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Abstract

Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science and the humanities. KeywordsPragmatism–Neurophilosophy–John Dewey–Dynamic systems–Consciousness–Mind
1 23
Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences
ISSN 1568-7759
Volume 10
Number 3
Phenom Cogn Sci (2011)
10:347-368
DOI 10.1007/
s11097-011-9202-6
Neuropragmatism, old and new
Tibor Solymosi
1 23
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Neuropragmatism, old and new
Tibor Solymosi
#
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of
John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these
developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well
before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century
European philosophers views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers
refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Deweysworkprovidesuseful
tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and
philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves
among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of
brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Deweys dynamic view of
mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking
metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-
dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophica l pragmatism or neuropragmatism
recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a
science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a
science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alonejust as explaining
cooking entails more than understanding the gutand therefore must establish
continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragma-
tism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and
manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between
science and the humanities.
Keywords Pragmatism
.
Neurophilosophy
.
John Dewey
.
Dynamic systems
.
Consciousness
.
Mind
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the
nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt
Phenom Cogn Sci (2011) 10:347368
DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9202-6
T. Solymosi (*)
Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Mailcode 4505, 3065 Faner Hall,
Carbondale, IL 62901, USA
e-mail: tibor@siu.edu
Published online: 2 April 2011
Author's personal copy
philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a
box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never finished process.
John Dewey (1925/LW1: 224)
John Dewey was doing neurophilosophy long before Patricia Churchlandsbookof
that name (Churchland 1986).
1
Amid growing neurophilosophical interest in Deweys
work outside of mainstream contemporary pragmatism and neo-pragmatism, the
potentials for neurophilosophical pragmatism have not yet been articulated. Many
contemporary neurophilosophers have either engaged with Deweysworkorhave
even gone so far as to identify themselves as pragmatists (cf. Churchland 1996, 2002,
2007, 2009;Dennett1995, 1996, 2006; Flanagan 1996). Others are developing to
varying degree positions that resemble Deweys, yet remain philosophically oblivious
insofar as they are barely cognizant of their similarity to Dewey (cf. Clark 1997, 2008;
Noë 2009;Thompson2007). There are also a few philosophers and neuroscientists
who address questions of mind and brain from an explicitly pragmatist starting point
(cf. Chemero 2009; Freeman 2000; Johnson 1987, 1993, 2007, 2009, 2010; Rockwell
2005; Schulkin 2004, 2009). Despite these developments and the early influence of
the neopragmatists Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, the resurgence in pragmatism
has come about with significant (though not total: cf. Putnam 2001;Rorty1970)
silence on things neuroscientific and neurophilosophical. My aim here is to initiate the
development of neuropragmatism as a rich and worthwhile extension of classical
pragmatism, notably Deweys, in which the work of some neurophilosophers provides
tools and materials with which to work toward the fulfillment of the above epigraph.
2
I first provide an overview of neurophilosophy by highlighting two main themes,
anti-Cartesianism and evolutionism. I then make a functional and highly idealized
distinction between first-wave and second-wave pragmatic neurophilosophers, whom I
refer to as neuropragmatists. This distinction parallels the difference between William
James and John Dewey on the mechanisms of learning. I then turn to further remarks
made by Dewey on these two themes to illustrate the shortcomings of the first-wave
1
See Dalton 2002 on Deweys interest in contemporary science and its influence on his philosophy.
2
Given the popularity of affixing the prefix neuro- to various fields and ideas, it comes as no surprise that
something very close to neuropragmatism has already been coined. Coming predominantly out of
cognitive linguistics is the emerging field of neuropragmatics. While pragmatics within linguistics is
distinct from pragmatism, there are important affinities, especially in their shared origins (see Tschaepe
2009). Brigitte Stemmer and Paul Walter Schönle introduce neuropragmatics in a manner that has great
affinity with neuropragmatism in the call for wide interdisciplinary work yet nevertheless succumb to a
version of Cartesian materialism in which the mind/brain is the subject matter of inquiry (see Stemmer and
Schönle 2000). Bruno G. Bara and Maurizio Tirassa are likewise very sympathetic with what I am calling
neuropragmatism, not only in their call for interdisciplinary inquiry but also with the emphasis for a more
ecological framework. Yet, they too come too close to Cartesian materialism in their endorsement of the
mind/brain and the condonation of mind as the function of the brain, a relation analogously based on
digestion and the gut (see Bara and Tirassa 2000). As I show, not only is this metaphor inadequate for
understanding mentality, but also it is not taken as seriously by its proponents as it needs to be.
Neuropragmatism differs from neuropragmatics in that the former is a general philosophical position taken
with regard to inquiry into mentality and thereby seeks to evade problematic premises and implicit
dichotomies found in the latter, a specific scientific subfield. Moreover, neuropragmatism is post-
linguistic, whereas neuropragmatics is specifically focused on the linguisticnot a weakness, mind you,
just a difference in emphasis and purpose. And let us not forget the abductive history of the early
pragmatists and the name of their doctrine (see Peirce 1905, p. 335).
348 T. Solymosi
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neuropragmatists. From this perspective, the second-wave neuropragmatists more fully
embrace the anti-Cartesianism of the classical pragmatists. Despite their progress in
moving beyond the cranium, I offer further critique of the second wave by introducing a
new metaphor for consciousness that also builds from my critique of the first-wave
neuropragmatists and the contributions from Dewey. These contributions predate
important insights largely attributed to European thinkers such as Edmund Husserl,
Martin Heidegger, or Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
In short, with the second-wave neuropragmatists, the Cartesian materialism found
in the consciousness-as-digestion metaphor is rejected in favor of something like
Alva Noës consciousness-as-dancing metaphor (Noë 2009). While the esthetic,
environment-engaging bodily movement of dancing is appreciated, I argue that a
consciousness-as-cooking metaphor better captures those aspects while maintaining
continuity with the digestion metaphor and the evolutionary need to survive through
organismenvironment transactions. This metaphor I take to repres ent a third, tidal
wave of neuropragmatism. I emphasize here that these first- and second-wave
neuropragmatists have positions distinct from the pragmatism of the aforementioned
pragmatist philosophers and neuroscientists, whose work influence the tidal-wave
position I introduce later in this essay.
What is neurophilosophy?
Neurophilosophy is the position or attitude that the questions traditionally raised by
philosophy are usefully addressed from a neuroscientific standpoint (Bickle 2009,3
4, 910). Either traditional philosophical questions are straightforwardly answered in
scientifically responsible ways in light of neuroscientific data, or the questions are
reconstructed so that they become respon sible to scientific evidence and methods, or
such questions are simply seen to be anachronistic non-start ers. Neurophilosophy is
distinct from the philosophy of neuros cience, in that the former sees evolutionary
cognitive neurobiology as providing rich fodder for philosophy, while the latter is
concerned more with the philosophical presumptions, assumptions, foundations, and
theoretic problems of neuroscience. While there may very well be a neurophilosophy
of neuroscience as well as a Cartesian philosophy of neuroscience, the notion of a
Cartesian neurophilosophy is paradoxical given that one of the major themes of
neurophilosophers is their staunch anti-Cartesianism.
