metacognitive knowledge, and (b) to understand and plan their own cog-
nitive activities within a formalized framework.
The rst section of this paper reviews standard accounts of metacogni-
tion and how metacognitive knowledge and regulation affect cognitive per-
formance. The second section provides a taxonomy of metacognitive theories
that range from tacit models of cognition to formalized theoretical structures.
The third section considers some of the ways that individuals construct meta-
cognitive theories. The nal section examines methodological and educational
implications of the present analysis.
Most accounts of metacognition make a basic distinction between meta-
cognitive knowledge (i.e., what one knows about cognition) and metacogni-
tive control processes (i.e., how one uses that knowledge to regulate cogni-
tion). Brown (1987) and Baker (1991), for example, distinguish knowledge
of cognition from regulation of cognition. In this section, we elaborate on the
distinction between metacognitive knowledge and regulation and consider
subprocesses involved in each.
Knowledge of Cognition
Knowledge of cognition refers to what individuals know about their own
cognition or about cognition in general. It usually includes three different
kinds of metacognitive awareness: declarative, procedural, and conditional
knowledge (Brown, 1987; Jacobs and Paris, 1987). Declarative knowledge
refers to knowing “about” things. Procedural knowledge refers to knowing
“how” to do things. Conditional knowledge refers to knowing the “why” and
“when” aspects of cognition.
Declarative Knowledge. Declarative knowledge includes knowledge
about oneself as a learner and about what factors in uence one’s performance.
For example, research investigating metamemory (i.e., knowledge about me-
morial processes) indicates that adults have more knowledge than children
about the cognitive processes associated with memory (see Baker, 1989 for a
review). Similarly, good learners appear to have more knowledge about their
own memory and are more likely than poor learners to use what they do know
(Garner, 1987; Schneider and Pressley, 1989). In one illustrative study, Leal
(1987) found that several subcomponents on a metamemory questionnaire
were signi cantly related to course performance among college students, in-
cluding estimated savings (i.e., estimates of how much was remembered from
study episodes).
Procedural Knowledge. Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge about
the execution of procedural skills. Individuals with a high degree of proce-
dural knowledge use skills more automatically (Stanovich, 1990), are more
likely to sequence strategies effectively (Pressley, Borkowski, and Schneider,
1987), and use qualitatively different strategies to solve problems (Glaser and
Chi, 1988).
From an instructional standpoint, a number of studies report that help-
ing younger students increase their procedural knowledge improves their
on-line problem solving performance. King (1991), for example, compared
groups of fth-grade students in which individuals solved problems using a
problem-solving prompt card or solved problems without it. Those who re-
ceived explicit procedural training in how to use the prompt card solved
more problems on a paper-and-pencil test than the control group. The ex-
plicit training group also performed better than the control group on a novel
computer task.
Conditional Knowledge. Conditional knowledge refers to knowing when
and why to apply various cognitive actions (Garner, 1990; Lorch, Lorch,
and Klusewitz, 1993). It may be thought of as declarative knowledge about
the relative utility of cognitive procedures. For example, Lorch et al. (1993)
found that college students distinguished among the information-processing
demands of ten different types of reading situations. Students selected differ-
ent strategies most appropriate for each situation in an effort to better regulate
their learning. Students’ beliefs about the relative severity of demands placed
on their cognitive resources also differed across the 10 situations.
Recent studies suggest that conditional knowledge continues developing
at least through middle childhood. For instance, Miller (1985) found that al-
though kindergarten students showed conditional knowledge about their own
learning, they showed less knowledge than older children. Similarly, older
children and adults appear better able than younger learners to selectively al-
locate their attention based on conditional task demands (see Reynolds, 1992
for a review). Comparing adults, Justice and Weaver-McDougall (1989) found
a positive relationship between knowledge about the relative effectiveness of
strategies (i.e., conditional knowledge) and strategy use (i.e., regulation of
Conclusion. Many studies support the claim that skilled learners pos-
sess declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge about cognition. This
knowledge usually improves performance. Many theorists believe that meta-
cognitive knowledge appears early and continues to develop at least through-
out adolescence (Brown, 1987; Garner and Alexander, 1989; Flavell, 1987).
Adults tend to have more knowledge about their own cognition than do young
children and are better able to describe that knowledge (Baker, 1989). How-
ever, a number of studies reveal that children as young as six can re ect with
accuracy on their own cognition, especially when asked to do so in a familiar
domain (see Flavell, 1992 for a review).
Metacognitive knowledge (i.e., knowledge of cognition) is not necessar-
ily statable (but see Brown, 1987). Children routinely demonstrate and use
knowledge about cognition without being able to express that knowledge
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, Chap. 5; Montgomery, 1992). Even adults experi-
ence great dif culty providing explicit descriptions of their own expert cogni-
tion (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1993; Chi, Glaser, and Farr, 1988). Although
metacognitive knowledge need not be statable to be useful, conscious access
to such information nevertheless may facilitate thinking and self-regulation.
Regulation of Cognition
Regulation of cognition refers to metacognitive activities that help con-
trol one’s thinking or learning. Although a number of regulatory skills have
been described in the literature, three essential skills are included in all ac-
counts: planning, monitoring, and evaluation (Jacobs and Paris, 1987; Kluwe,
Planning. Planning involves the selection of appropriate strategies and
the allocation of resources that affect performance. Examples include making
predictions before reading, strategy sequencing, and allocating time or atten-
tion selectively before beginning a task (Miller, 1985).
An in-depth analysis of how good and poor writers plan their writing has
been presented by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987). One nding is that the abil-
ity to plan, and knowledge about this process, develops throughout childhood
and adolescence, improving dramatically between the ages of 10 and 14. Older,
more experienced writers engage in more global as opposed to local planning.
