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Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?
... Gallie (1956) termed these types of concepts, for which consensus is unreachable, "essentially contested concepts." While we are the first to apply Gallie's (1956) framework to the materiality concept, it has been applied to numerous other concepts (e.g., Choi and Majumdar, 2014;Collier et al., 2006;Connelly, 2007;Daly, 2012;Miles, 2012;Mitnick, 2019;Okoye, 2009;Waldron, 2002). ...
... The earliest definition of "materiality" highlighted by Edgley (2014) appears in the first edition of Kohler's dictionary for accountants and defines materiality as "the characteristic attaching to a statement, fact, or item whereby its 6 Mitnick et al. (2021) suggested that the criterion describes how users refer to conceptual authorities, which may include examples, data, classic work, or arguments. An even broader interpretation of the criterion is provided by Waldron (2002), who suggested that the original exemplar may also be understood as an underlying problem, question, or issue at stake. disclosure . . . ...
... 7 However, the definition certainly shares key characteristics with the frequently cited materiality definitions underlying the GRI and the SASB standards (Christensen et al., 2021;Grewal et al., 2019;Khan et al., 2016). The common core of these multiple exemplars can be described as the likelihood of an item's disclosure affecting the judgment or decision of stakeholders, or, when formulated as a broad issue (Waldron, 2002), materiality definitions and related debates in academic literature are anchored in fundamental questions of what sustainability information matters, and to whom (Abhayawansa, 2022;Hahn et al., 2023). Against this backdrop, we consider the sixth criterion to be fulfilled in the broader sense. ...
Materiality is a key principle of corporate reporting. However, with developments toward more sustainability-related disclosure standards and regulations, fundamentally different definitions of and approaches to materiality have emerged among central standard-setting institutions and researchers. The current state of conceptual pluralism gives rise to the critical question of whether a unified understanding of materiality is possible. To address this question, we systematically review and examine the conceptualizations of materiality in sustainability disclosure research and practice, utilizing the analytical framework of essentially contested concepts. Our analysis reveals that the prevailing lack of consensus surrounding materiality is grounded in the concept’s essential contestation and not in conceptual confusion. We thus provide strong support for the assertion that conceptual plurality can be projected as materiality’s most probable future. Based on these findings, we elucidate two overarching—although not mutually exclusive—research directions. Specifically, we call for future research that explicitly embraces the concept’s plural character by investigating the similarities and differences between materiality conceptions in sustainability disclosures. Furthermore, we call for more interdisciplinary research on the concept of materiality to support evidence-based policymaking and the promotion of sustainable development. For both research avenues, we offer exemplary research questions following the established distinctions between the measurement, output, outcome, and frame conditions in the context of (sustainability) disclosure research.
... Jeremy Waldron (2002) calls for the more careful elaboration of the relation between theoretical and non-theoretical uses of an essentially contested concept. According to him, the street-uses of concepts are characteristically a form of know-how. ...
... Gallie refers to properties on a couple of occasions (ECC 171/PHU 159; PHU 174, 175; ART 104, 105, 111) but in so doing he does not add much in terms of clarification or substance, I think. 202 For other, roughly similar views see e.g., Waldron 2002, Collier et al. 2006, and Ehrenberg 2011. In contrast, see e.g., Freeden 1996, 59. willingness to tolerate dispute and difference. ...
... Jeremy Waldron (2002) suspects that continuing to refer to the exemplar's achievement might be too constricting as regards what bestows unity to a contested concept. At least some essentially contested concepts could be considered solution-concepts instead. ...
This study examines W.B. Gallie’s claim that a special group of concepts, i.e., essentially contested concepts, bring about endless and rationally irresolvable yet perfectly genuine disputes about their proper employment. The obscurity of Gallie’s original thesis has contributed to diverging interpretations and thus rendered the term ‘essentially contested concept’ ambiguous today. Moreover, attempts to make a firm enough case for the existence of essentially contested concepts have arguably failed. This work sets things straight in three main ways. First, it offers the most detailed discussion of Gallie’s thesis of essential contestedness to date. Second, it provides a comprehensive account of the critical reception of Gallie’s thesis. Third, it argues for an improved account of essential contestability.
Part one guides to the study and contextualizes the thesis of essential contestedness. Gallie was influenced by several intellectual strands of the 20h century, and his idea has inspired numerous scholars of different disciplines. Part two presents and analyzes the seven conditions of essential contestedness which are commonly understood as inhering in a particular kind of concept. Instead, they are best divided into two groups, one belonging to semantics, the other to pragmatics. Part three delves deeper into the nature of contestation, the required sense of essentiality, the rationality of having an irresolvable and endless dispute, the genuineness of disputes manifesting essential contestedness, and the presumed unity of an essentially contested concept. Part four evaluates the soundness of a concept-centered thesis that understands contestation as revolving around a single concept that has a special structure. Options found in the literature are presented and analyzed. In the end, the concept-centered thesis is discarded in favor of individuating essentially contested concepts functionally.
This study explicates for the first time virtually all elements of Gallie’s thesis, clarifies his terminological choices, and extensively covers the secondary literature that has accumulated over the years. It is claimed that the key to essential contestability is found in the specific way concepts are employed, that is, anthropocentrically with an aim to persuade others within the parameters set by a decision-based reasonable disagreement.
... 12 And like the rule of law, it has been defined, in Gallie's widely used expression, as "essentially contested" (1955)(1956)). See, for example Waldron (2002); Rehfeld (2018, 218). I elaborate my own understanding of the concept elsewhere (Bello Hutt 2019, 2020). ...
... On the concept of the rule of law, see for example,Waldron (2002); Tasioulas (2020). For discussions of the concept and the normative and empirical import of political representation, see for example,Rehfeld (2018, 21);Wolkenstein and Wratil (2020), respectively. ...
