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Investigation of the Two-Factor Model for the English Version of the Need for Closure Scale
Abstract
Using the English version of the Need for Closure Scale, this research investigated previous, though largely ignored, recommendations to exclude the close-mindedness subscale and to treat the Need for Closure Scale as a two-factor (vs single-factor) scale. Reliability and correlational analyses supported the recommendation to exclude close-mindedness. The two-factor model without close-mindedness yielded better fit indexes than a single-factor model or a two-factor model with close-mindedness. Despite the strong cross-cultural use of the scale, no investigation had yet tested the two-factor model without close-mindedness using any language other than Dutch. The present results and discussion can improve the study of need for closure by encouraging more researchers to consider the supported recommendations. Roets and Van Hiel's proposed modification to make the Need for Closure Scale a single-factor scale was also discussed.
... Need for structure was measured using a French-adapted version of the sixth item of the Need for closure scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993;Salama-Younes, Guingouain, Floch, & Somat, 2014), which in turn was borrowed from the Personal Need for structure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The Need for Closure scale was developed by proposing five facets (preference for order and structure, affective discomfort caused by ambiguity, decisiveness of judgments and decisions, desire for predictability, and closed-mindedness; Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002) as manifestations of one or two latent variables: one representing a preference for structure, including order, and one related to decisiveness (Mannetti et al., 2002;Salama-Younes et al., 2014;Stalder, 2012). The item retained in the present study specifically measures the need for order in the daily life of the respondents (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). ...
What individual factors influence people's preference for formal or informal urban parks?
• A greater need for structure favor preference for more formal parks.
• A higher connection with nature correlates with a preference for more informal parks.
• A greater need for structure drives attention towards geometrical order and human care.
• To accommodate different preferences, parks could be designed with zones of varying formalism.
1. In the context of global urbanisation, urban green spaces (UGS) serve as the primary means of direct contact with nature for many people. The design and management of urban parks should aim to maximise their ecological functions and services, while considering the well-being and connection with nature of urban residents. Despite extensive research into the factors that influence urban dwellers' appreciation of UGS, our understanding of the individual characteristics that shape preferences for different types of urban green spaces remains limited.
2. An important characteristic of UGS is the extent to which their vegetation appears or not 'formal', i. e. particularly geometrically designed with a high presence of symmetry, with clear straight or circular lines. The degree to which urban dwellers prefer more formal green spaces may be related to their need for structure (NFS), a psychological trait that refers to an individual's preference for order, predictability, and clarity in their environment and activities. To investigate the relationship between NFS and the preferences for the degree of 'formalism' of UGS, we conducted a survey with a large sample (N = 1,592) of the French general population. Participants were presented with a photo-questionnaire of real public park settings that varied in their degree of formalism, i.e. from highly structured, symmetrical layouts with geometrically cut vegetation to more irregular layouts. They were asked questions assessing their NFS, their connection with nature (CWN), an individual characteristic known to be associated with a preference for more informal environments, as well as the reasons for preferring more formal or more informal parks.
3. Our multivariate analysis showed that NFS negatively predicted a preference for more informal urban parks, while we confirmed that CWN was a strong positive predictor of this preference. Textual analysis showed that both individuals high and low in NFS who preferred more formal UGS described their preference in relation with 'order' and 'organization', but high-NFS respondents mentioned human care (e.g. cleanness, tidiness) and geometrical order (geometry, form, structure) more frequently than other respondents.
4. Individuals with a higher NFS tend to value more geometrically ordered urban parks, while those with a higher connection with nature tend to prefer more informal urban parks. To reconcile these conflicting preferences, parks could more often be designed with distinct areas of varying degrees of formalism. Alternatively, parks with a moderate level of formalism, well-defined structure, and lush vegetation could serve as a favorable compromise that meets the diverse preferences of residents and allows a variety of urban dwellers to experience nature and the associated health and well-being benefits.
... Focusing on NFCS, the only scale where CM exists as a defined subscale reveals further problems in previous treatment. The CM-subscale (consisting of 8 of our 17 items) of NFCS has been criticized for frequently showing low reliability, as well as lower correlation with other NFCS subscales (e.g., Neuberg et al., 1997;Roets & Van Hiel, 2007;Stalder, 2012). Its items are therefore frequently excluded (see, e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006;Van Hiel et al., 2004). ...
