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P. Meusburger et al. (eds.), Milieus of Creativity, Knowledge and Space 2, 97
© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009
Although some of the earliest case studies on famous scientists addressed the
importance of parents, peer groups, teachers, and fortuitous events for creative per-
sons (e.g., Candolle, 1873; Ellis, 1926; Ostwald, 1909), interactions with the envi-
ronment did not figure in the first theoretical conceptions of creativity. Researchers
claimed that creative persons are gifted with special innate talents and capacities
that others lack and that creativity is a gift or innate talent that cannot be acquired
or taught (see Boden, 2004, pp. 14–15). This concept eventually raised a number of
questions. For example, why are highly creative individuals not evenly distributed
over time and space? Why are certain cities and historical periods characterized
by great creativity in the visual arts, music, and science, whereas others are not?
Why are certain research departments or universities so successful at copiously
producing outstanding creative scientists, whereas others are not? Why does the
large majority of Nobel Prize winners stem from such a small share of universities?
Reflecting growing interest in the social environment as a variable, these questions
indicated a change in creativity research.
However, interest in spatial disparities of creativity and in the impact of spatial
contexts, spatial settings and spatial relations on creativity did not evolve until the
late twentieth century. One reason for such belatedness is that new, original, and
valuable ideas and topics often encounter resistance because they usually threaten
continuities and tradition and may destroy existing paradigms, power relations,
and self-efficacy. Both ignorance and the highly valued preexisting knowledge of
experts can block novel ideas and can lead merely to the production of tried and
trusted correct answers (Cropley, 2006, p. 402).
Eventually, an ever greater number of scholars accepted that creativity is not
an innate attribute of a single individual, no matter how intelligent and talented
that person might be. It was recognized that creative ideas emerge and develop
in complex, dynamic interaction between the creator and his or her environments
(see, for example, Amabile, 1983a, 1988, 1996; Amabile et al., 1990, 1996;
Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Ericsson, 1996; Feldman et al., 1994; Gardner,
Chapter 6
Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places,
Environments, and Spatial Contexts
Peter Meusburger
P. Meusburger ()
Universität Heidelberg, Geographisches Institut, Berliner Str. 48, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: peter.meusburger@geog.uni-heidelberg.de
peter.meusburger@geog.uni-heidelberg.de
98 P. Meusburger
1988, 1993a, b, 1995; Mayer, 1999; Mumford, 1995; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
It was realized that creative ideas arise from a large set of well-developed skills and
a rich body of domain-relevant knowledge that must be acquired through labori-
ous apprenticeship (Simonton, 2000, p. 152). Creativity, in other words, therefore
requires time and certain environmental conditions.
Second, viewing creativity from an interactional perspective accentuates the
relevance of situational, contextual, and cultural determinants and various layers
of existential dimensions. Place matters, because a stimulating environment and a
talented individual must come together and interact before a creative process can
occur (see Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). That process requires preparation through
learning, gaining experience, and identifying and solving problems. It takes cogni-
tive skills and results from complex and dynamic interaction between the actor and
his or her surroundings. This individual potential for creativity has to be actualized
and cultivated by the family, the school environment, role models, organizational
structures, challenges, disciplinary cultures, and chance opportunities in profes-
sional careers. As this viewpoint suggests, interaction of this sort is not mechanis-
tic. Creative, talented people are not just raised, trained, and embedded in particular
milieus. In their careers they tend to be attracted to certain institutions and places
where they can develop their abilities and ideas, have the occasions to interact with
other knowledgeable agents, procure the necessary support, be inspired, tackle chal-
lenges, and command the necessary resources. “Complex problem solving implies
the efficient interaction between a solver and the situational requirements of the
task and involves a solver’s cognitive, emotional, personal, and social abilities and
knowledge” (Frensch & Funke, 1995, p. 18). In short, the interactional perspective
posits that the social and material environment, with its ability to promote or hinder
such development, is an important constituent of creativity.
A third reason for the turn to the spatiality of creativity is that early problem-
finding and problem-solving depend on perceptual discernment and environmental
sensitivity, that is, on “the ability to be aware of and to correctly identify events
within one’s environment” (Carlozzi et al., 1995, p. 366). A number of studies sup-
port the hypothesis that creative persons have a heightened perceptual awareness
(Stamm, 1967, p. 93) and that they are likely to be more sensitive to environmen-
tal stimuli than are less creative individuals (Barron, 1969; Carlozzi et al., 1995,
p. 371). Because of the great sensitivity, keen attention, and prior knowledge that
creative individuals have, they perceive and identify upcoming problems and new
trends and research questions earlier than others do.
The principal aim of this chapter is to show that the generation, evaluation, and
adoption of creative ideas and products vary spatially and that the spatiality and
spatial distribution of creative processes should not be ignored. With the study of
creativity becoming increasingly multifaceted, my second aim is to explain why
various lines of research and insights from multiple disciplines should be brought
into a common framework. The purpose is to encourage the cross-fertilization
of ideas and to avoid the trap of disciplinary (and dogmatic) insularity. My third
concern is to discuss results and methodological problems of creativity research
from a geographical perspective and to clarify misunderstandings that might
peter.meusburger@geog.uni-heidelberg.de
6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 99
complicate transdisciplinary discourse between human geography and other social
and behavioral sciences.
Definitions, Types, Domains, and Degrees of Creativity
Definitions of Creativity
The aspects of creativity, the scales and units of research, and the approaches
that are of interest in the study of creativity differ from one group of scholars to
the next. Be they philosophers, psychologists, historians, art critics, geographers,
sociologists, economists, architects, urban planners, or scholars from some other
discipline, they all bring their own questions, approaches, concepts, and method-
ologies to bear on the subject. This variety has a number of advantages, for it en-
ables each field of inquiry to provide new insights not obtainable in the others. But
it also entails problems and misunderstandings. With regard to indicators, theoreti-
cal concepts, and empirical methods, research on creative individuals diverges as
much from the study of creative organizations as the latter does from inquiry into
creative environments. The more the term creativity has acquired buzzword status
in public debate (e.g. creative industries and creative class) and the more remote
its use has become from what it is understood to mean in psychology, the greater
the need has become to clarify the word. I do not intend to comment on each of the
more than one hundred different definitions of creativity. Instead, I wish to discuss
some problems of delimitation and specification.
Most definitions of creativity contain the key adjectives (or synonyms) that
appear in the definition by Boden (2004): “creativity is the ability to come up
with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising and valuable” (p. 1; italics added).
Creative people typically address topics that are unnoticed, underrated, or not
understood by others. New, original, and valuable ideas or products are inevitably
scarce in their initial stage (start-up period) and are therefore confined to a small
proportion of people and places. As soon as a creative idea or product has been
accepted by much of the population, as soon as it disseminates to a large number
of places, it ceases to be considered novel or surprising. The definition of creativity
therefore implies scarcity, which is the opposite of ubiquity.
Many authors, such as the psychologists Simonton (2000) and Funke (2000,
p. 284), have argued that creativity is an all-pervasive phenomenon of human
nature. All people constantly need and apply creativity to solve their everyday prob-
lems. However, creativity is a matter of degree, and its meaning shifts according to
discipline and spatial scale. One should therefore distinguish between various types
and fields of creativity. Boden (1994, pp. 76–77, 2004, p. 2), for instance, recom-
mends drawing a line between psychological creativity and historical creativity.
To her, psychological creativity involves coming up with a surprising, valuable idea
that is new to the person to whom it occurs, regardless of how many other people
have had that idea before. Historical creativity means that no one else has had the
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100 P. Meusburger
idea or made the artifact before (as far as is known), that it has arisen for the first
time in human history. Both types of creativity interact with their environment,
and both can result from environmental stimuli, cues, or prompts. In this sense,
a distinction between psychological and historical creativity or between everyday
problem-solving and outstanding achievements is necessary in order to avoid
misunderstandings.
Geographically speaking, it is an important fact that most definitions of creativity
include a relation to a context, environment, organization, group, or field. Briskman
(1980) claims that one of the most striking features about creative products “is their
appropriateness, the ‘internal connection’ which exists between these products and
the background against which they emerge” (p. 98). Stein (1953) suggests that
“creative work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or satisfying
by a group in some point in time” (p. 311). Oldham and Cummings (1996) define
creative performance “as products, ideas, or procedures that satisfy two conditions:
(1) they are novel or original and (2) they are potentially relevant for, or useful to,
an organization” (p. 608).
In the field of management, Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin (1993, p. 293)
define creativity as the generation of a valuable, useful new product, service, idea,
procedure, or process by individuals working together in a complex social system.
According to Ford (1996) “creativity is a subjective judgment made by members
of the field about the novelty and value of a product; it is not an inherent quality
that can be measured independent of social-construction processes within a field”
(p. 1115). He defines creativity “as a domain-specific, subjective judgment of the
novelty and value of an outcome of a particular action” (p. 1115). Similarly, Shalley,
Gilson, and Blum (2000, p. 215) stated that “creativity involves the production,
conceptualization, or development of novel and useful ideas, processes, or procedures
by an individual or by a group of individuals working together.” According to
D’Agostino (1984, pp. 88–102), true human creativity involves novelty, value,
appropriateness to context, and unpredictability in terms of antecedent knowledge,
available recipes, existing rules, and environmental stimuli. I note, however, that
values are a result of evaluations and vary over time and space. Quality in itself has
no meaning in the absence of a domain in which it is realized and a field by which
it is judged (Gardner, 1995, p. 38).
A work or idea is not necessarily novel merely by being different from what
preceded it. There must be some merit or value in being different. As the philoso-
pher Hausman (1979) states, eccentricities lack the criterion of value. Briskman
(1980) claims that one of the most striking features about creative products “is their
appropriateness, the ‘internal connection’ which exists between these products and
the background against which they emerge” (p. 98).
To avoid misunderstandings, creativity as a trait or input variable should be dif-
ferentiated from creativity as a process and creativity as an achievement or output
variable (see Wierenga & van Bruggen, 1998, p. 84). The psychologists True (1966,
p. 34) and Klausmeier (1961, p. 4) distinguish between creative ability and crea-
tive capacity, with ability meaning the power to perform an act now and capacity
referring to what the person might be able to do given maturation, education, and
interaction with other people.
peter.meusburger@geog.uni-heidelberg.de
6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 101
Categories of Problems and Modes of Thinking
When focusing on the interaction between perceived problem, problem-solver, and
the environment or when differentiating between innovation and creativity, between
creativity and intelligence, or between types and degrees of creativity, I find
it helpful to categorize problems according to the modes of thinking they call
for. The first distinction is between convergent and divergent thinking. Guilford
(1967) considered convergent thought to be a logical process that leads to an exact
solution. In contrast, divergent thought describes atypical conceptual associations,
a change of perspective, a deviation from the mainstream, and a broadening of the
horizon. Convergent thinking is oriented to one correct or conventional answer
that is deemed best. It is tied to existing knowledge, it emphasizes logic and
accuracy, and it leaves no room for ambiguity. Divergent thinking means thinking
in different directions and searching for new paths. It involves the production of
multiple or alternative answers from available information and requires unexpected
combinations, links between remote associations, and transformations of informa-
tion into unexpected forms (Cropley, 2006; Runco & Okuda, 1988). “Convergent
thinking usually generates orthodoxy, whereas divergent thinking always generates
variability” (Cropley, 2006, p. 392).
DeBono (1968) distinguishes between vertical and lateral thought processes.
The vertical thinker, in solving a problem, digs a preexisting hole deeper; the
lateral thinker digs a new hole. The work of the vertical thinker can be monitored
by management more easily than the work of the lateral or creative thinker can.
Creative thinkers are self-directed; it is almost impossible to wedge them into a
uniform scheme, especially if it involves detailed supervision of all aspects of work
(Suojanen & Brooke, 1971, p. 19).
Koestler (1964) discriminates between associative and bisociative thinking.
Associative thinking is based on habit; set routines; adherence to rules, disciplinary
paradigms, and boundaries; and the use of rationality and logic. Bisociative think-
ing is characterized by overlapping separate domains of thought, a lack of attention
to existing rules and disciplinary boundaries, and an emphasis on imagery and
intuition. According to Scott and Bruce (1994, p. 587), associative thinking rep-
resents the systematic problem-solving style working within established methods
or procedures, whereas bisociate thinking stands for the intuitive problem-solving
style. Similarly, the Gestaltists (K. Duncker, W. Köhler, and M. Wertheimer)
discriminated between productive and reproductive thought (see Funke, 2000, p.
290). Reproductive thought describes cognitive processes that need only to be
recalled in order to solve a problem or task. An example is the recalling of a math-
ematical operation, a physics equation, or a cooking recipe. Even if the cake has
never before been baked and the equation never solved—that is, even if the result
is new—the calculation method or the recipe is known. In the case of productive
thought, the path to the solution must first be discovered or construed.
Another way of demarcating various categories of creativity is to discriminate
between well-defined and ill-defined problems (Unsworth, 2001), open and closed
problems (Jaušovec, 2000), and analytical and creative problems. A well-defined
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102 P. Meusburger
problem is a means–end analysis, the most frequent process that humans use when
they solve everyday problems. It is precisely what rational behavior or rational
problem-solving is about. “The information necessary to solve a well-defined
problem is usually specified precisely in the statement of the problem itself. In the
case of ill-defined problems, it is often unclear what kind of information exactly
is relevant to the problem at hand” (Jaušovec, 2000, p. 214). Means–end analysis is
not suitable for studying open goals, dynamic evolution, or ill-defined problems.
In an analytical problem, all necessary conditions are stated and only one solu-
tion is possible. A mathematical equation can be solved by logic alone. Success
at solving it depends primarily on whether the solver is familiar with the logic
and rules. A creative problem is one that is open to a variety of solutions. It takes
flexibility, imagination, and interaction with the environment to solve that kind of
problem. The artist or poet is not praised as creative for following rules known
before producing his or her picture or poem but rather for bringing forth something
that did not previously exist. The creative process in art, music, and many fields of
basic research is open ended. Artists or scientists in basic research normally do not
know from the beginning what they are about. If they knew completely where their
work was heading, they could not be engaged in creative work (see Maitland, 1976,
p. 397; Tomas, 1958, pp. 1–3).
In early studies, convergent thinking and divergent thinking were often presented
as conflicting or competing processes. Convergent thinking was regarded as detri-
mental to creativity, and divergent thinking was almost equated with creativity.
Opinion in this regard seems to have shifted somewhat, however. Cropley (2006)
argues that a creative process requires a combination of divergent and convergent
thinking. “Divergent thinking and convergent thinking seem to add something to
each other or even to compensate for defects in each other” (p. 401). He suggests
a distinction between generating novelty and evaluating novelty’s risk. The genera-
tion of novelty stems mainly from divergent thinking. But the risks of introducing
novelty have to be explored by convergent thinking and logic.
From a geographer’s point of view, it seems important to distinguish between
knowledge based on cases, that is, knowledge acquired in places (e.g., in the field,
archives, museums, and laboratories) and knowledge based on rules and logic
(mathematics). The former kind of knowledge depends more on interactions with
the environment than the latter does.