How do the rule of law and political representation relate to each other? I answer this question, hitherto neglected by rule-of-law scholars, taking my cue from Joseph Raz’s revision of his conception of the rule of law and by relying on a distinction between preferences and interests, which pervades discussions of political representation. I argue that political representatives’ attention to their constituents’ preferences, and not just their interests, is a necessary feature of a conception of representation that expresses a robust allegiance to the rule of law. More specifically, that such allegiance is better honoured when representatives are responsive to preferences warranted by public interests. I offer two groups of rule-of-law reasons for that claim. First, because respect for preferences by representatives facilitates the conditions for the law to be obeyed. Second, respect for those preferences through the justification of the representatives’ collective decisions allows for accountability and for non-arbitrary creation and application of the law. I finish addressing a threefold objection to my reliance on preferences as objects that representatives should consider when making their decisions.
... In a common law system, case law is created over time by judges writing opinions; this precedent then builds on precedent in the way that a chain novel might be written in seriatim (Dworkin, 1986). By construction, these legal opinions are not atomic facts; indeed, on some views, the law is an "essentially contested" concept (Waldron, 2002). Thus, deciding what to retrieve can be challenging in a legal setting. ...
Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.
... Legal empowerment refers to individuals' ability to access and effectively use the justice system to protect their rights. These elements correspond to 48 53 The SDG target stresses promoting the rule of law and access to justice, requiring a focus on all three elements and their corresponding components. Countries must consider these elements to evaluate progress towards achieving these goals. ...
Background: The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the rule of law and sustainable development. The rule of law, frequently referred to as ‘the empire of laws and not of men,’ underscores the significance of constraining capricious authority and ensuring that public servants adhere to legal structures in their conduct. The rule of law, being a legal principle, is of paramount significance for society’s overall advancement and well-being; therefore, its importance should not be undervalued. Its worth should not be diminished. In contrast, sustainable development endeavours to reconcile the interests of current and future generations through the integration of economic, social, and environmental considerations. Methods: This study primarily focuses on theoretical observations and employs a qualitative methodology. Its objective is to explore the relationship between the rule of law and sustainable development by analysing their attributes, viewpoints, and interpretations. By integrating the idea of the rule of law with sustainable development, it aims to consolidate information that is often scattered or semi-structured. Data is gathered through methods including desk research, descriptive analysis, and theoretical observations. Results and Conclusions: The significance of upholding the rule of law in the pursuit of sustainable development is underscored in this article. Furthermore, the present study investigates the correlation between the advancement of sustainable development and the notion of the rule of law. This encompasses a comprehensive examination of multiple facets, including formal, procedural, substantive, constitutional, and good governance elements. The rule of law is recognised by the international development community as a foundational element that facilitates the achievement of additional development goals. This scholarly article enhances the existing understanding of the reciprocal support between sustainable development and the rule of law by analysing this intricate interplay).
... En este punto, es importante subrayar que este trabajo adopta una perspectiva ideacional del populismo. Junto con otros conceptos importantes en la ciencia política, tales como democracia (Collier y Levitsky, 1997;Munck y Verkuilen, 2002), ideología (Gerring, 1997) o estado de derecho (Fallon, 1997;Møller y Skaaning, 2012Tamanaha, 2007;Waldron, 2002), el populismo parece ser un concepto esencialmente controvertido (Collier, Hidalgo y Maciuceanu, 2007;Gallie, 1956). Es posible que no se llegue rápidamente a un consenso sobre la definición del populismo. ...
Según la definición ideacional del populismo, una narrativa es populista si se caracteriza por una cosmología maniquea que divide a la comunidad política entre un pueblo, concebido como una entidad homogéneamente virtuosa, y una élite, pensada como una entidad homogéneamente corrupta (Hawkins y Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde, 2004). A partir de esta definición, el presidente de México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) parece haber exhibido una narrativa populista. Partiendo de aquella conceptualización y centrándose en un estudio de caso, este trabajo indaga sobre si tal narrativa produce polarización y, especialmente, cuál de aquellos dos atributos ejerce un mayor efecto causal sobre las actitudes polarizadas entre los ciudadanos, proponiendo la hipótesis de que los mensajes invocando a una élite corrupta son más propensos a generar polarización afectiva que los mensajes aludiendo a un pueblo bueno. Para poner a prueba esta hipótesis, este artículo realiza análisis textual tanto de los posteos de AMLO en Facebook como de los comentarios de los seguidores a tales publicaciones. Los resultados muestran que los comentarios a los posteos de López Obrador son significativamente más polarizados cuando sus publicaciones exhiben un mensaje negativo sobre la “élite” que cuando muestran un mensaje con una mención positiva al “pueblo”. Las alusiones a una “élite corrupta” parecen desencadenar una gran polarización afectiva en las redes sociales.
... Building a causal argument that takes populist ideas as its starting point requires the proposal of causal mechanisms that connect citizens' cognition to politicians' narrative . Appeals to "corrupt and exploitative elite" seem to evoke resentment and hatred, two strong emotions that have been linked with polarization 1 Along with other major concepts in political science, such as democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997;Munck and Verkuilen 2002), ideology (Gerring 1997), and rule of law (Fallon 1997;Møller andSkaaning 2012, 2014;Tamanaha 2007;Waldron 2002), populism seems to be an essentially contested concept (Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu 2006;Gallie 1956). Several contesting conceptions of populism have been provided by Mudde, Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, Weyland, and de la Torre. ...
According to the ideational definition of populism, the president of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has certainly exhibited a populist narrative (Sarsfield 2022). Departing from such conceptualization, this work tries to explore, however, the contextual dimensions in AMLO's narrative that here, following a growing literature on political rhetoric, we call “storytelling” (e.g., Engesser et al. 2021). We define the idea of storytelling as the “art of telling a story where emotions, characters and other details are applied” in order “to promote a particular point of view or set of values” (Nordensvard and Ketola 2021, p.2). Focusing on a single-case study, this work concerns what are the stories that AMLO uses in his Twitter account and which of these stories provokes greater polarization among his followers. Although the results are not conclusive, findings suggest that we call the “conspiracy theory” and “ostracizing the others” stories push individuals to greater polarization.