The two themes of neurophilosophy I address for present purposes are its anti-
Cartesianism and its evolutionism. The anti-Cartesianism comes in a methodological
and an ontological form. Methodologically, neurophilosophers do not seek a first
philosophy. Ontologically, there is no substance dualism. Nevertheless, problems
arise with regard to Cartesian materialism, the position that there must be a place in
the brain
3
or a specific place at allwhere consciousness all comes together,
where a spectator of a self sits in a Cartesian Theater. The influence of evolution is
likewise both significant and underappreciated among neurophilosophers. The role
of evolution is inversely tied to the degree of Cartesian materialism at play.
3
Or something special or uniquely intrinsic about the brain as opposed to other non-neural media.
Neuropragmatism, old and new 349
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Neurophilosophy and pragmatism
My candidates for the most prominent first-wave neuropragmatists are Paul and
Patricia Churchland, Owen Flanagan, and Daniel Dennett.
4
The second-wave
neuropragmatists include Evan Thompson, Andy Clark, and Alva Noë.
5
I emphasize
that there is likely to be overlap between the two waves depending on factors like the
stage of each thinkers career or various specific points (e.g. regarding truth or
ethics). Despite the overlap, I intend each wave to more or less represent a general
focus that is characterized by the philosophical scope of cognition and by the
chronology of the thinkers rise to prominence. The difference between the waves
amounts to the degree of evolutionary influence each wave utilizes in understanding
the relation between mind and life in opposition to Cartesian materialism. What
these two waves share is that pragmatism and/or Deweys work are not explicit
starting points in the way pragmatism or Deweys work are for full-throttled, tidal-
wave neuropragmatists like Mark Johnson, Teed Rockwell, Walter J. Freeman, and
Jay Schulkin (whose work, as aforementioned, significantly influence the position I
articulate later).
6
For many neurophilosophers, especially the first-wave neuropragmatists, the mind
is the brain (at least until some technical concern is raised that leads to an onslaught
of qualifications). It is either a matter of strict identity or a matter of correl ation, as
exemplified by the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Other times,
the emphasis is not so much on correlation between min d and brain as it is a
functional relation. The mind is what the brain does. The mind is not some sort of
substantive thing, but an activity performed by the brain or central nervous system.
The popular analog is to digestion and the gut. Digestion is the process performed by
a properly functioning GI tract. Mentation, likewise, is the process performed by the
brain (or central nervous system). Regardless of the details, one thing is for sure: for
first-wave neuropragmatists, the only substance in town is neuralphysical and
extended.
Neurophilosophical anti-Cartesianism is not limited to the relationship between
mind and brain, however. One may reject substance dualism and nevertheless remain
Cartesian in ones philosophy. The whole of modern philosophy is easily seen as
Cartesian in its search for indubitable, incorrigible foundations for knowledge. The
neurophilosophers reject first philosophy as soon as they concede that the
4
The discussion of pragmatism or Dewey or the traits I attribute to the first-wave is so disparate among
these first wavers that I find no easy way to discuss them individually or summarily. Here are some
relevant citations on these details: Churchland 1989, 2002, 2007; Flanagan 1996, 1998, 2002, 2007;
Dennett 1991, 1995, 2006.
5
See Clark 2008, pp. x, xvii, and Noë 2009, p. 67, for the only mention of Dewey or pragmatism that I
have found among these second wavers. Thompson (2007) shares many affinities with the pragmatism I
suggest; however, his resources are more Continental than American.
6
Mark Johnson deserves recognition as seeing past many of the issues, though I limit myself from
discussing his views here. See Johnson 1987, 1993, 2007, 2009, 2010. Where Johnson and I differ is in
particular emphasis. Where I restrain myself to neurophilosophers, he looks at the history of cognitive
science as in two generations, the early being Cartesian and the latter coming around to pragmatism. While
he rightly notes that pragmatism was in most regards anathema to the first generation, it is worth
considering that Jerry Fodor has recently recognized that the problem with the whole of mind science
today is precisely because it is infected with pragmatism! (See Fodor 2008, pp. 815.)
350 T. Solymosi
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knowledge provided by the sciences, especially the mindbrain sciences, is the
proper starting point for philosophy. As Patricia Churchland has argued, neuro-
philosophical metaphysics takes the Greek etymology quite seriously: metaphysics is
after science, not prior to or independent from it (Churchland 2002,3940). This
approach to metaphysics is, as Churchland rightly acknowledges, at the heart of
pragmatism (Churchland 2002,4243).
It is worth emphasizing that some may see neurophilosophy as Cartesian insofar
as neuroscience becomes first philosophy. The strength of this parallel resides in the
failure to distinguish between the foundationalist and anti-fallibilist epistemology of
Cartesians and the holistic and fallibilist epistemology of pragmatists. Epistemolo-
gists in the Cartesian tradition seek indubitable and universal first principles from
which to deduce all knowledge. Pragmatists have long rejected this quest for
certainty, as Dewey called it, emphasizi ng the provisional nature of all truths,
especially the scientific (Dewey 1929/LW4).
Also at the core of pragmatism as recognized by these neurophilosophers is the
importance of evolution. For all these neurophilosophers, cognition (broadly
construed) is recognized as having to do with an organisms getting about in an
environment and not primarily or exclusively having to do with representing true
reality. In locom otive creatures, this getting about is controlled by the nervous
system. The first-wave neuropragmatists all endorse a connectionist model of the
nervous system (their technical disagreements are of no concern here). Like the
classical pragmatists, these neurophilosophers concei ve of human nature as the result
of the mammalian nervous systems evolution and ongoing engagement in an
environment. Nonetheless, this organismenvironment interaction is limited in
experiential scope.
7
Mentality, consciousness, or experience is limited to what is
going on in the brain. It is telling that these first-wave neuropragmatists often use the
expression mind/brain to indicate their non-dualist position. Yet, this limited
distribution of mentality ultimately leads to a break in the livi ng process of an
organism that Dewey, from his evolutionary standpoint, adamantly rejects (Cf. Popp
2007; Johnson 2007,111134 and 2009, 371373).
To recap, the pragmatic characteristics of these first-wave neuropragmatists
include the prominent anti-dualism of mindbrain and the evolutionary development
of the nervous system as the control system of locomotive organisms. Both
characteristic themes are strikes against Cartesianism. They a re countered by an
insufficient pragm atism, in which Cartesianism is not fully escaped because
mentality is limited to the brain. To return to the image of digestion, the first-wave
neuropragmatists, in likening mind to digestion, fail to appreciate the full ecological
richness of digestion as distributed beyond the gut. Before I elaborate further on the
problems with the first wavers use of this metaphor, I first illustrate the insufficient
evolutionary pragmatism by turning explicitly to Dewey. By connecting some of his
ideas with some of Dennetts, I aim to show that second-wave neuropragmatists
recognize the limitations of first-wave neuropragmatism. They both criticize and
extend first-wave views in ways that ring even truer to Deweys philosophy.
7
Throughout this paper, I interchange interaction and transaction, perhaps to the chagrin of many. For
details on the subtle differences between interaction, transaction, and enaction, see Johnson 2009, p. 372.
Neuropragmatism, old and new 351
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Dewey, continuity, and the reflex arc concept in psychology (1896)
A fair description of the whole of Deweys philosophy is that it seeks to eliminate
the traditional dichotomies of philosophy. Examples include the dichotomies of
mind/body, fact/value, internal/exte rnal, experience/nature, and happenings/actions.