In addition, more experienced writers are better able to plan effectively regard-
less of text “content,” whereas poor writers are unable to do so. These nd-
ings are typical of the developmental sequence found when studying other types
of regulatory metacognition (Baker, 1989; Garner and Alexander, 1989). Older,
more experienced learners possess more knowledge about cognition and use
that knowledge to regulate their learning before they undertake a task.
Monitoring. Monitoring refers to one’s on-line awareness of comprehen-
sion and task performance. The ability to engage in periodic self-testing while
learning is a good example. Research indicates that monitoring ability devel-
ops slowly and is quite poor in children and even adults (Glenberg, Sanocki,
Epstein, and Morris, 1987; Pressley and Ghatala, 1990). However, several re-
cent studies have found a link between metacognitive knowledge and moni-
toring accuracy. For example, Schraw (1994) found that adults’ ability to es-
timate how well they would understand a passage prior to reading was related
to monitoring accuracy on a post-reading comprehension test (see also Slife
and Weaver, 1992).
Studies also suggest that monitoring ability improves with training and
practice. For example, Delclos and Harrington (1991) examined fth- and
sixth-grader’s ability to solve computer problems after assignment to one of
three conditions. The rst group received speci c problem-solving training,
the second received problem solving plus self-monitoring training, while the
third received no training. The monitored problem solving group solved more
of the dif cult problems than either of the remaining groups and took less
time to do so. The group receiving problem solving and monitoring training
also solved complex problems faster than the control group.
Evaluation. Evaluation refers to appraising the products and regulatory
processes of one’s learning. Typical examples include re-evaluating one’s
goals and conclusions. A number of studies indicate that metacognitive
knowledge and regulatory skills such as planning are related to evaluation
(see Baker, 1989 for a summary). With respect to text revisions, for exam-
ple, Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) found that poor writers were less able
than good writers to adopt the reader’s perspective and had more dif culty
“diagnosing” text problems and correcting them. These differences were at-
tributed to the use of different mental models of writing. Good writers used
what Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987, p. 12) referred to as the “knowledge-
transforming” model. In contrast, poor writers used a “knowledge-telling”
Conclusion. Researchers agree that regulatory competence improves per-
formance in a number of ways, including better use of cognitive resources
such as attention, better use of strategies, and a greater awareness of com-
prehension breakdowns. A number of studies report signi cant improvement
in learning when regulatory skills and an understanding of how to use these
skills are included as part of classroom instruction (Cross and Paris, 1988;
Brown and Palincsar, 1989).
Brown (1987) has argued that regulatory processes—including plan-
ning, monitoring, and evaluation—may not be conscious or statable in many
learning situations. One reason is that many of these processes are highly
automated, at least among adults. A second reason is that some of these
processes have developed without any conscious re ection and therefore
are dif cult to report to others. A number of empirical studies support this
Research also indicates that knowledge of cognition and regulation of
cognition are not independent of one another. Swanson (1990) reported stat-
able knowledge of cognition was an important constraint on problem solving
among fth- and sixth-grade students. Schraw (1994) found that college stu-
dents’ judgments of their ability to monitor their reading comprehension were
signi cantly related to their observed monitoring accuracy.
Despite these conclusions, researchers disagree on how individuals con-
solidate metacognitive knowledge and how knowledge about cognition is
best characterized. In the next section, we propose a framework for address-
ing these questions. We argue that, although children as young as four possess
metacognitive knowledge, individuals differ greatly in the nature and extent
of their metacognitive theories.
Metacognitive theories are theories that integrate one’s knowledge about
cognition and regulation of cognition. By “theory” we mean a relatively sys-
tematic structure of knowledge that can be used to explain and predict a broad
range of empirical phenomena. By a “metacognitive theory” we mean a rela-
tively systematic structure of knowledge that can be used to explain and pre-
dict a broad range of cognitive and metacognitive phenomena.
Within the speci c domain of metacognition, theorists, and research-
ers have suggested that knowledge about cognition often is codi ed in some
systematic framework. For example, the term metacognitive knowledge of-
ten is used to refer to a systematic body of knowledge about one’s cogni-
tion. In some cases, individuals use this systematic knowledge to construct
theories. Current research suggests that children as young as three or four
appear to possess tacit theories of their own cognition (Flavell, Miller, and
Miller, 1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Montgomery, 1992). These theories
serve both social and cognitive functions (Flavell, 1992; Moore and Frye,
1991) and develop slowly at least through adolescence (Chandler, 1988;
King and Kitchener, 1994). In this section, we (a) clarify the concept of
metacognitive theory, (b) consider several general characteristics of meta-
cognitive theories, and (c) distinguish among three different types of meta-
cognitive theories.
Metacognitive Theories
By a metacognitive theory we mean a theory of cognition. Metacog-
nitive theories are a subset of theories of mind in that the class of all the-
ories of mind includes, but is not limited to, theories of cognition. Theo-
ries of mind address mental phenomena such as emotion, personality, and
so forth (Astington, 1993; Flavell, 1992; Moore and Frye, 1991). Metacog-
nitive theories are those theories of mind that focus on cognitive aspects of
the mind.
In theorizing about cognition, individuals create and synthesize meta-
cognitive knowledge. It is crucial, however, to distinguish (a) the struc-
tured knowledge that comprises a theory from (b) the phenomena the theory
is about. All theories are cognitive in that they are structures of knowledge,
but not all theories are about cognition. Metacognitive theories are theories
about cognition. As such, they comprise metacognitive knowledge but they
are not necessarily about such knowledge. Rather, theories about metacogni-
tion would constitute meta-metacognitive knowledge. Such theories represent
only a subset of metacognitive theories (see Bunge, 1972; Byrnes, 1992 for
related discussions).