... Indeed, it seems that when it comes to the rule of law, 'we recognize breakdowns more easily than the positive ideal.' 5 The positive ideal of the rule of law is so obscure that Jeremy Waldron famously called it an ' essentially contested concept,' the origins, content, and application of which have always been controversial. 6 It is in fact often claimed that the term has lost its meaning, with Judith Shklar, the late Harvard political theorist, going so far as to comment that the term 'has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general overuse […].' 7 Although many academics would dispute this last point, it does seem clear that understandings of the rule of law remain under development, in flux, contested, and are constantly challenged by changing times. However, it is still possible to sketch out two main theoretical starting points for conceptualising the rule of law: formal and substantive. ...
The rule of law is a central notion in legal thought and in the practice of democratic states. While a contested term, scholars have articulated its contours – both formal and substantive. This includes ideas such as legal certainty, prospectivity, access to justice, and the fact that everyone should be accountable under the law. Much of the scholarship has centred on states and international organisations as the primary entities responsible for protecting the rule of law. By contrast, the relationship between individuals and groups of people in civil society vis-à-vis the rule of law is under-explored in (international) law. This special issue is therefore dedicated to elaborating upon this relationship – the ‘rule of law from below.’ This Introduction sets out the concept and illustrates it with examples of the innovative ways that people are using in practice to support the rule of law from below. While noting that the concept of ‘rule of law from below’ is one under development, we argue that there is much value in investigating instances where actors beyond formal state institutions, who have no constitutional or other formal legal role, take it upon themselves to uphold and defend the rule of law. This is especially important in today’s global context of shifts in power between state and non-state actors, as well as pervasive democratic and rule-of-law backsliding.
... The article explores the compatibility of two 'essentially contested concepts' (Gallie, 1956: 169), democracy (Spicer, 2019;Tilly, 2007) and populism (Mudde, 2017), with the equally ambiguous concept of the rule of law (Waldron, 2002). Scholars have long debated the relationship between populism and democracy and, indeed, much of the disagreement about the impact of populism on the latter is a direct result of different definitions used for these concepts. ...
Popular sovereignty plays a central role in both the democratic and the populist ideology. While democracy’s version of qualified sovereignty is accepted as mutually constitutive with the rule of law, populism’s version of absolute sovereignty is seen as incompatible with this ideal. The article reconsiders this oversimplifying approach. By examining the interaction of these concepts with a nuanced account of the rule of law, it argues for the compatibility of both democracy and populism with different versions of this ideal. While this remains a key distinguishing factor between democracy and populism, the ambiguity of the rule of law still allows populism to claim that it complies with a thin version of this concept.
... Within a few decades, artistic and political categories (with rule of law included) had also been categorised as such. Cf. Waldron, 2002, pp. 137-164 and Collier, Hidalgo, Maciuceanu, 2006, pp. ...
The rule of law movement is a by-product of the post-WWII rebirth of human rights, which turned into a key political issue by the turn of the millennium. By becoming part of the language and blackmailing practice of international politics, it has self-emptied as well. It is an ideal; historically a function of human experience at individual places and times, shaped by local traditions. As a complex of heterogeneous values and principles, its ethos can at best be respected and approached via the never-ending balancing of compromise solutions.
... . Ver, por ejemplo,Waldron (2002). ...
... Our goal here is not to intervene in debates over other values the rule of law might serve. For a detailed account of key controversies, see Waldron (2002Waldron ( , 2008. 2. These are not the only concerns drawing scholarly and media commentaries. As we indicate in part V, an important body of commentary also highlights the particular challenges of responding to the pandemic in ways consistent with the relationship under Te Tiriti and respect for tikanga (e.g. ...
In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the New Zealand government has acted to restrict individual freedoms. The legality of the government’s actions has been the subject of public attention and litigation in the courts. In this article, we take a theoretical view of the question of legality in times of emergency. We characterise the challenges that emergencies pose to the ordinary legal constraints on public power, such as formal limitations requiring statutory authorisation, protection of individual rights, and institutional safeguards against abuse. We then relate these challenges to timeless questions in legal theory, including questions about the subjection of political power to legal rules, about the differences between mere pretence and robust commitments to legality, and about law’s legitimate authority and its legitimate coercion. Focusing on questions most relevant to the New Zealand context, we first examine the values associated with the authorisation of governmental action by legal rules, and explain why a formal fixation on ‘authorisation’ is not enough to serve these values. We then show how legality’s value in supporting law’s authority and guarding against illegitimate coercion depends (at least in part) upon its even operation amidst the contextual and contested realities of the exercise of public power.
... Finally, in Section IV, I will compare the idea of ambiguity, vagueness and incoherence with that of 'essential contestability'. This is an idea with roots in the work of W. B. Gallie (1956) that has been applied to the concept of power (Lukes 2005), along with a host of other concepts (Waldron 2002). ...
The major problems for complex multi-dimensional social science concepts is incoherence, often hidden by the fact that they are also vague. Analytically, precisifying can demonstrate we have incompatible intuitions about the meaning of complex normative terms. Simple vague terms can be precisified with ‘coding decisions’. Vagueness differs from ambiguity. Ambiguity occurs when a term is used to mean two quite different things and can be handled by the subscript gambit. Power is neither vague nor incoherent. We can identify a simple sense underlying all accounts of ‘power’. Ambiguous usage concerns the extension to which the simple term is applied.
... 19 Gallie adds that parties to the conceptual contest defend their interpretation as the only true one and attack their opponents for proclaiming false views. Waldron (2002b) has rephrased this as a distinction between concept and conception, as follows, ...