Intelligence, Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation:
Their Interplay, Interrelationship, and Delimitation
High levels of intelligence or knowledge do not guarantee creativity. Intelligence and
knowledge are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for creativity. Intelligence
and creativity are separate, albeit interdependent, variables (see Chapter 7 by
Kaufman in this book; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). According to Shekerjian
(1990), creativity is not the direct result of intelligence, talent, or skills. It comes
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 103
instead from having an open “beginner’s mind,” being curious, practicing divergent
thinking, seeing relationships between apparently unrelated factors, drawing on
intuition, and tolerating the “long dance of uncertainty” that precedes most break-
throughs (Saaty, 1998, p. 10). The interplay between creativity and intelligence
varies according to the problems to be solved and the different phases of a creative
process. Intelligence is needed for in-depth thinking and for the development of
techniques to solve defined problems. Creativity is needed in order to conceive new
ideas and new alternatives with which to solve problems. “To analyze problems in
detail, we need intelligence. But we need creativity to synthesize and create structure
to obtain higher level abstraction of problems” (Saaty, 1998, pp. 9–10). Robinson
(1970) states that intelligence is not the initiator or driving force of creativity, that
it becomes important only at a later stage, when the new ideas already produced by
the mind must be critically evaluated and their implications worked out.
Couger (1995) shows that creativity and intelligence are only moderately
related. They are strongly related up to an IQ of 120, after which point the relation
disappears. In a relaxed and unconstrained environment, intelligence and creativity
do not seem to be related (see also Saaty, 1998, p. 10). In other words, intelligence
tests are not very useful in measuring potential for creativity. Another nonlinear
relationship is that between knowledge and creativity. One must have knowledge
to produce something new, but creativity goes beyond knowledge (Weisberg, 1999).
“Knowledge may provide the basic elements, the building blocks out of which are
constructed new ideas, but in order for these building blocks to be available, the
mortar holding the old ideas together must not be too strong” (p. 226).
When a creative process enters the phase of elaboration and verification
(see below, “Stages of the Creative Process”), then creativity joins the stage of inno-
vation. Of course, it may be futile to draw a line between creativity and innovation
when analyzing the spatial distribution of creative or innovative products on the
spatial macroscale (e.g., patent intensity in provinces or nation-states). But the
distinction should be made at least in microscale analysis and in theoretical discus-
sions. Creativity is related to the generation of new and valuable ideas, whereas
innovation is more about the implementation of those ideas. Most innovations
begin with creative ideas, but many highly creative ideas are never implemented
or adopted. Many creative individuals fail to act on their ideas because they lack
the resources or interest to continue developing them. In many cases the innovator
applying a creative idea did not generate it.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the skills, personal traits, organizational
structures, and styles of leadership needed for creativity are not the same as those
needed for innovativeness. Creativity is linked to an intuitive problem-solving
style; innovation, more to a systematic problem-solving style. Successful innova-
tion depends not only on creative ideas but also on the ability to attract venture
capital, design new organizational processes, communicate the value of a new idea,
persuade people, and “manage impressions” (Kasof, 1995; Magyari-Beck, 1998).
In the innovative process, leaders have to set goals, manage attention, coordinate
and control actions, raise capital, promote the cohesiveness of their team, and study
the market. In the creative process, leaders have to arrange for incentives, supportive
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104 P. Meusburger
environments, new interactions, and exchanges between knowledgeable people.
They have to encourage the autonomy and self-esteem of the group members and
their willingness to take risks.
Drawing on Amabile (1988) and Staw (1990), Oldham and Cummings (1996)
apply these distinctions between creativity and innovation specifically to the realms
of performance and organization: “Creative performance refers to products, ideas,
and so forth produced at the individual level, whereas innovation refers to the
successful implementation of these products at the organizational level” (Oldham
& Cummings, 1996, p. 608). Woodman et al. (1993, p. 293) understand creativity
as a subset of the broader domain of innovation. They characterize innovation as
part of an even broader construct of organizational change. Organizational change
can include innovations and creativity, but a good deal of organizational change
takes place without innovation.
Categories and Domains of Creativity
To avoid misunderstandings, one should distinguish between various levels and
forms of creativity. Many creative processes include some kind of problem-solving,
but not all kinds of creativity can be reduced to problem-solving. In the performing
arts, visual arts, music, and similar fields, creativity is expressed through perform-
ance, self-expression, or self-actualization. Finding and identifying new problems
and raising new research questions may be much more creative than solving the
problem itself is—and may contribute more to the advance of science (see Sadler
& Green, 1977, p. 157).
Differentiating between open and closed problems (see Jaušovec, 2000),
Unsworth (2001) proposes four categories of creativity: expected and proactive
creativity for open problems and responsive and contributory creativity for closed
problems (see Fig. 6.1). Responsive and expected creativity are externally driven;
contributory creativity and proactive creativity are self-determined or driven by
internal motivation. Responsive creativity can be planned and organized (e.g. the
contributions of a think tank, or the Manhattan project). Expected and proactive
creativity involve scanning, categorizing, and interpreting the environment to
find a problem, evaluating a perceived situation, and then defining the problem in
such a way that it can be solved (Unsworth, 2001, p. 294). Expected and respon-
sive creativity have external drivers for engagement; proactive and contributory
creativity have internal drivers.
Saaty (1998) distinguishes between deductive and inductive creativity. Deductive
creativity is the ability “to face a new application instance to which we might bring
to bear past knowledge of similar situations” (p. 10). Inductive creativity “looks at
all that experience and attempts to induce from it a description of the larger system
from which the problem instances flow” (p. 10). In Chapter 12 of this book, Boden
distinguishes combinatorial, exploratory, and transformational. Abel (Chapter 4)
suggests a distinction between strong and weak creativity. Most authors agree that
a distinction between various types and levels of creativity is necessary.
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 105
Expected Creativity
Open
Closed
External Internal
Driver for Engagement
Type of
Problem
Proactive Creativity
Responsive Creativity
Creativity that is brought about
via an external expectation—but
with a self-discovered problem.
Example
: artists or scientists
who are prompted by their em-
ployer or situation to be creative
but who can choose their topic
Individuals, driven by internal
motivators, actively search for
problems to solve.
Example
: unprompted proposals
for new products or improved
processes
Problem is already specified,
participant responds to the re-
quirements of the situation and
to external demands
Example
: responses produced in
professional life
Contributory Creativity
Creativity that is self-determined
and based on a clearly formu-
lated problem; the participant
engages in solving a problem
with which he or she is not
directly involved
Example
: spontaneous activities
within informal networks
Inspired by clues of the envi-
ronment
Spontaneous interaction with the
external environment
High context-dependency
Interaction with the external
environment on a regular basis;
High context-dependency
Low context-dependency
Fig. 6.1 Types of creativity (Unsworth, 2001, p. 291, modified by P. Meusburger)
Judgment of creativity needs a frame of reference. In science and the arts alike,
certain rules, paradigms, conventions, expectations, and evaluation procedures
develop and come to be regarded as binding in the relevant community, discipline or
area, at least for a particular period of time (see Kroeber, 1944). Potential geniuses
who cannot fit in or who are unwilling to abide by the given rules or conventions
will be either doomed or frustrated. If they are successful, they might launch a new
paradigm. Some authors use the term domain to refer to these knowledge and evalu-
ation structures of discipline and control. Li and Gardner (1993) define “domain
as bodies of disciplined knowledge that have been structured culturally and that
can be acquired, practiced, and advanced through the act of creating. … A domain
can be described as a unified structure that is rooted in culture” (p. 95). According
to Csikszentmihalyi (1999, p. 314), an environment has “two salient aspects: a
cultural, or symbolic aspect which here is called the domain; and a social aspect
called the field. Creativity is a process that can be observed only at the intersection
where individuals, domains, and fields interact” (p. 314). A domain consists of a set
of rules; a field consists of persons working within the same domain.
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106 P. Meusburger
Boden (2004) uses the term conceptual space instead of domain. She defines
conceptual spaces as structured styles of thought (see also Chapter 12 in this book).
Conceptual spaces include ways of writing, styles of painting, theories in science,
fashions in couture or cooking, that is, any disciplined way of thinking that is familiar
and valued by a certain social group. Li and Gardner (1993, pp. 96–97) explain their
concept of domains by comparing Chinese and Western painting. The two domains
differ in the way objects are represented and in the materials and media that are
used. The differences between Chinese and Western paintings have little to do with
personal choices or capabilities but with “choices imposed by the different painting
domains in which the respective artists practice and create. … The chief distinguish-
ing characteristics of the two domains impose unique constraints on the process
of creativity” (Li & Gardner, 1993, p. 94). Similar rules exist in some scientific
disciplines or research departments. They stipulate the approaches or methods that
should be preferred and where good research should be published. The anticipa-
tory obedience or self-censorship that such spatially divergent expectations induce
in young researchers might favor their professional career but not necessarily their
creativity.
As long as a product, scientific concept, or piece of art has not been validated by
peers, experts, or users, it is not regarded as creative. These frames of reference or
domains can comprise a few dozen experts or millions of supporters. The relevance
and power of domains grows and shrinks in the course of time and varies in the
spatial dimension. Many scientific disciplines and fields of art are fragmented into
domains contradicting and opposing each other. Concepts that are highly respected
within one domain (e.g., rational agent in neoclassical economics or constructivism
in cultural studies) may be heavily criticized or even ridiculed in other domains.
Kasimir Malevich’s painting Black Square on a white ground is considered by some
art critiques to be one of the most important artworks of the twentieth century. For
them Malevich (1878–1935) is the legendary, radical, and influential representative
of abstract modernism in Russia and the founder of Suprematism. However, the
constructivists of Moscow and St. Petersburg (e.g., Vladimir Tatlin) fundamentally
criticized the spiritual aspects of Suprematism. They represented a radically mate-
rialistic position and sponsored “production art,” which emerged after the October
Revolution. It would be an interesting challenge to map and interpret the develop-
ment and diffusion of networks clinging to the one or other of these domains.
The Measurement of Creativity
I do not intend to elaborate on the numerous methods of measuring creativity
(for details see Eysenck, 1994; Chapter 7 by Kaufman in this book). But because theo-
ries are influenced by empirical results and because empirical results are influenced
by ways of measuring, some remarks on measurement seem necessary. Most authors
probably agree that creativity is not reducible to mere quantitative scientific analysis.
Some aspects of creativity are accessible only through qualitative methods.
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 107
At least four main approaches to ascertaining and studying creativity exist. The
first one involves analyzing the biographies of creative persons or evaluating what
eminent scientists or artists reveal about how they produced their creative work.
This methodology has been in use since the mid-nineteenth century (Galton, 1869;
Ostwald, 1909). Biographies include quantitative data (e.g., about creative output
and age), qualitative data (e.g., narratives and reported emotions and frustrations
of creative people), and interpretations of the meaning of relationships with other
people. Many Nobel Prize winners, artists, and other thinkers have left diaries,
letters, records, or autobiographies or have been interviewed about the steps of
their creative process, the way in which they achieved their outstanding results,
and the manner in which their environment supported or impeded their work. With
the autobiography being primarily a self-interpretation and a means of self-creation
(see Mayer, 1999, pp. 455–457; Vidal, 2003, p. 76), this procedure does not deliver
objective results but rather evidence that “this is how those who are accepted as
being creative say they work” (Westland, 1969, p. 128). Analysts of interactions
and relations ask which teachers creative people have been predominantly influ-
enced by, which interactions with other scientists creative people have profited
from most, and which kind of field work triggered their new insights. Researchers
can standardize and objectively score such self-reports by distributing personality
inventories to the test persons (see Rees & Goldman, 1961).
The second main approach to creativity centers on the question of whether people
who are regarded as creative in certain fields exhibit similar personality traits.
Scientists using this approach design and apply tests to measure the creative potential
of persons in order to predict their possible creativity. One kind of such creativity test
measures performance from which creativity can be judged. Another kind assesses
the creative personality. Both must grapple with two issues. The first is whether they
identify creative ability and distinguish between intelligence and creativity or rather
measure something else (e.g., originality) instead. The second issue is the fact that
they focus on just one side of the interaction—the creative potential or disposition
of a person—and more or less ignore the role of the environment.
The third approach is experimental and “uses cognitive task analysis to
specify the component processes in creative thinking” (Mayer, 1999, p. 454). Its
experiments are performed in controlled environments (artificial contexts). The
purpose of this psychometric approach is to find out whether people generally
produce a greater number of creative ideas under certain social, organizational,
or environmental conditions than under others (for an overview see Plucker
& Renzulli, 1999). By changing the procedure, situation, or information to
which the participants are exposed in an experiment and by then comparing the
responses of those persons, psychologists try to discover which environmental
factors help or hinder creativity. A similar method is to evaluate the work environ-
ment or climate of organizations. The climate for creativity can be measured by
several psychometrical instruments, such as KEYS, which is designed to provide
reliable and valid assessments of factors in the work environment that are likely
to influence innovation and the generation of creative ideas (Amabile, 1995;
Amabile et al., 1996, p. 1155).
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108 P. Meusburger
The fourth approach is preferably applied on the spatial meso- and macroscales.
It aids investigations into the question of why certain time periods, places, cities, or
contexts have produced more eminent creative artists and scientists or more creative
products (as measured by the number of patents, scientific awards and inventions,
for example) than others have (see Brix, 1993, 2003).
The question of whether researchers should tend to concentrate on creative per-
sons, creative products, creative processes, or rather on preconditions for creativity
touches not only on disciplinary traditions and scientific interests but also on the
matter of data availability. Process models of creativity are not superior to outcome
models. Both are needed, for they have complementary functions and fulfill differ-
ent purposes.
Stages of the Creative Process
Creativity is not a sudden insight but a lengthy process. Since Wallas (1926) and
Patrick (1937), it has been generally accepted that a creative process has four or more
stages (Funke, 2000; Runco, 1993; Weisberg, 1999; see also Funke’s Chapter 1 in
this book). Insight is only one of them. Equally important are the stages of prepa-
ration; incubation; verification; and acceptance within an organization, discipline,
or market. The classical model has four stages. Funke (2000) distinguishes
between five stages. Cropley (2006) described six stages: preparation, incubation,
illumination, verification, communication, and validation (p. 402). The following
description follows Funke (2000, pp. 288–289, see chapter 1 in this book).
Stage 1: Preparation. The preparation phase includes problem-finding, informa-
tion gathering, and formulation of preliminary ideas. It involves conscious work
and draws on a person’s education, analytical skills, and problem-relevant knowl-
edge (Lubart, 2000–2001, p. 296). In order to be creative, a person has to have been
involved in a specific problem or to have studied the foundations of a discipline and
the works of his or her predecessors over a substantial period. The institutions and
places of early learning and scientific or artistic socialization, fortuitous events in
life, and path dependencies in the early career of a person can have a crucial influ-
ence on that individual’s intellectual development and future creative processes.
Stage 2: Incubation. A number of authors (e.g., Dreistadt, 1969; Koestler, 1964;
Miller, 2000; Niederland, 1967) have studied the importance of latent stages of
creativity and have underlined the role of incubation. Incubation refers to the
temporary abandonment of conscious, rational, problem-solving endeavors, which
are often pursued when a person has reached an apparent dead end in his or her
work. It often makes sense to temporarily set aside a problem for which a crea-
tive solution is being sought. Throughout phases of inactivity, the human brain
evidently continues working. During this incubation stage, existing associative
ideas diminish in the memory and are altered by new information from the envi-
ronment that is superimposed.