Characteristics of Metacognitive Theories
A variety of criteria have been suggested for distinguishing a theory from
a nontheoretical body of knowledge. Our de nition of the term suggests two
primary characteristics of metacognitive theories that justify classifying them
as a distinct and important subset of metacognitive knowledge. Speci cally,
metacognitive theories (a) integrate a wide range of metacognitive knowl-
edge and experiences, and (b) permit explanation and prediction of cognitive
One primary characteristic of a metacognitive theory is that it allows
an individual to integrate diverse aspects of metacognition within a single
framework (cf. Kuhn, 1989). For example, research indicates that young
children often nd it dif cult to use their knowledge about memory and
learning strategies to regulate their cognition (Flavell et al., 1993). One rea-
son is that children have not integrated their metacognitive knowledge and
regulatory skills within a uni ed conceptual framework. As a consequence,
many of the skills at their disposal remain inert and dif cult to apply be-
yond the context in which they were learned (cf. Kuhn, Schauble, and Gar-
cia-Mila, 1992).
Second, metacognitive theories coordinate beliefs or postulates that allow
individuals to predict, control, and explain their cognition, the cognition of
others, or cognition in general (Flavell, 1992; Montgomery, 1992). Consider,
for example, the Good Strategy User as described by Pressley et al. (1987).
This individual understands that effective learning depends on activating rel-
evant knowledge from memory, using automated procedures whenever pos-
sible, allocating one’s resources in a planful way, using strategies selectively,
and motivating oneself to learn the material at a deeper level of understand-
ing. To the extent that such understanding is suf ciently coordinated to en-
hance control of one’s learning, it constitutes a theory of what it means to be
an effective learner.
Of course, the degree to which a metacognitive theory possesses each
of these properties, and the degree to which an individual is aware of these
properties, varies from person to person. We believe metacognitive theories
change gradually over time given personal experience and self-re ection. In
the next section, we describe three different metacognitive theories indicative
of this change.
Types of Metacognitive Theories
We propose three different kinds of metacognitive theories: (a) tacit, (b)
explicit but informal, and (c) explicit and formal. Henceforth, we refer to
these as tacit, informal, and formal metacognitive theories.
Tacit Theories. Tacit theories are those acquired or constructed without
any explicit awareness that one possesses a theory (McCutcheon, 1992). Con-
sider the work of Dweck and Leggett (1988), who have argued that young
children hold “implicit” theories about the nature of intelligence that, in turn,
affect their behavior in the classroom. An incremental theory in this frame-
work is one in which the child believes that intelligence is malleable and sub-
ject to change through other- or self-directed processes. Given the two criteria
proposed above, one could argue that a child’s implicit beliefs about intelli-
gence constitute a theory because they allow the child to synthesize obser-
vations about the nature of intelligence and make predictions based on those
observations. It is tacit in the sense that many children do not spontaneously
report holding a “theory of intelligence” even though they systematically ex-
press beliefs consistent with such a theory.
Tacit theories about one’s own cognition or about the epistemic nature of
the world also affect the way adults perform (Sternberg and Caruso, 1985).
McCutcheon (1992) describes how teachers’ tacit theories affect their interac-
tions with students and curricular choices. Kagan (1992) also reviews a num-
ber of the ways in which beliefs and tacit theories affect teachers’ decision
making. One important nding is that tacit theories may be dif cult to change
even when individuals are encouraged explicitly to do so (see Guzzetti, Sny-
der, Glass, and Gamas, 1993, for a related review).
We view tacit metacognitive theories as gradually constructed, implicit
organizational frameworks that systematize one’s metacognitive knowledge.
Some of the beliefs about cognition that form the core of one’s metacognitive
theory may be acquired from peers, teachers, or one’s culture. In the realms of
scienti c and informal reasoning, Kuhn (1989, 1991) has referred to these as
“reasoning scripts.” Other aspects of one’s metacognitive theory may be con-
structed tacitly based on personal experience or adaptations from others (Paris
and Byrnes, 1989).
Perhaps the most salient aspect of a tacit metacognitive theory as opposed
to an explicit one is that an individual is not readily aware of either the theory
itself or evidence that supports or refutes it. Thus, tacit theories are not readily
distinguished from, or tested against, relevant data (Kuhn, 1989; Moshman,
1979). To the extent that they remain tacit, metacognitive theories may be per-
sistent even when they are false and maladaptive.
Informal Theories. Informal theories often are fragmentary in that indi-
viduals are aware of some of their beliefs and assumptions regarding a phe-
nomenon, but have not yet constructed an explicit theoretical structure that
integrates and justi es these beliefs. Informal theorists may have only a ru-
dimentary awareness of their own metacognitive knowledge. Informal theo-
ries develop slowly and are affected by a number of social and personal in-
uences on theorizing described later in this paper (Kuhn, 1989; Paris and
Byrnes, 1989).
One important difference between tacit and informal theorists is that the
latter possess some degree of explicit metacognition. It seems likely that sim-
ple informal theories begin as domain-speci c entities (Kuhn et al., 1992;
Paris and Byrnes, 1989) and gradually are generalized to other domains. In-
creasing the depth and breadth of metacognitive theories over time may al-
low informal theorists to better understand and direct constructive processes
(Flavell et al., 1993; Montgomery, 1992). We view emerging recognition and
control of constructive processes as an essential feature of informal metacog-
nitive theories that is not found among tacit theorists. Awareness of the con-
structive nature of knowledge and theories is important because, without it,
individuals are unable to strategically modify their theories, and as a conse-
quence, should be less able to regulate their cognition and learning. With such
an awareness, individuals can begin to (a) purposefully formalize informal as-
pects of their theory, and (b) evaluate the adequacy of their metacognitive the-
ory as it becomes increasingly formalized.
One interesting example of how tacit theories develop into increasingly
sophisticated informal theories comes from the literature on false beliefs
(Moore and Frye, 1991). Research indicates that very young children simply
do not question the truth and certainty of their own beliefs or those of others
(Montgomery, 1992). One reason is that most children younger than four are
unable to conceptualize false beliefs and therefore nd it impossible to think
of true (or false) beliefs as a subset of beliefs in general.