In eliminating these dichotomies, Dewey was extremely discerning. He noted that
we must not replace an old dichotomy with a new one. We must not simply dress up
the old in new language while retaining the dualism which was at the root of
theoretical and practical problems. Since dichotomies are to be rejectedin favor of
continuitiesreplacing the language of an old dichotomy with new yet dichotomous
language is no rejection at all.
Deweys developmental a nd transactive account of continuity of brain, body, and
world is well explicated by Mark Johnson and serves as a valuable framework for
appreciating the rejection of dualisms. He sees Deweys principle of continuity as
having the following three components (2007,122123). First, there is the
continuity between humans and other animals. This allows for much of the science
that has been or can be done on non-human animals to have significance for humans
and our understanding of ourselves in nature. This aspect of continuity Johnson
identifies as that between higher and lower organisms, with regard to
evolutionary complexity (i.e., higher organisms are more complex in physiological
organization than lower ones). Second, our rational, logical, and scientific abilities
grow out of, viz., are continuous but not identical with, bodily processes that both
evolved prior to and developed into the higher level capacities. That is, humans
evolved complex physiologic al activities that have seemed to many to be of a
different kind than the body, hence the cultural mistake of mindbody dualism. For
Dewey, this aspect of continuity means that the mental is cultivated out of the
physical. The mindor mentation to be more preciseis not identical or
reducible to lower-level physical processes but is an outgrowth of those processes
that allow for cultural practices. Finally, Johnson understands Dewey s postulate of
continuity as not only between higher and lower across species and among processes
within an organism, but also as between inner and outer. That is, what goes on
outside an organism is just as vital as what goes on inside it. This integration is so
strong and so fluid across the skin barrier that the distinction between inner and outer
itself is an artifact that serves specific purposes and is not to be confused as defining
an ontological difference in kind. Not only do our factual and value judgments grow
out of lower-level bodily processes (such as the emotions), but they are also
entangled beyond the interior of the organism and into the wider culture. This
entanglement is conceived by Dewey as the organic system or behavioral field that
denotes mind (1925/LW1: 230).
Among Deweys most significant rejections is the dualism of mental and physical.
In his 1896 critique (Dewey 1896/EW5) of William Jamess discussion of the reflex
arc in The Principles of Psychology (James 1890, 24f), Dewey argued that the
standard stimulusresponse model is simply the old dualism between body and mind
repackaged. Those familiar with contemporary philosophy of mind and neuro-
philosophy will recognize Deweys criticism as a robust statement against Cartesian
materialism coupled with his evolutionary naturalism which is as far-reaching as that
of Dennett. That is, once the whole of life, including and especially human life, is
352 T. Solymosi
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seen as a matter of organismenvironment transaction, understanding biological
concernsevolutionary, ecological, neurological, and behavioralis instrumental in
understanding human affairs like consciousness, attention, experience, or mentation in
general. Here, I discuss Deweys criticism of James, relate it to Deweys evolutionary
naturalism and then return in the next section to my essays opening epigraph.
Instead of viewing the stimulus response as an isolated mechanism separate and
distinct from the process of living, Dewey argued that in order to understand how a child
learns that fire burns, we must enlarge the contextual situation to include the childs
activity prior to the touch of the fire. Dewey reconstructed Jamess static, passive, and
mechanical model with a purposeful organic unity in action. Dewey concluded that the
response to the burning from fire is not simply pain and the withdrawal of the hand from
fire, but a meaningful change in the system of tensions (Dewey 1896/EW5: 103; see
Rockwell 2005, 177ff, especially 182), whereby the mere seeing of a flame becomes
the seeing-of-a-light-that-means-pain-when-contact-occurs (Dewey 1896/EW5: 98).
The transformative activity is both a change in the physiology of the child and a
change in awareness and meaning. For James, there was a simple chain of stimulus,
motor action, and response that involved just vision and an appendage. For Dewey,
there is an entire organism already in action, an organized unity of numerous
interdependent systems that brings about the purposeful action of the childsreaching
for the flame. There is not a causal relationship between the physical changes and the
mental ones, where the physical and the mental are understood as different in kind.
The causal relation is understood by Dewey as phases in a process of organism
environment interaction. These phases of physical and mental are continuous with one
another (Dewey 1925/LW1: 201; Dewey 1938/LW12: 6685). This continuity allows
for the experimental methods of science to inquire and understand mentation (Dewey
1938/LW12: 29, 3031). This continuity is supported by the fact of evolution (Dewey
1938/LW12: 3065).
Before addressing evolution, there is one final step in illuminating Deweys
neuropragmatism. While Deweys criticism of the reflex arc model as a hidden
dualism led him to a dynamic reconstruction of learning, Dewey was also very wary
of simply replacing the stuff of mind with the stuff of brain. Dewey found deeply
problematic all attempts to simply see the seat of consciousness or the soul as a part
of the cortex, as the whole of the brain, or as the entire nervous system (Dewey
1925/LW1: 225). The worry is what Dennett has termed Cartesian materialism. The
Cartesian materialist believes that there is a part of the brain in which it all comes
together, where the real world is passively experienced and known. Dennetts
provocative imagery of the Cartesian Theater somewhere in the brain illustrates the
very concern Dewey himself had with misunderstandings not simply of advances in
brain science but with what the minds purpose or function actually is, especially
when understood as a biological activity.
The problem of Cartesian materialism is not simply its lack of scien tific support
but that it upholds the old spectator theory of mind. This view holds that the mind is
a passive receptacle of sensations provided by the sense modalities from their
passive meetings with the external world, from which the mind itself is separate and
distinct (remember, for the Cartesian, consciousness, thought, experience, mind, and
self are all identical). Thinking is the rearrangement of these sense data and likewise
separate from the body and the world. This view of the mind is not easily maintained
Neuropragmatism, old and new 353
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in light of Darwinian evolution. As both Dewey and Dennett argue, the physical
realm of mechanism and the mental realm of meani ng are made continuous with one
another due to the universal acid of evolution (Dewey 1910/MW4: 78; Dennett
1995, 82). The opposition of mind a nd body is eroded by the acid to yield
continuities. Once mind is made or understood to be continuous with the physical,
the passive spectator, who sits outside the world yet soaks it in, is no longer
respectable: for mind is now understood as an adaptive activity and therefore part of
the natural world. Pragmatists saw this a century ago as do neurophilos ophers today.
Mentation is an anticipatory function of locomotive organisms that coordinates and
guides the organisms behaviors as it gets about in its environment. This function is
performed in at least two ways as seen through Deweys distinction between mind
and consciousness. This distinction will receive further discussion with regard to the
consciousness-as-cooking metaphor. For now, the following suffices. Consciousness
is the focalization of the meaningful habits by which an organism is able to
anticipate. This focalization is intermittent wher eas the meanings and habits are
constant. Mind, so understood, undergirds the immediate awareness that defines
consciousness (Dewey 1925/LW1: 229230).