Being unaware of the processes that take place during the incubation stage, the
creative individual cannot actively influence them (Funke, 2000, p. 288). Mandler
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 109
(1992) has extensively studied processes in which solutions to a problem seem to
appear suddenly after a period of incubation. Miller (2000) describes how informa-
tion held in long-term memory can be processed in the unconscious and then find
its way into conscious thought:
Activation is maintained in the unconscious as the result of a previous intense conscious
desire to solve the problem at hand. This activation can spread in the unconscious in ways
that might not have been possible within the confines of conscious thought. (p. 337)
Psychological tests indicate that people do not experience sudden illuminations without
previous conscious or unconscious reasoning. (p. 332)
According to Westfall (1983, pp. 41–42) and Holmes (1986, p. 22), Newton’s law
of universal gravitation was not a sudden moment of insight but the result of incred-
ibly intense concentration that Newton sustained over some 30 months.
Stage 3: Insight. During incubation, various psychological processes culminate
in the moment of insight (Bloomberg, 1967, p. 130; Götz, 1981, p. 300). At a cer-
tain point in time, a recombined conceptual association penetrates the threshold of
consciousness and delivers a moment of inspiration. Such an illumination occurs
when the individual becomes aware of the creative moment, which follows the
relevant preparation and subsequent incubation (Funke, 2000, p. 289).
Stage 4: Evaluation. The creative insight gained from the moment of inspiration
must be evaluated for its usefulness or appropriateness by the creator and his or her
audience. In the history of scientific discoveries, many new phenomena (e.g., those
found by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Freud) were noticed long before they
were accepted, but their significance was not realized by the relevant gatekeepers or
audience (see Koestler, 1964; Symington, 1987). Kepler knew for 3 years that the
planets did not move in perfect circles, but he would not believe it. Freud took up
the earlier observations of Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak, all of whom knew about
the sexual aetiology of hysteria, but was less tenaciously attached to the medical
manner of practice and was therefore able to countenance the bisociation of two
matrices (Symington, 1987, p. 284). Because guidelines of domains or hegemonic
science cultures and paradigms vary spatially, the same idea or product will be eval-
uated differently at various locations. If an evaluation takes place too early, many
creative ideas will be killed by critics before they reach the stage of elaboration. At
some places scientists have more freedom and time to develop and elaborate their
ideas and experiments than in other areas.
Stage 5: Elaboration and verification. After an idea or work has been evaluated,
factors such as the availability of resources (venture capital), alliances, public opin-
ion, and power structures become significant in its verification and implementation.
Individuals sense problems, develop ideas, present them to the group, learn from the
group, work out issues in solitude, and then return to the group to keep modifying
and enhancing their ideas (Drazin et al., 1999, p. 290). If the team embraces the
creative idea, it has to be approved by the organization’s decision-makers and then
financed and transformed into a creative product. It is then up to the market to accept
that product. Creative processes at the organizational level may emerge from a pro-
cess of negotiating multiple and potentially competing interests both between different
groups within an organization and with external institutions (Drazin et al., 1999).
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110 P. Meusburger
Stages 1, 4, and 5 of this lengthy process are thought to be much more concate-
nated with environments, spatial contexts, and spatial relations than phases 2 and 3
are. But future contributions from perceptual psychology and brain research may
show that incubation and insight are more influenced by environmental prompts
than is presently known. Lubart (2000–2001) discusses some limitations of stage-
based models of creative processes and suggests that these models need to be
revised or replaced. He and others (e.g., Treffinger, 1995) suggest moving away
from the idea of a fixed sequence of activities and toward three sets of processes—
understanding the problem, generating ideas, and planning for action (see p. 300).
These processes take place in all stages, and their sequence is not fixed.
Explaining Spatial Disparities of Creativity
and Conceptualizing the Impact of Places,
Environments, and Contexts on Creativity
From the Creative Personality to Multidimensional Models
of Creativity
Since the early 1980s, an increasing number of authors have sought to explain
creativity by introducing multidimensional models that include contexts and
environments (Amabile, 1983a, b, 1988, 1996; Amabile et al., 1990, 1996; Clitheroe
et al., 1998; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1990; Ford, 1996; Hennessey & Amabile,
1988; Isaksen et al., 2000–2001; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley, 1995;
Shalley et al., 2000; Woodman et al., 1993). They have dealt primarily with the
question of how personal traits, group characteristics, work environments, organi-
zational structures, cultures, and political conditions interact and how they thereby
foster or inhibit creativity or innovative activities. The units of research, number
of dimensions, and levels of aggregation taken into account by these models vary
according to the research interests, disciplines, and methodologies in question.
Frensch and Funke (1995, p. 7) stated that a problem is defined not only by
task features but also by the interaction between task requirement, environmen-
tal context, and the personal goals and traits of the person attempting to solve it.
Scholars emphasizing task features rather than environment–solver interaction
seem to take it for granted that persons do not typically differ in terms of their
knowledge and absorptive capacity. These researchers therefore tend to believe that
all actors perceive situations in a similar (rational) way. The interactionist approach
suggests that the prior knowledge, expertise, experience, and “positionality”1 of
persons determine whether and how soon they are able to perceive a problem, risk,
1 The term comes from gender studies and means that the position in a social system (gender, for
example) influences the goals and perception of a person.
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 111
or opportunity and how they interpret and react to environmental prompts. Place,
space, milieu, network, and spatial context become important as soon as the issue
of interaction between person, organization, and environment is broached and as
soon as existing models of creativity are expanded to include external influences
and intraorganizational factors.
A contextual approach to organizational creativity focuses on the prompts that initiate crea-
tive behaviour, including the role of prompts in suggesting appropriate goals and potential
outcomes, and prompts as the basis for judgments about the creativeness of outcomes of
the creative process. (Clitheroe et al., 1998, p. 108)
There is abundant empirical evidence of the close relationship between social
environment and creativity. In one study, for example, projects rated high in creativ-
ity had significantly different work environments from those rated low in creativity
(Amabile & Conti, 1999, p. 631). Much less is known about how an environment
influences or triggers creative processes. Scholars disagree on how to conceptualize
the term environment. Is an environment a social or a spatial phenomenon? Is an
environment the sum of socioeconomic variables or a social macrophenomenon?
What motives are there for including spatial concepts in creativity research?
One reason to turn to spatial contexts and environments as factors of creativity
is that creativity research centering predominantly on isolated variables has come
to very inconsistent or contradictory results. Some of these inconsistencies have
resulted from taking individual variables out of context and from failing to take into
account that correlations between variables differ in the spatial dimension from one
context to the next. A second reason is that humans are highly contextual beings
and that context-dependencies rather increase than diminish in highly specialized
societies. On pages 122–126 I specify in more detail why working in the presence
of others or moving from one environment to the other may affect the creativity of
individuals and groups. Single variables or models ignoring spatial contexts appar-
ently have less power to explain creativity than some spatial categories do. The
various personal, organizational, material, cultural, and political factors affecting
creativity interact, merge, and modify each other in specific places or areas and lead
to spatially rooted macrophenomena called milieu, environment, action setting,
context, or “knowledgescapes.” According to Matthiesen (2006, 2007), knowled-
gescapes focus on the interplay of formal and informal interaction networks and
milieus in knowledge-based spatial dynamics. Knowledgescapes are contextual-
ized by different knowledge cultures and constituting distinctive knowledge-based
forms of habitus of a specific city region. The knowledgescapes heuristics are
focused on comparing particular and distinctive developmental pathways within
knowledge-based city-regional developments.
Explaining how an environment or context can have an impact on creative
processes makes it necessary to clarify concepts. In a book intended to bridge
gaps between disciplines and address nongeographers, it does well to remember
that geographers do not entirely agree on the exact definitions of the categories
presented in the next section. Some authors use the terms environment and spatial
context synonymously.
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112 P. Meusburger
Spatial Categories and Their Possible Relations to Creativity
Spatial categories have various characteristics in common but differ from each
other in several ways. All spatial categories have the capacity to facilitate or impede
interactions. All spatial categories comprise institutions, infrastructure, resources,
job opportunities, challenges, and risks. All categories can function as a projection
screen of symbolic capital and are used in everyday, reductionist language to absorb
the reputation of individuals and organizations working in that spatial unit.
Place. The smallest spatial category is the location (site or spot) where a person
performs an activity, faces a challenge, or perceives stimuli and clues. Locations
are transformed to culturally determined places by a process that Graumann (1996,
2002) calls appropriation (Aneignung). Appropriation literally means making some-
thing one’s own and taking it for one’s own use. (Fischer-Kowalski & Erb, 2003, use
the term colonization instead of appropriation.) Appropriation of space occurs:
by marking, naming, defining, categorizing, and evaluating space as appropriate or inap-
propriate, owned or free, by signs, words, rules, regulations, and laws; but also by regular
locomotion resulting in paths and roads; by the cultivation of nature as subsistence of sup-
ply of resources; … by building, constructing, and settling; but also by the artistic and
scientific representation of space; and finally by the overcoming of distance by developing
means of communication. (Graumann, 2002, p. 104)
According to Canter (1977), “a place is the result of relationships between actions,
conceptions, and physical attributes” (p. 159). Places are “the major building blocks
for understanding human actions in their naturally occurring context” (Canter, 1985,
p. 215). A place has an address, materiality, image, reputation, and an individual
history and identity. Places are part of shared experience—“they cannot be specified
independently of the people experiencing them” (Canter, 1986, p.8). The experience
of place has been characterized by Canter (1985) “as having three integrated compo-
nents: activities, evaluations, and physical form” (p. 231). Unlike situations, places
have a distinct, enduring existence and are inevitably intertwined with the physical
properties and history of their location (Canter, 1985, p. 216). The physical form of
places and their functions have Aufforderungscharakter (valence, or the capacity to
unite, react, or interact with something else). They summon people who have particu-
lar intentions and who command specific knowledge and experience, calling upon
them to engage in or refrain from certain activities. Whether the term place stands for
a room, location, neighborhood, or city depends on the scale of analysis.
Action setting. The terms behavior setting (Barker, 1968) or action setting
(Weichhart, 2003) indicate consistent and organized people–environment interac-
tion that result in extraindividual behavior patterns. Action settings have a physical
structure intentionally designed for a specific cultural purpose (e.g., church, office,
motorway, or laboratory). They have a clearly defined function maintained and
organized by certain material settings, programs, and rules that structure behavior
and define certain kinds of actions as inappropriate. The action setting consists of
the interdependence between a physical milieu and standing patterns of behavior
that are unique to the setting. The expectations elicited by the purpose, rules, and
restrictions of an action setting induce in people a collective behavior based on
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 113
anticipatory obedience or self-censorship in the sense that individuals evaluate their
own performance, actions, and artifacts through the eyes of their audience, supervi-
sors, or critics. By complying with the rules of an action setting, people try to avoid
sanctions or to achieve approval. At every place, an individual must be aware of the
pattern of activities that might be expected in that location, but action settings have
more stable and more controlled place rules.
Administrative area and region. Administratively demarcated areas may gain
relevance for creativity research when certain rules, regulatory frameworks (aboli-
tion of censorship, freedom of expression), practices, resources or other factors
influencing creativity are valid in or restricted to clearly defined spaces. Mild forms
of such influences are research policies, research funding, and evaluation proce-
dures that authorities prescribe for certain administrative areas (states). Harsher
versions are censorship, interdiction or restriction of research, sanctions on certain
research topics, and prohibition of study abroad. The ideological background of
Stalinism for research in biology and the Allied ban of a large variety of research
in occupied Germany from 1945 and valid through the early 1950s (Gimbel, 1990)
were effective in precisely defined administrative areas.
The concept of region shares many characteristics with the term area, but
most authors would agree that regions are defined by former or present functional
relations. Because functional relations are influenced by available transport lines,
communication technologies, politics, language barriers, power relations, and so on,
their porous and ill-defined boundaries constantly change. Demarcating functional
relations (regions) is a scientific task; demarcating administrative areas is a political
act. However, long-standing functional regions can become administrative areas by
political decision. For pragmatic reasons, administrative areas are also important
for creativity research. Most statistics and indicators describing the socioeconomic
preconditions for creativity or its output are related to administrative units (e.g., cen-
sus wards, municipalities, metropolitan areas, provinces, states). The interpretation
of spatial patterns of indicators related to administrative areas is a highly effi-
cient heuristic method of evaluating the preconditions for creative processes and
discovering underlying factors of influence.
Environment. The term environment refers to both subjectively perceived and
objective, relatively stable qualities of an individual’s or group’s physical and social
surroundings (see Clitheroe et al., 1998, p. 105). Unlike a place that is locally fixed
in absolute or relative space, an environment is actor or system centered. A subject
of intentionality is physical; it occupies a place and has a viewpoint from which
environmental objects are perceived and remembered (Graumann, 2002, p. 98) and
from which relations are maintained.
With regard to social systems (e.g., organizations and institutions), an internal
environment differs from the external environment. A social system’s external
environment comprises all those elements (persons, material objects, and places) to
which a social system has established relatively stable and regular relations and by
which a person or social system can be affected in its goals, motivation, learning
processes, and capacities. It consists of institutions, competitors, customers, infra-
structure, job opportunities, and social structures as well as of attitudes, values,
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114 P. Meusburger
policies, hegemonic ideologies, and pressures of public opinion prevailing in the
spaces of a person’s or an organization’s activities. Organizations live in symbiosis
with their external environment and shape their environment. They communicate
with it; make transactions; obtain and exchange energy, goods, and services; and
supply the environment with their products and services. Individuals and social
systems must make timely, effective responses to environmental changes; profit
(to varying degrees) from the environment’s potential; and are endangered by its
risks and uncertainty. Both the definition of important environmental elements and
the dependency of a person or social system on the external environment vary with
the type of task, the available resources and capacities, the autonomy of a social
system, and the degree of uncertainty confronting the social system. This is the
main reason why interactions between actor (organization) and environment have
an ideographic character that cannot be put into general rules.
Spatial context. In this chapter the term spatial context is conceptualized as a
social macrophenomenon that represents a totality of interdependent factors of
influence. It is an intersection of various social, cultural, economic, and material
spheres or matrices. It represents a kind of superordinate concept that includes
objective and subjectively perceived factors, the psychological aspects of inter-
personal relationships, and the rules and programs of action settings. A spatial
context it is not represented by an accumulation but rather a bundling—in the sense
meant by Schumpeter (1912/1934)—and an interdependence of various factors.
It is not equivalent to a container but to a catalyst in which various objectively
and subjectively perceived facts, individuals, institutions, resources, infrastructure,
opportunities, restrictions, norms, rules, and cultures interact, intermingle in their
mutual dependencies, and modify each other in a defined area. A slight change in
one variable, such as the trust in institutions or personal relationships, the avail-
ability of resources, or the competence of leaders, will also affect other variables,
such as the openness of information exchange, the style of supervision, or intrin-
sic motivation. The totality of these interacting items offers potential that may
stimulate or hamper creative processes.