By the age of four, however, most children recognize that beliefs can
be false and that it is thus reasonable to inquire about the truth or falsity
of a claim as part of the reasoning process (Flavell et al., 1993). At this
age, children begin to develop what Flavell et al. refer to as postulates re-
garding the truth and certainty of a claim. Although initially tacit, such pos-
tulates over time may provide a basis for testing an increasingly explicit
metacognitive theory. At the age of six, children also begin to develop an
awareness that knowledge and understanding are constructed and that they
have some degree of control over this process. Understanding the construc-
tive nature of knowing may help children develop rudimentary informal
theories of their own thinking (Montgomery, 1992), although such theories
clearly continue to develop well into adolescence (Chandler, 1988; King
and Kitchener, 1994).
One distinct advantage of an informal metacognitive theory compared to
a tacit one is that it enables individuals to re ect purposefully and systemat-
ically on their performance and, in turn, to use this information to modify or
redirect their future performance and thinking (Kuhn et al., 1992). For exam-
ple, Moshman (1990) argued that children who apply tacit logical rules expe-
rience more dif culty solving complex deductive reasoning problems than in-
dividuals who have explicit knowledge (i.e., an informal theory) concerning
the nature and use of such rules. One explanation is that individuals adopting
a “theory-driven” approach are better able to think about their performance
and understand it as an integrated system of actions.
A second advantage of explicit theories is that individuals can begin to
distinguish formal from empirical aspects, where the formal aspect refers to
the structure and contents of the theory, and the empirical aspect refers to data
that the theory attempts to explain (Hergenhahn and Olson, 1993). Making
this distinction allows beginning informal theorists to evaluate formal aspects
of their theory in light of discon rming empirical evidence. In comparison,
tacit theorists may abandon formal aspects of their theory on the basis of irrel-
evant evidence or ignore relevant, discon rming evidence because it threatens
the integrity of formal aspects of their theory.
A third advantage of explicit theories is that distinguishing the structure
of one’s metacognitive theory from evidence that supports or refutes it is a
necessary step in the development of more sophisticated theories. For ex-
ample, Reich, Oser, and Valentin (1994) have argued that knowledge about
the knowing process develops in a predictable sequence in which individu-
als rst become aware of changes in their beliefs, develop reasons for these
changes, and nally attempt to explain these changes in terms of a lay the-
ory of mind.
Formal Theories. Formal theories consist of highly systematized ac-
counts of a phenomenon involving explicit theoretical structures such as those
encountered in university classes in physics, music, or statistics. An exam-
ple in the cognitive domain is Sternberg’s (1986) triarchic theory of intelli-
gence. No doubt formal theories about one’s performance or anything else are
rare outside the realm of one’s immediate expertise, if they even occur there
(Kuhn, 1989). McCutcheon (1992), for instance, reports that formal theories
of pedagogy are rare even among skilled teachers. Schon (1987) makes a sim-
ilar argument regarding other domains of expertise. Nevertheless, when they
exist, formal theories may exert a profound impact on performance and on the
understanding of performance.
Presently, it is unclear what constitutes a formal metacognitive theory of
one’s cognition. One possible example of a formal metacognitive theorist is
the Good Strategy User as described by Pressley et al. (1987). The metacog-
nitive knowledge of the Good Strategy User is not only integrated and ex-
plicit, but in some individuals (e.g., professional educators) may constitute a
formalized theoretical structure involving a set of postulates that can be used
to test and evaluate one’s metacognitive knowledge.
In addition, it is likely that formal theorists possess some explicit aware-
ness of the constructive nature of theorizing and engage in purposeful efforts
to construct and modify metacognitive theories (Kuhn et al., 1992; Paris and
Byrnes, 1989). One potential advantage of a formal metacognitive theory
is that it allows the individual to make informed choices about self-regula-
tory behaviors. Reich et al. (1994, p. 168) refer to individuals who make such
choices as “producers of their own development.”
In related work, Kuhn (1989) has described two skills that may be neces-
sary for the construction of a formal theory. One is the ability to clearly dis-
tinguish and coordinate the formal and empirical aspects of a theory. Formal
theorists understand that the formal and empirical aspects of a theory are con-
ceptually independent of each other even though each can be used to evaluate
the adequacy of the other.
A second skill is the ability to evaluate and interpret the meaning of
empirical evidence apart from the formal aspects of one’s theory. Kuhn re-
ports strong developmental changes in this regard in which children and
some adolescents appear unable to evaluate the adequacy of empirical data.
In contrast, professional scientists evaluate evidence with a far greater de-
gree of accuracy. It appears likely that the ability to use evidence to test the
formal aspects of a theory is a late developing skill associated with formal
Summary. We have proposed three types of metacognitive theories and
considered how each differs from the others. These theories form a natu-
rally occurring hierarchy of knowledge about cognitive and metacognitive
processes. At one end of this continuum are tacit theories, which provide
limited guidance and explanatory power. These theories are characterized
by loosely systematized knowledge and postulates that are not known con-
sciously by the theorist. Informal theories are partially accessible to the the-
orist and presumably play a greater role in self-regulation. Formal theories
provide an explicit framework for understanding and regulating one’s cog-
nition. Moreover, because their formal and empirical aspects are explicitly
distinguished, they are more subject than informal theories to purposeful
and rigorous evaluation.
Little has been said, however, about what personal and cultural factors in-
uence the construction and development of metacognitive theories. The next
section examines three important in uences, including cultural learning, indi-
vidual construction, and peer interactions. This section also describes experi-
mental ndings that are relevant to each of these three in uences.
This section explores in more detail the origins of metacognitive theories.
We consider three factors that we believe interact to bring about change: cul-
tural learning, individual construction, and peer interaction.