Dewey and dynamic systems theory
The distinctions we have made between properties or things that are mental or
physical are contrivances intended to serve specific purposes in inquiry, learning,
or communication. The mistake of philosophers since antiquity is their taking this
artifact for reality. Throughout his career Dewey sought myriad ways to illustrate the
productive dynamism of experience. Fo r Dewey, experience is not only the
transaction of organism and environment, but it is also the entirety of the actions
going on, not as the physical effecting the mental or vice versa, but as a natural event
that may be understood in various ways. We emphasize different aspects that are
intelligible through the particulars of the situation. These particulars constitute how
we emphasize. For example, a specific problemat ic situation may call for a
physiological perspective over a phenomenological one as a more productive means
of resolution. Through reflective inquiry, we produce generalizations of these
different points of emphasis. Such generalizations may illustrate continuities among
the different perspectives that are otherwi se unrecognized. When eating, for
example, both the phenomenal experience and the physiological experience are
indistinguishable in media res. In short, whatever distinctions we may make between
so-called mental and physical properties are functional distinctions determined
by the situation: they are not ontological claims or repackagings. They are products
of reflection.
In contrast to Cartesian materialisma repackaging of mind-body dualismDewey
advanced a dynamic perspective that sees mentality as a biological process of organism
environment interaction, specifically as a behavioral field. As Teed Rockwell has
importantly noted, Dewey leapfrogged over both behavior ism and cognitive
psychology, and articulated the basic principles of dynamic systems theory (Rockwell
2005,177;cf.Chemero2009). The opening epigraph of my essay puts forth not
simply the importance of neuroscience for philosophy but advances this dynamic view
354 T. Solymosi
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of the scope of the interaction. Let us examine the whole paragraph from which this
epigraph, the neuropragmatistsmotto,istaken.Itreads(1925/LW1: 224225):
Old ideas do not die when the beliefs which have been explicitly associated
with them disappear; they usually only change their clothes. Present notions
about the organism are largely a survival, with changed vocabulary, of old
ideas about soul and body. The soul was conceived as inhabiting the body in
an external way. Now the nervous system is conceived as a substitute,
mysteriously within the body. But as the soul was simple and therefore not
diffused through the body, so the nervous system as the seat of mental events is
narrowed down to the brain, and then to the cortex of the brain; while many
physiological inquirers would doubtless feel enormously relieved if a specific
portion of the cortex could be ascertained to be the seat of consciousness
Here we see one of Deweys many criticisms of Cartesian materialism. Looking
for consciousness in any specific part of not only the brain but the entire nervous
system is problematic. Deweys paragraph continues:
Those who talk most of the organism, physiologists and psychologists, are
often just those who display the least sense of intimate, delicate and subtle
interdependence of all organic structures and processes with one another. The
world seems mad in preoccupation with what is specific, particular,
disconnected in medicine, politic s, science, industry, education. In terms of
conscious control of inclusive wholes, search for those links which occupy key
positions and which effect critical connections is indispensable. But recovery
of sanity depends upon seeing and using these specifiable things as links
functionally significant in a process
Again we see Deweys emphasis on unified, purposeful, goal-oriented action,
particularly in matters of conscious and social experience. Moreover, the emphasis
on inte rdependence goes beyond the bodily syst ems and extends into the social
human world (I return to this point in my discussion of consciousness as cooking).
Consciousness is not limited to nervous tissue; it is not something that happens to
such tissue: it is, as Noë argues, something we do (Noë 2009, xii, 10). Now, here is
my essays opening epigraph itself:
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain
in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems
which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as
marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never
finished process
With the previous remarks in mind, we can see where the first-wave
neuropragmatists get things right and where they begin to get things wrong.
The maj ority of proble ms which haunt philosophy a re those perta inin g to
dualisms, especially of m ind body. T he insights of the neurosci enc es serve as
resources fo r solvin g the se pr oble ms. He re th e firs t-w ave ne urop ra gmat ist s are
entirely on track in emphasizing the importance of these sciences. N evertheless,
in limiting the mind to the brain, in not escaping Cartesianism entirely, the first
wavers still face some familiar problems, particularly with questions around
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truth, representation, and the assertion that mentality is illusory. When we take the
evolutionary perspective of experience as organic-environmental transaction, we
begin to see how mentation is a process of growth. This process is dependent upon
the brain and nervous system yet beyond them as well. This evolutionary perspective
dissolves the dualisms to yield continuities throughout the brain, into the body, and
out to the worldand back again. Now the conclusion of this important paragraph:
Untilwehaveaprocedureinactualpractice which dem onstrates this
continuity, we shall continue to engage in appealing to some other specific thing,
some other broken off affair, to restore connectedness and unitycalling the
specific religion or reform or whatever specific is the fashionable cure of the
period. Thus we increase the disease in the means to cure it. (1925/LW1: 224225)
The procedure I am suggesting is evolutionary, ecological, dynamic a nd
instrumental. In placing classical pragmatism in the context of the aforementioned
neurophilosophers, I am introducing or reemphasizing Deweysinsightsto
contemporary neurophilosophy in the hope of generating further dialogue among
neuroscientists, pragmatists, and other neurophilosophers, much as have Freeman,
Johnson, Rockwell, and Schulkin before me. By neuropragmatism, I contend that
the understanding sought by both the humanities and the sciences is achieved by
taking seriously the insights, tools, and techniques developed by the ne urosciences
as ac hie vemen ts in a living context of growth. This exte nsion of De weys
pragmatism is illustrated, albeit somewhat unwittingly, by the second-wave neuro-
pragmatists in their rejection of the mind/brain of the first-wave.
The mind/brain of the first-wave neuropragmatists is riddled with Cartesian
materialism due to the under-appreciation of evolution as establishing dynamic
continuities of process in lieu of static dichotomies. Second-wave neuropragmatists
take this dynamic approach to mentation as one in which the systems at work go far
beyond the cranium and the skin, reaching into the world in a continuous and
developmental transaction of brain, body, and world. However, their emphasis on the
body often seems to come at the expense of either the brain or the environment or both.
These differences are expressed by the different metaphors of digestion or dancing. I
offer a new metaphor in the hope of establishing the continuity of brain, body, and world
that Dewey argued to be crucial for the evolutionary reconstruction of philosophy into a
productive enterprise that does not succumb to the problems of Cartesianism (Dewey
1916/MW9 and 1920/MW12).
Consciousness as cooking: a new way of thinking about what we have always
(thought we have) known
When we take the standpoint of action we may still treat some functions as primarily
physical and others as primarily mental. Thus we think of, say, digestion, reproduction
and locomotion as conspicuously physical, while thinking, desiring, hoping, loving,
fearing are distinctively mental. Yet if we are wise we shall not regard the difference as
other than one of degree and emphasis. If we go beyond this and draw a sharp line
between them, consigning one set to body exclusively and the other to mind exclusively
we are at once confronted by undeniable facts. The being who eats and digests is also the
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one who at the same time is sorrowing and rejoicing; it is a commonplace that he eats
and digests in one way to one effect when glad, and to another when he is sad. Eating is
also a social act and the emotional temper of the festal board enters into the alleged
merely physical function of digestion. Eating of bread and drinking of wine have indeed
become so integrated with the mental attitudes of multitudes of persons that they have
assumed a sacramental spiritual aspect. There is no need to pursue this line of thought to
other functions which are sometimes termed exclusively physical. The case of taking
and assimilating food is typical. It is an act in which means employed are physical while
the quality of the act determined by its consequences is also mental. The trouble is that
instead of taking the act in its entirety we cite the multitude of relevant facts only as
evidence of influence of mind on body and of body on mind, thus starting from and
perpetuating the idea of their independence and separation even when dealing with their
connection. What the facts testify to is not an influence exercised across and between
two separate things, but to behavior so integrated that it is artificial to split it up into two
things.