The domain of motivated social cognition includes a variety of concepts dealing with a need to seek structure and avoid ambiguity, and several of these concepts are also powerful predictors of social attitudes, such as authoritarianism. It is possible though that these relations are due to certain facets reoccurring in the different scales. In this paper, we tested the notion that authoritarianism is predicted specifically by rigidity in beliefs (closed-mindedness), rather than broader cognitive styles. Thus, we initially identified items in the motivated social cognition scales that are specifically measuring closed-mindedness. These items included the closed-mindedness facet of the need for closure scale and items from intolerance of ambiguity and need for cognition. We used these items to predict right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and their common factor authoritarianism (generalized). In line with our prediction, two studies showed that the motivated social cognition scales did not provide a significant prediction of authoritarianism beyond the closed-mindedness items. We conclude that the relation between motivated social cognition and authoritarianism is captured entirely by the former’s closed-mindedness component.
Social and cognitive psychological research and advances in behavioural economics have yielded a myriad of observations about people. This includes a desire to seek confirmatory evidence, a need for cognitive challenges, and personality traits. These can be measured so that campaigns may know which portion of the electorate is more or less risk averse. This chapter provides examples of classic psychometrics used to differentiate the electorate along psychological lines. In addition, it considers the types of data that campaigns may use in order to implement their models and segment the electorate.
S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neuberg's and J.T. Newsom's (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instrument's ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.
The aim of the present study is twofold: (1) to test the factor structure of the Need for Closure scale (NFCS) in three different samples that were not studied previously: Polish (N = 340), Flemish (N = 623), and Korean (N = 429); and (2) to test the invariance of the structure of the scale across the present samples, as well as an American sample (N = 240). With respect to the first objective, our results point out that the two second-order factor model should be preferred. This result corroborates previous studies on American and west European samples. With respect to the second objective, the results provide support for structural invariance, partial metric invariance and partial scalar invariance of the NFC scale across the four samples. In other words, the need for cognitive closure has the same basic meaning and structure cross-nationally, and ratings can be meaningfully compared across countries. The results also revealed significant higher need for closure mean scores in the American and Korean samples than in the Flemish and especially the Polish samples.
Goodness-of-fit (GOF) indexes provide "rules of thumb"—recommended cutoff values for assessing fit in structural equation modeling. Hu and Bentler (1999) proposed a more rigorous approach to evaluating decision rules based on GOF indexes and, on this basis, proposed new and more stringent cutoff values for many indexes. This article discusses potential problems underlying the hypothesis-testing rationale of their research, which is more appropriate to testing statistical significance than evaluating GOF. Many of their misspecified models resulted in a fit that should have been deemed acceptable according to even their new, more demanding criteria. Hence, rejection of these acceptable-misspecified models should have constituted a Type 1 error (incorrect rejection of an "acceptable" model), leading to the seemingly paradoxical results whereby the probability of correctly rejecting misspecified models decreased substantially with increasing N. In contrast to the application of cutoff values to evaluate each solution in isolation, all the GOF indexes were more effective at identifying differences in misspecification based on nested models. Whereas Hu and Bentler (1999) offered cautions about the use of GOF indexes, current practice seems to have incorporated their new guidelines without sufficient attention to the limitations noted by Hu and Bentler (1999).
D. M. Webster and A. W. Kruglanski's (1994) Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) confounds multiple dimensions and is redundant with existing instruments (S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, & S. G. West, 1997). A. W. Kruglanski and his colleagues (1997) dismissed these findings as "psychometric naysaying," although they presented no data that refute them. Moreover, Kruglanski et al (1997) suggested that researchers (a) be unconcerned with the NFCS's lack of discriminant validity and (b) use the scale as if it were unidimensional. These recommendations are problematic. Using the NFCS in this manner invites interpretational ambiguity and theoretical confusion. In contrast to the Kruglanski et al (1997) position, proper psychometric analyses play a critical role in theory testing and in the development of conceptually coherent measures of individual differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The Need for Closure Scale (NFCS; D. M. Webster & A. W. Kruglanski, 1994) was introduced to assess the extent to which a person, faced with a decision or judgment, desires
any answer, as compared with confusion and ambiguity. The NFCS was presented as being unidimensional and as having adequate discriminant validity. Our data contradict these conceptual and psychometric claims. As a unidimensional scale, the NFCS is redundant with the Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS; M. M. Thompson, M. E. Naccarato, & K. E. Parker, 1989). When the NFCS is used more appropriately as a multidimensional instrument, 3 of its facets are redundant with the PNS Scale, and a 4th is redundant with the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale (M. M. Thompson et al., 1989). It is suggested that the NFCS masks important distinctions between 2 independent epistemic motives: the preference for quick, decisive answers (nonspecific closure) and the need to create and maintain simple structures (one form of specific closure). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two studies examined the interaction of political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness in intergroup conflict and hostility toward outgroups. In the first study, Polish participants indicated their preference for coercive conflict strategies in the context of a real-life intergroup conflict. Only among participants who identify themselves as conservative, need for cognitive closure was positively and significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the outgroup. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicated that high in need for closure conservatives showed greater hostility against Arabs and Muslims only when they believed that Poland was under threat of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamist fundamentalism.
