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The New Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) and its Complementary Mechanisms
Abstract
The New Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) is one of the first individual transferable quota systems (ITQs) and the most
referred example of implementation of right-based management in fisheries. In New Zealand various groundbreaking measures
on fisheries management have been introduced. New Zealand does not share resources with neighbouring countries. All fisheries
are under the full jurisdiction of the government and thus no external factors have affected the QMS system since its introduction.
In addition, the government’s aim of achieving economic efficiency has determined that government intervention is low. The
QMS has evolved being strongly market-based although the government changed the design of the QMS in its early stages due
to stock collapses and Maori claims. The QMS has allowed the introduction of mechanisms implemented to reduce management costs,
that are now entirely borne by the industry and tools aiming at providing flexibility to the system such as the deemed value
instrument and the annual catch entitlement (ACE). Participation is another of the major improvements of the QMS. Indeed the
management process is consulted to a wide variety of stakeholders who actively participate in input giving even in scientific
matters. Although the system aims at reducing government intervention, drastic decisions of fishing closures are still being
taken by the government. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate New Zealand’s QMS system in terms of biological robustness,
cost-effectiveness of management, economic efficiency, and social robustness. The chapter is based on two sources of information:
desk studies and a field study trip.
KeywordsQMS-Individual transferable quotas-Enforcement-Cost-recovery-Participation
... Yet, despite the fact that Icelandic fisheries have been analysed rather thoroughly, participatory aspects have not been prominent in the discussion, neither on a scientific nor on a policy level. Whereas many other fisheries management systems have placed considerable emphasis on implementing bottom-up and participatory methods (Aranda and Christensen 2009;Evans et al. 2011;Trimble and Berkes 2013), such mechanisms are still absent in Iceland. Various instruments of fisheries management have been utilised during the past 40-50 years. ...
... The misuse of power locally is just one example of the possible criticisms levelled against co-management regimes. Others that are mentioned frequently concern the costly and time-consuming processes that co-management can entail (Aranda and Christensen 2009) and also that inclusiveness may not be as comprehensive as originally intended (Yandle 2003). The latter is a complex problem, but largely a semantic one, concerning how to define precisely the term 'stakeholder' (Eythórsson 2003;Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001;Soliman 2014b). ...
Icelandic fisheries have gone through tremendous changes since the 1980s and the gradual implementation of individual transferable quotas. The paper investigates to what extent the power of different stakeholders in the fisheries management system has changed, and examines whether and in which fields enhanced participation is favoured by relevant stakeholder groups. Strengths and weaknesses of participation within the system are scrutinized and alternatives assessed. The analytical framework stems from the concept of adaptive co-management, whereas the empirical data derives from a survey on Icelandic fisheries management among important stakeholder groups. This survey showed that the critique of individual transferable quotas is not homogeneous. Regional differences are present regarding the evaluation of the current regime, but also of proposed alternative management instruments. Overall, more stakeholder participation, especially in data gathering and decision making, is demanded. This has in fact decreased over time. The authors suggest that the perceived shortcomings of the quota system in general and the lack of stakeholder participation in particular, can be addressed by adopting certain elements of adaptive co-management.
... These include: a "paper trail" system that tracks fish from their capture to the retailer or exporter, with responsibilities and accountabilities at each step; convincing the courts to take fisheries infringements seriously and impose heavy penalties, including jail sentences and forfeiture of vessels and other gear involved in the offense; and a sophisticated compliance system. Such initiatives are covered elsewhere (Aranda and Christensen, 2009). ...
Mace, P. M., Sullivan, K. J., and Cryer, M. 2014. The evolution of New Zealand's fisheries science and management systems under ITQs. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 71: 204–215.
New Zealand implemented a comprehensive management system using individual transferable quotas in 1986 that has been instrumental in guiding the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of fisheries science, fisheries management, and the fishing industry ever since. However, at the time of the initial design, a number of issues were not adequately considered. These relate mainly to the dynamic nature of fish stocks, multispecies considerations, and environmental and other externalities. Subsequent efforts to address these issues have been challenging and many are not yet fully resolved. The outcomes for fisheries science, stock status, multispecies management, ecosystem effects, and fishing industry accountability have been mixed, although mostly positive. Fisheries science, fisheries management, and the fishing industry have all become much more professionalized and their activities have been increasingly streamlined. New initiatives to further improve the system continue to be researched and implemented. Overall, we believe that the positives considerably outweigh the negatives. The initial design has proved to be a system that can be built upon. Comparing New Zealand with most of the rest of the world, key positive outcomes for preventing overfishing are the current lack of significant overcapacity in most fisheries, the development of biological reference points and a harvest strategy standard, the favourable stock status for the majority of stocks with known status, and the development and implementation of comprehensive risk assessments and management plans to protect seabirds and marine mammals.
