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Modern Science: A Case of Collective Intelligence?
On the Role of Thought Economy and Gratifying Attention in Knowledge Production*
Georg Franck
Dept. of Digital Methods in Architecture and Planning
Institute of Architectural Sciences, Vienna University of Technology
franck@iemar.tuwien.ac.at
Intelligence, however it may be defined otherwise, denotes the capability of
using one’s attention efficiently. Being intelligent means to selectively pay
attention to what is relevant in the situation and most useful according to one’s
own aspirations. Attention, according to William James, “is the taking
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization,
concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from
some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which
has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French
is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German.”1 Attention, in order to align
the definition to the concept of efficiency, is the capacity of processing
information in a both highly selective and fully conscious way. This capacity,
that is the point of James’ definition, is of limited volume. How narrow this
capacity is in fact you can check immediately if you try to pay attention to two
independent processes simultaneously or to read this page by doubling the
speed you are accustomed to. The capacity is frighteningly narrow, given the
abundance of things deserving observance. Paying attention, to put it
economically, has considerable opportunity costs. It costs to ignore, at the same
time, everything except the particular object focussed. The allocation of
attention thus has to cope with a characteristic asymmetry between the
* Published in: Angewandte Chemie, International Edition, 2012-51/29, pp.
7088-92
1 James (1890), vol. 1, pp. 403f
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 2/12
potential uses and the uses realizable. In short, attention, for any person with
vivid interests, is a notoriously scarce resource.
Thinking and theorising are activities with significantly high demands on
attention. Attention, accordingly, is the critical input to scientific research. From
its very beginning, doing science has meant to get to grips with the limited
bandwidth of the capacity of consciously processing information. Since the
bandwidth of simultaneous processing is defined organically, thinking worth
its name starts with colonising the dimension of succession, i.e. of time. The
most basic and proven technology of involving the dimension of succession
into mental activity is language. To cast an idea into the form of language
means to decompose it into standardized units (words), suited for sequentially
passing the bottleneck of simultaneous processing and to be used repeatedly.
By concatenating the units according to mechanical (syntactic) rules, content is
sequenced into the form of sentences, which, in turn, can be linked up to
descriptions of any complexity.
From Thought Economy to the Knowledge Industry
Language thus proves to be the basic technology of thought economy. It vastly
amplifies the weak forces of unarmed attention. It overcomes the narrow limits
of the naturally defined capacity of conscious information processing.
Language empowers attention to deal, in a controlled way, with ideas whose
complexity vastly overburdens the forces of unarmed attention. It was only
logical, thus, that science started with developing the thought economic
potentials of language.2 By applying language onto itself, i.e. by explicitly
describing the meaning of words, words were turned into concepts with
sharply demarcated meaning. The leverage of language was further enhanced
by extending the specification and refinement of concepts through the
elaboration of terminologies, which, in turn, paved the way to the definition of
2 It is strange, thus, to find that the theory of science grossly ignores the role that thought
economy plays in scientific research. Remarkable exceptions to the rule are the classics Mach
(1883) and Husserl (1935). Until today, even psychology, sociology and economics of science
feel justified to circumvent the topic.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 3/12
artificial languages such as symbolisms that allow formalisation. It was by way
of the formalisation of language that thought economy could cross the
threshold to mechanisation. The upshot of formalisation is calculation, i.e. the
gain of precise information by a purely mechanical manipulation of symbols.
Mechanisation advanced when mathematics was utilized as a language of
description (and when empiricism, accordingly, developed systematic
observation into the methodology of measurement). Simultaneous equation
systems are capable of turning descriptions into models that work as abstract
machines. These abstract machines can be turned into concrete machines when
translated into algorithms implemented on digital machinery. By involving
digital machinery, mechanisation of cognitive labour finds itself extended to
automation.3 Eventually, cognitive labour thus harnesses external sources of
energy, as does physical labour in heavy industry.
Progress in science remains poorly understood if seen as an accumulation of
discoveries only. Progress in science always has had roots in, and repercussions
on, progress in thought economy. Remarkably, progress in thought economy
materialised in technology not only, but in methodology also and even in the
social organisation of cognitive work. A case in point is Descartes’ contribution
to the methodology of modern science. Descartes is famous for having
introduced the rational method (laid down in his Discours de la méthode, 1637)
to science. The rational method is an extension of the know-how of dealing with
complex ideas that natural language has incorporated since ever. Scientific
research starts with describing, i.e. with sequencing the problem. Description as
such is not enough, however. The problem has to be analysed. Analysis,
according to the rational method, means decomposition of the complex
problem into components of manageable size. The rational method is the
instruction of how to decompose complex problems into simpler and simpler
ones in such a way that the solution to the complex problem can be re-
composed out of the solutions of the simpler ones. The re-composition of the
solutions of the decomposed problems is called synthesis. Analysis and
synthesis are two sides of the same medal. Most remarkably, the interplay of
analysis and synthesis was a significant innovation in thought economy not
3 Today, even the borders between theory and experimentation are blurred by the role that
simulation models play in, e.g. materials science or the study of climate change. See Galison
1996.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 4/12
only, but an anticipation also for a century or so of the methods of what then
should become known as industrialisation.