This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has lethally infected liberal theory. This view neglects the distinction between genesis and justification. Political liberalism has since cleansed itself of the prejudices of its spiritual ancestors. Liberal human rights exclude racism as a matter of principle. The second part discusses the claim that the ubuntu philosophy provides a better basis for a constitution in a modern society than political liberalism. A major problem is that ubuntu is an essentially contested concept. Some philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund notion (Matolino); others see it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, it is elaborated from sundry incompatible political views, ranging from African nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism (Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). Conclusion: as an essentially contested ideological concept, ubuntu should not be a decisive constitutional standard for the application of state force. In contrast, the constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, as it is designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest.
... (De Smith and Brazier, 1994) A more politically oriented definition brings out issues of political empowerment, along with the requirement that any such powers be exercised in accordance with the 'rule of law' (Lane, 1996). The latter, much like the concept of accountability, has been the focus of considerable academic discussion and is widely recognized as yet another 'essentially contested concept' (Shklar and Hoffmann, 1998;Waldron, 2002). It is also frequently cited as a condition sine qua non for development (Stephenson, 2008), and, especially, a functioning market economy (Carothers, 1998). ...
In addressing the politics of the international regulation of public procurement, this book fills a major gap in the literature. Brown-Shafii does this by investigating whether a WTO Agreement can be used to promote good governance, development and accountability.
... The first condition of political literacy is reflexive awareness of the fact that mandates are partly constituted by essentially contested evaluative concepts. In his account of the rule of law as an essentially contested concept, Jeremy Waldron (2002) analyzes how users tend to apply this and other contested concepts as if there were simple criteria of application. For example, for some the rule of law may be seen as exhausted by the criterion of clarity and consistency; for others it may be about principled balancing of conflicting concerns. ...
Expert agencies are entrusted with public authority in virtue of their technical competence. Areas such as environmental protection, food safety, or market stability are regulated with the backing of professional judgments regarding complex technical
matters. But there is a clear political dimension to the work; regulation involves particular ways of framing problems and solutions. The very practice of regulation is bound up with evaluative concepts that are “essentially contested” or “interpretive.” Terms such as proportionality, reasonable precaution, or acceptable risk cannot be operationalized without taking a stand on evaluative matters on which there is reasonable disagreement. Moreover, expert agencies must apply these concepts in regulatory fields of heated political debate, concerning issues such as sustainability, security, and social justice. This paper seeks a model for capturing what it means for expert agencies to exercise political judgment responsibly. How can they engage with political values reflectively yet in a nonpartisan way?
The proposal is that expert agencies must possess a form of “political literacy.” As developed here, political literacy is a tripartite capacity that enables expert agencies (1) to be aware of the intrinsic political contestedness of the concepts they
operate with, (2) to recognize diverging conceptions as belonging to shared paradigms of value, and (3) to let the specification of political values be guided by the intentions of the mandate. It is a capacity we would not require of citizens as such, but rather an expectation of institutions tasked with carrying out public mandates.
To comply with Shiʿi theological-jurisprudential justifications and dogmatic traditions, the Iranian postrevolutionary legal system formally enshrined the principle of legality of crime and punishment within the Iranian Constitution and important legal provisions. Despite this formal entrenchment and codification of its criminal law, which together act as a legal constraint on the traditionally excessive power of Muslim judges, the Iranian theocratic system has exempted religious sins from this principle by blurring the distinction between crime and sin and criminalizing certain sinful acts with unclear language. These two legal mechanisms not only violate the principle of legality and amplify legal uncertainty, but their reference to Sharia law also binds the fate of the accused more tightly to the discretion of the judge than to the letter of the law. Consequently, the religiopolitical predilec-tions of judges have become a determining factor in findings of criminal responsibility and imposition of punishment on citizens.
Con la aprobación de la Resolución 61/39 titulada El Estado de derecho en los planos nacional e internacional, de 4 de diciembre de 2006, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas estableció por vez primera una distinción expresa entre los aspectos interno e internacional de este principio. A partir de esta Resolución, la Asamblea General ha centrado de lleno el debate sobre el estudio de la vertiente internacional del Estado de derecho tomando como referencia la única definición expresa que de este principio se ha elaborado en el seno de las Naciones Unidas y que consta en el informe del secretario general El Estado de derecho y la justicia de transición en las sociedades que sufren o han sufrido conflictos. El objeto del presente artículo es el de identificar y analizar aquellos elementos o componentes del Estado de derecho interno que se han extrapolado al ámbito internacional, en el seno de la práctica de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, con el propósito de elaborar una definición ad hoc de la vertiente internacional de este principio que, a efectos del presente trabajo, denominaremos preeminencia del derecho en derecho internacional.
El Estado de Derecho ha sido objeto de muchas más palabras rancias que de pensamientos frescos y hoy en día su aura dorada se ha atenuado. Con todo, es enormemente importante reflexionar correctamente sobre el mismo y creo que hay formas con las que esto se puede hacer mejor. El punto de partida crítico del argumento es una evaluación de los enfoques legalistas convencionales que, a pesar de las muchas diferencias que parecen importantes para sus autores, tienen en común que empiezan con la pregunta equivocada; siguen por una vía equivocada; y terminan en el lugar equivocado, con una respuesta estrecha y gremial de juristas a un problema social y político (además de jurídico) universal. No es de extrañar que, como se ha dicho de una buena persona, el Estado de Derecho es difícil de encontrar. Yo sostengo que, si empezamos y proseguimos de otra manera, acabaremos más cerca de un destino que merezca la pena visitar. Eso no hará que la búsqueda del Estado de Derecho sea un paseo de rosas, pero podría ayudarnos a evitar ser, una y otra vez, asaltados por la realidad. En lugar de empezar tratando de estipular qué es el Estado de Derecho, deberíamos preguntarnos para qué sirve: cuál es el objetivo, por qué es importante ese objetivo y qué se necesitaría para conseguirlo; sólo entonces cabe preguntarse qué podría hacer falta para lograrlo. Las respuestas variarán según el contexto, la época y las circunstancias y, por lo general, tendrán que ir más allá de las preocupaciones habituales. Así que hay que empezar por el problema y partir de ahí. El problema específico que debe resolver el Estado de Derecho, sostengo sin pretensión de originalidad, es el poder arbitrario. El carácter de cualquier solución debe ser atemperar (no sólo limitar) el ejercicio del poder para contener la arbitrariedad al mínimo. Entonces, la cuestión (la tercera cuestión, no la primera) es cómo hacerlo. Esto, casi con toda seguridad y en todas partes, dependerá de muchas más cosas de lo que sugiere el discurso convencional sobre el Estado de Derecho. El ideal del Estado de Derecho nunca es puramente jurídico, sino también social y político. Las soluciones serán diferentes, muchas no estarán implicadas, o irán más allá o permanecerán subyacentes o se situarán junto a la ley, y es mucho lo que está en juego.