Atomistic or holistic perspective? The conventional approach to perception
assumes that a stimulus activates a specific receptor in the nervous system and that
the pattern of receptor stimulation is interpreted with the memory of past experi-
ences to glean information about the environment. In this approach a person must
interpret disconnected stimuli in order to construct something meaningful about
the environment (for details see Bell et al., 2001, p. 65). Gibson (1979) believed
that perception is more holistic, meaning that properties of the environment are
perceived as meaningful entities, not as distinct points. Gibson (1960), Canter
(1977), and other psychologists have explained the need to have environmental psy-
chologists orient their research to molar units of the environment, that is, to “wholes
endowed with significance” (Canter, 1977, p. 1; for details about molar and
molecular approaches, see also Bonnes & Secchiaroli, 1995, pp. 68—71, 134–135,
170–171). Gibson (1960) proposes that stimuli be considered in a “molar” rather
than a “molecular” sense. Molar stimuli are represented by “what an organism is
responding to, and not by what excites all the little receptors” (p. 700). To Gibson
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 115
and many other psychologists, cognitive perception is a holistic phenomenon, for
it deals with the perception of meanings and not, as with visual perception, to the
perception of simple stimuli or patterns.
A similar turn is apparent in other social sciences. Schluchter (2005, p. 24)
explains why sociology should not restrict itself to methodological individualism
but should include social macrophenomena. However, some human geographers,
aware that terms such as landscape have been applied unscientifically in the past,
still hesitate to use them to refer to a spatial totality. Social and behavioral sciences
still see-saw between the two poles of atomistic/mechanistic and holistic or system-
oriented perspectives.
From the viewpoint of human geography, one can describe the nature of a spatial
context by using the metaphor of a seedbed. The seedbed’s outcome depends on
many variables, including the type and quality of the soil, the characteristics and
quality of the seeds, the amount of precipitation and evaporation, the average annual
temperature, the duration of the vegetation period, the availability of fertilizers, and
competition between the crops. Though perhaps trivial, it is worth stating that soil,
seeds, water, temperature, and other necessary factors must interact at a clearly
defined place. Proximity without interaction will not lead to the desired results.
If one important factor is absent or does not contribute to the processes in the usual
way, the crops will not develop as expected. Some deserts have very fertile soils and
are full of seeds, but as long there is not enough water the seeds cannot develop.
The seedbed metaphor makes it plain that the study of discrete variables has little
power to explain the outcome of the seedbed. What counts is the interaction of these
variables at a certain location. And that interaction does not occur automatically; it
must be initiated. Hot spots of brain power are like seedbeds, too; they are potential,
not independent, factors of influence. It would be a mistake to assume that nearby
agents (neighbors) automatically interact and that each of them perceives and uses
the available potential or that they depend to a similar extent on exchanging infor-
mation with the environment. Most observers of the seedbed will not be aware of
the chemical, physical, and biological processes occurring between the elements
of the seedbed. Neither do they have the knowledge to understand the processes
occurring within the plants. Most agents, in their life worlds, have a reductionist
view focused on the lot, for the details simply are not known.
The Impact of the Macroscale on Creativity:
Socioeconomic Structures and Value Systems
The historical persistence of large-scale spatial disparities of socioeconomic
structures. Highly developed, wealthy societies provide better or more expensive
educational institutions; attract more eminent scientists and artists; have greater
rates of specialization, experimentation, and risk-taking; provide more venture
capital; have more complex economic relations; and can invest more in expensive
basic research than subsistence or illiterate societies. However, even very wealthy
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116 P. Meusburger
societies and hegemonic states have extremely large internal spatial disparities of
creativity. When asking why creative acts concentrate at certain places or in specific
environments and regions, one must study both the process of creativity itself and
the preconditions or antecedents of creativity.
The antecedents enabling or promoting creativity operate on various spatial
scales. On the spatial macroscale they comprise the hierarchy of urban systems
and the established capacity of places and regions to attract, keep, support, and
inspire talented, knowledgeable, and potentially creative people. Such large-scale
disparities in economic and scientific attractiveness are the result of long historical
processes governing the spatial division of labor, uneven economic development,
educational policies, spatial power relations, migration patterns of talented people,
and various path dependencies.
Places differ in the complexity of their economic structure, the quality of the
jobs they offer, the location of power and decision-making, the spatial extension
of their economic relations, and their scientific reputation. Some places and areas
act like magnets attracting the most ambitious artists, scientists, and other talented
persons. They offer these people outstanding scientific equipment and resources
(venture capital), give them the freedom to experiment and break with traditions
(as illustrated in Vienna by Schönberg’s 12-tone music, Freud’s psychoanalysis,
and the artists of the “Secession” movement). These places offer them platforms
from which to exhibit their creative ideas and products, grant them access to high
level international networks, and enable them to gain reputation. The reputation of
a place is interrelated with its degree of international connectivity and its potential
for face-to-face contact with top-ranking experts of various domains.
Other places and regions constantly lose most of their talented young generation,
intellectuals, scientists, and artists through persistent brain drain or brain overflow
caused by lack of opportunities and demand, underdevelopment, or political restric-
tions. These spatial disparities and hierarchies of social, cultural, and economic
attractiveness are constantly in flux. Though disparities between the centers and
the peripheries have remarkable historical continuity and are perpetually repro-
duced by the asymmetry of power relations, some magnets eventually lose their
attractiveness for various reasons, and the artists, intellectuals, and scientists leave
for more engaging places. These processes on the spatial macroscale create certain
hot spots of brainpower. They are characterized by a high density and large spatial
concentration of workplaces for scientists, intellectuals, artists, innovative entre-
preneurs, highly skilled experts, top-level decision-makers of various sectors, and
sophisticated research infrastructure (Meusburger, 1998, 2000). In 1980, Budapest
and the capitals of the 19 Hungarian provinces (0.6% of all Hungarian cities and
villages) accounted for 35% of the country’s total population, but offered 96.1%
of all jobs for university graduates in personal and business services, 88.7% of all
jobs for university graduates in science and research, 88.6% of all jobs for univer-
sity graduates in cultural services, and the vast majority of highly skilled jobs in
other economic sectors (Meusburger, 1997, pp. 132–133). The more than 3,000
remaining Hungarian villages and towns almost entirely lacked the most important
precondition for creative milieus, a highly skilled labor force. Consequently, these
peripheral areas had virtually no foreign capital in after the introduction of market
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 117
economy, an imbalance that only reinforced the disparities that already existed
between the center and the periphery.
The impact of cultures, world-views, and research policies. Both the generation
and evaluation of creative ideas are affected by prevailing cultures, worldviews,
political systems, academic evaluation systems, policies on the recruitment of
scholars, and research funding. Ruling classes, powerful bureaucracies, or religious
leaders who are afraid that novelties potentially threaten their status or the power
structure of their system will be reluctant to introduce the relevant innovations. In
many cases it is epistemic power that determines what is to be regarded as a crea-
tive product, art, or useful technology. In some places creative ideas are recognized,
fostered, and implemented very early; in others, they are not regarded as useful or
appropriate, so their implementation may be delayed or rejected.
Ancient Chinese society is a good example of a central authority supported by a powerful
bureaucracy that was able to resist for centuries the spread of new ideas. Despite enormous
early cultural advances and a great number of creative individuals, Chinese society
believed the use of gunpowder for weapons and that of movable type for the printing of
books were bad ideas. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999, p. 323)
A new idea will face difficulties in being recognized as creative if the field is defensive,
rigid, or embedded in a social system that discourages novelty. For instance, the aridity of
Soviet genetics in the thirties was not … a fault of the scientists who made up the field, but
of the peculiar agenda of the broader social system of which the field was a part.
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p. 331)
Research policies, ways of research funding, and evaluation systems define what
good scholarship or good publishing is. However, the criteria and methods that are
used to evaluate scientific quality differ from one group of disciplines to the next,
and applying the criteria of one discipline to evaluate all other disciplines inter-
feres with scientific creativity. Drawing on Torrance’s (1995) claim that incom-
pleteness and disharmony can present openings for creativity, Ambrose (2006)
and Schorske (1997) distinguish between two types of academic disciplines: the
fractured-porous (e.g., political science, English studies, or human geography) and
unified-insular (e.g., analytic philosophy, large parts of psychology, economics).
The fractured-porous disciplines lack internal consensus about methods and
theories and are less policed by gatekeepers than the fields of the other category
are. The fractured-porous disciplines “tend to be internally contested, inclusive
of diverse ideas, and in the process of re-conceiving their fundamental conceptual
frameworks” (Ambrose, 2006, p. 77). They lack intradisciplinary interdependence
because of their fragmented conceptual frameworks, which reflect warring camps of
conflicting groups that vie for attention and supremacy. Because they show strong
interdisciplinary interdependence and because their porous borders allow the impor-
tation of constructs from a wide variety of neighboring disciplines, they seem to be
more open to new topics and theoretical perspectives (Ambrose, 2006, p. 82).
The tightly unified-insular disciplines are firmly bounded and heavily policed
by journals and career promotions and reflect confidence in their conceptual foun-
dations (see Ambrose, 2006, p. 77). Scholars in unified-insular disciplines “face
much less incompleteness and disharmony because they receive reminders about
the certainty of investigative methods and the apparent solidity of the conceptual
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118 P. Meusburger
foundations that underpin those methods” (Ambrose, 2006, p. 80). According to
Schorske (1997) the unified disciplines achieved their unity by tenaciously preserv-
ing their core assumptions and methods, purging themselves of diverse inquiry
methods, narrowing the scope of investigation, and marginalizing investigative
trajectories ill suited to its entrenched core assumptions (see also Ambrose, 2006,
pp. 77–78). “Members of unified-insular disciplines are highly interdependent within
their fields because they strongly agree on the fundamental conceptual frameworks
and research methods that define and constrain their work. However, they strongly
reject interdependence when it comes to interdisciplinary sharing and collaboration
because of their impervious disciplinary borders” (Ambrose, 2006, p. 82).
Unified-insular disciplines are more likely to suppress divergent thinking because
they enforce consensus about fundamental assumptions and research methods
through their policing of publishing and academic recruitment. In contrast, the
fractured-porous disciplines appear to encourage divergent thought. The “porous
border that surrounds a fragmented field enables the importation of multidisci-
plinary constructs that stir up additional divergence of thought” (Ambrose, 2006,
p. 81). Centrifugal impulses, lack of consensus, and fragmentation and splintering of
topics seem to entail more dynamics and creativity than is the case in disciplines that
tenaciously preserve their core assumptions and methods for long periods (Ambrose,
2006, p. 78). These two types of disciplinary outlook also shape the scientific poli-
cies and evaluation systems of universities, research foundations, and nations. Some
evaluation systems allow more fragmentation of scientific cultures, more splintering
of topics, and more diverse criteria of scientific excellence than others, with the
result that they can respond more readily to societal and political changes.
The Impact of the Mesoscale on Creativity:
Organizational Structures and Climates
Organizations are the spatial mesoscale on which creative processes are greatly
influenced. An organization is a goal-oriented and information-processing social
system that perceives, scans, interprets, and diagnoses information from the envi-
ronment and from its own elements in order to remain competitive and adapt its
goals and structures to new challenges. A primary task of organizations is to reduce
the degree of uncertainty and complexity confronting them, both internally and in
relation to the external environment.
Through their vertical division of labor, organizations contribute to internal
hierarchies of decision-making and spatial disparities of professional skills. These
structural features and characteristics of the organizational climate bear signifi-
cantly on employees’ creative performance at work (Amabile, 1988; Oldham &
Cummings, 1996; Redmond & Mumford, 1993; Staw, 1990), either supporting or
impairing it. Along with organizational culture and spatial relations, they affect
whether organizations can attract, recruit, and keep creative persons and whether
such individuals are positively stimulated by the work environment and able to
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 119
develop their creativity. All these factors determine whether creative people are
hindered in realizing their ideas, whether the organization accepts and promotes
creative ideas in time, and whether incompetent supervisors or mediocre teams
block them.
To conceptualize the faculties and dynamics affecting creativity at the meso level,
it is justified in organization theory and system theory to speak of organizational
intelligence, organizational learning, and organizational memories. “Organizational
intelligence is an organization’s capability to process, interpret, encode, manipu-
late, and access information in a purposeful, goal-directed manner, so it can
increase its adaptive potential in the environment in which it operates” (Glynn,
1996, p. 1088). One may also speak of creative organizations. Indeed, organiza-
tions themselves have to be creative if they are to attain their goals and survive
competition, for it is within organizations that most creative ideas are evaluated,
executed, or verified.
This kind of influence extends beyond organizations, too. Even isolated artists
or poets must deal with some organization or other if they want to exhibit or pub-
lish their work. With the assistance of organizations, individual agents can shape
socioeconomic structures on the macroscale.
Organizational structure. Many structural features of an organization are impor-
tant for creative processes. Some of them are:
The job complexity and skill variety within the organization•
The design of work settings•
The architecture or arrangement of formal communication, decision-making, •
and authority within the organization
The degree of centralization or decentralization of decision-making•
The professional and social competence of supervisors and decision-makers•
The style of supervision, evaluation, and conflict-resolution•
Principles of staff recruitment•
The span of control at various hierarchical levels•
The degree of autonomy that different levels of the organization enjoy•
The availability of resources•
The organization’s ability to respond to opportunities and risks of the environ-•
ment; and
The formalized structure of communication with the environment•
Effective obstacles to creativity are rigid adherence to rules, strong hierarchies, and
incompetence of supervisors unfamiliar with the subordinates’ areas of specializa-
tion (for details see Williams & Yang, 1999, p. 375).
Structures of decision-making and competence distribution within an organi-
zation cannot be deliberately altered. They depend on the goals, the external
environment, and internal resources of the social system. Disruption of formerly
stable relations to the environment, rapid changes of the environment, and growing
uncertainty imply the need to shift power to those who have the competence neces-
sary for solving the new challenges and averting crises. In threat-rigidity theory,
this kind of response is referred to as the “mechanistic shift” (Staw et al., 1981,
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120 P. Meusburger
p. 516) that organizations go through under threatening conditions. In those times,
they centralize control, conserve resources, restrict information flow, and rely on
familiar, well-practiced routines (see also Amabile & Conti, 1999, p. 631).
Group composition affects group performance and plays an important role in
creating a potentially stimulating environment (Smith, 1971, p. 495). Research
on the relationship between team composition and team performance (Hoffman,
1959; Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Hoffman & Smith, 1960; Smith, 1971) has found
that groups in which the members’ personalities are heterogeneous tend to pro-
duce high-quality solutions to problems. The reason given is that the members
apparently stimulate one another constructively and that they mutually correct
their errors. Some large companies assess cultural diversity so important that they
introduced diversity management.
Organizational culture and organizational climate. Some authors use the terms
organizational culture and organizational climate synonymously; others do not.
Schein (1985) defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integra-
tion, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those
problems” (p. 19). To Forehand and Gilmer (1964), organizational climate means
“the set of characteristics that describe an organization and that (a) distinguish the
organization from other organizations, (b) are relatively enduring over time, and
(c) influence the behavior of people in the organization” (p. 362). Tagiuri (1968)
considers this definition deficient because it takes no account of individual
perceptions. He notes that members of an organization interpret its climate in ways
that affect their attitudes and motivation. He defines climate as “the relatively
enduring quality of the total [organizational] environment that (a) is experienced
by the occupants, (b) influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms
of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of the environ-
ment” (p. 25). With similar emphasis on the individual, Isaksen et al. (2000–2001)
break the term climate down into two aspects. They define organizational climate
“as the recurring patterns of behavior, attitudes, and feelings that characterize life
in the organization” (p. 172) and regard psychological climate as referring to the
individual perceptions of the patterns of behavior.