Industrialisation means systematic exploitation of the potentials that the
division of labour holds for productivity. It means, on the micro-level,
decomposition of complex operations into simpler and simpler steps in such a
way that the single steps become susceptible to mechanisation and, in part at
least, to machination. Industrialisation means, on the macro-level,
differentiation of specialised lines of production that produce inputs to other
lines of specialised production. On the micro-level, the analogy between the
industrial and the scientific division of labour is close to perfect. As in physical
work, the division of cognitive work exploits the economies of routinisation
and mechanisation. Tangible machinery in material production immediately
corresponds to those “abstract machines” built of symbolisms. Regarding the
efficiency they enhance in human labour, theories built of symbolisms such as
the differential calculus or the chemical symbolism need not fear comparison
with the machinery arming physical labour in heavy industry.
On the macro-level, the analogy between scientific and industrial production is
not so obvious. There have been, to be sure, specialised lines of knowledge
production since antiquity. Regarding efficiency, however, the point of
differentiated lines of industrial production lies in their re-integration by
markets that organise exchange as well as the evaluation of output. It is first the
pricing of inputs and outputs that instructs of how to economise production. In
science, output is exchanged by way of publication, which means that the
output is not sold for money but delivered free of cost. In scientific
communication, accordingly, there is no formation of money prices. In the case
that there is no evaluation involved in the exchange of scientific information, it
is pointless to ask scientific production to be efficient. As rational as the thought
economy may be on the individual level, there will be nothing securing
rationality on the collective level.4
4 Cf. Franck (2002).
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 5/12
Remarkably though, at the same time when Descartes’ rational method became
professional standard, scientific communication underwent a substantial
transformation. Up to the seventeenth century, scholars, even in mathematics
and astronomy, were pre-eminently concerned with protecting their claims to
priority through secretiveness and mystification.5 Since information is power,
there is a constant temptation to monopolise it. Why communicate a discovery,
why share it with other researchers if you can sell it to some ruler or patron in
order to earn your living? It was only through the emergence of a novel kind of
entertainment business that publication became the regular completion of
making discoveries. Rumours of exciting discoveries stipulated the interest of a
bored aristocracy in being introduced to the new continent of science. The
interest could be met by utilising the novel involvement of science into
experimentation. Presenting experiments is like performing tricks in front of an
audience. A wave of start-ups took the opportunity of meeting the demand of
challenging entertainment. The entertainment of noblemen was one of the
purposes of the academies and learned societies founded in the 17th century.6
Aristocrats were supposed to observe a code of conduct different from that of
researchers as well as businessmen. Noblemen will be free of the temptation of
selling tomorrow as their own discovery what they learnt today in a scholarly
lecture. The scholar, accordingly, did not risk to be stolen his right of
authorship and priority. As long as there were reliable witnesses around, this
risk was minimal even when other scholars were in the audience. Testimony of
a noble audience, rather, became the first step to what later came to be called
intellectual property.
By publishing your findings in the right place you could acquire two things:
reputation as a scientist and intellectual property of your discovery. Acquiring
reputation means to become known for what you have achieved. It means to be
paid attention by others for the achievement of which you have invested your
own attention. Being paid attention is an excellent form of gratification, it is the
wage of fame. As soon as scientists work for acquiring reputation, scientific
communication assumes the character of a market. Scientists henceforth publish
for being paid attention. The role of intellectual property finds itself changing
accordingly. Its primary purpose turns into the justification of the claim of
5 Cf. Rescher (1989), p. 34.
6 See Ravetz (1971) and the literature cited there.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 6/12
earning attention. In this regard, the publication in written form of the
proceedings of the meetings proved an effective and productive system for the
authentication and protection of the stake of the creative scientist in the
intellectual property created by his innovative efforts.7 Publication puts
intellectual property at the disposal of the general public under the sole
condition that its processing into the user's intellectual property is credited by
citation.
In terms of attention, citation is not free of cost. It means, rather, transfer of a
part of the attention that the citing author earns for her or his work to the cited
author. Citation thus tests the preparedness to pay on the part of the scientist
looking for pre-processed information as a means of production. Citation,
moreover, tests the preparedness to pay on the part of those who are competent
to understand and thus to judge the value of the information offered. Since the
account of the citations a theory or a theorem earns measures how often it is
used as a means of production, the process of citation amounts to a measuring
process of the pragmatic value of scientific information.
Even though it seems at first sight that scientific information is withdrawn from
price formation, we thus discover that there is a pricing of scientific output.
