For the last sixty years, the concept of development has operated as a proxy for conversations about global inequalities. However its transformative logic ultimately implies that the West is the only legitimate source of models for social, economic and political organization. The understanding of law and legal systems is part of this broader tendency. A close study of the contemporary orthodoxy
... [Show full abstract] that promoting the 'rule of law' will bring about development reveals the way that developmental logic both secures a specific, positivistic conception of the rule of law, grounded in Western political theory and jurisprudence, and negates the possibility of other forms of normativity and regimes of legitimacy. Critiques which centre on the 'political' character of positive law are useful in pointing out the mythic character of institutional models, which empirically find no exemplars even within the 'developed' world. However such critiques ultimately avoid a consideration of the specific form which politics takes in positive legality, and the way developmentalism as a logic secures the ostensible universality of those Western forms of socio-legal ordering in the first place. Because of this, such interventions risk increasing, rather than reducing the sphere of intervention in Third World sovereignty legitimated by the concept of development.