John Dewey (1927/LW3: 2829)
To illustrate further the difference between the three waves of neuropragmatism, I
return to the first-waves analogy of the mind as digestion. This analogy holds that
the mind is what the brain doe s just as digestion is what the gut does. Cartesian
materialism limits the mind strictly to the brain, never permitting the extension of
mind beyond nervous tissue. The gastric analog to Cartesian materialism is the
insistence that digestion never goes beyond the gut. But recent work in the study of
the evolution of human brains and guts finds that a contributing factor to the
development of such a costly organ as our large brain is the extension of digestion
out beyond the body and into the environment through the cultural practice of
cooking (Laland et al. 2000, 140a; and Power and Schulkin 2009,6889). In
cooking our food, we become more sel ecti ve of ingredie nts and mea ns of
preparation that yield greater nutrition.
8
Moreover, cooking is not something that
simply happens to us in the way that the GI-tracts activity just happens. Cooking is
something we do. Consciousness (or mentation general ly) is no different.
Recall Johnsons three components of Deweys principle of continuity. First is the
continuity of physiological complexity across species. Second, the higher and more
powerful inferential abilities, such as the scientific, grow out of lower level processes,
like trial and error. Furthermore, what we commonly refer to as mind grows out of
what we commonly refer to as body. They are continuous but not strictly identical.
Finally, the inner/outer distinction often set at the boundary of the skin or cranium is
seen as functional and often arbitrary. All that goes on within, beyond and across the
boundary has an integral role in accounting for human experience. The differences
between the first, second, and tidal waves of neuropragmatism can be articulated in
terms of the strength or adherence to Deweys principle of continuity.
8
The use of processed foods and fast food may seem to be enough to falsify my claim here. I respond by
returning to Deweys emphasis on the need for unifying such disparate fields of experience or inquiry like
nutrition and economics. To say more on the plausible consequences of such, an integration would go well
beyond the scope of this essay.
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All three waves recognize the first two components. Any disagreements over the
degree of consciousness or intelligence of non-human animals are of little present
concern. That humans and human intelligence are natural products of evolution is
not in dispute. The major differences between the three waves is largely a matter of
the third component. First wavers keep mentation tightly within the cranium. Second
wavers let the scope move into the body and beyond the skin, yet they do so at an
apparent if not actual neglec t of the brain . The tidal wavers aim to maintain the
continuity of brain, body, and world. These differences are nicely illustrated through
metaphor. First wavers see consciousness as digestion; second wavers see
consciousness as dancing; and tidal wavers, I propose, see consciousnes s as cooking.
Thus far, I have spent much time discussing the differences between neuro-
pragmatists and Cartesians and between first- and second-wave neuropragmatists. To
initiate the development of my proposed metaphor to distinguish ti dal-wave
neuropragmatism, I first provide a sketch of viability and adaptation. This sketch
serves as a framework for reconstructing mentation. I then summarize the difference
between consciousness and mind as Dewey understood it. From the discussion of
viability, adaptation, and mentation, I connect experience as organicenvironmental
transaction to inquiry. From there, I examine the relationship between the evolution
of the human brain, human gut, and cooking. This entangled development serves as
the basis for my proposed metaphor. As I indicated earlier, my strategy following
Dewey is evolutionary, ecological, dynamic, and instrumental.
I have referred to Deweys expression process of growth. Her e, I clarify my use
of this conception of growth and its process. Following Deweys naturalism, I set
this discussion of growth in an evolutionary framework that focuses on viability and
adaptation as the heart of the growth process. Power and Schulkin define viability as
an organisms capability of success or ongoing effectiveness (Power and Schulkin
2009, 95). An activity of an organism that promotes its viability does so in a
consummatory manner. That is, the consequences of an organisms interaction with
its enviro nment promotes its viability if they resolv e problematic situations,
particularly in a manner that leaves the organism in a better situation than the one
in which it had been. This process need not be foresightful to be productive.
Consider digestion. In many cases, digestion is seen as an intradermal process that
just happens.
9
An iota of the extradermal environment is put to use for a specific end
through a transaction with that organisms metabolic processing of the consum ed
part of the environment.
10
Cycles of consumption, digestion, and excretion have
gone on for millennia. For the vast majority of that time metabolic changes
developed through an unconscious process of evolution. Viability is a local
phenomenon that changes accordingly with evolutionary adaptations. Some animals
9
There are insects like bees that can be described as performing external digestion. My point here is more
concerned with mammalian evolution and the development of human consciousness. While exceptions are
bound to be found throughout nature, my proposed metaphor may be suitably modified, or, if necessary,
rejected, in cases like external digestion.
10
My distinction between internal/external and organism/environment may seem to be a return to the
dualism I am otherwise attacking. Make no mistake: despite the limits of ordinary language, my
distinction is functional and emphasizes the transaction between organism and environment. While there
may not be a clear boundary between the two there is nevertheless a difference that makes a difference in
practice: viable organisms tend not to eat themselves.
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had internal organizations that were temporarily able to pass the test of natural
selection and contribute to viability. Eventually animals became capable of learning
what parts of the environment to avoid as well as how to alter the environment in
order to consume what was evolutionarily preferred that is, what evolution has
made desirable for that situation. Even though these animals became more adept at
modifying their environments and their interactions wi th it, the overall metabolic
process had not yet become deliberate or instrumental. Animals ate, no doubt, but
they did so simply because that is what animals with metabolism s which require
extradermal energy sources do. The less work an animal had to put forth to eat, the
better: optimal stupidity pays (Dennett 1995, 337). But what counts as stupid is
relative to the particular situation. Intelligence can and has emerged out of relatively
unique circumstances that prove to be as product ive with regard to viability as
optimal stupidity. As evolution went on and as the metabolic cycle carried on, the
means of viability continued to adapt in light of new organismenvironment
transactions. Among these adaptations emerged a group of hominids whose social
interactions afforded them sophisticated tool use and manufactur e, notably the
valuable practice of fire-keeping and fire-using.
To appreciate the effect technologies like fire and tool manufacture have for
viability (and subseque ntly for cooking and mentation), more needs to be said on
how cycles of organic-environmental transaction produce novelty and foster
viability. An organisms viability is contingent upon its adaptability with its
particular environment. How an organism or a population of organisms deals with
and responds to changi ng environments, including the consequences of their own
activities, are effectively dealt with by two distinct but related conceptions of
adaptation as described by Power and Schulkin. These two uses of the term fit well
with Larry Hickmans concept of adjustment, which is particularly pertinent for the
consciousness-as-cooking metaphor, as I will show.
Power and Schulkin note that [i]n evolution, adaptation refers to characteristics
of a species that enhanced survival, reproductive success, or both (Power and
Schulkin 2009, 92). Power and Schulkin contrast this with the physiological
conception where the word adaptation refers to short-term changes in physiology
and metabolism in response to some challenge (Power and Schulkin 2009, 93). The
evolutionary sense of adaptation captures the on-goi ng consequences of a population
of organisms that have adjusted to and with their environments. Hickman, following
Dewey, distinguishes between two ways of adjusting: adaptation and alteration
(Hickman 2001, 21, and Hickman 2007, 144, 200201). Adaptation here is the
physiological adaptation of Power and Schulkin: in order to resolve a problematic
situation, an organism changes some aspect of itself. Alteration is the process an
organism takes to change some aspect of its environment to resolve a problematic
situation. Adjustment is an expression of the growth process. To effect viability, an
organism adjusts the situation, either by adapting itself physiologically or by altering
its environment. Either way, the consequences of adjustment amount to evolutionary
adaptation.
