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Will we Witness an Upturn in European Fertility in the Near Future?
Abstract and Figures
Fertility in many European countries is not only low, but very low, and in some even lowest low. What fertility levels are
going to prevail in the near future? Firstly, some indicators of the “fertility climate” are presented. The study shows that
a country’s actual level of fertility correlates to people’s attitudes on how fertility should be dealt with on a societal
level. Secondly, levels of expected fertility, so-called “hypothetical completed fertility” (HCF), are calculated on the basis
of the information on individually-expressed intentions in the IPPAS database. The structure of the HCF indicator is analysed,
together with its interrelation with the “value-of-children” indicator. Multinomial regression is performed to find the net
effects of factors which we regard as relevant to expected fertility. Finally, we will speculate on the future of European
fertility and on the framework within which it operates.
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... van Peer 2002b; Berrington 2004), Microcensus data reveal that higher educated women frequently postpone their childbearing into their mid-and late-30s. Several studies have shown that higher-educated women not only postpone their childbearing, but also revise their fertility intentions downward more frequently than less educated women (see Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003 for the United States; Miettinen and Paajanen Note: See Fig. 7 above 16 After controlling for selected factors (age, employment, partnership status, and the indicators of the value of children), van Peer and Rabušic (2008) found that higher-educated men and women were less likely to prefer small family sizes (0 or 1 child) than their lower-educated counterparts. 17 Earlier surveys of fertility desires in Austria, then conducted among married women only, did not detect any differences in fertility desires for women with higher than primary education. ...
Combining the data of the 1986-2001 Microcensus surveys, I reconstruct trends in fertility intentions across time and over the life course of Austrian women born since the 1950s. Young adults in Austria expressed fertility intentions that were below the replacement-level threshold as early as in 1986 and women born since the mid-1950s consistently desired fewer than two children on average throughout their reproductive lives. A two-child family norm, however, still clearly dominates the fertility intentions of different age, cohort and education groups. Uncertainty about childbearing intentions is rather common, especially among younger and childless respondents. Different assumptions about reproductive preferences of undecided respondents affect estimates of the mean intended family size. Although Austrians were among the first in Europe to express low fertility intentions, their position is no longer unique. By the early 2000s, young women in a number of other European countries also expressed sub-replacement fertility intentions.
... Italy and the Netherlands occupy an intermediate position with desired fertility slightly below replacement. The general profile of fertility intentions in the PPAS countries has been further analysed by van Peer and Rabusic (2008). Here, we address the variation according to the prevailing views on men's role. ...
The development of modern family patterns of the past decades has been accompanied by substantial changes in social norms, values and gender relations. There is theoretical support for the assumption that the persistence of low fertility levels across Europe is likely to be linked to the incomplete gender revolution, more specifically to the lack of, or only limited changes in the male gender role as opposed to women’s role. In order to have a deeper understanding of the development of fertility, we aim to shed more light on the impact of men’s role orientation on their fertility intentions in this study. Our analyses include men aged 20-44 years in eight countries: Austria, Estonia, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland. The data are extracted from the Population Policy Acceptance Study of the early 2000s. Examining within-country differences, we find that men with egalitarian attitudes seem to have higher fertility aspirations than their traditional counterparts in contemporary Europe. This is supported by both the descriptive and the multivariate analyses. The picture is somewhat less conclusive though when we focus on country-rankings by intended family size and by the prevalence of egalitarian versus traditional attitudes.
Cílem tohoto článku je prezentovat reprodukční strategie mladých lidí ve věku od 27 do 29 let žijících v České republice. Analyzovali jsme kvantitativní data vztahující se k problematice determinantů oddalování rodičovství a očekávání spojených s rodičovskými rolemi. Hlavními otázkami textu jsou Které faktory ovlivňují oddalování početí dítěte? Existují rozdíly v reprodukčních strategiích podle sociodemografických charakteristik? Jaké důvody vedou mladé lidí ve věku od 27 do 29 let k tomu, že jsou stále bezdětní? Jaká očekávání mají mladí lidé od narození dítěte?
In the last decades of the twentieth century, Period Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) decreased in almost all industrialised countries, reaching values well below the replacement level. Particularly severe declines were observed in countries of Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), i.e., that part of Europe1 where the transition to low fertility occurred relatively late. Whereas by the end of the 1970s the average TFR in Continental and Northern Europe was around 1.66, in Southern and CEE state-socialist countries it was still at a level slightly above 2.1.2 Less than a decade later, the average TFR in Mediterranean countries was already below 1.4, a level the majority of the Northern and Continental European countries had never reached. At that time, fertility in CEE was still relatively high, with the TFR exceeding 1.8 in all of them apart from Slovenia and East Germany.