Moreover, we face a regular market doing the job. The introduction of the open
scientific literature can be seen as the emergence of a producer’s market for pre-
processed information. Scientists offer their own product as a means of
production for subsequent stages of knowledge production. The product is sold
not before its re-use is documented by way of citation.8
For the piece of information, being cited means showing to re-enter production
as a means of production. It means, in short, showing to be productive. For the
author, being cited means to be paid attention. It is only through being amply
cited that you can grow rich in terms of expert attention. Growing rich in expert
7 Cf. Ravetz (1971), p. 249.
8 It may be even rational for the scientist to bear the money cost of publication by publishing her
or his output in ‘open access’ media that offer it free of cost on the Internet. By thus enhancing
accessibility on the part of potential users, the money costs born by the supplier are an
investment into the prospects of attention returns. It is what in other contexts is called outlay on
sales promotion.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 7/12
attention means to accumulate reputation up to the level of fame. On the other
hand, there is nothing you can do better for the collective advancement of
science than being productive in the eyes of those competent to judge the value
of your work. Scientists are thus exactly doing what they are supposed to do
when they maximise citations in the way entrepreneurs maximise profits.9 The
collective progress of knowledge is maximised, in the eyes of those capable of
judging it, when the ruling motive of the working scientist is the maximisation
of the attention he or she receives from his or her peers.10
As soon as scientists work for publishing the output and as soon as scientific
communication works as a market where information is exchanged for
attention, the analogy of scientific production and industrial production is
established also on the macro-level. The development of efficiency enhancing
technology in thought economy finds itself complemented by the building of
markets that connect exchange with the evaluation of output. The joint result
was the transition form an artisan to an industrial mode of knowledge
production. The proverbial unleashing of productivity that industrialisation is
known for was paralleled if not anticipated by the breakthrough of modern
science.
The Market Called Scientific Communication
Even though textbooks tend to demarcate modern from medieval science in
terms of methodology only, the line drawn in terms of economy is equally
relevant if not even more revealing. Involving economy into the theory of
science does not mean to join the chorus that money rules the world. It means,
rather, to be clear of money not being what economy is all about. It is only by
describing science as a closed economy of attention where scientists invest their
own attention in order to gain the attention of other scientists, that science
reveals its basic structure as an industry. And it is only by accounting for the
9 Cf. Franck (1999), p. 55.
10 There are exceptions to the rule, of course. They are not negligible, moreover, see Franck 2005,
ch. 3. The exceptions do not undermine the basic strength of the argument, however.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 8/12
potentials of the industrial mode of production that the stupendous success of
science and its power to gain cultural leadership can be fully appreciated.
In antiquity and the Middle Ages, there were eminent scientists – think, e.g. of a
mathematician such as Euklid, a physician such as Archimedes or a logician
such as Ockham – but there was no cultural leadership of science in those times.
Both the world view and the life world prevailing were dominated by religion.
It was only by the revolution that knowledge production underwent in the 16th
and 17th centuries that science could grow into a rival to the established religious
superpower. In this revolution, methodology played a crucial role, to be sure. It
played this role for reasons of efficiency, however. Research is a resource
consuming activity. Inefficient use of resources consumed by knowledge
production is as detrimental to the collective advancement of knowledge as are
deficiencies in method. Economic inefficiency even encompasses
methodological inadequacy. Methods are inadequate if they tend to misallocate
time and effort. The grand answer to the widespread misallocation of time and
effort in artisan knowledge production was the overall industrialisation of
science.
In an industry where cognitive work, on the individual level, is organised
according to the rational method and where, on the collective level, the
specialised lines of information production are re-integrated by competitive
markets, a tendency towards overall efficiency is free to organise itself. It
depends on circumstances, of course, how powerful this tendency can grow.
Key conditions, however, are strong incentives and effective competition.
Earning expert attention is a strong incentive indeed. It is an almost
inexhaustible source of energy, it motivates enduring efforts and ample
frustration tolerance, it is particularly well suited to attract brilliant heads. Even
for the exceedingly ambitious and the slightly megalomaniac, the wage of fame
can compensate for the higher money incomes to be earned in business or the
power to be gained in public offices. Strong incentives are functional in
connection with social control. Social control is expensive and unpleasant when
exerted by personal surveillance. It is cheap and much more agreeable when
exerted implicitly in social exchange. That is why competition is a superior
means of social control. Though far from perfect, competition on the market of
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 9/12
scientific information is effective. It cannot strictly prevent plagiarism and
downright fraud, but it ensures that violations are risky. Wherever there are
markets, there are shadow markets as well. It depends on the proportions
whether social control can be said to work. If you have an eye for proportions
you should agree that social control works in scientific communication.