Before illustrating how viability and adaptation relate to Deweys distinction
between consciousness and mind, a brief remark is due on how the first two waves
of neuropragmatism fit with this discussion of adaptation and adjustment. With
regard to both consciousness and mind, the first-wave focuses primarily on how the
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organism adapts, specifically with regard to changes in its brain. Any discussion of
alteration of the environment is mediated through the brain. The second-wave may
seem to some to emphasize the environment more than the organism. But we need to
be cautious here. On the one hand, any discussion of extended mind obviously
involves environmental alteration. On the other hand, the dancing metaphor is more
about the body than the brain or the environment. For the second waver, we can
recognize the progress made in bringing the body into consideration, but it raises
issues of its own with regard to viability and adaptation. This is not to say that
dancing does not or could not contribute to the process of growth. Rather its relation
to consciousness or mind is not as tight as the relation is to digestion or cooking. An
organism that is not permitted to dance may not be as happy or as fulfilled as it
would otherwise be. But an organism stripped of its metabolic means, specifically its
guts or the environment that provides and/or produces its energy and nutrients is no
organism at all: its viability and subsequently its growth are destroyed. Of course, an
organism stripped of everything but its brain is not viable either. The point I am
driving at is that for both the first and second-wave neuropragmatists, their
respective foci neglect that of the other wave as well as the engagement with the
environment. Digestion is just intradermal. Dancing is just a body in coordinated
motion. Cooking, however, cuts across these differences and unifies them. Cooking
is digestion extended, requires coordinated bodily activity, and modifies the
environment. Cooking adjusts organisms more robustly than digestion or dancin g
alone. For this metaphor of consciousness and mind to be effective, however, an
evolutionary perspective must be diligently held.
For Dewey, the evolutionary perspective dissolves the veil of ideas of sensationalistic
empiricism. In his reconstruction of experience, mentation is conceived as a system of
tensions of organic-environmental transactions. As nervous systems evolve to
coordinate activity within and with the body, the environment was constantly affected,
eventually altered if not through evolution than through good tricks that organisms
chanced upon, which were recapitulated (Dennett 1995). These alterations and
adaptations set the scene for meaningful activities to be more expediently
accomplished for reasons retroactively known by human scientists but not to these
non-human organisms. The evolution of habits of actionwhether it be in the
plasticity of the brain or in the malleability of the environment matters not, for the
momentprovides the cranes (Dennett 1995) or the platforms (Dewey via Hickman
2001) that serve as the scaffolding for intelligent action. Such scaffolding is not only
found within the brain or in the body or in the environment: it is also the nexus of their
transactions that produces the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the
workings of organic life. Dewey identified this system as mind (1925/LW1: 230). On
this broad conception of mind, we very clearly see Deweys notion of continuity at
play: depending on the complexity of both organism and environment, many species
of life engage in meaningful activities that aim at viability and growth. Out of this
biological matrix grows the cultural (Dewey 1938/LW12). Experience as organism
environment transaction thus entails many forms of lifehuman and non-human
alike. Dewey used the word culture to denote the social experiencestransactions of
social organisms with each otherthat characterize human life.
Human experience is distinguished from the non-human organic transactions
because humans not only have experiences but also are able to reflect upon them in
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large part due to our communicative and linguistic skills. To elucidate the distinction
between mind and consciousness, Dewey argued for the following: that mind signifies
the meaningful habits of action that persist within an organic way of life; that culture
signifies human experience, i.e. human transactions within a social environment, and
that consciousness signifies a focalization of specific meanings and habits within a
specific situation. These specific situations are possible due to culture. For culture is
experience in which language makes symbolization possible. With symbolization, self-
awareness becomes possible. What this focalizationi.e. consciousnesspermits is at
once the transitive and serial procession of thought as well as the greater flexibility in
inquiring deeper into the subtleties of problematic situations. For the organism, the
consequences of greater awareness of its situation include richer experience, greater
attention (in focus and span), and the greater likelihood of effecting productive solutions
(see Dewey 1925/LW1: 229230, and 361).
With the rise of language and consciousness, meaningful activities can be
adjusted in deliberate ways. The degree of foresight that symbolization, creative
imagination, and social communication grant humans is astronomical in comparison
to non-human nature. The haphazard ways of designing solutions to problems of
viability and adaptability that are the mark of evolutiontrial and error, generate
and test (Hickman 1990; Dennett 1995 )begin to be rivaled by a novel activity that
grows out of evolutionary processes. Biological and social experience produce
higher-level skills of inquiry. Whatever tools or techniques may emerge from
experienceviz., the natural and cultural interactions of organisms with their
environments (which include other organisms)these tools or techniques emerge
and persist because they serve some purpose, are made to serve some purpose, or are
inevitable as undesirable consequences of skills or traits that are purposeful. What
constitutes purpose and survivability is the problem-solving characteristic of
technoscientific inquiry (Hickman 1990, 2001, 2007). From this perspectiv e, self-
consciousness and technoscience emerge together in evolutionary history (Hickman
2007, 155156). In be coming aware of its situation, an organism gains a greater
degree of control in its actions than it had in ignorance. This improved degree of
control is a result of consciousness.
Consciousness grows out of mind, from Deweys evolutionary perspective.
Remember that mind is understood here as a persistent system of meanings that
expedite activity. Consciousness enables deliberate thought and inquiry because it is
the focalization of pertinent meanings onto other elements of the larger system that
are out of equilibrium. Inquiry is the process of eradicating the disequilibrium of
doubt by means of adjusting the situation with specific ends-in-view. In other words,
inquiry is a process of coordinating the organic-environmental transaction wi th a
greater degree of foresight than was previously possible by means of adaptation and
alteration alone. Deweys concept of mind as a system of tensions through which
anticipation of future events is expedited makes possible a limited sort of inquiry.
But without the anticipatory powe r that consciousness effects for the individual
organism or a population of organisms, the productivity in adjustment is limited in
scope. In the terms of the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor, animals that alter
their environment to access or store food (e.g. squirrels breaking or hiding nuts)
interact within a meaningful environmen t. The digestive process begins upon
consumption of food. The food itself and the environment from which it comes are
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not instrument ally altered with deliberate foresight. The ecological niche is
constructed myopi cally through adjustment and adaptation. With the emergence of
cooking, the niche continues to be constructed but with greater foresight and
awareness of adjustments and their consequences. Out of this process of ecological
niche construction emerges the bio-cultural activity of inquiry, developed in part
through attempts at cooking.