the purpose of this work is to explore the relationship between the principle of efficacy and the rule of law as formal legality. A substantial part of the work is dedicated to reconstructing the foundation attributed to each notion in the prevailing legal theories and how they are related to the concept of law and the existence of legal systems This examination shows that the formal legality and the principle of effectiveness share the same foundation, which allows establishing certain relationships between them. The main results of this analysis are two. First, there is no unanimous determination about the relationship between the principle of efficacy and the rule of law as a legal formality with the concept of law and with the conditions of existence of legal systems. Second, two of the most influential positions in the literature on the relationship between both notions, present in the works of M. Kramer and J. Raz, have significant problems.
This review essay considers two objections to which Martin Loughlin’s jeremiad Against Constitutionalism might appear to be vulnerable: first, that his argument is entirely stipulative in the sense that all the work is done by a non-standard definition of his central concept and, second that, even if this is not the case, he has not done enough to substantiate his claims about constitutionalism’s deleterious effects. The answer given is that the first objection largely fails but that the second succeeds. Loughlin’s definition of ‘constitutionalism’ as the ideology that has arisen in support of the global spread of written constitutions on the American model is thus somewhat non-standard. In its ordinary usage, ‘constitutionalism’ is a polysemic concept that expresses an aspirational ideal that is deliberately underspecified and contested. There is no uniform ideology of constitutionalism, but a wide variety of national traditions. Nevertheless, Loughlin’s account does capture certain common features of the legitimating claims made by written constitutions on the American model and his argument is to that extent not entirely stipulative. To enlist us in his project of opposing constitutionalism, however, Loughlin needed to conduct a much more thorough assessment of the deleterious effects he alleges have accompanied the spread of constitutionalism. The post-war adaptations of the American model in Germany, India and South Africa departed from it in significant ways. Not all the problems associated with the American model can be attributed to them and, conversely, not all the problems constitutionalism is encountering in these three countries can be attributed to the American model. In ignoring these differences, Loughlin’s argument too often relies on uninterrogated normative priors and unsubstantiated causal claims. His book in that sense makes an elegant, unintended case for the need for comparative constitutional studies as a field.
In light of Hong Kong’s failed attempt to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in 2019 and China’s enactment of the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong, many countries have voiced unease about their extradition agreements with China. Some, out of concern over potential adverse impacts on human rights, have even suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong. In this article, we investigate factors affecting the signing of extradition agreements between China and other countries. We hypothesize that third countries are more likely to conclude an extradition agreement with China if they are more economically engaged with China or are already cooperating with China in civil and criminal matters. In contrast, countries more strongly committed to the rule of law, or those which maintain a Common Law system, are less likely to sign an extradition agreement with China. Statistical analyses of the 57 Chinese extradition agreements signed between 1993 and 2019 support our hypotheses.
The Eurozone and the European Union have recently been confronted with a number of existential threats. The sovereign debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have forced European decisionmakers to pass important reforms which have radically transformed the nature and scope of the Union's powers in the field of economic and fiscal policy. As the new economic governance of the Eurozone emerges as the main driver of integration in today's Europe, this book seeks to assess the solidity of the constitutional foundations supporting that system, and its compliance with the Union's core founding value: the rule of law. Using competence allocation, regulatory quality, access to external review and fundamental rights sustainability as analytical benchmarks, this book argues that the recent metamorphosis of Eurozone economic governance has not been accompanied by a parallel strengthening of its constitutional settlement, leading to a problematic misalignment between the Union's action and its governing principles.
In this article, I consider how fears of the future operation and use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the exercise of constitutional power and how the depiction of AI in science fiction may play a role in determining future conceptions of the Rule of Law. Through its role in limiting the exercise of arbitrary power, the Rule of Law plays a crucial role in society. Where popular Rule of Law conceptions were frequently shaped by their authors’ fears, the Rule of Law is a product of fear. The operation of AI in society is also tainted by fear. This fear is exacerbated by science fiction accounts that frequently portray AI as complicit in a dystopian future. This portrayal of AI’s role is capable of generating a state of fear in society that assists in priming society to accept a different form of the Rule of Law in the future. In other words, where contemporary ideas of the Rule of Law are shaped by fear, and where fear exists in relation to AI’s exercise of constitutional power (and where this is influenced by depictions of AI in science fiction), fears associated with AI’s exercise of power may shape future conceptions of the Rule of Law.
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University „Journal of Law“ is a full access bilingual, international peer-reviewed periodical published by TSU Faculty of Law. Georgian language journal was founded in 2009. Since 2011 the journal has been published in Georgian and English languages.
The Georgian title of the journal is ,,სამართლის ჟურნალი“, the English title is „Journal of Law“. By the decision of the TSU Publishing Board the journal is published in full open access, twice a year, in independent - Georgian and English language printed and electronic editions.The journal aims to establish a dynamic and international scientific platform and expand scientific discourse in a transnational context by publishing comparative legal research in all fields of law.
The International Standard Serial Number (ISSN) for the periodical is Print: 1987-7668 (for Georgian Edition), 2233-3746 (for English edition), electronic: 2720-782X.
ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის იურიდიული ფაკულტეტის ,,სამართლის ჟურნალი“ არის სრული ღია წვდომის ორენოვანი, საერთაშორისო რეფერირებადი და რეცენზირებადი პერიოდული გამოცემა.
