In today’s retail markets, products display opaque pricing, i.e., a single number that provides no information about the allocation
of the retail proceeds among agents who bring the product to market. We study transparent pricing, which is an alternative strategy in which allocation information is revealed. We differentiate transparent pricing from related
marketing practices such as social marketing, cause-related marketing, and pay-what-you-want. Using controlled experiments
in multiple product categories with diverse sampling frames, we find that transparent prices systematically alter consumer
utility functions and stated choice behavior. Our results support explanations drawn from both neoclassical and behavioral
economic theory, including inequity aversion, procedural justice, and altruism. Classical theory predicts that price transparency
should have little effect on consumer behavior. However, results from behavioral economics suggest that consumers may relax
“self-interest” in the face of transparent prices, leading to counter-intuitive preferences. For example, in one set of studies
we observe a significant proportion of consumers selecting the more expensive of two replicates of the same product. In another
study, a subset of motorists willingly pays higher gasoline taxes for the same gallon of gas, increasing the overall price
per gallon. We explain this behavior via parameterized utility functions that contain both self-interested and other-interested
components moderated by characteristics of the decision-maker and characteristics of the choice context.
KeywordsDifference aversion-Discrete-choice-Fairness-Price transparency-Cost transparency-Supply-chain