In an additional consideration of organizational culture and climate, Denison
(1996) writes that:
[I]nteraction reproduces a symbolic world that gives culture both a great stability and a
certain precarious and fragile nature rooted in the dependence of the system on individual
cognition and action. Climate, in contrast, portrays organizational environments as being
rooted in the organization’s value system, but tends to present these social environments in
relatively static terms, describing them in terms of a fixed (and broadly applicable) set of
dimensions. (p. 624)
[C]limate refers to a situation and its link to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organiza-
tional members. Thus, it is temporal, subjective, and often subject to direct manipulation
by people with power and influence. Culture, in contrast, refers to an evolved context
(within which a situation may be embedded). Thus, it is rooted in history, collectively held,
and sufficiently complex to resist many attempts at direct manipulation. (p. 644)
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 121
Another difference between culture and climate is that the climate of an organiza-
tion can be altered relatively quickly by external pressure—such as the downsizing
of a firm—or internal changes such as the replacement of group leaders. Culture
refers more to the deep and enduring structure of organizations, which is rooted
in values, beliefs, traditions, and assumptions held by organizational members
(Denison, 1996; Gagliardi, 1986; Isaksen et al., 2000–2001).
With regard to creativity, the important questions are whether the culture of an
organization tends to breed conformity and risk aversion (see Cummings, 1965,
p. 224), whether certain paradigms should be followed, or whether the culture
tolerates deviation from what is traditional. Are new members of an organization
confronted with ready-made questions, solutions, and answers, or is a diversity of
viewpoints, novelty, and innovation encouraged? Phenomenologically, climate is
external to the individual, but cognitively the climate is internal to the extent that it
is affected by individual perceptions (Woodman & King, 1978, p. 818). Following
James, Hater, Gent, and Bruni (1978, p. 786), Scott and Bruce (1994) define the
climate of an organization “as individual cognitive representations of the organiza-
tional setting expressed in terms that reflect psychologically meaningful interpreta-
tions of the situation” (p. 581). The climate of the work environment represents
“signals [that] individuals receive concerning organizational expectations for
behavior and potential outcomes of behavior” (Scott & Bruce, 1994, p. 582).
According to Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970):
[We] might define climate as a set of attributes specific to a particular organization that may
be induced from the way that organization deals with its members and its environment. For
the individual member within the organization, climate takes the form of a set of attributes
and expectancies which describe the organization in terms of both static characteristics
(such as degree of autonomy) and behavior-outcome and outcome-outcome contingencies.
(p. 390)
The measurement of organizational climate poses a difficult methodological
problem (for details see Hellriegel & Slocum, 1974; Isaksen et al., 1999; James &
Jones, 1974). Allegedly objective attributes will be perceived and evaluated differ-
ently by the members of an organization, depending on their motivation, status, and
personal experience. A senior manager, for instance, will perceive the climate of his
or her organization differently than a blue-collar worker at the bottom of the hier-
archy, so comparison of the two perspectives does not contribute much to research
knowledge. Nor does an attempt to average people’s job satisfaction or perception
of organizational climate. Variance in perceptually measured climate scores might
be related to differences in individuals rather than to differences in situations
(James & Jones, 1974, p. 1103). Because most large and complex organizations
are spread over many locations, the category “climate of an organization” should
be expressed in the plural. Each large organization has many different climates that
vary from one hierarchic level to the other and from one work group to the next.
Dimensions of social relations in the structure, climate, and culture of organi-
zations. The structure, climate, and culture of organizations are shaped by social
relations and can be fully understood only if one takes the following three issues
into account.
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122 P. Meusburger
1. The role of group work, brainstorming, solitude, and working in the presence
of others
A vast amount of literature on idea generation and creativity is influenced by the
brainstorming paradigm (Osborn, 1953; for an overview see Paulus & Yang, 2000).
It rests on two assumptions: that group work and group discussion offer a chance
to combine formerly unrelated ideas and that a group’s chances of generating a
creative response to a challenge improve with the number of different views and
knowledge bases there are in a discussion. Under certain conditions, group dis-
cussion may contribute to “combining known but previously unrelated facts and
ideas in such a way that new ones emerge” (Shalley, 1995, p. 484), generating new
ideas and boosting overall productivity. The cognitive theory of group creativity
(Brown et al., 1998; Paulus, 2000; Paulus et al., 2000) posits conditions under
which effects of cognitive stimulation can be observed in groups. However, the
underlying assumption seems to be that all participants in a brainstorming group
(a) have the same prior knowledge and the same intrinsic motivations and goals,
(b) are all interested in sharing their knowledge with others, and (c) will automati-
cally consider the arguments of others. Recent research is inconclusive about the
effects of brainstorming and group work on creativity (Mullen et al., 1991; Paulus,
2000; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993; Paulus et al., 1995, 2000; Paulus & Yang, 2000).
A certain skepticism stems from the argument that brainstorming and group work
can act as a stimulus by offering new experiences, ideas, and learning opportuni-
ties but that it can also exert pressure on the individual to conform to the mediocre
ideas of the majority. Collaborative projects tend to suppress individual initiative
and independence. It is thus asserted that brainstorming and group work apparently
are not major factors in scientific creative achievement. “There is little doubt that in
the realm of highest creativity there is only one creative instrument: the individual
mind and spirit of the creator. The landmarks of scientific invention have been
established by a handful of lone investigators” (Raudsepp, 1958, p. 71).
Empirical results of many studies have supported the hypothesis that group discus-
sion can lead group members to copy each other’s responses. In a study on the effects
of prior group discussion on individual creativity, for example, Andre, Schumer, and
Whitaker (1979) found that group discussion led to a lower total number of different
responses being produced by the group than by a comparable number of individu-
als working alone (p. 111). It appears as though “conformity within small groups
inhibits individual creativity. Group discussion acts not as a catalyst to individual
divergent thinking but merely allows individuals to adopt the different ideas of other
individuals” (p. 119). Similarly, an experiment on group influence on creativity in
mathematics found that “those pupils working as individuals have a higher creativ-
ity score than those working in groups” (Banghart & Spraker, 1963, p. 260). These
observations may explain why tight networks or scientific schools eventually lead to
a certain fixation on specific topics, methods, or paradigms. In short, group work or
strong integration in teams may keep individuals from following their own inclina-
tions and interests.
Many authors seem to understate the difficulties of and barriers to knowledge
management, knowledge exchange, and idea-sharing in groups or organizations.
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 123
This tendency is especially noticeable among researchers who do not distinguish
between knowledge and information or who apply a naïve model of knowledge
transfer built on the neoclassical concept of knowledge diffusion (for a critique of
this approach, see Meusburger, 2008, pp. 70–74). Andre et al. (1979) have shown
that groups using the brainstorming rules generate substantially fewer ideas than
the same number of individuals brainstorming in isolation. Similarly, Lindgren and
Lindgren (1965, p. 23) and Dunnette, Campbell, and Jaastad (1963) have shown
that individuals brainstorming alone are more creative than when brainstorming in a
group. As Andre et al. (1979) suggest, “in a practical situation where many alterna-
tive solutions to a problem are desired, it would be better to set individuals working
alone and then pool their contributions” (p. 122). Separateness and solitude can
serve as a protective shield for the scientist or artist.
There are a number of reasons why brainstorming does not always lead to the
desired effect and why creativity may be blocked by group work (the following
overview draws mainly on Paulus & Yang, 2000). Explaining why group discussion
can inhibit creativity, Andre et al. (1979) write:
1. The social nature of the group makes individual performance public, and indi-
viduals may be reluctant to express unusual or “far out” ideas because of anxiety
over how they will be received. Under this rationale conformity within the group
will inhibit individual productivity[,] leading to lower group performance.
2. An individual within the group, perhaps the most creative, may dominate discus-
sion[,] with the remaining individuals simply following his lead (p. 112).
Other scholars concur that creativity can be undermined by such unwillingness to
state one’s ideas and by the social loafing or free-riding that may ensue when indi-
viduals do not feel accountable or feel their efforts are not needed by the group
(Karau & Williams, 1993; Kerr & Bruun, 1983). Another factor that reduces
creativity is that some individuals cannot adequately express their ideas when
someone else is talking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991; Lamm & Trommsdorff, 1973).
Instead, certain members use such meetings to establish their own reputation
rather than listen to others. That kind of encounter frequently ends in competition
for reputational capital, not in the exchange of ideas (Drazin et al., 1999, p. 295;
Sutton & Hargadon, 1996, p. 706). Antipathy between group members and fear
of losing status are additional problems that often thwart attempts to generate and
exchange ideas within groups. Lack of support in a group quickly extinguishes the
spark of originality, and a hostile group climate often wipes out minority views.
Moreover, some team members may be disinclined to take responsibility for their
actions, and others may not be prepared to share the benefits of their creative ideas
with the group. Some participants may be preoccupied with their own ideas and
not pay much attention to those generated by others (Paulus & Yang, 2000, p. 86).
Glynn (1996) and Nemeth (1986) demonstrated that the positions expressed by a
majority of individuals tended to foster convergent thinking, limit the number of
presented alternatives, and enforce conformity to the prevailing views.
Hearing others generate ideas does not necessarily enhance one’s performance,
either. Individuals cannot be forced to participate in the interaction process of other
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124 P. Meusburger
group members, for some members of the group may lack the prior knowledge
necessary for understanding the possible benefits for their own work. Still others
may be preoccupied with different topics and lack the attention or interest required
for the transfer of knowledge. Time, too, partly explains why brainstorming and
its attendant levels of creativity may be disappointing. The incubation hypothesis
suggests that “individuals do carefully process the shared information but may lack
sufficient occasion to demonstrate the stimulation value of this information during
the sharing session. … It may take some time to reflect on the shared information
and to integrate this with one’s own ideas” (Paulus & Yang, 2000, p. 79; see also
Paulus et al., 2000).
However, Kurtzberg and Amabile (2000–2001) point out that researchers have
focused predominantly on brainstorming in groups and have paid little atten-
tion to team-level creativity. They note that the vast majority of studies on group
brainstorming has occurred in a laboratory setting, with groups of participants
who had no knowledge of each other’s strengths and weaknesses and no strong
incentive to create mutual understanding. Effective group problem-solving can
occur with the right combination of personalities, the right amount of diversity,
sufficient resources, and cooperative process behaviors (see Kurtzberg & Amabile,
2000–2001, p. 288).
Working in the presence of others is not the same as brainstorming. Various
authors (Amabile et al., 1990; Shalley, 1995; Zajonc, 1965) have examined
the effects that co-action, audience surveillance, expected evaluation, and
goal-setting have on creativity. Shalley (1995) reported that the highest levels of
creativity occurred when individuals had a creativity goal while working alone
and expecting to be evaluated. Matlin and Zajonc (1968) found that surveillance
had a significant negative effect on originality, which is an important component
of creativity. According to Zajonc (1965), audiences and co-actors intensify
“drive/arousal,” which facilitates simple, well-learned, dominant responses but
impairs complex, counterinstitutional, subordinate processes (quoted in Shalley,
1995, p. 486).
Working in the presence of others can have ambiguous effects. It can be dis-
tracting or inspiring. It can either energize people or disrupt their performance,
“depending upon whether their attention is focused on dominant or subordinate
responses” (Shalley, 1995, p. 486). Large office spaces or the presence of many
co-actors lead to an increase in the speed and accuracy with which simple, routine
tasks are performed and to a decline in performance on complex tasks (Bond &
Titus, 1983; Shalley, 1995). “Individuals working alone on an open-ended, ill-
structured task will have higher levels of creativity than individuals working in the
presence of co-actors” (Shalley, 1995, p. 486).
Several studies support the hypothesis that solitude, sensory deprivation, and
restricted environmental stimulation techniques promote cognitive processes,
problem-solving creativity, and scientific thinking and reinforce aspects of imagery
(Andre et al., 1979; Arieti, 1976; Forgays & Forgays, 1992; Norlander et al., 1998;
Shore, 1971; Suedfeld, 1968, 1980; Suedfeld & Landon, 1970; Suedfeld et al.,
1987). According to Shalley (1995), attentional overload may cause individuals to
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 125
rely on preexisting schemata and routines and may lead to a restriction of cogni-
tive focusing. In contrast, it is assumed that solitude may aid complex cognition
(Forgays & Forgays, 1992; Shore, 1971). Arieti (1976) and Suedfeld (1974)
consider aloneness conducive to creativity. They mention a long list of eminently
creative philosophers, scientists, and religious leaders whose lives are marked by
solitude and remoteness (Suedfeld et al., 1987, p. 220).
Arieti (1976) regards inactivity, daydreaming and the lack of external distrac-
tion as cultivating creative thought. Suedfeld et al. (1987) hypothesized that low
stimulation will enhance creative behavior. They tested their hypothesis by using
the Restricted Environmental Stimulation Technique (REST) in an experiment
chamber or flotation tank that induces relaxation, lowers arousal, and allows
the individual to concentrate on thoughts, feelings, and memories. Suedfeld and
Landon (1970) reported evidence that divergent thinking is enhanced under condi-
tions of sensory deprivation. Suedfeld et al. (1987), Forgays and Forgays (1992),
and Norlander et al. (1998) explored whether flotation facilitated creative problem-
solving ability and originality and whether it positively affected creative perform-
ance. All three studies arrived at the same conclusion, which is summed up by
Forgays and Forgays (1992):
Floaters increased their post- over their pre-scores on creativity and vigor, and maintain
their curiosity level while they decreased anxiety, tension, depression, and fatigue scores,
as compared with controls. It appears, then, that float subjects are alert but relaxed and that
these conditions may conduce to the creativity benefits obtained. (p. 333)
Forgays and Forgays also found that “higher creative persons respond to isolation
more positively and that such a response pattern may aid their creative process”
(p. 333). Floating is associated with increased vigor and a reduction in depression,
confusion, hostility, and fatigue (p. 334).
Many studies confirm the important role of solitude, interpersonal distance, and
reduced ambient stimulation in enhancing creative thought, but others underline
the importance of environmental stimuli as well. This apparent contradiction is
explicable in several ways. First, it indicates that creative individuals need periods
of intensive stimulation as well as periods of solitude. People seek solitude in order
to avoid overstimulation and various stressors associated with excessive proximity.
A sequence of group work (brainstorming, stimulation) and individual work (soli-
tude) may produce the best results. Second, group experience does inhibit creativity
for the items discussed by the participants, but it may serve as a trigger or catalyst
for individual creativity for subsequent items (Andre et al., 1979, p. 122). Third,
many past psychological studies on creativity used ad-hoc groups. The relation-
ship found between individual and group performance may not hold for preexist-
ing groups whose members trust each other and have a long history of successful
cooperation (Andre et al., 1979, p. 119). Fourth, the composition of the group, the
age of group members, and the duration of their successful cooperation may have
an important bearing.