Through inquiryat first as trial-and-error, later as experimental science
digestion and cognition are extended beyond the gut and the brain, respectively, into
the environment. Seen as systems of environmental transaction, digestion and
cognition gain significance as they are able to contribute to growth. The evolution of
cooking and agric ulture illustrate how something that happens (metabolic processes)
becomes selected for in more effective ways to the point at which the selection is not
simply natural but artificial as well, i.e. done for desired reasons, or, ends-in-view as
Dewey would put it. When we consider consciousness as not something that
happens but as an achievement (Schulkin 2009), we set consciousness into a larger
dynamic situation than the brain or nervous system alone. Just as we have
historically improved our cooking and thereby our digestion, we have improved our
awareness of ourselves, our bodies, and our world. The next step in understanding
and thereby improving our awareness is to see that it is more like cooking than intra-
dermal digestion. That is, just as cooking is a socia l activity that grows out of the
biological activity of the gut, human consciousness and mentation are cultural
activities that grow out of the brain. But none of these activities grow out of the gut
or brain alone: there is an environment that provides and at times produces food and
meaning, without which there would be no eating, no thin king, no experiencing.
Cooking and human mentation are purposeful social activities with multifarious
ends-in-view. They are both produced by and contribute to the production of
evolution, of adaptation and adjustment.
Taken together evolutionary adaptation and organic adjustment account not only
for digestion but provide the explanatory tools for the rise of cooking.
11
Digestion is
a physiological adaptation that is the consequence of a long process of evolutionary
adaptation. The only alterations involved in the process and evolution of digestion
are the ecological effects of consum ption and excretionnone of which is done with
individual or communal foresight, prior to the emergence of hominids. Things
happen, for reasons unbeknown to the organisms to which these things happen.
Experiences are had but not known.
12,13
When it comes to the gastrointestinal
processes of the vast majority of animals, including humans, only a very specialized
and small set have any indication of what goes on and why.
11
To be clear, my use of cooking here is very broad. While fire-using is central to my imagery here, its
use is not the only means humans have developed and utilized to prepare food. From yogurt to ceviche,
there are clearly ways to prepare foodstuffs in ways that serve similar ends as cooking with heat.
Regardless of the particular method, the emphasis here is on the transformation that occurs when digestion
becomes intelligently extended beyond the gut.
12
This phrasingexperiences are had but not knownI had thought was Deweys very phrasing; it
certainly sounds like something he would have said. Having searched through the electronic version of his
Collected Works and a general web search, I have found nothing to suggest that it is not my own phrasing.
Should I be shown that it is not my own creation, I would gladly give proper credit to the author of such
pith.
13
Experiences are first had before they are known. They are not always known, however.
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With the advent of cooking, significant changes came about regarding human life.
The tremendous cerebral growth characteristic of the evolution of Homo sapiens
coincides with a significant change in digestive processes. Given the extra energy
demands of a large brain , the human gut had to adapt. By becoming shorter and
more specialized, fewer energy demands are made by the body. Yet the work
previously done by a larger gut still needed to be done. Humans were able to meet
and improve upon these demands by extending the process of digestion into their
environment through the practice of cooking. Cooking, unlike digestion, involves
doing things for reasons (known to the cooks) as opposed to things just happening
(for no apparent reason). In this shift from physiological adaptation , eventually
leading to evolutionary adaptation, to the deliberate alteration of the environment to
resolve problems surrounding digestion and nutrition, we witness not only the shift
from digestion to cookin g but also the transaction from mere awareness of the here-
and-now to the self-awareness characteristic of humans. Indeed it is no stretch of the
imagination to see Dennetts just-so-story on the evolution of an introspective social
self that emerges from the social groupa story with a resemblance to Sellarss
myth of Jones, which is an elaboration of Deweys observation that [i]f we had not
talked wi th others and they with us, we should never talk to and with ourselvesas
a proto-conversation about how to prepare a specific dish or meal (Dennett 1991,
195; Sellars 1963, 178ff; Dewey 1925/LW1: 133).
With the rise of cooking, we see physiological and ecological developments as
intelligent extensions of digestion into the environment for purposes of adjustment to
effect viability in new conditions. With these developments, we also see the rise of
other distinctively human traits central to understanding experience. Foremost,
cooking is a social enterprise. It requires the acquisition of raw materials (whether
these materials are hunted, found, or cultivated differs from place to place), which in
turn requires social cooperation. It requires tool use, which also requires social
cooperation. Cooking develops into a learning activity in which technique and
rudimentary recipes are passed down to the young. Patterns of social and intelligent
activity evolve so that the relevant adjustments can be made individually and
socially.
This transformation of food as merely energy to a (source of) cultural activity
consider the value meals have traditionally had for people of all backgroundsfits
the p attern of experience-as-had-becoming -e xperie nce- known. This pattern of
organismenvironment interaction that Dewey generally concei ved as experience is
better conceived as culture (Dewey 1925/LW1: 361). The cultural is the mark of
human level mentality, where meanings become known, when the transaction
between organism and environment reach an organized level of unity from which
consciousness grows.
The neuropragmatists motto describes a nested hierarchical process of growth: a
cortex in a brain in a nervous system in an organism in nature. At each level of
description there are patterns of activity of entities (molecules, cells, tissues, organ
systems, organisms, social systems, etc.) that engage each other or larger systematic
wholes. In living things, these processes of patterned activity contribute to viability
by coordinating resources and energy exchange. Nervous systems coordinate the
activity of other bodily syst ems. But nervous systems are not the only coordinating
systems of organic activity. The organisms transaction with its environment is as
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much about coordinating activity as any specific neurotransmitter is. The degree and
depth of both mentation and cooking cannot be accounted for by brain, body, or
world sepa rately and distinctly. To see consciousness as cooking not only
emphasizes the continuities of brain, body, and world, this metaphorical view also
stresses the coordinative activity of intelligent organic-environmental transaction.
Consider the difference between prepar ing a dish that you have prepared again
and again, such as toast, and an ornate meal of several dishes. Toast does not take
much effort or attention: put a slice of bread in a toaster and wait. Provided the
toaster functions properly, there really is not much involved in the cooking process
or demanded of the cook (though this was not always the case: toasters are a
remarkable industrial achievement). The recipe or pattern is easy to follow. But with
the ornate meal, depending on the complexity of the dishes and the familiarity with
which the cook has in preparing several dishes at once, much more is demanded. Not
only are raw ingredients put together in possibly novel ways to create a dish, the
variety of dishes is itself rather great. Becoming aware of the possibilities, focusing
on which combinations of foods to bring together and acting to bring them to
fruition requires a higher-level of consciousness than merely habitually being aware
of meanings. The coordinative effort is immense. Toast preparation does not require
the focus that an eight-course meal of French cuisine requires. The attention required
to cook correlates with the activities required in the act of cooking. The more
habitual the act, the less awareness necessary to complete it. The more sophisticated
and demanding the act, the greater degree of attention required. But let us not forget
that certain affordances are made by the environment that are necessary to get the
creative activity going in the first place. From the kitchen appliances and utensils to
the plethora of ingredients, there is no cook without a kitchen: no mentation without
a situation of organic-environmental transaction.
Now consider the creative cook, who has acquired a multitude of skills, recipes,
and a general awareness or familiarity with a multitude of ingredients. This overall
acquisition of skills and information that are ready-at-hand illustrate what Dewey
calls mind. It is the scaffolding that makes possible the focus our imaginary culinary
virtuoso needs in order to create new dishes and recipes out of old ingredients,
recipes, and skills. Through this imagery, we can begin to see how our aims and
goals, our ends-in-view, are constructed in part by our situationa cook does not,
indeed could not, aim to create a dish entirely with ingredients utterly foreign to one
and allas well as how our ends-in-view serve to adapt (adjust and alter) our
transactions that modify both the means (be they of the body or the environment)
and the ends themselves. Consider the differences, however slight, in bodily
movements and in results between using a fork or a whisk to scramble eggs. As the
focusing in on the specific means in the larger context, consciousness is an acti vity
of creatively exploitin g mind or culture (skills, habits, meanings, information)an
activity no human brain could do entirely alone.