[Recommended citation: Hopkins, C.C.E., Hegland, T.J. & Wilson, D.W. 2013. Review of the Faroe Islands’ fisheries governance system: Objective setting and implementation. Contribution to Task 1.2 of the MYFISH project ‘Maximising yield of fisheries while balancing ecosystem, economic and social concerns. EU FP7 Project No. 289257 MYFISH. 58 pp.]
This report is part of a European Union (EU) FP7 project ‘Maximizing yield of fisheries while balancing ecosystem, economic and social concerns’ (Acronym: MYFISH) and one case study for Task 1.2, which aimed to review existing and proposed MSY variants, constraints and management measures. Accordingly, we have looked outwards from the EU to selected fisheries in other parts of the world (Australia, Alaska and the Faroe Islands) to investigate as ‘case studies’ which illustrate various aspects of sound governance from which the EU can potentially learn. The overall aim of Task 1.2 is to discover best practices and lessons learned with respect to MSY variants, objective (i.e. aim or goal) setting and implementation processes (i.e. means to achieve objectives), including the strengths and weaknesses, constraints and trade-offs, concerning the overall governance system for the particular fishery. We consider these ‘practices’ with regard to the three ‘pillars’ of sustainable development (c.f. Brundtland, 1987) and we refer to these three sustainability objectives as being a) Bio-ecological; b) Economic; and c) Social. We also consider ‘Governance’ as forming an integrative horizontal ‘beam’ interlinking the three sustainability ‘pillars’. The term ‘governance’ is defined in various ways in dictionaries. For the sake of the current study, we consider fishery governance as the sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage the fishery. We view fishery-related stakeholders as persons and/or groups which believe they have a legitimate interest in the fishery.
This specific report concerns the demersal mixed-fishery for gadoids (cod, haddock and saithe), a Faroe Islands’ fishery which is based inter alia on input (days-at-sea) management.
The future status of the surface ocean around New Zealand was projected using two Earth System Models and four emission scenarios. By 2100 mean changes are largest under Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 (RCP8.5), with a +2.5°C increase in sea surface temperature, and decreases in surface mixed layer depth (15%), macronutrients (7.5–20%), primary production (4.5%) and particle flux (12%). Largest macronutrient declines occur in the eastern Chatham Rise and subantarctic waters to the south, whereas dissolved iron increases in subtropical waters. Surface pH projections, validated against subantarctic time-series data, indicate a 0.335 decline to ∼7.77 by 2100. However, projected pH is sensitive to future CO2 emissions, remaining within the current range under RCP2.6, but decreasing below it by 2040 with all other scenarios. Sub-regions vulnerable to climate change include the Chatham Rise, polar waters south of 50°S, and subtropical waters north of New Zealand, whereas the central Tasman Sea is least affected.
Abstract This paper ,considers ,the costs of fisheries ,management. ,In reviewing ,the costs of fisheries management in Iceland, Newfoundland and Norway this study, as well as information from other countries, indicates that fisheries management costs are generally quite substantial relative to the value of landed catch. Itfollows that the common ,practice of ignoring ,fisheries management ,costs in the derivation of optimal ,fisheries rules and ,the actual design ,of fisheries ,policy is generally erroneous, perhaps seriously so. The necessary modifications of the usual
In this article Richard Boast considers the statutory settlements of Maori fishing claims made in 1989 and 1992. These settlements are seen as examples of a distinctive method of dealing with Maori grievances routinely used in the New Zealand legal and political system. He also considers the aftermath of the legislation, and the extent to which the recent claims of Urban Maori authorities have questioned the entire settlement process as it has evolved to date.
In this paper, I consider some older institutions and ideas from which systems of individual quota rights to fisheries may have emerged. What makes such new systems appear? Can they be regarded as new property institutions? Does an economic approach throw light on their development?