ქართულენოვანი ჟურნალი დაფუძნდა 2009 წელს, 2011 წლიდან ჟურნალი წელიწადში ორჯერ ქართულენოვან და ინგლისურენოვან დამოუკიდებელ გამოცემებად ქვეყნდება ელექტრონული და ბეჭდური სახით.
ჟურნალი მიზნად ისახავს სამართლის ყველა დარგობრივი მიმართულებით შედარებითსამართლებრივი კვლევების პუბლიცირების გზით დინამიური და ინტერნაციონალური სამეცნიერო პლატფორმის ჩამოყალიბებას და სამეცნიერო დისკურსის გაფართოებას ტრანსნაციონალურ კონტექსტში.
ჟურნალის პერიოდული გამოცემის საერთაშორისო სტანდარტული სერიული ნომრებია (ISSN):
ბეჭდური: 1987-7668 (ქართულენოვანი გამოცემისთვის), 2233-3746 (ინგლისურენოვანი გამოცემისთვის), ელექტრონული: 2720-782X.
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University „Journal of Law“ is a full access bilingual, international peer-reviewed periodical published by TSU Faculty of Law. Georgian language journal was founded in 2009. Since 2011 the journal has been published in Georgian and English languages.
The Georgian title of the journal is ,,სამართლის ჟურნალი“, the English title is „Journal of Law“. By the decision of the TSU Publishing Board the journal is published in full open access, twice a year, in independent - Georgian and English language printed and electronic editions.The journal aims to establish a dynamic and international scientific platform and expand scientific discourse in a transnational context by publishing comparative legal research in all fields of law.
The International Standard Serial Number (ISSN) for the periodical is Print: 1987-7668 (for Georgian Edition), 2233-3746 (for English edition), electronic: 2720-782X.
This paper analyses the mutually reinforcing relationship between upholding the Rule of Law and protecting university autonomy. Academic freedom as recognised in international human rights law can be deconstructed into two inter-connected dimensions: an individual right and institutional autonomy. The paper argues that the relationship between institutional autonomy of universities and the Rule of Law is a mutually reinforcing one, as demonstrated by the situation in Hungary, Poland and Russia. This relationship manifests in two distinct ways. Firstly, the core principles of the Rule of Law are necessary to ensure that university autonomy is not threatened by arbitrary and untrammeled exercise of State power. Secondly, this autonomy, in turn supports and strengthens the Rule of Law. Therefore, to fully appreciate the state of academic freedom in Hungary, Poland and Russia, we need to consider this bidirectional link between institutional autonomy of universities and the Rule of Law.
There is a perennial ambiguity in the rule-of-law preposition: it predicates that the law shall rule, but which law? This legal loophole has led to a diverse array of interpretations of the concept. Of these, two appear particularly adverse to what the rule of law should primarily be—the rulership of the law—yet still remain dominant. On the one hand, the rule of law is intended to be the vehicle to deliver above-the-law goods such as human rights or other individual entitlements like property, and to forever shield them against any other force, including the law. On the other hand, the rule of law is believed to be a tool at the rulers’ disposal, who make use of the law but are not bound by it, for either legal or practical reasons. In both cases, a pre-legal setting for society allocates rulership to something but not the law, against the very essence of the ideal: an authoritative legal practice for the sake of regulating the present society. As such, the rule of law has to meet certain requirements of craftsmanship, like conditions in law-making and law-enforcement, and sources, which are to be democratically underpinned.
On a popular understanding, the rule of law is valuable because it enables people to plan their lives. However, planning conceptions of the rule of law are undermined by the sheer quantity of legal rules, regulations, and policies characteristic of modern administrative states. Under conditions of hyperlexis, people cannot reasonably be expected to reliably use the law as a guide to conduct. Rather than conclude that the rule of law is inimical to the administrative state, however, I defend an alternative conception of the rule of law. On what I term a contestatory conception, the rule of law requires an adequate opportunity to challenge decisions made by officials in the exercise of their legal powers. The animating idea of a contestatory conception of the rule of the law is that officials should relate to citizens in the space of reasons rather than merely through the exercise of power.
This paper proposes a typology of four possible states of concepts: unquestioned, contested, essentially contested, and destabilized. The typology serves as a frame of reference and as an analytical tool for IR researchers who wish to study concepts and conceptualizing processes as a way of understanding politics. It argues that, within a context, every concept is in one out of four possible states. The typology rests on the relationship between experiences, perceptions, and concepts, aiming to rectify the lacuna of minimal attention to the experiences of many IR works which mainly focus on the inter-subjective sphere and actor-structure tensions. Thus, using the example of sovereignty in Jerusalem during the Israeli-Palestinians negotiations (1993–2001), a new state of concept, the destabilized state, is introduced.
Critics challenge international courts for their interference with domestic democratic processes and alleged violations of rule of law standards: they claim that these guardians of the rule of law are not well guarded themselves. These concerns should not be dismissed too quickly as mere disgruntled venting by populist politicians. This article focuses on regional human rights courts and argues that the same interests and values that justify rule of law standards of impartiality, independence and accountability domestically also justify similar standards for international courts. Focusing on the European Court of Human Rights and its doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the article demonstrates how this doctrine may contribute to fulfilling the rule of law but at the same time may also endanger it. This requires changes to the doctrine to ensure that the core rule of law standards of predictability and protection against arbitrary discretion are respected.
Beyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.