The article tackles the phenomenon of the one-child family in the Czech Republic. The authors try to answer the question of whether it is possible to expect that a significant proportion of Czech fertility intentions will be fulfilled when families conceive and give birth to an only child. Can it be assumed that one-child families will be a significant phenomenon in Czech society in the years to come? To answer the questions the authors used two different datasets in the analysis. The article includes a description of the socio-demographic characteristics of people who have or intend to have just one child. They then proceed to present some of the covariates that determine whether people have or intend to have one child in comparison with those who have other fertility intentions. Some of the findings indicate that it is likely that about 20-25% of women who finish their reproductive period within the next two decades will have only one child. The results indicate that being an only child increases the chances of intending to and having only one child. The opposite effect can be noticed when the place of residence is considered - living in small towns and rural areas may have a negative influence on the decision to have only one child.
The paper deals with the problem of the theoretical exploration of maternity
and motherhood as a feminist political idea and includes the overview of the
social practices and methods aimed at strengthening maternity and parenting
in modern states, emphasizing the issue of the political support and social
status of motherhood in Serbia today. The general trend in current changes is
the separation of the population policy from the social policy of family
planning, and deterioration of the social status of parenthood and
motherhood, while the formal legal framework and ideas for improving the
gender equality has been nominally improved, which contributes to their
impracticability. Recent changes and adoption of new laws dealing with family
and parenthood are fully adapted to the neoliberal transformation of Serbia,
within which the social position of women is getting worse. In response,
nationalist and patriarchal family policy are reinforced in the broader
society. The article highlights the importance of examining women’s
experiences and needs of women related to their reproduction and maternity,
as a necessary starting point for developing appropriate policies in the
wider society. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179035:
Izazovi nove društvene integracije u Srbiji - koncepti i akteri]
This chapter overviews the demography of the age at first birth, its causes and consequences: at what age do women nowadays
have their first child, how stable is that age pattern over time, and how similar is it across Europe? The chapter does not
only reflect on the terminology used and on the demographic trends – the weakening of teenage pregnancies, and the shift in
having the first child from ages between 22 and 25 to ages between 25 and 29 – but also on its determinants. Within the realm
of the Second Demographic Transition we hold at issues like partnership formation, the use of effective contraceptives, childlessness,
educational attainment, labour market participation, economic security, gender egalitarianism, and changing norms and values.
Views on and expectations about many of these issues have changed significantly over the past decades. Modern young adults
expect to be able to plan their lives, but can they decide rationally on having children or not and how to find the most optimal
timing for the first child? The chapter also holds at a few related demographic issues: the relation between the age at first
birth and family size, which can be perceived in two different ways (the period and a birth cohort perspective); the relation
between the age at first birth and population size/population ageing; the age at first birth among immigrant populations;
as well as several non-demographic consequences of late motherhood.
In Central and Eastern Europe following the political transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s there were dramatic declines in marriage and childbearing, significant increases in nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing, and a movement from reliance on abortion to a reliance on contraception for fertility limitation. Although many explanations have been offered for these trends, we offer new explanations based on ideational influences and the intersection of these ideational influences with structural factors. We focus on the political, economic, social, and cultural histories of the region, with particular emphasis on how countries in the region have interacted with and been influenced by Western European and North American countries. Our explanations emphasize the role of developmental models in guiding change in the region, suggesting that developmental idealism influenced family and demographic changes following the political transformations. Developmental idealism provides beliefs that modern family systems help to produce modern political and economic accomplishments and helps to establish the importance of freedom and equality as human rights in both the public and private spheres. The disintegration of the governments and the fall of the iron curtain in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought new understanding about social, economic, and family circumstances in the West, increasing consumption aspirations and expectations which clashed with both old economic realities and the dramatic declines in economic circumstances. In addition, the dissolution of the former governments removed or weakened systems supporting the bearing and rearing of children, and, the legitimacy of the former governments and their programs was largely destroyed, removing government support for old norms and patterns of behavior. In addition, the attacks of previous decades on the religious institutions in the region had in many places left these institutions weak. During this period many openly reached out to embrace the values, living standards, and economic, political, and familial systems of the West. And, the thirst for freedom-and its considerable expansion-operated in personal and familial as well as political and economic realms. These dramatic changes combined together to produce the many changes occurring in family and demographic behavior.