Young groups might be expected to benefit more from the stimulation of heterogeneously
composed groups than will old groups. (Smith, 1971, p. 491)
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126 P. Meusburger
Findings generally support the expectation that a heterogeneously composed team will be
superior in group performance. This is particularly the case for young groups, where there
may be greater need for a higher level of stimulation and energetic interaction. (Smith,
1971, p. 493)
2. Personality of leaders and leadership style
The effect and perception of an organizational structure and climate with regard
to creativity is modified by the personality of leaders. It shapes their style of
goal-setting, decision-making, supervising, and evaluating, which, in turn, influ-
ence the effect of other factors. Leaders express organizational norms and values,
structure the nature of group interaction, condition subordinates’ perceptions of
the work environment, and affect in many other ways the performance and crea-
tivity of organizations. They can enhance or diminish the subordinate’s feeling of
self-efficacy and self-esteem and the individual’s willingness to pursue risky or
original ideas (see Redmond & Mumford, 1993). Creative achievement is enhanced
by superiors who show consideration for the feelings and interests of employees;
encourage their subordinates to voice their own concerns; give positive, mainly
informative feedback; facilitate employee skill development; and promote personal
initiative and risk-taking at work. Creative performance in a group or organization is
likely to languish under supervisors, who rigidly control their subordinates, closely
monitor employee behavior, introduce rigid operating procedures, make decisions
without employee input, prove less competent than their subordinates, and suf-
fer from a sense of inferiority (Amabile, 1988; Amabile & Conti, 1999; Amabile
et al., 1996; Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1989; Andrews & Farris, 1967; Oldham &
Cummings, 1996; Shalley et al., 2000; Stahl & Koser, 1978; West, 1989).
Collectively, these authors have reported that teams of scientists produced their
most creative results when they were:
Allowed substantial freedom in the way the work was done•
Encouraged rather than controlled by their supervisors•
Given opportunities to influence important decisions and choose the processes •
of evaluation
Permitted to ask novel or disturbing questions, and•
Invited to come up with unusual solutions•
Other prerequisites of creativity that supervisors can influence are:
The degree of open information flow across departments•
Mutual receptiveness to other domains or disciplines•
Shared commitment to a project•
Fair and supportive assessment of new ideas•
Reward and recognition of creativity•
Participatory management and decision-making•
Open interaction between supervisor and subordinates, and•
Diversity in team members’ knowledge bases (disciplinary background)•
Hage and Dewar (1973) found that the values of organizational leaders explained
more variance in organizational innovation rates than any single structural dimen-
sion. To sum up, research has shown that inducing positive affects can enhance
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 127
creative problem-solving, whereas generating negative emotions, particularly
anxiety, has been associated with lowered creative performance (for an overview
see Clapham, 2000–2001).
3. Job satisfaction
Many authors assume that a high level of job satisfaction contributes positively
to organizational effectiveness and enhances creative performance and that job
dissatisfaction is detrimental to organizations (for an overview see O’Reilly, 1991).
They argue that dissatisfied members will quit their organizations and that other
employees will remain in the organization but respond either passively by accepting
their situation or exhibit passive withdrawal behavior. However, March and Simon
(1958), Simonton (2000), van Gundy (1987), Zhou and George (2001) and others
question this idea and suggest that job dissatisfaction can also lead to creativity
when individuals have “an active and constructive response to their dissatisfaction”
(Zhou & George, 2001, p. 684). They argue that discontentment with the status quo
can spur organizational change when dissatisfied members of the organization come
up with new ideas to do things better or gain new intrinsic motivation to improve
their current work situation. Under certain conditions, employees’ job dissatisfac-
tion may actually lead to a more creative performance because some employees
dissatisfied with the situation will actively try to improve conditions. Exceptional
creativity seldom emerges from the most supportive or harmonious environment.
Indeed, some studies maintain that creative potential seems to require exposure
to diversifying experiences or cultural diversity that help weaken the constraints
imposed by conventional socialization (Simonton, 2000, p. 153). This view is too
simplistic, however. Its accuracy depends on the type and circumstances of cultural
diversity. The consequences of cultural diversity that stems from cooperating elites
differ from those of cultural diversity arising from segregated, disadvantaged and
unskilled minorities being in conflict with each other.
Surprisingly, more research has been done on environmental factors enhanc-
ing creativity than on those that undermine it. This preoccupation belies the fact
that impediments to creativity, such as incompetent leaders, lack of resources, and
internal strife, are experienced on a daily basis much more explicitly than factors
enhancing creativity, which may not be recognized at all because they are regarded
as normal or self-evident.
The Spatial Microscale: Personal Traits of Creative
Individuals and Their Relations to the Environment
For many decades, creativity research in psychology, management studies, career
studies, art criticism, and philosophy focused mainly on the relationships between
creativity and personality, on the search for personal characteristics relating posi-
tively or negatively to creativity, and on the identification of traits predictive of
creative performance. Some of the early studies related creativity to pathology or
neurotic conflicts (for an overview see Becker, 2000–2001; Burchard, 1952; Eissler,
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128 P. Meusburger
1967; Rees & Goldman, 1961; Schuldberg, 2000–2001; Symington, 1987). Some
psychoanalysts believe that artistic creation arises from the unconscious and is
motivated by an unfulfilled ambition, an erotic wish, or oral regression (Bergler,
1950; Rees & Goldman, 1961, p. 145). Eissler (1967), Symington (1987), and
others have shown that many “great men” were suicidal or suffered from severe
injury to infantile narcissism. Other authors (e.g., Slochower, 1967, pp. 4–5) regard
crises, periods of sharp transition, and conflicts as a precondition for the highest
forms of creativity. Dante had to go through the Inferno to find Eden, and through
Purgatory to reach Paradise.
Other authors criticize this psychopathological approach, charging that too
much emphasis has been placed on the neurotic affiliations of artistic creation or
scientific excellence. Symington (1987) claimed that “psycho-analytic theory is
too pathology-oriented to be of much help to us in understanding creative genius”
(p. 286). According to Scott (1965), there is “no support for the common-sense
belief that creativity stems from neurosis or that creative individuals are inevitably
psychologically sick, physically frail, and socially irresponsible” (p. 219). However,
there is ample evidence that large numbers of highly creative people had life histo-
ries marked by severe frustration, deprivations, and traumatic experiences.
Attributes of creative people. Most authors agree that certain personality
characteristics relate to, enhance, or correlate with creativity. In the literature of
various disciplines, the most frequently mentioned attributes of this kind are moti-
vation; mental energy; a high level of multiple intelligence; ideational fluency;
wide-ranging interests; a disposition to the integration of diverse stimuli; attraction
to complexity; intuition; aesthetic sensitivity; general effectiveness of perform-
ance; existential security that permits a high degree of nonconformity and allows
time for reflective thought; an urge to seek self-fulfillment in a unique manner
of the individual’s own choosing; a heightened desire for attention, reputation,
and social appreciation; above-average adaptive flexibility; originality; curiosity;
self-confidence; a marked degree of independence in thought and action (field
independence); tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity; openness to experienc-
ing the inner self and the outer world; a rich and vivid fantasy life; above-average
memory for imaginary information; spontaneous flexibility; high level of self-
assertion, self-esteem, and self-confidence; a willingness to take risks; noncon-
formity; an ability to synthesize and rearrange existing facts in order to come up
with a new and useful answer to a problem; persistence in the development of ideas;
a strong sense of destiny with a marked degree of resoluteness; and a tendency to
cling tenaciously to a project in the face of repeated or perceived failure or disagree-
ment and critique of others (Amabile, 1988; Banghart & Spraker, 1963; Barron,
1955; Barron & Harrington, 1981; Carlozzi et al., 1995; Earl, 1987; Eulie, 1984;
Funke, 2000; Gardner, 1995; Givens, 1962; Goldsmith & Matherley, 1988; Gough,
1979; Hocevar, 1980; Martindale, 1989; Niederland, 1967; Norlander et al., 1998;
Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Rokeach, 1954, 1960; Runco, 1988, 1994; Shalley,
1995; Shaw, 1987; Simonton, 1999; Thomas, 1955).
Rather than discuss or evaluate the pertinence of these variables to creativity
studies and the inconsistency of some of the research results, I assert that most of
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 129
these personal traits are neither innate nor isolated from the social environment.
They are learned, activated, affected, or developed through relations and interac-
tions between actor and environment. Some of the characteristics or cognitive
frameworks do influence a person’s goals and motivation others impair the percep-
tion and interpretation of the environment; another group of traits influences social
relations. Also associated with the social environment are personal constraints and
personal traits inimical to creativity—such as depression, learned helplessness, lack
of self-esteem, inability to concentrate, or a sense of being controlled by others.
Scholars disagree on the existence of innate ideas or innate knowledge. Most
researchers prefer the terms innate capacities or propensities instead of innate
knowledge. Rescher (1966) uses the term innate (p. 210) to refer to all intellectual
capacities that enable humans to develop other capacities. He regards innate mental
propensities as a range of tendencies, inclinations, and dispositions relating to the
functioning of the human mind (p. 206). The capacity to learn calculus or attain
fluency in a foreign language are innate; the ability to solve calculus problems or
speak a foreign language are unquestionably acquired (Rescher, 1966, p. 206). The
capacities to recognize and discern structural patterns, regularities, and similarities
or to use analogies are also innate.
Motivation. The creative performance of individuals is influenced both by
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is one of the most important
determinants of creativity. Extrinsic motivation, according to a number of studies,
does not enhance creativity (Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1989; Amabile, 1988;
Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Runco, 1993; Shalley, 1995; Shalley & Perry-Smith,
2001; Woodman & Schoenfeldt, 1990). Other researchers (e.g., Eisenberger &
Rhoades, 2001; Eisenberger et al., 1999) find that extrinsic motivation, too, can
increase creativity when the reward is contingent on creativity. They have shown
that extrinsic motivation can do so by enhancing self-determination and intrinsic
task interest. Extrinsic motives might enhance self-determination and influence
choice of field, type of task, or implementation strategy rather than a person’s work
on the task itself (Mumford, 2003, p. 112).
Intrinsic motivation not only constitutes tenacity and a strong inner drive for
achievement. Together with prior knowledge, sensitivity, and curiosity, it also
moderates the relationship between external stimuli, attention, perception, and
behavior. Intrinsic motivation and prior knowledge direct attention to certain
environmental signs and patterns and help avoid attentional overload, which is
regarded as an obstacle to creativity. Ample empirical evidence shows that people’s
creativity peaks when their motivation is primarily intrinsic and fed by the chal-
lenge of their work, their interest in and curiosity about problem-solving, and their
satisfaction and enjoyment (Amabile, 1983a, 1988; Amabile et al., 1996, p. 1158).
Intrinsic motivation can be encouraged or eroded by external factors.
Organizational impasses, internal strife, rigid supervision, lack of resources, cor-
ruption, and incompetent leaders may decrease intrinsic motivation. According to
the Cognitive Evaluation Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1980, 1985), situational factors
can affect intrinsic motivation by two means: control (e.g., pressure to achieve a
certain outcome) and information (e.g., feedback that people receive about their
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130 P. Meusburger
self-determination and task competency) (Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2001, p. 3).
Some authors (Amabile, 1979; Amabile et al., 1990; Shalley, 1995; Shalley &
Oldham, 1985) suggest that expecting evaluation can have dysfunctional conse-
quences for intrinsic motivation. Individuals, they argue, may no longer dare to take
risks or play with ideas, for any failure of a risky experiment may prompt a negative
assessment. However, the direction of the response to expected evaluation seems to
depend at least partly on the kind of evaluation involved. The research of Shalley
and Perry-Smith (2001), for instance, indicates that “individuals who expected an
informational evaluation had higher intrinsic motivation and creativity than those
who expected a controlling evaluation” (p. 15).
Cooper and Jayatilaka (2006) propose a third type of motivation important for
creativity: motivation that comes from an individual’s feelings of obligation.
This motivation has characteristics in common with extrinsic motivation in that it is linked
to extrinsic rewards. However, in contrast to extrinsic motivation, rewards that may result
in obligation motivation are not contingent on task performance. (p. 154)
There appears to be a powerful rule of reciprocation that is pervasive in all human societies,
and which results in our feeling obligated to the future repayment of help, favors, and gifts.
(p. 156)
Openness of cognitive frameworks. Another focus of research on the spatial micro-
scale of creativity is the relative openness of a person’s cognitive framework that
has an impact on how a person receives, understands, and evaluates information
and acts on stimuli of the environment. Rokeach (1954, 1960) suggested that
highly dogmatic people exhibit a closed way of thinking, a tendency to distort
incoming information and meanings, and an intolerant attitude toward those with
dissimilar values or beliefs. Creativity and dogmatism seem to be inversely related
to each other. According to Ohnmacht and McMorris (1971), for example, the
problem-solving ability of dogmatic individuals has been found to decline when
the problems to be solved require the ability to synthesize rather than analyze.
Highly creative experimental participants exhibit greater flexibility and tolerance
for novelty, ambiguity, and incongruity than less creative ones do (Martindale et al.,
1974, p. 317) and are therefore able to attend to a wider range of environmental
stimuli and to absorb or activate a variety of knowledge bases.
Openness and flexibility are also related to empathy and emotions. Several studies
support the hypothesis that empathy (affective sensitivity) and creativity are related
processes (Alligood, 1991; Gallo, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1992). Carlozzi et al. (1995)
hypothesized that empathy is positively related to creativity and expressiveness and
inversely related to dogmatism. An affective concern for the relationship between self
and others seems to heighten one’s sensitivity to the environment as well. Research
shows that there is a strong connection between cognitive and affective processes
and that emotion can contribute to creativity in several ways (Lubart & Getz, 1997;
Russ, 1993). Lubart and Getz (1997, p. 286) argue that people in an emotional state
may notice stimuli in the environment that they would usually overlook and that they
may interpret stimuli in novel ways because of their emotional perspective.
Ego development, autonomy, and field independence. Many individual traits of
creativity and the quality of interaction between two or more individuals are related
to self-esteem and ego development. Investigations by Workman and Stillion (1974)
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 131
seem to confirm “a positive relationship between creativity and ego development,
since all creativity sub-scores, as well as total creativity, were significantly related
to ego development” (p. 193). A creative person needs self-esteem for various
reasons. Abandoning common frames of reference entails uncertainty, isolation,
criticism, opposition, and self-doubt. A person needs perseverance not only in order
to concentrate on a certain topic for lengthy period but also in order to overcome
the various hurdles encountered during the processes of acceptance and implemen-
tation. Creativity requires one to take risks, and self-trust makes one immune to
rejection by evaluators, journal editors, and peer groups. Creative people seem to be
less threatened by failure and criticism than noncreative individuals are. If the self-
trust feedback loop is strong enough, individuals will be intensely concerned with
their initial vision and will be able to carry on despite apparent rejection (Earl, 1987,
p. 423). Funke (2000, p. 295) points out that individuals must be entirely convinced
of the value and significance of their creative action and not allow themselves to
be negatively affected by others’ criticism and disparagement. Self-perception and
self-confidence develop in the framework of social relations and spatial settings.
They are shaped by past success and failure and derived from the image and status
of one’s place of work, the reputation of the organization one belongs to, and places
and spatial contexts with which people identify themselves.