Three major drivers toward New Zealand's system for the specification, purchase, and provision of fisheries research services were the state service-sector reforms started in the mid-1980s, fisheries management reforms starting with the introduction of the quota management system in 1986, and the introduction of a cost-recovery regime for fisheries services from 1994 onwards. Our critical review of this system reveals success in providing high-quality research largely funded by those that benefit from it but only limited progress toward the objectives of increasing efficiency and accountability and devolving responsibility to stakeholders. We see two steps as essential: greater public funding of marine research (although not as an alternative to industry's paying its share) and improvement of government planning processes to provide clear linkages between fisheries-management needs and all required research, less research-provider influence, and use of the most appropriate funding mechanism. Competitiveness among research providers must also be increased. If devolution is to be pursued, industry must take the risk of investing heavily in capacity building, in restructuring of its organization, and in developing fisheries plans.
This paper has two aims. First, New Zealand’s quota management system is analysed using a simple analytical economic model. Second, the paper describes how the system has evolved in response to pressures since implementation. The quota management system has provided a remarkably robust platform for addressing fisheries management problems during its first ten years of operation. It also provided the government with an instrument for settling Maori fishing claims. In 1996, the unsubsidised New Zealand fishing industry exported most of its harvest to highly competitive international markets. The paper concludes with a discussion of contemporary challenges.
Have the first eight years of the ITQ system been a success or failure? In my opinion the ITQ system has, on balance, been a success, although it has not been problem free. The positive aspects of the QMS have been as follows.1.
The overall perception is that the economic performance of the industry has improved.
2.
The biological status of the resource has improved, with rebuild strategies in place for stocks that are below B
msy.
3.
There has been increased industry responsibility in the conduct of their fishing operations and their contribution to fisheries management decision making.
4.
An open and transparent stock assessment and TAC setting process has evolved, with participation invited from all the sector/user groups.
5.
Bycatch problems appear to have been reduced by fishers adjusting their catch mix and methods of operation, by the adoption of industry codes of practice, and by the implementation of a system of overfishing provisions that has evolved to take into account changing circumstances.
6.
Quota busting, dumping, and high grading appear to have decreased.
The following are the major difficulties or problems still being encountered, but all are being or will be addressed.1.
The allocation of fisheries rights amongst competing sector/user groups (including the commercial industry, aboriginal/traditional users, recreational fishers and environmental/conservation groups) needs to be clearly defined before property rights are conferred under ITQs. The failure to clearly define property rights in New Zealand has hindered the development of secure access to the fisheries resource for all sector/user groups.
2.
There has been no evidence of a substantial reduction in government intervention. However, the recently introduced fisheries legislation gives more responsibility to the various sector/user groups for fisheries management decision making (a form of comanagement).
3.
The administrative systems of a QMS, especially matching catch against quota, should be kept as simple as possible. The catching right (ACE) should preferably be kept separate from the property right (ITQ).
The success of the ITQ system in New Zealand can be attributed to the following four main factors.1.
New Zealand is isolated geographically with no major shared or straddling stocks.
2.
Key fishing industry players were strong supporters and promoters of the ITQ system right from the start and were instrumental in getting the system introduced. The system also enjoyed widespread support from fishery managers and politicians.
3.
The Government bought back catch histories from inshore fishers to reduce TACs in stressed inshore stocks, so fishers were compensated for catch reductions.
4.
At the time of the catch reductions for the inshore species, the offshore, deep-water species were largely underexploited. Subsequently, catches from these latter fisheries increased, which formed a strong economic base for the development of the New Zealand fishing industry.
The pace of change in New Zealand's fisheries management structures and systems has moved rather quickly since the mid 1980s in comparison with most other fishing nations. The near future is likely to be no exception. We are moving into an era of the recovery of the attributable costs of fisheries management from the industry, increased participation of sector/user groups in fisheries management, contestability of the delivery of fisheries management services, and a fundamental restructuring of the Ministry of Fisheries. All of these changes cannot but help to fundamentally alter the way that fisheries are managed in New Zealand. Watch this space for the results of this experiment and for future developments.
The failure of existing systems to achieve a sustainable equilibrium between resources and fishing effort has led to a search for alternative approaches to the management of common property resources. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), including the allocation of fixed shares of the potential harvest among licensed vessels which may be exchanged, leased or sold on an open market, have been introduced in a handful of developed countries. The paper examines evidence from New Zealand, Canada and Iceland for common tendencies and unresolved issues. Most of the benefits claimed for ITQs are economic: increased operating efficiency, rationalisation of fleet structure, improved asset management and reduced monitoring costs for central government. The literature does little to expose the underlying moral dilemmas and the concern for social equity and balanced regional development. The paper concludes that, while their efficacy has yet to be tested in complex developed fisheries and they are unlikely to usurp other regulatory mechanisms, ITQs may have an important role to play in the development of a sustainable management strategy.