This article connects the insights of post-realist scholarship about radical indeterminacy and its consequences for the legitimacy of adjudication to the current legitimacy crisis of the international investment regime. In the past few years, numerous studies have exposed serious shortcomings in investment law and arbitration including procedural problems and the substantive asymmetry of the rights protected. These criticisms have prompted a broad consensus in favor of amending the international investment regime and multiple reform proposals have appeared that appeal to the rule of law ideal as an instrument for increasing the acceptability of the international investment system. This article argues that the reliance of such proposals on jurisprudential approaches that fail to adequately accommodate the post-realist indeterminacy critique and take seriously the role of ideology in adjudication renders reform efforts unable to solve the legitimacy problems of the investment regime. The conclusions suggest the need to abandon implausible claims to depoliticization and face the methodological challenges posed by the promise of ideologically balanced assessments advanced by some rule of law theorists. The article finally points at the urgency to reform traditional approaches to doctrinal work in order to increase awareness of critical challenges and open up doctrinal methods to alternative methodological avenues.
The rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland revealed the EU’s significant vulnerabilities in the face of the need to uphold the values that the whole system of EU integration presumes are in place. The lessons are revealing: respecting the acquis does not guarantee continuing adherence to Article 2 TEU values; economic success in the Union does not necessarily entrench democracy and the rule of law; the tools available to preserve the rule of law are largely inadequate, as they could go against the key assumptions of the internal market. Consequently, the lack of political will to deal with the values’ crisis is not at all irrational, which makes it even more worrisome. What stands out from the grim picture is the revolutionary case law of the Court of Justice on judicial independence and mutual trust, which bridges the available infringement procedures with the outstanding problems and offers horizontal and vertical empowerment to the EU’s decentralised judiciaries – now able to intervene – while also resolving the competences conundrum through a broad reading of the principle of judicial independence as a key element of the rule of law. However inspiring, recent case law developments are insufficient, we argue, to deal with the sociological legitimacy crisis in tackling illiberal democracies plaguing the EU: autocratic legalism cannot be fought with legalism alone. Designing a long-term systemic approach to a complex re-articulation of EU values is indispensable, as enforcement is not a panacea per se.
This paper makes two interlinked arguments. First, that the “concept of home” – the focus of a burgeoning literature within housing studies – meets Gallie’s conditions for an “essentially contested concept.” The influential theory, drawn on throughout the social sciences, seeks to explain concepts for which disputes are intractable; they cannot be settled by empirical evidence or argument. Second, that this “essential contestability” is not just a theoretical label, it tells us something useful about how scholars can best employ the concept of home in their own work. The argument is put in three sections. The first provides a summary of Gallie’s theory. The second argues that the concept of home meets Gallie’s conditions for essential contestability. Finally, the third outlines the implications of the arguments put in the first two sections for scholars engaging with the concept of home.
Ідея верховенства права визначається сьогодні в усьому світі однією правовою культурою, тією, в якій дещо проголошується правом ex post facto (як в англійському загальному праві) або в силу політичного прагматизму правові нововведення у правосудді залежать від обраних представницьких органів (як у США). Більш того, верховенство права, що використовується як політичний слоган, призводить до ідеократичної ідеалізації. Верховенство права, втілюючи інструментальну цінність (навіть якщо міжнародні групивпливу фундаменталізують її), представляє певну культуру у грі викликів і відповідей hic et nunc (навіть якщо глобалізм універсалізує її). Розвинене в різних місцях і в різні часи, воно не може бути чимось більшим, ніж низка живих культур зацікавлених країн, заснованих на такому, що еволюціонує історично, цивілізуючому та гуманізуючому ідеалі. Право як сукупність цінностей, які підлягають захисту, водночас стикається з конфліктом цінностей у щоденному правозастосуванні, що зазвичай вимагає зважування та балансування в пошуку компромісного рішення. Не відстоюючи абсолютизм «все або нічого», однобічність або гомогенізацію, варто все ж зазначити, що перетворення правової визначеності на ідола(як це зробив Конституційний Суд Угорщини) або підпорядкування дій уряду судовому або правозахисному контролю може обернутись принесенням у жертву справедливості за підтримки народу і зникнення raison d’être. Більш того, фетишизація власної гомогенності може викривити переваги, яким вона прагне служити. Глобалізована влада суддів намага-ється монополізувати всесвітній навчальний процес, відокремлюючи місцеві події від їх природного контексту, щоб нав’язати себе. Зрештою, питання про те, хто може опанувати право, є вирішальним при оцінці втручання міжнародних органів та Європейського Союзу в місцеві справи під гаслом верховенства права.
The concept of social entrepreneurship has been developing for several decades and although it is still a nascent field, it has come a long way in terms of practice and impact. Its influence on economic and social development, on sustainable development and the attainment of the sustainable development goals has been staggering. The potential of social entrepreneurship has been recognized on every level, especially in developed countries. However, developing countries lack a conducive eco-system for development of the field as a prerequisite to fulfilling its full potential.
In the thesis, we implement a holistic approach of the macro-environment for development and promotion of social entrepreneurship by exploring the trends in the literature with emphasis on the macro-environment. We identify the conducive factors for development and promotion of the field, analyze how the identified factors influence social entrepreneurship growth in developing countries with focus on North Macedonia and provide evidence to establish the need for developing a model for growth and expansion of social entrepreneurship in developing countries.
For this purpose, we used qualitative methodology, since this research has a broader, more contextual, flexible research questions that did not have a predefined expected outcome. It also provided a circular hierarchy of phases, meaning that the process was perpetuating and the confounding factors were searched in the field. This methodology also allowed a more flexible sampling by using open-ended and less structured protocols and guides, but also utilization of a tool that depended on interactive interviews, which opened the possibility to produce results that give meaning, experience and views of the context, and experience and interaction of the relevant stakeholders for development of social entrepreneurship in the country.
The perception of social entrepreneurs and key stakeholders is that there is a lack of political stability and will, governmental activism, supporting infrastructure, and financial instruments to support the development of the field. The shortage of country data hinders the research and practice and wastes resources, loses time and productivity which indicate poor organization and coordination of the country’s authorities.
The evidence highlight the need for developing a model for growth and expansion of social entrepreneurship. The evidence is also consistent with the need for development of a tool that would provide data on a nascent field that the country still does not have the capacity to facilitate the development process of a conducive environment. The external factors play a crucial role for development of social entrepreneurship in the country.