Witkin, Dyke, Faterson, Goodenough, and Karp (1962) introduced the concept of
field independence, which means autonomy, freedom from a scientific discipline’s
strict rules or shared beliefs, and freedom from the restrictive effects of dependency
on others. Creative persons must free themselves from orthodox means of solving
problems, from given structures and rules. Field independence is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for creativity. Creative individuals are likely to be field inde-
pendent, but not all field-independent subjects are creative. Gordon and Marquis
(1966) and Bloomberg (1967, 1971) report that field-independent persons were
consistently more creative than field-dependent persons. Similar conclusions about
the importance of independence are drawn by Hanák (1993), who analyzes the mar-
ginality of creative Jews in the Vienna of 1900. A stage of independence and integ-
rity offers marginal men a sort of cognitive privilege (p. 149). However, Ohnmacht
and McMorris (1971) warn not to oversimplify these relations. Autonomy and field
independence are closely related with other characteristics, and it may well be that
only the cumulative effect of these related variables has an impact on creativity.
Research on self-esteem bears out the theory of cognitive tuning, which rests on
the assumption that a relationship exists between affect and creativity (Friedman
& Förster 2002). Positive affective states facilitate creative problem-solving (Isen
et al., 1987) and bolster cognitive flexibility. It is posited that individuals in a
positive affective state become more inclined to take risks and adopt a relatively
heuristic processing style in which the likelihood of generating novel alternatives
rises (Friedman & Förster 2002; Isen, 1987). In contrast, negative affective states
entail risk aversion, increase adherence to established plans of action, and lead to
diminished originality.
Self-esteem and self-confidence are important prerequisites of creativity, but ego
defenses exert a dysfunctional influence in contexts where change and innovation
are desirable. They reduce the organization’s ability to learn and adapt. The most
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132 P. Meusburger
important ego defenses seem to be denial of reality, rationalization (an attempt to
justify needs, feelings, and behavior), idealization (overevaluation), fantasy (uncon-
scious endeavor to fulfill or gratify difficult or impossible goals and aspirations),
and symbolization (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Laughlin, 1970).
Sensitivity to the environment, acuteness of perception and observation. People
see what they have become sensitive to, what has made an impression on them.
Being aware of and sensitive to the environment, not falling into routine, taking
nothing in the external environment for granted, and retaining the capacity to be
surprised all belong to the realm of creative activities in both the arts and science
(see Robinson, 1970, p. 9). Perceiving the environment in predetermined categories
hinders creativity. Artists and other creative individuals often show an “unusually
intensive sensitivity to reality” (Kleinschmidt, 1978, p. 52). Creative individuals
(especially artists) are said to have greater sensory responsiveness and heightened
sensitivity to their inner and outer world (Niederland, 1967, p. 12).
Only by really looking at the world, and by constantly perceiving it afresh, can we hope to
break down our stereotyped sets of responses and open up the opportunity to discover dif-
ferent structures in the reality that surrounds us. … We must learn to see … with our eyes
and not with our brains, to perceive the world as it appears to us before memory with all
its habitual associations and interpretations and the intellect with all its categories and
conditioned reflexes have time to step in. (Robinson, 1970, p. 5)
Creativity is not merely a matter of inventing solutions, it also involves identifying
the important problems of the future (see Patton, 2002, p. 125). Many of these prob-
lems are identified by dealing with challenges and risks of the environment. Many
traits of creative persons are learned through interaction with the environment, or
they shape the perception of the environment or influence the interaction with the
environment (see Fig. 6.2).
Theoretical Issues Concerning the Spatiality
of Creative Behavior
Chance favors only the prepared mind.
Louis Pasteur (as quoted in Cropley, 2006, p. 394)
Relations between the physical environment and creative processes. As long as
scholars focus on the social environment, they can avoid a host of philosophical and
scientific controversies. However, a growing number of researchers demand that
social and behavioral scientists no longer ignore the physical world, especially the
ecological environment. The relationships between characteristics of the physical
environment and psychological processes are still hotly contested. Is the physical
environment only what appears through perceptual experience or does there exist
a “real world” outside perception? How much do the “perceptual world” and the
“real world” correspond? To what extent are individual differences in perceiving
the environment due to biological or psychological dispositions and unconscious
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 133
Problem structure,
closed or open problem?
Externally driven or self-
determined problem?
Complexity and transpar-
ency of the problem,
problem context
External Environment
of an Organization
Degree of uncertainty, risks,
local potential for learning,
imitating, and unplanned
face-to-face contacts with
high-level experts and
decision-makers, access to
important networks, connec-
tivity and reputation of the
external environment,
spatial, political, and societal
constraints, etc.
Internal Environment of
an Organization
Task or Problem
Problem-solver
Domain Field
Goals and expectations of the
organization the problem-
solver belongs to, architecture
of communication and decision-
making, available human and
material resources, climate
and culture, style of leader-
ship, size and autonomy of the
organization, organizational
and social constraints, etc.
Prior knowledge
Domain-specific knowledge, general
knowledge, experience
Cognitive capabilities
Acuteness of perception, memory,
conceptual thinking, divergent and
convergent thinking, openness,
flexibility, sensitivity to the
environment, etc.
Noncognitive variables
Personal goals, motivation, self-
confidence, reflective self-criticism,
perseverance, field independence,
etc.
Creative Process
Persons working
within the same
domain, produce
and select novelty
Set of rules, prac-
tices and evalua-
tion structures is
transmitted to the
individual
Culture Society
Fig. 6.2 Relations between task, environment, and problem-solver (design P. Meusburger)
processes? Can the social and cultural meaning of an environment be separated
from that environment’s materiality? Does the Cartesian distinction between the
material and symbolic world still make sense? Is perception a holistic or a mecha-
nistic phenomenon? What do we know about subconscious processes of perception
and information-processing? Philosophers and psychologists have been concerned
with some of these questions since the beginnings of their disciplines. Disputes
continue to pit the phenomenological orientation (Gestalt theory) against the “New
Look” school of perception, Brunswik’s (1956, 1957) theory of the lens model
against Gibson’s (1979) ecological perception (see Bonnes & Secchiaroli, 1995,
pp. 20–58), and holistic approaches against mechanistic ones.
In the conventional approach to perception, perception of the external environ-
ment is a function of several different interpretive psychological processes. It is
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134 P. Meusburger
assumed that a stimulus activates a specific nervous system receptor and that the
individual interprets the pattern of receptor stimulation by drawing on memories of
past experiences in order to gather information about the environment. According
to this approach, humans must interpret unconnected stimuli in order to construct
something meaningful about the environment (for details see Bell et al., 2001,
p. 65). Gibson (1979) believes that perception is more holistic than that. He holds
that properties of the environment are perceived not as distinct points but rather as
meaningful entities.
Until the 1990s, most social and behavioral scientists argued that it was mainly
the psychological, symbolic, and functional meaning of places, environmental
structures, and spatial arrangement of objects that influenced behavior and creativ-
ity. In recent years, however, researchers have argued against neglecting the role of
the materiality of objects and of the corporeality of persons (Funke, 2007; Gieryn,
2000, 2002a, b; Graumann, 2002; Jöns, 2003, 2006; Meusburger, 2008). A Cartesian
distinction between the material and symbolic worlds no longer makes sense in
an explanation of the actions of individuals in space. Therefore, environmental
psychology (for an overview see Bell et. al., 2001; Bonnes & Secchiaroli, 1995;
Funke, 2007; Graumann, 2002; Graumann & Kruse, 2003), environmental
anthropology (Berkes, 1999; Biersack, 1999; Neves-Graça, 2003, 2007), human
geography (Jöns, 2003, 2006; Klüter, 2003; Koch, 2003; Salbaum, 2008; Weichhart,
2003), and sociology (Fischer-Kowalski & Erb, 2003; Fischer-Kowalski & Weisz,
1998) have developed concepts to bridge the old dichotomy between the material
and social. Given Bateson’s epistemology (Bateson, 1972; Bateson & Bateson,
1987), environmental anthropologists no longer accept views that reduce ecosys-
tems and envi ronments to culturally constructed categories. A main premise of an
approach derived from Bateson is that human–environmental relations are charac-
terized by their mutual causality, that they co-construct one another (Berkes, 1999;
Neves-Graça, 2007; Rappaport, 1979). According to Neves-Graça (2007), “human-
environmental relations are recursively linked, … such that knowledge, forms of
knowing, and experiences of past human-environmental practices are constantly
being re-embedded in new contexts that are themselves simultaneously sociocultural,
historical and ecological. Hence, the ontological condition of human-environmental
relations is irreducibly interactive and dynamic” (pp. 149–150). The subject is inte-
grated into the context and socialized by the context. It adapts to the environment
but also actively adjusts and shapes the environment according to its capabilities,
resources, and position in the context. Places and environments have a physical real-
ity that can be structured by humans. This spatial positioning of objects is decoded,
synthesized, and interpreted by other agents who give the spatial patterns a social
meaning.
In many cases the symbolic meaning and function of an object cannot be sepa-
rated from its materiality. It is not only the symbolic meaning of a banknote that
enables its bearer to buy a good; it is also the note’s materiality, which is carefully
checked by the banker or shop owner in order to distinguish legal tender from
counterfeits. It is the materiality of a painting that enables experts to decide whether
it is an authentic work of a certain artist or a well-made copy. It is the materiality
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 135
of shelters that constitutes their function and meaning. The physical environment
provides a wide variety of experiences and learning opportunities and can enhance
creative processes (McCoy & Evans, 2002, p. 409). After traumatic events the
physical environment assumes the role of a conditioned stimulus that elicits a
conditioned response. Just the sight, sound, or smell of a traumatic environmental
experience may trigger a negative reaction such as a phobia, anxiety disorder,
or panic attack (Anthony & Watkins, 2002, p. 131). Furthermore, some material
objects can direct or stop actions long before individuals have had a chance to
attach a meaning to them. An unknown danger, too, can have devastating effects.
In studying the relations between environment and psychological processes
or the role of environments as archives and external memories, one might find
it helpful to follow Neisser (1987), who distinguishes between perceptual-visual
processes (seeing) and perceptual-cognitive processes (thinking, categorizing)
and between direct perception and theory-dependent categorizations. Perceptual-
visual processes are based on the direct intake of objectively existing information,
whereas perceptual-cognitive processes go beyond that information on the basis
of beliefs about the world. Thinking and categorizing rely on inferential processes
of cognitive functioning and are “anchored to the sociocultural characteristics of
the context” (Bonnes & Secchiaroli, 1995, p. 32). A similar point is made by
Funke (2007), who argues that the perception of space takes place at two levels,
the “surface level” and the “deep level” (pp. 245–250). The perception of space at
the surface level is based on the physiology of the sensory system, which analyzes
depth cues visible to the human eye, interprets smells and sounds, and reconstructs
the environment in a three-dimensional model of reality in the perceiver’s head.
The perception of space at the deep level has to do with functional aspects, that
is, with the meaning and significance of space as communicated between persons.
At the deep level, places, regions, and landscapes have the function of an external
memory or archive (see Funke, 2007, p. 245). A detailed description of the role of
landscapes as external memory is presented by Wassmann (2003) and Wassmann &
Keck (2007). Because space perception “requires an analysis of personal memories
for certain places” (Funke, 2007, p. 251), perceptual processes are inseparable from
human memory. A similar argument is used by the transactional school of percep-
tion, whose adherents focus on perceptual phenomena but tend to consider the
perceptual issue to be part of the more general one of the individual’s relationship
to the surrounding world.
Some ecologically relevant affordances, or “invariant functional properties of
objects as they are encountered in the course of an organism’s active exploration”
(Bell et. al., 2001, p. 65; see also Gibson, 1979), can be perceived directly with
little or no complex interpretation. They convey a great deal of information without
elaborate processing by higher brain centers. Other environmental signals, prompts,
and juxtapositions send ambiguous or polyvalent messages, which are perceived
and interpreted very differently by actors with varying prior knowledge, experi-
ence, memory, absorptive capacities, or ambitions. If a stimulus is ambiguous, then
perceivers must draw more heavily on their own knowledge base, their ability to
recognize and interpret patterns, their memory, and the social-psychological group
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136 P. Meusburger
dynamics than if the stimulus is unambiguous. Only motivated, experienced, and
capable persons are able to perceive and interpret ambiguous environmental clues
and stimuli in a way that they can make timely use of the locally offered potential or
avoid imminent risks. The ability to recognize the meaning and value of ambivalent
cues and patterns early is one of the most important attributes of creative persons
and successful decision-makers.
Many orientation skills, habits, and routines, such as driving a car or skiing down-
hill, are directed through subconscious perception of material objects and codes of
the environment. The model by Clitheroe et al. (1998) assumes that “prompts are
the starting point of an intentional or unintentional psychological and/or behavioral
process. Prompts may come from social or physical features of the contexts; from
individuals participating in the context; or from a wide array of extracontextual
sources such as published research results, news media, or the internet” (p. 106).
Whatever an individual’s talent, the conditions under which he or she works can
significantly raise or lower the level of creativity (Amabile, 1996, p. 17).
The effects that a place, context, or environment has on creative processes can-
not be precisely forecast. A context or environment means potential; it is an offer
or risk that some agents will perceive and take into account and that others will
disregard. Contexts and environments indirectly “influence creative performance
by shaping critical psychological processes rather than directly influencing creative
performance” (Choi, 2004, p. 197). A context can affect individual creativity in a
number of ways. It can structure problem-solving efforts (Mumford & Gustafson,
1988) or shape the nature and conditions under which individual capacities are
developed and applied (Redmond & Mumford, 1993). It can sharpen the indi-
vidual’s intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to pursue new ideas and take risks, and
it can furnish or withhold the needed resources. It can raise or lower the likelihood
of meeting prominent or inspiring people and can make for solitude or overstimula-
tion and stressors. However, the predictive power of social macrophenomena such
as spatial context, environment, or place is much greater than that of any discrete
variable studied in laboratory experiments.
Place dependence and emotional attachment to places. Comparatively little con-
troversy exists about which relations between environment (context) and behavior
can be subsumed by the terms place dependence, and place attachment. Individuals
depend on places. They are emotionally attached to places, are satisfied with
places or gather regularly at specific places for various functional, symbolic, and
emotional reasons. Places act as a meeting point or catalyst bringing people, ideas,
and resources together. Place dependence exists when scientists need expensive
scientific infrastructure for their daily work, when they need frequent and regular
face-to-face contact with other experts, or when they want to avail themselves of
an institution’s reputation or when they seek the liberty of uncontrolled discussions.
Even the most talented and best prepared individual cannot be creative if he or she
has no chance to work or perform. A surgeon needs a patient, a conductor needs
an orchestra, and a chemist needs a laboratory in order to develop and demonstrate
his or her creativity. An institution’s quality of scientific infrastructure (e.g., librar-
ies, laboratories, and computers), amount of resources, community of experienced
researchers, and scientific standing affect the range of possible research questions,
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 137
the quality of research output, and the institution’s capacity to attract and retain
outstanding scholars. Being prepared to tackle a challenge is not enough; one must
also meet the right people and be at the right place at the right time.