Cultural Learning. One possibility is that metacognitive theories are in-
ternalized from one’s culture via social learning. Socially shared conceptions
about the nature of cognition are transmitted to children via informal experi-
ence and formal education. The most obvious sort of cultural learning is di-
rect instruction in which students are taught to use a speci ed set of cognitive
skills and are shown how to coordinate the use of these skills (see Pressley,
Harris, and Marks, 1992).
One example of such an approach is the work of Paris and colleagues
(Cross and Paris, 1988; Jacobs and Paris, 1987; Paris, Cross, and Lipson,
1984). In a series of studies, children were taught cognitive and metacogni-
tive skills using the Informed Strategies for Learning (ISL) program which
focused on increasing declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge
about the reading process. For example, students received modeled instruc-
tion, guided practice, and independent practice on speci c reading strategies
such as identifying main ideas. Students also were provided with regular feed-
back regarding their use of strategies. Last, the ISL program also sought to
create higher levels of student involvement and awareness via the use of bul-
letin boards and periodic group discussions.
Cross and Paris (1988) reported signi cant gains between the third and
fth grades with respect to knowledge about cognition and regulation of cog-
nition while reading. Knowledge of cognition, which was de ned as an aware-
ness of variables that in uence thinking, was measured using a 15-question
reading awareness interview as well as a strategy rating task in which stu-
dents identi ed strategies that would be most helpful for learning new mate-
rial in a particular situation. Regulation of cognition, which was de ned as the
ability to regulate one’s learning, was measured by comparing pre- and post-
test measures of error detection pro ciency and changes in reading compre-
hension. Unlike the treatment group, signi cant changes did not occur among
control subjects. Similar results have been reported by Kurtz and Borkowski
(1987) and Palincsar and Brown (1984).
Notwithstanding these ndings, it is unclear whether formal instruction
using ISL or other direct instructional approaches leads to the development
of informal or formal metacognitive theories among students. Moreover, if
such theories do exist following direct instruction, they may be less useful to
students than self-constructed theories. Future research should compare those
who show evidence of a tacit, informal, or formal theory following instruction
to those who do not show evidence of a theory.
Individual Construction. Much of what people know about cognition de-
velops outside the realm of formal or informal instruction. We believe indi-
viduals spontaneously construct metacognitive theories for at least two rea-
sons. One is to systematize their growing repertoire of cognitive skills and
strategies as well as metacognitive knowledge about those strategies. A sec-
ond reason is to come to grips with what it means to be an effective, strategic
Individuals no doubt utilize a variety of strategies to construct metacog-
nitive theories. In some cases, construction may involve what Flavell et al.
(1993) refer to as phenomenological bootstrapping (see also Beckwith, 1991),
in which children and adults project their cognitive experiences onto others
and/or use these experiences as a basis for general re ection on the nature of
Other theorists also note the important role of private, re ective analy-
sis of one’s own cognition. Paris and Byrnes (1989) have suggested that self-
directed re ection develops in young children as part of self-correction and
takes on increasing importance as children grow older. Kamiloff-Smith (1992)
takes a similar view, suggesting that re ection leads to the restructuring of
one’s knowledge in a manner that promotes an increasingly theoretical un-
derstanding of one’s cognition. Both Paris and Byrnes (1989) and Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) view theory building as initially domain-speci c, followed by a
gradual extension of one’s theory to other domains.
Peer Interaction. A third factor, and one we wish to highlight, is social
interaction among peers (Youniss and Damon, 1992). By peers we mean in-
dividuals who are roughly at the same cognitive level in relevant aspects so
that none can be considered an expert with cultural knowledge to be passed
on to the others. Peer interaction involves a process of social construction that
differs in part from both cultural transmission and individual construction
(Brown and Palincsar, 1989; Pressley et al., 1992), even though it also may be
affected by cultural processes (Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978). One way this
occurs is when groups of individuals engage in collective reasoning. A recent
review by Pontecorvo (1993) describes a number of advantages of collective
and socially shared reasoning processes, but especially the role played by re-
solving group dissension.
One example of the effect of peer interaction is a recent study in which
Geil and Moshman (1994) asked college students to solve Wason’s (1966)
four-card problem. This task requires a person to decide which of four cards
needs to be examined further (i.e., turned over) in order to conclusively deter-
mine the truth or falsity of a given hypothesis. Success on this task requires
the metatheoretical insight that all those cards—and only those cards—that
could falsify the hypothesis must be turned over in order to reach a de nitive
conclusion. Geil and Moshman proposed that individuals working as a group
would engage in more sophisticated hypothesis testing than individuals work-
ing alone.
Students were asked to solve the problem individually or in groups of
ve or six. Only 9% of students reached the correct solution in the individual
condition, whereas 75% of the groups did so. In half of the groups, students
were asked to solve the problem individually prior to group discussion. Of
these individuals, 35 gave an incorrect answer before discussion and a correct
answer afterward, whereas only two showed the reverse pattern. These results
are consistent with the view that discussion of one’s metacognitive concep-
tions with others may help clarify those conceptions and improve complex
problem solving.
A cultural learning explanation of these results would suggest that stu-
dents changed their responses because they internalized either the majority
view or the view of one or more group members who were perceived as ex-
perts. The data contradict this explanation, however. The correct response was
not initially the majority view, or even the most common view, in any of those
groups in which individual problem solving preceded group discussion. In
three of those groups, in fact, not a single individual initially selected the pat-
tern of cards that showed understanding of the role of falsi cation in hypoth-
esis testing. All three of these groups nonetheless were among those that ulti-
mately agreed on the correct response.
It appears, then, that the falsi cation insight was actively constructed
and/or applied in the course of the discussion rather than being imposed by
the majority or by an expert. It is noteworthy in this respect that there was ini-
tial disagreement in all of the groups. One may speculate that this facilitated
group interaction and that such interaction is at least as important as individ-
ual re ection in the construction of a metacognitive theory.