Since its introduction the Need for Closure (NFC) Scale (Webster & Kruglanski 1994 revised by Roets & Van Hiel 2007) has been frequently used in psychological research However given the scale s substantial length researchers often used abridged idiosyncratic versions by selecting a number of items on seemingly arbitrary grounds without reporting or validating their item selection The present study aims to meet the apparent need for an empirically validated abridged NFC scale Based on data obtained from an aggregated heterogeneous sample (N = 1584) we propose a 15 item selection comprising three items from each facet scale Comparison of the full and reduced NFC scales revealed similar psychometric properties and correlations with third variables The brief NFC scale provides researchers with a useful tool for assessing the NFC construct when practical considerations prohibit the use of the original full 42 item scale or the 41-item revised version (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
We examined the extent to which the content of beliefs about appropriate behavior in social situations influences blame attributions for negative outcomes in relationship situations. Young, middle-aged, and older adults indicated their level of agreement to a set of traditional and nontraditional beliefs. Five months later, we assessed the degree to which these same individuals blamed traditional and nontraditional characters who violated their beliefs in 12 social conflict situations. Older adults held more traditional beliefs regarding appropriate relationship behaviors (e.g., the acceptability of premarital sex). Individual differences in the content of one's beliefs were needed to understand age-related patterns in blame attributions; for example, adherence to traditional beliefs about appropriate relationship behaviors led to higher responsibility and blame attributions toward characters behaving in ways that were inconsistent with these beliefs. Structural regression models showed that beliefs fully mediated the effects of working memory and need for closure on causal attributions and partially mediated the effects of age and religiosity on attributions. Personal identification with the characters had additional, independent effects on attributions. Findings are discussed from the theoretical perspective of a belief-based explanation of social judgment biases.
The authors investigate whether need for closure affects how people seek order in judging social relations. In Study 1, the authors find that people who have a high need for closure (NFC) were more likely to assume their social contacts were connected to each other (i.e., transitivity) when this was not the case. In Studies 2 and 3, the authors examine another form of order in network relations--racial homophily--and find that high-NFC participants were more inclined to believe that 2 individuals from the same racial category (e.g., African American) were friends than two racially dissimilar individuals. Furthermore, high-NFC individuals were more likely to make errors when judging a racially mixed group of people; specifically, they recalled more racial homophily (racially similar people sitting closer together) than had actually appeared.
This article introduces an individual-difference measure of the need for cognitive closure. As a dispositional construct, the need for cognitive closure is presently treated as a latent variable manifested through several different aspects, namely, desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-mindedness. This article presents psychometric work on the measure as well as several validation studies including (a) a "known-groups" discrimination between populations assumed to differ in their need for closure, (b) discriminant and convergent validation with respect to related personality measures, and (c) replication of effects obtained with situational inductions of the need for closure. The present findings suggest that the Need for Closure Scale is a reliable and valid instrument of considerable potential utility in future "motivated social cognition" research.
A theoretical framework is outlined in which the key construct is the need for (nonspecific) cognitive closure. The need for closure is a desire for definite knowledge on some issue. It represents a dimension of stable individual differences as well as a situationally evocable state. The need for closure has widely ramifying consequences for social-cognitive phenomena at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group levels of analysis. Those consequences derive from 2 general tendencies, those of urgency and performance. The urgency tendency represents an individual's inclination to attain closure as soon as possible, and the permanence tendency represents an individual's inclination to maintain it for as long as possible. Empirical evidence for present theory attests to diverse need for closure effects on fundamental social psychological phenomena, including impression formation, stereotyping, attribution, persuasion, group decision making, and language use in intergroup contexts.
The present study explores the influence of need for closure as well as authoritarian submission (Right-Wing Authoritarianism [RWA]) and authoritarian dominance (Social Dominance Orientation [SDO]) on the genesis of conservative beliefs and racism. For this purpose, two structural equation models were compared. In Model 1, RWA and SDO were entered as independent variables and the need for closure facets Decisiveness and Need for Simple Structure acted as mediator variables. In Model 2, the need for closure facets served as independent variables and RWA and SDO acted as mediators. In two student samples (Sample 1, N = 399, Sample 2, N = 330) and one adult sample (Sample 3, N = 379), Model 2 showed superior fit to the data. These results corroborate the hypothesis that authoritarianism should be interpreted in terms of generalized beliefs rather than in terms of personality characteristics. In addition, analyses show that the effects of Need for Simple Structure on conservative beliefs and racism are fully mediated by RWA but only partly by SDO. These results suggest a differential genesis of RWA and SDO.