When describing science as a closed economy of attention we face an industry
where a tendency towards efficiency organises itself. It even seems safe to say
that we face a social organisation that tends to allocate the attention it disposes
of efficiently. The organisational goal of science is the collective advancement of
knowledge. The advancement of knowledge cannot be measured from without
science itself. It can be judged only from within. The crux regarding the
collective intelligence of science is how those competent to judge are made to
utter their considered judgement overtly. By the requirement that the use of
foreign output as a means of one’s own production is marked by citation, the
preparedness to pay is queried on the part of those working in the field and
thus expected to be competent to judge the value of the means of production.
Citing means to transfer a part of the attention earned by one’s work to the
cited author. It is rational in the average to be honest in citing. If you cite too
much you forego an income that is rightfully yours. If you cite too little you risk
of being convicted of plagiarism. Hence, there is reason to assume that the
judgement works reasonably from within.
Insofar as intelligence means the efficient use of one’s attention, it seems thus
fair to attribute collective intelligence to the knowledge industry into which
modern science has developed. It seams reasonable to assume that a self-
organised tendency towards efficiency manifests itself in the scientific economy
of attention. Assuming that such a tendency prevails does not mean to suppose
that the overall efficiency of scientific production is particularly high. It rather
means that cases of serious malfunctioning and gross misallocation are
probably not due to the search for attention. Instead of being suspicious of the
self-organised exchange of information for attention, we should focus on the
ways science is financed and organised from outside when looking for
remedies against its major defects.
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 10/12
Science: A Case of Collective Intelligence?
Even though it is possible to identify a tendency towards efficiency in the use of
the attention working for the collective advancement of science, there is a
widespread hesitation to grant collective intelligence to science. One of the
reasons is misconduct, to be sure. Misconduct, if not excessive, is to be expected
wherever humans are involved. If the hesitation has to be taken seriously the
must be further reasons around. One of the more serious reasons might have to
do with a blind spot in the scientific view of the world. The kind of economy
described, even if effective, is hard to be recognised by science. In science and
scientific minded philosophy alike, attention is defined as the capability of
selectively processing information. This definition may be sufficient to account
of attention as the resource energising cognitive work, but certainly insufficient
to account for attention as a means of gratification. Attention, as a means of
gratification, derives its charm from the subjective nature of consciousness.
Consciousness must not be confused with the capacity of selectively processing
information. The capacity of processing information selectively can be
technically reproduced (at least in principle), the quality of being conscious
cannot. Being conscious denotes a ‘how it feels’ quality to which only its own
subject has access. This ‘how it feels’ or, as it is called, phenomenal quality of
consciousness does not exist in the perspective of the third person, the detached
observer. Since the scientific view of the world is committed to the perspective
of the third person, phenomenal consciousness seems to have no place in the
scientific view of the world.
The crux of the attribution of collective intelligence to science lies in the
question: How much ignorance about oneself is compatible with one’s being
intelligent? By being ignorant of the phenomenal quality of consciousness,
science is ignorant of an essential property of its main productive factor. Being
conscious is a regular if not necessary concomitant of self-assured cognitive and
creative functions. But that is not all. The supposedly phenomenal quality of
foreign consciousness is what makes the exchange of attention so attractive.11
When striving to obtain the attention of others it is not the processing of data in
11 Cf. Franck (1993), (2004).
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 11/12
foreign nervous systems we have in mind. What we are looking for is entering
another sphere of conscious experience. The wish to earn attention is the wish
to play a role in other people’s consciousness. What we are addicted to are the
feelings welcoming us over there.12 We are definitely not satisfied with
unconscious or half-conscious data processing having to do with our person. It
would be even one of the hardest offences to our vanity if we found ourselves
fooled by an automaton that only mimics conscious behaviour.
Without notion of the quality of subjective awareness, science is poorly
equipped to understand its own strength in making efficient use of the
attention being at its service. This mild form of schizophrenia could be
overlooked if it had no impact on the role that science plays as a social system.
Yet, its being oblivious to the nature of subjectivity not only blurs the image
science entertains of itself, it also taints the view which the scientific community
entertains of the world out there. Whether a world view implies or excludes
phenomenal consciousness makes a big difference concerning the value
attributed to certain research projects and to the ethical questions involved. A
collective kind of intelligence that is blind to the needs and wants of subjectivity
is without soul and void of morality. It is due to this blind spot that people
intuitively hesitate to award science the mark of collective intelligence.
References
Franck, Georg (1993), The economy of attention (English translation of “Die
Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit”, published in: Merkur no. 534/535, pp. 748-
761), in: Telepolis, http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/auf/5567/1.html
Franck, Georg (1999), Scientific communication: a vanity fair?, in: Science, vol.
286, no. 5437, pp. 53-55
12 Cf. Franck (1993).
G. Franck, Collective Intelligence 12/12
Franck, Georg (2002), The scientific economy of attention: A novel approach to
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Hanser
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