This chapter discusses the concept of the second demographic transition (SDT) and its relevance for explaining the ongoing changes in family and fertility patterns across Europe. It takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to family, reproduction, and children, and their representation in different chapters in this collection. It re-examines the link between the second demographic transition and fertility, highlights its strong positive association with fertility at later childbearing ages, and suggests that the transition does not necessarily lead to sub-replacement fertility levels. Subsequently, it provides an extensive discussion on the progression of the SDT behind the former ‘Iron Curtain.’ To explain some apparent contradictions in this process, it employs a conceptual model of ‘readiness, willingness, and ability’ (RWA) advocated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). It also explores the multifaceted nature of the second demographic transition between different social groups, and points out an apparent paradox: whereas lower-educated individuals often embrace values that can be characterised as rather traditional, they also frequently manifest family behaviour associated with the transition, such as non-marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high prevalence of long-term cohabitation. This suggests that there may be two different pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition. The concluding section points out the role of structural constraints for the diffusion of the transition among disadvantaged social strata, highlights the importance of the ‘gender revolution’ for the SDT trends, and discusses the usefulness of the SDT framework.
Preface (1994)AcknowledgmentsIntroduction31From Mobs to Memorials: The Sacralization of Child Life222From Useful to Useless: Moral Conflict Over Child Labor563From Child Labor to Child Work: Redefining the Economic World of Children734From a Proper Burial to a Proper Education: The Case of Children's Insurance1135From Wrongful Death to Wrongful Birth: The Changing Legal Evaluation of Children1386From Baby Farms to Black-Market Babies: The Changing Market for Children1697From Useful to Useless and Back to Useful? Emerging Patterns in the Valuation of Children208Notes229Index267
L'observation suivie, en 1974, 1976 et 1979, d'un même échantillon de femmes permet de confirmer que les projets en matière de fécondité constituent un bon prédicteur des comportements individuels (77% sur cinq ans), mais d'une précision toutefois insuffisante pour pouvoir être utilisés dans l'établissement de prévisions de fécondité, au niveau collectif. Un certain flou entoure en fait les projets, variable selon la nature du projet (vouloir ou non un autre enfant) et selon le nombre d'enfants. D'une façon générale, il y a, quasi systématiquement, surestimation du nombre d'enfant à naître. Ces résultats amènent à se demander si les couples ont réellement des projets exprimés en terme de descendance finale. On peut plutôt penser que chaque naissance fait l'objet d'un nouveau projet, défini dans le court terme. /// Consecutive observations made in 1974, 1976 and 1979 on the same sample of women show that statements about fertility intentions provide a reliable means of predicting the behaviour of individuals (77 per cent over five years), but are inadequate to project birth rates for the population in general. There is usually some ambiguity about statements of intention, depending on whetherwomen are asked whether they want an additional child, or about the total number of children they want. Generally, speaking the number of wanted children stated as intended turns out to be larger than the number actually achieved. These findings raise the question whether couples really have definite ideas about the total number of children they want. It would seem as if each new birth leads to a revision of intentions defined on a short-term basis. /// La observación continuada de una misma muestra de mujeres, en 1974, 1976 y 1979, permite confirmar la hipótesis de que los proyectos en materia de fecundidad constituyen un buen predictor de los comportamientos individuales (77% en 5 años), pero de una precisión insuficiente para poder ser utilizados en el establecimiento de previsiones de fecundidad en un nivel colectivo. Cierta ambigüedad rodea en realidad los proyectos, variable según la fecundidad proyectada (querer o no otro hijo) y según el número de hijos ya tenidos. De una manera general, hay, sistemáticamente, una sobre-estimacion del número de hijos que van a nacer. Estos resultados conducen a preguntarse si las parejas tienen realmente proyectos expresados en término de descendencia final. Puede pensarse, más bien, que cada nacimiento es el objeto de un nuevo proyecto, definido en el corto plazo.
An evaluation of whether the stated desire to terminate childbearing is a valid predictor of fertility, using national data from 134 surveys conducted over the past 10-15 years, reveals a strong relationship between the total fertility rate and the percentage of women who want no more children, even when the comparison is restricted to developing countries only. More than two-thirds of this strong association acts through contraceptive prevalence. Further analyses confirm the relationship between intention and fertility across time for those countries for which there were two sources of data about five years apart (on average). The conclusion reached is that the proportion of women reporting that they want no more children has high predictive validity and is therefore a useful tool for short-term fertility forecasting.