The validity of the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) has recently been debated in the research literature. In the present study, it is argued that the traditional Decisiveness scale primarily taps ability content instead of the hypothesized motivational need; therefore, new items that explicitly probe the need for quick and unambiguous answers were developed. It was shown that these need items form a reliable scale (Study 1); were predictive of the seizing process over and beyond ability, whereas the old Decisiveness scale was not (Study 2); and were sensitive to experimentally manipulated levels of task motivation (Study 3). Finally, a reassembled NFCS with the new items replacing the traditional Decisiveness items showed superior fit as a unidimensional model. In the Discussion, it is argued that the specific position of Decisiveness is due to its particular operationalization, not to its theoretical status.
A theoretical framework is outlined in which the key construct is the need for(nonspecific) cognitive closure. The need for closure is a desire for definite knowledge on some issue. It represents a dimension of stable individual differences as well as a situationally evocable state. The need for closure has widely ramifying consequences for social-cognitive phenomena at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group levels of analysis. Those consequences derive from 2 general tendencies, those of urgency and permanence. The urgency tendency represents an individual's inclination to attain closure as soon as possible, and the permanence tendency represents an individual's inclination to maintain it for as long as possible. Empirical evidence for present theory attests to diverse need for closure effects on fundamental social psychological phenomena, including impression formation, stereotyping, attribution, persuasion, group decision making, and language use in intergroup contexts.
This study evaluated the construct validity of the scores of the Chinese version of the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) as administered to a sample of Hong Kong college students who also completed the Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS) and the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale (PFI). The scale-scale and scale-facet correlations were similar to those of the original English versions. Factor analyses confirmed that the scores of the Chinese NFCS have a bidimensional structure in which the facets preference for order, preference for predictability, and discomfort with ambiguity constitute a factor together with the PNS and the facet decisiveness and the reverse-scored PFI constitute another orthogonal factor. The facet closed mindedness, however, needs further development. The two factors showed satisfactory internal consistency and divergent validity.
Sample size recommendations in confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) have recently shifted away from observations per variable or per parameter toward consideration of model quality. Extending research by Marsh, Hau, Balla, and Grayson (1998), simulations were conducted to determine the extent to which CFA model convergence and parameter estimation are affected by n as well as by construct reliability, which is a measure of measurement model quality derived from the number of indicators per factor (p/f) and factor loading magnitude. Results indicated that model convergence and accuracy of parameter estimation were affected by n and by construct reliability within levels of n. Sample size recommendations for applied researchers using CFA are presented herein as a function of relevant design characteristics.
Examined whether the type of information that determines persuasion varies as a function of the message recipients' chronic motivation for cognitive closure. In Exp 1, 133 chronic high and low need for closure college students evaluated a fictitious new telephone answering machine on the basis of a description of the product's attributes. Ss received either 3 or 9 arguments in favor of the machine and completed a questionnaire assessing their reactions. Results indicated that Ss relatively high in dispositional need for closure processed a persuasive message according to heuristic cues and failed to attend systematically to the message content. In contrast, Ss relatively low in dispositional need for closure scrutinized the message content. Exp 2 tested the hypothesis that Ss high in dispositional need for closure may process a message systematically if a heuristic cue was unavailable to provide an easy means for closure. 112 college students read either a strong or weak version of an article in support of senior comprehensive exams. Ss then reported their attitudes toward the exam. The results supported the hypothesis. These findings suggest that the interaction between the motivation for closure and the type of information available moderates the route to persuasion pursued. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
It is proposed that coping with conflictual decision-making can be viewed as a special case of coping with uncertainty. It is further suggested that two factors determine coping with uncertainty: (1) the individuals‘ need for cognitive structure (NCS), and (2) the individuals’ ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS). This paper demonstrates that the interaction between AACS and NCS may explain subjects' reaction to decisional conflict. The results show that high-NCS and low-AACS individuals experienced the greatest difficulties in their decision-making and showed a positive correlation between the extent to which they perceived the conflict in the situation and the amount of time that they spent making the decision. In contrast, high-AACS and high-NCS subjects showed a negative correlation between these factors. In addition, these subjects experienced the least difficulty in the situation.
