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Hilary Putnam And Immanuel Kant: Two `Internal Realists'?
Abstract
Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his `internal'',`pragmatic'', `natural'' or `common-sense'' realism and Kant''s transcendentalidealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysicalpicture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world,and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-madeworld. Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the false dichotomies inherent inthat picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity inKant''s proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming thepernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondaryqualities, between things that really exist and their projections, adistinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam''s revitalisation of Kantis not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions ofscientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which havenot received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, theproblematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant''s empiricalrealism, and the extent of Kant''s commitment to conceptual pluralism.However, I argue that Putnam''s qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him tosome of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, thefamiliar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion Isuggest that Putnam might consider Hegel''s attempts to solve this problem inKant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.
... As Putnam (1991, p. 62) recognizes, his internal realism is obviously inspired by Kant's system: "talk of ordinary 'empirical' objects is not talk of things-in-themselves but only talk of things-for-us". Hence, to talk about scientific theories describing the world is to be understood not as theories talking about the world-in-itself, but as theories talking about the world-for-the-theory. Internal realism is not more realist than Kant's empirical realism (Moran, 2000). Internal realism is also a terminology inspired by Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks, in which internal questions are trivial (or quickly decidable) and external questions are meaningless (cf. ...
Much has been discussed in the philosophy of science about how we should understand the scientific enterprise. On the one hand, scientific realists believe that empirically adequate theories can be supplemented by interpretations that can mirror reality-as-it-is; on the other hand, anti-realists argue that this is not the case, as long as scientific theories make sufficiently accurate experimental predictions the addition of narratives is irrelevant for the scientific enterprise, and regarding narratives, it is preferable to remain agnostic. In this paper, we argue that realism was never really at stake in this debate.
... As Putnam (1991, p. 62) recognizes, his internal realism is obviously inspired by Kant's system: "talk of ordinary 'empirical' objects is not talk of things-in-themselves but only talk of things-for-us". Hence, to talk about scientific theories describing the world is to be understood not as theories talking about the world-in-itself, but as theories talking about the world-for-the-theory. Internal realism is not more realist than Kant's empirical realism (Moran, 2000). Internal realism is also a terminology inspired by Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks, in which internal questions are trivial (or quickly decidable) and external questions are meaningless (cf. ...
Much has been discussed in the philosophy of science about how we should understand the scientific enterprise. On the one hand, scientific realists believe that empirically adequate theories can be supplemented by interpretations that can mirror reality-as-it-is; on the other hand, anti-realists argue that this is not the case, as long as scientific theories make sufficiently accurate experimental predictions the addition of narratives is irrelevant for the scientific enterprise, and regarding narratives, it is preferable to remain agnostic. In this paper, we argue that realism was never really at stake in this debate.
... Just because the two may conflict at times, does not mean we should abandon the joint exploration of ontology (being) and epistemology (knowledge or truth) entirely. For Putnam, common-sense intuitions about the world should be preserved regardless of the ever-evolving nature of the standards and norms by which we judge their acceptability (Moran, 2000). From his point of view, the truth is indeed 'out there'. ...
In this article, the authors conduct a historical review of recent philosophies influencing the Occupational Therapy profession in the United States (analytic philosophy and Continental varieties such as neopragmatism). Four philosophical categories are explored: epistemology, axiology, ontology, and praxis. The dominant strand of analytic philosophy is characterized by reductionist views of knowledge and reality, with little sustained attention to ethics and practical action. Competing but lesser recognized Continentally-inspired philosophies offer a critical and more phenomenological approach which values human subjectivities, narratives, and social agency. The authors argue that the dominance of analytic philosophy has created the intellectual foundations for neoliberalism to thrive and permeate the profession of Occupational Therapy in its curricula, practice models, reimbursement systems, and research agenda. As this Northern (United States) version of Occupational Therapy expands globally, the danger exists for professional neocolonialism to occur which can negatively influence or contradict more local ways of knowing and doing. The article concludes by offering strategies to unmask, disentangle, and dismantle Occupational Therapy from its Northern roots towards wider acceptance of Southern epistemologies, ethics, and collective action.
Keywords:
Philosophy; Occupational Therapy; Professional Practice; Colonialism; Politics
... Dummett (1978), p. 146. 25 See Putnam (1980Putnam ( , 1981Putnam ( , 1982Putnam ( , 1983Putnam ( , 1987Putnam ( , 1988Putnam ( , 1990Putnam ( , 1999. Cf. Moran (2000), Stevenson (1983) and Walker (1983). particular argues that although (semantic) anti-realism can "help us to understand" Kant's doctrine, "there are profound differences between the Kantian position" and this view. ...
Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.
... It is somewhat ironic that in rejecting Hick's pluralistic hypothesis on the grounds that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon determines an unacceptable degree of cognitive delusion in religious beliefs, Harrison proposes to adhere to a much more radically Kantian setting, namely that of internal realism. According to Putnam, Kant is the precursor of internal realism and the paradigmatic adversary of any form of metaphysical realism, due to his understanding of the content of experience of reality in terms of the conceptual apparatuses of the mind (Moran 2000). Conceptual schemes do not simply provide an explanation of experience: they determine its content. ...