Conclusion. It seems plausible that cultural learning, individual construc-
tion, and peer interaction all play important roles in the emergence of meta-
cognitive theories. Moreover, it is likely that their in uence is interactive
rather than simply additive. By interactive, we mean that improvements made
via any of the three factors described above reciprocally affect the remaining
factors. For example, the communication of speci c information about cogni-
tion via direct instruction may enhance a student’s ability to construct an in-
formal or formal theory of his or her own cognition. Similarly, peer discussion
and collective theorizing about cognition may enhance the effectiveness of di-
rect instruction. In general, we believe that cultural learning, individual con-
struction, and peer interaction are not mutually exclusive pathways to self-
regulation, but are interrelated. An important direction for future research is
to explore the interactive role of these factors in the emergence of metacogni-
tive theories.
Research and application with respect to metacognitive theories require
means for characterizing such theories. One possible approach is to model a
person’s expertise, including his or her metacognitive theory about that ex-
pertise, using verbal report procedures (Ericsson and Oliver, 1988). While
subject to criticism, under some circumstances the verbal report technique
offers direct access to otherwise unobservable processes such as metacog-
nition, mental models, and personal theories. We believe this method may
be especially useful during preliminary investigations of metacognitive
A second approach is to compare individuals on a task that can be per-
formed more ef ciently with a theory-in-action, by implementing a mental
model of the task at hand, or when one possesses a formal metacognitive the-
ory. For example, Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974-75), found that older
children were more likely than younger children to construct a theory-in-ac-
tion of a block balancing task and, in turn, to use evidence from their perfor-
mance to con rm or discon rm their theory. Veri cation of the theory led to
improved performance. Similarly, Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) proposed
that the use of different mental models of writing led to differences in the
quality of writing among older children and adults. One possibility would be
to observe expert and novice teachers as they evaluate their students. These
teachers would be expected to differ in two ways: (a) with respect to their
explicit awareness of their own metacognitive theory, and (b) the extent to
which they use their metacognitive theory to evaluate their students’ cognition
and performance.
A third approach is to use computer modeling techniques to approximate
the structure of a metacognitive theory. For example, Goldsmith, Johnson, and
Acton (1991) have generated multidimensional representations of complex
structural knowledge within a domain using the Path nder system. Computer
simulations in this case are based on empirical data collected from students
who completed a semester-long course. Simulations also could be created
based on theory-driven parameters rather than empirical data. This procedure
is fairly routine among researchers attempting to construct expert systems and
arti cial intelligence.
It is important to note, however, that numerous measurement problems
are endemic to the study of metacognition and especially metacognitive the-
ories. Due to the complexity of the knowledge that must be assessed, prob-
lems related to reliability are inevitable. Assuming that metacognitive theo-
ries can be detected reliably, the problem of comparing one person’s theory
to another still exists. Although computer programs are available to make
such comparisons (Goldsmith et al., 1991), they are not without their crit-
ics. One of the greatest challenges for researchers will be to develop reli-
able methodologies for detecting and representing people’s metacognitive
Educational Implications
One criticism of traditional instruction is that it encourages passive rather
than active learning and thus may lead to inert knowledge structures. Many
recent instructional programs have sought to improve learning by encourag-
ing students to be more active and constructive and by providing greater op-
portunities for peer interaction. For example, a number of programs designed
to improve reading provide explicit and sustained strategy instruction in skills
such as predicting and summarizing (Brown and Palincsar, 1989) and encour-
age discussions designed to increase metacognitive awareness about those
strategies (Cross and Paris, 1988).
Although many of these programs are quite effective at improving strat-
egy use, performance, and metacognitive awareness, few if any seek to pro-
mote what we refer to as metacognitive theories. Thus, although students may
attempt spontaneously to systematize their skills and knowledge into a the-
ory-like structure, there is little encouragement or assistance for such efforts.
Lacking a theory, many students are unable to explain their cognitive perfor-
mance or to plan effectively.
Kuhn (1989) has argued that children and adolescents have a great deal
of dif culty engaging in scienti c reasoning because they fail to understand
how theories work; that is, they do not distinguish between the formal pos-
tulates of the theory and the data that are used to test those postulates. Many
students, including those in college, may nd it especially dif cult to con-
struct meaningful theories of their own cognition. Providing these students
with metacognitive knowledge and regulatory skills is important, and many
effective educational programs do so. However, many of these programs fall
short of helping students (a) to understand the structure of theories, and (b)
to use theories to systematize self-knowledge and apply that knowledge to
For this reason, we believe instructional programs should include three
additional instructional components: (a) a rationale for the importance of
metacognitive theorizing, (b) examples of informal and formal metacognitive
theories, and (c) ways to construct metacognitive theories. Regarding the sec-
ond point, one possibility is for teachers or mentors to explicitly model their
own knowledge about their expertise and about how they regulate their expert
performance. A rather different approach would be to use a formal instruc-
tional model such as Sternberg’s (1986) triarchic theory.
One program that makes an attempt to accomplish these goals among
younger students is the transactional strategy instruction model described in
Pressley et al. (1992). In the transactional model, even young readers are en-
couraged to theorize to themselves (typically out loud) and to others about the
reading process. Students also are shown how to construct text meanings and
are encouraged to do so. One advantage of this program is that it promotes
thinking about learning that draws on individual, cultural, and peer in uences.
Over time, transactional instruction may promote the kind of explicit theoreti-
cal understanding of one’s learning that we have associated with informal and
especially formal metacognitive theories.
There remains the question of when individuals are rst “ready” to en-
gage in metacognitive theorizing. Some educators may believe that metacog-
nitive skills should be excluded from the curriculum until basic skills are mas-
tered. An alternative view is that metacognitive awareness and metacognitive
theorizing should parallel, or perhaps even precede, basic skills instruction.