The implications of this research thesis are threefold. This data contributes to the development of social entrepreneurship on a national and local level, helps the social enterprises to better understand the environment, helps researchers and contributes to the literature and practice by opening an area that currently lacks critical investigation.
To contribute to this context on a national level, but also to foster the development of social entrepreneurship in the country, and in accordance with the aforementioned results, discussion and conclusions, we developed a tool called the Social Entrepreneurship Index.
The International Criminal Court was created with the aim of expanding the virtues of Law to spaces that remained beyond its reach. In Paul Kahn’s words, the establishment of the International Criminal Court can be understood as an effort to replace the language of power for the language of law. However, the International Criminal Court still has a long way to go in the path towards legality. In order to sustain this last claim, this article reviews the ways in which the problems of a life without a State are expressed in the operations of the International Criminal Court. By looking into the problem of selectivity it will then be argued that the current institutional structure of the Court is an obstacle for the justification of international punishment. The main purpose of these considerations is not to criticize the Court but to show that the justification of punishment always depends on the justification of the political arrangement in which it takes place.
In recent years, it has become common to see claims that the doctrine of legitimate expectations has no sufficiently defined purpose, and that administrative law scholars should do more theoretical work to bring coherence to this area of law. In this paper, I suggest this ‘conceptual critique’ of legitimate expectations is misplaced and that, instead, it reveals a much wider failing of contemporary administrative law scholarship. First, I show how there has not yet been, and is unlikely to be, a satisfactory answer to the conceptual critique. Following on from this premise, I suggest that the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique are faulty and, administrative lawyers need to fundamentally alter and expand how they study legitimate expectations. The aim now, I argue, must be to move towards providing an account of the practice of legitimate expectations in the wider context of public administration. My specific argument in this paper is thus a case for a significant reorientation and an expansion of the study of how law protects legitimate expectations, but the wider suggestion is that the same shift is required in administrative law scholarship generally.
The rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland revealed the EU’s significant vulnerabilities in the face of the need to uphold the values that the whole system of EU integration presumes are in place. The lessons are revealing: respecting the acquis does not guarantee continuing adherence to Article 2 TEU values; economic success in the Union does not necessarily entrench democracy and the rule of law; the tools available to preserve the rule of law are largely inadequate, as they could go against the key assumptions of the internal market. Consequently, the lack of political will to deal with the values’ crisis is not at all irrational, which makes it even more worrisome. What stands out from the grim picture is the revolutionary case law of the Court of Justice on judicial independence and mutual trust, which bridges the available infringement procedures with the outstanding problems and offers horizontal and vertical empowerment to the EU’s decentralised judiciaries – now able to intervene – while also resolving the competences conundrum through a broad reading of the principle of judicial independence as a key element of the rule of law. However inspiring, recent case law developments are insufficient, we argue, to deal with the sociological legitimacy crisis in tackling illiberal democracies plaguing the EU: autocratic legalism cannot be fought with legalism alone. Designing a long-term systemic approach to a complex re-articulation of EU values is indispensable, as enforcement is not a panacea per se.
With the rise of research on the rule of law during recent years, the meaning of that concept has become a subject of much debate. The lack of consensus becomes quickly noticeable when some of the existing concepts of the rule of law are examined. This chapter seeks to explore the different concepts of the rule of law – and its definitional prerequisites – present in the literature. This review is organized according to two competing accounts of conceptual analysis used in political science, hierarchical structures (e.g., Møller/Skaaning 2014), and radial categories (e.g., Collier/Mahon 1993). Hierarchical structures organize different definitions of a concept along a continuum from the thinner (or minimalist) definitions to the thicker (or maximalist) definitions, while the conceptual analysis of radial categories proposes the existence of a “primary category” (Collier/Mahon 1993) with different “diminished subtypes” of the concept (Collier/Levitsky 1997). Thick and thin conceptualizations “involve trade-offs between generality and specificity, quantity and quality, and absolutes and matters of degree” (Coppedge 2002: 1).
This article analyses the decision-making process of the UN Security Council when it adopts outcome documents, such as resolutions, Presidential statements and press statements. It is commonly assumed that because of their veto power and permanency China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have greater influence than their elected counterparts in shaping those outcomes. In recent years, that control has been strengthened by the penholdership system. Under this practice, one or more members, usually France, the United States or the United Kingdom (P3), take leadership over a situation on the agenda of the Council. When ‘holding the pen’ a member often decides what action the Council should take, then drafts an outcome document that it negotiates with other permanent members before sharing the text with elected members. This article explores the development of this practice and its impact on the respect for the rule of law in the Security Council’s decision-making process. It argues that, while concentrating power in the hands of the P3, hence diminishing transparency and the opportunity for all members to participate in the decision-making of the Council, at the same time the penholdership system also provides an avenue to strengthen elected members’ influence in ways that promote respect for the international rule of law.
Rephrasing the question of "law and morals" in terms of "order and good order," Professor Fuller criticizes Professor H. L. A. Hart for ignoring the internal "morality of order" necessary to the creation of all law. He then rejects Professor Hart's theory of statutory interpretation on the ground that we seek the objectives of entire provisions rather than the meanings of individual words which are claimed to have "standard instances."
Normative (or Ethical) Positivism Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to 'The Concept of Law
- See Jeremy Waldron
See Jeremy Waldron, " Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, " in Jules Coleman (ed.) Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript
to 'The Concept of Law' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 411, at pp. 419-22.
See Finnis, supra note 67, at p. 276; see also Jeremy Waldron Does Law Promise Justice?
See Finnis, supra note 67, at p. 276; see also Jeremy Waldron, " Does Law Promise Justice? " Georgia State University Law
Review, 17 (2001), 759.
The Federalist Papers (1787-8)Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- James Madison
- Alexander Hamilton
- John Jay
James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787-8), ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1987), pp. 318-22 and 436-42 (Numbers 51 by Madison and 78 by Hamilton); and A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution (1886), (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), pp. 268-73.