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Substanzontologie versus Funktionsontologie - Wie bestimmen wir den Beginn und die Ansprüche schutzwürdigen menschlichen Lebens?
The legal framework in effect in Germany since 1991, bars all research on human embryos and permits, since 2002, the import of embryonic stem cells only under the fulfillment of relatively demanding conditions. Legislation linked this position to the goal of ensuring freedom of biomedical research (only) to the extent that it could be justified in view of the state's obligation to protect human dignity and the right to life. Underlying this was the assumption, understood by the draft of the law that embryonic stem cells, given the destruction of embryos, which necessarily precedes their utilization, “cannot be viewed just like any other biological material from an ethical perspective.” In the meantime, however, the legal-political, would-be “enlightened”; Zeitgeist has become oriented toward a hidden or openly displayed “liberalization” of human embryonic stem cell research, which raises the question of what could have fundamentally changed about the previously named “ethical problem.” Great uncertainties obviously exist regarding the central significance of the “human dignity” guaranteed to be “inviolable” as well as about the relevance of this “iron ration” of libertarian-humanist legal thought in the context of destructive embryo research. The present essay gives an overview of the potential interpretive possibilities and subjects them to critical examination against the background of current legal-political developments, which are perceived in Germany not only as a “revolution” not only in the sphere of biological policy, but also ultimately in that of the central determining factors in general in the relationship between state and individual. In this light, how can the kernel of the ideal of human dignity be preserved even against the demands of the (post-) modern (age)?
Some have argued that embryos and fetuses have the moral status of personhood because of certain criteria that are satisfied
during gestation. However, these attempts to base personhood during gestation on intrinsic characteristics have uniformly
been unsuccessful. Within a secular framework, another approach to establishing a moral standing for embryos and fetuses is
to argue that we ought to confer some moral status upon them. There appear to be two main approaches to defending conferred moral standing; namely, consequentialist
and contractarian arguments. This article puts forward a consequentialist argument for the conferred moral standing of preembryos,
embryos, fetuses, and infants. It states and defends an original version of the commonlyheld view that moral standing increases
during gestation. It also explores the implications of this viewpoint for several issues: what is involved in showing ‘respect’
for preembryos; and whether it is permissible to create preembryos solely for research.
Hg.): Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen
- G Damschen
- D Schönecker
Reproductive choices and state policyHg.): Towards reproductive certainty. Fertility and genetics beyond 1999. The plenary proceedings of the 11th World Congress on In vitro Fertilization and Human Reproductive Genetics
- P Singer
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- D Mortimer
Der Mensch wird geboren. Kleine Apologie der Humanität
- V Gerhardt
- V. Gerhardt
Hg.): Towards reproductive certainty. Fertility and genetics beyond 1999
- P Singer
- R Jansen
- D Mortimer