The developmental research described earlier in this paper suggests that
most children are able to theorize about their own cognition by the age of
four (Flavell et al., 1993; Montgomery, 1992) even though the depth and
breadth of their theorizing continues to develop throughout their school ca-
reers (Chandler, 1988; Moore and Frye, 1991), into adolescence (Kuhn,
1989) and adulthood (Benack and Basseches, 1989; King and Kitchener,
1994). Children also appear to use simple constructed theories to regulate
their performance (Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder, 1974–75; cf. Moshman,
1979). These ndings suggest that it is reasonable to place some degree of
emphasis on metacognitive theorizing from the time a child enters school re-
gardless of his or her skill level.
In conclusion, we believe that schools should actively promote metacog-
nitive theorizing among all students. Research indicates that theorizing im-
proves both performance and understanding of one’s performance. Research
further supports the claim that metacognitive theorizing can be facilitated by
self-talk and peer interactions that focus on the process rather than the prod-
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... This enables an individual to accomplish a task, by choosing the appropriate strategies within his/her knowledge in learning process. Finally, conditional knowledge seeks an answer to the question of why and when various cognitive strategies should be used (Alt & Raichel, 2020;Altıok et al., 2019;Larkin, 2009;Yore & Treagust, 2006;Hartman, 2001;Schraw & Moshman, 1995;Schraw & Dennison, 1994). In this way, an individual can rationally use appropriate cognitive strategies and apply appropriate usage procedures of strategies in the face of a situation that is likely to occur in the learning process. ...
... Schraw and Dennison (1994) defined them as five factors of metacognitive regulation as follow: planning, knowledge management, debugging, monitoring and evaluation. Planning refers to the process of choosing appropriate strategies and allocating the right cognitive resources to accomplish a specific task (Teng 2020;Altıok et al., 2019;Schraw & Moshman 1995;Schraw & Dennison 1994). Information management requires the use of a variety of skills and strategies, such as organizing, summarizing, and elaborating information (Schraw & Dennison 1994). ...
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The present study dealt with exploring to what extent asynchronous virtual learning environment (ASVLE) and synchronous virtual learning environment (SVLE) enhance students' metacognitive awareness in L3 German learning process. During a five-week intervention, the students of the experimental group were taught L3 German synchronously through the BigBlueButton web conferencing system. In contrast, course notes, video-recordings were shared on Moodle Learning Management System (MLMS) asynchronously with those of the control group. The study was conducted on 72 undergraduates and assessed based on the pre-and post-tests of the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) and semi-structured interviews. The findings indicated that SVLE improved the MAI scores of students in the experimental group. In addition, the findings obtained from the interviews revealed that the interaction between student-instructors in SVLE increased the students' motivation and engagements into the courses compared to ASVLE. As for ASVLE, there was no evidence about the enhancements of the students of control group in terms of metacognitive awareness before and after intervention. Transactional distance and poor quality of the relationship between students and instructor caused students to give up learning L3 German.
... Agnew (2002) continued by asserting that students are encouraged to develop higher order thinking skills though ICT. An important element of students' learning, metacognition, has two main subcomponents such as knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, as cited in Amin, 2013. Knowledge of cognition refers to what we know about our cognition and regulation of cognition refers to planning, monitoring, and evaluation of our cognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, as cited in Schraw, Crippen & Hartley, 2006. ...
... An important element of students' learning, metacognition, has two main subcomponents such as knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, as cited in Amin, 2013. Knowledge of cognition refers to what we know about our cognition and regulation of cognition refers to planning, monitoring, and evaluation of our cognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, as cited in Schraw, Crippen & Hartley, 2006. In a study by Hollingworth and McLoughlin (2001), ICT has been integrated in teaching-learning to promote learners' metacognitive skills. ...
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ICT generally relates to those technologies that are used for accessing, gathering, manipulating and presenting or communicating information. ICT integration is a complex and multi layered phenomenon. Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has formulated ICT policy 2015 to emphasize the integration of ICT in the field of Education and Research to ensure quality teaching-learning. Previously the researchers studied the current status of ICT in the context of secondary education in Bangladesh. However, there is still a lack of a research that focuses on how effectively the teachers integrate ICT. This study aims to fill the gap by determining how teachers integrate ICT in teaching-learning effectively and by exploring the changes in the teaching-learning of secondary education after ICT integration. This study also explores the challenges which hampers the effective integration of ICT and recommends some suggestions to overcome this situation. This study has used Logic Model for Evaluation of Technology Integration to determine whether the teachers are integrating ICT effectively in classroom situation. The data sources were two teachers and thirty students from each of ten schools. Hence, total sample size is of the study was 320 (300 students + 20 teachers). Moreover, one teacher from each class has been observed to explore practices. Data obtained from questionnaire and observation has been analyzed using Statistical package software SPSS v20.0. According to our findings, majority of secondary schools are not well equipped with ICT facilities like multimedia, sound system and internet. Besides, those schools have no scope of using ICT to apply and complete admission process; however, providing test result through ICT has been adopted in most of the schools. Though ICT has been integrated in the classroom, teachers and students are in short of sound technical skills to use ICT for educational purpose. As such, usage of ICT is very limited. Teachers are well aware of the positive impact the ICT enabled teaching learning can have on learning outcomes. However, they do not find time to develop their ICT skills as well as devote sufficient time for developing ICT enabled teaching learning materials. Furthermore, majority of our teachers have faced problems with handling of hardware, application software as well as other forms of technical glitches. By exploring these issues, this research can inform the policy- makers, curriculum developers, teachers and other stakeholders about the level of implementation as well as the occurrences of changes in teaching-learning that ICT integration brings in secondary education
... For instance, Paris and colleagues (e.g., Paris & Oka, 1986) introduced a component called "conditional metacognitive knowledge" that focused on children's ability to justify or explain their decision concerning memory activities. Whereas the declarative metamemory component introduced by Flavell and Wellman focused on "knowing that," conditional metamemory referred to "knowing why" (see also Schraw & Moshman, 1995). ...