La bassa fecondità e l'alto livello di invecchiamento caratterizzano ormai la situazione demografica italiana. Mentre il desiderio di avere figli rimane invariato, anche nelle generazioni recenti e per le donne che molto hanno investito in formazione e vogliono perseguire progetti lavorativi precisi, il raggiungimento del numero desiderato di figli rappresenta un problema. La proporzione di donne senza figli o con un figlio solo è continuamente aumentata. La bassa fecondità sembra dipendere da effetti di cadenza e da effetti di intensità. L'aumento dell'istruzione e della partecipazione al mercato del lavoro influenzano il rinvio del matrimonio. Gli effetti di intensità sembrano collegati alle difficoltà di conciliare la carriera lavorativa e la vita familiare in una società che presenta ancora diseguaglianze di genere. Low fertility and high level of ageing make Italy a rather particular case in Europe. While the desire to have children remains unaltered, even in more recent generations and even in women who have invested a lot in their education and want to achieve their career aspirations, fulfilling those desires appears to pose a problem for the majority. The proportions of childless women and of women who have a single child are increased. Low fertility seems to depend on timing and quantum effects. Increase in education and in participation into the labour market affect delay of age at marriage. Quantum effects seem related to the difficulties to reconcile a working and a domestic life in a society that presents gender inequalities. Le bas niveau de fécondité et le haut niveau de vieillissement caractérisent la situation démographique italienne. Tandis que le désir d'avoir des enfants reste inchangé, soit dans les générations récentes et pour les femmes qui ont investi beaucoup dans la formation et qui désirent poursuivre des projets de travail, la réalisation du nombre désiré d'enfants reste cependant un problème. La proportion de femmes sans enfant ou avec un seul enfant augmente continuellement. La basse fécondité semble dépendre d'effets de calendrier et d'effets d'intensité. L'augmentation du niveau d'instruction et de participation au marché du travail conditionne le report du mariage. Les effets d'intensité semblent liés aux difficultés de concilier la carrière professionnelle et la vie familiale dans une société qui présente encore des inégalités de genre.
Abstract Conventional theories have little to say about the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the demographic transition, although it is often as- sumed that replacement fertility of about 2.1 births per woman,will prevail in the long run. However, fertility has dropped below the replacement level in virtually every population that has moved through the transition. If future fertility remains at these low levels, populations will decline in size and will age rapidly. This paper examines the causes of discrepancies between reproductive pref- erences and observed fertility. Examples of such deviations are found in many contemporary developed countries, where desired family size is typically two children while fertility is well below replacement. Six factors are identified as the causes of these discrepancies. Of these factors, the fertility-depressing im- pact of the rising age at childbearing is one of the most important. This factor reduces fertility only as long as the age at childbearing keeps rising. Once the mean age stops rising—as it eventually must—fertility will rise closer to the desired level of two children, because the depressing effect is then removed. The current low levels of fertility in many developed countries may therefore not be permanent. This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from
Building on a framework suggested by Bongaarts (2001)and using data from the 1979 National LongitudinalSurvey of Youth, we describe the correspondencebetween intended family size and observed fertilityfor the 1957 to 1961 birth cohorts of U.S. women andmen. Over an 18-year period (1982–2000), we showthat while aggregate intentions are quite stable,discrepancies are very common at the individual level.Women and men were more likely to err in predictingnumber of additional births in the period 1982–2000 thanto hit their target number. A very strong predictor of over-and underachieving fertility is initial intended parity. Thosewho intended more than two children tended to have fewerchildren than intended, while those who intended fewer thantwo children tended to have more children than intended. Inaddition and consistent with life course arguments, thoseunmarried in 1982, childless in 1982, and (for women) stillin school in 1982 were most likely to underachieve their 2000intended parity (i.e., have fewer children than intended). Weconclude by reflecting on how the circumstances that allowdiscrepancies between intentions and behavior to almost``balance'' in the U.S. may cumulate differently elsewhere toproduce much lower fertility.
Throughout the developed world the total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped well below the replacement level. The theory of demographic transition has to be reconsidered: post-transitional societies will face a permanent disequi- librium (hyperaging and ultimate population implosion). The basic paradigm has reversed: in the past, there was a large proportion of unwanted pregnancies and family planning programs were designed to reduce them; now, in post-industrial contexts, the opposite is true. Many desired pregnancies do not occur; in the European Union, for example, the TFR is 1.4 whereas the desired number of children is 2.1. Thus, there is a latent demand for family support. In countries where family support is better (like those in Scandinavia), the gap between the ideal and the real family size is narrow, whereas in societies where family support is mini- mal (as in sexist societies such as Germany, Italy, and Spain), this gap is maximal. This is the essence of the present feminist paradox: feminism and pronatalism work together; in societies that alleviate the burden of working — or potentially working — mothers, the fertility rate is higher than in societies where traditional roles prevail. Two basic measures have a decisive impact: the implementation of parental leave and the allocation of pension benefits to parents for each child. Both of these measures tend to alleviate the cost of child care for the mother and the family and to reduce the main obstacles to childbearing.