Some may argue that I am taking this analog between cooking and consciousness
so strongly that I am conflating the two. Surely I cook, therefore I am is a bit too
easy (and not to mention too Cartesian!) an explanation for mentality. Nevertheless, I
contend that there is some benefit to be gained in recasting our metaphor for
mentality in the cultural and biological practice of cooking, especially as it illustrates
Deweys principle of continuity in its emphasis of higher complexity growing out of
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lower-level operations as well as the continuity between what goes on within the
organism and outside of it. The standard first-wave neuropragmatic account of
consciousness runs into difficulties because it limits human consciousness to the
brain alone. It is no different than trying to explain cooking by looking at the gut
alone. Likewise the consciousnes s as dancing analogy is like trying to account
scientifically for cooking without talking about the gut and digestion, and only
talking about how to cut with a knife, or mix with a spoon. A theory of
consciousness, mind, and experience that is not only explanatorily powerful but also
technically productive for further human ends must account for what is going on
inside, outside, and across the skin. The consciousness-as-cooking metaphor is a
promising reframing of how to think about developing a scientific theory of
consciousness.
Conclusion
The problem for a scientific understanding of consciousness is not that conscious-
ness is illusory or that it is necessarily beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. The
problem is that consciousness is not like anything we have though t it to be. Most
striking is the thought that a unique human consciousness is simply there upon
conception, requiring education only to familiarize itself with its body and physical
surroundings. Such a view, Cartesian through and through, has had such catastrophic
effects that the well-deserved enthusiasm of the rise of the neurosciences has blinded
us to the possibility of a science of experience, mind, and consci ousness that is at
once physical, biological, behavioral, neural , anthropological, technological, and
above all, productive. Such a view is still a ways off, as it requires the reconciliation
of not only the scientific and manifest images of humanity, but also the dissolution
of the divide between the sciences and the humanities.
The philosophical consequences of even attempting such a reconciliation
cannot be underestimated. John Dewey saw philosophers as primarily liaison
officers between the specialized subject-matters of all areas of inquiry and
experience, especially with that of the c ommon person (Dewey 1925/LW1: 306).
Central to this v ision of philosophy is its e volu ti onar y r ec ons truc tio n of inquiry as
the p rocess of fixing guides to reality. These guidesbeliefs are about but not
reflections of reality. They a re only r epresentations insofar as they present the
world again, anew, in order t o reorient ourselves, creatively, with the world. Here
my cooking metaphor is also useful. Anyone who has t ried to foll ow a reci pe is
concerned with following an established b ut flexible patt ern of act ivit y designed to
produce a desired end product. A successful recipe, like a successful theory, is a
tool that reliably promotes the improvement of those following or being affected by
the emp loym en t of the recipe or theory. The recipe is not i de ntic al to nor resembles
the dish for which it provides instruction. Nevertheless we can speak of a recipe as
good and true provided that it usefully produces a delicious dish. Obviously,
scientific theories are far more sophisticated and req ui re significantly more training
and education to employ skillfully, let alone to develop, than is required to follow
or develop a recipe. Nevertheless, both endeavors share a pattern of inquiry that is
systematic and p roductive.
Neuropragmatism, old and new 365
Author's personal copy
Perhaps, another way of putting my concern is to change focus again, though only
slightly. In discussing Deweys view of ethics as engineering, Larry Hickman evokes
Deweys garden metaphor as a means for illustrating the continuity between non-
human nature and human, but all-the-while natural, cultural activity (Hickman 1990,
4 and 12; 2007, 144145). On Deweys pragmatic instrumentalist account of ethical
inquiry, norms develop from particular organismenvironment transactions, just as
better or worse ways of farming have evolved over time, through experience. This
view of inquiry is emphatically value-ladenwhich is not a weakness but its
strength. The evolution and cultivation of consciousness is likewise value-laden. The
scientific realist struggles with mind and consciousness as much as he struggles with
value because he finds no place in his ontology for values or valuation. It is this gap
that a pragma tic realism never permits to form. It comes about from an
underappreciation of the import of evolutionary thinking. On the view of continuity
I put forth, following Dewey, it may be worthwhile to consider the normative aspects
of inquiry that follow a pattern similar to gardening or to cooking, when we consider
experience and what its scientific account could be. Overcoming the dualisms of
both mind/body and fact/value is required if such a reconstruction in our imagination
is to yield a productive science of consciousness.
We must recognize, with first-wave neuropragmatist Paul Churchl and, that the
future of philosophy depends on our going into the brain (2007, 232238). Dewey
would agree in part that such a journey is indispensable to philosophy, just as the
neuropragmatists motto suggests. However, as the motto also states, once we have
gone into the brain, we must readily get out of our heads as the second- wave
neuropragmatist Alva Noë recommends if we are to achieve an understanding of
human life (2009). Neuropragmatism so understoodas continuously and dynam-
ically going in and outstands as a promising avenue toward such understanding of
the problems that have long haunted philosophy.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to Larry Hickman, John Shook, Shaun Gallagher, Jay Schulkin,
Donald Dryden, Liz Swan, Judy Walker, Teed Rockwell, Steven Miller, Mark Tschaepe and, especially,
Bill Bywater for their feedback and support through various drafts of this paper. I also am thankful for the
helpful comments from anonymous reviewers.
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A noted philosopher proposes a naturalistic (rather than supernaturalistic) way to solve the "really hard problem": how to live in a meaningful way—how to live a life that really matters—even as a finite material being living in a material world. If consciousness is "the hard problem" in mind science—explaining how the amazing private world of consciousness emerges from neuronal activity—then "the really hard problem," writes Owen Flanagan in this provocative book, is explaining how meaning is possible in the material world. How can we make sense of the magic and mystery of life naturalistically, without an appeal to the supernatural? How do we say truthful and enchanting things about being human if we accept the fact that we are finite material beings living in a material world, or, in Flanagan's description, short-lived pieces of organized cells and tissue? Flanagan's answer is both naturalistic and enchanting. We all wish to live in a meaningful way, to live a life that really matters, to flourish, to achieve eudaimonia—to be a "happy spirit." Flanagan calls his "empirical-normative" inquiry into the nature, causes, and conditions of human flourishing eudaimonics. Eudaimonics, systematic philosophical investigation that is continuous with science, is the naturalist's response to those who say that science has robbed the world of the meaning that fantastical, wishful stories once provided. Flanagan draws on philosophy, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and psychology, as well as on transformative mindfulness and self-cultivation practices that come from such nontheistic spiritual traditions as Buddhism, Confucianism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism, in his quest. He gathers from these disciplines knowledge that will help us understand the nature, causes, and constituents of well-being and advance human flourishing. Eudaimonics can help us find out how to make a difference, how to contribute to the accumulation of good effects—how to live a meaningful life. Bradford Books imprint
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In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory—which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)—and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems. Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST). Bradford Books imprint