In this chapter, major trends in the development of metacognitive competences and its relationship to various aspects of cognitive/academic performance are described, with a focus on metamemory and reading comprehension. In a first step, classic and more recent theoretical models of metacognitive competences are presented that elaborate on the development of the declarative and procedural components of metacognition. The declarative component focuses on explicit and verbalizable knowledge, whereas the procedural component deals with monitoring and self-regulation processes. Common measures of both components are presented next, followed by a description of major developmental trends, as indicated by cross-sectional and longitudinal studies on developmental differences and changes in declarative knowledge, memory and comprehension monitoring, and self-regulation. Furthermore, research findings illustrating the relationship between metacognitive competences and cognitive performance in childhood and adolescence are presented for the domains of memory and reading comprehension, respectively. The final section focuses on educational implications of research on metacognition, underlining the importance of teacher behavior in the classroom and special instruction programs for students’ acquisition of metacognitive competences.
... Deliberate practice also enhances metacognition. Metacognition refers to an individual's ability to reflect upon, understand, and control one's learning (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Athletes' ability to reflect on their thoughts and actions in a superior fashion compared to individuals not engaged in deliberate practice can be very beneficial in a variety of ways (MacIntyre et al., 2014). ...
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In this paper, some results about the controllability of spectral centrality in a complex network are presented. In particular, the inverse problem of designing an unweigthed graph with a prescribed centrality is considered. We show that for every possible ranking, eventually with ties, an unweighted directed/undirected complex network can be found whose PageRank or eigenvector centrality gives the ranking considered. Different families of networks are presented in order to analytically solve this problem either for directed and undirected graphs with and without loops.
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The main purpose of this research is to determine the effects of metacognitive thinking skills and metacognitive reading skills of students at normal and gifted levels on reading comprehension. The research was carried out by random sampling method with totally 408 students in Istanbul, including 83 gifted students in the fifth grade who are studying at two science and art centers, and 324 students in the fifth grade who are in normal schools in Istanbul. In this study, total data was generated with the combination of “A Form of Metacognitive Awareness Inventory”, “Reading Strategies of Metacognitive Awareness Inventory”, “Personal Information Form” perpared by researchers, and “Reading Comprehension Test" for testing the comprehension of what they read. Collected data, which is in accordance with the purpose of this study, was analyzed by 20 packets of IBM SPSS software programs. Firstly, we demonstrated the frequency and percentage distributions of demographic variables picked from the “Personal Information Form”. Then, the arithmetic average and standard deviation values were calculated by using the sub-dimensions of “A Form of Metacognitive Awareness Inventory”, “Reading Strategies of Metacognitive Awareness Inventory”. The frequency and percentage distribution, mean, standard deviations were calculated and T-test score is analyzed by the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Researchers also investigated whether there is a significant difference between metacognitive thinking and metacognitive reading scores and demographic variables in the student participating in the research. As a result, a significant relationship was detected, between metacognitive thinking, metacognitive reading and demographic information.
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Students with learning difficulties have the right to enjoy equal opportunities in all areas of their lives and in education. The integrated teaching approach S.T.E.M. teaches students Science and Technology through exploratory activities. In this way, the interdisciplinarity of these areas is highlighted and students acquire skills that will be particularly useful to them in modern life. Such activities can play a very important role in educating children with learning disabilities as they can acquire the appropriate knowledge and skills and thus ensure equal opportunities in both academic and social life. In this way, in addition to the cognitive ones, we also have psychological benefits for the students, favoring their social integration. The present research is a bibliographic review in which the necessary adjustments that are necessary in order to have the maximum possible benefits from students with learning difficulties are investigated. The relationship between such activities and cognitive and metacognitive skills are also being explored. The results showed that education in the S.T.E.M. It has cognitive and psychological benefits for students with learning disabilities and at the same time can benefit from the development of skills necessary for the social integration of these children.
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Gifted students, although they have high IQ and high potentials, often face several difficulties and problems, which is why they are included in the Special Education sector. The term of giftedness is hardly be defined by a single definition, because there are many factors that affect it, such as cognitive and metacognitive skills, executive functions and consciousness. The aim of this study is to investigate new developments in the understanding and development of giftedness. The most important theories of giftedness, metacognition, executive functions and brain training are analyzed. Moreover the contribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in gifted education is also analyzed, since ICT consists of many techniques and tools, which can be used as ways of intervening in gifted students. The present study is a bibliographic review based on high-level scientific articles. The results showed that giftedness is closely related to the term metacognition, which is important for the development of the individual. Gifted students have increased metacognitive skills and they are able to develop their consciousness.
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This study focuses on identification of metacognitive development levels among students in their grade 5 in either (a) mainstream elementary schools, (b) elementary schools implementing Dalton education elements in their curriculum or (c) elementary schools implementing RWCT program in their daily activities. The main goal of the empirical study is to verify or disprove the assumption which states that the type of educational programme can influence the metacognitive development of a child in a specific reading domain. That is why author of this text examines the level of (a) the regulation aspect and (b) knowledge aspect of metacognition at research sample of 1103 students from different types of elementary schools. The results of this study verify the hypothesis that the type of education program has direct influence on metacognitive development of a student: (a) students of RWCT elementary can better judge the relative effectivity of suggested strategies based on the task situation (metacognitive knowledge) and together with student from Dalton plan elementary schools they are able to (b) recognize false answers from correct ones and are also (c) more accurate in their error approximations of answers related to reading comprehension (metacognitive regulation). Students from RWCT elementary schools, as well as from Dalton plan elementary were significantly better at (d) scoring high in their tests which evaluated the reading comprehension levels, than their peers in mainstream schools. Students from RWCT elementary schools, as well as from Dalton plan elementary also (e) showed a slight underestimation in their performance. The conclusion part of the study suggests possible outcome explanations of the differences among individual types of study programmes in relation to the metacognitive knowledge and regulation levels among students (based on curriculum) and also suggestions for future research in this specific area, limits of this study and suggestions for theory and clinical practice.