This article examines the adequacy of the “rules of thumb” conventional cutoff criteria and several new alternatives for various fit indexes used to evaluate model fit in practice. Using a 2‐index presentation strategy, which includes using the maximum likelihood (ML)‐based standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) and supplementing it with either Tucker‐Lewis Index (TLI), Bollen's (1989) Fit Index (BL89), Relative Noncentrality Index (RNI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Gamma Hat, McDonald's Centrality Index (Mc), or root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), various combinations of cutoff values from selected ranges of cutoff criteria for the ML‐based SRMR and a given supplemental fit index were used to calculate rejection rates for various types of true‐population and misspecified models; that is, models with misspecified factor covariance(s) and models with misspecified factor loading(s). The results suggest that, for the ML method, a cutoff value close to .95 for TLI, BL89, CFI, RNI, and Gamma Hat; a cutoff value close to .90 for Mc; a cutoff value close to .08 for SRMR; and a cutoff value close to .06 for RMSEA are needed before we can conclude that there is a relatively good fit between the hypothesized model and the observed data. Furthermore, the 2‐index presentation strategy is required to reject reasonable proportions of various types of true‐population and misspecified models. Finally, using the proposed cutoff criteria, the ML‐based TLI, Mc, and RMSEA tend to overreject true‐population models at small sample size and thus are less preferable when sample size is small.
Stalder and Baron (1998) found no relation between need for closure (NFC) and dissonance, despite a prediction by Kruglanski and Webster (1996) for a positive relation. However, Stalder and Baron did not consider the two orthogonal subfactors of NFC, decisiveness and need for structure (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997). A reanalysis of the original data showed that need for structure predicted dissonance-produced attitude change whereas decisiveness attenuated it. In addition, only decisiveness related to two other modes of dissonance reduction (trivialization and external justification). Results underscore the importance of considering both NFC subfactors and support further investigation of dissonance-NFC connections.
Encouraging people to consider multiple alternatives appears to be a useful debiasing technique for reducing many biases (explanation, hindsight, and overconfidence), if the generation of alternatives is experienced as easy. The present research tests whether these alternative generation procedures induce a mental simulation mind-set (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), such that debiasing in one domain transfers to debias judgments in unrelated domains. The results indeed demonstrated that easy alternative generation tasks not only debiased judgments in the same domain but also generalized to debias judgments in unrelated domains, provided that participants were low in the need for structure. The alternative generation tasks (even when they were easy to perform) showed no evidence of activating a mental simulation mind-set in individuals high in need for structure, as these individuals displayed no transfer effects. Implications of the results for understanding the role of the need for structure, ease of generation, and mental simulation mind-set activation for debiasing are discussed.
Webster’s (1993) finding that the need for closure (NFC) trait predicts the fundamental attribution error (FAE) is well-cited but has mixed support. After detailing failed replications and contradictory findings, this article reports an attempt to verify the positive NFC–FAE relation using the questioner–contestant paradigm. Rarely investigated but potentially vital to the field, this research also considered the two orthogonal subfactors of NFC, decisiveness and need for structure (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997). Results showed that need for structure predicted, overall NFC partially predicted, but decisiveness attenuated the FAE. Thus, Webster’s finding was both replicated and reversed by different aspects of NFC. Decisiveness adds to a short list of trait moderators of the FAE. Implications are discussed for how to measure NFC.
S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neuberg's and J. T. Newsom's (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instrument's ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.
This study was designed to compare the factor structure of Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) as it emerges from three European samples (Croatia, Italy and The Netherlands) to the structure emerging from a USA sample, and to test the invariance of the structure of the scale both across three European contexts and across European and US samples. This comparison was conducted to examine the generalizability of results obtained with the NFCS across cultures.
The sample sizes employed in this study range from 201 (Croatia) to 418 (Italy) participants. First‐ and second‐order confirmatory factor analysis and multiple‐group measurement invariance tests were performed using the LISREL‐8 program (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). The analyses revealed that the factor structure of the scale was invariant across all samples, and that the best fitting model was one with two latent second‐order factors, thus confirming results of previous studies (Kruglanski et al. , 1997; Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997).
The dimensionality and correlates of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) were examined in a sample of 239 university students. In addition to completing the IUS, participants completed measures of worrying, anxious arousal, anhedonic depression, the big five personality dimensions, and the Need for Closure Scale. A factor analysis of the IUS suggested that it includes the following dimensions: (a) desire for predictability; (b) tendency to become paralyzed in the face of uncertainty; (c) tendency to experience distress in the face of uncertainty; and (d) inflexible uncertainty beliefs. Subscale scores computed on the basis of the factor analysis were differentially associated with the other variables.