Places differ according to their functions, connectivity, and the range and quality
of their interactions with other places. Some professions derive part of their iden-
tity, reputation, authority, and authenticity from the places they “belong to.” The
formation of identity is largely shaped by relations to others, both by identification
with others and differentiation from others. The probability of spontaneously meet-
ing the knowledgeable others who are needed for interaction and inspiration as well
as for critique, judgment, and evaluation varies from place to place. The depend-
ency on face-to-face communication and infrastructure, and thus the importance
of place dependence, varies from one profession and discipline to the next. An
artist needs a different environment to develop his or her creativity than a banker;
a high-energy physicist, a different environment than a theoretical physicist. Place
dependency varies according to stages of a creative process as well. Latent or pre-
liminary phases of inspiration, incubation, and preparatory processes of creativity
need different types of environments than do periods of elaboration, which likewise
require contexts different from those needed in phases of evaluating, showing and
marketing. Each phase has its own demands for stimulation, distraction, solitude,
organizational support, publicity, and frequency of face-to-face contact.
Individuals can be emotionally attached to certain places and environments.
Places are embedded in contexts of feeling, emotion, and memory and can have an
atmospheric quality.
It is above all the symbolic effects and the atmospheric qualities of places that motivate
those who have the necessary material, social and cultural resources (wealth, power) to turn
places into “scenes,” to establish spatial orders that tell “stories” (narrative spaces) and in
their symbolic effect convey an atmosphere of amazement, of fascination, and of cultural
and social support, of belonging and identity while, at the same time, the existing power
and rule relationships can be reproduced and legitimized. (Hennings, 2007, p. 129)
If agents repeatedly have negative experiences at certain places, they may project their
negative emotions and fears onto these places with the effect that places evoke in them
negative feelings or anxiety when they return to them. A specific environment or spa-
tial context can destroy self-esteem and arouse anxiety, whereas another environment
can foster the feeling of security and enhance capability beliefs, motivation, ideational
fluency, or the willingness to take risks. With trauma victims a particular place or
space may later repeatedly unleash the memory of the trauma (what one has tried to
bury in the subconscious). Crowded public spaces often set off panic attacks or agora-
phobia (Anthony & Watkins, 2002). “The physical environment assumes the role of a
conditioned stimulus that elicits a conditioned response. Just the sight, sound, or smell
of a traumatic environmental experience may trigger a negative reaction” (p. 131).
Affective memories can be activated through pictures, objects, names, and
scenes. Places and environments can serve as triggers for the episodic memory,
which makes the recollection of an episode possible. Lubart and Getz (1997) use
the metaphor of a tuning fork to describe the relation between object, memory, and
emotion. Depending on a person’s emotional state and experience, external stimuli
can start a particular tuning fork vibrating.
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138 P. Meusburger
The environment: Opportunities to learn and experiment. Humans acquire
much of their knowledge by interacting with the social and material environment,
gathering experience, and developing skills when performing tasks and solving
problems in a specific context. Problems to be solved vary spatially, as do the
opportunities to imitate successful individuals. The localized necessity of coping
repeatedly with specific challenges and solving particular problems steers attention
to certain topics, sharpens the perception of particular clues and patterns, builds
specialized knowledge bases, and sparks motivational processes that can give
rise to new ideas and actions. A stimulating and enriched early environment is an
important factor in developing intelligence and creativity and may have an even
stronger impact than the environments in later career phases. Children and students
learn a great deal through their identification with parents, teachers, mentors, and
other role models. If students adopt the attitudes of their teachers, it is not neces-
sarily imitation but rather “the integration of attitudes about the self, about how one
finds self- satisfaction and self-fulfillment” (Berlin, 1960, p. 99). In order to meet
the expectations or gain the recognition of the mentors or peers, students must
internalize the rules of the domain and the context. The context tells the informed
actor what kind of behavior will be regarded as appropriate within certain limits.
Learning to survive in a given environment for an extended period equips or
adapts agents for particular challenges and situations. Social systems operating for
an extended period in specific physical environments (e.g., rain forests, deserts, or
polar regions) have developed certain techniques, strategies, competencies, knowl-
edge bases, and value systems to help them adjust to their environment and adapt
it. Similar opportunities and necessities to learn derive from social and cultural
environments as well. Artists, scientists, and engineers are not the only people who
evaluate their work before they complete it. Friends, adversaries, teachers, students,
colleagues, reviewers, critics, and the general audience often participate in the
creative process by joining in the evaluation of emerging works or previous ones.
“The evaluation itself contributes to the value of the work: that is, the evaluative
acts that go into the initial creation of the work and its later actualization, form part
of an organic whole’ ” (Leddy, 1994, p. 173). The criticisms and encouragement of
others enrich or diminish the scholar’s or artist’s self-concept and self-esteem and
influence that person’s intrinsic motivation.
The evaluation process—another important part of the scientist’s or artist’s
creative experience—also varies spatially. An idea, theory, or piece of work that is
praised and admired in one location may be misunderstood, heavily criticized, or
rejected in others. University departments, research institutions, and art schools dif-
fer in their learning environments, conditions of professional socialization, chances
to communicate with experienced and knowledgeable experts, material and per-
sonal resources, attitudes, expectations, value systems, credentials, reputation, and
socioemotional relationships that support or impede creative processes.
Places and spatial contexts as potential for serendipitous interactions. In some
special fields of painting, music, or science, only a few select critics and discussion
partners serve as a valid reference point (see Funke, 2000, p. 292). Colonies of art-
ists (Murnau in Bavaria, or Worpswede northeast of Bremen), architects (Bauhaus
peter.meusburger@geog.uni-heidelberg.de
6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 139
in Dessau), or scientists (development of the nuclear bomb at Los Alamos) were
able to achieve their goals successfully in remote rural locations primarily because
their projects were self-sustaining in their evaluation processes. Other projects
depend on transgressing social and scientific systems (Acham, 2003, p. 292) and
crossing disciplinary boundaries; drawing analogies from completely different
domains that previously had nothing to do with one another; consulting a broad
variety of knowledge bases; and face-to-face contact with experts, evaluators,
and critics of many different disciplines. Only major, functionally complex cities
offering a large variety of professional skills, scientific disciplines, artistic styles,
cultural experiences, and economic and cultural diversity provide such potential for
unplanned contact. Díaz de Chumaceiro (1998, 1999, 2004) and others have shown
that chance events, unplanned contact, or serendipity have led many scientists
(e.g., Pasteur, Fleming, Röntgen, Becquerel, Edison, Galvani, Nobel, and Freud) to
breakthroughs or have decisively shaped and affected their choice and pursuit of a
career. Serendipity is the unexpected finding of valuable ideas, persons, and things.
In this context true serendipity is defined as the accidental finding of something
valuable but unsought, pseudoserendipity is discovery by accidental means of
things sought (for details see Díaz de Chumaceiro, 2004, pp. 346–347).
What makes a location attractive is the possible, not the actual, contact with other
highly creative persons. It is the place’s imagined, not the real, advantages, that make
a location attractive. Whether and how often this potential is activated through com-
munication and interaction is another question. The fact that millions of people play
the lottery indicates that possibility is a strong driving force that influences behavior.
In most lines of work, the probability of profiting from serendipitous opportunities
or interactions is much higher in some spatial contexts than in others.
Members of prestigious university departments, editors of international journals,
and researchers integrated into powerful research clusters and long-range research
programs demonstrate that long-term proximity to the epistemic centers of disci-
plinary power affords a scientist prestige, reputation, and strategic advantages and
facilitates his or her access to resources. Over time, though, it can have detrimental
effects on that person’s creativity. There is much empirical evidence that a position
near the “key persons” may give scientists the illusion of moving automatically in
the right direction or being at the frontier of research. The impact of leading jour-
nals makes it difficult for scientists to abandon dominating paradigms or to come
up with divergent and provocative thinking. Large research programs and clusters
keep scholars on tracks favored or supported by politics or project leaders. Some
creative scientists and artists are very proficient at alternating between proximity
and distance to epistemological power or between publicity and solitude. They need
proximity to experienced, knowledgeable, and challenging people for inspiration,
ideas, motivation and emotional support. They then seek distance and solitude in
order to avoid strict paradigms and elaborate their still poorly conceived ideas or
products without the interference of early critique. In some disciplines, periods of
data-gathering, experimentation, and elaboration are place dependent because they
depend on expensive instruments or field work. In other fields, this period may also
be spent in solitude. However, when it comes to showing and marketing results,
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140 P. Meusburger
proximity to the important decision-makers of a discipline and platforms of atten-
tion is helpful.
The environment of a single city or area seldom offers all the incentives, inspira-
tion, and learning opportunities that an artist, artisan, or scholar needs to develop
his or her creativity. Mobility increases professional experience and stimulates
“new patterns of thinking” (Törnqvist 2004, p. 236). Creative persons are therefore
supposed to be mobile and circulate from one place (court, university) to the next
so that they experience different work environments; learn from different cultures,
professional practices, and knowledge bases; and focus attention on new issues,
techniques, and methods. Spatial mobility and—ultimately—location in one of the
epistemic centers of one’s profession has become a status symbol or sign of excel-
lence in certain professions.
Open Debates and Suggestions for Further Research
Additional research is needed on the role of the time dimension, unconscious infor-
mation-processing during the incubation phase, the neurological principals of creative
thought, the relations between knowledge and action, cultural impacts on creativity,
and various other questions. There is much empirical evidence that creativity does not
proceed in linear or hierarchical paths but rather in uneven, chaotic bursts in response
to problems that erupt over time (Drazin et al., 1999; Kazanjian, 1988; Peterson,
1998). The generation and introduction of creative ideas is easier in some periods than
in others. The chance to make certain organizational changes or transform systems is
relatively brief. If a creative idea comes too early or too late, it will not be accepted or
successfully implemented. Histories of science, inventions, and the arts contain many
examples of lengthy lags between the date of an idea’s conception or a product’s crea-
tion and the moment when that idea or product was regarded as valuable and creative.
These histories brim with disappointing accounts of highly creative ideas and prod-
ucts that have been ignored by informed, well-educated people (see Magyari-Beck,
1998). Many artists whose paintings are sold today for millions of dollars were not
considered as creative in their own lifetimes. Cropley (2006, p. 396) describes how
the mathematical propositions of Evariste Galois (e.g., the Galois Theory), who is
now regarded as one of history’s most original mathematicians, were judged to have
no foundation in mathematical knowledge and to lack effectiveness. “His divergent
thinking could not gain recognition until convergent thinking had advanced suffi-
ciently to make the effective novelty of his ideas apparent” (pp. 396–397).
The time dimension, too, plays an important role in understanding the interplay
of agent and structure. Individuals react differently to the influence of macrolevel
factors across multiple periods of time (see Drazin et al., 1999, p. 290). A number of
papers (Gray, 1958, 1961, 1966; Munro, 1962; Simonton, 1975, 1979, 1981) suggest
that the ups and downs in creativity are the effects of underlying cycles in the politi-
cal, economic, and social milieu. When the peaks of these cycles converge, the result
is a period of great florescence in the arts and sciences (Simonton, 1981, p. 628).
Another problem related to time is the “nemesis of creativity” (Anspach, 1952).
All creative actions become habitual after a time. Styles and patterns developed in
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6 Milieus of Creativity: The Role of Places, Environments, and Spatial Contexts 141
creative periods may eventually become selective and controlling. Creative insights
or new revolutionary paradigms introduced by geniuses are worshipped and finally
end in a new orthodoxy constraining the creativity of the next generation. “Leading
thinkers often bring forth a visionary new thought framework only to have it
concretized by well-meaning but shortsighted followers” (Ambrose, 2006, p. 83).
This tendency is described by Koestler (1964):
The new territory opened up by the impetuous advance of a few geniuses, acting as a
spearhead, is subsequently occupied by the solid phalanxes of mediocrity; and soon the
revolution turns into a new orthodoxy with its unavoidable symptoms of one-sidedness,
over-specialization, loss of contact with other provinces of knowledge, and, ultimately,
estrangement from reality. We see this happening—unavoidably it seems—at various times
in the history of various sciences. The emergent orthodoxy hardens into a ‘closed system’
of thought, unwilling or unable to assimilate new empirical data or adjust itself to signifi-
cant changes in other fields of knowledge. (p. 225)
Answers to some of the following questions would greatly help explain some of
the still obscure relationships between environment, learning and action: How are
colors, smells, sounds, and spatial patterns perceived and how are they processed
in different emotional dispositions? What is the evolutionary perspective of the
cognitive unconscious (Reber, 1992)? To which extent can intuition or inspira-
tion be triggered by images of the environment? What are the basic neurological
principles of creative thought, inspiration, and memory? How does the mind forget
and remember (Schacter, 1992)? Is there a neuroscience of creativity? How far can
neural structures be epigenetically influenced by variations in external stimulation or
by learning? To what extent is the creative process recursive? What provokes recur-
sion? Which contextual variables lead to modifications in the creative process?
Certain theoretical terms, such as creative industries, creative classes, and crea-
tive cities (Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 1998; Florida, 2002, 2005),
need further debate and clarification. Suggesting that creative cities can “be made,”
they fascinate politicians and administrators alike. Such expressions have spawned
a new policy area and have become buzzwords in recent years. But they and the
empirical methodologies used to define creative cities and creative industries are
roundly criticized in academia, for they widely fail to reflect decades of creativity
research and have little to do with the definition of creativity developed in psychol-
ogy. According to the British government’s Department of Culture, Media and
Sport (1998), for instance, creative industries include advertising, architecture, the
art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure
software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software, and television and radio
(p. 1). Jeffcutt (2005) states that creative industries
are shaped by interconnection between the media/information industries and the cultural/
arts sector. … The creative industries are shaped by interconnection between diverse
domains (or forms) of creative endeavor (i.e. visual art, craft, print, video, music, etc.) that
are brought together through new opportunities for the use of digital media technologies.
(p. 104)
Do these interconnections really entail creativity? Is any TV production and any
yellow press journal creative? Do plagiarism in music or routine products in adver-
tising conform to the definition of creativity (new, original, and valuable)? What
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142 P. Meusburger
about the industries not mentioned in the British government’s list? Do they lack
creative people and products? The attempt to label certain industries or professions
as creative and the rest, by omission, as noncreative without evaluating their ideas
and products contradicts any definition of creativity accepted in the core disciplines
of creativity research.
Many psychologists and human geographers regard the term creative industry as
inappropriate. For if a person accepts the concept of psychological creativity and
the assumption that anybody is creative in his or her daily problem-solving, then
it makes no sense to distinguish between creative and noncreative industries. If
one adopts the concept of historical creativity, then one must accept that creativity
can be neither predicted nor administered, that a given profession has only a tiny
proportion of historically creative people, and that members of a given profession
are not invariably creative. If these propositions are accepted, then it makes no
sense to label a whole industry or whole groups of professions as creative before
evaluating their ideas and products. Neither the advertising nor the media industry
perpetually engage in creative processes and continuously invent and fabricate
creative products.
With regard to creative milieus (environments, contexts, and so forth), it may
have become evident that the transdisciplinary discourse between human geog-
raphy and other social and behavioral sciences has not yet come to an endpoint.
Indeed, the promising start of this discourse suggests that this long journey will
bring many new insights for all who participate.
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