Victoria S. Harrison’s theory of internal pluralism approaches religious beliefs in terms of conceptual schemes. To her, this approach has the advantage of preserving core pluralist intuitions without being challenged by the usual difficulties (such as the incompatibility problem). My claim is that this is not the case. After providing a succinct presentation of internal pluralism, I show that the critique of traditional pluralist views such as Hick’s may also be addressed to Harrison. There are two main reasons in support of my claim. Firstly, a believer’s common understanding of religious experiences (both mystical and ritual) conflicts with the way in which internal pluralism understands religious belief. Such conflict implies that if internal pluralism were a sound theory, most religious beliefs would turn out to be false, and, contrary to Harrison’s intention, they would be rendered cognitively irrelevant. Secondly, internal pluralism excludes the possibility of religious disagreements. By applying to religions an epistemological approach based on conceptual schemes, doxastic dissent is actually dismantled at the cost of developing an entirely solipsistic reading of religious beliefs. In the final section of my paper, I will show that such unattractive features are consequences of the notion of conceptual scheme.
El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar dos doctrinas que se mantienen entrelazadas en el periodo de producción de Hilary Putnam, que va del año 1976-1990, a saber, el realismo interno y el externalismo semántico, a la luz de dos presupuestos de los argumentos “tierra gemela” y “cerebros en una cubeta”: los enunciados autoadscriptivos y el uso del lenguaje. El propósito del presente trabajo es demostrar que en estos puzzles se evidencia la adopción satisfactoria de ambas posiciones en el programa del referido filósofo, y que un análisis exhaustivo permite una ponderación más precisa del alcance y los planteamientos del autor. La conclusión a la que se arriba es que, si bien existe compatibilidad entre el externalismo semántico y el realismo interno, con distintos matices, en los argumentos mencionados, sin embargo, resulta ambiguo el estatus ontológico y epistémico del lenguaje representacional de quienes se encuentren en el estado hipotético presentados en ambos puzzles.
By considering the semantic footings of the so-called antinomies of pure reason, this article contributes to the debate about whether Kant was committed to semantic realism or anti-realism . That is, whether verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) or not (anti-realism). Against the (empiricist) semantic principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed to Kant as the “principle of significance,” the bedrock of my article is what I call Kant’s Real Principle of Significance : an extension-based and normative principle stating that a judgement can have no “significance” or “objective validity” (truth-value) without a universally recognizable norm for verifying it. This principle entails semantic anti-realism. I argue that we can extract the principle from the antinomy chapter of KrV , since in there Kant concludes that judgements of the form “the world as such is x” are without “significance” (lack a truth-value) in virtue of being unverifiable as a matter of principle. I propose that Kant’s reference to some of the antinomical judgements as “false” is not incompatible with this anti-realist reading because he operates with two distinct world-concepts: an illegitimate transcendental realist one and a legitimate transcendental idealist one. In contrast to most anti-realist Kant-interpretations, it is furthermore argued that any satisfactory anti-realist construal of Kant’s view must be compatible with his assertion that the thesis in the third antinomy about freedom “can be true.” That requires a thicker conception of “significance” or “objective validity” than what is often ascribed to Kant, which is encapsulated by the Real Principle of Significance .
The paper, in Part 1, is devoted to discussing the underlying logic and algebra of the classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, their syntax and semantics, the reasons for their differences and the diagrammatic representations of the two.
This part of the paper also demonstrates that there are several puzzling characters of microphysical phenomena by alluding to the relevant details of the double-slit experiment. These counterintuitive results of the experiment make it difficult to explain the empirical success and realist commitments of quantum mechanics. The second part, Part 2, of the paper is concerned with the question as to how conceptual schemes of scientists interact with the world such that the problem of new meaning and reference of the microphysical terms could be determined. The paper refrains from having a general discussion on Realism and do not venture into a comprehensive survey and critique of all known varieties of realistic interpretations. It selects only a few forms of realism (based on the reasons given) in investigating microphysical phenomena forming part of QM. These selected forms of realism explain how does conceptual scheme/terms in scientific theory hookup to the objects and their relations in the world based on the model-theoretic character of the scientific theory and causal rigidified descriptivism of scientific terms (vide Putnam) as well as scientist’s interaction with the world, say, in the “instrumental context of laboratory” (vide Heelan) such that the problem of meaning and reference could be resolved. The paper claims that convergence of the two views may result in a particular form of realism, the Hermeneuticized Internal Realism, appropriate for the science of microphysical phenomena.
In this article, we explore what Maurizio Ferraris’ “New realism” consists of, and later we do the same thing with Mauricio Beuchot’s “analogical realism”. In the conclusions we have pointed out a few points not clear in both realisms, and we propose the ontological trinity of the real, idea and moral beings, following the ontology proposed by Antonio Rosmini.
The Centenary of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen is being celebrated this year. On such an occasion one might look back at the first 100 years of phenomenology, appraising that which has already been achieved, and taking comfort in the fact that phenomenology has been one of the dominant philosophical traditions in the 20th Century. However, one might also use the opportunity to reflect on the current status of phenomenology, and ask whether phenomenology will be able to maintain its position in the 21 st Century.
This chapter introduces the value problem for knowledge and distinguishes various forms of this problem. It shows that one such form of the problem - the swamping problem - poses a difficulty for a certain conception of epistemic value which is termed epistemic value T-monism. Various responses to this problem are canvassed. It is argued that the putative final value of knowledge is important to assessing the value problem, since if knowledge is indeed finally valuable then all the different forms of the value problem, including the swamping problem, are thereby seemingly resolved. © Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock 2010. All rights reserved.